COMPLIANCE AND STATE-BUILDING: U.S.-IMPOSED INSTITUTIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINE COLONIAL STATE

By

DANIEL R. ALLEN

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Department of Political Science

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation/thesis of DANIEL R. ALLEN find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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This project extends Amitai Etzioni’s compliance theory of complex organizations to the colonial state-building efforts by the United States in the Philippines from 1898 to World War II. The compliance theory gives a compelling prediction of the relationship between institutions and subject peoples, helping to explain why institutions matter in nation-building missions. There is an “occupier’s dilemma” consisting of the need of the occupying entity to gain a sense of support for state institutions which are imposed through force on a populace. Yet, the use of coercive force in the course of imposing institutions undermines the ability to gain this support. The American experience in the Philippines represents a case of this dynamic which is overlooked in recent research on nation-building.

The Philippine case reveals that the construction of state institutions did in fact help to mitigate violent conflict in society, as institutional theories predict. However, institutions alone were not sufficient to lead to society-wide consensus or stability over a reasonably long period of time. In the Philippines, conflict migrated from the battlefield to the legislative arena; in spite of this transition, the legitimacy of U.S. rule did not
cement within the Philippine Islands. For this reason, approaches to the study of nation-building should reflect both the nature of institutions’ interaction with society as well as the other known components of nation-building. Adding a layer of understanding to institutional theories of nation-building leads to an increase in the knowledge regarding the nation-building dynamic in cases where the institutions are imposed from without.
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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Nicole. She is an endless provider of love, encouragement, and, when the wind chill is thirty below zero, coffee.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This project extends Amitai Etzioni’s compliance theory of complex organizations to the colonial state-building efforts by the United States in the Philippines from 1898 to World War II. The compliance theory gives a compelling prediction of the relationship between institutions and subject peoples, helping to explain why institutions matter in nation-building missions. There is an “occupier’s dilemma” consisting of the need of the occupying entity to gain a sense of support for state institutions which are imposed through force on a populace. Yet, the use of coercive force in the course of imposing institutions undermines the ability to gain this support. The American experience in the Philippines represents a case of this dynamic which is overlooked in recent research on nation-building.

The Philippine case reveals that the construction of state institutions did in fact help to mitigate violent conflict in society, as institutional theories predict. However, institutions alone were not sufficient to lead to society-wide consensus or stability over a reasonably long period of time. In the Philippines, conflict migrated from the battlefield to the legislative arena; in spite of this transition, the legitimacy of U.S. rule did not cement within the Philippine Islands. For this reason, approaches to the study of nation-building should reflect both the nature of institutions’ interaction with society as well as the other known components of nation-building. Adding a layer of understanding to institutional theories of nation-building leads to an increase in the knowledge regarding the nation-building dynamic in cases where the institutions are imposed from without. The Philippines, a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society with tremendous ideological and
class-based cleavages, should be a more deeply considered case in looking at nation-building outcomes. Currently, the Philippine case is most overlooked in favor of other cases which have less to offer scholars and policymakers dealing with the contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is perhaps no single issue in American foreign policy of more immediate and visceral importance than that of attempting to gain a true understanding of the concept of nation-building and the manner in which imposed institutions affect the diverse societies into which they are placed.

Nation-building has captured the agenda of many governments and international organizations as they formulate foreign policy in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world. The concept of nation-building is understood in different ways depending upon the theoretical and methodological approach taken in its study. One reason that the concept appears so muddled is the fact that nation-building research straddles multiple subfields of political science, not to mention adopted frameworks from sociology, economics, and psychology. It is a myth, however, to state that nation-building policies are new or unprecedented in the foreign policy of the United States. In a sense, the United States has been engaged in the components of nation-building, both inside and outside of its borders, since at least as early as 1865. The post-Civil War “reconstruction” of political institutions in the seceding Southern states, including the military occupations and the ratification of constitutional amendments as a prerequisite for rejoining the Union, set historical precedents for the United States as it expanded the territory under its control (Heffron 2004). Yet, if the historical experience of U.S.-led nation-building has been extensive, this has not been the case with institutional memory and conceptual clarity regarding nation-building (Fukuyama 2006).
An initial task in the exploration of the nation-building concept is to clearly differentiate nation-building from state-building. In several studies, the concepts are conflated; this is troublesome in the light of the various components making up nation-building that are revealed in scholarly literature. *Nation-building* involves the development of all the aspects of political, social, and economic systems of a society. It is a large concept that has been abused in the literature because it is so vast. It must be broken down into its major components in order to be understood more clearly. *State-building* is but one component of nation-building, albeit an integral component. State-building involves the creation and development of the institutions of a political system. These institutions may be tangible, like a legislature or a written constitution; or, they may be intangible, such as sub-national territorial divisions for efficiently governing a society.

