

**INFORMATION SHARING AMONG COPS: PROGRESS &  
BARRIERS WITNESSED IN A CASE STUDY OF THE H.I.T.S.  
PROGRAM IN WASHINGTON STATE**

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of CHARLES L. JOHNSON find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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Chair

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INFORMATION SHARING AMONG COPS: PROGRESS & BARRIERS WITNESSED IN A  
CASE STUDY OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM IN WASHINGTON STATE

Abstract

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Since the early 1800s the police function in America has been generally categorized under four labels—professional, standard, community-oriented policing (COP), and problem-oriented policing (POP). Each category is characterized by the role of the police, as defined by those responsible for its administration. The role has changed through the years as the public institution of “the police” seeks to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of those served. Presently, a major attempt is being made to once again redefine the police mission in line with the concept of *intelligence-led policing*.

The purpose of this study is to point out the pitfalls of abandoning that which we have learned from previous models of policing in favor of the newest conceptualization of technology-oriented police operations. This project demonstrates that police administrators not only *can* effectively stand on the shoulders of previous policing models, but that they would be wise to build on prior knowledge if they are to succeed in maintaining their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens and local government leaders under whom they work.

Woven into the fabric of what should be considered *best policing practices* is the undergirding idea that the future of policing in America depends on effective communications

both *horizontally* within agencies and *vertically* across agencies. Using as a foundation dataset and source of information a program evaluation report on a specialized criminal investigation unit that works with many large and small policing agencies across Washington State, this dissertation makes the case that police investigators must adopt better methods for sharing data if they want to be successful in the larger mission of effective crime solving and achieve the ultimate benefits of intelligence-led policing.

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# Chapter One

## *Introduction*

### **Current State of Policing**

The police community has labored mightily since the turbulent 1960s to maintain order while presenting a service-oriented face to the public. In this regard, we can take note of the large number of agencies that displayed public commitments of service on their patrol cruisers, such as “To Protect and Serve” on the part of the Los Angeles Police Department. Many other agencies emulated this practice in the face of widespread accusations of police brutality associated with the treatment of civil rights and anti-war protesters during this period of societal upheaval in the United States during the process of rebuilding the policing institutions of the nation. James Q. Wilson (1978) usefully noted three distinct styles of policing—*service*, wherein calls for service are taken seriously, but the emphasis of the mission was that of pursuing justice by broadly serving the public; *watchman*, which connotes the steadfast maintenance of public order and safety; and *legalistic*, a model under which police follow strict codes of conduct and make many arrests to enforce conduct codes on citizens.

In the aftermath of the turbulent 1960s police administrators came to realize that those they serve expect police agencies to serve them by conducting police work in an honest, ethical, productive manner without violating the rights of citizenry. In due course the long standing *professional* model of policing reflecting a legalistic style and quasi-militaristic organizational culture gave way to community oriented policing (COP) reflecting a service style of operation

and an organizational culture emphasizing the decentralization of authority and the empowerment of line officers to exercise broad discretion on a wide range of police action (Crank, 2003; Manning, 1988). As that new model of policing continued to evolve among practitioners, some police agencies turned to the problem-oriented policing (POP) model (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Eck and Maguire, 2000). Today, the professional buzz is on intelligence-led policing (Manning, 2001a; Ratcliffe, 2001; Maguire and King, 2004).

To date, academics have not produced much research on the intelligence-led policing model. Lacking such research, serious questions remain regarding the likelihood of successful implementation of this new concept in the provision of police services. A major concern is that of police investigators' proclivity to refuse the sharing of information on criminal matters with other agencies charged with clearing like crimes. Herein rests a paradox for police. How do police administrators set achievable mission goals of efficient service to their respective city, county and state citizens while maintaining public order *in their own jurisdiction*? Put another way, are police administrators obligated to work in unison with neighboring law enforcement administrators, or is their mandate limited to their own socio-political boundary? This dissertation will examine this paradox in the context of a specialized criminal investigative unit within an office of a state attorney general to determine where barriers to communication and cooperation rest in the pursuit of police mission goals. Suggestions for reducing those barriers will then be offered based upon a systematic process of evidence collection associated with an evaluation study conducted over the course of two years.

## **Overview of the Problem**

Law enforcement department heads, regardless of whether they carry the title Sheriff, Chief, or Commander, are universally sensitive to their principal responsibilities to their respective constituents. They generally believe that their policing agency must give priority to calls for service from those within the jurisdiction of the agency. It is also broadly agreed that order keeping duties include the clearance of crimes by connecting an offender with a reported offense. The point of negotiation within police agencies is the question of the types of crimes upon which to allocate resources, and the amount of resources needed to meet the department's goals—all the while seeking to achieve the contentment and support of the public they serve and the local government officials who provide for their operational needs.

Police organizational structure will be discussed in more detail later, but for now suffice it to say that American police agencies are divided categorically by major components that include at a minimum sub-agencies responsible for responding to and investigating the crimes of homicide, robbery, burglary, arson, sexual assault, drug law violations, vice, as well as a separate unit responsible for vehicular traffic control. In large departments, within each sub-agency there may be additional sub-agencies. For example, fraud, theft, and prostitution would be investigated by teams within a unit or division with a broader responsibility. One problem associated with the typical organizational structure in law enforcement agencies is that it allows a division of work to stand in the way of crime clearance in that detectives working homicide cases and other violent crimes rarely communicate with traffic patrol officers. Described in organization literature as “working silos” (Ratcliffe, 2005; Maguire and John, 2006), agency

productivity and efficiency are hampered by the very nature of agency design. With corrective systems in place, communication would more easily flow between functionally-identified employees working within a police organization, and more efficient use of workforce resources would result.

### **Statement of the Problem**

American law enforcement agencies serve the public and have common goals that include *timely response* to criminal incidents deemed important to the caller and to the agency, and the *quick apprehension* of offenders connected to those incidents. As time between the incident call and an arrest increases, so too do tensions rise between the agency and those they serve. The incidence of silo-thinking and the too common problem of lack of internal communication among police administrators can contribute to public disaffection from the police. If barriers to effective communication among officers *within* a given agency were reduced, and if barriers to effective communication *between and among* agencies were reduced, crime clearance levels would increase and citizens would be more content with the quality of their police services.

There currently exists in the criminal justice community a hearty discussion of the current police mandate. Some claim the decades-old *professional model* of policing is passé, having given way to community-oriented policing (Crank, 2003; Manning, 1988). Others think community-oriented policing in many progressive agencies has largely given way to problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Eck and Maguire, 2000). Still others are looking at the current state of policing as being increasingly technologically-based, therefore assuming a new

model referred to as *intelligence-led policing* (Manning, 2001a, Clarke, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2007). Each of these models will be explored in the literature review, but first the need for this particular study is addressed directly.

### **Need for the Study**

In the past, the public saw the police as an entity capable of protecting them while solving crimes with various degrees of competence and skill. Unknown to most citizens was the fact that police agencies did not communicate well across jurisdictional borders. Even less known was that many times officers within the same agencies frequently did not communicate with one another. The common belief was that criminals cannot outrun the police radio, thus police had the potential of omnipresence. In the internal world of policing, a different reality is widely known. Police agencies only responded to what was known to them. If communications channels either became clogged, or worse yet did not exist in the first place, accomplishment of the police mandate was hampered by the lack of timely information. The image of the police held by the public with respect to their potential for omnipresence changed dramatically on September 11, 2001 when the United States was attacked by al Qaeda. What was once only known within police inner circles was now broad public knowledge; American police are ill-equipped to know what they need to know to protect their citizens because of poor lines of communication and the lack of intelligence. More specifically, both inter and intra-police communication lines for the timely sharing of intelligence failed in preventing an act of terrorism involving individuals about whom some police agencies had telling information not shared with other agencies which could have taken timely action (911 Commission Report, 2004).



The International Association of Chiefs of Police, in a major post 9/11 report, wrote, “Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice” (IACP, 2005: vii). That sharing of information model includes “cooperative, fluid structures that can collect information and move intelligence to end users more quickly...[and they] require increased collaboration in information gathering...” (IACP, 2005: vii). With respect to the status of the communication process within the criminal justice institution, the 9/11 Commission Report concluded that there must be a unity of effort in sharing information, stating in this regard: “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis—to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information” (9/11 Commission Report: 416). What is clear in our post 9/11 society is that police need to develop better systems for gathering, maintaining, analyzing and dispersing information about criminal elements. Information gathering must extend beyond the ranks of the police if they are to be better informed. In a highly prescient observation Maguire (2000) urged much broader police “acceptance of the idea that organizations other than the police have a major part to play, in ‘partnership’ with the police, in operations against crime; and concomitantly...information previously regarded as confidential to individual agencies should be much more freely exchanged between them” (317).

The ability to *gather* data is not the principal problem faced by police. The problem is that collected data largely rests in databases never to see the light of day. “The bottom line for police organizations is that they must display, in their organizational behavior and design, that they care about constituents’ concerns...” (Crank, 2003:187). In a major study of crime mapping and crime analysis, Peter Manning discovered that crime mapping has very limited operational effects because of the following communication-related problems: “The lack of infrastructure of

support and interpretation; the distribution of the information, isolated and unintegrated (sic) databases, and lack of on-line access by patrol officers, renders the extant software and analytic capacity ineffectual” (Manning, 2001: 83). Manning elaborated upon communications-related problems thusly: “The constraints and visibility of railroad tracks, parks, vacant lots, and high-rise public housing projects are real and visible, whereas the constraints of gang memberships, co-offending, networks of victims and their ‘at risk’ status is not so easily comprehended. The tacit connections made by officers between the expressions and the content that constitute the sign are the driving forces behind any form of problem solving” (Manning, 2001: 98).

The point Manning drives home very effectively is that not only should police be collecting the proper types of data, but they should also communicate their insights derived from those data with one another more fully. Taking his point further, Manning continues with this insightful observation: “Police gather far too much data for which they have no identified purpose. It is kept in case, or because it has always been kept...Databases are not coordinated in the departments I have studied. There are many standard and some new types of data being gathered in policing, some of which can be combined, but others that are not and cannot be” (Manning, 2001: 98-99).

To further illustrate the problem police face regarding their outmoded intelligence and communication systems, the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative organized the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) following 9/11 to assess responsibilities for intelligence gathering (National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 2005). The group, made up of local, state, federal and tribal law enforcement personnel, discovered that 75% of law enforcement agencies in the United States have fewer than 25 sworn officers, “and more often than not, these

agencies do not have staff dedicated to intelligence functions” (National: iii). Additionally, there is a serious funding issue. The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA) reports that, “As local budgets are reduced and the costs associated with the latest enforcement tools increase, a state intelligence program will increasingly be called upon to provide and maintain services and expertise to local law enforcement agencies” (IALEIA, 1997: 10). Compstat, which will be discussed in the literature review section of this dissertation, holds promise as it helps law enforcement move into the information technology derived 21<sup>st</sup> century. Says the widely read University of Louisville professor William Walsh, “At the heart of this [Compstat] process is a new managerial perspective that is based on the belief that the police can and should control crime and improve the livability of neighborhoods [and] not just react to it” (Walsh, 2001: 353).

American citizens are increasingly holding the police agencies that serve them accountable for their personal security. It is critical that American law enforcement agencies do a better job of communicating known information with one another so that the larger police institutional goals of service and crime response can be more effectively attained. The purpose of this dissertation is to identify key barriers to the flow of information through communication in American police agencies. The literature review that follows will first examine policing styles that have dominated the American policing landscape for over the past 100 years, after which a review of the current move toward intelligence-led policing (ILP) will be conducted. Following the literature review, methods used in obtaining the research data reported herein are explained. A discussion of the findings derived from the Homicide Investigation Tracking System (H.I.T.S.)

evaluation study is included before recommendations for an improved policing model are offered.

### **Limitations**

The present study benefits from the evaluation of a unique criminal investigative unit housed within the office of the Washington State Attorney General known as H.I.T.S. A thorough description of that unit is forthcoming, but for the sake of explaining the limitations of this study the reader should know that to the knowledge of the author only two such state-level or national-level investigative units exist in the United States; H.I.T.S. from Washington State and the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) which is a national program maintained by the F.B.I. Therefore, though the observations of the author cannot be generalized more widely to similar units, there is substantial inference taken from the research data to lead the author to conclude that the observations of police practice within surveyed agencies is characteristic of other similar police agencies.

The basis for this study was a program that helps criminal investigators throughout the state of Washington clear homicides, sexual assaults, and other serious felonies. Therefore, much of the work that makes up everyday police work is not examined. Conclusions from the evaluation report are a glaring statement of how the improvement, both within a policing agency and across agencies, might help in the clearance of misdemeanors as well. Additionally, the same conclusions can, if heeded, guide the daily operation of law enforcement agencies so that they are not surprised by another 9/11-type attack. That will be a likely result if the flow of criminal intelligence remains greatly hindered.

This study is further limited by its very design. It is not intended to test the strength of relationships between specific variables identified as important in a specific theory; rather, it is designed to offer a descriptive report of findings of a program evaluation itself designed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of an information sharing process. Those findings will add to the currently limited knowledge base of law enforcement communications barriers that hinder the making of timely connections between offenders and offenses. A review of the literature describing various police models follows as a primary step in the process of understanding the challenges facing those wishing to build upon an intelligence-led policing conception of policing in the United States.

## Chapter Two

### *Review of the Literature*

#### **Separate Tables**

In a classic treatise on the condition of American political science in the 1980s, Gabriel Almond, professor emeritus at Stanford University, argued that the field of political science suffered under a cloud of “uneasy separateness” (Almond: 828). He contended that political theorists had become divided along two dimensions of ideology and methodology. Almond’s concern was that some political scientists had lost their focus of “commitment to the search of objectivity” (Almond: 840), and instead turned to methodology as a means to support their ideological, if not political, points. Using *Separate Tables* (Rattigan, 1955) as a metaphor to describe his view that four different sects of political science theorists drew from a common intellectual buffet, all the while protecting their own vulnerable ideas about “proper” political science, Almond urged the discipline to retain the values that were important to building the discipline knowledge base while cautioning that embracing new methodologies (in this case, statistical and mathematical tools) could continue to divide the discipline in unproductive ways. Criminal justice, as a discipline, can learn from the wisdom of Almond, particularly if one considers that the new breed of quantitatively oriented criminal justice pundits seem to be as equally aggressive as were those depicted by Almond in dictating what it is cops should do according to their own ideological and methodological preferences.

The divide in policing broadly defines the camps of those in support of the command and control police structure and those who prefer decentralization of power and decision-making authority within police organizations. Command and control, discussed later in the literature review, connotes a rigid bureaucracy in which orders flow from the top down. Decentralization of power is a significant component of community oriented-policing, which will also be discussed later. Those who support the command and control structure have a difficult time letting go of that tenet which is engrained in the professional and standard models of policing. Proponents of community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) are more willing to move away from command and control. In fact, they believe such a move is a prerequisite to ensure the inclusion of key “stakeholders” who can help to expand the policing mission and enhance public safety. There is evidence in the as yet scant literature which suggests that as the policing institution moves toward an intelligence-led base of operation the structure of policing will appear more like the old command and control variety, but retaining some boundary spanning COP components (McGarrell, Freilich and Chermak, 2007; see also Deukmedjian, 2006). We first examine how policing mandates have changed over the past 100 years, then a new paradigm in policing, *Intelligence-led Policing*, is introduced as a foundation for the case study of the H.I.T.S. program featured in this dissertation.

### **Professional Policing and the Standard Model of Policing**

Formalized local government-based policing in America began in the late 1820s in the largest American cities, and early police officers were not considered to be professional with respect to social status. In fact, the terms professional and police were not likely to appear

together. Policemen in this historical period were typically not much more than watchmen. It wasn't until the turn of the 20th century that professionalism began to characterize American police. Most agree that the professionalization of the police in the United States began with the efforts of August Vollmer (Douthit, 1975). Vollmer was the first Chief of Police of Berkeley, California, elected as the town Marshall in 1905. By the time of his retirement in 1932, Vollmer had led the way in reforming policing as a socially recognized profession. He expanded his police force to include night and daytime patrols, and he developed law enforcement training courses that would later be replicated widely throughout the nation. Vollmer developed college courses as well that were designed to teach both police officers and civilians alike about the role of police in a democratic society. His main focus was on conveying the notion of police officers as "social workers" who in the course of their public safety promotion work addressed a broad range of social problems giving rise to criminal activity. In addition, Vollmer spent ample time training his officers on technical issues such as criminal law and criminal investigation, and in the proper use of equipment and law enforcement technology available at the time (e.g., fingerprinting). Vollmer's work was championed by other early reformers, such as O.W. Wilson (Wilson, 1953).

The post-Vollmer era saw formal education as being a critical component of police work. Some agencies, including Berkeley, required officers to hold a bachelor's degree as a work prerequisite. San Jose, California, later was headed by the first chief in the nation to hold a Ph.D., Joseph McNamara (Kelling, 1988). Education alone did not define police professionalism for Vollmer. His tenacious attacks on public morality crimes such as prostitution, gambling, public drunkenness, disorderliness, and corruption drew both praise and criticism from



community members. The well-known scholar James Q. Wilson agreed with Vollmer that the police role was more about handling people than about the enforcement of laws (Wilson, 1968), and credits Vollmer with having had a major favorable influence on the development of policing in the United States.

Manning (2001) characterizes Vollmer as one of the key players (he also included O.W. Wilson, Bruce Smith, Harry E. Fosdick, and V.O. Leonard) who was instrumental in the development of the professional police model. Praising the movement for raising the ideal of the police to a new level in the eyes of the public, Manning was nonetheless in agreement with Goldstein (1990) in his criticism that under the professional police model, too much focus was placed upon the means of police work to the detriment of adapting the ends to be served to an ever-changing society. Some characterized these traits as those of the “traditional bureaucratic professional model with its emphasis on efficiency and organizational control...” (Walsh, 2001: 348; Goldstein, 1990).

During the 1970s it was assumed that policing could be easily accomplished by standardizing the police function to include random patrols, rapid response to calls for service (CFS), and aggressive response to criminal incidences with attentive follow-up by trained investigators. However, by mid-decade it had been shown in a Kansas City field study conducted by Kelling and his associates that the standard model might not be as effective as had been assumed (Kelling, et al., 1974). More recently, Weisburd and Eck found that “...little evidence supports the standard model of policing” (2004: 42). Based on their studies Weisburd and Eck agree that community oriented policing, when combined with hotspots or problem oriented policing, both helps to reduce the fear of crime and reduces crime levels (2004:42).

Increases in violent and property crime, coupled with civil unrest that included war and civil rights protests, led some scholars to recognize that a new trend was emerging in American policing. The image of police as professionals was beginning to fade (e.g., Crank, 2003; Skogan, 2006; Klockars, 1988). A new era in policing was unfolding featuring the emergence of community oriented policing (COP). Some scholars, including Crank, Weisburd and Eck view the COP movement as re-legitimizing police in America in a period in which public confidence in law enforcement had become seriously eroded.

### **The Community Oriented Policing Mandate**

In the true spirit of Thomas Kuhn, for there to be a paradigm shift there must be a change in the basic assumptions about a process (Kuhn 1962). That is precisely what occurred for policing following the social unrest in the 1960s and early 1970s. COP was begun in some communities as neighborhood watches and eventually, following a flood of federal funding, reshaped as COP storefronts and volunteer-staffed substations and “COP shops” popped up in local at-risk neighborhoods. Critics of the conventional command and control structure that had been the backbone of professionalized police organizations championed the new “friendlier” face of the beat cop who once made local residents feel secure. The power shift resulted in the decentralization of power in police circles so that tactical public safety decisions were now made at lower levels within police organizations. In their widely distributed but unpublished manuscript, Ritti and Mastrofski (2002) contend that COP emerged as a solution to the problem that the public had rejected the professional police model that had served as the accepted policing standard. Others, including Weisburd and Eck (2004), contend that COP reflects the

fact that policing agencies came to understand that they needed outside sources of support and cooperation in their effort to carry out the police mission.

Goldstein (1990), along with Skolnick and Bayley (1986), agree that effective policing can only be accomplished with the cooperation of a community larger than the police organization alone. Zhao, Lovrich and Robinson (2001), citing their research on change in the organizational priorities pursued within policing agencies in the COP period, noted that contrary to expectation contingency theory did not explain organizational change in American policing. Instead, they concluded that an institutional perspective better accounts for the acceptance of COP. Their research based on surveys of police agencies led them to conclude that, "...the core functional priorities of American policing largely remain closely modeled after the professional model..." (373). Their findings echo Bittner's 1972 claim that the core function of American policing, namely crime control, order maintenance, and service provision, remain as standards. Of course, the COP model should be examined on the bases of results as well as priorities of action specified by police executives.

The question of effectiveness eventually comes up when discussing any major program; COP is no exception. Looking at FBI Uniform Crime data on violent property crime rates between 1995 and 1999, Zhao, Scheider and Thurman (2002) reported that, "...COPS hiring and innovative grant programs have resulted in significant reductions in local crime rates in cities with populations greater than 10,000 for both violent and nonviolent offenses" (2002: 7). Weisburd and Eck concluded that the COP model is sound, but with a caveat: "The research available suggests that when the police partner more generally with the public, levels of citizen fear will decline" (2004: 52).

Mastrofski, a friendly critic of community policing, challenges the COP model in observing the following: “To the extent that community policing is a good thing, it should withstand the careful scrutiny of thoughtful doubters” (2006: 44). He further concludes that in many instances police-community partnerships have not added greatly to the capacity to control crime because the COP model has not done enough to develop relationships with those from whom intelligence data could be gleaned, and because the model has not developed strategies for using the data it has to effectively build strategies for crime control (57). Mastrofski agrees with Weisburd and Eck in their position that COP has helped to reduce fear of crime, however (65). The COP model withstood challenges from its critics (friendly and unsympathetic alike) and commanded a strong presence in the police community from roughly the late 1970s through the present. The staying power of the COP model can be attributed largely to the availability of federal funding and the fact that people feel better about themselves when they think they have a say in the process of deciding how police resources should be used to address public safety concerns. Under present circumstances people like helping the police, but citizens are also coming to have higher expectations about what people are able to do with modern science and technology—what some have called the “CSI effect.” Police organizations and prosecutors are under considerable pressure from citizens (and jurors in particular) to demonstrate that they can make use of such knowledge-based tools in their public safety promotion work (Pratt, et al., 2006; Tyler, 2006; Schweitzer and Saks, 2007).

In this regard, Manning (2001) describes one important police function as that of *dramaturgy*, noting that police administrators are key players in controlling public opinion by acting in ways that respond to the desires of the public and media. Citing the NYPD

administration under Rudy Giuliani's top cop pick of William Bratton, Manning successfully demonstrates that Bratton shifted the policy of the department from COP to a crime control model. Bratton implemented a zero-tolerance campaign in the 1990s that saw the frequent citation and apprehension of minor misdemeanants (such as those who squeegeed car windshields at red lights) in his effort to restore order and alleviate fear on the streets. The high number of arrests carried out by officers under the command of Bratton provided statistical data to support his promise to Giuliani that he would show a drop in crime. The stats were maintained in a database that Bratton engineered. Dubbed Compstat (the literature does not agree on the meaning of the acronym, but it is generally accepted that it refers to computer statistics, or compare statistics), Bratton created what would later become the policing standard for the maintenance of statistics on incidence of criminal activity. Erosion of the COP model was not limited to the NYPD case study, however.

In a study of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) mission, Deukmedjian (2006) noted that the RCMP adopted Intelligence-led policing (ILP) in December 2000 as "...a shift in executive discourse away from the earlier decade's emphasis on community policing adoption" (523). The reason for the shift from COP to ILP was given as "Despite their efforts to gain broad acceptance for community policing by *aligning* training and management, executives were unable to integrate the community and garner organizational support for empowerment" (523-524). The RCMP shift from COP to ILP was definitively the most significant break from COP revealed by this literature review. As will be discussed later, when many agencies decided to move toward the ILP model they kept the portions of "community policing" that worked, and built on them. For the RCMP, however, the decision was to "...discard the community-policing

mission for an intelligence-led mission.” (531). The language used in this shift was rather direct (531):

In December 2000, the Commissioner’s Office issued the ‘Directional Statement for 2000/2001,’ stating that ‘being an intelligence-led organization means we will work together internally, and with our partners at home and abroad, to ensure that we utilize the best information in making decisions, taking action and assessing our results’. For RCMP executives, then, intelligence-led policing maintained the reflexive notion of policing through partnerships. Among the key differences was the absence of any notion of ‘community.’”

Curtis Clarke (2006) conducted a study of the Edmonton Police Service from which he concluded that the COP model had established a good foundation upon which to build the ILP model. Other researchers were also beginning to sing similar songs, as noted here: “The effectiveness of the hot-spots policing approach has strong empirical support” (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 56).

Maguire and King criticized the COP model as having been “implemented across the landscape of policing...so weakly...or in such a scattershot fashion, so as not to constitute a significant transformation at the industry level” (2004: 17). The chatter in the police management community and among scholars regarding the effectiveness of COP has taken its toll, and some began to seek a purpose for policing as an institution elsewhere than in the established COP liturgy.

### **Problem Oriented Policing: the New Solution?**

In a now classic article, Herman Goldstein challenged police administrators to stop focusing on the things that had become their perennial concerns—things such as “lack of manpower, inadequate supervision, inadequate training, or strained relations with police unions”

and start focusing on “street robberies, residential burglaries, battered wives and acts of terrorism” (Goldstein, 1979: 243). Now termed problem-oriented policing (POP), according to Goldstein the proper emphasis in policing should be on the end result of law enforcement action. Disappointed that the term *problem-oriented policing* had been “used to describe a wide variety of initiatives, many of which bear little relationship to the original concept,” Goldstein later clarified the definition to give problem-oriented policing a more precise meaning (Goldstein, 2003: 14). Clarifying that POP was originally defined as, “...a new way of thinking about policing: it introduces a thought process that could become the centerpiece around which all elements of police operations are organized” (2003: 14).

Goldstein further elaborates upon his conception by citing reasons officers’ efforts in addressing problems are typically limited. He notes the following in this regard: “Chiefs leave office, agencies undergo changes in their orientation. Key people are promoted or reassigned. Individual officers are reassigned, or acquire less supportive supervisors, or are reined-in or discouraged by other changes in their working environment” (2003: 18). Goldstein further observes in this regard (2003: 19):

To energize and hasten the development of problem-oriented policing, the greatest current need, in my opinion, is to invest heavily in building a capacity into local policing to analyze discrete pieces of police business in depth and to carefully evaluate the effectiveness of alternative strategies for responding to them. Such an investment should continue to draw on the knowledge and experience of all police employees, but it will depend heavily, for its success, on the full engagement of their chief executive and management. And it will require, in one form or another, the acquisition of research skills that are not currently available within police agencies.

The fundamental premise underlying the concept of problem-oriented policing is that police practices, in responding to common problems that arise in the community, should be informed by the best knowledge that

can be acquired about the nature of those problems and about the effectiveness of various strategies for dealing with them.

Goldstein ties the current lack of concentrated efforts to the negative image of the police maintained by many citizens. Says Goldstein, “With such imperfect working conditions, it should come as no surprise that, with monotonous regularity, shortcomings in policing surface...allegations of inefficiency, abuse of authority, corruption, negligence or incompetence” (2003: 24). Goldstein identifies five major impediments to the progress of POP: (1) the absence of a long-term commitment on the part of police leaders to strengthening policing and the police as an institution; (2) the lack of skills within a police agency that are required to analyze problems and to evaluate strategies for dealing with those problems; (3) the lack of a clear academic connection; (4) the absence of informed outside pressures; and (5) the lack of financial support (Goldstein, 2003: 26-34). The ways in which the research data derived from the evaluation of the H.I.T.S. program can be used to address these issues will be discussed in chapter five.

Weisburd and Eck posit that police administrators should tailor their provision of services so that the focus is not simply on meeting the needs of law enforcement, but rather meeting the self-identified needs of citizens. Acknowledging that COP tends to reduce the fears of crime in communities, their research points to great results when COP practices are combined with hotspots policing, or what Hermann Goldstein called problem-oriented policing (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). “While we have little evidence indicating the effectiveness of standard models of policing in reducing crime, disorder, or fear of crime, the strongest evidence of police effectiveness in our review is found in...focused policing efforts” (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 58).



This new way of looking at combining POP with other known data is accomplished with programs such as H.I.T.S., giving the policing community new hope for optimism in their ongoing effort to meet the expectations of citizens.

Ennis and Fielding (2002) generally agree with the proposition put forth by Goldstein that all 'business' that is taken to the police should be considered 'police business,' but they contend that there currently exists no serious attempt to collect and maintain data related to lesser incidents. They urge the creation of data management techniques that capture and record less serious incidents brought to the attention of police. The H.I.T.S. evaluation report considered this notion and addressed it with an inquiry of criminal investigators. Specifically, the question asked was "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Having access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department of Corrections would probably assist investigators in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults'" (see appendix 1, question 9 this dissertation). The purpose of the question was to ascertain the level of interest that exists in having access to patrol-generated data. The results of the survey will be discussed in chapter 5, showing whether or not the position of Ennis, Fielding and Goldstein would be supported. The present literature review now turns to a policing model that is getting a great deal of attention by academics and practitioners alike, especially since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Intelligence-Led Policing**

The most commonly used policing organizational model shifted from command and control through a tight hierarchy to the systematic decentralization of police decision-making as

evidenced by the placement of storefronts and substations and volunteer-staffed cop shops in local neighborhoods, as discussed in the section on COP. There was an unmistakable shift in the basic assumption of how police work was to be done. The move from COP to POP was not a true paradigm shift, but rather for those who embraced the POP model it redefined the COP mission to look at specific ways police could target specific crimes to accomplish targeted results. In his theory of organizations, Howard Aldrich defines a transformation as “a major change occurring along three possible dimensions: changes in goals, boundaries, and activities” (Aldrich, 1999: 163). Perhaps that is what ILP is to the police institution. What was needed, in the words of Jerry Ratcliffe, was the following: “An integrated strategy that combines some sort of the benefits of problem-oriented policing with the targeted and objective approach of proactive policing seems to be the direction in which proponents of intelligence-led policing are heading” (2008: 63). Though intelligence-lead policing (ILP) does not lend itself as a new model of policing, per se, a more in-depth look at the emergence of ILP as a strategy is nonetheless quite worthwhile.

The term ILP first took hold in Britain following an Audit Commission report in 1993 (Hale, Heaton, and Uglow, 2004). The goal of ILP was to target “...criminals rather than responding to crime incidents” (Audit Commission, 1993: 2). Manning points to a significant communication problem that taxes most agencies: “Since detectives work on a case-based activity, they have no reference to trends or patterns unless they appear presently, e.g. a series of unsolved house breakings in a particular neighborhood over the last few days or weeks” (Manning, 2001: 94). This is a distribution problem as well. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) points out that the U.S. Department of Justice first laid the blueprint for

intelligence work in 1971 when it "...called on every law enforcement agency and every state to immediately establish and maintain the capability to gather and evaluate information and to disseminate intelligence in a manner that protects every individual's right to privacy while it curtails organized crime and public disorder" (IACP, 2005: 3). That decree apparently applied to agencies with a sworn officer count of 75 or more.

The IACP defines "intelligence" in this context as "...information plus analysis equals intelligence" (IACP, 2005: 3). Ratcliffe elaborates on the definition of intelligence to include the component that intelligence analysis "...involves the development of critical and substantive products that support law enforcement decision-making efforts that are centered on organized criminal activity...while crime analysis...involves the use of various geographical and socio-demographic information, in combination with spatial techniques, to analyze, prevent, and solve crime and disorder problems" (Ratcliffe, 2007: v).

Manning (2001a) characterizes the function of the modern police as units responding to incidents in the here and now, with relatively scant regard to preemptive or preventive efforts. His contention that police should reorient their focus to include the anticipation of crime, coupled with the analysis of crime through new technologies is quite on target in the context of strong demand from citizens that government services—including their police services—make proper use of modern technology in their provision of services. "There is a long and hopeful history, stretching back to the invention of the telegraph, fire alarm systems, and early police watch stations, that contains the assumption that rapid and efficient flow of information (by technological means) would in itself empower policing. This assumption, a technological fallacy, is a seductive one" (2001a: 84). New and better ways to gather and store data abound

with the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The problem now recognized by virtually every police agency in America stems from a common thought; how do police, already short on manpower and technological skills, manage the mounds of data in ways that allow the timely and efficient analysis and redistribution of results?

Manning has argued that “substantive direct impact on disorder and crime can be made via data analysis combining police-gathered and non-police-gathered data, and this data as information can be used to direct and systematize enforcement” (2001a: 90). On the topic of the state of information technology infrastructure, Manning pointed out that, “Ethnographic research demonstrates further sources of police resistance and/or acceptance of IT [information technology]—it is based on time and manner of introduction of the IT, officers’ rank, specialized function, the level of information to which the officer has access and must use, and local policing practices and traditions” (2001a: 94). Says Manning, “The technical support staff in police departments is typically overworked and inadequate to maintaining complex electronic infrastructure. . .elaborate technology-based systems, such as expert systems for detectives, are not supported and abandoned when federal funding vanishes” (2001a: 94). Manning cautions that the current trend to embrace intelligence as a police mandate may not lead to the desired results anticipated. He notes in this regard the following:

...the ways of technology are many, and the argument for an information-based policing, focusing on risk management, and enhancing security is both premature and flawed. The potential of crime analysis and crime mapping as means, combining a technology and a technique, is greater than any other innovation in policing in recent times, arguably, because they raise questions about the basic contradictions in the mandate—that policing can control crime, reduce the fear of crime, and yet be an almost entirely responsive, demand-driven, situational force dispensing just in time and just enough, order maintenance. (2001a: 101)

Indeed, Manning is quite right in his assessment of the manner in which it presently appears that police management is attempting to implement ILP. What Manning seems to be championing is the notion that COP and POP are the *ex-post facto* standards in policing, and that a new movement in the direction of ILP is potentially ill-fated because of the lack of training of officers in the proper use of the new technologies at their disposal. The Washington State H.I.T.S. program might be viewed as a communication bridge specifically designed to address this contradiction in mandates. A simple example of how the effective use of police technologies led to the capture of one of America's most notorious terrorists may shed some light on the apparent communication gap that impedes the effective use of technologies.

After apparently blowing up the Murrow building in Oklahoma City, Timothy McVeigh drove northbound on a freeway to escape the scene of his crime. A lone Oklahoma State Highway Patrol officer stopped McVeigh for speeding, and subsequently discovered that he had outstanding warrants. An arrest was made, following which the connection between McVeigh and the bombing of the Murrow building was made. The information that tied McVeigh to the bombing was initially developed through a relatively simple searchable database that stores warrant information. That information, had it not been used properly, would have remained unexamined, resulting in the release at the scene of McVeigh. The technology was in place, and it was properly used by the well trained officer, averting the unthinkable release of the terrorist McVeigh. Manning is correct in his assessment that such information technologies too often are not properly used, but a review of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington and the research methods used in the development of the evaluation report, followed by a discussion of properly

implemented strategies for the use of technologies will offer a fresh view of the contradiction in the police mandate as reported by Manning.

There is a strong tendency in the police culture to gather data only to under-analyze them, leaving the law enforcement community under-informed about crime dynamics and the causes of crime (Gill, 1997; Trambly and Rochon, 1991). For progress to occur more rapidly in this area police must become more efficient in the four principal stages of the intelligence system—namely, *targeting*, *gathering*, *analysis* and *dissemination* (Gill, 1997: 304). Gill cites the dissemination of intelligence to other agencies as “the critical point at which power interacts most obviously with the information process” (309) and that “Dissemination is an important stage in the police’s overall ability to seek control of the information process” (309). The ability of the H.I.T.S. program to recruit local police agencies to work with them on the systematic sharing of criminal investigation information would be a good measure of the effectiveness of the program, based on the notions put forth by Gill.

Willem and Buelens (2007) assert that effective knowledge-sharing is essential for all formal organizations. Key to that sharing is the presence of trust among those with whom knowledge is shared (581). In their research on organizational communications, Willem and Buelens discovered “It was **trust** that was important, not as part of informal or lateral coordination or developed through identification. Not only would people share more knowledge in an environment of trust but also knowledge sharing would be more effective” (597). It is apparent that the subculture of the police is a breeding ground for mistrust (Cope, 2004; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983; Walters and Ussery, 2007; Allen, 2002), and that this problem has to be addressed effectively before progress toward ILP can be made. This is also a concern pointed

out by Maguire and John (2006) with regard to information hoarding and silo-thinking; threats to community safety often remain known to some but are not shared with those who could take appropriate preventative action. Findings derived from the H.I.T.S. evaluation report have the potential to address this problem area.

In a recent important contribution to the topic of ILP, McGarrell, Freilich and Chermak (2007) point out that ILP is yet the most recent iteration of the attempt by police to reinvent themselves without having set out a clear path or goal toward which they aspire. McGarrell and his colleagues note that external pressures to change have led the police community to seek “change for change’s sake,” and they argue for a “broad conceptualization of ILP that embraces community policing, problem-solving policing, a continuous improvement managerial philosophy, and an ‘all crimes’ focus” (McGarrell, et al. 2007: 143). Drawing on the insights derived from the tribal law enforcement work of Carter (2004), McGarrell and his colleagues note that both COP and ILP are “dependent on two-way communications with the public” (144). They also point out that both COP and ILP rely on actionable intelligence that results from the timely analysis of information. McGarrell and his associates argue that POP should not be abandoned, but rather that it should be shored up using a “Greater infusion of the ILP philosophy within policing...strengthening the analytic component of POP” (145). McGarrell and his colleagues use Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) to support their contention that the combined efforts of POP and ILP can work in a productive synergy:

The PSN model calls for multi-agency task forces to employ a strategic problem-solving model whereby local gun crime patterns are analyzed, strategies are crafted to respond to these patterns, and ongoing assessment and refinement occurs. PSN built on the crime-analysis and resource-deployment approach embodied in Compstat as well as the problem-

solving model that was part of Boston's Ceasefire program and later part of the [U.S.] DOJ's Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative...Although [this] ILP example...focus(es) only on traditional street crime and gun crime in particular, we believe there is great potential in using the ILP model to respond to terrorism. Recent arrests of suspected terrorists in the United States (Florida), Canada, and Britain suggest that intelligence may be able to identify groups and allow for intervention prior to an attack. This is consistent with reports from countries, such as Israel, with long experience in combating terrorism. (145-47)

McGarrell and his colleagues caution that ILP should not simply become a vague, broad conceptual framework within which the current models of COP and POP are incorporated haphazardly, resulting in a watered down version of policing methodology. Instead, the components of COP, POP and ILP need to be combined in purposeful ways. Tilley (2003) concurs that ILP does not differ greatly in fundamental concept from the POP model, and as we are about to see Nina Cope also believes that ILP is perhaps most properly viewed as an important extension and enhancement of POP.

We move now to the view that ILP can establish itself as a legitimate policing model by means of "volume crime analysis." Cope (2004) examined two police forces in the U.K. and concluded that, "...while the rhetoric of using analysis to target police activity is generally accepted, the practice is different" (2004: 188). Police agencies depend on crime analysis to deliver "the right information...to the right people at the right time" (Fletcher, 2000: 114). Cope describes the function of crime analysis as, "...[it] incorporates the collection and review of information into manageable summaries, for example crime maps or networks charts, to facilitate its interpretation. When the nature of crime problems is better understood, recommendations for action logically follow"



(2004: 191). Cope concludes from her systematic observations of these two law enforcement agencies that, “Despite the recognition that knowledge abstraction and production is a collective process, the research demonstrated that street level police officers continued to exert considerable control over the intelligence process.” (197). The implication of this finding is that if ILP is to make a noteworthy impact on policing it must include the combined efforts of field patrol officers, criminal investigators, and crime analysts (at a minimum) brought together as one working group through the leadership of top management that has “bought into” the notion that ILP can help to accomplish the police mandate.

Ratcliffe and McCullagh (2001) observed that it is not heretofore a natural part of police work to develop an overview of crime problems by drawing on various sources of data. Before we look at the methods used and data gained from the H.I.T.S. evaluation study, it would be useful to examine some of the barriers to the communications of intelligence that were identified in the literature review. Michael Townsley and colleagues support the integration of ILP with what we know about POP, stating:

If a defining characteristic of problem-oriented policing is its being evidence-based, it would be necessary to ensure that adequate resources are allocated to intelligence units so that different forms of evidence can be assembled and triangulated, and that the members of these units acquire ‘problem-oriented policing heads.’ (Townsley, et al. 2003: 197)

Other researchers echo the view that for policing to move into the new intelligence-led paradigm, cooperation beyond the walls of the traditional policing community will be critical: “The analysis required in an intelligence-led policing environment goes beyond that which has traditionally been practiced in most law enforcement agencies. It requires

the exploitation of all pertinent information and the analysts must be prepared to go beyond traditional sources such as police files to other government and regulatory agencies, private databases and open sources” (IALEIA, 1997: 7). For example, in the case of national security concerns had flight school records been incorporated in a scrutinized database, the names of several soon-to-be 9/11 hijackers would have been present on the proverbial radar screen of criminal investigators.

James Sheptycki identified eleven commonplace pathologies of organizational information flow that hinder the flow of intelligence and that deserve attention if we are to solve some of the communication problems inherent in the current intelligence-sharing scheme. These common problems are as follows: digital divide; linkage blindness; noise; intelligence overload; non-reporting; intelligence gaps; duplication; institutional friction; intelligence-hoarding and information silos; defensive data concentration and the differences of occupational subculture (2004: 313). The term digital divide reflects the likelihood that agencies in different jurisdictions have different information and communication technology systems that do not allow for the uninterrupted flow of data from one to the other; the term “interoperability” is used to characterize the state of seamless data and communication interchange. Linkage blindness refers to the gap in information that sometimes occurs that leads to an incomplete picture of the facts. Sheptycki illustrates this problem by pointing out that “...a firearm may be ‘rented’ or shared among a group of active criminals and used in a variety of locations” (315). By Noise, Sheptycki refers to the fact that all information is subject to interpretation, thus critical information may not be recognized. Intelligence overload involves both an

abundance of legacy data that may not be needed, thus it drags the software down, and the lack of technical capacity to process the important data that is stored. Non-reporting and non-recording of data is a critical consideration because analysts can only analyze those data that are present. A significant reason for non-reporting and non-recording is examined in the H.I.T.S. evaluation study. Intelligence gaps occur when links between crimes and the offenders involved in the commission of those crimes are not made. Duplication is problematic because it bogs the system down and indicates the lack of monitoring of data for quality of control.

On institutional friction, Sheptycki comments as follows: “As with most multi-agency work, intelligence-sharing is based on a collaborative rather than a command relationship...Insofar as intelligence-sharing is concerned, ‘institutional friction’ describes the difficulties of moving information across bureaucratic boundaries” (320). Intelligence-hoarding and information silos are symptomatic of the policing occupational subculture (320). Because many in law enforcement see good work as being tied to career advancement, there is a strong tendency to protect information that might lead to that coveted recognition. Sheptycki calls information such as this “a valuable commodity that must be kept back until it can realize its best return for the one who holds it” (321). He warns, however, that “The intelligence-led policing (ILP) works according to a different logic. The ILP model depends on the sharing of information in order to produce accurate pictures of crime and disorder problems” (321). The systematic hoarding of intelligence, therefore, is highly “corrosive of the principles of intelligence-led policing” (321).

Defensive data concentration refers to another type of data duplication that occurs when data are strategically gathered on a given problem such as sex offenses, illegal gun possession or gang crimes. According to Sheptycki, this problem leads to “overstretched reporting” of the incidence of crime. Organizational subcultures cause competing intelligence systems that lead some to believe the intelligence communication structure is more like an intricate web than an interconnected control hub and strategically located and spaced spokes (322). Rivalries exist between detectives and uniformed officers, between detectives and crime analysts, and elsewhere in larger police organizations. Subculture rivalries lead to silo thinking and information hoarding, as well as data being underused. The organizational subcultures problem not only leads to a pathology of criminal intelligence communication flow, but it also describes a well-established barrier to effective internal organizational communications. Sheptycki observes in this regard, “It is a long established fact that multi-agency working is adversely affected by differences in working practice and that there can be a struggle for power and resources (including information) between agencies in these circumstances” (325).

Heaton (2001) looks to ILP as a way to maintain better control over repeat offenders through enhanced database records. His research concurred with the insights derived from most of the researchers featured in this literature review—namely, that the addition of ‘information managers’ alone will not lead to the attainment of the desired goal of enhanced law enforcement through increased information sharing. Heaton acknowledges that there must be a total organizational buy-in approach to data gathering, information maintenance, and intelligence sharing that starts from top management and

works its way down through the ranks. In a multi-national study of policing, Bayley argued that police can do little to ‘control’ crime, noting the fact that “the police are not able to prevent crime should not come as a surprise to thoughtful people. It is generally understood that social conditions outside the control of the police, as well as outside the control of the criminal justice system as a whole, determine crime levels in communities” (1994: 10).

There may exist a compelling alternate reason behind the desire on the part of contemporary police organizations to move to enhanced intelligence gathering. Some contend that the desire on the part of the police to gather and maintain information is part of a larger purposive scheme. Maguire (2000) cites the growth of a ‘risk society’ as a possible external pressure forcing policing to shift toward a ‘knowledge’ base. This notion is supported elsewhere in the *knowledge utilization* literature, as evidenced by this observation: “Most of the crime-related knowledge produced by the police is disseminated to other institutions (for example, those concerned with health, insurance, public welfare, financial matters, and education) for their risk management needs, rather than used for criminal prosecution and punishment” (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 5). Thus, the external thirst for information on the part of other social institutions has lead the police to become valued ‘gatekeepers of information’ for other social institutions (Ratcliffe, 2002: 55; see also the powerful story of failures in information sharing in the area of public health featured in Garrett’s *Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health*, 2000).

Innes, Fielding and Cope (2005) observed that the rush to infuse crime analysis methods into policing techniques has resulted in the policing community taking credit for the implementation of ‘scientific objectification’ of crime analysis through enhanced crime data techniques, when in reality much of the product of the crime analysis function within police agencies goes largely ignored. This has resulted in the claim by policing administrators that crime analysis is effective despite the fact that they are seldom using the product of crime analysis services to target and control crime effectively. Maguire and John conclude “...evidence of the success of police to engage with partners for crime reduction is as yet a little elusive, and intelligence-led policing has also evolved from being an analytical tool to a fully-fledged business model for policing” (2006: 4). The argument advanced by Maguire and John is not widely agreed upon, however. It would be incorrect to assume that the preponderance of veteran police officials fully embrace new information technologies. “A move toward intelligence or data-driven strategies often appears to encounter a recurring problem of resistance to change, either a fear of the impact of the new technology on the working conditions of officers or as a feature of the general inflexibility of ‘police culture’” (Ratcliffe, 2005: 437; see also Chan, 1997 and 1999; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; McGarrell et al., 2007; Manning, 1997). Numerous information technologies are emerging on the scene such as mobile video/audio recorders and transmitters, GPS tracking devices, license plate scanners, and power data mining software, all vying for the attention of the potentially enormous market that includes all aspects of the criminal justice arena. One such integrative information technology is

Compstat. Before the potential barriers to moving forward with ILP are examined, a brief discussion of the concept of Compstat is required at this point.

### **A Note on Compstat**

This literature review would be remiss if it failed to include a section on Compstat, since this process is the most widely used program for putting the theoretical model of POP into action through an ILP process. Compstat was a 1996 winner in the Innovations in American Government Program, administered by Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Developed for the New York Police Department by then-Chief William Bratton, Compstat (the origins of the name are in dispute, but most research ties the name to "compare statistics") is used by most police agencies with 100+ sworn officers to identify criminal hotspots (Weisburd et al., 2003; Walsh, 2001; Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd, 2004; IALEIA, 1997; Eterno and Silverman, 2006). The Compstat process for crime analysis reflects the view that there are four principles of effective crime reduction that must be interconnected (IALEIA: 28): (1) accurate and timely intelligence; (2) effective tactics; (3) rapid deployment of personnel; and (4) resources, and relentless follow-up and assessment. The core of the Compstat program is its ability to analyze weekly crime statistics and to offer recommended hot spots for the appropriate assignment of patrols (Silverman, 1999; Walsh, 2001).

Compstat has gained favor among many because it does not replace COP components, but rather builds on the critical components of COP in that data derived from personnel in COP programs are used to inform patrol missions. The command and control model that is the backbone of the professional model of policing is reinforced under the Compstat rubric as well. Says Walsh, "The Compstat process when employed in this fashion establishes accountability at

all managerial levels under the direction of the executive staff and focuses the entire organization on the department's mission" (353). In the process of involving the whole organization, Compstat goes far beyond the incremental structural changes that occurred during the adaptation of community policing while retaining an "organizational leadership style similar to that established by Sir Robert Peel during the police reform of 1829 and the professional reform movement of 1930-1970" (Walsh, 2004: 353). Walsh warns, however, that:

Compstat is not a quick fix to control crime or lower the crime rate. Creating more responsive and effective police organizations will require organizational changes that demand more than quick and limited structural changes. It will necessitate major reengineering of police organizations, changes in managerial culture and re-training of police personnel especially at the supervisory and managerial levels—all of which will take significant time and resources to achieve. (359)

Eterno and Silverman (2006) concur with other researchers working in this area that Compstat may be 'the single most important organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century' (e.g., Kelling and Sousa, 2001: 6; Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan and Willis, 2003). They are proponents of building a future with Compstat on the foundation of COP. Their chief criticisms of Compstat are that it has "an overwhelming focus on crime control" (Eterno and Silverman, 2005: 221) and that a strong connection between the use of Compstat and complaints involving civil rights violations can be pointed to as an important danger signal which police managers ought to heed (222).

Motives for the use of Compstat have drawn some serious attention by scholars.

Weisburd and his associates note the following in this regard:

Compstat holds out the promise of allowing police agencies to adopt innovative technologies and problem-solving techniques while empowering traditional police organizational structures. However, our



analysis suggests that at this stage, what most characterizes Compstat departments and distinguishes them from the others is the development of the control element of this reform. This leads us to question whether the rapid rise of Compstat in American police agencies can be interpreted more as an effort to maintain and reinforce the ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘paramilitary’ model of police organization (that has been under attack by scholars for most of the last two decades) than as an attempt to truly reform models of American policing. (2003: 422)

Weisburd and his colleagues tracked the origins and justification of Compstat to what had been described by others as failures of traditional policing (e.g., Goldstein, 1990; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Weisburd and Braga, 2003) and the “ambiguity of setting priorities under community policing programs” (425). Their research shows that one-third of agencies with 100+ sworn officers use Compstat or similar programs (430); smaller agencies were less likely to use Compstat (but likely reasons were not given). They concluded that the reason Compstat has spread so quickly throughout larger agencies is that it promises to control crime, but they add that many of the components of Compstat were being used in American police departments before the term Compstat was coined (445). Weisburd and his colleagues surmised, “Compstat is appealing precisely because it holds out the promise of innovation in police organization, strategies, and tactics but does not demand a revolution in the organizational structure of American policing. Rather, it preserves—indeed, claims to reinvigorate—the traditional hierarchical structure of the military model of policing, a structure that has been attacked by a powerful reform wave over the last two decades” (446).

The adaptation of Compstat generally results in a decrease in crime, but the reasons for the decrease are comingled with other crime prevention initiatives, making conclusive analysis of the effects of Compstat difficult (Braga and Weisburd: 343). Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd

(2004) studied the implementation of Compstat in Lowell, New York, a city of 105,167 inhabitants that boasts a sworn member police force of 260 officers. Their survey of officers found that, “Approximately 92% of those surveyed responded that ‘reducing violent crime’ and ‘improving the quality of life’ in the city were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat important’ to the department’s COMPSAT strategy” (2004: 475-76). Overall, their study showed that, “...although fairly strong on mission clarification and internal accountability, COMPSTAT agencies were largely indistinguishable from non-COMPSTAT agencies on measures that gauged the program’s other elements. The thrust of our argument is that in Lowell, where the COMPSTAT changes sought to strengthen traditional bureaucratic structures, they were most successful. Where they tried to loosen or reverse these structures, they were much less so” (Willis et al., 2004: 490). They further comment, “Most significant, COMPSTAT’s reinforcement of the bureaucratic hierarchy of policing stifles creative problem solving approaches” (493) which tends to support the notion that third-party investigative units would do more to promote a move to ILP than would Compstat.

### **Barriers to Moving Forward**

The Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) identified several prominent barriers that impede information and intelligence sharing, some of which relate to the need for increased technical training, and the importance of the development of minimum standards in planning, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. The GIWG stepped outside the normal rhetoric box, however, by calling for the “need to increase availability of information, from classified systems to local and state law enforcement agencies, for

the prevention and investigation of crime in their jurisdictions” (National, 2004: iv). They went further to emphasize that there remains a very strong need to “foster trust among law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and the communities they serve...” (National, 2004: vi).

In this regard, Jim Basara, CEO of Memex, Inc., a major database software company, recognizes a significant hurdle in information sharing that must be overcome. Basara observes the following: “It is also important to recognize that the composition of U.S. law enforcement exponentially complicates the use of information technology to support ILP. While there are many reasons for this, the most difficulty to overcome are the sheer number of law enforcement agencies within small geographical regions that must be brought together in order to have a full intelligence view of that area” (IALEIA, 1997: 15).

One major reason ILP will have a difficult time moving forward is abundantly apparent in both the literature and in the H.I.T.S. evaluation study. Succinctly stated by Weisburd and his colleagues, “Our survey of police agencies...our observations in Compstat departments suggest that the rank-and-file remain largely oblivious to Compstat and that it intrudes little, if at all, into their daily work” (449). While Weisburd and his associates cite turf battles that prevent teamwork as hindrances to moving forward (426), Willis and his collaborators (2004) noted in their Compstat study in Lowell, New York that, “By providing outsiders with greater access to the department, COMPSTAT can be used to generate external support among stakeholders, and to solicit and acquire information and input on the needs and priorities of the community.

Furthermore, it can be used as a mechanism for providing external constituents with information on the department's goals and its progress toward achieving them.

This process of the sharing of information with those outside of the agency conflicts with Max Weber's prescient observation, and that of many police scholars since, that 'official secrets' are a common feature of bureaucratic organizations. Because specialized knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge that grows 'out of experience in the service' bestows power upon officials, they are reluctant to cede this source of influence to the public (citing Weber 1922/1978: 225, 992)" (Willis et al., 2004: 488). The IACP cites communication barriers between local, state, and federal crime analysts as a major hindrance to better intelligence sharing. The organization also claims that analysis that is too specific, (e.g., restricted to burglaries, gangs, or organized crimes) often fails to see the bigger picture (IACP, 2005).

Ratcliffe (2007, 2008) argues that the adoption of technology alone is not enough for moving forward with the ILP model. He notes that, "While many executives get access to crime analysis, sometimes through Compstat meetings or similar briefings, too often criminal intelligence is not integrated into the picture and executives make key decisions without access to all of the pertinent knowledge available within their organization" (2007: 1). Referring to the information silos created when agency sub units within an organization retain information within the virtual walls of their unit, Ratcliffe urges law enforcement to do a better job of sharing known information across unit and agency lines. He also notes that challenges exist in this area, including the lack of training, data entry problems, lack of continuity in the structure of intelligence units,

opaque chains of command for the process of intelligence dissemination, a lack of clarity as to the principles of intelligence-led crime reduction, and a narrowly focused performance measurement culture rather than a crime reduction culture (2005: 449).

These observations bring us back to the point made by Goldstein when he argued that the police industry is off track when it focuses too heavily on means rather than ends.

The existence of disparate databases often constitutes a barrier to the effective flow of information (Ratcliffe, 2002: 63). The current study will examine and report on a unique aspect of sharing relevant information that has been noted in police organizations. The literature suggests that when civilian colleagues need information from sworn police officials, such as in the case of crime analysts, there is a tendency to refrain from the sharing of information on the part of commissioned officers (Ratcliffe, 2005; 2007). As an obvious barrier in the timely communication of information, particular attention will be placed on this phenomenon in the H.I.T.S. evaluation study to determine if similar situations exist both between investigators within the H.I.T.S. unit and their crime analyst, and between H.I.T.S. investigators and field investigators. This focus will help to identify a possible hurdle that needs to be overcome if H.I.T.S. is to be more effective in its role as a third-party investigative unit assisting local law enforcement agencies with the investigation of homicides and sexual assaults.

Ratcliffe (2007, 2008) identified numerous hindrances to the integration of analysis with crime intelligence, citing two notable instances: civilians working within the law enforcement setting often feel that they are treated as second-class citizens, and there is a broad perception of the existence of legal constraints prohibiting the sharing of some forms of crime information. In the first instance, it is axiomatic that if some in an

agency feel superior to others, they might tend to treat them as less critical to the mission, thus the sharing of information might be impeded. On the second issue, if there is a lack of familiarity with 28 Code of Federal Regulations<sup>1</sup>, Ratcliffe points out that this “...leads many intelligence analysts to be overly cautious in their handling of potentially sensitive information. This results in both compartmentalization and silo thinking...” (2007: 26). The phenomena of compartmentalization and silo thinking represent an important focus for the evaluation done by the W.S.U. research team assessing the operation of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington. The present study now turns to the methods used in the gathering of the data assembled for the H.I.T.S. evaluation study, followed by an analysis of that data and the development of recommendations derived from that study for the accomplishment of a unified police intelligence model.

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<sup>1</sup> 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 governs inter-jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that were funded by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and that collect, store, or disseminate criminal justice data on behalf of state or local law enforcement agencies. The regulation applies to very few agencies, but as a cautionary approach to handling sensitive criminal intelligence data, most state and local agencies have adopted 28 CFR Part 23 as an operational standard.

## Chapter Three

### *Methodology and Data Collection Processes*

#### **H.I.T.S. Evaluation Report to the Washington State Attorney General**

This study relies on the findings in an unpublished evaluation report on a unique criminal investigation unit housed with the office of the Washington State Attorney General (Johnson, et al. 2006). A detailed description of the operations of the Homicide Investigation Tracking System (H.I.T.S) will follow in chapter four, but a depiction of the methods used for conducting the evaluation study is essential to the present study as a preface to that description. A depiction of the methodologies and data collection processes relied upon will provide a good account of the study participants and the nature of their ideas regarding the state of the criminal investigation information sharing process in contemporary policing. Before moving too deeply into the range of research methods used, a brief overview of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington will give the reader a good conceptual framework of how similar programs might help fill information gaps in their own jurisdictions.

The H.I.T.S. unit is rather unusual in that it is housed within the criminal investigation division of the Office of the Washington State Attorney General. Its purpose is to help local law enforcement agencies statewide investigate homicides and serious sexual assaults, with an emphasis being placed on helping “small counties with big cases first, and big counties with small cases last” (Moran, 2006: 1). The H.I.T.S. unit is the only such known unit operated at the state level in the United States. The services provided by the H.I.T.S. team of nine investigators

and one crime analyst include most of the criminal investigation support that is normally found within police agencies. There is no charge to the local agency for the research and investigative services provided to them, and the H.I.T.S. investigators are all retired detectives drawn from law enforcement agencies throughout Washington State. Focusing on unsolved homicides as a priority, the H.I.T.S. team will assist any local law enforcement agency on any crime of a serious nature. Their myriad databases house current as well as legacy archival data that are not available in any other single source in Washington State. Further discussion of the capabilities of the H.I.T.S. team will be provided in chapter 4, following an in-depth description of the methodologies used for gathering the data assembled for the W.S.U. evaluation study providing a foundation for this dissertation.

To accomplish this evaluation, several types of data were gathered to gain insight on the two specific areas of interest (the relevancy of the technology used by the H.I.T.S. team, and the utility of the services provided by the people who work in the H.I.T.S. unit). The Dillman Total Survey Design method was used in developing and carrying out the several mail and on-line surveys conducted for the evaluation study (Dillman, 2000). The first area of interest, program impact on service recipients, was evaluated through the interpretation of pre-tested, self-administered surveys sent to criminal investigators, their supervisors (mid-level investigators), and to Police Chiefs and Sheriffs. Tribal Police Chiefs were also included in that mail survey effort. All surveys were multi-wave, with a minimum of two follow-ups with non-respondents. A self-administered survey was also sent to H.I.T.S. unit investigator/analysts, and follow-up interviews were conducted with each investigator and the crime analyst. An additional self-administered survey was used to assess the usefulness of H.I.T.S. bulletins (police advisories



distributed via e-mail) created and disseminated by the H.I.T.S. unit. That survey was conducted on-line, and the survey participants were bulletin recipients who carry out various roles in the criminal justice community.

In conjunction with the mail and on-line self-administered surveys, several focus group sessions were organized and numerous key actors were interviewed, either in person or over the telephone. Adding to the value of this evaluation is an analysis of the very large number of H.I.T.S. Bulletins created and distributed by the H.I.T.S. team. The analysis of the 1,179 bulletins assessed includes the first one issued on January 16, 2002, and concludes with those H.I.T.S. Bulletins issued up through mid-April of 2006.

### **Profile of Evaluation Survey Participants**


Each section below serves to identify evaluation study participants based on their respective law enforcement roles. This information will serve to inform the reader as to the question of to whom the H.I.T.S. program provides its various investigative services. Along with the description of the roles played by each type of survey respondent is an account of the rate of response achieved in the multiple-wave surveys administered over the course of several months during 2006. The costs associated with the collection of these data were covered by the Office of the Washington State Attorney General, and the data collection process was carried out by the staff of the Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State University. The author served as a member of the W.S.U. evaluation team and was responsible for carrying out the surveys, conducting the focus group sessions, and conducting all of the personal interviews.

### **Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, and Their Respective Agencies**

Police Chiefs from 215 municipalities, tribal police chiefs from 21 tribal law enforcement agencies, and Sheriffs from all 39 counties in Washington were invited to participate in the H.I.T.S. “user” surveys (total N=275). Participation varied somewhat across job titles; the levels of participation which occurred in the 2006 survey of H.I.T.S. user groups are reported below. It was anticipated that many of the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs surveyed would delegate the completion of the H.I.T.S. survey to one of their subordinates due to time constraints imposed on them by the demands of their status as the chief executive officer of their respective agencies. Responses graphed out on the following chart document the rate of response attained in the Chiefs and Sheriffs survey, and the degree of delegation that occurred at the CEO level in the completion of this survey (N=177; response rate  $[177/275] = 64.4\%$ ).

It is noteworthy that two out of three of the Police Chiefs and County Sheriffs surveyed completed the H.I.T.S. survey questionnaire themselves rather than delegating that task to a trusted subordinate. This fact attests to the importance of the topic for the many Police Chiefs and Sheriffs taking part in the W.S.U. evaluation study. The response rate of 64% lies in the normal range for institutional surveys of this type [see excellent review of literature on response rates for institutional surveys in Steven J. Ziegler, “Increasing Response Rates in Mail Surveys Without Increasing Error: A Research Note.” *Criminal Justice Policy Review*, (2006) 17 (1), 22-31]. The suggestions made by Ziegler were implemented in the design and administration of the survey components of the H.I.T.S. program evaluation study.

Figure 3.1




Fully 114 (64.4%) of the survey respondents noted that they are the Chief of Police or Sheriff; another 13 (7.3%) stated they were either a bureau chief or an undersheriff. Many of the 37 (20.9%) survey respondents who indicated “other” identified themselves either as investigative division commanders or acting chiefs. Another 11 (6.2%) identified themselves as holding the title of Deputy Chief/Assistant Chief or Assistant Sheriff. Two (1.2%) missing responses were noted on this survey item. Based on these findings, the W.S.U. evaluation team had a high degree of confidence that the questions targeting the state’s local Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were answered by those with the authority over and/or first-hand knowledge of jurisdictional command-level issues relating to the investigation of serious crimes. Next, the evaluation study team sought to determine the size of agencies managed by the Chiefs and

Sheriffs surveyed. The pattern of responses collected with respect to agency size is represented on the following graph.

*Figure 3.2*

**DISTRIBUTION OF AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN THE 2006 POLICE CHIEF AND SHERIFF SURVEY BY AGENCY WORKFORCE SIZE**




The distribution of agencies represented by participating Police Chiefs and Sheriffs (N=177) indicated to the W.S.U. evaluation team that local law enforcement jurisdictions of all sizes were adequately represented in this evaluation. It was anticipated that the majority of agencies represented would be composed of 25 or fewer officers. The graph above demonstrates that 70.6% of the respondents to the Chief and Sheriff survey manage small (25 or fewer officers) agencies, while just over 10% run medium sized agencies (51-100 officers), and another 10% lead large agencies (more than 100 officers). The Washington Statewide Regional

Homeland Security Coordination Districts were used in an effort to determine the general geographical breakdown of 2006 H.I.T.S. Survey respondents.<sup>2</sup>

*Figure 3.3*

**GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 2006 H.I.T.S. SURVEY RESPONDENTS TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER SURVEY [N=177]**



Fully 31 (17.5%) of responding Police Chiefs and County Sheriffs manage agencies in the Homeland Security Coordination Districts that include Snohomish, Whatcom, or Skagit Counties, while another 26 (14.7%) manage agencies located in the City of Spokane, in Spokane County, and in other eastern Washington cities and counties. Based on the information displayed in the two foregoing charts, it appears that agencies of a variety of sizes and a wide array of urban, suburban and rural geographical locations within Washington state are represented among

<sup>2</sup> Map shown on page 60 is courtesy of and prepared by the staff of the Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, and is available at [www.emd.wa.gov](http://www.emd.wa.gov). The map is used here with permission of that agency.

the H.I.T.S. survey respondents. [An enlarged version of the following map of Washington's Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Districts is available in [appendix 6.](#)]

*Figure 3.4*


### Washington Statewide Regional Homeland Security Coordination Districts (RHSCD)



Since the H.I.T.S. program is based on effective collaboration with local law enforcement leaders on the part of the people who work in the H.I.T.S. unit using the information technology available to them, the following two questions were posed to Police Chiefs and Sheriffs to help evaluators uncover possible “advanced technology aversion” that might negatively impact the use of H.I.T.S. services by local law enforcement agencies.

Figure 3.5

**Survey Item:**




A total of 144 (81.4%) Washington police executive survey respondents claim to be comfortable with new technologies, while 32 (18.1%) purport to be willing to adopt new technologies despite their personal lack of technological inclination. This is an important factor to document in the survey since much of what the H.I.T.S. program offers involves the use of new communication technologies and innovative analytical methods designed to assist local law enforcement officers in identifying patterns of crime commission and making linkages between and among persons of interest which are helpful in solving violent crimes. It is additionally important from the standpoint of a law enforcement leadership role. If the person at the CEO level of law enforcement in a given law enforcement agency has a particular proclivity, it is likely that his or her staff will likewise engage or disengage with specific practices reflecting

those proclivities. Responses to this question by supervising investigators and criminal investigators are reported next for comparison and contrast.

### **Supervising Investigators and Their Respective Agencies**

Similar questions to those posed to Washington Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked of 157 supervising investigators in order to develop a profile of these survey respondents (N=87, or 55.4%) of those contacted. These survey respondents serve as crucial “middle management” in local law enforcement agencies, and because of that role their views are of particular interest. There is considerable literature dealing with the critical role—often oppositional—of middle managers in the process of adaptation to organizational change (Townsend, Johnson and Pease, 2003; Ratcliffe 2008; Chan, 2008). For this reason it was important to include this group in the H.I.T.S. program evaluation.

*Figure 3.6*






At first glance it would appear that supervising investigators from agencies with more than 100 officers were disproportionately represented in this survey (constituting over a third of the respondents). The distribution of investigation supervisors is quite diverse upon a closer look, however. While 28 (32.2%) of the responding supervising investigators represent large (more than 100 officers) agencies, 22 (25.2%) of these supervisors work in small agencies of 25 officers or fewer, and another 33 (37.9%) carry out their duties in mid-sized agencies of more than 25 but fewer than 51 officers. It was also determined that the number of investigators being supervised by these middle managers within the agencies represented in the survey varied considerably, with most managing small units of five or fewer full-time investigators. This means that these investigator supervisors are working in settings where the resources of the H.I.T.S. program could theoretically be of greatest benefit to local investigators

*Figure 3.7*

**Survey Item:**




While 58 (66.6%) of the supervising investigators responded that there are ten or fewer full-time investigators in their particular law enforcement agency, 26 (29.9%) indicated there are more than ten full-time investigators present in their department. Survey respondents were given the opportunity to inform the W.S.U. evaluation team as to the level of government of their sponsoring agency on a continuum ranging from municipal, to county, to state, to tribal, and finally to federal government. Though response options included that of *federal*, no survey participant selected that option. The breakdown of survey respondent agencies by level of government represented is depicted in the following graph.

Figure 3.8

**DISTRIBUTION OF AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN THE  
2006 SUPERVISING INVESTIGATOR SURVEY:  
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT**

**Survey Item:**




As anticipated by the W.S.U. evaluation team, the majority of respondents reported that they serve in municipal agencies (54, or 62.1%), followed by county (27, or 31.0%), state (2, or 2.3%), and tribal (1 or 1.1%) law enforcement agencies. Additionally, investigative supervisors responded overwhelmingly in the affirmative that their respective agencies carry out a comprehensive law enforcement mission which includes crime investigation. This information contributes to the confidence that the H.I.T.S. surveys disseminated by the W.S.U. evaluation team reached the desired target audience; this is the client group that the H.I.T.S. unit was created to serve. Response options for this question on the survey included the categories of corrections, law enforcement, prosecution, and “other.”

*Figure 3.9*

**DISTRIBUTION OF AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN THE  
2006 SUPERVISING INVESTIGATOR SURVEY:  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FUNCTION**

**Survey Item:**

**Which of the following describes the primary function of the agency that employs you?**




Criminal Justice Functions Carried Out (options included corrections, law enforcement, prosecuting attorney and “other”)

[N=87]

As was the case with the survey of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, the W.S.U. evaluation team sought to document the geographic distribution of agencies served by responding supervising investigators. It is important, of course, that a high degree of diversity of survey respondents be present among the investigator supervisors responding to the self-administered survey across the state's nine homeland security coordination districts.

*Figure 3.10*




A total of 14 (16.1%) of the responding supervising investigators work in law enforcement agencies in Snohomish, Whatcom, or Skagit Counties, while 10 (11.5%) work in the City of Spokane, Spokane County, or other eastern Washington cities and counties. A total of 13 (14.9%) respondents to the 2006 mail survey serve in various law enforcement agencies located in King County.

Since the H.I.T.S. program focuses on collecting crime “data related to homicides, sexual assaults, and other crimes” (Moran, 2006) the W.S.U. evaluation team focused its attention on those activities conducted by survey respondents that specifically link up to homicides

(murders), sexual assaults, and other violent crimes. Specifically regarding supervising investigators, the following graph demonstrates that virtually all of the respondents participating in the supervising investigators survey [85, or 97.7%] confirmed in their respective questionnaires that they have investigative authority for the critical tasks set forth by the Criminal Justice Division of the Washington Office of Attorney General.

*Figure 3.11*

**Survey Item:**




Also of importance to evaluators was whether or not investigative supervisors actively participate in criminal investigations. This question serves to inform evaluators of the need to filter analyses of some survey data when they consider responses by supervisors to questions that pertain to the functional intricacies related to the investigative role, especially as they pertain to the availability and delivery of H.I.T.S. program services. A total of 68 survey respondents

(78.2%) responded that they not only supervise investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, but they also actively participate in such criminal investigations. A total of 17 (19.5%) survey respondents responded that they supervise investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, but they themselves *do not* actively participate in such investigations. In subsequent analyses reported in this dissertation these particular investigative supervisors were excluded from the analysis conducted in some instances.

*Figure 3.12*

**Survey Item:**




[N=87]

A potential indicator as to the likelihood of a supervising investigator embracing that which the H.I.T.S. program offers is the acclimation of that supervisor to new technologies. Some of the literature on the barriers to organizational change posed by middle management opposition relate to this phenomenon of aversion to new technology (Ratcliffe, 2008; Weisburd

et al, 2003; Eterno and Silverman, 2005) hence it is important to assess the degree to which this phenomenon is at play in the case of the H.I.T.S. program. Responses to the following question indicate that most of the Washington state investigative supervisors are either currently rather comfortable with new information technology, or they are willing to embrace it if that specific technology supports the accomplishment of their agency mission.

*Figure 3.13*  
**Survey Item:**



The responses given to the technology acceptance question are in the range anticipated. A different outcome, such as a large percentage of investigative supervisors responding that they are often confused by new technologies, would have signaled to evaluators that many of the services offered by the H.I.T.S. unit are potentially misdirected. One would hope to find as well

that criminal investigators responded in similarly high numbers to this question on receptivity to new information and crime analysis technologies.

The next question asked of supervisors also provides evaluators with a strong indication that H.I.T.S. unit resources are correctly founded. Forthcoming discussions related to services offered by the H.I.T.S. team will be better understood because of the information the next table confirms. A total of 74 supervisors (85.1%) opine that law enforcement has access to all of the technological tools it needs to clear crimes, but felt that agencies have to make greater efforts to learn how to use them more effectively. This finding would seem to echo one of the principal findings reported in the 911 Commission Report that, “The U.S. government has a weak system for processing and using what it has.” (911 Commission Report: 416). A similar conclusion was arrived at regarding the use of GIS technology in one of the major agencies included in this study (the Spokane Police Department) in a doctoral dissertation recently completed at Washington State University (Akgul, 2008).

As a reminder, the present section of this dissertation serves to profile the evaluation study participants. The connection between responses such as this one with the services offered by H.I.T.S. will be provided later in the dissertation.

Supervisor attitudes regarding their willingness to embrace mission-driven new and unfamiliar technologies were also assessed directly in the survey process. Even though the possible responses for this question ranged all the way from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” along a five-point continuum, 100% of the responding investigative supervisors either somewhat or strongly agreed that they embrace any information or investigatory technology that




helps their agency become more efficient or effective in carrying out its law enforcement duties as the following chart shows:

*Figure 3.14*

**Survey Item:**

**Which of the following statements best represents your perspective on the proper place of new technologies in criminal justice? [Investigator Supervisors]  
[N=87]**




This information bolstered the confidence of the W.S.U. evaluation team that the need for the criminal investigation services provided by the H.I.T.S. unit is strongly present in the local law enforcement community throughout Washington and at all levels of policing—municipal, county and state.

*Figure 3.15*

**Survey Item:**

**As an investigator/investigative supervisor for a criminal justice agency,  
I embrace any technology that helps my agency become more efficient or  
effective in its functions. [Investigator Supervisors]**

**[N=87]**




In summary, most supervising investigators who participated in the 2006 H.I.T.S. evaluation survey were working supervisors at the time of the survey. That is to say, these survey respondents conduct criminal investigations as well as supervise others who likewise investigate homicides and rapes/sexual assaults. Most of these local law enforcement supervisors work for either a city or county agency whose main role is the provision of comprehensive law enforcement services. The investigative supervisors surveyed are about evenly divided among small, medium and large agencies from all nine of the state's Homeland Security coordination districts. About half of them work in agencies with 10 or fewer full-time investigators, and the other half work in agencies with more than 10 full time investigators. The vast majority of these local agency supervisory investigators say that they openly embrace new

technologies that will assist them in the accomplishment of their law enforcement goals. The next section of this chapter features a profile of the respondents to the investigator survey, and documents the character of the agencies in which they work.

### **Criminal Investigators and Their Respective Agencies**

Fairly comprehensive survey questionnaires were mailed to 566 criminal investigators scattered throughout Washington. The survey recipients were drawn from lists of known investigators identified by the Office of the Attorney General from all officially recognized law enforcement agencies present in Washington, including both municipal and county agencies. The W.S.U. evaluation team received 293 responses, for a return rate of 51.8%. More than one third (114, or 38.9%) of the criminal investigators who responded to the mailed, self-administered written survey have a workforce of 100 officers or more. Some 68 (23.2%) work in law enforcement agencies with 51 – 100 commissioned officers, and 47 (16%) work in city or county agencies with 26 – 50 officers. As reported in the following chart, 52 (17.8%) are working in local police agencies with 25 or fewer officers.


*Figure 3.16*



It was anticipated by the W.S.U. evaluation team that Homeland Security Coordination District Region 6 would be heavily represented by criminal investigators who responded to the written survey. Region 6 includes Seattle and King County wherein nearly half of the state's population resides. Despite the high level of representation of that region (82, or 28%), other regions across the state received fairly proportionate representation. As the chart below shows, while regions 1 and 6 each received more than 20% of the total criminal investigation representation, no region received less than 5% of the representation. By comparison, Spokane city and county (and the other jurisdictions that make up region 9) was represented by 25 (8.5%) of the criminal investigator responses.

*Figure 3.17*


**Criminal Investigators by Geographic Area [N=293]**



As verified in the following graph, 98% of criminal investigator respondents indicated they have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, or other violent and non-violent crimes committed within the state of Washington.

*Figure 3.18***Survey Item:**


**Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, or other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of Washington? [N=293]**



Upon further breakdown of the survey responses reported by criminal investigators in Washington, it was learned that 188 (64.2%) investigator survey respondents claim to spend somewhere between one and 24% of their time carrying out investigations on homicides. An additional 30 (10.2%) of these investigators indicate they spend more than a quarter but less than half of their working time investigating homicides cases. Finally, a total of 36 (12.3%) of the survey respondents indicated that they tend to spend more than half of their duty day investigating homicides.


Figure 3.19

**Survey Item:**




The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team was interested to learn about the nature of rapes/sexual assaults investigations in Washington state. Providing assistance to local law enforcement agencies is a critical mission task of the H.I.T.S. program, and this information can help to establish the degree to which the H.I.T.S. team members are addressing this important investigative function. The graph below shows that a total of 112 (38.2%) of the respondents to the criminal investigator survey spend 1 – 24% of their time investigating rapes/sexual assaults. Another 48 (16.4%) work on rapes/sexual assaults more than a quarter, but less than half, of their working time. Finally, 70 (23.8%) of the investigators indicated that they spend more than half of their time investigating rapes/sexual assaults.

*Figure 3.20*  
**Survey Item:**



In determining the potential impact of the H.I.T.S. unit/team on criminal investigators, it is important to have a good understanding of the assignment cycle for the role of detectives. Discussed later in the dissertation are the frustrations H.I.T.S. team members frequently experience as they attempt to keep in touch with an ever-transitory investigator client base. The following table serves to inform evaluators of the likelihood that H.I.T.S. team members have to update periodically their investigator contact list. A total of 119 (40.6%) of the criminal investigators who responded to the written survey claim to have been homicide investigators for more than five years. Another 102 (34.8%) stated that they have been homicide investigators for between one and five years. Of those who indicated that they investigate homicides, only 22 (7.5%) have been doing so for less than a year.

*Figure 3.21*  
**Survey Item:**




This information confirms that the W.S.U. evaluation team was successful in getting the H.I.T.S. program evaluation client survey in the hands of many seasoned investigators. The survey-based information that is forthcoming from criminal investigators is therefore reliable inasmuch as it was produced by experienced investigators working in a wide variety of Washington's local law enforcement agencies.

Although nearly a quarter of those responding indicated that they do not investigate rapes/sexual assaults, 204 (69.6%) of those responding to the survey affirmed that they *do* investigate rapes/sexual assaults and indicated that they have been doing so for a year or longer. Only 14 (4.8%) claim to have been investigating rapes/sexual assaults for less than a year. As



with homicide investigators, the W.S.U. evaluation team was confident that the responses that follow which pertain to rapes/sexual assaults are made by competent, seasoned investigators.

*Figure 3.22*  
**Survey Item:**



A total of 109 (37.2%) Washington investigators responded that they work in an agency that employs ten or more full time investigators, while 59 (20.1%) indicated that they work in an agency with more than six but fewer than ten investigators. Another group of 110 (37.5%) survey respondents indicated that they work in a law enforcement agency that has only one to five investigators. In keeping with H.I.T.S. mission goals of serving smaller agencies with big cases as a priority, it is indeed significant that more than half of the respondents to the 2006 H.I.T.S. program evaluation client investigator survey work in small agencies. An operational


doctrine of the H.I.T.S. unit is to work first with small agencies that have big cases, then to work with big agencies that have small cases if resources and time available permit.

*Figure 3.23*

**Survey Item:**

**To the best of your knowledge, how many full-time investigators (including homicide and rape/sexual assault specialists) are employed by your agency?**

[N=293]




The majority of Washington's criminal investigators who responded to the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation survey (166, or 56.7%) are employed in a municipal law enforcement agency, while the majority of the balance 113 (38.6%) work in a County Sheriff's department. Only four (1.4%) of the investigator survey respondents work in federal agencies, and only one person (.3%) indicated they work in either in a tribal or private agency. The most likely scenario for a survey respondent is that the criminal investigator participating in the survey in 2006 worked in a local city police department or county sheriff's department and carries out

the types of major crime investigations that the H.I.T.S. program is designed to support and assist.

*Figure 3.24*  
**Survey Item:**

**Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that employs you? [N=293]**



In summary, a preponderance of criminal investigators who responded to the survey conducted as part of the H.I.T.S. program evaluation have been employed as a rape/sexual assault or homicide investigator for more than a year. They represent all geographical areas in Washington state, with the highest concentration coming from the densely populated areas of Whatcom, Skagit, Snohomish and King counties. While 114 (38.9%) of the survey respondents represent agencies that have over 100 full time-officers, over half (167, or 57%) represent agencies with under 100 full-time officers.

### **H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analysts**

The H.I.T.S. unit was headed by Scott Blonien, Criminal Justice Division Chief, at the time of the study. The H.I.T.S. unit is supervised by Darryl Roosendaal, Chief Investigator. There are several support staff members who assist in data entry, data analysis, and staff document preparation work. At the core of the H.I.T.S. unit are six investigator/analysts. Currently employed in that capacity are Tammee Matheny, Marv Skeen, Jim Hansen, George Fox, Dick Gagnon, and Rick Grabenstein. Five of the H.I.T.S. unit team of investigator/analysts have a combined 173 years of field law enforcement experience, with most of that experience being in investigating homicides, rapes/sexual assaults, and other violent crimes. Only Tammee Matheny serves the unit with no prior field investigative experience, but the W.S.U. evaluation team determined from a combination of personal interviews, unsolicited comments from field investigators, and a review of her work outputs at the H.I.T.S. unit that she has developed into a highly critical asset for the H.I.T.S. unit. Ms. Matheny brings to the table valuable expertise in data location and pattern/linkage analysis that has proven to be mission-critical. Detailed biographies of all of the members of the H.I.T.S. staff can be found in appendix 7.

### **Bulletin Recipients (On-line Survey)**


Everyone included on the H.I.T.S. e-mail list who is entitled to receive the H.I.T.S. Bulletin (on-line police advisory) was e-mailed a survey in which they were asked to assess the H.I.T.S. program services (see appendix 5). The on-line survey resulted in 643 responses (N=643); however, for the purposes of this dissertation a filter was run on the dataset to sort out

those survey respondents who had no investigative responsibilities. The result was a sub-set of survey data (N= 219) representing verified criminal investigators. None of the filtered responses had a bearing on the outcome of the evaluation study of this dissertation. Most of the excluded survey respondents were Community Corrections Officers (CCOs). The state's CCOs are indeed an important component of the H.I.T.S. unit target audience for the purpose of assisting investigators in tracking offenders, but their lack of direct contribution to the investigation of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults would have translated into a significant skewing of the survey results had their survey responses been grouped with those of investigators.

The result of the sorting of respondents in this way is that the evaluation report and this doctoral dissertation are both informed predominately by the views and experiences of Washington's criminal investigators. That fact is in concert with the mission of the H.I.T.S. unit, to provide timely and helpful assistance to local investigators in their efforts to anticipate, prevent and solve crime through the effective sharing of crime investigation information across law enforcement agency boundaries. The following graph confirms that the filtering of respondents to the on-line survey of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients resulted in the identification of and connection with the targeted criminal investigators dealing with the major crimes of homicide and sexual assault committed in the Evergreen State.

Asked to specify their role in the criminal justice system, some 125 (57.1%) of the on-line survey respondents indicated conducting criminal investigations. Another 56 (25.6%) of the on-line survey respondents indicated that they are supervising investigators, and 20 (9.1%) survey participants responded that they are patrol officers.


*Figure 3.25*  
**Survey Item:**



The vast majority (181, or 82.6%) of the on-line survey participants responded that they spend less than a quarter of their time investigating homicides, and nearly everyone who responded (206 or 94%) claimed to spend less than half of their time investigating homicides. Only 13 (5.9%) of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient respondents reported that they spend more than half of their duty time on homicide investigations. However, a large proportion of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient survey respondents did report that they spend more than half of their time investigating sexual assaults (22.4%), while 45 (20.5%) claim to spend up to a quarter of their available time investigating sexual assaults.

Figure 3.26


**Survey Item:**



Next, the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team wanted to know if the H.I.T.S. Bulletins were being received by an acceptable number of homicide investigators who had considerable time on the job. Of those responding that they investigate homicides, over half (111 or 50.7%) have been doing so for more than five years. Another 63 (28.8%) report having been homicide investigators for between one and five years. Of those responding that they do investigate homicides, only 17 (7.9%) report having been homicide investigators for less than one year. Based on this information, the W.S.U. evaluation team was quite confident that survey responses collected from H.I.T.S Bulletin recipients reflected adequate field-level investigative experience to inform the evaluation as to the H.I.T.S. unit's impact on local criminal investigators.

Figure 3.27


**Survey Item:**



As with homicide investigators, those who investigate sexual assaults also represent sufficient experience to inform this evaluation. Length of time on the job as investigator of rapes/sexual assaults is considered to be important because longevity on the job affords investigators ample time to develop solid working relationships with other sex crime workers, such as nurses at hospitals. A total of 130 (59.4%) of the investigators responded that they have been sexual assault investigators for five years or more. Another 53 (24.2%) have been sexual assault investigators for between one and five years. Of those who responded that they are sexual assault investigators, only 9 (4.1%) have been doing so for less than one year, as indicated in the following chart.



*Figure 3.28*  
**Survey Item:**




Unlike the case with criminal investigator survey responses, the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients' survey reveals a pattern of heavy use of part-time investigators among investigators who work in agencies featuring ten or fewer criminal investigators. Some 187 (85.4%) of those responding to the on-line survey report working in agencies that have fewer than 10 full-time investigators. Only 24 (12.8%) of the on-line survey respondents indicated that they work in agencies featuring more than ten investigators. Another 54 (24.7%) survey respondents responded that their agency has no full-time criminal investigators, which indicates that their agencies make heavy use of part-time investigators. That is a common practice in small agencies that are strapped for manpower resources. Typically part-time investigators in such agencies also perform other tasks, such as patrol and traffic enforcement.

On-line survey respondents primarily work in city or county agencies, as was the case with respondents to the criminal investigators mail survey. Some 116 (53%) of the on-line

survey respondents work in a city agency, and 82 (37.4%) work in a county agency. Another 14 on-line survey respondents (6.4%) indicated that they work in a state law enforcement agency, and the balance (7, or 3.2%) work in either a federal agency or are employed by a tribal police department.

*Figure 3.29*  
**Survey Item:**



The overwhelming majority of 206 (94.1%) of the on-line survey respondents work in a public agency which carries out a law enforcement mission; the remainder of five (2.3%) survey respondents work in the area of community corrections. One person taking part in the on-line survey responded that he/she works in a prosecutorial function. One person also indicated he/she is the Sheriff of a county in which the Sheriff's department oversees jail operations.

In summary, on-line survey respondents work primarily in municipal police departments or in county sheriff departments in the role of criminal investigators. Most of them work in law enforcement agencies with fewer than ten full-time investigators, and they lay claim to five years or more of criminal investigative experience. Most of the survey respondents work less than a quarter of their time on homicide investigations, while nearly 43% work more than a quarter of their time on rape/sexual assault investigations.

### **Evaluation Study Focus Group Participants**

Focus group interviews were conducted in two distinct ways. First, in-person interviews were conducted over a two-day period at a basic homicide class held in Vancouver, Washington (N=30) on March 13 and 14, 2006. The training session was conducted by H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts, and it was certified for credit and hosted by the Washington Criminal Justice Training Commission (CJTC). Participants in that training class enrolled on their own accord, and their participation in the evaluation process was not anticipated by them at the time they enrolled in and began taking instruction in the course. Attendees were criminal investigators representing city, county and state law enforcement agencies operating in the state of Washington. The comments and observations made regarding the H.I.T.S. program were recorded on audio tapes and those discussions were subsequently transcribed by the W.S.U. evaluation team staff. The principal themes derived from this focus group session are incorporated into the analysis to follow in Chapter 4.

A second set of interviews was conducted among attendees of an interrogations class held in Cheney, Washington (N=9). That class, held at the Washington State Digital Archives

building on the campus of Eastern Washington University, was conducted by instructors from the F.B.I. and it was hosted by the Cheney Police Department. Attendees, representing a combination of city, county, state and federal agencies, did not know in advance that their participation in an evaluation study would be requested. Immediately prior to this focus group interview the evaluator/interviewer asked for a show of hands of those in the room who had *not* heard of the H.I.T.S. program. He then advised all who had not heard of H.I.T.S. that they could excuse themselves from the interview. It was reasoned that they would not be able to provide sufficient comment on the unit and its services to add substantially to the discussion of the H.I.T.S. program.

The fact that a number of the original class attendees had not heard of the H.I.T.S. program was of considerable concern to the W.S.U. evaluation team. The following is a list of agencies represented by the original attendees (N=33): Spokane County Sheriff's Office (13 participants); Washington State Department of Corrections (5 participants); Spokane Police Department (3 participants); Cheney Police Department (2 participants); F.B.I. (2 participants); Valley Fire Department (2 participants); Colville Police Department (2 participants); Kalispel Tribe (1 participant); Pullman Police Department (1 participant); Thurston County Sheriff's Office (1 participant); and Liberty Lake Police Department (1 participant).

Those who remained to participate in the focus group interview were: Spokane County Sheriff's Office and Spokane Police Department (7 participants); and Washington State Department of Corrections (2 participants). Notes were taken of the interview, and comments were used to support major themes derived from the evaluation study.

A third set of focus group interviews was conducted via telephone calls through a recorded conferencing call center. These focus groups targeted supervising investigators and Police Chiefs and Sheriffs. Those interviews, conducted over a two-day period, were also transcribed from audio recordings. Analysis and discussion of the research findings follow in Chapter 4, and major conclusions to be drawn and major policy implications of the case study are set forth in the concluding chapter.

## Chapter Four

### *Analysis and Discussion of the Research Data*

To the ends that this discussion should report how the findings of the H.I.T.S. evaluation report match up with theories and observations noted in the literature review, this author has elected to place these observations into three major categories. These significant topic headings include technologies, people, and organizational and professional environment. The *technologies* category will include discussions on the myriad topics relating to technology and how it is used in knowledge-based policing. Databases, software, and information outputs will anchor the discussion. The *people* section will center on various actors and their roles in the intelligence-led policing realm. The *environment* section is designed to illuminate the *organizational or professional culture* of policing, particularly as it relates to intelligence-led policing. The first topic, *technologies*, is quite detailed and follows immediately.

#### **Technologies**

This section is designed to inform the reader about the major information systems and components currently used in American policing. Details of each follow, then a discussion of some of the major H.I.T.S. evaluation report findings sheds light on how each of these information technologies is being used by criminal investigators in Washington State.

#### **National Crime Information Center**

The F.B.I.'s National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.) is a computerized database that maintains records of crimes and criminals. Included in this repository are vehicle and

licensing information, as well as records on boats and guns; information on wanted, missing, and unidentified persons is also maintained in N.C.I.C. records. There is an important component of N.C.I.C. that allows for the exchange of information across state lines between reporting agencies, and facilitates communication among those professional law enforcement personnel seeking specific crime-related information.

### **ViCAP**

The F.B.I. has a specialized unit dedicated to the identification and apprehension of violent criminals, particularly related to homicide and sexual assault. The Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) has 18 analysts who serve all of the U.S. One widely acknowledged problem associated with ViCAP, and shared with the H.I.T.S. program as well, is that it is underutilized. The F.B.I. has memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with only 900 agencies nationwide while 17,456 agencies report crimes to the FBI for tabulation in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs). That equates to less than a 6% rate of participation in ViCAP by local law enforcement agencies across the country. The H.I.T.S. program, which was purposefully modeled after ViCAP, benefits from their team of nine investigators (compared to 18 analysts with ViCAP) who serve a much smaller agency base in Washington State. That considerably higher investigator-to-agencies served ratio results in greater program efficiency.

### **Compstat**

Compstat (compare statistics or computer statistics) was discussed briefly in chapter two, but as a refresher it can be noted that Compstat is a police management tool being used by two-thirds of U.S. police agencies featuring 100 or more sworn police officers. First used in New

York City in the late 1990's, Compstat allows law enforcement managers to identify crime hot-spots and allows for the reporting of information on request, eliminating previous lengthy delays in reporting. Police agency management teams frequently use Compstat to make management decisions regarding patrol unit assignments based on geographically-focused criminal activity and/or anticipated public safety problems.

### **COPLINK®**

COPLINK® is a commercial database product, developed by the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the University of Arizona under a grant awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Science Foundation working in collaboration. The strengths of COPLINK® include its ease of access by remote desktop users and its quite massive collection of data. Weaknesses of the system include the high cost of implementation and the fact that the database is limited to data known to system management, a problem shared with all other information database systems. That is to say, data not known or data not included because it is not entered for other reasons, such as the lack of participation by the data host agency, will not be included for search purposes.

A major hurdle in the way of moving forward with the intelligence-led policing concept is the high cost to implement the new information technologies involved. Los Angeles County recently paid more than \$7 million to integrate COPLINK® with 45 local law enforcement agencies operating in Southern California. At that high cost, COPLINK® is cost-prohibitive for the vast majority of local agencies across the country, including most of those located in Washington; with the exception of the very largest agencies there is little chance that COPLINK® will become a significant resource for Washington's detectives. Without support



from a larger network (e.g., Los Angeles County in this case) local agencies must turn elsewhere for help. Most smaller agencies located outside of major metropolitan areas simply go without.

### **LInX**

The Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) is a collaborative technology tool for criminal investigators that deserves mention. It is a partnership between the United States Department of Justice and the Naval Criminal Investigative Services (N.C.I.S.) that operates in only a few regions in the United States. Of particular note is the Pacific Northwest unit that includes Washington, Alaska, Idaho, Nevada and Oregon. Unique to LInX is the feature that criminal investigators who work in agencies that have an executed memorandum of understanding (MOU) can access data that is stored in the LInX database from the convenience of the desk of the investigator. The data searched is housed in a separate data storage system managed by the N.C.I.S. but gathered from over 250 cooperating law enforcement agencies in the Pacific Northwest. LInX is light years ahead of the competition in that it is federal government operated, but not federal government owned. The participating agencies own the data, and share it within the co-op established through the N.C.I.S.-brokered MOU. It is inexpensive for local law enforcement to log on to the database, unlike the civilian model COPLINK®. Los Angeles County, as mentioned above, paid over \$7 million to connect 45 local agencies to COPLINK® within the past three years, but has now turned its attention to the less-expensive LInX.

LInX does not replace programs such as H.I.T.S.; however, because LInX and similar systems are content-based, they lack the *people* component (i.e., investigators with broad detective experience) that increases the appeal of H.I.T.S. The balance of the discussion relating

to crime-related information technologies will focus on Washington's H.I.T.S. program and the various forms of data collected during the H.I.T.S. program evaluation conducted by the Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State University.

### **Homicide Investigation Tracking System**

The Homicide Investigation Tracking System (H.I.T.S.) was founded in Washington State in 1987 and it is maintained in the criminal investigation unit of the Office of Attorney General Rob McKenna. Modeled after the F.B.I.'s ViCAP program, H.I.T.S. adds two important components to the information/knowledge universe. First, H.I.T.S. maintains nine full-time investigators who retired from various Washington State police agencies; these investigators specialized in the investigation of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults. Their field experience helps to open doors to investigators still active in local law enforcement agencies. The interaction between H.I.T.S. investigators and the field detectives offers one of the strongest tools available in the production of police work—namely, the human interaction of like-minded people working on the common goal of solving crimes. This interaction, when it occurs, increases the satisfaction of the public with the work of the police.