The two terms, nation-building and state-building, are not interchangeable. Unfortunately, some researchers treat the terms as such; for the purposes of this study, differentiation between the two terms is crucial to understanding two keys to unlocking the complexity of nation-building. The first key is the fact that there are multiple components of what it means to build a nation; the institutions of a state are one crucial component. The second key is that each of the components of nation-building drive interaction effects which form part of the whole picture of national development. After reviewing literature on nation-building, the theoretical components can be better understood. Then, the specific component of most concern in this study, state-building, can be investigated in more detail.
Nation-building has been investigated as a development task, a security concern, as well as a social construction. Each of these approaches leads the researcher to focus on particular inputs of nation-building policies and particular outcomes on various measures related to the polity in which the nation-building policies are applied. Many scholars argue that a better understanding of the relationship between the inputs and the outcomes related to nation-building cases could be had if attention is shifted to the role played by institutions in the nation-building process. However, even institutionally-focused theory on nation-building needs improvement by addressing how institutions matter with respect to the ultimately observed outcomes. Substantial theoretical developments have established the path-dependent nature of institutional frameworks (North 1990; Pierson 2000, 2004; Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005), as well as the role of institutions in shaping actors’ preferences (March and Olsen 1989; Ostrom 1999). The applications of institutionalism to the study of nation-building have become more prominent in recent years; yet, work remains in tying the relationship between institutional developments to the nation-building outcomes in a stronger fashion.

In the developmental approach to nation-building, the concept is fashioned as investment in infrastructural projects in countries or sections of countries which lag behind economically. Foreign aid donations are the primary input of nation-building policy from this perspective. This input is usually related to a set of outcome variables such as roads, dams, or electricity production, as well as changes in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Indirectly, outcomes on governance, including democracy, are related to the inputs of foreign aid and technocratic expertise (advisors from donor countries). This approach to the study of nation-building rests on the modernization
theory argument that a natural link exists between economic liberalism, quantifiable measures of growth, and the eventual emergence of successful, democratic states. By itself, the developmental approach to nation-building does not account for unfavorable outcomes related to failure in state capacity, corruption of donor recipients, poor allocation of aid, or the political strings often attached to foreign aid (Ekbladh 2006; Sutton 2006).

In the security literature, nation-building refers to the combination of strategic, military, and humanitarian concerns in what are usually post-conflict deployments of donor resources. These missions have grown in complexity and frequency since the end of the Cold War; missions meeting the most widely accepted definitions of nation-building include both post-civil war cases and cases in which the victorious, occupying combatant initiates a nation-building effort. Dobbins et al. (2003) develops one of the most policy-relevant frameworks for the study of nation-building. Conceptually, their RAND study conflates the terms nation-building, occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction under the concept of nation-building, stating that each term relates to the use of military force to underpin a process of democratization (p. 1). Successful nation-building is defined as “the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions” (p. 2). The assumption of military force as the primary tool of nation-building must be highlighted when evaluating this work; it is an assumption strongly related to the making of foreign policy, specifically, how nation-building will be done and where it will take place.

The Dobbins-led study takes as the key inputs military presence (soldiers per capita), police presence, and monetary assistance (total, per capita, and as a percentage of
GDP). Output variables include post-conflict combat deaths, the timing of elections, changes in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons over time, and changes in per capita GDP over time (pp. xv-xvi). These measures clearly reflect the influence of the developmental approach. Later work by Dobbins et al. (2005) adds the outcome variables of sustained peace and measures of democracy from the Polity IV database (pp. 226, 234, 236-238). A draft of the 2003 study in particular was read and debated across a number of U.S. government agencies during the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War. This was largely due to the role of the input variable of troop levels and their theorized relationship to the defined outcome of success (Gordon and Trainor 2006, pp. 477-478). The proposed correlation is that higher levels of troops on the ground will be related directly to greater levels of security and related indirectly to more successful nation-building outcomes.

Orr (2004) approaches the nation-building concept through a similar, security-based lens. However, Orr’s theoretical framework conceptually separates the concept into four distinct “pillars,” security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. This gives Orr’s case studies a different and more conceptually precise context than Dobbins et al with respect to the type of data sought and presented.

Nation-building as a policy working towards a social construction among a given population is a conceptualization that has not been incorporated into the developmental or security-based assessments of nation-building missions. This does not mean that this approach has gone completely neglected in the literature. The idea of nationhood as the historical and interpersonal creation of a shared, communally defined belief may be an
integral part of the pacifying and unifying effects sought out by those who carry out nation-building efforts. Benedict Anderson (1983) and Paul A. Kramer (2006) both understand nation-building from this perspective.