The second component H.I.T.S. adds is that the data maintained by the unit is never purged. There exists in the Washington State model of crime information sharing, therefore, legacy data which is lost by the other contemporaneous intelligence/information investigative systems mentioned above. It is the position of this author that the discussion of each of these systems moves forward with the mindset that for the rhetoric of intelligence-led policing to succeed, it is imperative that a collaborative platform be soundly established with the foundation being the integration of the best of each existing system. Just as some prominent proponents of

COP and POP have argued in the research literature reviewed above, ILP must integrate the community of intelligence/knowledge people and systems if ILP is to succeed as a model of *best practices*. With a brief description of the most prominent information systems behind us, we now focus on specific observations derived from the H.I.T.S. program evaluation report.

The target user of H.I.T.S. resources was determined by program evaluators as being any law enforcement agency member that has the authority to investigate, prevent, or otherwise intervene in criminal activity. Though the physical boundary was not set at the borders of Washington State, the scope of H.I.T.S. activities would seem to stop largely at the state's borders. There is anecdotal evidence that H.I.T.S. has an impact beyond the physical borders of the state, but forthcoming discussion and recommendations support the notion that H.I.T.S. mainly serves city, county, state and federal law enforcement officers operating primarily within the Evergreen state. The first objective of this evaluation was to determine how familiar the target user pool is with the H.I.T.S. unit, and with the various services provided by that unit. It is theorized that the first logical step in an agency's decision to make use of outside services is knowledge that the services in question exist. Other considerations such as cost for the use of such services follow. To get at the question of H.I.T.S. program familiarity, several questions were asked of survey, focus group, and personal interview participants. What follows is a brief discussion of each set of questions and their respective answers, categorized by investigative role.

To determine the extent to which criminal investigators (N=293) were familiar with the H.I.T.S. program, they were asked to answer a series of questions concerning program services. The first question posed addressed the overall level of satisfaction the respondent had regarding


services provided by H.I.T.S. The survey asked, “If you have used any of the services provided by the H.I.T.S. team, how would you rate your level of satisfaction with those services?” Only 14.3% of the criminal investigators surveyed indicated that they have *never used* the services of the H.I.T.S. team. It is a reasonable assumption that by the act of answering a question regarding the use of H.I.T.S. team services, investigators also intended to indicate their use of the H.I.T.S. database; recall that access to that database is only achieved through the H.I.T.S. team. A total of 233 (79.5%) of the survey participants responded that they were satisfied or highly satisfied with the services of the H.I.T.S. team. Only 5 (1.7%) indicated dissatisfaction with H.I.T.S. services. Another useful measure of familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program was derived by assessing answers to the following survey question: “Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best represents your level of information?” Fully 76.8% of criminal investigators responded that either they use H.I.T.S. even though it is not their primary investigative database, or that it is their primary investigative database. Only four out of 293 (1.4%) respondents indicated that they are not at all familiar with the H.I.T.S program.

Familiarity with H.I.T.S. was also measured by comparative reference to database use and preference. The following charts show the response rankings of each of the five most often cited criminal activity databases. Respondents were asked to rank each of the databases from 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest level of utility to the respondent and 7 being the lowest level of crime investigation utility.


The responses recorded were as anticipated by the W.S.U. evaluation team. The rationale for such anticipation is based on the fact that every commissioned law enforcement officer is introduced to the N.C.I.C. in the police academy operated by the Washington Criminal Justice

Training Commission. In addition, virtually every college student majoring in criminal justice is taught about the significance of the N.C.I.C. in their college textbooks. The N.C.I.C. is a long-time standard for criminal and crime scene information. In contrast, it is not assumed that law enforcement officers have been introduced to the H.I.T.S. program. The following table shows that 61.1% of the survey participants ranked the N.C.I.C. in the top spot in this ranking exercise. This question asked the respondents to rank each database; it did not ask them to compare databases with one another. That format allowed evaluators to make additional observations not available under a question structure that pits one database against another. One such observation is that while 61.1% ranked N.C.I.C. as their most utilized database, 75.1% ranked it as either #1 or #2. When asked to rank H.I.T.S., the next table shows that 22.9% of respondents ranked it as their most utilized database, but 61.5% picked H.I.T.S. as either their first or second choice. These survey-based results indicate quite clearly that both N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S. possess high familiarity and receive frequent use among criminal investigators carrying out their criminal investigations of homicides and sexual assaults and rapes in Washington State.

*Figure 4.1*



*Figure 4.2*



Rankings (1 = highest use and 7 = lowest use)

Three other databases were compared to N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S. The first, Law Enforcement Information Exchange LInX<sup>3</sup>, was cited as being the top utility database by 14 respondents (4.8%), compared to 61.1% and 22.9% top rankings for N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S., respectively. Unlike N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S., which were both considered strongly as either number one or number two databases in terms of utility, LInX was only ranked either number one or number two a total of 38 times (13%).

Figure 4.3




Figure 4.4





Figure 1.5



*These graphs show rankings of various databases by criminal investigators. One indicates the most use, and seven indicates the least use.*

<sup>3</sup> The acronym LInX accurately depicts the title of this young program (Law Enforcement Information Exchange), but the acronym has also appeared as LYNX.


COPLINK® was picked as the top database in terms of utility by 8 (2.7%) of the respondents, compared with RAIN, a King County regional database, which received 3 (1%) top utility rankings.

Another question devised to assist evaluators in determining familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program asked survey takers to rank databases based on their opinion as to the *best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information*. The responses, shown in the table below, not only indicate that criminal investigators are aware of the H.I.T.S. program, but they document the fact that they favor it over N.C.I.C. by a slim margin of 45.5% to 42.8% (N=293). The LInX system ranked third in this comparison, with 17 (5.8%) of the responses. There is no logical reason for the difference in responses to these two questions. Evaluators would have expected the responses to a question regarding opinion of best overall database to closely resemble the responses to a question referencing utility of the database.

*Figure 4.6*

**Survey Item:**

**Which do you see as being the best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information?  
[Investigators][N=293]**



Upon examining the information from the foregoing chart, the attention of program evaluators was drawn to the striking fact that most of the criminal investigators who responded to the survey seemed to ignore the ViCAP program as a resource in their work. The following section sheds additional light on the limited degree of use of the federal government’s ViCAP system in Washington state criminal investigations. The criminal investigator survey targeted investigator familiarity of the H.I.T.S. program through yet another question related to utility. Respondents were asked to describe the extent to which they rely on each of the major database resources available to them.

Figure 4.7

**Survey Item:**






Figure 4.8




Figure 4.9





Figure 4.10



It is noteworthy that several other database options were offered, but the level of their use was determined to be insignificant by comparison to those reported. An important inference is made when considering the other options, however. Databases that originated in Canada (ViClas), in New York (HALT), in Pennsylvania (ATAC), in Iowa, and in Minnesota (MINN/SCAP -Minnesota Sex Crimes Analysis Program) were so poorly represented in the responses given by Washington criminal investigators that credence is given to the value of local or regional databases in lieu of distant ones.


Again, only 4 respondents (1.4%) indicated that they never use H.I.T.S. A total of 270 (92.2%) of the survey respondents indicated some level of use of the H.I.T.S. program. These figures take into consideration some 19 (6.5%) survey takers who did not respond to this question. By contrast, 122 (41.7%) indicated use of LInX, and 90 (30.7%) indicated use of King

County’s RAIN database. N.C.I.C. was omitted from the list of possible responses, but there was an option for the inclusion of N.C.I.C. in the “other” selection. N.C.I.C. was only mentioned 25 times in the “other” category. Even if respondents simply selected H.I.T.S. as the best option available all the while neglecting to include N.C.I.C. in the “other” category, the survey results demonstrate a high level of familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program on the part of the state’s police investigators.

Survey participants were asked pointedly to indicate their level of knowledge regarding the H.I.T.S. program. Given a direct opportunity to indicate that they are not familiar with H.I.T.S., the table below confirms that 280 (95.6%) of those surveyed opined that they felt they were familiar with H.I.T.S.:

*Figure 4.11*

**Survey Item:**




An additional question was posed to criminal investigators, the answer to which supports the conclusion of wide familiarity and use of, as well as preference for, the H.I.T.S. program. In the following table, 143 (48.8%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I have used H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of an alternative resource(s).”

*Figure 4.12*

**Survey Item:**

**I have used H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of an alternate resource(s) [Investigators]  
[N=293]**



Only 48 (16.4%) respondents indicated that, although they have used H.I.T.S., they prefer to use an alternative database resource. When prompted to name the alternative source, N.C.I.C. was only mentioned 5 times, and none of the survey respondents selected either Rain or LInX systems over H.I.T.S.


A proxy for investigator familiarity and use of H.I.T.S. was indicated by responses to the following statement regarding content of the H.I.T.S. database: “I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children.” While 95.6% of the state’s criminal

investigators previously claimed to know about H.I.T.S., the W.S.U. evaluation team determined that their familiarity is likely at least somewhat superficial. Their collective answer to the present question indicates a lack of detailed knowledge of program elements. As indicated in the following chart, while 156 (53.2%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 134 (45.7%) were either uncertain, or they disagreed with the statement. An additional 39 (13.3%) indicated that they were not familiar enough with H.I.T.S. to respond to the statement.

*Figure 4.13*

**Survey Item:**

**I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children [Investigators]  
[N=293]**




More evidence of somewhat superficial familiarity of the H.I.T.S. program among the state's criminal investigators results from responses to the following survey statement: "I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System." Only four-in-ten (120) survey respondents correctly indicate this statement to be true; another 116 (39.6%) survey respondents were either uncertain or incorrectly disagreed with this factually correct statement concerning the H.I.T.S. program.

*Figure 4.14*

**Survey Item:**

**I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System [Investigators][N=293]**




Yet another proxy for documenting the level of familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program among criminal investigators is found in the following question regarding the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst who renders assistance to local investigators:

*Figure 4.15*

**Survey Item:**

**What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your agency? [Investigators][N=293]**



One-in-five (58 or 19.8%) of the survey respondents indicated that they did not know the name of their assigned investigator/analyst, or they simply did not answer the question. Answers to this question not only give an indication as to the degree of familiarity criminal investigators have with H.I.T.S., but they also provide understanding of the geographical location effects at play since the geographical assignment of each H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst does not change over time. A strong majority (235, or 80.2%) readily identified their own assigned investigator. It is not likely that respondents guessed at the name of an investigator without being familiar with the H.I.T.S. program, though that is perhaps a remote possibility.

In summary, criminal investigator familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program was measured several ways. In responses to their satisfaction level of services rendered by H.I.T.S., 85.7% indicated they had made use of H.I.T.S. program services. That percentage of familiar users varied, however, depending on the question asked. In a question about whether or not H.I.T.S. was the primary database of choice, 76.8% confirmed use of H.I.T.S. When compared to other databases, the use of H.I.T.S. was confirmed by 61.5% of the respondents. When asked to confirm the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst assigned to their agency, about four-in-five respondents could do so. That measure indicates about 80% familiarity, but that is not a fully reliable measure due to the fact that some who use H.I.T.S. might simply not be aware of their assigned investigator.

The best indicator of H.I.T.S. familiarity is the 95.6% negative response to the statement, “I do not know what H.I.T.S. is, nor have I ever used it.” It was apparent to the W.S.U. evaluation team, however, that Washington investigator knowledge of H.I.T.S. services may be broad but somewhat shallow because only about half of the respondents could confirm two true

statements about H.I.T.S. database content. The program evaluation team next examined the level of familiarity with H.I.T.S. exhibited by supervising investigators. The apparent dismissal of the ViCAP program of the F.B.I. by criminal investigators indicates that H.I.T.S. has been successful in securing its place as a legitimate source for crime scene, criminal, and victim information available to criminal investigators in Washington.

Supervising investigators were asked to rank a list of criminal databases with respect to their utility to them or their investigators. Their responses reflected those of investigators in that N.C.I.C. was selected most often as the most useful database among the choices offered. Other databases suggested in the survey were ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program), H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System), MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange), COPLINK®, RAIN, and LInX. As indicated in the charts below, 55 (63.2%) named N.C.I.C. as their first choice of databases with respect to their utility. Separately, 20 (23%) named H.I.T.S. as their first choice. Compared to the N.C.I.C., H.I.T.S. ranks high considering that 63 (72.4%) of supervisors regard H.I.T.S. as either their first or second choice of databases with respect to their utility, while 74 (85.1%) chose N.C.I.C. Only 5 (5.7%) of the supervising investigators selected LInX first, and 4 (4.6%) selected RAIN first.<sup>4</sup> ViCAP received only 8 (9.2%) responses, ranking it as either as the most or second-most used database.

As with criminal investigators, the supervising investigators were asked their opinion of the *best* overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information. H.I.T.S. was selected as the best overall database by 35 (40.2%) respondents, followed by N.C.I.C. (33 or 37.9%), LInX (9 or 10.3%), and COPLINK® (4 or 4.6%). RAIN and ViCAP were only selected

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
<sup>4</sup> For a complete list of responses, see appendix 10



once each (1.1% each) as the best overall crime scene, criminal, and victim information database:


*Figure 4.16*

**Survey Item:**



As with responses given by criminal investigators, survey responses indicate that H.I.T.S. has both strong use and support among supervising investigators. A striking observation is that both investigators and supervising investigators selected H.I.T.S. overwhelmingly over the FBI's ViCAP as their database of choice. It is reported elsewhere in this dissertation that the national ViCAP system does not enjoy the level of participation among local law enforcement agencies as does the Washington state H.I.T.S. program. The reason for the high level of awareness of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington state is likely due to the efforts of the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts who make themselves available to local agency criminal investigators. The following question pertains to H.I.T.S. awareness:


*Figure 4.17*  
**Survey Item:**



None of the 87 supervising investigators selected the option “I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard much about it.” Only 10 (11.5%) indicated that they are familiar with H.I.T.S., but that neither they nor their investigators make use of it. Their lack of use of H.I.T.S. might be the result of either their lack of need due to the size of their agency or the lack of serious crime within their respective jurisdictions. Investigating supervisors were also given a list of databases and asked to comment on their level of reliance on each. Included in the list were H.I.T.S., LInX, ViCAP and COPLINK©; the findings for each are shown in the following series of charts:

*Figure 4.18*

**Survey Item:**




A total of 22 (25.3%) of the supervisors cited H.I.T.S. as their primary database, and another 20 (23%) declared it as their secondary database. Some 83 (95.4%) of the supervisors indicated their familiarity with H.I.T.S. by declaring that they use the database at some level. Only 2 (2.4%) of the supervisors claim to never use H.I.T.S. The following table shows that investigative supervisors also acknowledged the use of LInX at some level (52 or 59.8%):

*Figure 4.19*



As with the criminal investigator survey, N.C.I.C. was not offered as an option. Among supervisors, only 4 (4.6%) declared N.C.I.C. as an investigative tool when they had to write it in as an option. Nobody selected ViCAP as their primary database, and only 7 (8.%) chose it as their secondary database. Some 22 (25.3%) indicated that they do not use ViCAP at all. These responses were unexpected given the clout and resources of the F.B.I. This situation gives rise to the question as to whether local law enforcement investigators and their supervisors are familiar with what it is that ViCAP can do for their criminal investigations.

*Figure 4.20*




COPLINK® is relatively new, and it was anticipated by the W.S.U. evaluation team that very few investigative supervisors would affirm that they use this database as their primary investigative tool. The following table demonstrates that only 4 (4.6%) use COPLINK® as their primary investigative database, and only 24 (27.6%) indicated that they use COPLINK® to any degree. One reason COPLINK® is not more widely used may be owing to its high cost of implementation. The COPLINK® sales website reports that a recent contract was negotiated to pull together data from 45 communities in the Los Angeles County region at a cost of \$7 million.

A follow-up interview with Tom O’Neil, Vice President of sales for the corporation, confirmed that the cost to implement the COPLINK® database in a city the size of Spokane could well exceed \$250,000.

*Figure 4.21*

**Survey Item:**



The above analysis gives the evaluation team a good idea of likelihood of use of H.I.T.S. by investigative teams. Fully 100% of the surveyed supervising investigators indicated they are at least somewhat familiar with H.I.T.S.

A total of 47 (54%) of the supervisors responded affirmatively to the following statement regarding the H.I.T.S. database: *My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children*; another 36 (41.4%) were uncertain or disagreed with the statement. That result compares with 156 (53.2%) criminal investigators who agreed or strongly

agreed with the statement, and 134 (45.7%) who were either uncertain or disagreed with the statement.


An additional question sheds somewhat more light on this issue on H.I.T.S. program content. Asked to comment on the statement, “My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database part of the Amber Alert System,” supervising investigators were likewise only partially (43.9%) able to confirm the statement.

*Figure 4.22*

**Survey Item:**

**My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part  
of the Amber Alert System [Supervising Investigators]**

**[N=87]**



It is difficult to say how much that question reveals about investigator-supervisor relationships, but one thing is quite clear. Both criminal investigators and supervisors indicated rather high


levels of awareness of H.I.T.S., but neither group could be definitive about this specific component of the H.I.T.S. program.

As in the case of criminal investigators, an exceptionally large proportion of supervising investigators could not identify the H.I.T.S. team investigator/analyst assigned to their particular agency. While nearly one-in-five investigators could not make the identification, nearly one-in-four supervisors (18 or 20.7%) could not make the proper connection. When the number who simply did not answer this question is factored in, that number climbs to 28 (32.2%), or close to one-in-three. The majority (59 or 67.8%) of those who answered the question did correctly identify an assigned investigator/analyst.

*Figure 4.23*

**Survey Item:**

**What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your agency? [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]**



In summary, supervising investigators reported a high level of awareness of the H.I.T.S. program (95.4% in an indirect response, and 100% on a direct response), but they were not sure

that their subordinate investigators would know specific important things about the H.I.T.S. program. Most supervising investigators correctly identified the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst assigned to their agency, but one-in-four could not do so. Supervising investigators ranked H.I.T.S. high in terms of use, placing it a close second to N.C.I.C. They selected H.I.T.S. as the overall best database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information. We next turn to an examination of the familiarity level that Police Chiefs and Sheriffs demonstrate regarding the H.I.T.S. program.


As with investigators and supervising investigators, Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked a series of questions designed to determine the level of awareness they possess with respect to the H.I.T.S. program. The first was, “Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best represents your level of information?” Their responses indicate that only 13 (7.3%) indicated that they were not at all familiar with H.I.T.S. That compares with the responses of 1.4% for criminal investigators, and 0.0% of supervising investigators to the same question. The survey responses registered to this question indicate that supervising investigators tend to be more familiar with H.I.T.S. than either their subordinate investigators or their respective Chiefs and Sheriffs.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs selected H.I.T.S. as their primary database 16% of the time. They selected it as their secondary database in greater numbers (18.4%), and overall 89.7% of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs indicated some use of H.I.T.S., as the following chart demonstrates:



*Figure 4.24*  
**Survey Item:**

**Please tell us about the extent of your agency's reliance upon these crime investigation resources:  
 H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System) [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]  
 [N=177]**




Unexpectedly, Police Chiefs and Sheriffs reject ViCAP as their primary database in almost every instance. Only one (0.6%) Police Chief or Sheriff selected ViCAP as their primary database. Ten (5.6%) law enforcement CEOs selected ViCAP as their secondary database, and 47 (26.6%) say they don't use ViCAP at all. These findings coincide with those derived from survey questions posed to both the criminal investigators and the supervising investigators. As mentioned earlier in this section of the dissertation the acknowledgement by criminal investigators, their supervisors, and their CEOs that they do not utilize such a vast database system that has nationwide roots is a significant commentary on the state of intelligence in an era that is witness to the development of intelligence led policing.

Figure 4.25

**Survey Item:**

**Please tell us about the extent of your agency's reliance upon these crime investigation resources:  
ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program) [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]  
[N=177]**




The following chart indicates that while 15 (8.5%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs noted LInX as their primary database, 59 (33.3%) claim to not use LInX at all.

Figure 4.26

**Survey Item:**


**Please tell us about the extent of your agency's reliance upon these crime investigation resources:  
LInX (Law Enforcement Information Exchange) [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]  
[N=177]**



Only 5 (2.8%) Police Chiefs and Sheriffs reported RAIN as their primary database, while 84 (47.5%) of their colleagues stated that they do not use RAIN at all:

*Figure 4.27*  
**Survey Item:**


**Please tell us about the extent of your agency's reliance upon these crime investigation resources:  
RAIN (King County) [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]  
[N=177]**



Only 3 Police Chiefs and Sheriffs (1.7%) claim COPLINK® to be their primary database, and fully 102 (57.6%) of the law enforcement CEOs reported that they do not use COPLINK® in any manner. These findings are not surprising since COPLINK® is a private, propriety database system that is expensive to implement and maintain. Additionally, because of its cost it has very limited data that is geographically narrow in scope. The following chart shows the relatively insignificant level of use of COPLINK® among local law enforcement agency CEOs:

Figure 4.28  
Survey Item:

Please tell us about the extent of your agency's reliance upon these crime investigation resources:  
**COPLINK® [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]**  
 [N=177]




As with the criminal investigator and supervising investigator surveys, N.C.I.C. was omitted as an answer option. Some 17 (9.6%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs wrote in N.C.I.C. under the “other” category. It is rather clear that a large proportion of Chiefs, Sheriffs, investigator supervisors, and criminal investigators are very much familiar with H.I.T.S., whether familiarity of H.I.T.S. relates to the overall program, the database, or the team of investigator/analysts. That said, it is also true that a majority of the same Chiefs, Sheriffs, supervisors, and investigators are relatively *unfamiliar* with the specific services offered by the H.I.T.S. team. Set forth below is a discussion of evidence that many who are familiar with the H.I.T.S. program are not particularly knowledgeable with respect to many of the services offered by the H.I.T.S. program.

Washington Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were also asked to identify the best overall database for

crime scene, criminal, and victim information. The following chart displays their responses on this question:

*Figure 4.29*

**Survey Item:**



A total of 79 (44.6%) of the law enforcement CEOs selected N.C.I.C. as the best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information. Another 37 (20.9%) cited H.I.T.S. as being the best overall database. ViCAP, expected by evaluators to receive higher assessments, was selected by only 8 (4.5%) as being the best overall database. LInX received 18 (10.2%) high rankings, while RAIN and COPLINK® each received less than 3% of the preference votes cast in the statewide police C.E.O. survey.

As with criminal investigators and supervising investigators, Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked to confirm their knowledge of two true statements regarding the H.I.T.S. database.


The following questions require them to make judgment calls as to both the knowledge level of their subordinates, and of the components of the H.I.T.S. database. The first question read as follows: “My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children.” This item was answered with rather mixed results. Fully 88 (49.7%) of the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs confirmed that they and their investigators are aware the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children. However, initially an identical number (89, 50.3%) could not make the connection:

*Figure 4.30*

**Survey Item:**

**Please respond to this statement specific to the AG's H.I.T.S. program: My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children. [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]**

[N=177]




The investigator supervisors were likewise unable to confirm the following statement: “My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System.” Only 82 (46.3%) could make the connection between their knowledge of what they and their

investigators know with the factual statement of this H.I.T.S. database component. This might not be a good proxy for assessing the level of familiarity of H.I.T.S. resources because it is not known what Police Chiefs and Sheriffs know about their investigators. Had familiarity with H.I.T.S. resources been more widely known, evaluators expected Chiefs and Sheriffs to have been more confident about their responses to these questions:

*Figure 4.31*

**Survey Item:**

**Please respond to this statement specific to the AG's H.I.T.S. program: My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System. [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]**  
[N=177]



In summary, Police Chiefs and Sheriffs are less familiar with H.I.T.S. than supervising investigators and criminal investigators. Only 16% of Chiefs and Sheriffs indicated that H.I.T.S. is their primary database, while 25.9% of supervisors and 22.9% of investigators made that preference designation.


Washington's Police Chiefs and Sheriffs indicated that H.I.T.S. is used far more frequently than ViCAP, which may support the hypothesis that police officials like working with other local police agencies when it comes to intelligence gathering and information sharing. There is evidence in the W.S.U. evaluation report to support the supposition that familiarity with H.I.T.S. by Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, as is the case with supervisors and investigators, only scratches the surface of potential benefits to be derived from the H.I.T.S. program. Many of the database capabilities and H.I.T.S. unit services are relatively untapped by law enforcement CEOs and their respective staff members. Familiarity with H.I.T.S. was also determined among H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients through the on-line survey process.

H.I.T.S. Bulletins are created by H.I.T.S. staff support personnel and are distributed via e-mail. They are generated with the help and prodding of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts assigned to each local law enforcement agency in Washington. Recipients of H.I.T.S. Bulletins were surveyed via the Internet. There were 643 respondents to the survey, but it was discovered that many who receive the H.I.T.S. Bulletins do not have investigative authority over homicide and rape/sexual assault cases. Such authority was determined to be an operational standard for the evaluation study. Some of the information from those lacking investigative authority is nonetheless important. Consequently, two separate data analysis runs were made on the on-line survey; one run includes all respondents (N=643), while the other run included only those survey respondents who have investigative authority over homicide and/or over rape/sexual assault cases (N=219). Most of the charts showing responses of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were taken from the surveys completed by investigators only. In the relatively rare event that survey responses from all survey participants were used to make a point, the reader is duly notified of



this fact. The first on-line survey question the W.S.U. evaluation team examined to aid in determining H.I.T.S. familiarity was:

*Figure 4.32*  
**Survey Item:**



Two-thirds (145, 66.2%) of the on-line survey respondents indicated that none of the obstacles posed in the question applied to them, which suggests that the results of the survey are informed by participants who are either familiar with H.I.T.S. and use H.I.T.S. services, or who don't encounter the obstacles set forth in the question. Another 32 (14.6%) cited time constraints as hindrances to full benefit of H.I.T.S., and yet another 38 (17.4%) indicated the lack of familiarity with H.I.T.S. as the cause.


One important measure of limited familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program services is demonstrated by the failure of about one-in-five of those surveyed in each survey subgroup to

identify the H.I.T.S. team investigator/analyst assigned to their own agency. The next chart sets forth findings regarding this question for the investigators responding to the on-line survey.

*Figure 4.33*

**Survey Item:**

**What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your agency? [Bulletin Recipients]**  
[N=219]



This question was designed to determine if criminal investigators were comfortable enough with either the person or name recognition of their assigned investigator/analyst. The results from this question indicate that the H.I.T.S. Bulletin user investigator/analysts demonstrate about 80% name recognition. To illustrate an important point, evaluators investigated the responses from all on-line survey respondents to this question. The finding of 51.2% checking the "I don't know" option among this group of 643 survey respondents is a clear indicator that those who do not have investigative authority (e.g., CCOs) could strongly skew the responses to this survey.


With over half of the on-line survey respondents responding that they could not identify the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst assigned to their agency, it can be concluded that H.I.T.S. Bulletins are being sent to many people who have no other connection with H.I.T.S. other than receipt of the periodic criminal investigation advisory bulletins (N=643).

As with criminal investigators, supervising investigators and Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were asked in the on-line survey to rank various databases in order of their utility. The responses to this survey question were open-ended. That is to say, each participant could write in any number of databases they wished, a format which differed from the responses allowed in the previous surveys. In those self-administered mail surveys, participants were asked to rank databases by use from one to seven. Therefore, the following responses include numbers higher than seven. On the chart below the lowest numbered responses indicate the highest use, and the highest numbered responses indicate the lowest use.

*Figure 4.34*

**Survey Item:**

**Please rank in order of utility in your crime investigation: N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)  
[Bulletin Recipients] [N=219]**




As is clearly indicated above a high number of survey respondents [145, or 66.2%] of those writing in a preference selected N.C.I.C. as their primary criminal activity information database.

With regards to H.I.T.S., 38 (12.4%) of the on-line respondents with investigative authority who indicated a preference signified H.I.T.S. as their primary database, and another 109 (49.8%) indicated it is their second-most used database:

*Figure 4.35*

**Survey Item:**




Some investigators who participated in the on-line survey indicated use of the RAIN database; it was mostly identified as a tool for use after their respective main databases were consulted. It is important to note that 122 respondents (55.7%) simply did not select RAIN in any capacity. Their responses are displayed as “missing data” on the statistical run.

As with RAIN, a large number of respondents simply did not comment on LInX (126 or 57.5%). It is not known if that is because of the lack of use or the lack of familiarity with the database, since there was not an option to specifically indicate either of those options. The fact that 7 (3.2%) investigators indicated zero use of the database suggests that those who gave no response are not familiar with LInX. A total of 46 (21%) respondents with a choice selected LInX as their second or third most used database:

*Figure 4.36*

**Survey Item:**

**Please rank in order of utility in your crime investigation:  
LInX [Bulletin Recipients]  
[N=219]**



As in the case of ViCAP, RAIN and LInX, many (in this case, 127 or 58%) of those surveyed did not comment on COPLINK®. Of those who commented, only 1 (.5%) ranked COPLINK® as their most-used database. Only 92 (42% of those surveyed) indicated use of COPLINK® to any degree.


In summary, investigators of all ranks and levels of responsibility who participated in the on-line (H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients) survey cited N.C.I.C. as their primary database in terms of utility. H.I.T.S. was ranked second, and ViCAP third. RAIN, LInX, and COPLINK® are used to some degree, but most who took the survey did not comment on any of the latter-mentioned databases. There were other options listed, such as HALT and ATAC, but they received such low rates of mention that their limited mention in the evaluation report leads to the likely conclusion that the more removed a database is from local input, the less likely investigators are to participate in the use of that database.

Answers to another question can be used to assess the level of familiarity with the H.I.T.S. unit, and/or its database components. Participants were asked, “How many times have you contributed data for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database.” It was reasoned by the W.S.U. evaluation team that an investigator must be familiar with H.I.T.S. if he/she has contributed information to the database. Certainly, not all of those failing to contribute to the H.I.T.S. database are without familiarity, so this is only intended as an indirect indicator:

*Figure 4.37*

**Survey Item:**

**How many times have you contributed data for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database? [Bulletin Recipients]  
[N=219]**



A total of 173 (79%) on-line survey respondents indicated that they have contributed information to the H.I.T.S. database at least once, with the majority (101 or 46.1%) of those having contributed information between one and five times. Another 44 (20.1%) survey respondents indicated they have contributed data more than ten times, which is a marker of regular H.I.T.S. use and participation for the evaluation team. Some of those who claim they have never provided information on criminal activity for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database gave specific reasons for their inactivity. Of those who gave reasons, the most commonly reason stated was that they have had no cases that needed it (7 or 3.2%). Other survey respondents indicated that it was not their job in their agency to do so (6 or 3.0%), while yet others indicated that they were not sure how to do so (4 or 1.8%). This question addressed those who were willing to submit data for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database. The final component of the determination of familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program includes an evaluation of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts.

Of course, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are intimately familiar with the H.I.T.S. program. In this section, evaluators included answers to questions posed to the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts to determine their familiarity with *their constituents*. That is, the W.S.U. evaluation team was seeking to determine how much H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts know about the use of H.I.T.S. services by those whom they serve. The first thing evaluators wanted to determine was how investigator/analysts responded compared to investigators in the field with respect to the general use of known databases.

H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked, “In a criminal investigation, which of the following do you see as being the ‘hub’ for crime scene, criminal, or victim information? (*Please mark only one selection*). Options given included: ViCAP; H.I.T.S.; SMART; CATCH;

MATRIX; N.C.I.C.; and COPLINK®. The H.I.T.S. staff was offered the opportunity to write-in a response.

Five H.I.T.S. staff (71.4%) indicated H.I.T.S. as the “hub” for crime scene, criminal, or victim information. One investigator/analyst cited N.C.I.C. as the hub, while nobody selected ViCAP. The remaining selection went to the subject of local database systems maintained by local agencies. Considering that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are (with one exception) seasoned crime scene veterans, their responses to this question are important in adding value to the evaluation study. They are either motivated to respond favorably to a system that they believe in, one that feeds them, or both. When the strong representation of H.I.T.S. by criminal investigators is factored in, it must be considered that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are drawn toward H.I.T.S. over N.C.I.C. due to their familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program and knowing about its capabilities. This observation adds weight to the conclusion that H.I.T.S.-like programs could serve as models for effective law enforcement information sharing missions nationwide.

All seven investigator/analysts agreed that H.I.T.S. Bulletins *do not* include all Amber Alerts generated in the state of Washington. Although H.I.T.S. is part of the National Amber Alert system, the H.I.T.S. Bulletins do not include all Amber Alerts issued. Such advisory bulletins are only generated when H.I.T.S. staff members are notified directly by administrators of the Amber Alert system of such an alert issuance.

Evaluators posed the question to the H.I.T.S. staff, “What percentage of the active homicide cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?” This is a good time to discuss vernacular as it was used in the survey instruments. The H.I.T.S. unit is not concerned with all cases of homicide occurring in the state of Washington. It is only



interested in those cases deemed or considered to be “murders.” The term “homicide” in the context of H.I.T.S. program operations would include any deaths not attributable to murder, such as justifiable homicide and accidental deaths. The H.I.T.S. unit *is* interested in gathering information on homicides for its crime scene database because it is not always apparent at first glance if the investigation is of a murder or not. For the purpose of the evaluation study the term “homicide” was taken to refer to all cases of interest to the H.I.T.S. unit wherein the death of a person has occurred. Five investigators agreed that 75-100% of all active homicide investigations (suspected murders) are known to H.I.T.S. One investigator believes that between 51 and 74% of such cases are known to H.I.T.S., and one investigator did not answer the question. Six H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts believe the H.I.T.S. team knows about most (75-100%) of the active cold case (stalled) homicides in their respective jurisdictions. Again, one investigator did not respond to the question.

H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked, “What percentage of the active sex crime cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?” The question could have been worded more carefully to capture the mission of the H.I.T.S. unit, which is to assist in the investigation of rape/sexual assault, and other serious violent crime. The answers given by investigator/analysts indicate, however, that they understood the intended spirit of the question.

Data collected from this question in the survey indicate that four investigators believe that only 1 – 24% of the active sex crime cases of the agencies within their support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S. One investigator believes that 75-100% of such cases is submitted to H.I.T.S., one did not know, and one did not respond to the question.

The previous two questions addressed what the W.S.U. evaluation team determined to be the most critical components of the H.I.T.S. unit mission. The H.I.T.S. unit was created to focus primarily on unsolved murders. The focus of the unit widened over time to include active assistance in the investigation of rapes. In the W.S.U. evaluation study the term “rapes” is always accompanied by the term “sexual assaults” because the terms have become interchangeable in both police and civilian jargon. The primary focus of the H.I.T.S. unit is the incidence of stranger-to-stranger rape. It is not important to the W.S.U. evaluators that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts be able to determine the exact number of homicides or rapes/sexual assaults reported to the H.I.T.S. unit. What is of importance is that they made distinctions between the reporting levels of homicides, cold cases, and rapes/sexual assaults. Their answers to the following questions indicate even finer distinctions being drawn. Two of the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts responded that between 54-74% of the missing persons aged 18 and over are reported to the H.I.T.S. unit. These data will come in handy later when the same question is responded to by criminal investigators. The importance of this information in the current context is that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are clearly split in terms of their familiarity of both mission goals and response from their respective jurisdictional agencies.

Regarding missing persons under the age of 18, three H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts believe that 75-100% of those cases are reported to H.I.T.S. One believes that number to be 1-24%, while another believes it to be 25-49%. One did not know, and one did not answer the question. As in the case before, evaluators are more concerned with the bigger picture presented by the pattern of responses to this question. What is apparent is that investigator/analysts are more likely to believe they know about more cases in which missing persons are under age 18

than they do about similar cases involving adults. This pattern of responses indicates that missing persons cases are important to investigator/analysts, and that those involving persons under age 18 are most important. The tracking of missing persons cases became an important mission of the H.I.T.S. unit due to the possible link between missing persons and both homicides and rape/sexual assault victims.

It is shown that most (five out of seven) respondents think that between 75 and 100% of those in agencies within their jurisdiction understand what the H.I.T.S. program can do for their agency. One thinks the percentage is between 50 and 74%, and one person did not answer the question. This is an important distinction because the survey data demonstrate that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are confident that they are doing things that are important to the H.I.T.S. program mission. That is an inferred conclusion because they assume those with whom they are in contact are highly knowledgeable of H.I.T.S. services. A discussion of the differences between the responses given to this question across groups of survey respondents follows in another area of this dissertation.

Investigator/analysts were asked to estimate the percentage of investigators working within their assigned jurisdictions who know them by name. Based on the premise that the strength of the H.I.T.S. unit is that it marries the personal relationships between knowledgeable and highly experienced investigator/analysts with field investigators, and combines those personal relationships with the technologies available to H.I.T.S., this question informs evaluators as to the strength of the relationship between H.I.T.S. and those served by the unit. Four investigators think their criminal investigator constituents are between 75 and 100% likely to be able to identify them by name. One investigator/analyst responded that less than 10%

would know him/her by name, and another respondent did not answer the question. A discussion of the results of cross-analysis of the data gathered from criminal investigators regarding their knowledge of the investigator assigned to their agency follows in another segment of this chapter.

In summary, most H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts believe H.I.T.S. to be the hub for crime scene, criminal, and victim information, while one person believes that local agency databases (including networks of local databases) serve that function. They have greater faith in the H.I.T.S. program than they do in N.C.I.C. and ViCAP. Most believe that almost all active and cold case murders are known by the H.I.T.S. program, but most think they do not know about most rapes/sexual assaults perpetrated by strangers. Most investigator/analysts believe that their constituent field investigators know what H.I.T.S. can do for their local agencies. Most are also convinced that between 75 and 100% of their constituents can identify them by name.

Implications of the data gathered by this survey and reported in the W.S.U. evaluation study are that the major concern of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts is both active and cold case murders, followed by sexual assault. There is a heavy emphasis on tracking adult missing persons' cases, but they are most concerned with missing persons' cases when the person is under the age of 18. Discussion of how the survey responses given by the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts compare to those of their constituents follow in a separate forthcoming section of this chapter. Having examined the degree to which various users of H.I.T.S. services are familiar with the H.I.T.S. program, the attention now turns to the question of how much the people responsible for the investigation of serious criminal violations in local police jurisdictions know about specific H.I.T.S. programs and services.

Evaluators wanted to go beyond mere awareness that the H.I.T.S. program exists, so questions were asked of all participants to determine to what degree they were familiar with and have used various H.I.T.S. services. If there is one overall theme to describe the degree to which the criminal justice community responded with regard to the H.I.T.S. program, it can be summed up by the following quote from a criminal investigator:

*We sporadically consider the use of H.I.T.S.--I don't think they make themselves known enough or all the services they provide. We tend to get tunnel vision in our own jurisdictions.*

Several of the key services of the H.I.T.S. program are therefore singled out for inclusion in this section of chapter four. We begin this segment of our analysis with a look at the H.I.T.S. program training component. The H.I.T.S. team provides low or no cost certified training for local law enforcement officers. Training is generally provided in conjunction with the Washington Criminal Justice Training Center (CJTC). The ongoing need for high quality, low-cost training in law enforcement is demonstrated by the following comment recorded from a criminal investigator during a focus group session held after such a training session for local police personnel conducted in Vancouver:

*We have to pay the FBI fee for the practical homicide course. It runs between \$375 and \$600 for the national instructors that put it on. This is minimal cost here, about \$50 [as provided by H.I.T.S.]. The private guy out of New York homicide charges a minimum of \$375.*

Criminal investigators were asked to confirm their knowledge that the H.I.T.S. team offers basic investigations training. The following chart reveals a common pattern of limited awareness and

utilization which will be documented in a number of areas of H.I.T.S. program activities and services.

*Figure 4.38*

**Survey Item:**




Of those who responded, 126 (43%) indicated they were familiar with this service, and they have used it. Another 50 (17.1%) responded that they know this training is available, but indicate that they have not used it. Another 88 (17.2%) stated that they are not familiar with the training but that they would use it, and 13 (2.5%) investigators responded that they would not use this training. These survey results indicate that 176 (60.1%) criminal investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic investigation training. It is reasonable to conclude from this evidence that more criminal investigators would take advantage of this training if they were aware of its existence. The percentage of respondents who indicate that they are not familiar with the training but would use it can be seen as the *untapped market*. The **untapped market** for this training is 17.2%.

Criminal investigators were also asked about their knowledge of basic homicide training offered by H.I.T.S. team members. The need for such classes was pointed out by the following statement from a criminal investigator:

*Basic Homicide class made me more aware of what is required of a homicide investigator.*

Figure 4.39

**Survey Item:**



A total of 162 (55%) investigators responded that they are familiar with the basic homicide investigations training offered by H.I.T.S. Another 46 (15.7%) indicated that they know about this training but they have not used it. Another 60 (20.5%) responded that they are not familiar with it, but that they would use it. These numbers indicate that 208 (71%) criminal investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic homicide investigation training. The **untapped market** for this training is 20.5%.


Regarding training on advanced homicide investigations, the criminal investigators surveyed responded thusly:

*Figure 4.40*

**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. offers training on advanced homicide investigations [Criminal Investigators]**

[N=293]



Of those who responded, 94 (32.1%) indicated they were familiar with this service, and that they have used it. Another 82 (28%) responded that they know that this training is available, but that they have not used it. Another 96 (32.8%) stated that they are not familiar with the training but that they would use it, and 6 (2%) responded that they would not use this training. These numbers indicate that 176 (60.1%) criminal investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic investigation training. The **untapped market** for this training is 32.8%.

Criminal investigators were asked to identify training courses they think the H.I.T.S. team should offer. As a testament to the fact that many field investigators are unfamiliar with the




training already being offered by H.I.T.S., many of the responses were for additional training in the areas of basic and advanced homicide investigations, sexual assault investigation, training on what H.I.T.S. does, blood spatter investigation, computer forensic evaluation, DNA analysis training, and cold case homicide investigation. The only course suggestions offered by the field that are not already being regularly offered by the H.I.T.S. team were cell phone and video analysis training. Many of the suggested courses involved the expansion of current training, such as first responder training, crime scene processing, and all aspects of collecting and storing DNA forensic evidence.

Supervising investigators were also asked about their familiarity with H.I.T.S. training opportunities. First, they were asked about basic investigations:

*Figure 4.41*

**Survey Item:**



Of those who responded, 27 (31%) indicated they were familiar with this service, and that they have used it. Another 19 (21.8%) responded that they are familiar that this training is available, but that they have not used it. Another 34 (39.1%) stated that they are not familiar with the training but that they would use it, and 6 (6.9%) responded that they would not use this training. These numbers indicate that 46 (52.9%) of the supervising investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic investigation training. The **untapped market** for this training is 39.1%.


Next, the W.S.U. evaluation team looked at the topic of basic homicide investigations. As one supervising investigator put it,

*Through training classes on homicide investigations...I can turn to more experienced homicide detectives with just a call.*

Figure 4.42

**Survey Item:**

H.I.T.S. offers training on basic homicide investigations [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]




Of those who responded, 40 (46%) indicated they were familiar with this service, and they have used it. Another 20 (23%) responded that they are familiar that this training is available, but that they have not used it. Another 23 (26.4%) stated that they are not familiar with the training but that they would use it, and 3 (3.4%) responded that they would not use this training. These numbers indicate that 60 (69%) supervising investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic investigation training. The **untapped market** for this training is 26.4%.

As with criminal investigators, supervising investigators were asked to identify training classes they would like to see offered by H.I.T.S. They, too, indicated lack of familiarity with the topics on which H.I.T.S. team members currently train. Several supervisors identified new training needs, however. Advanced forensic methods training was cited a few times. In one instance it was noted that training in forensic light source and advanced fingerprint processing is needed. Another suggestion indicated the need for training for those supervisors who do oversee rape/sexual assault cases.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were not asked the same questions regarding their familiarity with H.I.T.S. training opportunities. They were, however, asked to give their opinion of the benefits offered by H.I.T.S. program training. The following question measures the general attitude Police Chiefs and Sheriffs have toward H.I.T.S. in-service training: “Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis” The results are shown in the following graph:

*Figure 4.43*  
**Survey Item:**

**Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]**  
 [N=177]



Of those responding, 165 (93.2%) agreed or strongly agreed that such in-service training would be beneficial to their homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators. Only 6 (3.4%) either were not certain or disagreed with the statement. This is an important notation to the topic of training for at least two reasons. First, it indicated that Police Chiefs and Sheriffs are fully aware of the need for continuing in-service training. They realize and acknowledge that investigators in their agencies are not naturally equipped with the wide range of skills and investigative tools they need to be fully effective as criminal investigators. Secondly, their collective response affirms that there is a strong probability that if the H.I.T.S. unit were to continue to enhance their training offerings to match the needs of the field, and if they were to make a stronger effort to

communicate information about their training offerings, Chiefs and Sheriffs would support enhanced in-service training by H.I.T.S. team members.

Evaluators only uncovered one instance in which H.I.T.S. training deficiencies might exist. The following statement by an on-line survey respondent makes his/her point:

*I've been very satisfied in general with the H.I.T.S. personnel. The training I've received has been disappointing. It's not the H.I.T.S. personnel doing the training, they were only the facilitators.*

Other comments regarding the demand for training were directed at the need for the H.I.T.S. team to train local agency investigators on H.I.T.S. resources and assistance. For example, note the following survey statements:

*From a criminal investigator: "I am unaware of what H.I.T.S. does, other than distribute bulletins cross-agency."*

*From a Chief or Sheriff: "Would like to receive training/resources to understand what all is available through H.I.T.S. and other resources. At this time we have not received any specific training or briefings on what H.I.T.S. can do for us."*

*From an on-line survey participant: "Knowledge of all the services that can be provided by H.I.T.S. could go a long ways in agencies utilizing their work more."*

Others were more complimentary and supportive of the H.I.T.S. training mission; an indicator of H.I.T.S. program success:

*From a criminal investigator: "Past training and investigator help - excellent."*

*From a criminal investigator: "Training - Consultations - "War Stories" from investigators."*

*From an on-line participant: "The H.I.T.S. Unit provides services to all law enforcement agencies in Washington (and even neighboring states) that no other agency can provide. They provide some excellent training opportunities for investigators and they provide the pivotal (sic) role in linking agencies statewide by receiving and distributing critical information on crimes and wanted persons."*

In summary, the need for in-service training is validated by all members of law enforcement at all ranks. Survey responses by surveys of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs indicate their likely support of enhanced in-service training. There is a significant amount of untapped potential for future H.I.T.S. training classes. Estimates of potential increases in demand for training range from 25% to 40%. Training of the nature demonstrated above shows promise to help overcome what Sheptycki calls the *digital divide* (2004: 313).

In another important area of work the H.I.T.S. team offers assistance to criminal investigators in local law enforcement agencies across the state who work cases of homicide and rape/sexual assaults that have “gone cold.” The following are some of the field data the W.S.U. evaluation team gathered on this topic of cold case investigations. The need for outside assistance on cold cases can best be exemplified by three statements recorded from three different criminal investigators when asked how the H.I.T.S. team has helped them in this area of their work:

*By providing info on solved and unsolved cases with similar circumstances. What worked for someone else might work for me.*

*I work on cold cases (20+ years old) and H.I.T.S. has a lot of information on these cases as well as suspects who were active during that time.*

*We organized different agencies investigators to review unsolved cases. This gives input from seasoned investigators on new ideas to explore to solve them.*


Criminal investigators were asked to tell of their knowledge about assistance available to them from outside their host agency.

*Figure 4.44*

**Survey Item:**

**I have help from outside of my agency in nearly every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned "cold" (cases that have stalled) [Criminal Investigators]**

[N=293]



A total of 151 (51.5%) criminal investigators responded that help is available to them from outside their agency in cases of homicide and rape/sexual assault. Nearly as many (134 or 45.7%) indicated that they were not sure or that such assistance is not available.

These findings somewhat puzzled the W.S.U. evaluation team because cold case assistance is a major reason for the existence of the H.I.T.S. unit. Cross-tabulations were run on these data to determine specifics about those who responded to this statement. Evaluators filtered out all respondents who did not work homicide or sexual assault investigations at least 75% of the time to see if the percentages changed (N=38). Only 9 (23.7%) criminal investigators who work either homicide or sexual assault investigations between 75 and 100% of the time could confirm that assistance on cold cases is available to them from outside of their agency.

Surprisingly, the balance of 29 (76.3%) could not affirm the statement. As a follow-up step in the analysis, the data from the same group of highly engaged criminal investigators were drawn from the responses to the following statement: “H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual assault cases that have stalled.”