Fukuyama (2004) separates the institutional component, state-building, out from under the umbrella of the nation-building concept. He asserts that states strong in institutional capacity are necessary for accomplishing the ultimate goals of nation-building missions. The view of institutions and state-capacity exhibited by this idea runs counter to earlier notions of state-building which sought to limit the role of the state in influencing markets and civil society. Under small-state approaches (e.g. Olson 1982), the potential negative influence of the state on economic growth is stressed; meanwhile, the new institutional approach to state-building stresses the failures of developmentalism and the finding that a weak state can undercut economic growth and political stability, potentially creating the very situations of insecurity for which nation-building missions are undertaken to remedy. Robust institutions are seen in this view as a necessary condition for political stability, economic growth, and ultimately democracy (Paris 2004, 2006; Fukuyama 2006). Thus, the conceptualization of nation-building employed by institutionalism is similar to that of Orr (2004). Specifically, the component parts of nation-building are security, state capacity building, economic development, and peaceful reconciliation of inter-group conflicts in a society. The ultimate outcomes looked for in this perspective are measures of peace, stability, and institutional creation and/or reconstruction. Most contemporary nation-building missions have democratization as an explicit goal, though this is not necessary for it to be a nation-building policy, and democratization to any extent would be investigated in an institutional analysis.
Most recently, Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens (2008) differentiate the concepts of nation and state building in a manner that counters the approach of Dobbins that conflates the terms, but unduly limits the breadth of what nation-building entails. Focusing on post-conflict peacebuilding, Call and Cousens define state-building as “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding.” Nation-building is defined as, “actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and usually to mobilize a population behind a parallel state building project” (p. 4). The authors correctly point out that the two concepts are often conflated; however, their study and this one take a different tack with respect to which process supersedes the other. Call and Cousens place nation-building as a potential, parallel support to state-building. This study does the opposite, arguing that state-building is a parallel support to nation-building.

The reason this distinction becomes important is due to the fact that contemporary nations under construction do not develop in a social, political, institutional, or economic vacuum. When states make the conscious decision to intervene in other societies to build states and national identities (i.e. nation-building as a policy), the state which develops becomes just much part of the social fabric as the sense of nationhood. For this reason, the comprehensive concept of nation-building can, in fact, subsume the various components which make up how societies construct political, economic, and social institutions. This is the conceptualization which will be reflected in this study. This is
not to reject outright either the definitions or the conceptualizations of Call and Cousens. They correctly point out that nation-building is explicitly different from post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding operations (p. 4). Rather, the framework here is simply more useful for synthesizing the range of literature on the concepts and emphasizing the particular phenomenon that occurs when nation-building is undertaken by outside force in a society; and, Call and Cousens’ take on the concepts must be addressed.

The importance of the state and its institutions for society is at the core of the work of Joel Migdal (1988) on theory of state-society relations in which it is argued that for states to succeed in managing their territory and monopolize political authority over that territory, states must obtain and maintain “social control.” Social control is defined as the “successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor of the behavior prescribed by state rules.” This is necessary to the state’s ability (capacity in Fukuyama’s terms) to mobilize population and resources (pp. 21-22). Social control “rests on the organizational ability to deliver key components for individuals’ strategies of survival” and that non-compliance within a state’s territory is “an indication of a more fundamental conflict over which organizations in society, the state or others” holds legitimacy in the rules they make (pp. 27, 29). Thus, Migdal’s state-society model consists of how the rules are made and maintained in societies with a focus on all the social organizations that have exercised social control, including informal organizations, norms, rules, symbols, and other incentive structures (p. 25). Within this state-society context, state-builders seek “coherence” among the state’s institutions in that they operate together in order to secure “stateness” and enhance the state’s capabilities. Stateness includes holding the monopoly
on means of coercion within a territory, the existence of an autonomous entity of the state as an actor with its own interests and preferences, and, ultimately, differentiation and specialization within this state entity (pp. 18-19). State capabilities include the capacity (again-echoed in Fukuyama 2004) to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate resources (p. 4).

Midgal’s conception of state-building stresses the role of institutions and social control. However, the necessary and sufficient conditions argued in the state-society model for the creating of strong states should be reviewed carefully for their relationship to the nation-building context. The two necessary conditions, which when present with other factors can lead to state-building, are “massive societal dislocation” and mass migration; both conditions can be prevalent as a result of war, revolution, or other events which are likely reasons for outside forces to consider undertaking a nation-building mission (pp. 269-271). The four sufficient conditions, each one of which can lead to the creating of a strong state, include exogenous forces, military threat, the basis for an independent bureaucracy, and skillful leadership (pp. 271-277). In other words, the sufficient conditions for building a strong state can occur at any level of analysis and most certainly need to be investigated within cases in order to determine the causes of a given trajectory of state-and ultimately-nation-building.

Yet another developing literature related to state institutions and societal outcomes is that of institutional reform, a literature related to “New Institutional Economics” theory as well as to the scientific approach to public administration. The term “reform” in and of itself can be seen as value-laden, as it puts a positive spin on forced institutional changes. One should not assume that just because institutions are
“reformed” that they are normatively better than they were before, especially when they are altered in a top-down command environment.