Of those who responded, 28 (73.7%) demonstrated familiarity with the H.I.T.S. service. Another 6 (15.8%) indicated that they are not familiar with the service, but that they would use it. Three individuals (7.9%) responded that they would not use the service. There is no ready explanation for the fact that 76.3% of criminal investigators would indicate their lack of familiarity with outside cold case assistance in one area of the survey, and then only 16.2% of the same respondents demonstrated the lack of knowledge of the availability of H.I.T.S. unit assistance in another area of the survey. It is possible that “signal bias” played a part in the responses. The mere suggestion of the H.I.T.S. service could perhaps have reminded the respondents that it exists.

When leads run dry in a criminal investigation the case often grows old (it becomes “cold”). Cold cases involving homicide and rape/sexual assault are of serious concern both to the local law enforcement agency in whose jurisdiction the crime occurred and to the Office of the Attorney General of the state. In Washington state the H.I.T.S. program provides assistance to local law enforcement investigators in the investigation of cold homicides and rapes/sexual assaults. The following chart demonstrates the results when criminal investigators were asked specifically about their knowledge of H.I.T.S. unit assistance in cold cases, and all respondents were included:



*Figure 4.45*  
Survey Item:

**H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual assault cases that have stalled [Criminal Investigators]**  
 [N=293]



Of those who responded, 66 (23.5%) indicated that they are familiar with and have used cold case homicide and rape/sexual assault assistance offered by H.I.T.S. Another 128 (43.7%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Another 79 (27%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would likely use it. Only four (1.4%) survey respondents indicated that they would not use the service. When evaluators examined the data from homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators who work at least 75% of their duty time on such investigations, they discovered that only 16.2% indicated that they were unfamiliar with H.I.T.S. program cold case assistance.

The data reported here suggest that 194 (66.2%) criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit cold case assistance. The **untapped market** for this assistance is estimated at 27%. We now turn to the data on supervising investigators.


Supervising investigators were asked two similar questions:

*Figure 4.46*

**Survey Item:**

**My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have help available from outside of my agency in every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned "cold" (stalled) [Supervising Investigators]**


[N=87]



This first question was specifically designed to inform the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team whether or not supervising investigators could identify the presence of *any* outside assistance for cold cases. Of those who responded, 54 (62.1%) indicated that their agency's investigators have access to outside assistance for cold cases. Another 33 (37.9%) could not confirm the existence of such services. Supervising investigators were also asked to confirm their familiarity with H.I.T.S. services that include cold case assistance:

*Figure 4.47*  
**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual assault cases that have stalled [Supervising Investigators]**  
 [N=87]



Of those who responded, 26 (29.9%) indicated that they are familiar with and have used cold case homicide and rape/sexual assault assistance offered by H.I.T.S. Another 37 (42.5%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Twenty (23%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. No supervising investigator responded that they would decline use of the service.

The findings reported here suggest that 63 (72.4%) supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit cold case assistance. The **untapped market** for this assistance is estimated to be 23%. Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked a somewhat less pointed question in this area.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs are in a unique position to recognize the need for assistance on cold cases. Consider the following comment made by a Police Chief who participated in the H.I.T.S. Chief and Sheriff survey:


*They [H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts] have been extremely helpful in our combined efforts to solve a cold case homicide investigation. While the case has not been cleared, their collaboration has definitely been of benefit.*

The question that informs evaluators as to the attitude of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs toward the possibility of teaming up with outside investigators in order to solve crimes was asked thusly:

*Figure 4.48*

**Survey Item:**

**Please offer your opinion as to the tools and resources available to your agency: The availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding, directing, or counseling my agency's investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual assault would be beneficial [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]  
[N=177]**




A total of 133 (75.1%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs agreed that the availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding, directing, or counseling their agency's

investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual assault would be beneficial. Another 21 (11.9%) disagreed with the statement, and 19 (10.7%) were uncertain as to their response. The Chiefs and Sheriffs were then asked a more pointed follow-up question regarding the availability of outside assistance.

*Figure 4.49*

**Survey Item:**

**Please offer your opinion as to the tools and resources available to your agency: My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have help available from outside of my agency in every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned “cold” (stalled) [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]**  
[N=177]



A total of 144 (81.4%) responded that their homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have outside help in every homicide or rape/sexual assault cold case. Twenty-nine (16.4%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs could not confirm the existence of such assistance.

In summary, the data regarding the need for and availability of cold case homicide and rape/sexual assault assistance from outside entities tell us that there is a significant untapped

market for the H.I.T.S. unit. Criminal investigators were nearly split on their knowledge of cold case assistance from outside their agency. Nearly half of the criminal investigators surveyed were familiar with the H.I.T.S. cold case unit, but only about half of those (23.8%) where detectives have used the service.

Supervising investigators were more likely than criminal investigators to confirm the availability of outside assistance for cold cases (62% to 53%, respectively). Supervisors were more likely than criminal investigators to have used H.I.T.S. cold case unit services. It is not known by evaluators if this is because supervisors are more likely than criminal investigators to have job longevity. Nearly 76% of supervising investigators indicated familiarity with H.I.T.S. cold case assistance. That compares with 70% of criminal investigators who confirmed familiarity with the service. These findings seem to support the hypothesis posed by some H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts that investigator turnover makes contact for building awareness of program services difficult.

Nearly 77% of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs support the view that outside help would benefit their agencies' investigators, but 16% of Chiefs and Sheriffs could not confirm that such assistance is available. The potential for H.I.T.S. service growth in the area of cold case assistance is estimated to be 27% for criminal investigators, 23% for supervising investigators, and 16% for Police Chiefs and Sheriffs. While these percentages cannot be relied on for the budgeting of personnel and resources, they certainly do support the argument that many of the services currently offered currently by the H.I.T.S. program are underutilized. This point is tellingly made by a supervising investigator in registering this comment on the survey:

*It wasn't until recently that I truly understood all the different aspects/resources offered by H.I.T.S. I am confident and satisfied with the intelligence shared through H.I.T.S. I think that more agencies/officers need to be made aware of the benefits/resources available to them.*

The discussion now turns to another service offered by the H.I.T.S. unit.

The H.I.T.S. team is effective at getting together with investigators and their supervisors across Washington in an effort to have an impact on what they see as their core mission—namely, solving cold case homicides and rapes/sexual assaults. Their efforts have not gone unnoticed by field investigators, as is evident by the following statements recorded as comments on the on-line survey of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients:

*From an on-line survey respondent:*

*“Rick Grabenstein is great, always willing to help and share ideas. Very easy to work with, a real team player, and easy to get a hold of.”*

*From another on-line survey participant:*

*“In my 8 years in the investigative arena (major crimes supervisor, commander over Green River investigation) I felt we had a strong relationship with our H.I.T.S. investigator. I appreciated Marv's insight into our investigations.”*

*From yet another on-line survey:*

*“H.I.T.S. has been very helpful in homicide investigation. On the last investigation, H.I.T.S. assisted in identifying the main suspect who was an illegal alien.”*


*From a final on-line survey:*

*“I always enjoy being visited by the H.I.T.S. team investigators. They provide a wealth of knowledge and experience.”*

When H.I.T.S. team members are able to get out to visit field investigators, their primary mission is to communicate information regarding the range of services and forms of criminal investigative assistance they can provide. A measure of their effectiveness in communicating their services is accomplished through the following statement, asked of criminal investigators:

*Figure 4.50*  
Survey Item:

**H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled) unit development [Criminal Investigators]**  
 [N=293]



Of those who responded, 52 (17.1%) indicated that they are familiar with and have used cold case unit development and support offered by H.I.T.S. Another 113 (38.6%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 102 (34.8%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 11 (3.8%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use the service.

These findings suggest that 165 (56.3%) of the state's criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. assistance for cold case unit development. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 34.8%. Supervising investigators were asked to respond to the same question.




Supervising investigators are slightly more likely than criminal investigators to be aware that the H.I.T.S. unit offers training and support for cold case units.

*Figure 4.51*

**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled) unit development [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]**




Of those who responded, 20 (23%) supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used cold case unit development and support offered by H.I.T.S. Another 27 (31%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Thirty (34.5%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 4 (4.6%) supervising investigators responded that they would not use the service. These findings suggest that 47 (54%) of the supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. assistance for cold case unit development. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 34.5%.

In summary, H.I.T.S. team investigator/analysts are doing a good job of communicating the services offered by the H.I.T.S. unit, but there is still a potential to increase the awareness of their ability to assist in cold case unit development by about 40% among criminal investigators and supervising investigators. We now turn to another important service offered by the H.I.T.S. program to assist in determining how aware field investigators and their supervisors are of various H.I.T.S. services.

H.I.T.S. team members are qualified to provide expert witness testimony in criminal matters. What follows are the findings drawn from the survey data gathered with respect to awareness of this service by criminal investigators and their supervisors. Criminal investigators were asked to respond to the statement that H.I.T.S. offers expert witness testimony in official court proceedings.

*Figure 4.52*

**Survey Item:**



Of those who responded, only 10 (3.4%) indicated that they are familiar with and have used the expert witness testimony assistance offered by H.I.T.S. Another 101 (34.5%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Fully 154 (52.6%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 12 (4.1%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use the service.

These findings suggest that 111 (37.9%) of the criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit expert witness testimony service. The **untapped market** for this important source of state-led assistance to local law enforcement is a substantial 52.6%.


Another service offered by H.I.T.S. team members, assistance in determining how death occurred, is explored next. H.I.T.S. unit members offer assistance to homicide investigators who need to determine cause of death in suspicious circumstances. As with other services offered by the H.I.T.S. team (with the exception of some training, to which a nominal fee is attached), this assistance is provided at no cost to the assisted agency. Years of experience in homicide investigation places H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts in a unique position to assist field investigators in determining how death occurred (see [appendix 7](#) for their biographies).

As shown in the following chart, of those who responded, 27 (9.2%) local criminal investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. assistance in the matter of determining how death occurred. Another 117 (39.9%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 114 (38.9%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 20 (6.8%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use the service.

Figure 4.53

**Survey Item:**

H.I.T.S. offers assistance to homicide investigators for determining how death occurred [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]




These findings suggest that 144 (49.1%) of the criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance to determine how death occurred. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 39.9%. Supervising investigators were asked the same question.

Supervising investigators are less likely than criminal investigators to know that the H.I.T.S. team offers assistance for determining how death occurred. Of those who responded, 15 (17.2%) supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. assistance in the matter of determining how death occurred. Another 31 (35.6%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 35 (40.2%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 5 (5.7%) of the supervising investigators responded that they would not use the service.

*Figure 4.54*  
Survey Item:

**H.I.T.S. offers assistance to homicide investigators for determining how death occurred [Supervising Investigators]  
 [N=87]**




These findings indicate that 46 (52.9%) supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance to determine how death occurred. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 40.2%. Evaluators now look at investigator awareness of another H.I.T.S. service. H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts offer assistance to criminal investigators in interviewing (interrogation) techniques to be used on known offenders.

As with many of the other services offered by the H.I.T.S. program, this assistance is significantly overlooked by investigators in the field. Responses to the following statement give a clear indication that H.I.T.S. team members could perhaps do a somewhat better job of communicating the availability of this service to potential clients:

Figure 4.55

Survey Item:

H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for interrogating known offenders [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]



Of those who responded, 33 (11.3%) criminal investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. assistance in developing techniques in interrogating known offenders. Another 92 (31.4%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 133 (45.4%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 19 (6.5%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use the service.


These findings suggest that 125 (42.7%) criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance on techniques for interrogating known offenders. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 45.4%. Responses by supervising investigators to the same question follow.

The untapped market potential for H.I.T.S. investigators is more than 50% in this service area, as is demonstrated by responses to the following statement:

Figure 4.56

**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for interrogating known offenders [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]**



Of those who responded, 10 (11.5%) supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. program assistance in developing techniques for interrogating known offenders. Another 24 (27.6%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 46 (52.9%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 6 (6.9%) supervising investigators responded that they would not use the service.

These findings suggest that 34 (39.1%) supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance on developing techniques for interrogating known offenders.


The **untapped market** for this assistance is 52.9%. The evaluation now turns to yet another area of H.I.T.S. service – namely, assistance in establishing timelines in criminal cases.

The establishment of documented timelines in criminal cases is critical for the successful linkage of a potential perpetrator to both the scene of a crime and the commission of that particular crime. Timelines are therefore often critical for the successful conviction of a suspected offender. The H.I.T.S. program team is quite proficient and experienced in assisting criminal investigators with establishing such timelines in criminal matters. They combine their experience and expertise with the use of sophisticated analytical tools to make linkages that often prove mission-critical in criminal cases. As in previous instances of H.I.T.S. program services, the W.S.U. evaluation team examined the level of familiarity criminal investigators and their supervisors have with this important service provided by the H.I.T.S. program.

Criminal investigators were first asked to express their opinion about the importance of access to documented timelines in the following survey question, “Access to timelines (chronological sequence of events) in a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is often important.” A total of 282 (96.2%) of the local police criminal investigators participating in the survey agreed or strongly agreed with that statement. There is virtually no question that the H.I.T.S. program timeline service could be an important aspect of difficult criminal investigations of violent offenses. The following chart displays the level of knowledge existing among detectives regarding the assistance which the H.I.T.S. program investigators can provide to local municipal and county law enforcement regarding such documented timelines.



*Figure 4.57*  
Survey Item:




Even though more than 96% of criminal investigators agreed that access to timelines is often important in crime investigation, only 108 (36.9%) could affirm that timeline assistance is available to them. Fully 179 (61.1%) criminal investigators could not affirm that such assistance is available to them at all, much less from outside of their agency. These findings suggest that the H.I.T.S. unit could see a 61.1% increase in the use of this **untapped resource**. Supervising investigators were asked similar questions.

Supervising investigators were asked to respond to the following statement: “Access to timelines (chronological sequence events) in a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is often important.” As with investigators, well over 90% of them agreed on the importance of

timelines. Their responses indicate that there is a high potential for H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts to capitalize on this under-used service:

*Figure 4.58*

**Survey Item:**



Even though more than 96% of supervising investigators (84 of 87) agreed that access to timelines is often important in crime investigation, only 38 (43.7%) could affirm that timeline assistance is available to them and their investigators. Another 47 (54%) of the supervising investigators could not affirm that such assistance is available to them at all, much less from outside of their agency. These findings suggest that the H.I.T.S. unit could see a 54% increase in the use of this **untapped resource**.

The design of this survey did not allow for evaluators to determine from where assistance is available to those indicating the availability of such assistance. What can be inferred by these

data is that the majority of criminal investigators and their supervisors agree about the importance of timelines in criminal investigations, but most are unaware that timeline assistance is available through H.I.T.S. The evaluation now examines assistance with DNA analysis, and its place in the H.I.T.S. team-field investigator world.

The need for assistance with DNA analysis has increased dramatically since the practice of the collection of DNA from among evidence present at crime scenes began in the mid 1980s. With the proliferation of late of various popular television programs in which DNA evidence is gathered and used to solve crimes, interest in the techniques of DNA collection analysis has been piqued among criminal investigators in the field. The following two comments from criminal investigators indicate the need for assistance with evidence that might contain DNA:

*If H.I.T.S. had a team to come in and take over or assist small agencies with DNA type of evidence processing it would be helpful.*

Responding to a question about ways in which H.I.T.S. training can be improved, another criminal investigator stated:

*How to obtain DNA in this state without violating suspect's rights.*

Criminal investigators were asked to respond to the statement, "H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual assault cases." Of those responding, 33 (11.3%) of the criminal investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. assistance on DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual assault cases. Another 99 (33.8%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 137 (46.8%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 7 (2.4%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use the service. These findings show that 132 (45.1%) of the


state's criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service on DNA analysis. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 46.8%. Responses by supervising investigators to the same question follow.

By percentages, more supervising investigators than criminal investigators have used H.I.T.S. team assistance with DNA analysis, and more of them indicated that they would be likely to use the service than did criminal investigators:

*Figure 4.59*

**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual assault cases [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]**



Of those who responded, 12 (13.8%) supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. assistance in DNA analysis in cases of homicide or rape/sexual assault. Another 26 (29.9%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Another 45 (51.7%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 2 (2.3%) supervising investigators responded that they would not use the

service. These findings show that 38 (43.7%) of the supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance on DNA analysis. The **untapped market** for this assistance is 51.7%. Next we look at the service provided by the H.I.T.S. team that addresses gang affiliation phenomena.

Many crimes in Washington are linked to drugs. Many serious violent crimes are directly or indirectly the result of drug dealing. Gangs have been shown to be connected with drugs through the creation and operation of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Drugs are moved from Mexico and California throughout Washington, and from Canada throughout Washington by DTOs. Knowledge of gang affiliation of both offenders and victims, therefore, is clearly an important tool for criminal investigators.


Two questions were asked of criminal investigators and supervising investigators with respect to H.I.T.S. services available to them that will assist them in making the crime scene-victim-offender connection. Criminal investigators were asked their opinion regarding gang affiliation: "Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if any, could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rape/sexual assaults." Over 90% of the crime investigators either agree or strongly agree that this constitutes important information.

When asked about their knowledge of the availability of gang affiliation data, however, only 117 (39.9%) of the respondents indicated that they somewhat or strongly agree that such data are available to them. Some 174 (59.4%) of the criminal investigators were not aware that such data are available through H.I.T.S., as shown in the following table:

Figure 4.60

**Survey Item:**

**Gang affiliation data are readily available to me or my team for use in investigations [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]**




The apparent **untapped potential** existing in this important area of criminal investigation among Washington's criminal investigators for H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts is estimated to be 59.2%.

Unexpectedly, supervising investigators responded similarly in this area. As with some of the responses to other questions, this survey was not designed to capture their knowledge of the source of gang data, so it is not known if those who responded affirmatively to the availability of the data are aware that it is available through H.I.T.S. For the purposes of this evaluation, however, it can be inferred that the majority of supervisors and criminal investigators are not aware that H.I.T.S. maintains gang affiliation data. As is shown in the next chart, only 43 (49.4%) of the supervising investigators are aware that gang data are available from the H.I.T.S. unit, while 44 (50.5%) of them could not confirm the availability of such vital data:

Figure 4.61

**Survey Item:**

Gang affiliation data are readily available to me and/or my team for use in investigations [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]



It is apparent that this H.I.T.S. service is underutilized by over 50%, thus creating a **50% market potential**. Attention now turns to the examination of criminal profiling assistance provided by H.I.T.S. team members.

The strength of the H.I.T.S. program is the ability of the people who work in the unit to interact with the tools supplied them, combining years of criminal investigation expertise with technology to make deductions that lead investigators to probable suspects in criminal cases. H.I.T.S. team members have years of experience in assisting the successful closing of serial murder cases, including that of the Spokane serial killer Robert Yates and the Green River serial murderer, Gary Ridgeway. The ability to profile potential killers and rapists is a principal area of

expertise of the H.I.T.S. team. Witness the need for profiling assistance through the following comment from a criminal investigator when asked what the H.I.T.S. team has done to improve the investigative process:


*[They] provided profiling, timeline, background, access to DOL database as well as credit report info.*

Criminal investigators were asked to respond to the statement that, “Criminal profiling is available to me from an entity outside my agency:”

*Figure 4.62*

**Survey Item:**

**Criminal profiling is available to me from an entity outside of my agency [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]**



Only 84 (28.7%) criminal investigators could verify that criminal profiling assistance is available to them from outside their own agency. Fully 181 (61.8%) could not confirm the




existence of help from outside of their agency for such a critical element of the criminal investigation mission.

Of those who indicated that criminal profiling assistance is available through an outside source, the most common response was H.I.T.S. The F.B.I., W.S.P., Seattle P.D., and N.C.M.E.C. (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) were also mentioned, but the rate of mention for each source was minimal. Criminal investigators were then asked to verify their familiarity with criminal profiling assistance provided through H.I.T.S. team members:

*Figure 4.63*

**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide investigators [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]**



Of those who responded, 22 (7.5%) criminal investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. criminal profiling assistance. Another 114 (38.9%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Another 143 (48.8%)

criminal investigators indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 7 (2.4%) investigators responded that they would not use the service.


These findings suggest that 136 (46.4%) of the state's criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit criminal profiling assistance. The **untapped market** for this assistance is estimated to be 48.8%. Supervising investigators were asked the same questions.

The first question asked of supervising investigators was meant to determine their awareness of the profiling services available to them or their investigative team:

*Figure 4.64*


**Survey Item:**

**Criminal profiling services are available to me or my team within my agency [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]**



The majority (74 or 85.1%) of supervising investigators could not confirm that assistance with criminal profiling is available within their own agency. Only 12 (13.8%) could make that confirmation. They were then asked about the same services from outside of their host agency:

Figure 4.65

**Survey Item:****Criminal profiling is available to me or my team from an entity outside of my agency [Supervising Investigators]****[N=87]**

Only 42 (48.3%) supervising investigators affirmed that criminal profiling services are available to them and their investigators from outside their agency. Most (50.5%) could not confirm the existence of such services. Of those noting that profiling services are available to them from outside their agency, one-third cited the F.B.I. as that source of assistance. A few mentioned H.I.T.S., but many more cited H.I.T.S. in their responses to the following statement: “H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide investigators.”

Of those who responded, only 8 (9.2%) supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. criminal profiling assistance. Another 34 (39.1%) reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 44 (50.6%) supervising investigators indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. No supervising investigators responded that they would decline the use of the service. These

findings suggest that 42 (48.3%) supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit cold case assistance. The **untapped market** for criminal profiling assistance is 50.6%. Next the area of forensic computer analysis assistance as offered by the H.I.T.S. program team is investigated.

The need for assistance in computer forensic analysis is near the top of the list of services desired lately. For example, convicted murderer and child molester Joseph Duncan withheld the encrypted code to his personal computer from prosecutors until he secured a better deal under a plea bargain arrangement. It is believed by prosecutors that the computer contains leads to many other crimes committed by Duncan. Many sexual predators are using chat rooms to connect, first electronically and eventually in person, with their underage victims. The need for forensic computer analysis is likely to increase greatly in the years to come.

A majority of both investigators and supervising investigators feel that they have access to forensic computer analysis within their own department, as is shown in the two next charts:

*Figure 4.66*

**Survey Item:**

**Forensic computer crime investigators are available to me within my agency [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]**





Figure 4.67

**Survey Item:**

As with criminal investigators, more than 59% of the responding supervising investigators confirmed that forensic computer crime investigators are available to them within their agency. The data produced by this line of inquiry confirm to evaluators that many criminal investigators and their supervisors do not know that the H.I.T.S. team can assist them in forensic computer crime analysis. Another service provided by the H.I.T.S. unit is crime mapping, and it appears that this is another under-utilized service available from H.I.T.S. team members.

The term “crime mapping” can be somewhat misleading. If criminal investigators and their supervisors think of crime mapping simply as identifying where crime has occurred in the past, they would easily miss the point of the service the H.I.T.S. unit can provide for them. Crime mapping is an area in which H.I.T.S. team members can excel, given the opportunity.

Getting back to the purpose of the H.I.T.S. program, to serve investigators by assisting them to solve murders, rapes/sexual assaults, and other violent crimes, crime mapping blends the expertise of veteran detectives with technology to help identify crime and criminal patterns in non static ways. A criminal investigator stated the benefit thusly:

*It [crime mapping] makes us cognizant of possible trends; patterns and methods used in the crime that may be similar to what has occurred in other areas/jurisdictions.*

And from another:


*It [crime mapping] helped by focusing on out of county suspects. It streamlines the investigations.*

Criminal investigators were asked in the survey to tell evaluators some things about their knowledge of crime mapping assistance available to them. The first response statement, “Mapping by crime type/location is available to me within my agency” was responded to thusly:

*Figure 4.68*

**Survey Item:**

**Mapping by crime type/location is available to me within my agency [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]**




A total of 172 (58.7%) criminal investigators responded that mapping by crime type/location is available to them from within their agency. Another 119 (40.6%) could not make that verification. Some 51 (17.4%) indicated that the same service was available to them from outside of their agency. Fully 233 (79.5%) could not verify the existence of outside crime mapping assistance. These data suggest that 79.5% of criminal investigators are not likely to know that the H.I.T.S. team offers crime mapping assistance. This demonstrates the **possibility of a 79.5% market share** for this H.I.T.S. service.

Figure 4.69

**Survey Item:**

Mapping by crime type or location is available to me from an entity outside of my agency [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]



The investigators were given the opportunity to inform the evaluators of the source of their outside crime mapping assistance. Most of the responses cited county planning offices, other city police agencies, and other databases. A few (15 or 5.1%) mentioned H.I.T.S. as a write-in option. Evaluators conclude, based on these data, ***the vast majority of criminal investigators currently working in the field do not know that they can turn to the H.I.T.S. team***

*for assistance in crime mapping*, and that they may do so at no cost or obligation to their agency. W.S.U. evaluators next reached out to supervising investigators for their perspective.

A total of 58 (66.7%) supervising investigators believe crime mapping to be available to them from within their agency. Their numbers are slightly higher than those of criminal investigators. This phenomenon is not perplexing to evaluators of the H.I.T.S. program because it is commonly believed that supervisors know more about agency resources than do their subordinates. That knowledge, it is believed, comes from job longevity. That does not explain, however, why so few supervising investigators know that the H.I.T.S. team offers this service.

Only 16 (18.4%) supervising investigators knew that crime mapping is available to them or their investigators from outside of their agency. Some 68 (78.2%) did not know of this service. Of those who named an outside source for crime mapping assistance, only three mentioned H.I.T.S. The W.S.U. evaluators concluded from these data that ***at least 80% of criminal investigators and their supervisors*** are likely to be surprised to hear from their assigned investigator/analysts that crime mapping assistance is available to them through the H.I.T.S. program. Another service provided by the H.I.T.S. team is research in the archival records of the State of Washington regarding motor vehicles and licensing (Department of Licensing).

Investigators were asked to identify some things that would help to make H.I.T.S. better. Many answers included services already offered by the H.I.T.S. team: for example, H.I.T.S. databases contain archived data from the Department of Licensing. As stated one criminal investigator regarding needed improvements:

*Being able to connect capers by M.O. [modus operandi] statewide. Database searches for vehicle descriptions/partial license plates.*



Unlike the presently accessible current records of state agencies, the data maintained by the H.I.T.S. unit include archival records that are never purged. The need for archival motor vehicle records can be further summed up with a comment from a criminal investigator:


*I like to make use of the vehicle registration data that they [H.I.T.S.] can gather - like partial plate possibilities.*

To gauge awareness of this H.I.T.S. service capability, criminal investigators were asked to respond to the following statement, “Archival motor vehicle records are available to me even if they have been purged from publicly available records.” Only one third of those who responded could verify this statement. Another 93 (31.7%) agreed that archival motor vehicle records are available to them even if they have been purged from publicly available records:

*Figure 4.70*

**Survey Item:**

**Archival motor vehicle records are available to me even if they have been purged from publicly available records [Criminal Investigators]  
[N=293]**




The majority (197 or 67.2%) of criminal investigators could not confirm that such records are available to them. Their responses to this statement confirm to evaluators that the *H.I.T.S. unit is maintaining data that is under-utilized*. Supervising investigators were asked to comment on the same statement.

About the same percentage of supervising investigators (31.7%) as criminal investigators (32.1%) could confirm that archival motor vehicle records are available to them even after the records have been purged from publicly available records:

*Figure 4.71*

**Survey Item:**

**Archival motor vehicle records are available to me and/or my team even if they have been purged from publicly available records [Supervising Investigators]**  
[N=87]




The fact that 67.2% of supervising investigators could not confirm the availability of archival motor vehicle records raises the concern that the under-utilization of these records may

be preventing some serious crimes from being solved in our state. Next, our attention turns to investigator awareness of archival driver license records.

As in the case of archival motor vehicle records, the H.I.T.S. unit also maintains archived driver license records. Those records provide a host of information, such as past known addresses, that can greatly assist investigators in solving crimes. Evaluators were interested to determine if criminal investigators were aware of the archived database available to them through the H.I.T.S. program.

Survey participants were asked to comment on the following statement, “Archival driver license information is available to me even if records have been purged from publicly available records:”

*Figure 4.72*  
**Survey Item:**




Of those who responded, 99 (33.7%) affirmed that accurate statement. Another 191 (65.2%) criminal investigators could not affirm that archival driver license information is available to them even if those records had been purged from publicly available records. This is a strong indicator that H.I.T.S. unit investigator/analysts have not communicated sufficiently often to enough law enforcement audiences the fact that they may be of assistance to investigators in this important regard. Supervising investigators were offered the opportunity to respond to the same question.

Of supervising investigators who responded to this statement, only 35 (40.2%) affirmed the availability of archival driver license information:

*Figure 4.73*

**Survey Item:**

**Archival driver license information is available to me and/or my team  
even if records have been from publicly available records [Supervising Investigators]  
[N=87]**



Some 48 (55.2%) could not connect the availability of archival driver license information to any source. Though the H.I.T.S. unit was not specified as a source for such data, supervising investigators were overwhelmingly unaware of its existence. As in the case of criminal investigators, the H.I.T.S. team could improve their communication of this valuable asset. Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked to opine regarding the availability of personal data in public source databases.

Evaluators were interested in discovering the attitudes Police Chiefs and Sheriffs hold regarding repositories of personal data. They were asked to respond to the statement, “The way I see it, a repository of personal data that includes records from the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Licensing, the Department of Corrections, and other public sources is a valuable tool for criminal investigators:” As expected, virtually all (92.7%) of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs agreed with the statement; only 9 (5.1%) law enforcement CEOs did not agree with this statement.

In summary, the results obtained from this line of inquiry provided the W.S.U. evaluation team with considerable information upon which to draw an informed assessment of the degree to which the H.I.T.S. unit has effectively communicated many of its services to those most likely to benefit from the use of those services. When asked to tell evaluators how H.I.T.S. could improve its services, one supervising investigator commented as follows:

*If one agency was trained in what H.I.T.S. can do. I had no idea all these services were available.*

The importance of the availability of each of the services studied is demonstrated by the following comment made by a criminal investigator:

*The H.I.T.S. program has assisted many investigators in my department with crimes/information [such as] vehicles during the first part of an investigation. Without this resource agencies within the state would not know about each other's crimes. I can ask H.I.T.S. if my investigation is similar to the other agencies' case. Armed with that information, I can contact the investigator who has the case first hand. If not, then I will not contact the investigator and waste his time. Partial plates/DOL information/address searches/time lines on serial criminals/these are all sources which have assisted me through H.I.T.S. to continue on a path or just an entry that I checked. Take the resource away and things go back many years. That is not a good thing when investigating violent crimes.*

Familiarity with or awareness of the existence of assistance is the key to valuation of that service. Existence of a service or of a database serves no purpose if those who can benefit from that service or database cannot access it. Access to the H.I.T.S. database and services is made only after an investigator in the field is made aware of its availability. That is why evaluators of the H.I.T.S. program spent so much energy and time in gathering and reporting on data from the service side of H.I.T.S.

Responses to the above statements and questions permitted the W.S.U. evaluation team to conclude that all of the H.I.T.S. services are substantially under-utilized by investigators in the field. The degree to which some services are used while others are not varies somewhat, but the general pattern is serious under-utilization. What follows on the next page next is a brief recap of the services included in this section of the evaluation. First defined by topic, this chart depicts the percentage of criminal investigators and supervising investigators that indicated in some way that they were unaware that assistance for each particular service is available from an outside source.

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Criminal Investigators</b>	<b>Supervising Investigators</b>
Basic Investigations Training	17.2%	39.2%
Basic Homicide Inv. Training	20.5%	26.4%
Advanced Homicide Inv. Training	32.8%	33.0%
H.I.T.S. Cold Case Assistance	27.0% <sup>5</sup>	23.0%
Cold Case Assist Outside Agency	47.0% <sup>6</sup>	37.9%
Cold Case Unit Development Assist	34.8%	40.7%
Expert Witness Testimony Assist	52.6%	51.7%
How Death Occurred Assistance	38.9%	40.2%
Interrogation Technique Assistance	45.4%	52.9%
Crime Timeline Assistance	61.1%	54.0%
DNA Analysis Assistance	46.8%	51.7%
Gang Affiliation Information	59.4%	50.6%
Criminal Profiling	46.4%	50.6%
Crime Mapping	79.5%	78.2%
Archival Motor Vehicle Records	67.2%	67.2%
Archival Driver Licensing Records	65.2%	55.2%

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<sup>5</sup> This percentage dropped to 16.2% when data were filtered to include only investigators who work at least 75% of their time on homicide or rape/sexual assault investigations.

<sup>6</sup> This percentage increased to 76.3% when data were filtered to include only investigators who work at least 75% of their time on homicide or rape/sexual assault investigations.

It is important to note that for many of the services listed, the percentages shown were obtained through a response option that read, “I am not familiar with it but would use it.” Evaluators are confident that the above percentages represent potential for use of underutilized H.I.T.S. services. There is plenty of evidence throughout the W.S.U. evaluation team’s report that supports the fact that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are effective in their efforts to accomplish H.I.T.S. mission goals. *Communicating more effectively information concerning the services they can provide to those who would use them was a principal recommendation made by the W.S.U. program evaluators.* Having sufficiently reviewed the data drawn from many instances of H.I.T.S. services, we now examine the role H.I.T.S. Bulletins play in assisting local criminal investigators in their work.

### **Introduction to H.I.T.S. Bulletins**

The H.I.T.S. unit began issuing Bulletins on January 16, 2002 in an effort to inform the local law enforcement community of unsolved homicides, rapes/sexual assaults, and other serious crimes that might affect them. Immediately upon being created, the Bulletins are distributed via e-mail through a list maintained at the H.I.T.S. unit. A section of the W.S.U. 2006 H.I.T.S. program evaluation report addressed many aspects of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins, including their purpose, the pattern of their distribution, and the opinions users of the Bulletins hold concerning this informational source. There were 1,179 Bulletins issued and distributed by the H.I.T.S. unit between January 16, 2002 and April 14, 2006.

Recipients of H.I.T.S. Bulletins were surveyed via a self-administered survey conducted on the Internet. There were 643 respondents to the on-line survey, but it was discovered that




many who receive the periodic bulletins do not have investigative authority over homicide and rape/sexual assault cases. Such authority was determined to be an operational standard for the evaluation. Information from those lacking investigative authority is nonetheless important. Therefore, it was decided by the evaluation team that two data runs would be made on the on-line survey. One run includes all respondents (N=643), while the second run included only those respondents who have investigative authority over homicide and/or rape/sexual assault cases (N=219). Consequently, some of the charts that follow will show more participants than others.

### Distribution of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins

In order to learn how H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients became aware of, and began receiving H.I.T.S. Bulletins, the W.S.U. evaluation team asked them the following question: “Which of the following best describes how you were introduced to H.I.T.S. Bulletins?”

*Figure 4.74*

**Survey Item:**



**66.1% of Bulletin recipients heard about H.I.T.S. Bulletins through a co-worker or a colleague**

Responses to this question indicate that bulletin recipients were almost equally divided in thirds as to the method by which they started receiving H.I.T.S. Bulletins. Some 220 (34.2%) bulletin recipients responded that they heard about the bulletins from a co-worker, and they requested to receive them. A total of 206 (32%) indicated that the bulletins started appearing in their e-mail without their solicitation. Yet another 205 (31.9%) responded that they heard about the bulletins through a colleague and they made a request to receive them. The majority of those who responded that the bulletins started appearing in their e-mail without solicitation (206, or 32.0%) are likely Community Corrections Officers (CCOs). When evaluators inquired as to the process by which names are added to the bulletin recipient list a H.I.T.S. staff member readily volunteered the evidence that the names of all CCOs in Washington were added to the H.I.T.S. bulletin e-mail list at one time. Otherwise, the staffer stated, people are added to the distribution list only upon direct request.

These survey data results indicate that 425 (66.1%) of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients requested to receive the bulletins after hearing about them through either a co-worker or a colleague. The distinction between the categories “co-worker” and “colleague” was intentionally left to the respondents. Evaluators intended co-worker to mean somebody who works in the same agency as the recipient. Colleague was intended to mean somebody from an allied agency, which could have included H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts. Nobody commented on this specific distinction, and the W.S.U. evaluation team cannot be certain that the intended distinction was realized by the on-line survey participants. It is believed that those who indicated co-worker implied that they learned about the H.I.T.S. Bulletins through somebody within their agency, and

those who responded “colleague” meant someone in law enforcement from outside of their own agency.

### **Distribution of Bulletins; Intended Audience**

In any program resource allocation the question of whom to include and whom to exclude arises. In interviews conducted with the H.I.T.S. team it was learned that the H.I.T.S. staff has grappled with the question of the proper range of distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins. Due to the confidential nature of some of the bulletins, it is debatable as to whether they should be distributed to persons who are not certified as peace officers. Recommendations regarding the distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins follow in a later segment of this dissertation. Of immediate concern is whether the distribution list produces the impact intended by the H.I.T.S. unit management. H.I.T.S. Bulletins are designed and issued as an informational tool intended to increase the potential that serious crime in Washington be either cleared, meaning that an arrest is made in the case, or prevented, such as due to the apprehension of a potential perpetrator prior to the commission of future crimes.

The W.S.U. evaluation team members honed in on one critical question: Since one measure of success for the H.I.T.S. unit is the number of bulletins sent out<sup>7</sup>, and the number of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients, should concern be occasioned that 206, or nearly one-third, of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients replied that they did not request receipt of the bulletins? When asked about this issue, a H.I.T.S. staff member replied to one W.S.U. evaluation team member via e-mail, “Also, at one point several years ago, we entered every DOC CCO address we could find.

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<sup>7</sup> H.I.T.S. management refers to the H.I.T.S. Bulletins in two separate mission statements.

That seriously bloated our numbers.” The term, “bloated our numbers” was not interpreted by evaluators to mean that H.I.T.S. team members intentionally padded the numbers of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients to justify their existence. Rather, it was interpreted literally to mean that the number of recipients increased significantly following the inclusion of the CCO e-mail addresses. What was left for the W.S.U. evaluation team to decide was whether the practice of sending H.I.T.S. Bulletins, some of which contain “law enforcement confidential information,” to non-sworn personnel serves the intended mission of the H.I.T.S. unit.

Information given to H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts is so given based on the age-old “need to know” doctrine. Based on the review of over 1,100 H.I.T.S. Bulletins by the W.S.U. evaluation team, it is submitted that the bulletins **do not** contain information that would jeopardize any criminal case. Information that could jeopardize a criminal case is generally termed as “hold-back” information. Hold-back information is only released to those with direct ties to the investigation of that specific case. The sort of information that appears on the H.I.T.S. Bulletins, though not critical to the prosecution of a case, is at times rather sensitive. H.I.T.S. program evaluators reviewed comments from H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients to gather additional information on which to make a judgment call as to the appropriateness of the distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins to CCOs. Four notable comments in this area were as follows:

*For Community Corrections Officers and Community Corrections Supervisors [like me] our use of the bulletins is to see if someone whom law enforcement is looking for may possibly be on our caseloads. We see so many faces of offenders throughout the years that many times a CCO somewhere in the state may be able to provide the tip that law enforcement needs. That is the benefit for DOC and I would like to see that continued.*

*I am a Washington State D.O.C. Community Corrections Supervisor and [I] receive the bulletins regularly. I believe it is very important for officers/supervisors of DOC's*

*Community Corrections Division to receive the bulletins, as we have regular contact and vital information on thousands of felons in Washington State, and may be able to assist police investigators in solving their cases.*

*H.I.T.S. information is rarely used by DOC field staff; however, it may be used in conjunction with new or 'crime-partner' investigations to locate a wanted person. We usually leave the investigations to the experts, but we may do a follow-up violation report to the Court or Hearings Unit in conjunction with a new conviction.*

*...I do not believe that you should have to be a commissioned officer to belong to H.I.T.S.*

Based on the comments presented, the W.S.U. evaluation team recommended that CCOs continue to receive H.I.T.S. Bulletins, despite their classification as non-commissioned law enforcement. The job function of CCOs places them in a unique position to offer timely tips to local law enforcement regarding the known and verified whereabouts of potential offenders. That recommendation was also based on the fact that upon a systematic review of the content of all 1,000+ H.I.T.S. Bulletins issued up until the most recent ones vis-à-vis the date of the completion of the W.S.U. program evaluation report, it was determined that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins did not result in the inappropriate release of information that could jeopardize the successful clearance of a criminal case. Furthermore, the distribution of information (including H.I.T.S. Bulletins) to a greater number of people in the criminal justice professional network could result in the rendering of timely assistance to local law enforcement resulting in the clearing of a crime sooner rather than later. That is, after all, the principal mission of the H.I.T.S. unit. What follows next is analysis of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins including the source and purpose of each bulletin.

### Source and Purpose of Bulletins:

The list below represents the top 11 agencies to have created H.I.T.S. Bulletins (from January 16, 2002 through April 14, 2006), not including bulletins that announced training or featured U.S. Probation reports:<sup>8</sup>

	Number of Bulletins	Percent of total (N=1,179)
1. Seattle P.D.	81	6.9%
2. King Co S.D.	80	6.8%
3. Snohomish Co S.D.	74	6.3%
4. H.I.T.S. Team	43	3.6%
5. Spokane P.D.	28	2.4%
6. Tacoma P.D.	28	2.4%
7. Federal Way P.D.	27	2.3%
8. Bellevue P.D.	26	2.2%
9. Bellingham P.D.	23	2.0%
10. Kent P.D.	22	1.9%
11. Auburn P.D.	21	1.8%

A total of 338 (28.7%) H.I.T.S. Bulletins were generated by local law enforcement agencies located within Washington State Regional Homeland Security Coordination District Region 6 (King County). Another 222 (18.8%) H.I.T.S. Bulletins were generated within Region

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<sup>8</sup> A similar version of this list appeared in a preliminary evaluation study report; however that listing showed the top 10 agencies responsible for the creation of bulletins. The H.I.T.S. team contributions were excluded from that listing.

1 (Snohomish, Skagit, and Whatcom Counties). Nearly half (47.5%) of the bulletins were generated by agencies located within those four Westside counties. Following is a categorical breakdown of the reasons for these bulletins:

**Top 18 Reasons Bulletins Were Generated (N=1,179):**

	Number of Bulletins	Percent of total (N=1,179)
1. Homicide Suspect	150	12.7%
2. Missing Persons (over age 18)	140	11.9%
3. Training	95	8.1%
4. Robbery Suspect	48	4.1%
5. Bank Robbery Suspect	40	3.4%
6. Rape Suspect	40	3.4%
7. Officer Safety	34	2.9%
8. Armed Robbery Suspects	27	2.3%
9. Assault Suspects	25	2.1%
10. Suspicious Circumstances	21	1.8%
11. Homicide Persons of Interest	20	1.7%
12. Home Invasion Robbery Suspects	19	1.6%
13. Serial Robbery Suspect	17	1.4%
14. Escapee	16	1.4%
15. Missing Persons (Under age 18)	16	1.4%
16. Child Rape Suspect	16	1.4%
17. Homicide Witness(es)	14	1.2%
18. Rape/Kidnapping Suspect(s)	13	1.1%

<i>All Robbery</i> , including #4,5,8,12, & 13 above	151	12.8%
<i>All Rape</i> , including #6, 16, & 18 above	69	5.9%

In examining the number of bulletins created for each topic, the W.S.U. evaluation team cautions the reader that more than one bulletin could have been generated for each incident. For example, if a bulletin was generated for a homicide suspect, and at a subsequent time another bulletin is generated to advise that a suspect was arrested in that case, both bulletins would count in the category “homicide.” Therefore, one should not assume that the number of homicide-related bulletins (150) indicates that there were 150 separate homicides that each generated one H.I.T.S. Bulletin.

It was imperative that the W.S.U. evaluation team look beyond the crimes that lead to the generation of the bulletins and determine the jurisdictions that were not the source of bulletins in order to document if it is the case that some local law enforcement agencies are being left out of this aspect of H.I.T.S. program services. But first, it is quite helpful to demonstrate the level of participation in the H.I.T.S. Bulletin program by Washington cities and counties.

*Following is a list of Washington cities and towns (with population<sup>9</sup> indicated) for which H.I.T.S. Bulletins **have been created**, since the inception of the bulletin program on January 16, 2002 (N=80).*

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<sup>9</sup> 2007 Office of Financial Management Estimate. Source: Scott D. Dwyor and Mary B. Dwyor (eds.), **2008 Washington State Yearbook**. Sammamish: Electronic Handbook Publishers, Inc.



Aberdeen (16,450)	Hoquiam (8,845)
Airway Heights (5,030)	Issaquah (24,710)
Algona (2,725)	Kennewick (62,520)
Anacortes (16,400)	Kent (86,660)
Arlington (16,720)	Kirkland (47,890)
Auburn (50,470)	Kittitas (1,135)
Bellevue (118,100)	Lacey (350)
Bellingham (75,220)	Lake Forest Park (12,770)
Bonney Lake (15,740)	Lakewood (58,950)
Bothell (32,400)	Longview (35,710)
Bremerton (35,810)	Lynden (11,150)
Brewster (2,195)	Lynnwood (35,490)
Brier (6,480)	Marysville (36,210)
Centralia (15,520)	Mercer Island (22,380)
College Place (8,860)	Mill Creek (17,620)
Coupeville (1,855)	Monroe (16,290)
Des Moines (29,090)	Moses Lake (17,440)
Edmonds (40,560)	Mount Vernon (29,390)
Ellensburg (17,220)	Mountlake Terrace (20,810)
Everett (101,800)	Mukilteo (19,940)
Federal Way (87,390)	Oak Harbor (22,690)
Fife (7,180)	Olympia (44,460)
Gig Harbor (6,780)	Othello (6,340)

Pacific (6,055)	South Bend (1,770)
Pasco (50,210)	Spokane (202,900)
Port Angeles (19,010)	Spokane Valley (88,280)
Port Townsend (8,865)	Springdale (275)
Pullman (26,860)	Stanwood (5,200)
Puyallup (36,790)	Steilacoom (6,220)
Quincy (5,455)	Sumner (9,035)
Redmond (3,005)	Sunnyside (15,130)
Renton (60,290)	Tacoma (201,700)
Richland (45,070)	Toppenish (9,105)
Seattle (572,600)	Tukwila (18,000)
Sedro Wooley (9,945)	Tumwater (13,340)
Sequim (5,330)	Vancouver (160,800)
Shelton (8,895)	Washougal (12,980)
Shoreline (53,190)	Wenatchee (30,270)
Snohomish (8,970)	West Richland (10,850)
Soap Lake (1,750)	Yakima (82,940)

*This is a list of Washington cities and towns for which H.I.T.S. Bulletins **have not been** created (N=203):*

Albion (625)	Bainbridge Island (23,080)
Almira (285)	Battle Ground (16,240)
Asotin (1,180)	Beau Arts Village (310)

Benton City (2,860)	Colton (420)
Bingen (680)	Colville (5,020)
Black Diamond (4,120)	Conconully (190)
Blaine (4,650)	Concrete (845)
Bridgeport (2,090)	Connell (3,205)
Buckley (4,555)	Cosmopolis (1,645)
Bucoda (655)	Coulee City (600)
Burien (31,410)	Coulee Dam (1,025)
Burlington (8,400)	Covington (17,190)
Camas (16,280)	Creston (255)
Carbonado (655)	Cusick (210)
Carnation (1,900)	Darrington (1,485)
Cashmere (2,980)	Davenport (1,745)
Castle Rock (2,135)	Dayton (2,720)
Cathlamet (560)	Deer Park (3,235)
Chehalis (7,045)	Dupont (7,045)
Chelan (3,835)	Duvall (5,845)
Cheney (10,210)	East Wenatchee (11,480)
Chewelah (2,350)	Eatonville (2,380)
Clarkston (7,280)	Edgewood (9,560)
Cle Elum (1,835)	Electric City (970)
Clyde Hill (2,810)	Elma (3,140)
Colfax (2,905)	Elmer City (241)

Endicott (331)	Hatton (105)
Entiat (1,130)	Hunts Point (480)
Enumclaw (11,320)	Ilwaco (1,040)
Ephrata (7,025)	Index (160)
Everson (2,165)	Ione (420)
Fairfield (627)	Kahlotus (220)
Farmington (145)	Kalama (2,105)
Ferndale (10,540)	Kelso (11,840)
Fircrest (6,270)	Kenmore (19,940)
Forks (3,175)	Kettle Falls (1,610)
Friday Harbor (2,220)	Krupp (60)
Garfield (630)	La Center (2,440)
George (530)	La Conner (900)
Gold Bar (2,175)	La Crosse (35,870)
Goldendale (3,715)	Lake Stevens (13,350)
Grand Coulee (930)	Lamont (90)
Grandview (9,150)	Langley (1,060)
Granger (2,955)	Latah (192)
Granite Falls (3,195)	Leavenworth (2,225)
Hamilton (330)	Liberty Lake (6,580)
Harrah (630)	Lind (560)
Harrington (420)	Long Beach (1,460)
Hartline (145)	Lyman (450)

Lynden (11,150)	Newport (1,990)
Mabton (2,080)	Nooksack (1,075)
Malden (215)	Normandy Park (6,435)
Mansfield (330)	North Bend (4,705)
Maple Valley (20,020)	North Bonneville (882)
Marcus (175)	Northport (290)
Mattawa (3,340)	Oakesdale (420)
McCleary (1,555)	Oakville (715)
Medical Lake (4,695)	Ocean Shores (4,705)
Medina (2,950)	Odessa (955)
Mesa (440)	Okanogan (2,445)
Metaline (165)	Omak (4,735)
Metaline Falls (286)	Oroville (1,710)
Millwood (1,665)	Orting (5,940)
Milton (6,520)	Palouse (1,020)
Montesano (3,550)	Port Orchard (8,350)
Morton (1,140)	Pateros (620)
Mossyrock (485)	Pe Ell (670)
Moxee (2,065)	Pomeroy (1,520)
Naches (805)	Port Orchard (8,350)
Napavine (1,492)	Poulsbo (7,560)
Nespelem (205)	Prescott (315)
Newcastle (9,550)	Prosser (5,075)

Rainier (1,705)	Sprague (495)
Raymond (3,005)	Starbuck (130)
Reardan (630)	Stevenson (1,370)
Republic (985)	Sultan (4,530)
Ridgefield (3,680)	Sumas (1,191)
Ritzville (1,730)	Tekoa (835)
Riverside (320)	Tenino (1,520)
Rockford (865)	Tieton (1,200)
Rock Island (504)	Toledo (685)
Rosalia (650)	Tonasket (990)
Roslyn (1,020)	Twisp (980)
Roy (870)	Union Gap (5,700)
Royal City (1,885)	Uniontown (345)
Ruston (750)	University Place (31,300)
Saint John (564)	Vader (620)
Sammamish (40,260)	Waitsburg (1,230)
SeaTac (25,530)	Walla Walla (30,990)
Selah (6,935)	Wapato (4,540)
Skykomish (210)	Warden (2,575)
Snoqualmie (8,600)	Washtucna (260)
South Cle Elum (580)	Waterville (1,180)
South Prairie (440)	Waverly (120)
Spangle (275)	Westport (2,335)

White Salmon (2,195)	Woodland (4,960)
Wilbur (900)	Woodway (1,180)
Wilkeson (455)	Yacolt (1,370)
Wilson Creek (245)	Yarrow Point (975)
Winlock (1,370)	Yelm (4,845)
Winthrop (380)	Zillah (2,660)
Woodinville (10,390)	

*This is a list of Washington counties for which H.I.T.S. Bulletins **have been** generated (N=27):*

Benton (162,900)	Lincoln (10,300)
Chelan (71,200)	Mason (54,600)
Clallam (68,500)	Pacific (21,600)
Clark (415,000)	Pierce (790,500)
Cowlitz (97,800)	Skagit (115,300)
Douglas (36,300)	Skamania (10,700)
Grant (82,500)	Snohomish (686,300)
Grays Harbor (70,800)	Spokane (451,200)
Island (78,400)	Stevens (43,000)
Jefferson (28,600)	Thurston (238,000)
King (1,861,300)	Walla Walla (58,300)
Kitsap (244,800)	Whatcom (188,300)
Kittitas (38,300)	Yakima (234,200)
Lewis (74,100)	


Counties not generating H.I.T.S. Bulletins were the following: Asotin (21,300), Adams (17,600), Columbia (4,100), Ferry (7,550), Franklin (67,400), Garfield (2,350), Klickitat (19,900), Okanogan (39,800), Pend Oreille (12,600), San Juan (15,900), Wahkiakum (4,000), and Whitman (42,700).

There were rare instances in which a city or a county law enforcement agency worked in conjunction with a neighboring jurisdiction to develop a H.I.T.S. Bulletin in a criminal investigation matter of mutual concern. If that was the only instance requiring a H.I.T.S. Bulletin, it is possible that the neighboring jurisdiction was annotated as the recipient of the H.I.T.S. unit service, leaving that agency identified as having not benefited by the distribution of a H.I.T.S. Bulletin. Only one instance of that occurring was identified wherein Franklin and Benton counties had a joint case. Because only one agency could be shown to benefit from the H.I.T.S. service, Benton County was given the credit and Franklin County shows as having not received the benefit. Neither county's Sheriff Department has made much use of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin service. City police departments such as Pasco, Richland and Kennewick benefited from H.I.T.S. Bulletin services while the host county Sheriff's Departments did not.

The following graph shows the percentage of cities that have not generated a H.I.T.S. Bulletin since the first bulletin was issued on January 16, 2002. The cities shown are categorized by police agency size, as indicated by the number of sworn officers on staff:



*Figure 4.75*  
**Survey Item:**



As the graph shows, 81 (72.3%) of the agencies for which no H.I.T.S. Bulletin has ever been created have between one and ten sworn officers. Another 26 (23.1%) have 11 – 25 sworn officers. Four cities--Burien, Kelso, SeaTac and Walla Walla—are the largest cities in Washington to not have benefited from H.I.T.S. Bulletin service. They each have between 26 and 50 sworn officers. This is evidence that there is a serious communication deficiency that must be overcome if law enforcement agencies want to experience the best possible flow of information/intelligence.

H.I.T.S. Bulletins are generated and distributed for any reason deemed by H.I.T.S. personnel to be “mission worthy.” It would be difficult to argue that the city and county law enforcement agencies listed above which have not benefited from the distribution of H.I.T.S.


Bulletins have not had incidents that warranted the creation of a Bulletin since January 16, 2002. It seems clear that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts may have the opportunity to penetrate those jurisdictions if they increase their level of attention to stranger-to-stranger sexual assaults. Now that a clear pattern of uneven distribution has emerged, the evaluators turn their attention to the impact the H.I.T.S. Bulletin program has had on crime.

### **Bulletin Impact on Crime**

The W.S.U. evaluation team sought to ascertain the degree to which bulletins issued from the H.I.T.S. unit have been useful in assisting local criminal justice agencies in their crime fighting effort. Several questions asked of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were designed to capture data that informed the evaluation team on this specific important topic. In this regard they were asked this question: “Which of the following best describes how useful H.I.T.S. Bulletins are in assisting you in your job?” The following bar graph plots out the frequencies of response registered in each category of the continuum.

*Figure 4.76*

**Survey Item:**



The response categories ranged from “not useful at all” on one end of a continuum to “very useful” on the other.


Responses for all 643 of the Bulletin recipients who responded to the survey were examined. Fully 472 (73.4%) local criminal justice professionals responded that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins are “somewhat” or “very” useful. Another 114 (17.7%) indicated that they were “undecided,” and only 50 (7.8%) reported that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins are not useful in assisting them in their job or on their investigations. In an effort to determine if the degree of usefulness of H.I.T.S. Bulletins varied across the groups of those who reported to be criminal investigators (who investigate homicides and rapes/sexual assault) and those who do not, the replies to this question recorded by criminal investigators were plotted separately.

The vast majority of on-line survey respondents who identified themselves as criminal investigators (184, 84.0%) rated the H.I.T.S. Bulletins as being useful. This compares to the figure of 73.9% when all recipients were included. Those who were undecided about the help provided by H.I.T.S. Bulletins dropped to 12.3% (compared to 17.9%), and those not finding the H.I.T.S. Bulletins to be useful dropped from 7.9% to 3.7%. These survey data indicate that H.I.T.S. Bulletins are helpful to more than 92% of all bulletin recipients, and that percentage of “assistance rendered” increases to over 96% for those whose main job is the investigation of homicides and rapes/sexual assault.

H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were given the opportunity to tell evaluators how many times they have benefited directly from the receipt of H.I.T.S. Bulletins. The following bar chart sets forth these findings.

*Figure 4.77*  
**Survey Item:**

**Frequency of H.I.T.S. Bulletins Assisting Criminal Investigations [On-line Survey]**  
[N=643]



A full 243 (37.8%) responded that they are not investigators, so they did not believe this question to be applicable to them. Another 127 (19.8%) indicated that their investigations have never benefited by H.I.T.S. Bulletins. Some 177 (27.5%) responded that they have benefited one to five times, while 40 (6.2%) claimed to have benefited six to ten times. Forty-seven (7.3%) individuals indicated that their investigations have been assisted by a H.I.T.S. Bulletin more than ten times. All told, 41.6% of all H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients confirmed that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins

have benefited them in their investigative duties. That percentage dramatically increases when the responses of those whose job is primarily that of investigations are more closely examined.

Of those investigators identified as having investigative authority of homicides and rapes/sexual assaults, 69.6% responded that their investigations benefited from H.I.T.S. Bulletins. With a firm understanding of the level of investigation benefits provided by the H.I.T.S. Bulletins, the W.S.U. evaluation team next explored additional benefits the H.I.T.S. Bulletins might provide to criminal justice system professionals working in local police agencies and in community corrections across the state.

### **Bulletins Provide Historical Data**

In the process of evaluating a service such as the H.I.T.S. Bulletin it is inevitable that determinations need to be made as to the need of certain components of the host program. In the case of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins, the data gathered confirms that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins provide much more than an “all points bulletin” type of informational source used on an immediate criminal offense. Such advisories are usually discarded within hours or even minutes of their creation. Stated best by one H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient who expressed support for the continuation of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin program, the importance of the bulletins as historical data needs to be recognized:

*Although we do not usually submit items to H.I.T.S., our agency always reviews the information and compares wanted suspects with in-house data in case there is a connection. In November of 2005, while compiling a wanted poster for U.S. Probation, I recalled an earlier H.I.T.S. Bulletin for a bank robber. The subject of my wanted poster turned out to be the H.I.T.S. bank robber of a bank in Kennewick, WA. The FBI was notified and the suspect was arrested a few weeks later in Nevada (after robbing a few more banks).*

The W.S.U. evaluation team uncovered additional data of this kind that suggest that H.I.T.S. Bulletins are seen as a valuable asset in the local law enforcement community.

### **Support for the Continuation of Distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins, and Comments on Their Use**

*Information not shared is useless information. – From a H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient*

The following text is a series of statements made by H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients in response to a question that prompted them to comment on their overall opinion of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins and distribution thereof:

*I work for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (U.S. Customs) in the intelligence office. As I get the bulletins, I query subjects for a nexus to the U.S. borders. I have been able assist investigation with this information.*

*I started receiving H.I.T.S. Bulletins when I was a detective in a sexual assault unit. I have continued to receive them after being promoted and returning to patrol. I will post them on a LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLY bulletin board if applicable to our area.*

*The information contained in these bulletins helps me keep in tune with the community I serve. This is simply because I am a Community Corrections Officer and a lot of the H.I.T.S. bulletins contain information of future members of my case load. You and your bulletins provide a great service - Thank you for all you do for me!*

*H.I.T.S. [bulletin resource] is a great resource of information. We utilize it to keep officers aware of individuals and crimes which have occurred in nearby communities. While we review every bulletin I believe we have only utilized H.I.T.S. services 1-2 times.  
- From a Police Chief.*

*I love to receive the H.I.T.S. bulletins. We are so rural and small that we are rarely able to provide useful info to other agencies about their postings. Also, our reported violent crime/sexual assault crime rate is very low. - From a supervising investigator.*

*H.I.T.S. information is rarely used by DOC field staff; however, it may be used in conjunction with new or 'crime-partner' investigations to locate a wanted person. We usually leave the investigations to the experts, but we may do a follow-up violation report to the Court or Hearings Unit in conjunction with a new conviction.*

*I am a Washington State D.O.C. Community Corrections Supervisor, and I receive the bulletins regularly. I believe it is very important for officers/supervisors of DOC's Community Corrections Division to receive the bulletins, as we have regular contact [with] and vital information on thousands of felons in Washington. [We] may be able to assist police investigators in solving their cases.*

*I think it is important for DOC to be involved in receiving these bulletins. Just last month I was able to help another local agency locate an individual they were looking for concerning a homicide as I had updated information on him.*

It was apparent to the W.S.U. evaluation team that the H.I.T.S. Bulletin component of the H.I.T.S. unit program provides important and timely information to local law enforcement agents who serve in varied capacities to accomplish similar goals. It is important for a program such as H.I.T.S. to not only have technologies available for the efficient means by which to attain mission goals, but to achieve a nexus between people within the program associated with those technologies and those being served by the program is also critical to mission success. It appears that this important nexus was achieved in the case of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins.

### **Technology-Related Issues**

Several key issues related to the H.I.T.S. criminal information technologies used by local law enforcement were identified by the W.S.U. evaluation team and were captured in this report. These issues can be easily categorized under three useful headings: data input issues; access to

the data issues; and training issues. These observations from the program evaluation study are particularly important for the development of deeper insight into the barriers to the successful development of ILP in contemporary American law enforcement.

### **Data Input**

All database systems rely on the input of accurate and appropriate data. Queries of the database can only produce outputs based on the appropriate organization of information entered. It is therefore essential that policies be established for the inclusion of certain data, while the exclusion of non-essential data is ensured. Relevant discussion topics related to data input include: What data are to be included and excluded? Who should be charged with the input of data? How should data be entered into the database? The first task is to identify the type of data to be included and excluded.

Perhaps the single biggest policy issue related to criminal intelligence databases concerns the type of data to be included or excluded. H.I.T.S. administrators pride themselves in their decision to enter and maintain legacy data for use in solving cold homicides and rapes. Sheptycki (2004) warns against this practice in his outline of pathologies that hinder organizational communications. Calling the collection and maintenance of redundant or outdated information “intelligence overload,” Sheptycki cautions that only up-to-date data should be included in police intelligence databases. There is certainly room for debate on this specific issue inasmuch as H.I.T.S. team members point to instances in which their database queries have resulted in retrieving archived license plate information long ago discarded by the department of vehicle licensing. This precisely illustrates the importance of having policy



statements in place to guide the police intelligence and communications processes. The availability of legacy data in the H.I.T.S. system is a prime opportunity for the H.I.T.S. team to use it as a tool to help to open doors of communications across agency lines, as recommended by Mastrofski (2006).

An example of data that should be included in all police databases is field interrogation information. Called FIRs (for field interview or field interrogation report) in the police community, the information gathered in the course of routine patrol could be critical to solving criminal offenses based on the well-known proverb that criminal offenders seldom commit a single illegal act. Evidence gathered for the H.I.T.S. program evaluation report prepared by the W.S.U. researchers indicates that FIRs are vastly underused in criminal investigations. Support for the inclusion of FIRs in criminal investigative databases was found in the literature: “Limited evidence supports the effectiveness of field interrogations in reducing specific types of crime...” (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 51).

In a focus group session held on March 14, 2006, one city patrolman stated “We do FICs (field interview cards, a.k.a. field interrogation reports) on patrol and that information just sits there. If H.I.T.S. wants that information, all they have to do is ask for it. Guys on patrol are too busy with paperwork to fill out H.I.T.S. forms. We could send up thousands of cards over the past year.” Important to the topic of data entry is the process of data entry. Most police agencies are under-staffed, and their crime analysis unit is typically no exception. Frankly, there are not enough personnel available to input thousands of FIRs. As yet, few FIRs are recorded digitally; when that percentage grows this particular barrier to data entry will be greatly reduced.

Data input is a serious concern for the H.I.T.S. team as well. Since they assist in cases that relate specifically to homicides and rapes, the H.I.T.S. program uses standardized input forms which they make available to all criminal investigators in Washington State. Key to the present discussion is the question of who inputs the case-based data. The H.I.T.S. input forms for homicides and sexual assaults are 236 and 217 data entry items in length, respectively. Data entry for each case requires between one to two hours. The forms must first be filled out by the investigating detective, then the data entry process begins at the H.I.T.S. office. That process adds additional time to the investigation of each case.

Findings from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation report highlight the debate over data entry. Regarding the handling of homicide and rape/sexual assault data, criminal investigators were asked about the flow of information thusly: "Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team." Only 44 of 293 (15%) responded that they "agree or strongly agree" with this statement; 79 (27%) were "uncertain;" and 109 (37%) responded they "somewhat or strongly disagree." This indicates that field investigators want help inputting data. Comments associated with this question cited time constraints as the main reason for requesting help. This issue was addressed by another survey question which read as follows: "I would prefer to be able to input data from my investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through the H.I.T.S. team." Only 53 of 293 (18%) Criminal investigators responded that they "somewhat or strongly agree" with the statement; 55 of 293 (18.8%) responded they were "uncertain;" and 147 of 293 (50.2%) responded that they "somewhat or strongly disagree."

Supervising investigators were asked to respond to the following statement: “I would prefer that my investigators input data from their investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.” Only 9 of 87 (10.3%) responded that they “somewhat or strongly agree;” 24 (27.6%) responded “uncertain;” 50 (57.5%) responded “somewhat or strongly disagree.” When asked to respond to the following question, results were somewhat different: “Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigators.” Those supervising investigators who responded “somewhat or strongly agree” numbered 17 of 87 (19.5%); 27 (31%) were “uncertain;” and 35 (40.2%) responded “somewhat or strongly disagree.”


Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were also asked to respond to the statement: “I would prefer that my investigators input data from their investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.” Only 15.8% (28 of 177) “agree or strongly agree;” 52 of 177 (29.4%) responded that they were “uncertain;” 56 of 177 (31.6%) responded “somewhat or strongly disagree” and 39 of 177 (22%) indicated they did not have enough experience to answer the question.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked to respond to the statement: “Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.” Only slightly more than one-in-five (41 of 177, or 23.2%) responded “agree or strongly agree;” 52 or 29.4% responded “uncertain;” 34 or 19.2% responded “disagree or strongly disagree;” and 48 or 27.1% indicated that they did not have enough

experience to answer the question. Data from criminal investigators, their supervisors, and police chiefs and Sheriffs indicate that the flow of information would be enhanced if detectives are not required to input data directly into the H.I.T.S. database.

H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked their views regarding the need for them to assist local law enforcement criminal investigators to input crime data into the H.I.T.S. database. Their responses follow:

*Figure 4.78*  
**Survey Item:**



These comments from the criminal investigator survey were typical of those wanting direct access to the H.I.T.S. database. Their responses were to a question that asked them how the H.I.T.S. unit could be improved:

*If we could connect on line and also do our own searches.*

*Easier access.*

*Being able to search the database without calling a H.I.T.S. employee to request information.*

*Could be accessed from my computer.*

*Having direct access to the database and being able to input data would make the database more accessible and information reading available.*

*If major crimes investigators could perform queries to the H.I.T.S. database directly.*

*The data was more readily available to local investigator (read only terminal).*

The input forms for murder and rape/sexual assault cases contain a good deal of sensitive information<sup>10</sup>. The homicide form contains 236 data entry points, and the sexual assault form contains 217 entry points, as previously mentioned. The trained staff within the H.I.T.S. unit reports they can complete input of the data in less than an hour. The evaluation team estimated that it would take each local law enforcement criminal investigator in the field more than an hour to complete data input for each incidence of homicide or rape/sexual assault.

It was apparent to the W.S.U. evaluation team that Police Chiefs, Sheriffs, supervising investigators and criminal investigators concur that the time-consuming task of data input is an unwelcome distraction to clients serviced by the H.I.T.S. unit. It should be noted that this policy consideration will not come without cost to the H.I.T.S. unit. The continuation of the practice of having H.I.T.S. team members assist local law enforcement agency members to input crime data

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<sup>10</sup> The complete input form for Murder may be viewed in Appendix 16, for Sexual assault see Appendix 17.

will add strain to those within the H.I.T.S. unit, possibly making the likelihood of the necessity of securing funding for additional H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts inevitable. Future costs attributable to this data-tracking process may have to become a shared expense of state and local governments.


A closer examination of the survey data suggests that there may be room for negotiation between the H.I.T.S. unit and local law enforcement agencies with respect to sharing the financial burden of data entry and analysis. While it is evident elsewhere in survey data that many investigators want *direct access* to the data within the H.I.T.S. database, there exists evidence in the above responses that suggests that those surveyed might be willing to look more closely at the issue of data entry. The percentage of criminal investigators (nearly 25%), supervising investigators (nearly 29%), and Police Chiefs and Sheriffs (nearly 38%) who were *uncertain* about their preference as to whether criminal investigators input data with or without assistance indicates room for further discussion on this topic. A quick look at one other aspect of access to the H.I.T.S. database will perhaps shed additional light on this topic. Once data are entered into a policing database myriad questions arise as to the extent of access permitted to that data. A few of the major issues surrounding access are now addressed.

### **Access to Data**

A major hindrance to the sharing of data is nested in the area of confidentiality. As was indicated in the information gathered for the H.I.T.S. evaluation report, criminal investigators and their supervisors want information housed in all other criminal databases to be readily available to them, but they are reticent to share their information for fear of jeopardizing cases.

Though the question could have been written for a more direct response regarding the willingness to share data, the evaluation team believed they captured the essence of the spirit that local law enforcement officers hold with the following question: “In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?”

*Figure 4.79*  
**Survey Item:**




As shown in the bar graph above, 159 (54.3%) of criminal investigators responded that any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity -- including police patrol officers -- should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 117 (39.9%) of criminal investigators

opined that direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database should be given only to those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency.

Supervising investigators were asked the same question.

*Figure 4.80*

**Survey Item:**



More than half (48 or 55.2%) of the supervising investigators who responded to this question agreed that any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers, should have direct and unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 34 (39.1%) of the supervising investigators indicated that direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database should be given only



to those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency.


The local Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked the same question. Their responses follow:

*Figure 4.81*

**Survey Item:**


**In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who should have direct, unfiltered access to criminal investigation databases? [Police Chiefs and Sheriffs]**

[N=177]



Nearly two-thirds, 112 (63.3%) of the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs who responded to the survey agreed that any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers, should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 57 (32.2%) of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs stated that direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database should be given only to those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency. H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were asked a similar question, and their responses follow:

Figure 4.82

**Survey Item:**

Nearly three-quarters (163 [74.4%]) of the investigators who responded to this on-line survey question agreed that any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers, should have direct and unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 35 (16%) of the same respondents replied that direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database should be given only to those commissioned law enforcement officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency.

These data suggest that the overwhelming majority of criminal investigators of all ranks and with varying investigative responsibilities surveyed favor granting access to the H.I.T.S.

database by any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers. These survey responses indicate clearly that criminal investigators and their local government-based colleagues in the criminal justice system believe they should have a wide scope of authority over crime scene and criminal data maintained by the State of Washington in the Attorney General's H.I.T.S. program database.

Manning (2001a) persuasively argues that the analytic capacity of local law enforcement is ineffectual largely due to impediments to data access. Data from the H.I.T.S. evaluation report lead the W.S.U. evaluation research team to conclude that the vast majority of criminal investigators in local law enforcement agencies want immediate remote access to all of the criminal justice data available without having to go through complicated processes of search requests or connecting with other human gatekeepers. This supports the theory proposed by Manning that police efficiency would be best accomplished by giving patrol units immediate access to criminal data. In his study of a police department in a city with 127,000 population, Manning posits that resistance to new technologies by police officers is related to whether or not the officer has access to data and is required to use it. He suggests that if officers have the technology and are trained to use it, they are more likely to accept it (2001a: 94). While the views of police officers are important, it is also important to look beyond the end user, criminal investigators in the field, to their supervisors and department CEOs in order to gain a broader understanding of the likelihood of support for new information technologies in policing.

Findings from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation report supports the notion that the supervisors of criminal investigators and police chiefs and sheriffs would likely embrace new


information technologies more fully if they were made more available through easier access processes. Supervising Investigators were asked: “Which of the following most closely represents your attitude toward new technologies?” One supervisor responded “I am often confused by new technologies, and I defer to others;” 23 of 87 (26.4%) responded “I am not technologically inclined, but I am willing to learn;” and 62 of 87 (71.3%) responded “I am comfortable with new technologies and I embrace their use.” Police chiefs and Sheriffs were asked: “Which of the following statements best represents your perspective on the proper place of new technologies in criminal justice?” Fully 162 of 177 (91.5%) responded “I believe that law enforcement has access to all of the technological tools it needs to successfully clear crimes; however agencies have to make greater efforts to learn to use them properly;” and 15 (8.5%) responded “I believe that new technologies for crime solving and crime prevention have been over-sold. There is no substitute for good old-fashioned detective work.” Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were also asked to respond to this question: “Which of the following most closely represents your attitudes toward new technologies?” A total 34 of 177 (19.2%) responded “I am not technologically inclined, but I am willing to adopt new technologies if they show promise for helping my agency meet its mission and/or goals;” 148 of 177 (83.6%) responded “I am comfortable with new technologies, and I embrace their use in crime solving and crime prevention.

The W.S.U. evaluation team wanted to formulate a sense of how well the H.I.T.S. team shares responsibility with respect to the use of the H.I.T.S. database for analysis. During interviews with H.I.T.S. staff members, the W.S.U. evaluation team probed the ability of each

H.I.T.S. team member to run his or her own queries on the program database. H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked the following question regarding queries:

*Figure 4.83*  
**Survey Item:**


**I am qualified to run my own queries in the H.I.T.S. databases [H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analysts]**  
[N=7]



Six of the seven respondents indicated that they are somewhat or strongly in agreement that they are qualified to run their own queries in the H.I.T.S. databases. One respondent indicated uncertainty. Interview and survey responses from H.I.T.S. team staff tell a somewhat different story. The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team wanted to learn more about the process of running database queries on the H.I.T.S. system. Next, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked a question about their confidence in obtaining satisfactory results from their queries. While four investigator/analysts agree or strongly agree with the statement, one disagreed with it, and another two investigator/analysts indicated that they are uncertain that their query results would be satisfactory as noted in the following graph:

Figure 4.84

**I am confident that I would obtain satisfactory results from queries if I personally ran queries in the H.I.T.S. databases [H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analysts]  
[N=7]**



The H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts work diligently to meet with the criminal investigators within their respective jurisdictions; however, despite their best efforts there is much evidence that they need to make themselves and the services offered by the H.I.T.S. unit better known. Face-to-face meetings between H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts is the optimum method by which requisite grooming will occur to ensure that local law enforcement investigators will think of the H.I.T.S. team in the course of their investigative work, and as a result call the assigned H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst when their services are needed. Such meetings do not always occur, however, and that is not solely the fault of H.I.T.S. staffers. Many criminal investigators are reticent to give up valuable time for consultations with H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts when their time is being consumed by preoccupation with active investigations.

The H.I.T.S. program's investigator/analysts have demonstrated that they are fully aware of their mission to assist local law enforcement criminal investigators in all aspects of criminal

investigation involving serious crimes against persons. The W.S.U. evaluation team concluded in its program evaluation report that local criminal investigators need to be more fully educated on that H.I.T.S. mission in a manner that will assist the H.I.T.S. team to overcome what is a natural tendency of local law enforcement officials to resist seeking outside assistance due to an unfounded fear of having a state agency “take over” the crime investigation function. To meet this issue head-on, and to make better use of the new information technologies currently employed by the H.I.T.S. unit, it is apparent that the H.I.T.S. program will need additional H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts in the coming years.

The data from the surveys and impressions gathered in interviews with the H.I.T.S. staff suggest that while H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts possess the ability to run queries in the H.I.T.S. databases, some lack confidence that their search results will end with satisfactory results. Based on this information, the W.S.U. evaluation team recommended that H.I.T.S. unit management initiate a staff development training program featuring **cross-training** among H.I.T.S. staff. This type of training initiative will both promote the enhancement of skills among the staff and will ensure the seamless continuation of service provision in the event those who are confident of their abilities to run data queries are for some unforeseen reason unable to perform those mission-critical tasks. The importance of training for everyone associated with criminal justice information is emphasized in the next section of this dissertation.

## **Training**

Nina Cope identified the lack of understanding by police officers of crime analysis and its potential to support policing as a significant inhibitor to the use of available analytical products

(Cope: 194). Manning observes that “police gather far too much data for which they have no identified purpose” (2001a: 98), and he points to inadequate training in the use of the data gathered as being a major shortcoming of contemporary policing. As was reported in the H.I.T.S. evaluation study, many of the criminal investigators, their supervisors, and their agency chiefs and sheriffs could not positively confirm the existence of training and support by outside agencies on various topics critical to their tasks. The H.I.T.S. program offers training and support on myriad criminal investigation topics, including each of the following: basic investigation; basic homicide investigations; advanced homicide investigations; DNA use and collection; expert witness testimony; gang identification and affiliation; blood spatter analysis; cold case investigation; crime mapping by time and location, and archival vehicle and driver license searches—all *at no charge* to recipient agencies and these services are significantly underused by local law enforcement. Findings derived from the H.I.T.S. evaluation report suggest the main reason for this deficiency in the training cycle is the lack of knowledge of the existence of the training. Despite the efforts made by the H.I.T.S. team to inform local law enforcement officials of the availability of these critical resources, they remain underutilized.

## **People**

### **Contact with Criminal Investigators**

The W.S.U. evaluation team sought to determine if the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were likely to miss opportunities to develop relationships with more than one criminal investigator within each client agency (if more than one is available). The purpose of gathering this information is to help evaluators gauge the extent to which H.I.T.S. staff members endeavor



to develop working relationships with members of local law enforcement agencies who are likely to use H.I.T.S. program services.

Fully 100% of those staff responding to a question on the survey regarding the contacting of multiple investigators indicated that they contact more than one investigator within each agency. Responses indicating that they have a main contact or exclusive contact in each client agency could have indicated that some potential users of H.I.T.S. services are excluded from information sharing regarding program benefits. In response to a follow-up question two respondents agreed with the statement, “In my function as a H.I.T.S. investigator, I tend to limit the number of investigators I contact within each agency so that all of my work is channeled through a main point of contact.” Four H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts disagreed with the statement, and another did not respond. The operative part of this statement, limited contact within each agency, indicates that those who agreed with this statement might be narrowing their contact within each agency to a funneling point of contact.


A third statement requested a response to inform evaluators on this same topic of character of contact maintained between H.I.T.S. analysts/investigators and client law enforcement agencies. Only one investigator/analyst responded that he/she finds it difficult to connect with a replacement when one of his/her investigator contacts is no longer available to them. The responses to this statement, as shown in the following graph, along with those of the prior statements on this topic, suggested to the W.S.U. program evaluation team that the H.I.T.S. program’s investigator/analysts diligently work to ensure that they are in regular contact with many of the intended local law enforcement agency-based users of H.I.T.S. program services.

Figure 4.85

**Survey Item:**

**When one of my contacts within a specific agency retires, promotes, or otherwise moves on, I find it difficult to connect with a replacement [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**

[N=7]



It is the case, however, that data gathered in the criminal investigator survey, in the supervising investigator survey, in the Chief and Sheriff survey, and in the on-line survey of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients indicate that the H.I.T.S. team is to some extent missing the opportunity to make contact with a sizeable portion of potential users of H.I.T.S. services. That conclusion is mostly supported by the significant number of voluntary comments written by survey respondents stating that they are unaware of what the H.I.T.S. unit does or what services it offers.

A component of relationship building that will help to ensure the more effective use of H.I.T.S. services by the majority of those it intends to serve involves *calls for service*. A


measure of the likelihood that criminal investigators will think of and call upon H.I.T.S. unit investigator/analysts when they need assistance in their criminal investigations was built into the following question:

*Figure 4.86*

**Survey Item:**

**All investigators within each agency within my H.I.T.S. jurisdiction know that they may contact me directly if they need assistance [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**

[N=7]




Four of the responding investigator/analysts indicated that they believe that investigators within their respective jurisdictions know that they may contact that investigator/analyst directly if they desire assistance in carrying out their major crime investigations. Two investigator/analysts did not express agreement with the statement, and one did not respond to this question. Another way W.S.U. evaluators gauged the relationship between H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts and those they serve was through questions that directly addressed attitudes toward the fostering of such relationships. The bar graph below shows that most of the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts believe

they are being successful in building partnerships with criminal investigators in a collaborative and mutually beneficial crime-fighting effort.

*Figure 4.87*

**Survey Item:**

**H.I.T.S. Success in Building Partnerships for Homicide and Rape/Sexual Assault Investigations: The Views of H.I.T.S. Program Staff [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**  
[N=7]



Six of the seven (85.7%) respondents to this question agreed that the H.I.T.S. program is successful at building partnerships among various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units within Washington state. No explanation was offered by the one survey respondent who strongly disagreed with the statement.

One aspect of the role the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts that was challenged by some criminal investigators was the degree to which the H.I.T.S. team would “control” any given investigation. A situation arose at a local police department that illustrates this point of

contention between a criminal investigator and a H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst over the logistics of completing a crime input form.


*He [the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst] showed up unannounced at my police department, like I have time in the middle of a homicide investigation, and he was real pushy, **real** pushy. And so there was a real personality conflict. He's like, "well, I will just take your case and go through it." I was like, you will **NOT** go through my case. I've got original evidence statements in there and you are not going to sit there and pop through my case.*

The role played by investigator/analysts has been the subject of numerous conversations between H.I.T.S. staff members and members of the W.S.U. evaluation team. Based on those conversations, and supported with data gathered from the following survey question, the W.S.U. evaluation team came to the conclusion that the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst respondents understand their role well as it applies to the H.I.T.S. mission.

Figure 4.88

**Survey Item:**

**As a H.I.T.S. investigator I believe I am obligated to take the lead in investigating homicides or sexual assaults in cases where it is obvious that investigators are "in over their heads" [H.I.T.S. Investigators] [N=7]**




All six investigators responded that they disagree with the statement, which affirms their understanding that one goal of the H.I.T.S. unit is to *assist* local law enforcement in their effort to solve crimes, and not to “control” or “take over” a local case. The W.S.U. evaluation team examined the issue of H.I.T.S. investigator imposition another way.

*Figure 4.89*

**Survey Item:**

**In approaching detectives regarding cases, I sometimes feel a sense that my efforts are an imposition on their work [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**  
[N=7]




H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were split on their response to the statement regarding becoming an imposition on the work of local investigators. As depicted in the scenario above, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are sometimes seen by local criminal investigators as unwelcome outsiders. That can prove to be a frustrating situation to H.I.T.S. team members who see themselves as a fresh set of eyes in an investigation, all the while being seen as a potential distraction to those they are trying to help. A concern to the W.S.U. evaluation team was that negative pushback

from field investigators could lead to the systematic under-utilization of H.I.T.S. program services by their local law enforcement agency. The following data, combined with earlier findings on local agency visitation patterns reported by H.I.T.S. staff members, suggest that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts do not substantiate the speculation that they tend to avoid visiting certain local jurisdictions because they feel they are unwelcome guests there.

*Figure 4.90*

**Survey Item:**

**There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I simply avoid because I do not feel welcome [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**  
[N=7]




All six investigator/analysts indicate that they do not avoid certain local law enforcement agencies due to feeling unwelcome. The W.S.U. evaluation team examined another area of practice by the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst team to determine if their efforts to assist criminal investigators were being stymied due to internal H.I.T.S. program policy pressures.

Figure 4.91

**Survey Item:**

**I sometimes feel that the time spent on some cases prevents me from spending time contacting all of the investigators within my jurisdiction [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**

[N=7]




Three of the five investigator/analysts who responded to the statement regarding time constraints agreed that they sometimes feel that the time spent on some cases prevents them from spending time contacting all of the investigators within their service area. The other two H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts disagreed with the statement. A measure of the ability of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts to succeed in the H.I.T.S. unit mission of assisting local law enforcement officers “in small jurisdictions with big cases first, and in big jurisdictions with small cases last” was addressed next by the W.S.U. evaluation team. A major complaint by local criminal investigators was that they want to see their H.I.T.S. team representatives more often, and that they want to know more about what the H.I.T.S. team can do for their local, relatively small agency. To get at this issue the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked about their frequency of visitation to local agencies within their respective service areas.



Figure 4.92

**Survey Item:**

**There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I don't get out to at least every six months [H.I.T.S. Investigators]**  
[N=7]



Most (five out of six) investigator/analysts agree that they do not visit every agency within their jurisdiction at least every six months. These additional statements from the field support those made above, with one important distinction; these statements were made in response to the question, “If you no longer use any of the services provided by H.I.T.S., but you did so in the past, please explain the reasons for discontinuing your use of H.I.T.S. program services.”

*From a criminal investigator: “After Dick Steiner retired from H.I.T.S., I have never seen his replacement, \_\_\_(removed for privacy)\_\_\_\_\_ who is reportedly assigned to our area.”*

*From a supervising investigator: “Have not been contacted by our Rep since Dick Steiner retired.”*

*From a criminal investigator: “Used to have regular contact with H.I.T.S. representatives. Since change in personnel, never see them.”*

From a criminal investigator: “Our primary investigator left, so we have little contact with H.I.T.S.”

From a supervising investigator: “The assigned H.I.T.S. investigator does not meet with them [his subordinate criminal investigators] - he'd rather meet with Admin.”

From a supervising investigator: “Not familiar with what they do. In 1996 we had monthly contact with our H.I.T.S. person. Now we don't have any contact and, frankly, we forget they exist.”

The following comment from a criminal investigator adds to the discussion. It was made in response to a solicitation for suggestions to make improvements on H.I.T.S. program service delivery. The statement read, “The H.I.T.S. program would be better if it...”

From a criminal investigator: “Have more investigators like Dick Steiner. He always stopped by our detective unit to see how he could help us. Our current investigator has stopped to speak to us one time in the past several years. That could be due to many reasons, but it is true.”

Some of the most telling comments drawn from a survey question soliciting comments on what changes would improve the H.I.T.S. program relate to the need for personal contact and more effective sharing of information on the services of the H.I.T.S. program. The following set of comments made by criminal investigators document their desire to receive frequent visits by H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts:

From a criminal investigator: “Had time to consult with each investigator on every case. A fresh look by a seasoned investigator can bring new ideas to any investigation. They could use more investigators for (doing) better consultation.”

From a criminal investigator: “Would come to the agency and meet with those charged with investigations and let us know what H.I.T.S. is, and can do -- and how to do it -- so we are familiar with it and would use it more.”

From a criminal investigator: “More of you... guys are spread too thin!”

From a criminal investigator: “Promote H.I.T.S. itself! I am not aware how it can help a city our size; we tend to think that it's (sic) services only really help the large city areas...our population is about 40,000.”

From a criminal investigator: “Contact in some way (mail, email or phone) every 6 months or so to remind agencies of the resource and hw to access it. Something to keep us aware H.I.T.S. is still active. Valuable resource I support, but have not had an opportunity to use.”

From a criminal investigator: “Stop in more often - review cases with detectives - more face-to-face contact!”

From a criminal investigator: “As with everything else in Washington, all of the resources are in the Puget Sound area. Merely having face-to-face contact would be a huge benefit.” [From Clark County]

From a criminal investigator: “I would like to know more about H.I.T.S.: I seldom use H.I.T.S., and have only spoke (sic) with [investigator/analyst name deleted] three times.”

From a supervising investigator: “H.I.T.S. needs to be more assertive in staying in contact with smaller agencies.”

From a supervising investigator: “Having another H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to SE Washington - Yakima/Tri-Cities/Walla Walla.”

From a supervising investigator: “If we heard from them on a regular basis and not only after we had a homicide so they could collect their data.”

From a criminal investigator: “H.I.T.S. is currently out of touch with Eastside agencies. It's viewed as a place where refined investigators go to work, and help put together bulletins. Their other services are not widely advertised. Glad to see the A.G. is considering revision of the current offering.”

Evaluators juxtaposed those statements with the following reasons given by the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts as justification for not visiting every local law enforcement agency within their service area more often than they do:

#### **Comments from H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts**

*They are located a long distance from my office and don't have a large number of cases for H.I.T.S. contacts.*

*I may not know all investigators in my area. The jurisdictions I have more contact with have more activity, thus, I have less reason to contact some agencies.*

*Their workloads and mine preclude contact; they do not experience violent crime.*

*Time and lack of murders.*

H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are each responsible for relatively large geographical areas. The six investigator/analysts provide coverage for the entire state of Washington. As indicated several times in previous comments from criminal investigators, there is a general consensus that additional investigators are needed if the H.I.T.S. unit wishes not only to continue the current level of assistance it provides local law enforcement, but to increase those services to the levels needed to respond to its current and potential service clientele. The evaluators asked H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts about the need for additional team investigators. All the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts are in full agreement that the H.I.T.S. unit needs more investigator/analysts in order to serve the H.I.T.S. program mission more faithfully.

The working relationship between H.I.T.S. team members and their clients in the local law enforcement agencies they serve, as well as those new clients whom they wish to serve, currently relies on a system that is quite resource-strained. The development of relationships between members serving each entity (H.I.T.S. and local law enforcement) relies heavily on a balance of needs for service and the delivery of that service. In the present case, the H.I.T.S. program staff must be in a position to deliver services in the way of training, expertise, and professional guidance, to name a few, to members of local law enforcement agencies in their time of need. The needs of criminal investigators in the field and the ability of H.I.T.S. to deliver can be viewed as a proverbial “Catch-22” in that if criminal investigators don’t know that


H.I.T.S. assistance and other services are available, they don't know to ask for help. All the while, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts, the link to the important services needed by local law enforcement, skip regular contact with those investigators who do not have regular on-going cases. The W.S.U. evaluation team recommended a constant, on-going grooming of local law enforcement investigators by H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts so that as services are needed, the H.I.T.S. unit comes to the minds of those in need.

In another attempt to learn about the effective use of technologies available to the H.I.T.S. unit, the evaluation team probed the opinions of the users of H.I.T.S. services regarding the H.I.T.S. database and the gaining access to information contained therein. The results of that important inquiry follow.

H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients (those who identified themselves as investigators) were asked to respond to the statement, "The lack of direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered criminal investigations in my department."

*Figure 4.93*

**Survey Item:**




*Only 5.5% of criminal investigators who responded to the on-line survey claim that the lack of direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered criminal investigations in their department.*

The responses graphed above are offered with a caveat. While it is true that only 5.5% of the respondent criminal investigators indicated that the lack of direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered criminal investigations, the answer to whether direct access is important remains unanswered, however. **A full 47% of those responding were not sure if their investigations had or had not been impaired.** Answers to the next two questions were assessed by the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation team regarding attitudes held by H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts toward H.I.T.S. program policy and team practice with respect to data input into the H.I.T.S. program database.

*Figure 4.94*

**Survey Item:**

**The input forms for inclusion of a crime in the H.I.T.S. database *should be* completed by...  
[H.I.T.S. Investigator/analysts]  
[N=7]**



H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are nearly evenly split on the important issue of data input to the H.I.T.S. database. Four (57.1%) H.I.T.S. staffers responded that H.I.T.S. investigators

should complete the crime input forms, while the remaining three (42.9%) replied that the detective handling the case should perform that function. When asked to comment on H.I.T.S. unit current practices in this regard, the responses of these same individuals flipped. Three H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts reported that the H.I.T.S. input forms are usually completed by H.I.T.S. investigators, while the remaining four indicated that the detective usually completes the form. These findings are important considering the results of the questions pertaining to the question of who should input data into the H.I.T.S. database. Criminal investigators and their supervisors are obviously cautious about protecting valuable time resources, thus they would reasonably want H.I.T.S. investigators to input data for them. The fact that H.I.T.S. investigators are about evenly split in their opinion about who should input data and who actually inputs data gives reason to recommend that the H.I.T.S. team reevaluate their handling of data input. Provided adequate staffing resources are available, the H.I.T.S. team should make the input of data from the homicide and sexual assault input forms a top priority, thus relieving field investigators of that duty so that they may focus their efforts on their pressing cases. Interface with the H.I.T.S. database has an output side as well.

Criminal investigators in local law enforcement agencies weighed in on the accessibility of H.I.T.S. data. During a focus group session held on March 14, 2006, a detective summed up a common feeling among field investigators:

*It doesn't seem that there is a real user-friendly interface to the H.I.T.S. database. It sounds to me like you have to contact someone at H.I.T.S., there's no on-line access to it, there's no...it's easier to me at least in doing investigations to hop on-line and find out what I need there rather than to make phone calls and hopefully get somebody there or leave a*

*message and wait for them to call me back...it's just that when you want information you want it now, and I can get it now in a lot of other arenas. But, maybe they have that and I just don't know, but I didn't hear that yesterday. That seems to me as a fairly big gap to access, maybe there's a reason and I just don't know.*

The dissertation discussion now examines specific issues within the police culture that impact the efficient flow of information.

### **Environment**

The culture in which police carry out their work contributes negatively to the effective flow of information. This is the case for a number of reasons related to the way police officers tend to view their roles in the crime control process, and to the way they tend to view others in the crime control arena. "Police officers continue to exert considerable control over the intelligence process" which is an inhibitor to the flow of information (Cope: 197). Other scholars have noted quite properly that information itself is power, and a major inhibitor of the efficient transfer of knowledge (Willem: 582). Willem elaborates on this theme, stating the following: "Sharing of knowledge between departments relies on not only formal systems, but lateral coordination combined with high levels of trust and verification, clear incentives, and the absence of power games" (598).

Cope has identified another area of police culture that weighs down the potential for change; namely mistrust of non-sworn personnel. According to Cope, some police officers are uncomfortable accepting recommendations from non-sworn police personnel, suggesting that doing so would encroach on their role (Cope: 191-192). Other scholars and practitioners alike have made similar observations. A common theme was observed in the transition to COP and



the transition to ILP, demonstrating inhibitors to change. “The success of community policing depends on the police officers who are responsible for implementing the program. In essence, their attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors must be substantially changed before community policing can be put into practice” (Lurigio and Skogan, 1994: 315). Lurigio and Skogan also note “They [police officers] are resentful when the community is consulted about internal police business...” (316).

These observations give the serious observer of the H.I.T.S. program reason for pause. If there is mistrust on the part of police officers and non-sworn analysts, is there also mistrust between criminal investigators in the field and H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts? After all, it was noted that some investigators fear their cases will be “taken over” by the H.I.T.S. team. One police chief commented with regard to the value of H.I.T.S. thusly: “The fact that there is a dedicated H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to our unit bolsters our relationship and led us to work on lots of cases together.” The general tendency for local law enforcement criminal investigators to decide to not utilize the H.I.T.S. team may not be an issue of trust, but rather one of pride. This response by a criminal investigator at a focus group session raises this possibility: “I saw it as a pride issue among some new administrators and some senior officers that we would take care of our own. It was a conscious decision not to seek out an expertise (sic) on some issues because—and that part is self-perception—pride issues. Now it’s going to a cold case and we are going to have to have to do it another way. Now this one is probably eight years old by now.”

As discussed in the literature review, Goldstein identifies five major impediments to the progress of POP. These same impediments can also be cited as troublesome as the police

community enters the ILP era. As a reminder, they are: (1) the absence of a long-term commitment on the part of police leaders to strengthening policing and the police as an institution; (2) the lack of skills within a police agency that are required to analyze problems and to evaluate strategies for dealing with those problems; (3) the lack of a clear academic connection; (4) the absence of informed outside pressures; and (5) the lack of financial support (Goldstein, 2003: 26-34).

Observations from the H.I.T.S. program evaluation support point number one, and at the same time offer a solution. Goldstein's contention in point number one is that: "Police and, it follows, their leaders, are under extraordinary pressure in these times to respond most directly to the urgent concerns of the moment—be it a serious crime that awaits clearance, a crime wave that is generating widespread fears, or a much larger and amorphous threat such as, most recently, terrorism" (Goldstein, 2003: 27).