There are two distinct threads to the literature on institutional reform as it pertains to building state capacity. The first thread concerns reforming rules and incentive structures within the state in order to decrease the level of corruption and clientelist (patronage) politics. Specifically, this set of reforms increases the professionalism of the civil service, which should then lead to an increase in state capacity and legitimacy. This style of reform in the United States has roots in the “Progressive” movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and is directly related to the growth of public administration as a subject of social scientific study. The second thread of the literature on institutional reform concerns alterations in the institutional structures themselves, often for purposes of efficiency or in the normative belief that the provision of public goods is best done at smaller levels of government (i.e. devolution of power in a federalized system). In this sense, institutional reform can be couched in terms of “reinventing government” or “minimizing redundancy” in organizational frameworks. Streamlining organizations in the name of such efficiency is adopted from a corporate model of minimizing input costs (overhead) (e.g. Rusaw 1998, Ch. 1).

Within the context of state capacity building, the benefits of pure efficiency are debated. Olson’s model of maximizing economic growth by cutting the incentives for rent-seeking groups in society, as well as the neoliberal approaches to state-building, prize efficiency but neglect the role of civil employment and a substantial state sector as a

1 Interestingly, the theoretical development of public administration science and its Progressive Era applications to civil service employment policies plays a role in nation-building policies in the Philippine case. This will be addressed in a separate section of the project.
legitimating factor of a state. New Institutional Economics does not always seek to pare down state institutions at the expense of the market; rather, economic theories are said to operate within the context of state and society, with institutions and their set-up as an important influential factor on outcomes (e.g. nation and state-building outcomes). The New Institutional Economics approach to theories of institutional reform recognizes the importance the state has in shaping the rules of development (North 1990; Pierson 2000, 2004; Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005; see also Eicher and García-Peñalosa 2006). Stronger institutions of public administration are seen as more beneficial to the developing state and corresponding society than smaller institutions which may not be effective in spite of lower redundancy and efficiency. Fukuyama (2004) stresses the crucial role of a modern civil service based on merit as opposed to patronage in building state capacity; he argues that truly strengthening state capacity requires outside actors to invest in local entities of civil society and locally developing institutions (a bottom-up approach) while avoiding the tendency for the outside actor to take over service delivery in the interests of efficiency (pp. 82-91). Legitimacy of the state being built benefits from this approach to nation and state-building (see also Fukuyama 2006) Fukuyama’s argument is unique among the literature related to institutional reform in that it considers the role of outside forces in establishing and “reforming” institutions elsewhere.

An example of this recent examination of institutional reform is Axline (1993) which is a technical research report on intergovernmental reforms of Papua New Guinea. Axline’s primary concern is with a “crisis of governance” especially as it relates to resource distribution (p. 3). Axline’s report also directly references the two tracks in the literature and theory on institutional reform (pp. 5, 7-10). These two tracks are built upon
in the course of evaluating recommendations for reform by the Papua New Guinean Bi-
Partisan Select Committee on Provincial Government. Axline evaluates the
recommendations in light of the “technical” and “political” approaches to reform. These
approaches are analogous to the increasing of state capacity through the increasing of
bureaucratic expertise; the latter is analogous to the shifting of how institutions and their
rules are made and legitimated (pp. 101-102). While the goals for each track of
institutional reform are the same (increasing state capacity to achieve goals), the means
are fundamentally different and bring different costs to existing state systems. The costs
for any increase in state capacity will be lower in the technical reform approach.
However, the political aspects can hinder the efficacy of technical reforms; there is an
interaction between the actors and institutions of concern to each track in the reform
literature (p. 107).

Roett (1995) concerns the same theoretical approaches to the study of institutional
reform in a politically and economically liberalizing Mexico. In addition, the public
policy outputs of institutional reforms are shown to have direct consequences for the
state-society relationship. Going beyond Axline’s technical reporting to an analysis of
the societal interplay with reform efforts, Roett’s volume examines specific groups and
how they effect institutional change as well as are affected by reforms. Diamond and
Shin (2000) address the same topic with a focus on the political reform track in the case
of South Korea. Meanwhile, Joseph (1999) looks at democratization and economic
liberalization and the relationship between state and society in multiple cases on the
African continent. Of note is the discussion of state power and ethnic divisions in the
post-colonial context, a problem not found in the Korean case. One final example of the
burgeoning literature on institutional reform and the state-society relationship is directly relevant to this study in that it looks back historically to the nascent development of a contemporary state. Antony and Leonard (2002) tackle the case of Qing era China and state-building from the mid-seventeenth century to the early twentieth century. Both the infrastructure of politics (e.g. the extent of centralization) and the technical aspects of reform (e.g. state-interest linkages) are examined. The importance of the role of the state’s institutions in shaping societal outcomes is a fruitful topic across historical eras and in both society-driven (bottom-up) and outsider-driven (top-down) contexts. The theories associated with literature on institutional reform have direct implications for the study of cases of state capacity development as per its role in nation-building efforts.