The issue Goldstein makes of point number two is the following: "Many police agencies of sufficient size have, over the past half-century, established units or designated individuals to engage in research, planning, and crime analysis. The scope and quality of work of these units is quite uneven...but even the most advanced of the crime analysis efforts have not extended their work to analyzing in depth...the common problems that the police are required to handle" (Goldstein, 2003: 29). As pointed out in chapter three, the vast majority of police agencies in Washington State are so small that they lack the manpower and ability to conduct serious criminal investigations. This is a prime example of a need being filled by the H.I.T.S. unit. Goldstein's third point is elaborated herein:

*From among the universe of studies, even fewer focus on strategies for responding to those problems [that police routinely handle] and, particularly, on the relative effectiveness of those strategies. [Additionally] an array of complex issues in the relationships between practitioners and academics and other researchers impede initiating more such studies. These same issues greatly limit the use of that knowledge that has already been acquired. The most critical needs, upfront, are: (1) to increase the number of academics willing to study the problems of concern to the police and willing to work on the development of the methodologies for doing so; (2) to increase the number of practitioners who are willing to engage with academics involved in this work and to open their agencies to research; and (3) to develop university-level training for students interested in a career working within the police field in the newly denned position of problem analyst. (Goldstein, 2003: 31).*

Goldstein's fourth point, the absence of informed outside pressures, is an important one. What he is referring to is the fact that the police often will not change until pressures from outside the agency force it to do so. Goldstein points out that, "Good, rigorously developed data, carefully presented, can be very powerful in altering public attitudes and pressures. Affected citizens can become an important force in support of good practice" (Goldstein, 2003: 34). This is a good point for H.I.T.S. administrators to heed, judging from the findings of the W.S.U. evaluation team. The H.I.T.S. program has helped investigators solve cold case homicides, including both single violent crime incidents and serial cases. Survivors of the victims can become champions of the H.I.T.S. unit as producers of quality work which allows the right to justice which the victims of crime deserve.

The fifth point Goldstein makes regarding the impediments of POP is the lack of financial support. He specifically addresses the lack of adequate analyst staffing as an issue. He sums up his point by stating, "With the passage of time and changes in administration, it is increasingly difficult to point with confidence to a single agency in which there is a continuing

concentration of high quality work in addressing pieces of its business” (Goldstein, 2003: 39). H.I.T.S. is poised to assist local agencies over the time continuum without regard to changes in mission and personnel at the local agency level.

A consideration for the present study was to determine communication hindrances in the processing of incident-critical information. One issue under examination was how criminal investigators in the field “connected” with H.I.T.S. unit investigators. Another issue was the nature of the communication flow existing between H.I.T.S. investigators and the H.I.T.S. unit crime analyst. Cope (2004) discovered in the course of her work the following: “Police officers felt uncomfortable accepting recommendations from non-police personnel, suggesting this encroached upon their role” (191).

One concern of this research was whether the work of crime analysts would go unused, or “overlooked” as Cope reported from her field work with two police departments. If so, it is important to identify where in the communication process between crime analyst and field investigators a disconnection occurs, and determine the reason for that disconnect if possible. Cope’s findings were that crime analysts were not included in the entire crime incident process, thus their work was often sidelined because it did not include the results anticipated. This is a key finding that supports the observations recorded in the H.I.T.S. evaluation report that H.I.T.S. analysts and investigators can only work with the information they are given from the field. If they do not have accurate and complete information in their database, it is not possible to formulate the “big picture.” Communications in this regard must improve. Cope expounds on the problems that arise when the entire team does not get all the information needed in the crime analysis process:

*As the computer intelligence databases were the primary source of information for analysts, the quality of analysis was integrally linked to the quality of information on intelligence system. Consequently the poor quality information and lack of detail on the systems inevitably limited their analytical insights so that they focused on what had happened and provided statistical summaries of crime data. It was unclear whether officers understood the extent analysts relied on their inputs, although in an urban borough a criminal database supervisor comments that: "Nobody trusts the analysts' stuff because they get their information from the [computer systems] and officers know they put crap in the system." (Cope, 2004: 193)*

A disturbing breakdown in the flow of information occurred in Washington State, as discovered during the focus group session conducted on March 14, 2006. A detective stated that he caught a suspect that the U.S. Marshals were looking for on an attempted homicide committed in Seattle. He recounted that the person in question had been on the H.I.T.S. Bulletins for about 14 months when he killed his in-laws in Kennewick, Washington. The suspect then went back to Western Washington and killed two more people. The detective turned to other detectives in the focus group from Kennewick and asked if they knew who the suspect was when he was featured on the H.I.T.S. Bulletins. The Kennewick detectives, who were patrol officers at the time of the incident, stated the suspect was not known to them because they were not privy to the H.I.T.S. Bulletins as patrol officers.

The final analysis of the data discovered in the H.I.T.S. evaluation report involves the methods used by the H.I.T.S. program administrators to measure unit performance. To fulfill its mission, the Criminal Justice Division in the Office of the Attorney General cites the following performance measures on a memorandum that was not included in its

entirety in the W.S.U. program evaluation report due to information of a confidential nature appearing on that memorandum. The pertinent text reads as follows:

- Number of cases entered into the database:
  - Type of crime (i.e., homicide, sexual assault, other)
  - Where the crime occurred (outside or inside the State of Washington)
  - If inside Washington, if the crime was solved or unsolved
- Record data entered from other sources (i.e., DOL, DMV, DOC, etc.)
- Number of open, on-going investigations with active H.I.T.S. participation:
  - Type of case
  - Requesting agency
  - Amount of time applied
  - Description of assistance rendered
  - Investigator assigned
- Requests for Information:
  - Number of requests
  - Source of requests
  - Nature of requests and data requested
  - Investigator assigned
  - Response time in supplying information/data requested
- Distribution of Bulletins:
  - Number of requests
  - Source of requests
  - Current crime information contained in bulletin

- Specialized training classes:
  - Type of class (e.g., Basic Homicide Investigations, Advanced Homicide)
  - Location of class
  - H.I.T.S. instructors
  - Number of attendees
- To record other services as provided:
  - Participation in research and studies funded by federal grants
  - Criminal profiling
  - Mapping
  - Preparation of time-lines

### **H.I.T.S. Performance Reports**

The following performance data, provided by the Criminal Justice Division management, summarizes the activity of the H.I.T.S. unit between July 1, 2005 and April 26, 2006.<sup>11</sup>

Scott;

This Memorandum is in response to your request for a summary of H.I.T.S. activity for the period July 1, 2005 to the present.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Activity</u>	
1.	Cases entered into the Murder file of the database	214
2.	Cases entered into the Rape file of the database	45

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<sup>11</sup> Internal Attorney General memorandum from Darryl Roosendaal and Tamara Matheny to Scott Blonien, Chief, AGO-CJD on April 26, 2006

3. Cases entered into the Crime Data file of the database	2,397
4. Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) contacts:	
Telephone:	2,288
In-Person:	<u>1,365</u>
	3,653
5. LEA CEO contacts (approximately)	300
6. Training sessions (CJTC, WVCIA, H.I.T.S. Demos, Others)	37
7. LEA personnel trained:	
CJTC/WVCIA:	666
H.I.T.S. Demos:	<u>122</u>
	788
8. Attendees at H.I.T.S. Demos to Student/Community Groups	545
9. Attendees at other H.I.T.S.-related presentations	125
10. Requests for Information (RFI's) from LEA's	536
11. Bulletins (H.I.T.S., CJD, U.S. Probation) issued	404
12. "Cold Case" reviews, consultations, etc.	10-12



It was noted earlier that the H.I.T.S. unit maintains a mission-driven focus on *murders that remain unsolved*, and *rapes/sexual assaults that are other than familial in nature*. There were 214 cases entered into the H.I.T.S. murder file during the period July 1, 2005 and April 26, 2006. Though there are no official statistics for that exact time frame, the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports (U.C.R.) for the year 2005 cite 205 murders and non-negligent manslaughters for the state of Washington. Any discrepancy in the numbers of actual murders and the numbers of cases entered into the H.I.T.S. murder file could easily be explained as cases that occurred at some previous time, or in a jurisdiction that borders Washington State. It should also be noted that the period between July 1 and April 26 is nearly ten months, and not a year – the period of time covered by the U.C.R. statistics. It is believed by the W.S.U. evaluation team that the H.I.T.S. team knows about virtually all of the murders that have occurred in Washington State during the time the H.I.T.S. team has existed. The degree of attention given to rapes/sexual assaults by the H.I.T.S. unit is somewhat less satisfying, however.

The F.B.I. notes that 2,811 forcible rapes were reported in Washington State during 2005. Only 45 rapes were entered into the H.I.T.S. rape file during the ten-month period ending on April 26, 2006. An important clarification is warranted with regards to the reporting of rape/sexual assault. The U.C.R. figure of 2,811 includes only reported rapes, but it includes *forcible* rape regardless of whether or not the victim knows the offender. In many cases involving domestic violence and other incidents involving victims who know their perpetrator, rape reports are often withdrawn at some point following the event. The H.I.T.S. program focuses on *non-familial* rape/sexual assault so that their time is best directed toward those cases that warrant their expertise in locating a perpetrator. The rape/sexual assault data suggest that

the H.I.T.S. team could likely benefit from devoting more effort to the identification of rape/sexual assault investigations that could take advantage of the vast amount of data maintained in the H.I.T.S. database and benefit from the expertise of the team of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts. With the principal components of the H.I.T.S. unit mission accounted for, the W.S.U. evaluation team identified some additional areas of outcome assessment against which the H.I.T.S. program should be judged.

The staff at the H.I.T.S. unit are guided by a mantra-like saying that goes something like, “Help the smaller agencies with big problems first, and the big agencies with small problems last.” That saying has been mentioned numerous times previously in this dissertation, but its essence has no better place to be discussed than in this section. H.I.T.S. is a relatively unique program that provides a valuable clearinghouse of archival data on past crimes that often prove to be the link to future crimes. The value of the H.I.T.S. program extends to the provision of a link between criminal investigators at local law enforcement agencies, and other criminal investigators in other jurisdictions who are likewise looking for a mutual link that will assist him/her in solving a serious crime against persons. The majority of those criminal investigators work with only a couple of others in their agency, exacerbating the problem of reaching out for investigative assistance.

The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation program report currently contains many comments from local law enforcement CEOs, supervising investigators, and criminal investigators attesting to the value of the H.I.T.S. program for two important reasons. First, there were so many heartfelt comments, both solicited and unsolicited, that it became apparent to the evaluation team members that H.I.T.S. is a program about which many people are passionate; and, second, the

comments are likely so positive because they reflect the fact that the intended users of the H.I.T.S. program understand its value and they want *more* access to its services. Indicative of these comments are the following:

*From a supervising investigator: “H.I.T.S. has been valuable to me from day one as a detective. Networking is what it is all about for a small agency and I’m glad H.I.T.S. is there. Dick Gagnon has specifically been very helpful to me in my professional development. He is an encourager and a great source of inspiration.”*

*From a bulletin recipient: “Please remember that urban law enforcement needs can be completely different from rural communities. The bigger agencies have the manpower to participate in the development of information systems that are tailored to their needs. Hopefully someone would appropriately represent small agencies.”*

*From a Police Chief or Sheriff: “We are a very small agency that has very little need for H.I.T.S. – but we know it’s there and will not hesitate to use [it] when needed.”*

*From an on-line survey: “This is a very small jurisdiction with low crime rates. I feel H.I.T.S. is excellent and would use it when needed.”*

*From a criminal investigator: “This program could be the best tool within the State if it was expanded to a more useful degree. We have the same problem as a lot of small agencies manpower; time and money.”*

*From a criminal investigator: “H.I.T.S. is a great resource for small agencies around the state.”*

*From a criminal investigator: “I just do not feel H.I.T.S. promotes itself well or advises what it has to offer! I have always thought of it as trying to help in just catching the serial killer or serial rapist or someone of many crimes (the same crime). Also I’m sure it can help the smaller jurisdictions - let us know how they can assist! The H.I.T.S. info is so vast - let us know what that info is and how it can help us!”*

The H.I.T.S. program, it is indeed clear, does more than maintain a database of information about murders and stranger rapes/sexual assaults. The survey data gathered in this evaluation study strongly suggest that staff members of the H.I.T.S. unit give considerable peace of mind to local law enforcement investigators who would otherwise be left pretty much to their own meager devices to produce leads to serious crimes against persons in their jurisdiction. The *link* provided by the H.I.T.S. program, therefore, is crucial in the crime-solving effort for many law enforcement agencies of limited size.

An important component of the theory behind the H.I.T.S. unit is its ability to build partnerships between and among local law enforcement officials in an effort to prevent criminals from moving from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, staying one step ahead of justice. It is widely accepted in criminal justice studies that offenders often move beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of an area in which they commit a crime. Serial killer Ted Bundy committed his crimes against young women not only in Washington, but in other states as well. He was eventually tried and executed in the state of Florida. Washington State was home to another serial killer who committed his crimes in several areas within the state. Robert Yates lived in the Walla Walla area when two young people were murdered. He was not immediately identified as a suspect in that case, but he was connected to those crimes years later. By then, Yates had moved to Western Washington where law enforcement officials would later link him to crimes in that area. Yates ultimately settled in Spokane, where he committed several additional murders.

Effective partnerships, or networks, of local law enforcement officials and criminal investigators can serve as a web in which offenders who try to move out of one jurisdiction to avoid detection will surely move into another part of the web. Having sufficiently reported an

analysis of the principal relevant findings from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation report, this dissertation now concludes with observations drawn from that study about the future of data sharing and effective communications within the American law enforcement community.

## Chapter Five

### *Conclusions, Lego® Blocks, and Implications for Future Research*

In his excellent analysis of the state of intelligence-led policing, Manning (2001a) challenges us to consider the “basic contradictions in the [police] mandate—that policing can control crime, reduce the fear of crime, and yet be an almost entirely responsive, demand-driven, situational force dispensing just in time and just enough, order maintenance” (101). This dissertation has drawn largely on this challenge because the author believes that Manning’s premise—namely, that “an information-based policing, focusing on risk management, and enhancing security is both premature and flawed” (101) was accurate *at the time it was written*. However, the end of the year 2001 ushered in a new era in our collective societal thinking about how police collect, store, use, and share data. This post-911 era offers the police community, including sworn officers, civilian employees, and others such as academics involved in the practical or theoretical application of police services to chart the future of policing. We should not see ourselves in the midst of a “paradigm shift” as we begin to embrace intelligence-led policing. What is needed instead is a new way of thinking about the future without abandoning the past, for there is much to be garnered from what has already been learned.

Observers of the police in American society have conveniently attached labels on the police based on perceived public mandates. As American society has changed over succeeding generations, so too has the police mandate has taken on new contours. Born of necessity for order maintenance, police in due course became increasingly professional as their multifaceted

social role became more clearly defined. Eventually, cultural clashes between the police and the society in which they carried out their work led to a move away from the arms length and detached professional model to a “warmer and fuzzier” community-oriented model of operation. Unable to sustain itself as a viable model, either because of the inability of administrators to secure essential community buy-in (e.g., The R.C.M.P. in Canada) or the lack of sustained financial commitments to the model (e.g., the United States), many community-oriented law enforcement agencies began to re-define the police mandate once again. Problem-oriented policing (POP) was seen as the solution for many careful observers because it incorporated both components of hotspots policing and community-oriented policing (COP) into a synthesized effort by putting officers in geographically targeted areas which were prone to particular types of criminal activity.

As information collection and data storage, data retrieval and data analysis technologies improved and police budgets allowed, police agencies began to collect data on everything ranging from traffic stops to suspicious activity to criminal complaints. The first concerted effort to use the POP theory in combination with new technologies occurred in New York City with the introduction of Compstat. The problem of directing sources to respond to documented needs for police administrators became even more difficult with the advent of all these new forms of information. Compstat is designed to help administrators identify the areas where crime occurs, and document the types of crimes committed at those locations; it does not make connections between crime scenes, criminals and their associates, and criminal evidence available on crimes committed. Administrators are left with the daunting task of figuring out what to do with all of the data that has now been gathered and stored using the new technologies afforded the police

agency. As has been aptly noted, “The U.S. government has a weak system for processing and using what it has” (911 Commission Report: 416). Use of field interrogation reports (FIRs) is a good place to start in this regard.

Thomas H. Davenport holds the President’s Chair in Information Technology and Management at Babson College. In 2005 Davenport was named one of the world’s top three “Business/Technology Analysts” by *Optimize* magazine, and in 2007, he was named one of the 100 most influential people in the information technology industry by Ziff-Davis magazines. He also holds the honor of being the highest-ranked business academic in the information technology area (Davenport and Jarvenpaa: 2008: 32). Davenport and his colleague Sirkka Jarvenpaa have studied private industry and public sector organizations to determine how effectively they make use of analytics in the pursuit of their respective missions.

Davenport and Jarvenpaa describe analytics broadly as “business intelligence” (2008:4). In their work they argue that “...analytics is the extensive use of data, statistical and quantitative analysis, explanatory and predictive models, and fact-based management to drive decisions and actions” (2008: 6). Davenport and Jarvenpaa point to the Compstat program as an appropriate example of the use of analytics in the law enforcement community. “Many government agencies have considerable data at their disposal from various forms of transactions, but they do not often analyze the data in detail to identify opportunities for better service or more revenue” (2008: 28).

Davenport’s recommendation to overcome what he sees as a manpower shortage is that those public agencies, especially those in the well-funded terrorism-fighting arena, establish partnerships with private sector firms that can fill the labor gap. Another recommendation proposed by Davenport and Jarvenpaa is that public agencies work harder at partnering with



other similar agencies to increase their analytical sophistication. His feeling is that such strategic partnering will help to bridge the fragmentation gaps that are so prevalent in the highly fragmented government sector (Nice and Fredericksen, 1995: 225-253). Davenport and Jarvenpaa support their viewpoint by citing their findings from the government sector analysis they conducted primarily in the areas of health care, logistics, and revenue management, noting that: “On the whole, while we found many examples of the successful use of analytics, we did not find the elements of leadership, an enterprise orientation, and long-term strategic targeting that would characterize both managerial innovation in general and a strategic focus on analytics in particular” (2008: 7).

In his ethnographic study *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community*, Rob Johnston comments:

*The conflict between secrecy, a necessary condition for intelligence, and openness, a necessary condition for performance improvement, was a recurring theme I observed during this research. Any organization that requires secrecy to perform its duties will struggle with and often reject openness, even at the expense of efficacy. Despite this, and to their credit, a number of small groups within the Intelligence Community have tasked themselves with creating formal and informal ties with the nation’s academic, non-profit, and industrial communities. In addition, there has been an appreciable increase in the use of alternative analyses and open-source materials. These efforts alone may not be sufficient to alter the historical culture of secrecy, but they do reinforce the idea that the Intelligence Community itself has a responsibility to reconsider the relationship between secrecy, openness, and efficacy. This is especially true as it relates to the community’s performance and the occurrence of errors and failure. External oversight and public debate will not solve these issues; the desire to improve the Intelligence Community’s performance needs to come from within. Once the determination has been found and the necessary policy guidelines put in place, it is incumbent upon the Intelligence Community to find and utilize the internal and*

*external resources necessary to create a performance improvement infrastructure.* (Johnston, 2005: 3)

In an intriguing discussion on the topic of intelligence data, CIA Directorate of Science and Technology analyst Stephen C. Mercado persuasively argues that the Intelligence Community would be wise to reconsider the distinction between open information and official secrets. Says Mercado in this regard, “Too many policymakers and intelligence officers mistake secrecy for intelligence and assume that information covertly acquired is superior to that obtained openly” (Mercado, 2008: 1).

Mercado argues the value of open sources based on six important points of assessment: speed, quantity, quality, clarity, ease of use, and cost. Using these assessment points, let us examine how the law enforcement community might benefit from information obtained from open sources. Mercado points out the following: “When a crisis erupts in some distant part of the globe, in an area where established intelligence assets are thin, intelligence analysts and policymakers alike will often turn first to the television set and Internet” (3). The need for speedy information flow is essential for police officials as well. Police dispatchers often rely on eye-witness accounts at the scene of incidents in their collection of information to pass on to responding officers. The public, therefore, is a good open information source for the collection of speedy details that can later either be discounted or verified by police officers.

On *quantity* Mercado opines, “There are far more bloggers, journalists, pundits, television reporters, and think-tankers in the world than there are case officers. While two or three of the latter may, with good agents, beat the legions of open reporters by their access to secrets, the odds are good that the composite bits of information assembled from the many can

often approach, match, or even surpass the classified reporting of the few” (3). Law enforcement could make great use of a couple of analysts trained in decoding information posted on public MySpace and Facebook accounts. Employers are already making use of these open sources of information to screen job applicants. Additionally, progressive police agencies could benefit from blogs that allow the public to make their rants and raves known. The issue of *clarity* as pointed out by Mercado is present in secret and open sources of information alike. Mercado cautions that information must be triangulated whenever possible so as to not rely on a single source as gospel. Scrutiny of information from blogs and other community networking sites would still be necessary, but that screening could be accomplished by trained analysts.

Mercado cites the *ease of use* of information obtained from open sources by contrasting it with the difficulty of using information that is “Secrets, hidden behind classifications, compartments, and special access programs” (3). His point is that “secrets” are “difficult to share with policymakers and even fellow intelligence officers” (3). Though Mercado does not specifically mention silo-thinking, his description certainly connotes Manning’s idea that law enforcement personnel are more productive when they share information within and across agency boundaries. The final component Mercado highlights with respect to the value of open sources is the *cost* of such information. He states, “A reconnaissance satellite, developed, launched, and maintained at a cost of billions of dollars, can provide images of a weapon’s factory’s roof or a submarine’s hull. A foreign magazine, with an annual subscription cost of \$100, may include photographs of that factory’s floor or that submarine’s interior” (3). It is apparent that a new police model for information gathering and use in “analytics” is needed given these considerations.

A hybrid model of policing should incorporate the key elements of previous policing models in ways that take advantage of the successes we have learned from past experience. Such a model can be viewed as adding layers, one upon another, as in building a model using Lego® blocks. The command and control tenets of the professional model should remain as the backbone of the police organization. The police mission should continue to embrace the public as it did under the COP model, but a new emphasis must be placed on developing partners in the community that can assist local law enforcement in the collection and analysis of data that can effectively direct police actions *a la POP* to reducing crime and the fear of crime. Weisburd and Eck posit “Strongest evidence of police effectiveness in our review is found in...focused policing efforts” (58).

One impediment to change for the police is the way they see their role in incident management. Manning cites this as one of the most important areas to address if change is to occur (2001a: 87). Manning correctly concludes that, even with new technologies, challenges to the present structure of policing exist because “Proactive crime control, in the form of investigation, intelligence gathering and application—and to a lesser extent vice, have been underfunded relative to the other functions and are poorly developed and resourced” (2001a: 89). Claiming that COP (and probably POP) cannot solve the police paradox currently faced by the police—that “the police aims to protect lives and property, yet loss of these, as well as complex disorders or urban freedom...[and that] ‘Responsiveness’ now incorporates the idea that citizens have a direct obligation, like the police, to react to and perhaps even anticipate the dynamics of crime and disorder in their neighborhoods” (2001: 89)—Manning challenges the institution to

use dominant technologies for more than mere recordkeeping systems by incorporating new analytical methods.

Moving forward with an intelligence-led policing model will require top-down buy-in. Administrators must lead by example, and they must be willing to embrace new technologies, both fiscally and in reality (via active use). Says Manning regarding requirements for ILP to move from its “premature” state to the forefront, “[the] need for an infrastructure; easy distribution of information; and integrated databases” (2001a: 93). He continues, “While the apparent issue is the effects of technology, the more vexing issue lies in the use and interpretation of the materials produced rather than the means” (93). Deukmedjian reminds us to get to the organizational challenges of adoption of new strategies: “Indeed, police agencies are reestablished as sources of analytical expertise” (2006: 531). McGarrell, et al. (2007) caution that the use of ILP must not be seen as a separate and sole provider of intelligence within an organization, rather it must be conceptualized as part of the overall mission of the police agency—including line officers from virtually all significant organizational sub units.

McGarrell and his associates echo the notion that ILP must be embraced by all levels of command within the police structure, and should never be viewed as a non-core sub agency of the department. “Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge” (911 Commission Report: 417). The Commission continues, “We propose that information be shared horizontally, across new networks that transcend individual agencies. A decentralized network model...agencies would still have their own databases, but those databases would be searchable across agency lines” (911 Commission Report: 418). For the adaptation of ILP to move forward, change must come from

within police agencies. That could be a stumbling block to many agencies if John Crank is right about the underlying motivations for the prevailing institutional alignments. He gives strong evidence that police organizations drift from their primary mission of crime control in favor of other sub optimizing pressures, both internal and external to the organization (Crank: 2003).

The present study examines an as yet unique component within the policing institution in an attempt to determine to what extent communications in policing tend to constrain the police to counterproductive information silos. The H.I.T.S. unit works behind the scenes to help criminal investigators solve cases that local law enforcement agents probably could not solve without the help of the unit. In the context of police management the question of unit justification would come naturally, but in the case of H.I.T.S. a bigger picture develops. Goldstein outlined three key elements of POP that must be adhered to in moving forward with the ILP concept: Problems must be defined more specifically (by that he means that burglaries and robberies must include critical elements of time and location of occurrence, motivation if known, behavior of offenders). H.I.T.S. takes these into account in homicide and rape/sexual assault input forms...and they go farther to include known associates, contacts, network of participants; information about the problem must be collected from outside sources and not just internal police sources; police officers must engage in broad search for solutions. We must draw on the resources of the public (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 46).

In these times of tightened financial resources it will be difficult, but nonetheless clearly necessary, for police administrators and those local government officials in charge of police budgets to look beyond traditional resource allocation as highly valued work (“value work”) associated with building a foundation for ILP. Crank (2003: 187) puts it this way, “Value work

does not convert easily into economics. Consider the following question: how much money is it worth for a police officer to save a citizen's life?" The value of H.I.T.S. cannot be assessed fully in dollar terms, but its importance as a model crime-solving tool in a national criminal justice system of highly fragmented law enforcement organizations cannot be ignored. Adoption of this new Lego® block approach to policing can help American law enforcement accomplish its mission without appearing to be simply conducting their business in line with the newest of "mere circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate police distribution of non-negotiable coercive force" as posited by Klockars (1988: 91). We now consider specific lessons gleaned from the W.S.U. research team H.I.T.S. program evaluation report and make recommendations for further research.

### **Implications of the H.I.T.S. Program Evaluation for Further Research**

The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report has shed light on several important areas related to removing key barriers to the process of effective communication among personnel in law enforcement agencies that have also been identified in the academic literature reviewed for this dissertation. Some of these barrier-broaching ideas warrant consideration for further research. A brief review of some of the key findings drawn from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report will add to the presently limited research available that addresses impediments to effective communication among law enforcement practitioners and between police agencies in an era of enhanced information technologies.

The single most pressing issue for progressive police managers is one of effective communication both within their respective agencies and horizontally across law enforcement agency boundaries. The greatest challenges to overcoming this impediment are: 1) silo-thinking

among police practitioners, and associated motives such as the desire to possess “power;” 2) issues related to the collection, storage, access, and use of information; and 3) trust issues. These points will now be addressed together because they are very much intertwined.

If police officers, criminal investigators, and others working in the policing environment want to fully employ the myriad new information technologies that are emerging they must learn to work together and not simply get caught up in the rhetoric of working as a team. Findings derived from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report clearly point to the need for further research that will assist the law enforcement community to come to an agreement as to the types of information they need to assist them in criminal investigations. That information must be stored in databases that are easily accessible by those investigators who have a need to know about it, and that access must be made available to them at their remote locations by means that are universally defined. Further research on rules of conduct must be carried out and guidelines agreed upon regarding the handling of information that is gathered and stored by criminal justice agencies. The agreed upon rules must strike a balance between society’s need to know and each individual’s right to privacy. Perhaps a meeting of the minds in this area will help to overcome control issues, power-based hostilities, and silo-thinking.

Largely because success in the career of law enforcement personnel is defined principally by production-based promotions, professional influence and power often is developed by commanding information that leads to successful case closure by linking suspects with specific crimes. Information, given this setting for police work, is indeed power. There exists a natural inclination on the part of career-minded police practitioners to gather information and to hoard it until its value is made significant by a specific criminal incident or until the agency is



encouraged by an external force to seek outside help. Hoarding is done at the unit and the agency level as well. The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report was successful in identifying multiple instances wherein such systematic information hoarding led to silo-thinking, itself a barrier to effective communication. Only when lines of communication are open can trust be established, be cultivated and become sustainable.

One of the key findings emerging from the H.I.T.S. program evaluation report was that communications between criminal investigators from different agencies, including those from the H.I.T.S. unit, were crucial in developing a culture of trust among like-minded people where work could be mutually beneficial. Further research on the factors that help to foster higher levels of trust among people with similar goals is imperative if the goal of building a community of intelligence-led policing is to be achieved. Further discussion of this important concept of trust levels is carried out in the following section that is aimed at informing practitioners in states other than Washington of useful tips if they want to replicate the successes of the Washington State H.I.T.S. unit in their own state.

### **Lessons for Other States Considering H.I.T.S.-Like Units**

The H.I.T.S. program was largely the brainchild of Robert Keppel, Ph.D. and former King County, Washington detective who recognized the need for a statewide centralized unit that would have a vested interest in filling the investigation gap that plagues most local law enforcement agencies in the United States. This specialized Washington state unit, modeled after the F.B.I.'s nationwide Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP), serves hundreds of local law enforcement detectives and their respective agencies who would potentially fail to connect offenders to homicides and rapes/sexual assaults in the absence of H.I.T.S. The H.I.T.S.

program, therefore, serves as a model that should be considered for emulation by the many law enforcement practitioners in other states wherein many small local law enforcement agencies are in need of professional assistance in solving and preventing serious violent crimes.

Large police agencies (conventionally defined as those with 100 or more sworn officers) generally have numerous detectives who specialize in solving homicides (murders) and rapes/sexual assaults. Smaller agencies many times lack the workforce to sustain specialized units, and sometimes that model works because smaller agencies tend to encounter fewer such crimes. The law enforcement quandary for those agencies begins when their need to address such crimes is not matched with capable investigators. Not only do these smaller agencies generally lack the skills required to meet the challenges posed by the occasional serious violent crime, but they lack the investigative tools as well. The presence of a state-level specialized unit such as H.I.T.S. can make the difference between investigation success and failure. Police administrators contemplating whether or not they would benefit from such a state-level unit are encouraged to heed a few cautionary notes before they make their final decision.

What sets the H.I.T.S. program apart from any other crime investigation model is that it is housed within the Criminal Justice Division of the Washington State Office of the Attorney General. Funding for the H.I.T.S. program is at the sole discretion of the Governor, thus much of the financial politics over program sustenance are removed from a competitive environment. This can be both a good thing and a bad thing. On the positive side, if the sitting Governor both recognizes the need for and approves funding for the program it is sustained. If there is either a lack of understanding of the H.I.T.S. program, or lack of appreciation of its capabilities or its outcomes the program is subject to losing its funding. Given this status of executive

discretionary funding it is critical that unit leaders build into the program a robust evaluation component that will enable periodic independent review of the program, one that will document its successes and identify its weaknesses at predetermined intervals. The resulting evaluation report can be an important asset for program administrators, as was the case for the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation as evidenced in this post-evaluation report submission comment from the then-director of H.I.T.S., Scott Blonien:

*I wanted to again thank all of you [W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team members] for the excellent work you did on the H.I.T.S. study. As I have mentioned before because of your hard, conscientious work we can easily plot a course for H.I.T.S. for the future. You can be proud of what you've accomplished (Blonien, 2007).*

In this instance the evaluation report identified areas of potential mission drift not readily recognized by program managers, and subsequent recommendations for corrective action were made.

Another key consideration in the creation and development of a H.I.T.S.-like unit is that a workable, if as yet imperfect, model has been cast and there is no need to re-invent it. Specifically, key elements that include the maintenance of a centralized database of information that contains myriad data from multiple sources, and the availability of analysis personnel to help turn *information* into *intelligence* cannot be overstated. Comments from criminal investigators and their supervisors who work in the field reportedly pointed to the availability of H.I.T.S. investigators/analysts as being the foundation blocks to building a productive investigative community. Finally, a brief discussion of the development of a community of trust is appropriate and timely.

As mentioned in the section above on recommendations for further research, the development of a culture of trust is absolutely essential if law enforcement managers wish to fully embrace new information technologies in their work. This culture of trust concept is one of the most crucial components to be established among law enforcement agencies if a H.I.T.S.-like unit is to be developed in another regional or statewide jurisdiction. When Dr. Keppel created the H.I.T.S. program in Washington he built relationships between investigator-practitioners and himself using his credentials as a like-minded retired detective. The bond of common training, experience and goals between Dr. Keppel and local government criminal investigators created trust between the H.I.T.S. unit and local law enforcement; the fact that these relationships grew over time is clear evidence of that early bond. Out of those original relationships other new relationships were forged as new investigators from each agency replaced retiring detectives. Similar relationships are needed beyond the police detective brethren. Relationships must be forged between law enforcement and others in their working environment to create a culture of trust that will enhance the bond between the community with law enforcement. Those relationships will result in the development of information that can be analyzed to create intelligence.

As evidenced by the Washington H.I.T.S. program, community building must have the blessing of top executive managers within the home jurisdiction for it to succeed. For Washington state, the Office of the Governor held by Christine Gregoire, a former Washington State Attorney General, proved a good place to start the state's effort to promote Information Led Policing. As in so many areas of progressive governmental

management, Washington's early innovation in the H.I.T.S. program deserves careful consideration by other states wherein ILP's promise is constrained by a lack of timely information sharing and the absence of a culture of trust within and among the law enforcement community.

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## **Appendices**

## *Appendix 1 – Criminal Investigator Survey*

### **H.I.T.S. Program Assessment**

### **Criminal Investigator Survey**

**2006**

**NOTE:** For those who have already completed the H.I.T.S. BULLETIN RECIPIENTS SURVEY administered by e-mail, this is a different survey which we would also like you to complete.

The *Division of Governmental Studies and Services* at Washington State University is conducting this detained survey of **crime investigators** in Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the Attorney General's office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program (Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty member at W.S.U., and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for the field research interviews to follow up on the collection of survey data.

This survey will take about 20 minutes to fill out. Please return the completed questionnaire to Washington State University in the enclosed pre-addressed, postage-paid envelope. Your participation in the survey is **completely voluntary**, of course. We strongly urge you to reply, however, so that we can do the best possible job of assessing the utility of the H.I.T.S. program to crime investigators in our state. Your responses will help make H.I.T.S. more beneficial to the criminal justice community.

If you have any questions concerning the survey, please contact either Prof. Nicholas Lovrich or Prof. Noelle Fearn at W.S.U. Pullman: (509) 335-4811. All responses on the survey will remain confidential, and only aggregate summary results will be reported to the AG's office and in public reports. This study has been reviewed and approved for human subject participation by the W.S.U. Institutional Review Board (IRB). This survey meets all the requirements for the protection of respondent privacy and confidentiality. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant you can call W.S.U. IRB at (509) 335-9661.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

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*Nicholas Lovrich*, Director

Division of Governmental

Studies & Services

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*Noelle Fearn*, Assistant Professor

Criminal Justice Program

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*Charles Johnson*, Doctoral Candidate

Criminal Justice Program

W.S.U. Reference # \_\_\_\_\_

Note: This number is for W.S.U. purposes only. It is needed to coordinate follow-up mailings. When you return your survey your number will be checked off the mailing list and you will not be bothered by reminder cards and repeat mailings.

**SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgment**

**The following questions concern your background in crime investigation and your views on a number of professional issues related to the investigation of serious crimes. In the following section please place an “X” in the brackets to the left of the best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested, please mark only one answer for each question.**

**Q-1.** Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, or other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of Washington?

Yes

No

**Q-2.** What percentage of your job-related activities is normally taken up with the investigation of homicides?

I do not investigate homicides.

1—24%

25%—49%

50%—74%

75%—100%

**Q-3.** What percentage of your job-related activities is normally taken up with the investigation of sexual assaults (including rapes)?

I do not investigate sexual assaults.

1—24%

25%—49%

50%—74%

75%—100%

**Q-4.** How long have you been a homicide investigator?

I do not investigate homicides.       Less than 6 months

Between 6 months and one year       Between 1 and 5 years

Over 5 years

**Q-5.** How long have you been a rape/sexual assault investigator?

- I do not investigate rape/sexual assault.       Less than 6 months
- Between 6 months and one year       Between 1 and 5 years
- Over 5 years

**Q-6.** Regarding your own work as a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigator, please rank the following criminal databases with respect to their utility to you

[1 = highest; 7 = lowest].

**RANKING**

- ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
- COPLINK®
- RAIN
- LInX

Other databases of interest? Please note here: <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin-top: 5px;"/>
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**Q-7.** In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?

- Any person, public or private, whose job it is to investigate crimes
- Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers
- Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency
- Only one designated person within a criminal justice agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity

**Q-8.** If a public entity gathers crime-related data from various sources and maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion, who can be said to “own” the data in that repository?



- The *agency* that gathers and maintains the data
- The *public* served by the agency in question
- The *individual* to whom the data relate
- Q-9.** Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Having access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department of Corrections would probably assist investigators in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.”
- I strongly agree     I somewhat agree     Undecided
- I somewhat disagree     I strongly disagree
- Q-10.** Which of the following statements best reflects your agency’s operations with respect to a cold case squad/unit?
- No such unit exists, and no plans are in place to create one.
- No such unit currently exists, but plans are in place to create one.
- The agency has such a unit, but it is not effective.
- The agency has a somewhat effective unit of this type.
- The agency has a quite effective cold case squad/unit.
- Q-11.** Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best represents your level of information?
- I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard much about it.
- I am familiar with H.I.T.S., but I do not use it.
- I use H.I.T.S., but it is not my primary investigative database.
- H.I.T.S. is my primary investigative database.

**Q-12.** For criminal investigations generally, which of the following major crime database resources do you see as being the best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information? (Please mark **only one** selection.)

- ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
- COPLINK®
- RAIN
- LInX

### Section 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime Investigation

The following statements concern the resources and tools available to you as well as those you would like to have available. Using the scale shown below, please offer your opinion.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

- Q-13.**  DNA evidence is important but not critical in clearing rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-14.**  Criminal investigators who use public records to clear crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the public whose information is accessed.
- Q-15.**  Access to timelines (chronological sequence events) in a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is often important.

- Q-16.** [ ] Timelines are available to me for every investigation of a homicide or rape/sexual assault.
- Q-17.** [ ] Archival motor vehicle records are available to me even if they have been purged from publicly available records.
- Q-18.** [ ] Archival driver license information is available to me even if records have been purged from publicly available records.
- Q-19.** [ ] Investigators should use available victim self-report data even if the victim did not file a police report.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

- Q-20.** [ ] Investigators from different agencies have adequate means by which to share information with one another for the purpose of clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-21.** [ ] Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if any, could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rape/sexual assaults.
- Q-22.** [ ] As an investigator for a criminal justice agency, I embrace any technology that helps my agency become more efficient or effective in its functions.
- Q-23.** [ ] Gang affiliation data are readily available to me or my team for use in investigations.
- Q-24.** [ ] I communicate with criminal investigators outside of my agency on most of my investigations of homicides or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-25.** [ ] I have help from outside of my agency in nearly every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned “cold” (cases that have stalled).
- Q-26.** [ ] As I see it, a repository of personal data that includes records from the Washington State Patrol, the Department of Licensing, the Department of Corrections, and other public sources is a valuable tool for criminal investigators.
- Q-27.** [ ] I believe it is critical that law enforcement agencies share any information they have access to with allied law enforcement agencies.
- Q-28.** [ ] Mapping by crime type/location is available to me within my agency.

- Q-29. [ ] Mapping by crime type or location is available to me from an entity outside of my agency. (Please list: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Q-30. [ ] Criminal profiling services are available to me within my agency.
- Q-31. [ ] Criminal profiling is available to me from an entity outside of my agency. (Please list: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Q-32. [ ] The ability to connect known inhabitants with specific addresses would be useful in the investigation of homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-33. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability is important in the investigation of homicides.
- Q-34. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability is important in the investigation of rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-35. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigators are available to me within my agency.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

- Q-36. [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual investigation assaults.
- Q-37. [ ] The availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding, directing, or counseling my agency's investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation would be beneficial.
- Q-38. [ ] Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis.
- Q-39. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another across sub-units within their agency in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.

### Section 3: Crime Analysis Database Awareness

For each of the following investigative databases, using the scale shown below, please tell us about the extent of your reliance upon these crime investigation resources.

1	2	3	4	5
This is our primary database.	This is our secondary database.	We sometimes use this database.	We rarely use this database.	We never use this database.

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

- Q-40. [ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- Q-41. [ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- Q-42. [ ] MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- Q-43. [ ] COPLINK®
- Q-44. [ ] HALT (Homicide Investigation and Lead Tracking – New York)
- Q-45. [ ] ViCLAS (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
- Q-46. [ ] ATAC (Pennsylvania State)
- Q-47. [ ] Iowa State Sex Crimes Analysis System
- Q-48. [ ] MINN/SCAP (Minnesota Sex Crimes Analysis Program)
- Q-49. [ ] RAIN (King County, Washington)
- Q-50. [ ] LInX
- Q-51. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify)

#### Section 4: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact

In this section you are asked to respond to a series of statements specific to the AG's H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. [Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program.]

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer this question.</b>

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer this question.</b>
<b>Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the brackets to the left of each statement.</b>					

**Q-52.**      [ ]      I do not know what H.I.T.S. is, nor have I ever used it. If true, please indicate with an X in the brackets.

(If you checked X for Q-52 above, please advance to Section 7 on page 11.)

**These statements assume that you have been exposed, in some form, to the H.I.T.S. program or its database, even if you do not currently make frequent use of it as an investigative resource.**

**Q-53.**      [ ]      H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of homicides in Washington state.

**Q-54.**      [ ]      H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of rapes/sexual assaults in Washington State.

- Q-55. [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units within Washington state.
- Q-56. [ ] I feel that I have received helpful attention from at least one member of the H.I.T.S. office when I needed assistance during an investigation.
- Q-57. [ ] I would prefer to be able to input data from my investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.
- Q-58. [ ] The assistance I receive from H.I.T.S. investigators is likely to be useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-59. [ ] The information I receive from my H.I.T.S. queries is useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-60. [ ] I have been given the opportunity to provide feedback regarding my experience with H.I.T.S..
- Q-61. [ ] I have a high level of confidence that my requests for H.I.T.S. queries will result in information that will assist me in clearing a crime.
- Q-62. [ ] My level of satisfaction with H.I.T.S. and H.I.T.S. investigators encourages me to continue using H.I.T.S. as an investigative tool.

1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>	<b>I have not had enough</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>experience with H.I.T.S.</b>
					<b>to answer this question.</b>

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

- Q-63. [ ] I have used H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of an alternative resource(s). (Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Q-64. [ ] Regarding turnaround time, I am satisfied with the timely manner in which I receive responses to my H.I.T.S. queries.
- Q-65. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped me to clear at least one “cold case” (stalled) homicide.
- Q-66. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped me to clear at least one “cold case” (stalled) rape/sexual assault.
- Q-67. [ ] Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.
- Q-68. [ ] I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children.
- Q-69. [ ] I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System.

### SECTION 5: H.I.T.S. Program Services and Training Programs

**In the following section you are asked to respond to another series of statements specific to the H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program.**

1	2	3	4
<b>I am familiar with it and have used it.</b>	<b>I am familiar with it but have not used it.</b>	<b>I am not familiar with it but would use it.</b>	<b>I would not use it.</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, or 4 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

- Q-70.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers training on basic investigations.
- Q-71.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers training on basic homicide investigations.
- Q-72.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers training on advanced homicide investigations.
- Q-73.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled) unit development.
- Q-74.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers assistance to homicide investigators for determining how death occurred.
- Q-75.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for interrogating known offenders.
- Q-76.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers expert witness testimony in court cases.
- Q-77.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual assault cases that have stalled.
- Q-78.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide investigators.
- Q-79.        [ ]    H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual assault cases.
- Q-80.        H.I.T.S. should offer training/service for \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_.



**SECTION 6: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information**

**In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your agency's interaction with H.I.T.S.. Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the following questions, please place an "X" next to the appropriate answer.**

**Q-81.** How many times have your investigations been assisted by access to the H.I.T.S. database?

- 0             1—5             6—10             More than 10  
 Don't know

**Q-82.** How many times have you communicated with a H.I.T.S. investigator by phone, fax, mail or e-mail?

- 0             1—5             6—10             More than 10  
 Don't know

**Q-83.** If you have used any of the services provided by the H.I.T.S. team, how would you rate your level of satisfaction with those services?

- I have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.  
 Highly satisfied     Satisfied     Dissatisfied     Highly dissatisfied

**Q-84.** If you have used any of the services provided by the H.I.T.S. team, were you offered the opportunity to provide feedback regarding your satisfaction with those services?

- I have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.  
 Yes, feedback was solicited             No, feedback was not requested

**Q-85.** What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your agency?

- Don't know  
 Richard "Dick" Gagnon

[ ] George Fox

[ ] Marvin Skeen

[ ] Tamara Matheny

[ ] Rick Grabenstein

[ ] Jim Hansen

**Q-86.** What percentage of your agency's active sex crime cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] None      [ ] 1-24%      [ ] 25-49%      [ ] 50-74%

[ ] 75-100%      *If unknown, check this box*     

**Q-87.** What percentage of your agency's active homicide cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] None      [ ] 1-24%      [ ] 25-49%      [ ] 50-74%

[ ] 75-100%      *If unknown, check this box*     

**Q-88.** What percentage of your agency's cold (stalled) homicides and sex crimes is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] None      [ ] 1-24%      [ ] 25-49%      [ ] 50-74%

[ ] 75-100%      *If unknown, check this box*     

**Q-89.** What percentage of your agency's missing persons (age 18 and over) cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] None      [ ] 1-24%      [ ] 25-49%      [ ] 50-74%

[ ] 75-100%      *If unknown, check this box*     

**Q-90.** What percentage of your agency's missing children (under age 18) cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] None      [ ] 1-24%      [ ] 25-49%      [ ] 50-74%

[ ] 75-100%      *If unknown, check this box*

**Q-91.** In what ways, if any, has H.I.T.S. helped improve your investigative strategies?

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**Q-92.** If you no longer use any of the services provided by H.I.T.S., but did so in the past, please explain the reason(s) for discontinuing your use of H.I.T.S. program services:

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**Q-93.** If you are aware that H.I.T.S. has helped other investigators in your agency to improve their investigations of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, please indicate how that service was beneficial to their investigation(s):

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**Q-94.** H.I.T.S. would be even more effective **IF IT**.... (please describe the kinds of additional information, knowledge, or support H.I.T.S. could incorporate in its services that would be helpful in your investigations):

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### SECTION 7: Agency Information

**In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your agency. For each of the following questions, please place an “X” in the box next to the appropriate answer.**

**Q-95.** To the best of your knowledge, how many full-time investigators (including homicide and rape/sexual assault specialists) are employed by your agency?

0       1-5       6-10       10 +

**Q-96.** Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that employs you?

Municipal                       County                       State  
 Federal                               Tribal                               Private

**Q-97.** Which of the following describes the primary function of the agency that employs you?

Corrections                       Law Enforcement       Prosecution  
 Other (*please specify*) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q-98.** Would you like to be invited to take part in a *group discussion* of the H.I.T.S. program?

Yes       No  **Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the H.I.T.S. program or this survey.**

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT TO  
ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM.**

## *Appendix 2 – Supervising Investigator Survey*

### **H.I.T.S. Program Assessment Supervising Investigator Survey 2006**

**NOTE:** For those who have already completed the H.I.T.S. BULLETIN RECIPIENTS SURVEY administered by e-mail, this is a different survey which we would also like you to complete.

The *Division of Governmental Studies and Services* at Washington State University is conducting this detained survey of **Supervising Investigators** in Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the Attorney General's office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program (Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty member at W.S.U., and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for the field research interviews to follow up on the collection of survey data.

This survey will take about 20 minutes to fill out. Please return the completed questionnaire to Washington State University in the enclosed pre-addressed, postage-paid envelope. Your participation in the survey is **completely voluntary**, of course. We strongly urge you to reply, however, so that we can do the best possible job of assessing the utility of the H.I.T.S. program to crime investigators in our state. Your responses will help make H.I.T.S. more beneficial to the criminal justice community.

If you have any questions concerning the survey, please contact either Prof. Nicholas Lovrich or Prof. Noelle Fearn at W.S.U. Pullman: (509) 335-4811. All responses on the survey will remain confidential, and only aggregate summary results will be reported to the AG's office and in public reports. This study has been reviewed and approved for human subject participation by the W.S.U. Institutional Review Board (IRB). This survey meets all the requirements for the protection of respondent privacy and confidentiality. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant you can call W.S.U. IRB at (509) 335-9661.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

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*Nicholas Lovrich*, Director  
Division of Governmental  
Studies & Services

*Noelle Fearn*, Assistant Professor  
Criminal Justice Program

*Charles Johnson*, Doctoral  
Candidate  
Criminal Justice Program

W.S.U. Reference # \_\_\_\_\_

Note: This number is for W.S.U. purposes only. It is needed to coordinate follow-up mailings. When you return your survey your number will be checked off the mailing list and you will not be bothered by reminder cards and repeat mailings

### **SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgment**

**The following questions concern your background in law enforcement and your views on a number of professional issues related to the investigation of serious crimes. In the following section please place an “X” next to the best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested, please mark only one answer for each question.**

**Q-1.** Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, or other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of Washington?

Yes

No

**Q-2.** Please mark the option that best describes your main role within your agency.

I supervise investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, and I actively participate in investigations.

I supervise investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, but I **do not** actively participate in investigations.

**Q-3.** Which of the following most closely represents your attitude toward new technologies?

- I am often confused by new technologies, and I prefer to leave decisions to adopt them to others in the organization. (Please specify to whom you defer such decisions \_\_\_\_\_)
- I am not technologically inclined, but I am willing to learn new technologies if they show promise for helping my agency meet its mission and/or goals.
- I am comfortable with new technologies, and I embrace their use in crime solving and crime prevention.

**Q-4.** Which of the following statements best represents your perspective on the proper place of new technologies in criminal justice?

- I believe that law enforcement has access to all of the technological tools it needs to clear crimes, but agencies have to make greater efforts to learn to use them properly.
- I believe that new technologies for crime solving and crime prevention have been over-sold. There is no substitute for good old-fashioned detective work.

**Q-5.** Regarding you/your investigators' work as homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators, please rank the following criminal databases with respect to their utility to you/your investigators [1 = highest; 7 = lowest].

### **RANKING**

- ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
- COPLINK®
- RAIN
- LInX

Other databases of interest? Please note here:

**Q-6.** In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?

- Any person, public or private, whose job it is to investigate crimes



- Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers
  - Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency
  - Only one designated person within a criminal justice agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity
- Q-7.** If a public entity gathers data from various sources and maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion, who can it be said to “own” the data in that repository?
- The **agency** that gathers and maintains the data
  - The **public** served by the agency in question
  - The **individual** to whom the data relates
- Q-8.** Which of the following statements best reflects your agency’s operations with respect to a cold case squad unit?
- No such unit exists, and no plans are in place to create one.
  - No such unit currently exists, but plans are in place to create one.
  - The agency has such a unit but it is not effective.
  - The agency has a somewhat effective unit of this type.
  - The agency has a quite effective cold case squad/unit.
- Q-9.** For criminal investigations generally, which of the following major crime database resources do you see as being the best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information? *(Please mark **only one** selection.)*
- ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
  - H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
  - MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
  - N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
  - COPLINK®
  - RAIN
  - LInX
- Q-10.** Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best represents your level of information?

- I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard much about it.
- I am familiar with H.I.T.S., but neither I nor my investigators use it.
- My investigators and I both use H.I.T.S., but it is not our primary investigative database.
- H.I.T.S. is my investigators' primary investigative database.

**Q-11.** Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Having access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department of Corrections would greatly assist investigators in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults."

- I strongly agree                       I somewhat agree                       Undecided
- I somewhat disagree                       I strongly disagree

## **Section 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime Investigation**

**The following statements concern the resources and tools available to you and those you supervise as well as those you would like to have available. Using the scale shown below, please offer your opinion.**

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

- Q-12.**  DNA evidence is important but not critical in clearing rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-13.**  Criminal investigators who use public records to clear crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the public whose information is accessed.
- Q-14.**  Access to timelines (chronological sequence events) in a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is often important.
- Q-15.**  Timelines are available to me and/or my team for every investigation of a homicide or rape/sexual assault.

Q-16. [ ] Archival motor vehicle records are available to me and/or my team even if they have been purged from publicly available records.

Q-17. [ ] Archival driver license information is available to me and/or my team even if records have been from publicly available records.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

Q-18. [ ] Investigators should use available victim self-report data even if the victim did not file a police report.

Q-19. [ ] Investigators from different agencies have adequate means by which to share information with one another for the purpose of clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.

Q-20. [ ] Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if any, could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.

Q-21. [ ] As an investigator/investigative supervisor for a criminal justice agency, I embrace any technology that helps my agency become more efficient or effective in its functions.

Q-22. [ ] Gang affiliation data are readily available to me and/or my team for use in investigations

Q-23. [ ] My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators communicate with investigators outside of my agency on most of their investigations.

Q-24. [ ] My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have help available from outside of my agency in every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned “cold” (stalled).

Q-25. [ ] As I see it, a repository of personal data that includes records from the Washington State Patrol, the Department of Licensing, the Department of Corrections, and other public sources is a valuable tool for criminal investigators.

Q-26. [ ] I believe it is critical that law enforcement agencies share any information they have access to with allied law enforcement agencies.

Q-27. [ ] Mapping by crime type/location is available to me or my team from within my agency.

Q-28. [ ] Mapping by crime type or location is available to me or my team from an entity outside of my agency. (Please list \_\_\_\_\_)

Q-29. [ ] Criminal profiling services are available to me or my team within my agency.

- Q-30. [ ] Criminal profiling is available to me or my team from an entity outside of my agency.  
(Please list \_\_\_\_\_)
- Q-31. [ ] The ability to connect known inhabitants with specific addresses would be useful in the investigation of homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-32. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability is important in the investigation of homicides.
- Q-33. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability is important in the investigation of rapes/sexual assaults.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

- Q-34. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigators are available to me or my team within my agency.
- Q-35. [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-36. [ ] The availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding, directing, or counseling my agency's investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation would be beneficial.
- Q-37. [ ] Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis.
- Q-38. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another across sub-units within their agency in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.

### Section 3: Crime Analysis Database Awareness

For each of the following investigative databases, using the scale shown below, please tell us about the extent of your reliance upon these crime investigation resources.

1	2	3	4	5
This is our primary database.	This is our secondary database.	We sometimes use this database.	We rarely use this database.	We never use this database.

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

- Q-39. [ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- Q-40. [ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- Q-41. [ ] MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- Q-42. [ ] COPLINK®
- Q-43. [ ] HALT (Homicide Investigation and Lead Tracking – New York)
- Q-44. [ ] ViCLAS (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
- Q-45. [ ] ATAC (Pennsylvania State)
- Q-46. [ ] Iowa State Sex Crimes Analysis System
- Q-47. [ ] MINN/SCAP (Minnesota Sex Crimes Analysis Program)
- Q-48. [ ] RAIN (King County, Washington)
- Q-49. [ ] LInX
- Q-50. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_ (*please specify*)

### Section 4: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact

In the following section you are asked to respond to a series of statements specific to the AG's H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. [Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program.]

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Uncertain	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S.

to answer this question.

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

Q-51. [ ] I do not know what H.I.T.S. is, nor have I ever used it. If true, please indicate with an X in the brackets.

(If you checked X for Q-52 above, please advance to Section 7 on page 11.)

These statements assume that you have been exposed, in some form, to the H.I.T.S. program or its database, even if your staff does not currently make frequent use of it as an investigative resource.

Q-52. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of homicides in Washington state.

Q-53. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of rapes/sexual assaults.

Q-54. [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units within Washington state.

Q-55. [ ] I feel that my investigators have received helpful attention from at least one member of H.I.T.S. when they have needed assistance during an investigation.

Q-56. [ ] I would prefer that my investigators input data from their investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.

Q-57. [ ] The assistance my investigators receive from H.I.T.S. investigators has been useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.

Q-58. [ ] The information my investigators have received from H.I.T.S. queries has been useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.

Q-59. [ ] My investigators have been provided with the opportunity to provide feedback regarding their experience with H.I.T.S..

Q-60. [ ] I have a high level of confidence that requests by my investigators for H.I.T.S. queries will result in information that will assist him/her in clearing a crime.

Q-61. [ ] My level of satisfaction with H.I.T.S. prompts me to continue to encourage my investigators to use H.I.T.S. as an investigative tool.

Q-62. [ ] I have personally used H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of an alternative resource(s). (Please specify \_\_\_\_\_)

Q-63. [ ] Regarding turnaround time, I am satisfied with the timely manner in which my investigators receive responses to H.I.T.S. queries.

Q-64. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators to clear at least one “cold ” (stalled) homicide.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer this question.</b>

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

Q-65. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators to clear at least one “cold” (stalled) rape/sexual assault.

Q-66. [ ] Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.

Q-67. [ ] My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children.

Q-68. [ ] My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System.

### SECTION 5: H.I.T.S. Program Services and Training Programs

In the following section you are asked to respond to another series of statements specific to the H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>I am familiar with it and have used it.</b>	<b>I am familiar with it but have not used it.</b>	<b>I am not familiar with it but would use it.</b>	<b>I would not use it.</b>

Please place a 1, 2, 3, or 4 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

Q-69. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on basic investigations.

Q-70. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on basic homicide investigations.

Q-71. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on advanced homicide investigations.

Q-72. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled) unit development.

Q-73. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance to homicide investigators for determining how death occurred.

Q-74. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for interrogating known offenders.

- Q-75.  H.I.T.S. offers expert witness testimony in court cases.
- Q-76.  H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual assault cases that have stalled.
- Q-77.  H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide investigators.
- Q-78.  H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual assault cases.
- Q-79.  H.I.T.S. should offer training/service for \_\_\_\_\_.

#### SECTION 6: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information

**In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your agency's interaction with H.I.T.S.. Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the following questions, please place an "X" next to the appropriate answer.**

- Q-80. How many times have your investigations/investigators been assisted by the H.I.T.S. program/team?
- 0             1—5             6—10             More than 10
- Don't know
- Q-81. In your opinion, who "owns" the data retained in the H.I.T.S. database repository?
- The office of the Attorney General, since H.I.T.S. is part of that agency
- The public
- The individual to whom the data relates
- The agency or entity from which the data originated
- Q-82. If you/your investigators have ever used the services of the H.I.T.S. team, how would you or your investigators rate the level of satisfaction?
- I/we have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.
- Highly satisfied     Satisfied     Dissatisfied     Highly dissatisfied
- Q-83. If you/your investigators have ever used the services of the H.I.T.S. team, were you or your investigators offered the opportunity to provide feedback regarding the satisfaction of the services performed?
- I/we have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.
- Yes, feedback was solicited                       No, feedback was not requested



**Q-84.** What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your agency?

- Don't know  
 Richard "Dick" Gagnon  
 George Fox  
 Marvin Skeen  
 Tamara Matheny  
 Rick Grabenstein  
 Jim Hansen

**Q-85.** What percentage of your agency's active sex crime cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

- None       1-24%       25-49%       50-74%  
 75-100% *If unknown, check this box*

**Q-86.** What percentage of your agency's active homicide cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

- None       1-24%       25-49%       50-74%  
 75-100% *If unknown, check this box*

**Q-87.** What percentage of your agency's cold (stalled) homicides and sex crimes is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

- None       1-24%       25-49%       50-74%  
 75-100% *If unknown, check this box*

**Q-88.** What percentage of your agency's missing persons (age 18 and over) cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

- None       1-24%       25-49%       50-74%  
 75-100% *If unknown, check this box*

**Q-89.** What percentage of your agency's missing children (under age 18) cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

- None       1-24%       25-49%       50-74%  
 75-100% *If unknown, check this box*

**Q-90.** If you/your investigators no longer use any of the services provided by H.I.T.S., but did so in the past, please explain the reason(s) for discontinuing your use of H.I.T.S. program services:

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**Q-91.** How has the H.I.T.S. program helped investigators in your agency improve their investigations of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults? (please be specific):

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**Q-92.** H.I.T.S. has helped to increase my confidence in my own or my investigators' abilities to clear homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults **because** (please be specific):

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**Q-93.** H.I.T.S. would be more helpful to me or my team's investigations **if** (please describe in detail the kinds of information, knowledge, or support that would be helpful to you/your investigators):

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**SECTION 7: Agency Information**

**In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your agency. For each of the following questions, please place an "X" in the box next to the appropriate answer.**

**Q-94.** How many full-time investigators (including homicide and rape/sexual assault specialists) are employed by your agency?

0       1-5       6-10       10 +

**Q-95.** Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that employs you?

Municipal                       County                       State  
 Federal                               Tribal                               Private

**Q-96.** Which of the following describes the primary function of the agency that employs you?

Corrections                       Law Enforcement                       Prosecution  
 Other (please specify \_\_\_\_\_)

**Q-97.** Would you like to be invited to take part in a *group discussion* of the H.I.T.S. program?

Yes                       No

**Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the H.I.T.S. program or this survey.**

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM.**

### *Appendix 3 – Police Chief and Sheriff Survey*

## **H.I.T.S. Program Assessment**

### **Police Chief and Sheriff Survey**

**2006**

**NOTE:** For those who have already completed the H.I.T.S. BULLETIN RECIPIENTS SURVEY administered by e-mail, this is a different survey which we would also like you to complete.

The *Division of Governmental Studies and Services* at Washington State University is conducting this detained survey of **Police Chiefs and Sheriffs** in Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the Attorney General's office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program (Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty member at W.S.U., and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for the field research interviews to follow up on the collection of survey data.

This survey will take about 20 minutes to fill out. Please return the completed questionnaire to Washington State University in the enclosed pre-addressed, postage-paid envelope. Your participation in the survey is **completely voluntary**, of course. We strongly urge you to reply, however, so that we can do the best possible job of assessing the utility of the H.I.T.S. program to crime investigators in our state. Your responses will help make H.I.T.S. more beneficial to the criminal justice community.

If you have any questions concerning the survey, please contact either Prof. Nicholas Lovrich or Prof. Noelle Fearn at W.S.U. Pullman: (509) 335-4811. All responses on the survey will remain confidential, and only aggregate summary results will be reported to the AG's office and in public reports. This study has been reviewed and approved for human subject participation by the W.S.U. Institutional Review Board (IRB). This survey meets all the requirements for the protection of respondent privacy and confidentiality. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant you can call W.S.U. IRB at (509) 335-9661.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

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*Nicholas Lovrich*, Director  
Division of Governmental

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*Noelle Fearn*, Assistant Professor  
Criminal Justice Program

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*Charles Johnson*, Doctoral  
Candidate

W.S.U. Reference # \_\_\_\_\_

*Note: This number is for W.S.U. purposes only. It is needed to coordinate follow-up mailings. When you return your survey your number will be checked off the mailing list and you will not be bothered by reminder cards and repeat mailings.*

### **SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgment**

**The following questions concern your background in law enforcement and your views on a number of professional issues related to the investigation of serious crimes. In the following section please place an “X” next to the best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested, please mark only one answer for each question.**

**Q-1.** Please mark the option that best describes your main role within your agency.

- Chief of Police or Sheriff
- Bureau Chief or Undersheriff
- Deputy/Assistant Chief/Sheriff
- Other (please specify \_\_\_\_\_)

**Q-2.** Which of the following most closely represents your attitude toward new technologies?

- I am not technologically inclined, but I am willing to adopt new technologies if they show promise for helping my agency meet its mission and/or goals.
- I am comfortable with new technologies, and I embrace their use in crime solving and crime prevention.

**Q-3.** Which of the following statements best represents your perspective on the proper place of new technologies in criminal justice?

- I believe that law enforcement has access to all of the technological tools it needs to successfully clear crimes; however, agencies have to make greater efforts to learn to use them properly.
- I believe that new technologies for crime solving and crime prevention have been oversold. There is no substitute for good old-fashioned detective work.

**Q-4.** Regarding the tools available to your homicide and/or rape/sexual assault investigators, please rank the following criminal databases with respect to their utility to your own agency [1 = highest; 7 = lowest].

**RANKING**

- ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
- COPLINK®
- RAIN
- LInX

Other databases of interest? Please note here:

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**Q-5.** In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who should have direct, unfiltered access to criminal investigation databases?

- Any person, public or private, whose job it is to investigate crimes
- Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers
- Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency
- Only one designated person within a criminal justice agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity

**Q-6.** If a public entity gathers crime-related data from various sources and maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion, who “owns” the data in that repository?

- The **agency** that gathers and maintains the data
- The **public** served by the agency in question
- The **individual** to whom the data relates

**Q-7.** For criminal investigations generally, which of the following major crime database resources do you see as being the best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information? (Please mark **only one** selection.)

- ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
- COPLINK®
- RAIN
- LInX

**Q-8.** Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best represents your level of information?

- I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard much about it.
- I am familiar with H.I.T.S., but neither I nor my investigators use it.
- My investigators use H.I.T.S., but it is not their primary investigative database.
- H.I.T.S. is my investigators' primary investigative database.

## **Section 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime Investigation**

The following questions concern the resources and tools available to your agency and those your agency would like to have available. Using the scale shown below, please offer your opinion.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

- Q-9.** [ ] DNA evidence is important but not critical in clearing rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-10.** [ ] Criminal investigators who use public records to clear crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the public whose information is accessed.
- Q-11.** [ ] Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol officers on persons under the supervision of the Department of Corrections would greatly assist investigators in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-12.** [ ] My agency's homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators communicate with investigators outside of my agency on most of their investigations.
- Q-13.** [ ] My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have help available from outside of my agency in every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned "cold" (stalled).
- Q-14.** [ ] The way I see it, a repository of personal data that includes records from the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Licensing, the Department of Corrections, and other public sources is a valuable tool for criminal investigators.
- Q-15.** [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-16.** [ ] The availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding, directing, or counseling my agency's investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation would be beneficial.
- Q-17.** [ ] Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis.



- Q-18. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another across sub-units within their agency in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.

### Section 3: Crime Analysis Database Awareness

For each of the following investigative databases, using the scale shown below, please tell us about the extent of your agency's reliance upon these crime investigation resources.

1	2	3	4	5
This is our primary database.	This is our secondary database.	We sometimes use this database.	We rarely use this database.	We never use this database.

Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

- Q-19. [ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
- Q-20. [ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
- Q-21. [ ] MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- Q-22. [ ] COPLINK®
- Q-23. [ ] HALT (Homicide Investigation and Lead Tracking – New York)
- Q-24. [ ] ViCLAS (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
- Q-25. [ ] ATAC (Pennsylvania State)
- Q-26. [ ] Iowa State Sex Crimes Analysis System
- Q-27. [ ] MINN/SCAP (Minnesota Sex Crimes Analysis Program)
- Q-28. [ ] RAIN (King County, Washington)
- Q-29. [ ] LInX
- Q-30. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify)

### Section 4: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact

**In the following section you are asked to respond to a series of statements specific to the AG's H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. [Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program.]**

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer this question.</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**

**These statements assume that you have been exposed, in some form, to the H.I.T.S. program or its database, even if your agency does not currently use it as an investigative resource.**

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer this question.</b>

- Q-31.** [ ] The H.I.T.S. program has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of homicides in Washington state.
- Q-32.** [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of rapes/sexual assaults in Washington state.
- Q-33.** [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units within Washington state.
- Q-34.** [ ] I feel that my investigators have received adequate attention from at least one member of H.I.T.S. when they have needed assistance during an investigation.
- Q-35.** [ ] I would prefer that my investigators input data from their investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.
- Q-36.** [ ] The assistance my investigators receive from H.I.T.S. investigators has been useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-37.** [ ] The information my investigators have received from H.I.T.S. queries has been useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- Q-38.** [ ] My investigators have been provided with the opportunity to provide feedback regarding their experience with H.I.T.S.
- Q-39.** [ ] I have a high level of confidence that requests by my investigators for H.I.T.S. queries will result in information that will assist him/her in clearing a crime.

- Q-40.  My level of satisfaction with H.I.T.S. prompts me to continue to encourage my investigators to use H.I.T.S. as an investigative tool.
- Q-41.  Regarding turnaround time, I am satisfied with the timely manner in which my investigators receive responses to H.I.T.S. queries.
- Q-42.  H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators clear at least one “cold” (stalled) homicide.
- Q-43.  H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators clear at least one “cold” (stalled) rape/sexual assault.
- Q-44.  Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.
- Q-45.  My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children.
- Q-46.  My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber Alert System.

#### **Section 5: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information**

**In this final section you are asked a series of seven questions specific to your agency’s interaction with the H.I.T.S. program. Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the following questions, please place an “X” next to the appropriate answer.**

- Q-47. How many times have your investigations/investigators been assisted by the H.I.T.S. program/team?
- None       1-5       6-10       10 +
- Q-48. In your opinion, who “owns” the data retained in the H.I.T.S. database repository?
- The office of the Attorney General, since H.I.T.S. is part of that agency
- The public
- The individual to whom the data relates
- The agency or entity from which the data originated
- Q-49. How would you rate your agency’s level of satisfaction with the services provided to your investigative team by the H.I.T.S. program?

- We have never used the services of H.I.T.S..
- Extremely satisfied
- Somewhat satisfied
- Uncertain
- Somewhat dissatisfied
- Extremely dissatisfied

**Q-50.** Would you like to be invited to take part in a *group discussion* of the H.I.T.S. program?

- Yes       No

**Q-51.** Would you like to receive a summary of the results of this particular survey of Chiefs and Sheriffs in Washington?

- Yes       No

**Q-52.** Would you like to receive a summary of the results of a survey on the H.I.T.S. program conducted among criminal investigators in law enforcement agencies in Washington?

- Yes       No

**Q-53.** Would you like to have a session at WASPC devoted to the findings derived from the Washington State University assessment of the H.I.T.S. program?

- Yes       No

**Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the H.I.T.S. program or this survey.**

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM.**

## ***Appendix 4 – H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey***

### **H.I.T.S. Program Assessment**

#### **H.I.T.S. Investigators**

The *Division of Governmental Studies and Services* at Washington State University is conducting this detailed and probing survey of crime investigators in Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the Attorney General's office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program (Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty member, and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for the field research interviews to follow upon the collection of survey data.

Please take the 30-45 minutes or so required to fill out this survey instrument, and return it to Washington State University in the enclosed pre-addressed, postage-paid envelope. Your participation in the survey is completely voluntary, of course. We strongly urge you to reply, however, so that we can do the best possible job assessing the utility of the H.I.T.S. program to crime investigators in our state.

If you have any questions concerning the survey, please contact either Prof. Nicholas Lovrich or Prof. Noelle Fearn at W.S.U. Pullman: (509) 335-4811. All responses on the survey will remain confidential, and only aggregate summary results will be reported to the AG's office and in public reports. This study has been reviewed and approved by the W.S.U. Institutional Review Board (IRB), and meets all the requirements for the protection of respondent privacy and confidentiality. If you have any concerns regarding this survey you can call W.S.U. IRB at (509) 335-9661.

**Thank you in advance for your participation.**

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Nicholas Lovrich, Director	Noelle Fearn, Assistant Professor	Charles Johnson, Doctoral Candidate
Division of Governmental Studies & Services	Criminal Justice Program	Criminal Justice Program

W.S.U. Reference # \_\_\_\_\_

Note: This number is for W.S.U. purposes only. It is needed to coordinate follow-up mailings. When you return your survey your number will be checked off the mailing list and you will not be bothered by reminder cards and repeat mailings.

**SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgments**

**The following set of 3 questions concern your own background in crime investigation and your views on a number of professional issues related to the investigation of serious crimes. In the following section please place an “X” next to the best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested, please mark only one answer for each question.**

Q – 1. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Having access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department of Corrections would probably assist investigators in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.”

a. I strongly agree       b. I somewhat agree       c. Undecided

d. I somewhat disagree       e. I strongly disagree

Q – 2. In a criminal investigation, which of the following do you see as being the “hub” for crime scene, criminal, or victim information? (*Please mark only one selection*)

a. VICAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)

b. H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)

c. SMART (Supervision Management and Recidivist Tracking)

- d. CATCH (Computer-Aided Tracking and Characterization of Homicides)
- e. MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
- f. N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
- g. COPLINK®
- h. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Q – 3. I feel my employment background, including training and experience, qualify me to assist law enforcement detectives in their investigations involving homicides.

- a. I strongly agree       b. I somewhat agree       c. Undecided
- d. I somewhat disagree       e. I strongly disagree

**SECTION 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime Investigation**

**The following set of 7 questions concerns the resources and tools available to you and those resources you might like to command. Using the scale shown below, please offer your opinion on the following section of questions:**

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>

**Please place a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in the brackets to the left of each statement.**



- [ ] Q – 4. Criminal investigators who use public records to clear crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the public whose information is accessed.
- [ ] Q – 5. Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if any, could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rape/sexual assaults.
- [ ] Q – 6. As I see it, a repository of personal data that includes records from the Department of Motor Vehicles, Department of Licensing, Department of Corrections, and other public sources, is a valuable tool for criminal investigators.
- [ ] Q – 7. I believe it is critical that law enforcement agencies share any information they have access to with allied law enforcement agencies.
- [ ] Q – 8 . The ability to connect known inhabitants with specific addresses would be useful in the investigation of homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
- [ ] Q – 9. Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
- [ ] Q – 10. Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of sharing information with one another across sub-units within their home agency

in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.

**SECTION 3: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact**

**The following section poses a series of questions specific to the H.I.T.S. program. Your answers will provide important information for our analysis of the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the following questions, please place the appropriate number next to the corresponding question.**

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Uncertain</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>agree</b>	<b>agree</b>		<b>disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>

- [ ] Q – 11. H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of homicides in Washington state.
- [ ] Q – 12. H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of rapes/sexual assaults in Washington state.
- [ ] Q – 13. H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units within Washington state.
- [ ] Q – 14. I would prefer that investigators be able to input data from their investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go

through the H.I.T.S. team.

- [ ] Q – 15. Information would flow from law enforcement agencies to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from those agencies could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.
- [ ] Q – 16. In my function as a H.I.T.S. investigator, I tend to limit the number of investigators I contact within each agency so that all of my work is channeled through a main point of contact.
- [ ] Q – 17. All investigators within each agency within my H.I.T.S. jurisdiction know that they may contact me directly if they need assistance.
- [ ] Q - 18. When one of my contacts within a specific agency retires, promotes, or otherwise moves on, I find it difficult to connect with a replacement.
- [ ] Q - 19. As a H.I.T.S. investigator I believe I am obligated to take the lead in investigating homicides or sexual assaults in cases where it is obvious that investigators within the agency of jurisdiction are “in over their heads.”
- [ ] Q - 20. I am qualified to run my own queries in the H.I.T.S. databases.
- [ ] Q - 21. I am confident that I would obtain satisfactory results from queries if I personally ran queries in the H.I.T.S. databases.

- [ ] Q - 22. I feel my employment background, including training and experience qualify me to assist law enforcement detectives in their investigations involving sexual assaults.
  
- [ ] Q - 23. H.I.T.S. bulletins include all amber alerts that are generated in Washington state.
  
- [ ] Q - 24. In approaching detectives regarding cases, I sometimes feel a sense that my efforts are an imposition on their work.
  
- [ ] Q - 25. There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I don't get out to at least every six months.
  
- [ ] Q - 26. The H.I.T.S. team would benefit from additional H.I.T.S. investigators.
  
- [ ] Q - 27. I sometimes feel that the time spent on some cases prevents me from spending time contacting all of the investigators within my jurisdiction.
  
- [ ] Q - 28. I think the communication of information from agency to agency through the H.I.T.S. databases would be improved if detectives could run their own queries without H.I.T.S. personnel assistance.
  
- [ ] Q - 29. I would prefer that detectives input their crime data directly into the H.I.T.S. system without coordinating that effort through me.

- [ ] Q - 30. Crime investigation information gathered and maintained by the H.I.T.S. program and its members remains confidential, and detectives that share their information should feel confident that such information is only shared on a need-to-know basis.

**SECTION 4: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information**

**In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to the interaction between agencies within your support jurisdiction and H.I.T.S.. Your answers will provide important information for the successful analysis of H.I.T.S. and the assessment of its effectiveness. For each of the following questions, please place an "X" next to the appropriate answer.**

- Q – 31. What percentage of the active sex crime cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] a. None      [ ] b. 1 – 24%      [ ] c. 25 – 49%

[ ] d. 51 – 74%      [ ] e. 75 – 100%

*If unknown, check this box*

- Q – 32. What percentage of the active homicide cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] a. None      [ ] b. 1 – 24%      [ ] c. 25 – 49%

[ ] d. 51 – 74%      [ ] e. 75 – 100%

*If unknown, check this box*

Q – 33. What percentage of the active cold case (stalled) homicide cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%

[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%

*If unknown, check this box*

Q – 34. What percentage of the missing persons (age 18 and over) cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%

[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%

*If unknown, check this box*

Q – 35. What percentage of the missing persons (under age 18) cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?

[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%

[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%

*If unknown, check this box*

Q – 36. Regarding agencies within your H.I.T.S. jurisdiction, what percentage do you feel would say that they understand what the H.I.T.S. program can do for their agency?

a. less than 10%       b. 11 – 24%

c. 25 – 49%       d. 50 – 74%

e. 75 – 100%

Q – 37. Regarding investigators of agencies that have authority to conduct homicide, sexual assault, or other violent crimes within your H.I.T.S. jurisdiction, what percentage do you feel know you by name?

a. less than 10%       b. 11 – 24%

c. 25 – 49%       d. 50 – 74%

e. 75 – 100%

Q – 38. Which of the following best describes your contact with field investigators when offering H.I.T.S. assistance?

a. I have a main contact person within each agency

b. I contact different investigators within each agency for input

Q – 39. Of the H.I.T.S. bulletins you assisted in generating during the time frame of December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005, please indicate the approximate percentages related to each topic below (please be sure your total equals 100%):

a. Homicide  b. Sexual assault

c. Robbery  d. Aggravated assault

e. Vehicle theft  f. Burglary

g. Other (please list) \_\_\_\_\_

Q – 40. The input forms for inclusion of a crime in the H.I.T.S. database should be completed by (please mark only one response):

a. H.I.T.S. investigators  b. H.I.T.S. support staff

c. Detective handling the case  d. Other \_\_\_\_\_

Q – 41. The input forms for inclusion of a crime in the H.I.T.S. database **are usually** completed by (please mark only one response):

a. H.I.T.S. investigators  b. H.I.T.S. support staff

c. Detective handling the case  d. Other \_\_\_\_\_



Q – 42. If additional H.I.T.S. investigators were added to the team, they would most benefit us in the area of (please mark all that apply):

- a. Homicide investigations                       b. Training
- c. Sexual assault investigations    d. Other \_\_\_\_\_

Q – 43. There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I simply avoid because I do not feel welcome.

- a. I strongly agree             b. I somewhat agree
- c. Undecided
- d. I somewhat disagree    e. I strongly disagree

Q – 44. Please indicate by percentages the amount of time you spend assisting each of the following agency types (please be sure your total equals 100%):

- a. Federal             b. State
- c. Municipal         d. Tribal

Q – 45. Please list reasons you do not regularly communicate with some investigators within your jurisdiction.

- Q – 46. H.I.T.S. would be even more effective if, as a H.I.T.S. investigator, I could (please describe in detail the kinds of information, knowledge, technologies or support that would be helpful in assisting you in the performance of your job):
- Q – 47. Please briefly describe ways in which you attempt to increase voluntary compliance by agencies in both reporting applicable crimes to H.I.T.S., and in soliciting H.I.T.S. team assistance.

#### **ADDITIONAL COMMENTS**

**Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the H.I.T.S. program or this survey.**

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT TO  
ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM**

## *Appendix 5 – H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey*

### **H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey**

#### **H.I.T.S. Program Assessment H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipient Survey**

The Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State University is conducting this survey of **H.I.T.S. Bulletin** recipients. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the Attorney General's office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program (Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty, and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for the field research interviews to follow-up on the collection of survey data.

The survey will take about 20 minutes to fill out. Your participation in the survey is **completely voluntary**, of course. We strongly urge you to reply, however, so that we can do the best possible job of assessing the utility of the H.I.T.S. program to criminal investigators in our state.

If you have any questions concerning the survey, please contact either Prof. Nicholas Lovrich or Prof. Noelle Fearn at W.S.U. Pullman: (509) 335-4811. All responses on the survey will remain confidential, and only aggregate summary results will be reported to the AG's office and in public reports. This study has been reviewed and approved by the W.S.U. Institutional Review Board (IRB). This survey meets all the requirements for the protection of respondent privacy and confidentiality. If you have any concerns regarding your rights as a participant you can call W.S.U. IRB at (509) 335-9661.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

### H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipient Survey<sup>12</sup>

Please mark the most appropriate answer for each of the following questions. Thank you.

1. Regarding H.I.T.S. Bulletins, which of the following applies?

I currently receive them via e-mail.

I no longer receive them, but I received them via e-mail in the past.

I have never received H.I.T.S. Bulletins, via e-mail or otherwise.

2. Which of the following best describes how you were introduced to H.I.T.S. Bulletins?

They started appearing in my e-mail without my solicitation.

I heard about them from a co-worker, and I requested to receive them.

I heard about them from a colleague, and I requested to receive them.

I do not receive the H.I.T.S. Bulletins.

3. Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, and other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of Washington?

Yes

No

4. Which of the following best describes your job?

Patrol officer

Criminal investigator

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<sup>12</sup> Although the format of the boxes changed slightly upon transferring this on-line document to the appendices, the questions remained intact.

Supervisor of criminal investigators

Community corrections officer

Crime analyst AND criminal investigator

Crime analyst but NOT a criminal investigator

Criminal Justice Agency support staff

None of the above

5. What percentage of your job-related activities includes the investigation of homicides?

0 - I do not investigate homicides

1 - 24%

25% - 49%

50% - 74%

75% - 100%

6. What percentage of your job-related activities includes the investigation of sexual assaults (including rapes)?

0 - I do not investigate sexual assaults.

1 - 24%

25% - 49%

50% - 74%

75% - 100%

7. How long have you been a homicide investigator?

0 - I do not investigate homicides.

Less than 6 months.

More than 6 months, but less than a year.

1 - 5 years.

Over 5 years.

8. How long have you been a sexual assault investigator?

0 - I do not investigate sexual assaults.

Less than 6 months.

More than 6 months, but less than a year.

1 - 5 years.

Over 5 years.

9. In your opinion, of the persons described below who should have unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?

Any person, public or private, whose job it is to investigate crimes.

Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers.

Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency.

Only one designated person within a criminal justice agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity.

Only H.I.T.S. investigators

10. The lack of direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered criminal investigations in my department.

Yes

No

Unknown

11. Please rank in order of utility in your crime investigation.

VICAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)

H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)

MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-terrorism Information Exchange)

N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Exchange)

COPLINK®

RAIN

LINX

12. If a criminal justice agency gathers data from various sources and maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion who "owns" the data?

The agency that gathers and maintains the data

The public served by the agency in question

The individual to whom the data relates

13. How many times have you contributed data for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database?

0

1 - 5

6 - 10

More than 10.

If none, please tell us why.

14. Which of the following obstacles have prevented your criminal investigation from more fully benefiting from the H.I.T.S. database?

Lack of familiarity with H.I.T.S.

I have had a bad prior experience with H.I.T.S.

Management at my agency hinders my exposure to H.I.T.S.

Time constraints prevent me from maximizing my use of H.I.T.S.

None of these obstacles apply to me

15. Which of the following best describes how useful H.I.T.S. Bulletins are in assisting you in your job or on your investigations?

Very useful.

Somewhat useful.

Undecided.

Not very useful.

Not useful at all.

16. How many times has one of your investigations been assisted by a H.I.T.S. Bulletin?

Not applicable, as I am not an investigator.

0

1 - 5

6 -1 0

More than 10.



17. How many times has one of your investigations been assisted by the H.I.T.S. team, **not** including H.I.T.S. Bulletins?

Not applicable, as I am not an investigator.

0

1 - 5

6 - 10

More than 10.

18. How many times have you communicated with a H.I.T.S. investigator, either by phone, fax, e-mail, or regular mail?

Not applicable, as I am not a criminal investigator.

0

1 - 5

6 - 10

More than 10

19. In your opinion, who "owns" the data retained in the H.I.T.S. database repository?

The office of the Attorney General, since H.I.T.S. is part of that agency.

The public.

The individual to whom the data relates.

The agency or entity from which the data originated.

If you have used the services of the H.I.T.S. team, how would you rate your level of satisfaction with each of the following services?

Please use the scale provided. If you have never used this service of the H.I.T.S. team please mark the NA option

Extremely satisfied    Satisfied    Undecided    Not satisfied    Somewhat disappointed    Extremely Disappointed    NA

20. Collection of violent crime data

21. H.I.T.S. training-instructional presentation

22. H.I.T.S. training-course curriculum

23. Consultation

24. Investigation assistance

25. Hands-on assistance on open and active violent crimes

26. Facilitation of cold case meetings

27. Investigation of cold cases involving violent crimes

28. Coordinator of multi-jurisdiction task forces

29. If you have used the services of the H.I.T.S. team, were you offered the opportunity to provide feedback regarding your satisfaction with the services performed?

I have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.

Yes

No

30. How many full-time homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators are employed by your agency?

0

1 - 5

6 - 10

More than 10

I don't know.

31. How many part-time homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators are employed by your agency?

0

1 - 5

6 - 10

More than 10.

I don't know.

32. Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that employs you?

City

County

State

Federal

Tribal

Private

33. Which of the following describes the function of the agency that employs you?

Law enforcement, including patrol or investigations.

Corrections.

Prosecution.

If other please specify.

34. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Having access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRS) generated by patrol officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department of Corrections would greatly assist investigators in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults."

I strongly agree.

I somewhat agree.

Undecided.

I somewhat disagree.

I strongly disagree.

35. What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your agency?

Richard "Dick" Gagnon

George Fox

Marvin Skeen

Tamara Matheny

Rick Grabenstein

Jim Hansen

I don't know.

36. What percentage of your agency's active sex crime cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?

None

1 - 24%

25 - 49%

50 - 74%

75 - 100%

I don't know.

37. What percentage of your agency's active homicide cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?

None

1 - 24%

25 - 49%

50 - 74%

75 - 100%

I don't know.

38. What percentage of your agency's cold case (stalled) homicide cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?

None

1 - 24%

25 - 49%

50 - 74%

75 - 100%

I don't know.

39. What percentage of your agency's missing persons (age 18 and over) cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?

None

1 - 24%

25 - 49%

50 - 74%

75 - 100%

I don't know.

40. What percentage of your agency's missing children (under age 18) cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?

None

1 - 24%

25 - 49%

50 - 74%

75 - 100%

I don't know.

41. Regarding H.I.T.S. Bulletins, which statement reflects your experience?

This does not apply to me since I do not receive the bulletins.

The bulletins always open properly.

Sometimes the bulletins do not open properly.

The bulletins rarely open properly.

The bulletins never open properly.

42. If H.I.T.S. Bulletins do not open properly, what action do you take?

This does not apply to me since I do not receive the bulletins.

This does not apply to me since the bulletins always open properly.

If they open in a text format, I still read them.

If they open in a text format, I discard them without reading them.

43. Please check the boxes below if you would like to receive the results from this survey or participate in a follow up survey.

I would like the results from this survey.

I would like to participate in a follow up survey.

44. If you would like the results from this survey or are willing to participate in a follow up survey please provide your name and mailing address in the box below.

45. If you prefer to be contacted by email, please provide your address in the box below.


46. If you have any additional comments, please provide them in the box below.

***Thank you for completing the survey***

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*Appendix 6 – Map of WA Statewide Regional Homeland Security Coordination Districts13*

**Washington Statewide Regional Homeland Security Coordination Districts (RHSCD)**



<sup>1</sup>Note: These coincide with Local Health Regions for Public Health Emergency Planning and Coordination.



## ***Appendix 7 - Investigator/Analyst Biographies***

### **Investigator/Analyst Biographies**

Tammee Matheny: Joined the AGO-CJD as a student intern in May 1989, and became the first Crime Analyst in the H.I.T.S. Unit in May 1989; promoted to an Investigator/Analyst position in the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2002.

Marv Skeen: A total of 36 years in law enforcement, 28 years working violent crimes; previously worked for the Bellevue P.D.; involved with over 200 homicide and sexual assault investigations; cases of interest---Pohlreich/Beethe/Levine serial murder case, Undi (60 year old female) kidnapping case in 1987; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 1994.

Jim Hansen: A total of 32 years in law enforcement, 18 years working violent crimes; previously worked for the Spokane County Sheriff's Office.; involved with over 250 homicide and sexual assault investigations; cases of interest---Robert L. Yates serial murder case; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 1999.

George Fox: A total of 35 years in law enforcement, including 18 years working homicide investigations, 5 years as the Supervisor of the Homicide Unit; previously worked for the Long Beach (CA) P.D.; was lead investigator or assisted in over 500 homicide investigations; cases of interest---murder of Gen. Carl Marion (OR), Jeremy Strohmier case (murder of young girl in a Nevada casino), Randy Kraft serial murder case, Martin James Kipp serial murder case; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2000.

Dick Gagnon: A total of 36 years in law enforcement, including 16 years working violent crimes and 3 years on a "Cold Case" team; previously worked for the Seattle P.D.; was lead investigator or assisted in over 100 homicide investigations; "Cold Case" team obtained convictions in 21 unsolved murder cases; cases of interest---DeWayne Lee Harris (aka "Chilly Willy") serial murder case; Kevin Cruz ("Shipyard" murder case), singer Mia Zapata, Kristen Sumstad ("Envelope" case); joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2004.

Rick Grabenstein: A total of 34 years in law enforcement, including 14 years working Major Crimes; previously worked for the Coeur d'Alene P.D. (3 years) and the Spokane County S.O. (29 years); was

lead investigator or assisted in approximately 300 homicide and sexual assault/child sexual abuse investigations, including 14 capital murder cases as part of Spokane's Homicide Task Force; cases of interest--Robert L. Yates serial murder case, Duane Woods double murder case, 1996 Spokane bombings/arrest of four Aryan Nations sympathizers; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2004.

*Appendix 8 – H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)*



(Revised July 10, 2006)

# Homicide Investigation Tracking System®

## Murder Form

Please complete the questions on the Murder form to the best of your knowledge.

The **HIGHLIGHTED** questions ***must*** be completed on all cases (missing person, unidentified found bodies, and all non-stranger murders). (Note: Gaps exist in the numbering system to coincide with the fields inside the H.I.T.S. database). Stranger cases should have most of the questions completed to assist in determining MO and signature of the offender and in linking cases.

After completing a form, **save it to a file with a name that is recognizable to you**, and e-mail it as an **attachment** to your H.I.T.S. Investigator.

Information on your homicide case is as important to us in the H.I.T.S. Unit as it is to you. When you have a homicide within your jurisdiction, you need to submit a H.I.T.S. form as soon as possible so we can help you with your investigation, especially when the offender is not known.

- We can and will search for other cases that could match your case.
- We will look for similar cases where a suspect was convicted and perhaps has completed his prison time and been released.

- We can give you a list of persons with criminal history that live in a certain area or near a certain address.
- We can assist with other suspect information.
- We can search for vehicles by partial license number or by make, model and color of a suspect vehicle.

If you have a suspect at large or one that has not been identified, we can assist by sending out a bulletin to all law enforcement agencies statewide, including Oregon.

If you have any questions you should call your H.I.T.S. investigator or the general phone number: 206-464-6209 or 800-345-2793.

**To get started just hit the tab button or use your mouse and click on question # 1 answer box.**  
**MURDER FORM**

### I. CASE ADMINISTRATION

1. Date received or completed: \_\_\_\_\_ 2. H.I.T.S. report ID#:

3. Reporting agency ORI#: \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Reporting agency:

5. Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Reporting agency's case/incident #:

7. Officer/Det. Last name: \_\_\_\_\_ 8. First name:

10. Case status:

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Open - Unsolved (active investigation)	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Cleared by arrest - Solved
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Suspended (inactive investigation)	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Exceptionally cleared
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Open - Warrant issued	

11. Evidence suggests the victim in this case is a:

1  Single victim3  Victim in a possible series2  Multiple victims4  Is a series victim; Series name:**CLASSIFICATION**

13. Check the response(s) that most closely fits the **main** classification or **major** motivation that compelled the offender to commit this murder. **(check all that apply)**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Heat of anger	26 <input type="checkbox"/> Psychopathic
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Arson	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Homosexual	27 <input type="checkbox"/> Rape
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Burglary	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Justifiable homicide	28 <input type="checkbox"/> Reckless/Negligent
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Child abuse murder	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Kidnap	29 <input type="checkbox"/> Revenge
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Conspiracy	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Love triangle	30 <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Cult (ritualistic)	19 <input type="checkbox"/> Mass	31 <input type="checkbox"/> Self-defense
7 <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic violence	20 <input type="checkbox"/> Mental/Insane	32 <input type="checkbox"/> Serial/Possible serial
8 <input type="checkbox"/> Drug related	21 <input type="checkbox"/> Mercy killing	33 <input type="checkbox"/> Sex related (other)
9 <input type="checkbox"/> Financial gain	22 <input type="checkbox"/> Missing person presumed dead	34 <input type="checkbox"/> Sniper
10 <input type="checkbox"/> For hire	23 <input type="checkbox"/> Murder to conceal another crime	35 <input type="checkbox"/> Torture (not sexual)
11 <input type="checkbox"/> Fun/Amusement	24 <input type="checkbox"/> Murder to prevent testimony/ident	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
12 <input type="checkbox"/> Gang	25 <input type="checkbox"/> Officer killed	99 <input type="checkbox"/> Unable to determine
13 <input type="checkbox"/> Hate/Bias		

**CRIME SCENE**

14. If the initial contact or assault on the victim was in a building, how did the offender gain entry?

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Building open	3 <input type="checkbox"/> Let in by victim	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Let in by 3 <sup>rd</sup> person	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
--	---	---	------------------------------------

to public			
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Non-forced entry	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Forced entry	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender lived/had right to be there	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other

15. Did the offender(s) disable the telephone, security system, or other utilities? 1  Yes 2  No

16. The property at the crime scene was: (**check all that apply**)

1  Undisturbed 2  Disturbed 3  Ransacked 4  Vandalized 5  Burned

17. Did the offender(s) destroy/attempt to destroy evidence at the crime scene?

1  Yes \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No (**if NO, go to #20**)

#### **OFFENDER'S WRITING OR DRAWING AT SCENE**

18. Was there writing or drawing at the crime scene(s)?

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No (**if NO, go to #20**)

19. Instrument used to write or draw at the crime scene(s):

1  Knife or sharp instrument 3  Lipstick 88  Other  
2  Blood 4  Writing instrument (pen, etc.)

#### **SYMBOLIC ARTIFACTS**

20. Did evidence suggest a deliberate or unusual ritual, act, or thing that had been performed on, with, or near the victim (such as orderly formation of rocks, burnt candles, dead animals, defecation, etc.)?

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

20a. (131) Were significant item(s) taken from the victim or the crime scene? (Items usually taken in burglaries--tv, stereo, money.)

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

### **EVIDENCE**

From the case file or evidence form/log (including items of evidence developed by the crime lab or medical examiner/coroner), list all evidence of possible importance to this case and/or evidence that could possibly link this case with other similar cases.

E.G.: Blood, Hair, Fibers, Weapon(s), Spent ammunition, Shoe impressions, Tire tracks, Trace evidence, or other significant item(s).

21. Evidence item #:

22. Description (include model, ser. #, etc.):

### **FINGERPRINTING ID**

23. Were comparable latent fingerprints obtained in this case? 1  Yes 2  No

24. Were fingerprints sent to the print lab for comparison? 1  Yes (classification) 2  No

25. What were the results of the fingerprint comparison? 1  Positive 2  Negative 3   
Incomplete

### **DNA**



26. Were blood, other fluid, body specimens, or other items preserved for or DNA tested? 1  Yes 2  
 No

Fluids/Specimens/Items: \_\_\_\_\_ DNA label:

## II. VICTIM INFORMATION

28. This is victim of victim(s) in **this incident**:

(number) (total)

29. Status of the victim is:

- 1  Murdered - victim **deceased** - victim **identified**.  
 2  **Unidentified** dead body where manner of death is known or suspected to be homicide.  
 3  **Missing or kidnapped** person with evidence of foul play. (Victim still missing)  
 4  **Attempted** murder.