This study operates in the same spirit as that of Weaver and Rockman (1993) in which the effects of institutions on state capabilities is addressed in the context of largely stable democracies. Weaver and Rockman delineate three “tiers of explanations of differences in government capabilities” that ease cross-case comparisons of institutional development and capacity. The first tier is the most basic, comparison of executive-legislative relations and separation of powers, with the consequent capacity related issues. The second tier addresses regime type. The third tier is the most relevant to this study. Differences in state capacity are influenced by a wide variety of factors including broad institutional frameworks, the characteristics of institutions, political conditions and policymakers’ goals, socioeconomic and demographic conditions, and previous policy choices (p. 10).

The compliance theory explicated in Chapter Two specifically concerns the state-society relationship’s consequences stemming from the first three of the factors in this
third tier; the Philippine case also clearly confirms the importance for institutional
development and state capacity of the latter two factors in the third tier, providing strong
confirmation of Weaver and Rockman’s contention that institutional structures do, in
fact, have far reaching effects on the ability of the state and society to develop in desired
ways. This study shares Weaver and Rockman’s belief that particular institutions have
“contingent effects” on government capabilities (pp. 445-446). In addition, these
capabilities (capacity) can vary widely with respect to different policy areas as well as
decision-making context faced in a particular case (pp. 447-449). This process is traced
in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

Preview of this Study

Against the backdrop of the study of the nation-building concept, this study
pursues a greater understanding of the relationship between the state-building component
of nation-building and the outcomes of nation-building in the particular context of
imposed institutions. Imposition occurs when institutions, be they formal or informal, are
forcibly founded and developed in a given society by an outside entity. In order to move
towards this goal of further understanding nation-building in the context of imposition,
the sociological theory of compliance in complex organizations developed by Amitai
Etzioni is employed in order to uncover the relationships between individuals and groups
in society and the institutions imposed upon them. The outside imposition of state
institutions is one of the most common strategies of nation-builders in the pursuit of
foreign policy goals. The explication of compliance theory and its relevance for the
study of nation-building is the primary goal of Chapter Two. Chapter Two also discusses
the concerns of historical case study methods and the archival sources utilized in this study.

Chapter Three introduces a case of nation and state-building which is overlooked in much of the contemporary literature on the concepts. The American occupation and the imposition of state institutions in the Philippines are left out of much of the discussion of nation-building; this is theoretically unsound. The case study of the Philippines traces the historical development of state institutions there, from Spanish imperial conquest, to the arrival of American forces in 1898. It then discusses the state-building process under American occupation from 1898 to 1941 from the perspective of both policy makers in the United States as well as Philippine society.

In Chapter Four, the historical data on the case of the colonial Philippines is inserted back into the context of compliance theory. Compliance theory reveals key aspects of state-society interactions which have long term effects on state and nation development. Chapter Four explains why the ultimate goals of American policy makers to create a viable, prosperous, and unified democratic Philippine state were undermined to a significant degree by manner in which the colonial state interacted with Philippine society. This is established by looking at key indicators of societal response to the imposed state in the post-independence Philippines with data from several available datasets. The outcome represents a partial validation of the extension of Etzioni’s compliance framework to the study of state-society relationships, particularly when dealing with state institutions imposed from outside of that society. Finally, this chapter briefly compares key variables in the Philippine case to other cases of outside-imposed
nation-building which are more often cited as paradigmatic examples of likely outcomes when these policies are undertaken by the United States.

Finally, Chapter Five concludes this study by pointing out connections between the findings here and other possible approaches to the Philippine case and the nation-building and state-building concepts. Also, the potential value of a component based framework for understanding the nation-building concept is reassessed in light of this study; thus, this research project is firmly situated as a contribution to the literature on the concept.

This study does not claim to unlock the sole and definitive path to successful nation-building policy. It does, however, represent a challenge to those who unnecessarily conflate concepts, overlook troublesome, yet important cases, and to those who downplay the importance of the relationship between state institutions and political development in a society. Additionally, this study supports those researchers who find contemporary value in historical sources. There are contributions to be made on the policy relevant questions of today from century-old documents. It is in this spirit that these findings are presented here.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Given a definition of successful nation-building is as an outcome of an internally peaceful state with “strong” institutions accepted by the populace, there remains a missing element of the theory connecting the creation of institutions and their acceptance among the populace. For this reason, a theory incorporating the role of organizations in society into the developing literature on nation-building would be a valuable combination for researchers interested in understanding how institutional creation matters to the outcome of a nation-building case. Amitai Etzioni’s theory of complex organizations is an example of such a theory which can help bridge the gap between theorizing the need for strong institutions and nation-building outcomes.

Amitai Etzioni’s (1975) compliance theory is a useful theoretical lens for the study of nation-building. Compliance theory as developed by Etzioni is deductively based and can be used to generate testable hypotheses on multiple levels of analysis pertaining to “complex organizations.” By levels of analysis, it is meant that compliance theory examines the relationship between the individual at the lowest level and a higher level organization. An intermediate level also exists, that of sub-groups’ existence under the larger umbrella of the complex organization. Etzioni’s construct is richly developed, enabling cross-level study of relationships between actors and institutions. This theory assists advocates of institutional approaches to the study of nation-building by theorizing under which circumstances various relationship patterns emerge within complex organizations, institutions or a nexus thereof, or ultimately any collectivity such as a newly constructed or reconstructed polity. In short, compliance theory begins to bridge
the theoretical gap between the hypothesized relationship between institutional
development and “successful” nation-building outcomes.

Etzioni developed compliance theory in the interest of moving towards middle
range organizational theory, between the depth of single case studies and the level of
theory in which overarching generalizations can be made about all organizations. It was
“crucial to study systematic differences among the various social units classed as
organizations” (pp. xi-xii). Etzioni (1975) placed his theory squarely in the canon
developed by March and Simon (1958) on organizational theory, while seeing the need to
conceptually define charisma and understand the differences between organizational
elites and what he called “lower participants.” Other organizational theories seen as
crucial predecessors to compliance theory include Weber’s theories of bureaucracy and
Janowitz (1959).

Another of the foundational assertions of compliance theory is that organizations
serve as “collectivities” within which the general problem of social order may be studied
empirically. This is because “social order in modern society is based to a great extent
upon interaction in and among organizations” (p. xvii). It is at this point where there is a
logical connection between compliance theory and theories about the role of institutions
in nation-building. Given that institutions are theorized to be related to outcomes in
nation-building and given that social order in modern society is based upon interaction in
and among organizations (which are often synonymous with institutions), then greater
understanding of the nature of the structural and relational aspects of organizations
should increase the depth of knowledge regarding the relationship between institutions
and nation-building outcomes. The theories complement one another. Knowing the
degree to which organizational modes of control are effective within the nation-building context will enable greater understanding of the importance of institutions in that same context.

Compliance is defined as a relationship consisting of the power employed by superiors to control subordinates and the orientation of the subordinates to this power. Thus, there is both a structural and motivational aspect to the relationship (Etzioni, p. xv). Complex organizations “which differ in their compliance structure tend also to differ in the goals they pursue; in the kind, location, power, and interaction of their elites; in the level and kinds of consensus attained and in the communications and socialization employed to attain it; in recruitment, scope, and pervasiveness [of the organization]; and in the distribution and control of charismatic participants. Moreover, organizations which differ in their compliance structure tend also to differ in the way they allocate tasks and power over time” (p. xv).

Compliance structures are assumed to be based upon three major “sources of control whose allocation and manipulation account to a great extent for the foundations of social order” (p. xvi). These sources of control are coercion, economic assets, and normative values. None of the three sources of control are assumed to be the superior form, nor is one more powerful than another; rather, Etzioni’s theory explicitly attempts to remove the assumption that coercive control is morally wrong or illegitimate (pp. xvi-xvii). Instead, it is the nature of the organization in question which determines which source of control is the best for the interests of the organization. The three sources of control serve as the basis for defining three types of compliance: coercive, utilitarian, and normative (p. xvi). The sources of control are directly related to the three kinds of
power employed by organizations to control lower participants. Compliance is a relationship in two directions, a top-down hierarchical relationship “in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another actor’s power, and [the bottom-up relationship] to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied.” The compliance relationship is asymmetric, making the theory well suited to application in cases of occupation and imposition. Etzioni’s power definition is based upon the sources of control used to distribute rewards and deprivations throughout an organization. The orientation (involvement) of the subordinated actor is defined as either positive or negative involvement and is determined by the degree to which the power applied is considered legitimate by the lower participants in the compliance relationship, then leading to the lower participant’s alienation or commitment to the goals of the organization. Thus, there are two actors with different degrees of power (access to the means to reward) and different orientations toward the organization (degrees of positive or negative) (pp. 3-4, 12).

Power, the ability of an actor in the organization to influence another actor to carry out desired actions or to hold desired norms, differs according to the means employed to make subjects comply. The means are based upon the sources of control. Three types of power of concern to compliance theory are coercive power, remunerative power, and normative power. Coercive power rests on the “application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions such as the infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation of frustration through restriction of movement; or controlling though force the satisfaction of needs such as those for food, sex, comfort, and the like.” Remunerative power is “based on control over material resources and rewards through the allocation of
salaries and wages, commissions and contributions, “fringe benefits,” services and commodities.” Normative power “rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and prestige symbols, administration of ritual, and influence over the distribution of “acceptance” and “positive response.”” A related form of power to normative power is that of “social power” in which horizontal relationships are used to encourage a particular response, as opposed to “pure” normative power which is hierarchical in nature (pp. 5-7).

Most organizations are assumed to emphasize one means of power, coercive, remunerative, or normative. The reason for this is that the application of one type of power can influence the effectiveness of the other power means. For example, the use of coercive power or remunerative power can mitigate or “neutralize” appeals to idealistic motives in support of organizational goals (pp. 7-8).