## DATE AND TIME PARAMETERS

30. Victim last seen prior to death: To:

31. Death/Major assault: To:

32. Victim/Body found: To:

## VICTIM IDENTIFICATION & CHARACTERISTICS

33. L Name: 34. F.Name: 35. M.Name:

36. AKAs:

37. Street: 38. City:

39. County: 40. State: 41. Zip:

42. Prev. street address: 43. City: 44. County: 45. State:

46. DOB: 47. Age: 48. Race: 49. Sex:

50. Hgt: 51. Wgt: 53. Hair color: 54. Hair length: Eye color:

55. Did the victim have outstanding physical features or was there something about the victim that would attract attention?

1  Yes 2  No

#### **VICTIM BACKGROUND**

56. SS#: 57. SID#: 58. FBI#

59. Marital status: 1  Single 2  Married 3  Divorced 4  Widowed 5  Separated

60. Occupation (legitimate or non-legitimate):

61. Employer & city:

#### **RELATIONSHIP TO OFFENDER**

62. Using the list below, pick the selection that best describes the relationship between the victim and the offender(s).

Victim was the offender's: **(check all that apply)**

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Acquaintance (business, drugs, etc.)	9 <input type="checkbox"/>	Lover	17 <input type="checkbox"/>	Spouse
2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Acquaintance (first time, just met)	10 <input type="checkbox"/>	Lover (Ex-)	18 <input type="checkbox"/>	Spouse (Ex-)
3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Acquaintance (one way)	11 <input type="checkbox"/>	Parent/Child	19 <input type="checkbox"/>	Spouse (Common-law)
4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Babysitter/child	12 <input type="checkbox"/>	Parent's boy/girlfriend	20 <input type="checkbox"/>	Spouse (Estranged)
5 <input type="checkbox"/>	Family member (other)	13 <input type="checkbox"/>	Parent (Grand)/Grandchild	21 <input type="checkbox"/>	Total stranger
6 <input type="checkbox"/>	Friend/Neighbor	14 <input type="checkbox"/>	Parent (Step-)/Step-child	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	Other
7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Guardian/Dependent	15 <input type="checkbox"/>	Prostitute/John	99 <input type="checkbox"/>	Unable to determine
8 <input type="checkbox"/>	Hitchhiker/Person providing ride	16 <input type="checkbox"/>	Sibling		

**63. General lifestyle: (check all that apply)**

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Described as "average citizen"	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	Alcohol abuser	11 <input type="checkbox"/>	Bondage
2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Described as a "party animal"	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Drug user/abuser	12 <input type="checkbox"/>	Promiscuous
3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Engages in criminal activity	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	Drug dealer	13 <input type="checkbox"/>	Prostitute
4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Reclusive	9 <input type="checkbox"/>	Homosexual	14 <input type="checkbox"/>	Gang Member
5 <input type="checkbox"/>	Transient	10 <input type="checkbox"/>	Bisexual	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	Other

66. Is or was the victim a member of a gang?  Yes (If **YES**, check the appropriate box and describe)  No

Gang Name	Subset	Gang Name	Subset
<input type="checkbox"/> Asian		<input type="checkbox"/> Samoan/Filipino	
<input type="checkbox"/> BGD		<input type="checkbox"/> White Supremacist	
<input type="checkbox"/> Bikers		<input type="checkbox"/> Terrorist	
<input type="checkbox"/> Blood		<input type="checkbox"/> Miscellaneous	
<input type="checkbox"/> Crip		<input type="checkbox"/> 88 Other	
<input type="checkbox"/> Hispanic			

### III. UNIDENTIFIED DEAD VICTIM OR MISSING PERSON

67. N.C.I.C. number if victim is a missing person or an unidentified dead body:

68. Did the victim have any scars or birthmarks?  Yes  No

69. Did the victim have any tattoos?  Yes  No

71. **Location** **Description**

<input type="checkbox"/> Scar	<input type="checkbox"/> B-mark	<input type="checkbox"/> Tattoo		
<input type="checkbox"/> Scar	<input type="checkbox"/> B-mark	<input type="checkbox"/> Tattoo		
<input type="checkbox"/> Scar	<input type="checkbox"/> B-mark	<input type="checkbox"/> Tattoo		

72. Abnormalities of the teeth: (check all that apply) (if victim is IDENTIFIED, go to #78)

- None                       Crooked                       Some or all missing                       88 Other  
 Braces                       Decayed                       Stained  
 Broken or chipped                       Noticeable gaps                       Partial plates and/or bridges

73. Wears glasses: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Regular glasses      3  Rimless      5  Metal frames      88  Other  
 2  Sunglasses      4  Plastic frames      6  Contacts

### **VICTIM CLOTHING**

If this is an UNIDENTIFIED DEAD or a MISSING PERSON CASE where foul play is suspected, list victim's clothing, clothing color, and description. If the clothing item is multi-colored, list each of the predominate colors.  
**(use all that apply)**

- 1) Whites      3) Greens      5) Purples/Violets      7) Browns/Tans  
 2) Yellows      4) Blues      6) Reds/Oranges      8) Grays/Blacks

74. Clothing item:      75. Color:      Characteristics (rips, brand, logos, etc.):

### **VICTIM MEDICAL IDENTIFICATION**

If the victim is a MISSING PERSON and foul play is suspected, please attempt to obtain the following medical information.

76. Doctor or medical facility that has the victim's medical records:

Dr.'s Name:      Medical Facility:  
 Street:      City:      County:      State      Zip:

77. Dentist or dental facility that has the victim's dental records/x-rays:

Dr.'s Name:      Dental Facility:  
 Street:      City:      County:      State:      Zip:



104. Death/major assault site to body recovery site

105. Was the body recovery site in or about the victim's residence? 1  Yes 2  No

106. If applicable, the victim's work place was: (**check all that apply**)

- 1  Last known location of the victim prior to assault/murder      3  Murder or major assault site  
 2  Initial contact site between the offender and victim  
 recovery site      4  Victim found or body

#### V. CONDITION OF VICTIM WHEN FOUND

##### **BODY DISPOSITION**

107. How did the offender dispose of the body?

- 1  Openly displayed or placed to ensure discovery      3  Unconcerned as to whether or not  
 the body      was discovered  
 2  Concealed, hidden, or placed in order to prevent discovery

108. Did the offender intentionally place the body in an unusual position? (e.g., staged or posed)

- 1  Yes 2  No

##### **OFFENDER'S WRITING OR CARVING ON THE BODY**

109. Was there writing or carving on the body?

- 1  Yes 2  No

110. What instrument was used to write or carve on the body?

- 1  Knife or sharp instruments      2  Blood      3  Lipstick      4  Writing instrument (pen, etc.)

5  Fingernail polish      88  Other

111. Is there reason to believe the offender moved the body from the assault/death site to the body recovery site?

1  Yes      2  No

112. The body was discovered: **(check all that apply)**

1  In a building      6  Bagged      10  In a container (box, dumpster, trunk, etc.)  
 2  In vehicle      7  Hanging      11  Concealed/Covered completely  
 3  Buried completely      8  In water completely      12  Concealed/Covered partially  
 4  Buried partially      9  In water partially      13  Not concealed/In plain view  
 5  Dumped in wooded area      88  Other

113. Condition of body when found: **(check all that apply)**

1  Fresh      3  Decomposing      5  Mummified      7  Parts scattered, skeletal  
 2  Burned      4  Parts scattered, not skeletal      6  Skeletal remains

114. If the body was weighted, then thrown or placed in water, how was it weighted? **(check all that apply)**

1  N/A      2  Rocks      3  Chain      4  Metal      5  Cement      88  Other

---

**RESTRAINTS USED ON VICTIM**

115. Is there evidence that the victim was bound?      1  Yes      2  No      **(if NO, go to #120)**

117. What was used to bind the victim? **(check all that apply)**



1 <input type="checkbox"/> Nylons, Pantyhose	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Underclothing	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Coat hanger	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Cord	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Leather
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Socks	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Other clothing	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Tape	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Chain	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Handcuffs
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Scarf	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Rope	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Electrical cord	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Belt	19 <input type="checkbox"/> Plastic ties/Flexcuffs
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Nightgown/N epligee	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Wire	12 <input type="checkbox"/> String/Twine	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Shoelaces	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other

118. Parts of the victim that were bound: **(check all that apply)**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> None	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Legs	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Hands & ankles bound together
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Hands (in front)	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Feet/Ankles	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Arms bound to torso
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Hands (in rear)	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Neck	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other

119. The restraining device(s) was: **(check all that apply)**

1  Brought to the scene by the offender    2  Found at the scene by the offender    3  Unknown

120. Was the body tied to an object or other victim?

1  Yes 2  No

121. Was there evidence of an object or a gag having been placed in or over the victim's mouth?

1  Yes 2  No

122. Was a blindfold placed on or over the victim's eyes?

1  Yes 2  No

123. In your opinion was the victim's face covered or turned away in a manner that would indicate that the offender was uncomfortable with the victim's eyes staring at him/her?

1  Yes 2  No

**CLOTHING AND PROPERTY OF VICTIM**

124. Clothing on victim when found:

1  Dressed (appropriately dressed for the occasion, time/location) 2  Partially undressed 3   
Nude

125. Is there evidence the victim was re-dressed by the offender?

1  Yes, same clothing 2  Yes, different clothing 3  No

126. Is there evidence to suggest that some or all of the victim's clothing had been ripped or torn by the offender?

1  Yes (which items) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

127. Is there evidence to suggest that the offender had cut some or all of the victim's clothing from the body?

1  Yes (which items) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

128. Victim's clothing (not on the body) found at the body recovery site:

1  None 2  Piled neatly 3  Scattered 4  Dumped 5  Hidden

129. Were items of the victim's clothing missing from the body recovery site?

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

130. Did the offender take small personal items from the victim? (This question focuses on *trophies* and/or *souvenirs* and may or may not be valuable--e.g., bra, panties, photos, driver's license, real or costume jewelry, etc.)

1  Yes  No

**ELEMENTS OF TORTURE OR UNUSUAL ASSAULT**

132. Is there evidence to suggest that the offender disfigured the body in order to delay identification of the victim? (e.g., burned the body; destroyed/removed hands, feet, head, etc.)

1  Yes 2  No

133. Were body parts removed by offender? 1  Yes 2  No (if NO, go to #136)

134. Dismemberment method:

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Bitten off	3 <input type="checkbox"/> Cut - Unskilled/Rough-cut	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Sawed off
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Cut - Skilled/Surgical	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Hacked/Chopped off	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other

135. Body parts removed: (check all that apply)

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Head	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Eye(s)	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Arm(s)	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Nipple(s)
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Scalp	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Ear(s)	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Leg(s)	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Anus
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Face	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Nose	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Feet	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Genitalia
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Teeth	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Hand(s)	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Toe(s)	19 <input type="checkbox"/> Internal organs
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Nails	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Finger(s)	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Breast(s)	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other

136. Unusual or additional assault upon victim: (check all that apply)

1 <input type="checkbox"/> None	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Body or parts of body skinned
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Mutilated/Disfigured	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender explored, probed, mutilated cavities/wounds of the victim
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim whipped	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Evidence of cannibalism/vampirism
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Burning of victim	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Drugged/Sedated
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim run over by vehicle	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Body parts removed	

**SEXUAL ASSAULT**

137. Is there evidence of sexual assault to victim or any of the victim's organs or body cavities?

1  Yes      2  No      3  Unable to determine

138. Evidence suggests sexual assault was:

1  Antemortem      2  Postmortem      3  Both      4  Unable to determine

139. Was there evidence of other ejaculation?

1  No      2  On the body of the victim \_\_\_\_\_      3  Elsewhere at the scene

140. Type of sexual assault, or attempt: **(check all that apply)**

1  Offender performed oral sex on victim      3  Vaginal      88  Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 2  Victim performed oral sex on offender      4  Anal

141. Was semen found in body cavity(s) of the victim? **(check all that apply)**

1  No    2  In vagina    3  In anus    4  In mouth    88  Other \_\_\_\_ 142. Foreign objects inserted into openings of the victim's body and **present when the victim was discovered.**

**OBJECT**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Bathroom implements	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Food item - Real/Plastic	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Pipe/Metal object
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Bottle	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Gun	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Stick/Piece of wood
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Curling iron	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Hammer/Bat/Broom handle, etc.	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown hard object
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Dildo/Vibrator	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Kitchen implements	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Wire/Hanger/TV antenna
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Dirt/Rocks	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Knife	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Feces/Dirt/Rocks, etc.	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanics tools	
7 <input type="checkbox"/> Flashlight	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Pencil/Pen/Marker, etc.	

**BODY OPENING**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Anus	3 <input type="checkbox"/> Eye	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Nose	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Vagina
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Ear	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Mouth	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Penis	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Hole cut in victim's body

143. Sexual insertion of foreign objects into openings of the victim's body, **removed before victim was discovered.**

**OBJECT**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Bathroom implements	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Food item - Real/Plastic	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Pipe/Metal object
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Bottle	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Gun	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Stick/Piece of wood
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Curling iron	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Hammer/Bat/Broom handle, etc.	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown hard object
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Dildo/Vibrator	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Kitchen implements	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Wire/Hanger/TV antenna
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Dirt/Rocks	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Knife	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Feces/Dirt/Rocks, etc.	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanics tools	
7 <input type="checkbox"/> Flashlight	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Pencil/Pen/Marker, etc.	

**BODY OPENING**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Anus	3 <input type="checkbox"/> Eye	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Nose	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Vagina
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Ear	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Mouth	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Penis	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Hole cut in victim's body

**BITE MARKS ON VICTIM**

144. Did the offender bite the victim?      1  Yes 2  No

145. Location of bite marks: **(check all that apply)**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Face	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Abdomen	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Buttocks	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Arms/Hands	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Neck	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Chest	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Groin	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Legs/Feet	
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Breasts	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Back	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Genitalia	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Thighs	

**CAUSE OF DEATH**

146. What was the Medical Examiner's or Coroner's officially listed cause of death?

\_\_\_\_\_ and/or \_\_\_\_\_

**TRAUMA**

147. Extent of blunt force injury:

- 1  None
- 2  Minimal (minor bruising only; e.g., caused by offender's slapping to control the victim)
- 3  Moderate (injury insufficient to cause death by itself)
- 4  Severe (injury sufficient to cause death, whether the actual cause of death or not)
- 5  Extreme (injury beyond that necessary to cause death, overkill)

148. Estimated number of stab wounds: \_\_\_\_\_

149. Estimated number of cutting wounds: \_\_\_\_\_

150. Estimated number of blunt force wounds: \_\_\_\_\_

151. Estimated number of gunshot wounds: \_\_\_\_\_

Please complete 152 & 153 for *all* wounds inflicted. If a firearm was used, please complete questions 154 & 155 to provide information about the range and caliber. If more than one firearm was used, fill in the information for each firearm.

RANGE = 1) **Distant** or with no stippling/tattooing present      3) **Close** or with powder residue/tattooing present

2) **Intermediate** or with stippling/tattooing present      4) **Contact**

152. Location of Wounds:    153. Number of wounds:      154. Range      155. Caliber/gauge

### WEAPONS

159. The weapon was:

1  Recovered at the scene      2  Recovered elsewhere \_\_\_\_\_      3  Not recovered

160. Type of weapon(s) used by the offender in this assault: (check all that apply)

1  None      4  Bludgeon or club      7  Unable to determine  
 2  Firearm      5  Ligature      8  Other weapon  
 3  Stabbing or cutting weapon      6  Hands or feet

161. Weapon(s) used: (check all that apply)

#### STABBING OR CUTTING WEAPON

#### FIREARM

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Pocket knife	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Screwdriver	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Shotgun	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Military type - AK-47, AR-16, etc
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Hunting knife	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Razor blade	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Rifle	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Other firearm
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Folding knife	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Other cutting	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-auto pistol	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown firearm
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Kitchen knife	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown cutting	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Revolver	
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Ice pick		14 <input type="checkbox"/> Handgun – Unknown if auto or revolver	

**BLUDGEONING WEAPON****LIGATURE**

18 <input type="checkbox"/> Hammer	23 <input type="checkbox"/> Rock	27 <input type="checkbox"/> Rope/Cord	33 <input type="checkbox"/> Scarf
19 <input type="checkbox"/> Tire iron	24 <input type="checkbox"/> Bottle	28 <input type="checkbox"/> Belt	34 <input type="checkbox"/> Wire
20 <input type="checkbox"/> Club	25 <input type="checkbox"/> Other bludgeon	29 <input type="checkbox"/> Necktie	35 <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone cord
21 <input type="checkbox"/> Stick	26 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown bludgeon	30 <input type="checkbox"/> Sock(s)	36 <input type="checkbox"/> Shoestrings
22 <input type="checkbox"/> Ball bat		31 <input type="checkbox"/> Nylons	37 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ligature
		32 <input type="checkbox"/> Pantyhose	38 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown ligature

162. Assault weapons(s) used by the offender: **(check all that apply)**

1  Found at the scene by the offender

2  Brought to scene by offender

**VI. OFFENDER INFORMATION**

For the purposes of the H.I.T.S. analysis report, “offender” is defined as and includes arrestee(s), perpetrator(s), suspect(s), or any person the investigator has reasonable cause to believe is responsible for the commission of this crime.

163. This is offender \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ offender(s) in this incident.

(number) (total)

**OFFENDER STATUS**

164. The offender is:

1  Unknown - Not seen

2  Unknown - Seen



3  Identified (named) - Not arrested or charged in this case

4  Was arrested and/or charged as a suspect in this case

5  Deceased

**OFFENDER IDENTIFICATION, (if NOT SEEN, go to #223)**

168. L.Name: 169. F.Name: 170. M.Name:

171. AKAs:

172. POB State: 173. DOB: 174. Age: 175. Race: 176. Sex:

177. Hgt: 178. Wgt: 179. Build: 180. Hair shade: 181. Hair color: 182. Length: 183. Eyes:

184. Street: 185. City: 186. County: 187. State: 188. Zip:

Prior address:

189. Street: 190. City: 191. County: 192. State: Zip:

**OFFENDER OUTSTANDING PHYSICAL FEATURES**

193. Did the offender have outstanding physical features or was there something about the offender that would attract attention?

1  Yes  No



**OFFENDER BACKGROUND** (if offender was **SEEN BUT IS UNKNOWN**, go to #221)

202. SS#

203. SID#:

204. FBI#

205. Was the offender employed at the time of incident? 1  Yes 2  No

206. Occupation (legitimate or non-legitimate):

207. Employer &amp; City:

208. Marital status: 1  Single 2  Married 3  Divorced 4  Widowed 5  Separated209. General lifestyle: (**check all that apply**)

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Described as "average citizen"	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	Alcohol abuser	11 <input type="checkbox"/>	Bondage
2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Described as a "party animal"	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Drug user/abuser	12 <input type="checkbox"/>	Promiscuous
3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Engages in criminal activity	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	Drug dealer	13 <input type="checkbox"/>	Prostitute
4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Reclusive	9 <input type="checkbox"/>	Homosexual	14 <input type="checkbox"/>	Gang Member
5 <input type="checkbox"/>	Transient	10 <input type="checkbox"/>	Bisexual	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	Other

**OFFENDER CRIMINAL HISTORY**

211. At the time of this incident, the offender was:

- 1  On parole or probation      5  An escapee      9  In prison or jail
- 2  On furlough      6  Out on bail, appeal, or PR bond      10  On release from a mental hospital
- 3  On work release      7  In a halfway house      11  Prior Conviction



**OFFENDER COMMUNICATIONS**

Did the offender initiate any communication with respect to this case? EXAMPLES: Offender sends a letter, tape recording, or ransom note to the police or media claiming responsibility for the crime; or a suspicious communication received by the victim prior to the crime. (This is not referring to conversations between the offender and victim *during the commission of the crime.*)

223. Was there any communication from the offender before or after the crime? 1  Yes (include synopsis in summary) 2  No

**VII. VEHICLE INFORMATION**

Complete vehicle information if: 1) a vehicle was used by the offender in this case; 2) if this is a missing person case and the vehicle is still missing; 3) if this is an unidentified dead case and the vehicle has been connected with the victim; or 4) if the vehicle is in any way significantly involved in this incident.

224. Was a vehicle used in or as a significant part of this incident? 1  Yes 2  No

225. The vehicle was under the control or owned by:

1  Offender                      2  Victim

226. Vehicle Body Style:    1  Passenger Car                      4  Jeep type / SUV                      7  Bus  
    2  Van    5  Tractor/Trailer                      8  Bicycle  
    3  Pick-up truck                      6  Motorcycle                      88  Other

227. Lic #:            228. State:            229. Year:                      230. Make:                      231. Model:

232. Color: (top) (bottom)                      233. Unusual characteristics:

234. If this case is unsolved, list those persons, if any, that are believed to be good suspects. (Please copy this page if additional suspect space is needed.)

L.Name: F.Name: M.Name:

AKAs:

POB State: DOB: Age: Race:  
Sex:

Hgt: Wgt: Build: Hair shade: Hair color: Length Eyes:

SS#: SID#: FBI#:

Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:

Street City County State: Zip:

Prior address:

Street: City: County: State: Zip:

Additional Info:

Gang Member:  Possible gang member  Name of gang: \_\_\_\_\_ Sub-set: \_\_\_\_\_

L.Name: F.Name: M.Name:

AKAs:

POB State: DOB: Age: Race:  
Sex:

Hgt: Wgt: Build: Hair shade: Hair color: Length Eyes:

SS#: SID#: FBI#:

Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:

Street City County State: Zip:

Prior address:

Street: City: County: State: Zip:

Additional Info:

Gang Member:  Possible gang member  Name of gang: \_\_\_\_\_ Sub-set: \_\_\_\_\_

### VIII. SUMMARY

235. The space below is provided for a narrative summary of this incident. Please give a general overview, details, unusual characteristics, and the sequence of events. Also include any other pertinent information re: victim(s), suspect(s), evidence, etc. that was not captured elsewhere in this form.

### Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.X. OTHER ASSOCIATED NAMES LIST

236. The following spaces are for the names of persons that you feel are important to or are associated with the suspect(s) or victim(s) in this or other related cases. If more space is needed, copy this page as many times as necessary.

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX
HGT	WGT	BUILD	HAIR SHADE
			HAIR COLOR
			LENGTH
			EYES
SS#:	SID#:		FBI#:

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX
HGT	WGT	BUILD	HAIR SHADE
			HAIR COLOR
			LENGTH
			EYES
SS#:	SID#:		FBI#:

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX
HGT	WGT	BUILD	HAIR SHADE
			HAIR COLOR
			LENGTH
			EYES
SS#:	SID#:		FBI#:

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA			
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX			
HGT	WGT	BUILD	HAIR SHADE	HAIR COLOR	LENGTH	EYES
SS#:		SID#:		FBI#:		



*Appendix 9 - H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)*

# Homicide Investigation Tracking System®

## Sexual Assault Form

(Revised August 4, 2006)

Information on your rape case is as important to us in the H.I.T.S. Unit as it is to you. When you have a rape within your jurisdiction, you need to submit a H.I.T.S. form as soon as possible so we can help you with your investigation, especially when the offender is not known.

Please complete the questions on the Rape form to the best of your knowledge.

The **HIGHLIGHTED** questions must be completed on all cases (date rape, statutory rape, non-stranger, etc). Stranger rape cases should have most of the questions completed to assist in determining MO and signature of the offender and in linking cases. (Note: Gaps exist in the numbering system to coincide with the fields inside the H.I.T.S. database).

After completing the forms, **save it to a file with a name that is recognizable to you**, and e-mail it as an **attachment** to your H.I.T.S. Investigator.

- **We can and will search for other cases that could match your case.**
- **We will look for similar cases where a suspect was convicted and perhaps has completed his prison time and been released.**
- **We can assist with other suspect information.**
- **We can provide you with a list of persons with a criminal history living within an area or near a certain address.**
- **We can search for vehicles by partial license number or by make, model and color of a suspect vehicle.**

- **If you have a suspect at large or one that has not been identified, we can assist by sending out a statewide bulletin, including Oregon, to all law enforcement agencies.**

If you have any questions you should call your H.I.T.S. investigator, the general phone number, 206-464-6209 or 800-345-2793.

**To get started just hit the tab button or use your mouse and click on question # 1 answer box.**

## SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT

### ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Date received or completed: \_\_\_\_\_ 2. H.I.T.S. report ID#: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Reporting agency ORI#: \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Reporting agency: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Reporting agency's case/incident #: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Officer/Det. Last name: \_\_\_\_\_ 8. First name: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Date of crime: \_\_\_\_\_ 11. Time of crime: \_\_\_\_\_
12. Case status: 1  Solved      2  Unsolved
13. Offender was known by or an acquaintance of the victim: 1  Yes      2  No
14. Evidence suggests this incident:
- 1  Is NOT a series
- 2  Is one of a possible series
- 3  Is one of a series; Series name: \_\_\_\_\_
15. Prior to, or at the time of the initial contact between the offender and victim, was there an event or activity in the area that may have contributed to the opportunity for the crime (carnival, street dance, street fair, convention, etc.)?
- 1  Yes (explain) \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

**16. Crime classification: (check all that apply)**1  Rape  
murder4  Gang rape7  Incest10  Attempted2  Attempted rape  
offense5  Robbery/Rape8  Indecent libs.11  Other sex3  Child rape  
rape6  Burglary/Rape9  Kidnapping12  Drug induced**RELATED CASES**

List other sex related cases possibly committed by this offender:

17. Victim:

18. Date:

19. Crime:

20. Case number:

21. Agency:

**EVIDENCE**

23. Were comparable latent fingerprints obtained in this case? 1  Yes 2  No

24. Were blood, other fluid, body specimens, or other items preserved for or DNA tested? 1  Yes 2  No

Fluids/Specimens/Items: \_\_\_\_\_ DNA label: \_\_\_\_\_

25. Physical evidence possibly related to the offender that is suitable for comparison: **(check all that apply)**

- |   |  |   |  |
|---|--|---|--|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> None           | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Fibers        | 11 <input type="checkbox"/> Shell casings         | 16 <input type="checkbox"/> Voice recordings |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Hair available | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Clothing      | 12 <input type="checkbox"/> Tire castings         | 17 <input type="checkbox"/> Composite        |
| 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Blood          | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Bullets       | 13 <input type="checkbox"/> Trace evidence        | 18 <input type="checkbox"/> Rape kit         |
| 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Semen          | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Latent prints | 14 <input type="checkbox"/> Handwriting           | 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ___        |
| 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Saliva         | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> Shoe prints  | 15 <input type="checkbox"/> Bite mark impressions |  |

**VICTIM INFORMATION**

26. This is victim \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ victim(s) in this case.

27. L.Name:

28. F.Name:

29. M.Name:

30. AKAs:

31. DOB:

32. Age:

33. Race:

34. Sex:

35. Hgt

36. Wgt:

38. Hair color:

39. Hair length:

Eye color:

40. Street:

41. City:

42. County:

43. State:

44. Zip:

45. Prev city:

46. State:

47. Distinguishing physical features:

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_2  No

48. General lifestyle: (check all that apply)

1  Described as "average citizen"6  Alcohol abuser11  Bisexual2  Described as a "party animal"7  Drug user/abuser12  Bondage3  Engages in criminal activity8  Drug dealer13  Promiscuous4  Reclusive9  Gang member14  Prostitute5  Transient10  Homosexual88  Other \_\_\_\_

50. Normal mode of transportation: (check all that apply)

1  Walks3  Hitchhikes5  Public transportation88  Other \_2  Drives4  Bicycle6  Relies on others

51. SS#: \_\_\_\_\_

52. Marital status:

1  Single2  Married3  Divorced4  Widowed5  Separated

53. Occupation: \_\_\_\_

54. Employer &amp; City / State: \_\_\_\_

55. Has the victim been previously sexually assaulted?

1  Yes (specify) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
 No

56. Has the victim been the victim of any other crime within the past six (6) months?

1  Yes (specify) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
 No

**INITIAL CONTACT SITE**

57. Was the initial contact site: 1  Indoors 2  Outdoors

58. Describe the initial contact neighborhood: 1  Commercial/Industrial 4   
 Farm/Agricultural

2  Residential 5

Uninhabited/Wilderness

3  Mixed commercial-residential

59. Describe the initial contact community: 1  Rural 2  Urban 3  Suburban 4   
 Unknown

60. If the initial contact or assault on the victim was in a building, how did the offender gain entry?

1  Building open to public 3  Let in by victim 5  Let in by 3<sup>rd</sup> person 7   
 Unknown

2  Non-forced 4  Forced entry 6  Offender lived/had right to be there 8   
 Other \_\_\_\_

62. Was the initial contact site the victim's residence? 1  Yes 2  No



63. Was the initial contact site the victim's workplace? 1  Yes 2  No

64. Were there multiple sexual assault sites? 1  Yes 2  No

65. Are there indications the offender was familiar with the initial contact site? 1  Yes 2  No

66. Activity at the time of initial contact with offender(s): \_\_\_\_

67. Victim's incapacitation at time of initial contact with offender(s):

- |  |  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> None                | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol     | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-adolescent | 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ____ |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Disabled physically | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs       | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Old age        |  |
| 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Disabled mentally   | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Poor health | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Sleeping       |  |



3  Mixed commercial-residential

80. Describe the first sexual assault site community: 1  Rural 2  Urban 3  Suburban 4  Unknown

81. Describe the type of location of FIRST SEXUAL ASSAULT. (E.g.: bar, apartment, bus stop, parking lot)

Location type: \_\_\_\_\_

What was the address of the first sexual assault site?

82. Street: 83. City: 84. County: 85. State: 86. Zip:

**VICTIM RELEASE / ESCAPE INFORMATION**

87. How did the victim/offender contact end?

1  Released 2  Escaped 3  Other \_\_\_\_\_

88. Was victim release/escape site and first sexual assault site the same? 1  Yes 2  No

89. Was victim release/escape site and initial contact site the same? 1  Yes 2  No

90. Describe the release/escape site neighborhood: 1  Commercial/Industrial 4  Farm/Agricultural  
2  Residential 5  Uninhabited/Wilderness  
3  Mixed commercial-residential

91. Describe the release/escape site community: 1  Rural 2  Urban 3  Suburban

4  Unknown92. Describe the **type** of location where VICTIM WAS RELEASED. (e.g.: bar, apartment, bus stop, parking lot)

Location type: \_\_\_\_\_

What was the address of the release site?

93. Street:

94. City:

95. County:

96. State:

97. Zip:

**APPROACH**

98. How far did the offender transport the victim?

1  No transportation    2  Less than one mile    3  One mile    4  One to ten miles    5   
More than ten miles99. Prior to the sexual assault, were the victim and offender together mutually?    1  Yes    2  No

101. What were the circumstances?

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Date rape	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Babysitting	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim hitchhiking	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Committed during burglary	
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender hitchhiking	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Committed during robbery	
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim jogging/cycling	9 <input type="checkbox"/> During another crime	
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender happened upon victim	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Party	

102. Describe the offender's initial approach to the victim: **(check all that apply)**

**DECEPTIVE APPROACH**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Posed as an authority figure	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Asked for or offered assistance
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Posed as a business person	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Caused/staged traffic accident
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Asked victim to pose/model for photos	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Phony police traffic stop
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Offered job, money, treats, toys	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Solicitation for sex
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Implied family illness or emergency	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Offered ride or transportation
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Wanted to show something to victim	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Other deception

**SURPRISE APPROACH**

13 <input type="checkbox"/> Lay in wait - Out of doors	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Lay in wait - In a vehicle	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Other surprise
14 <input type="checkbox"/> Lay in wait - In a building	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim sleeping	

**DIRECT OR IMMEDIATE ASSAULT TYPE OF APPROACH**

18 <input type="checkbox"/> Immediately and physically overpowered victim (picks up, carries away, etc.)	21 <input type="checkbox"/> Immediately stabbed victim
19 <input type="checkbox"/> Immediately hit victim with hand, fist, or clubbing weapon	22 <input type="checkbox"/> Other direct assault
20 <input type="checkbox"/> Grabbed and immediately choked victim	23 <input type="checkbox"/> Threatened with weapon

**WEAPONS**

103. Was a weapon or threats of a weapon used? 1  Yes 2  No (if NO, go to #109)

104. Rate the use of a weapon by the offender.

1  None 2  Implied 3  Displayed 4  Threatened with 5  Used

105. Weapon recovered: 1  Recovered at the scene 2  Recovered elsewhere \_\_\_ 3  Not recovered

106. Type of weapon used by offender in this assault: **(check all that apply)**

1  None      3  Stabbing or cutting      5  Ligature      88  Other weapon \_\_\_  
 2  Firearm      4  Bludgeon or club      6  Hands or feet

107. Weapon(s) used: **(check all that apply)**

**STABBING OR CUTTING WEAPON**

**FIREARM**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Pocket knife	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Screwdriver	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Shotgun	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Military type - AK-47, AR-16, etc
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Hunting knife	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Razor blade	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Rifle	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Other firearm
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Folding knife	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Other cutting	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-auto pistol	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown firearm
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Kitchen knife	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown cutting	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Revolver	
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Ice pick		14 <input type="checkbox"/> Handgun - Unk if semi-auto or revolver	

**BLUDGEONING WEAPON**

**LIGATURE**

18 <input type="checkbox"/> Hammer	23 <input type="checkbox"/> Rock	27 <input type="checkbox"/> Rope/Cord	33 <input type="checkbox"/> Scarf
19 <input type="checkbox"/> Tire iron	24 <input type="checkbox"/> Bottle	28 <input type="checkbox"/> Belt	34 <input type="checkbox"/> Wire
20 <input type="checkbox"/> Club	25 <input type="checkbox"/> Other bludgeon	29 <input type="checkbox"/> Necktie	35 <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone cord
21 <input type="checkbox"/> Stick	26 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown bludgeon	30 <input type="checkbox"/> Sock(s)	36 <input type="checkbox"/> Shoestrings
22 <input type="checkbox"/> Ball bat		31 <input type="checkbox"/> Nylons	37 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ligature
		32 <input type="checkbox"/> Pantyhose	38 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown ligature

108. Assault weapons(s) used or displayed by the offender: **(check all that apply)**

1  Found at the scene by the offender

2  Brought to scene by offender

### STATEMENTS

109. Did the offender make any specific statements about himself?

1  None      2  Very little      3  Moderately      4  Quite a bit      5   
Excessively

110. Did the offender ask specific questions about the victim or her/his personal life?

1  None      2  Very little      3  Moderately      4  Quite a bit      5   
Excessively

111. Rate the image the offender projected.

1  Very sensitive      2  Sensitive      3  Neutral      4  Macho      5   
Very Macho

112. Rate the demeanor of the offender.

1  Complimentary      2  Neutral      3  Demeaning

113. Rate the effort made by the offender to reassure the victim.

1  Repeated attempts      2  Attempts      3  No attempts

114. Rate the extent of negotiation between offender and victim.

1  Extensive      2  Some      3  None

**BINDINGS**

115. Is there evidence that the victim was bound? 1  Yes 2  No **(if NO, go to #120)**

116. Did the offender take the bindings from the scene? 1  Yes 2  No

117. What was used to bind the body? **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Nylons/pantyhose 5  Underclothing 9  Coat hanger 13  Cord 17  Leather  
 2  Socks 6  Other clothing 10  Tape 14  Chain 18  Handcuffs  
 3  Scarf 7  Rope 11  Electrical cord 15  Belt 19  Plastic ties/Flexcuffs  
 4  Nightgown/Negligee 8  Wire 12  String/Twine 16  Shoelaces 88  Other \_\_\_\_\_

118. Parts of the victim that were bound: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  None 4  Legs 8  Hands & ankles bound together  
 2  Hands (in front) 5  Feet/Ankles 9  Arms bound to torso  
 3  Hands (in rear) 6  Neck 10  Hands & feet bound to object  
 4  Hands (unk. front/back) 7  Gagged 88  Other \_\_\_\_\_

119. The restraining device(s) was: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Brought to the scene by the offender 2  Found at the scene by the offender 3  Unknown



### ASSAULT

120. Sexual acts **(check all that apply)**

- |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Kissing _____               | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender masturbated                        | 11 <input type="checkbox"/> Attempt only |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Vaginal rape                | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim performed oral sex                   | 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ____   |
| 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Anal rape                   | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim forced to masturbate                 |  |
| 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender performed oral sex | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim forced to fondle/masturbate offender |  |
| 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Offender fondled victim     | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> Insertion of foreign object(s)             |  |

121. Additional unusual assault on victim: **(check all that apply)**

- |  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim whipped  | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Disfigured         | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Drugged/Sedated |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Burns on victim | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Body parts removed | 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ____     |

122. Did the offender exhibit any sexual dysfunction during the sexual assault?

- |  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No <b>(if NO, go to #124)</b> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Unable to ejaculate            | 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ____ |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Premature ejaculation         | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Unable to maintain an erection |  |
| 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Retarded ejaculation          | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Unable to penetrate            |  |

123. What did the offender do to overcome the dysfunction? **(check all that apply)**

- |   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing          | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim forced to oral copulation            | 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other ____ |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Masturbated self | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Victim forced to fondle/masturbate offender |  |

124. Did the offender bite the victim?      1  Yes      2  No

125. Location of bite marks: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Face      4  Abdomen      7  Buttocks      10  Arms/Hands      88  Other \_\_\_
- 2  Neck      5  Chest      8  Groin      11  Legs/Feet
- 3  Breasts      6  Back      9  Genitalia      12  Thighs

126. Clothing removed: (**check all that apply**)

- 1  N/A      4  Victim disrobed offender
- 2  Offender disrobed victim      5  Victim disrobed self
- 3  Offender disrobed self      88  Other \_\_\_

127. How was the victim's clothing removed?

- 1  N/A      3  Cut/Slashed      88  Other \_\_\_
- 2  Ripped/Torn      4  Without damage

### FETISH

128. Did the offender display any obvious special sexual interest (**fetish**) in some part of the victim's body or in a non-sexual or artificial object?

- 1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_
- 2  No

**NOTE:** Some sex offenders live out their sexual fantasies by requiring the victim to say specific words (e.g., "Say, 'I love you,'" or "Say, 'I want you.'") or require the victim to perform specific acts (e.g., putting on a negligee). This is generally referred to as "scripting" and is often difficult to distinguish from commands given simply to complete the crime.

129. Did the offender require the victim to **say specific words**, as if he used a “script”?

1  Yes (specific language used) \_\_\_\_\_ 2

No

130. Did the offender require the victim to **perform specific act or movements**, as if he used a “script”?

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2

No

131. Did the offender physically torture the victim just to see the victim suffer?

1  Yes (if YES, explain in the summary) 2  No

132. Did the offender mentally abuse the victim just to see the victim suffer?

1  Yes (if YES, explain in the summary) 2  No

133. Were special props used by the offender? (vibrators, dildos, photos, etc.)

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2

No

134 Insertion of a **foreign object** into an opening of the victim’s body:

### OBJECT

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Bathroom implements	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Food item - Real/Plastic	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Pipe/Metal object
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Bottle	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Gun	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Stick/Piece of wood
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Curling iron	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Hammer/Bat/Broom handle, etc.	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown hard object
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Dildo/Vibrator	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Kitchen implements	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Wire/Hanger/TV antenna
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Dirt/Rocks	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Knife	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Feces/Dirt/Rocks, etc.	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanics tools	
7 <input type="checkbox"/> Flashlight	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Pencil/Pen/Marker, etc.	

**BODY OPENING**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Anus	3 <input type="checkbox"/> Eye	5 <input type="checkbox"/> Nose	7 <input type="checkbox"/> Vagina
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Ear	4 <input type="checkbox"/> Mouth	6 <input type="checkbox"/> Penis	8 <input type="checkbox"/> Hole cut in victim's body

**FORCE USED**

135. Describe the physical force used by the offender.

- 1  None
- 2  Minimal (for the purpose of intimidation rather than punishment)
- 3  Moderate (repeated slapping or hitting, even in absence of resistance)
- 4  Excessive (victim beaten to point of possibly needing hospitalization)
- 5  Extreme (torture, severe pain/injury inflicted, probable hospitalization needed)

136. Victim's resistance:

- 1  No resistance
- 2  Passive resistance (did not comply, but did not physically resist)
- 3  Verbal resistance (verbally refusing, screaming, pleading, negotiating)
- 4  Physical resistance (attempts to prevent attack, bites, kicks, runs, etc.)

137. Physical injuries inflicted by the offender:

- 1  None
- 2  Minor (required no medical treatment)
- 3  Moderate (required outpatient treatment)
- 4  Excessive (required hospitalization; was not life threatening)
- 5  Extreme (life threatening, whether fatal or not)

138. The physical injuries inflicted by the offender appeared to be: 1  Accidental/Inadvertent 2  Intentional/Deliberate

139. Rate the extent of the offender's anger.

1  None      2  Minor      3  Moderate      4  Excessive      5  Extreme

140. When was force used during the assault? (**check all that apply**)

1  Immediately upon victim contact  
offender was leaving      3  During actual sexual assault      5  As  
2  After victim contact, but prior to assault      4  After sexual assault

**AFTER RELEASE**

141. Time lapse between offender's **initial contact** with and **release** of victim:

Hours	Minutes
-------	---------

142. Time lapse between **last sexual assault** and victim's **release**:

Hours	Minutes
-------	---------

143. After leaving the scene, did the offender attempt to re-contact the victim? (**check all that apply**)

1  No      3  By letter/note      5  Through third party  
2  By phone      4  In person      88  Other \_\_\_

**CRIME SCENE**

144. Did the offender record the crime in any way? (**check all that apply**)

1  No      3  Audio recordings      5  Video recordings  
2  Photographs      4  Made notes      88  Other \_\_\_

145. Precautions used by the offender to avoid apprehension: (**check all that apply**)

1 <input type="checkbox"/> None	9 <input type="checkbox"/> Used police scanner
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Wore a mask	10 <input type="checkbox"/> Used lookout
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Wore a disguise	11 <input type="checkbox"/> Used a warning system to warn of intrusion
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Wore gloves	12 <input type="checkbox"/> Removed or destroyed forensic evidence
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Covered victim's eyes/face	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Removed or destroyed bedding
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Gagged victim	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Made victim douche or bathe
7 <input type="checkbox"/> Disabled utilities	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Used condom
8 <input type="checkbox"/> Disabled victim's vehicle	88 <input type="checkbox"/> Other

146. Were significant item(s) taken from the victim or the crime scene? (TV, stereo, coin collections - items usually taken in burglaries)

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
No

147. Did the offender take small personal items from the victim? (Trophies and/or souvenirs; may not be valuable.)

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
No

### OFFENDER INFORMATION

148. This is offender \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ offenders in this case.

149. L.Name: \_\_\_\_\_ 150. F.Name: \_\_\_\_\_ 151. M.Name: \_\_\_\_\_

152. AKAs

153. POB State \_\_\_\_\_ 154. DOB: \_\_\_\_\_ 155. Age: \_\_\_\_\_ 156. Race: \_\_\_\_\_ 157. Sex: \_\_\_\_\_

158. Hgt: 159. Wgt: 160. Build: 161. Hair color: 162. Eyes:

164. Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:

165. Facial hair: 1  N/A (female, young male) 3  Unshaven (stubble) 5  Goatee 7  Beard  
 2  Clean shaven 4  Mustache 6  Long sideburns

166. Street: 167. City: 168. County: 169. State: 170.  
 Zip:

171. Prev. Street: 172. City: 173. County: 174.  
 State & Zip:

**(if the OFFENDER IS UNKNOWN, go to #203)**

175. SS#:

176. SID#:

177. FBI#:

178. Marital status: 1  Single 2  Married 3  Divorced 4  Widowed 5   
 Separated

179. Occupation:

180. Employer:

181. Did the offender have lists of names, addresses, or photographs that are possibly related to this or other sex crimes?

1  Yes (if YES, please attach a list of names and addresses to this form) 2  No

182. General lifestyle: **(check all that apply)**

1  Described as "average citizen" 6  Alcohol abuser 11  Bisexual  
 2  Described as a "party animal" 7  Drug user/abuser 12  Bondage

- 3  Engages in criminal activity      8  Drug dealer      13  Promiscuous  
 4  Reclusive      9  Gang member      14  Prostitute  
 5  Transient      10  Homosexual      88  Other \_\_\_

183. Living with: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Alone      3  Children      5  Relatives      7  Roommate(s)  
 2  Spouse, Ex-spouse      4  Parent/Guardian      6  Boy/Girlfriend      88  Other \_\_\_

## 184. Normal mode of transportation:

- 1  Walks      3  Hitchhikes      5  Public transportation      88  Other \_\_\_  
 2  Drives      4  Bicycle      6  Relies on others

185. Sex items or collections related to or owned by the offender: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Sexual devices      3  Sex films/videos      5  Child pornography  
 2  Sexual photos      4  Pornography      88  Other \_\_\_

192. Was the offender wearing eye glasses?      1  Yes      2  No193. Type of glasses worn: **(check all that apply)**

- 1  Regular glasses      3  Rimless      5  Metal frames      88  Other \_\_\_  
 2  Sunglasses      4  Plastic frames      6  Contacts

194. General appearance:      1  Very neat      2  Average      3  Unkempt



195. Noticeable odor about the offender's person:

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
No

196. Did the offender appear to have used alcohol/drugs?

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
No

197. Was there a noticeable speech impediment or accent?

1  Yes (describe) \_\_\_\_\_ 2   
No

198. Distinguishing clothing, jewelry, or physical features: \_\_\_\_\_

199. At the time of this incident, the offender was:

- |  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> On parole or probation<br>mental hospital | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> An escapee                            | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> On release from a    |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> On furlough                               | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Out on bail, appeal, or PR bond       | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> Prior conviction    |
| 3 <input type="checkbox"/> On work release<br>offender               | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Wanted on warrant(s) or other charges | 11 <input type="checkbox"/> Registered sex      |
| 4 <input type="checkbox"/> In a halfway house                        | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> In prison or jail                     | 12 <input type="checkbox"/> Non offender status |

Offender **admits** other serious crime(s):

200. Crime:

201. City / State:

202. Date of crime:

**VISUAL ID**

203. Was there an **Identikit** or **Composite Drawing** made of the offender/suspect in this case?

1  Yes - Identikit code: \_\_\_\_\_ 2  No

**VEHICLE**

205. Was a vehicle used in or as a significant part of this incident? 1  Yes 2  No

206. The vehicle was under the control or owned by: 1  Offender 2  Victim

207. Vehicle Body Style: 1  Passenger Car 4  Jeep type / SUV 7  Bus  
 2  Van 5  Tractor/Trailer 8  Bicycle  
 3  Pick-up truck 6  Motorcycle 88  Other

208. Lic #: 209. State: 210. Year: 211. Make: 212. Model:

213. Color: (top) (bottom) 214. Unusual characteristics:

215. If this case is unsolved, list those persons, if any, that are believed to be good suspects. (Copy this page if additional space is needed.)

L.Name: F.Name: M.Name:

AKAs:

POB State: DOB: Age: Race:  
Sex:

Hgt: Wgt: Build: Hair shade: Hair color: Length Eyes:

SS#: SID#: FBI#:

Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:

Street: City: County: State: Zip:

Prior address:

Street: City: County: State: Zip:

Additional Info:

Gang Member:  Possible gang member  Name of gang: \_\_\_\_\_ Sub-set:

L.Name: F.Name: M.Name:

AKAs:

POB State: DOB: Age: Race:  
Sex:

Hgt: Wgt: Build: Hair shade: Hair color: Length Eyes:

SS#: SID#: FBI#:

Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:

Street: City: County: State: Zip:

Prior address:

Street: City: County: State: Zip:

Additional Info:

Gang Member:  Possible gang member  Name of gang: \_\_\_ Sub-set: \_\_\_\_\_

### CASE SUMMARY

216. The space below is provided for a narrative summary of this incident. Please give a general overview, details, unusual characteristics, and the sequence of events. Also include any other pertinent information re: victim(s), suspect(s), evidence, etc. that was not captured elsewhere in this form.

### OTHER ASSOCIATED NAMES LIST

217. The following spaces are for the names of persons that you feel are important to or are associated with the suspect(s), victim(s) in this or other related cases. If more space is needed, copy this page as many times as necessary.

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	AKA
DOB	AGE	RACE	SEX