The three types of involvement are derived from a positive-negative orientation of a participant to an organization. Involvement also varies based upon the intensity of the participant’s positive-negative orientation. Positive involvement is called “commitment” and negative involvement is called “alienation.” An intensely negative orientation is “alienative” involvement. An intensely positive involvement (high commitment) is called “moral” involvement. Finally, less intense alienation or commitment is called “calculative” involvement. “Organizations are placed on the involvement continuum according to the modal involvement pattern of their lower participants” (pp. 8-11).

The two dimensions of the compliance relationship, the kind of power employed by the organization to compel lower participants towards organizational goals and the
modal kind of involvement by lower participants in the organization, form a typology from which theoretically useful deductions are made.

Table 1: Typology of power and involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Power</th>
<th>Kinds of Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alienative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remunerative</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Etzioni (1975, p. 12)

Combinations 1, 5, and 9 are highlighted because they are expected “congruent” relationships. Organizations with congruence between downwardly focused power and bottom-up orientations are expected to be most efficient at meeting organizational goals. Take combination 3 for example; an organization applying coercive power to will likely decrease the moral involvement of lower participants towards organizational goals. In another example of incongruence, combination 7, manipulation of symbols is not expected to encourage lower participants to believe in the goals of a prison camp, a coercive organization. As Etzioni (1975) states, “the exercise of power depends on the resources the organization can recruit and the license it is allowed in using them…Hence, to the degree that the environment of the organization allows, organizations tend to shift their compliance structure from incongruent to congruent types and organizations which have congruent compliance structures tend to resist factors pushing them toward incongruent compliance structures.” The congruent types become the ideal types of organizations. Combination 1 is coercive compliance, combination 5 is utilitarian, and

\footnote{Bold type is not in the original.}
combination 9 is normative compliance (pp. 12-14). Organizations themselves are classified according to their predominant compliance pattern (p. 23).

Helga Drummond (1993) includes combination 3 as congruent in a review of Etzioni’s compliance theory. This can be due to the existence of dual compliance structures within the same organization (e.g. military combat units) or differing compliance structures at different levels of the same coercive organization. For example, the lowest ranking guards in a prison camp can have a different type of involvement (moral) than lower participants who are prisoners (pp. 11-15, 179). Drummond’s classification of combination 3 as congruent goes beyond those combinations stressed by Etzioni’s typology.

The first classification is that of coercive organizations. The ideal type of coercive organization is combination 1 in the compliance typology. Coercion is the major means of control over lower participants in the organization while the orientation of lower participants towards the organization consists of a high degree of alienation. Force is required to assure fulfillment of the major organizational tasks; if the force was removed, it is not likely that the goals of coercive organizations would be met (pp. 27-29). Examples of coercive organizations include prisons and concentration camps (pp. 40-41).

The second classification is that of utilitarian organizations. The ideal type of utilitarian organization is combination 5 in the compliance typology. Remuneration is the major means of control over lower participants; meanwhile, the orientation of the largest portion of lower organizational participants is one of calculative involvement. This involvement is characterized by mild alienation or mild commitment to the
As remunerative means of control are altered, the level of commitment to the organization tends to change accordingly among lower participants. At the same time, attempts to appeal to moral sentiments (normative means of control) have a tendency to fail among lower participants in utilitarian organizations. Examples of utilitarian organizations include most blue-collar and white-collar employment arrangements (pp. 40-41).

The third classification is that of normative organizations. The ideal type of normative organization is combination 9 in the compliance typology. Normative power is the major source of control over most lower participants, whose orientation is characterized by high commitment to organizational goals and/or norms. The compliance relationship relies upon internalization of directives as legitimate in the perception of those executing the directives. Leadership, rituals, manipulation of social and prestige symbols, and resocialization are among the most important techniques indicative of normative means of control (p. 40). Primary examples of normative organizations are religious and political groups, as well as volunteer organizations (pp. 40-41).

A final classification of organizations which does not fall into one of the ideal types from the compliance typology is that of the dual organization. Dual compliance structures are found in organizations which have two particular compliance patterns with similar frequency in the same organization. Combat units in the military can be seen as both normative and coercive in nature; organizational effectiveness is raised when lower participants believe in the cause, though the underlying factor of compulsion serves to reinforce the participation in circumstances where normative motivations are lacking. Some labor unions and professional associations can have a normative as well as a
utilitarian compliance structure. Both normative and remunerative factors can influence the orientation of lower participants towards organizational goals (pp. 55-56).

Etzioni’s research on compliance structures and organizational goals demonstrates that there are congruent combinations of compliance and goals which are more effective than incongruent combinations of compliance structures and kinds of goals. He finds that there are three types of organizational goals. The first type is order-related goals; these goals consist of organizations seeking to control “deviant” actors. Order is a “negative” goal in that something needs to be prevented from happening by the organization (pp. 103-104). The second goal type is economic; economic goals are those related to the production of commodities or services supplied to those outside of the organization. The third type of organizational goal is cultural. Cultural goals “institutionalize the conditions needed for the creation and preservation of symbolic objects, their application and the creation or reinforcement of commitments to such objects” (p. 105). “Social” goals, those goals created by horizontal pressures between peers, fall in the cultural category. Many organizations have multiple goals, but these goals are usually in the same category (p. 106).

The types of organizations and the kinds of goals pursued by organizations yield a second typology of interest to compliance theory.
Table 2: Typology of organization classification and goal-types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Kinds of Organizational Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Etzioni (1975, p. 106)³

Just as in the first typology, combinations 1, 5, and 9 are representative of congruent relationships in which the given organization is matched with the goals which are most logically and efficiently pursued through the associated compliance structures.

In combination 1, a coercive organization pursues order goals through the coercion of lower participants in the organization. In combination 5, economic goals are pursued by the utilitarian organization, which uses remunerative means to control lower participants. In the final congruent combination, combination 9, the normative organization pursues cultural goals by fostering moral commitments through symbolic and normative means of control.

Etzioni is careful to note that political goals are not in and of themselves a separate category of goals. Political groups’ goals are related to the gaining and maintaining of power. This power “is a universal key to all three ends; it may be pursued in order to control or change the allocation of coercion, to affect the allotment of material resources, or to change a normative pattern, as well as to serve various combinations of these goals...However, realization of the power goal requires that it be related to organizational goals which are more acceptable to the rank and file and more legitimate.

³ Bold type is not in the original.
in the eyes of the public.” In short, differences in political goals are associated with
differences in the compliance structures of the organizations serving them (pp. 107-108).

The congruent relationships in both typologies are crucial for the maximization of
the efficiency with which organizations pursue their goals. Organizations are not
naturally occurring entities; they are purposefully created for a purpose (p. 121).
Congruence is not required for achievement of goals, but it is required for maximized
efficiency (pp. 109-111). In order for an organization to function with efficiency, the
lower participants whose contributions are required for organizational performance must
have the proper inducements to perform. These inducements, need to match the
motivations of the participants, otherwise, some efficiency will be lost in a given
participant’s efforts. For example, “the attainment of culture goals such as the creation,
application, or transmission of values requires the development of identification with the
organizational representatives” (p. 115). These goals are not likely to be met by lower
participants whose orientation to the organization is influenced by, and related to, non-
normative means of control. In other words, the compliance relationship within
organizations is a dynamic process in which the leadership of the organization applies
certain inducements downward which then affect the orientation and the performance of
the lower participants. However, the independent-dependent variable relationship can go
the other way; the orientation of lower participants in an organization can influence the
means of control employed by the elites in order to encourage participation for the
purpose of goal achievement. All else being equal, organizations should strive for
congruence (pp. 119-120).
The basics of Etzioni’s compliance theory have been examined and extended in a number of ways. The most prominent empirical tests of the theory are the Iowa State Compliance Studies, which were done after the first edition of the compliance theory was elucidated in 1961. The Iowa State studies sought to build a bridge between Etzioni’s theory and the Bales-Parsons dynamic phase model of organizational behavior. In this structural-functional model, organizations are a sub-category of social systems, which are developed as a response to basic functional needs. These four “universal functional problems” are the system’s need to control the environment (adaptation), achieving the goals of the system (goal attainment), maintenance of solidarity among system units (integration), and the reinforcement of the integrity of the value system and its institutionalization (latency). The first two problems are “instrumental” while the latter are “expressive” functional problems. This can be referred to as the AGIL model in reference to the component parts of the model (Parsons, 1937; Parsons, Bales, and Shills, 1953).

The Iowa State studies investigated organizations with respect to the Bales-Parsons conceptualization, while seeking to test for the expected relationships between means of control and lower participants’ orientations to their respective organizations. The most common method of testing the theory involved survey research; lower participants at various types of institutions were questioned regarding their affective orientations towards organizational goals. These organizations were also assessed by the researchers with respect to Bales-Parsons model. Finally, statistical correlations and eventually causal models were used to test for congruence between the modal means of control applied by organizational leaders towards the surveyed lower participants.
Organizations included the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, which was considered a normative organization, and a farmer co-operative considered a utilitarian organization. Etzioni (1975) reviews the fifteen Iowa State Compliance Studies and asserts that they confirm the predicted correlations between power-means and lower participant orientations (pp. 142-143).

Etzioni accepts the linkage between his compliance theory and that of Bales and Parsons, though the compliance theory is not strictly structural-functional in its approach. Among the important concepts related to both theories are the sources of elite power in organizations and social systems and the relationship between types of elites and whether the organizational goal at-hand is instrumental or expressive (pp. 154-157).

Helga Drummond (1993) tests compliance theory as well as an additional variable which is called “work alienation.” Using survey data from differing types of organizations, Drummond’s statistical analysis finds “clear evidence of systematic variation of power, involvement, and “work alienation” between the three archetypal organizations.” In other work, Drummond (2001) builds on Etzioni’s conceptualization of power by comparing it to French and Raven’s typology, which finds six distinct bases of power. In addition to coercion and reward (which corresponds to remunerative power), French and Raven add expertise, information, legitimacy, and referent power. Expertise and information are both based upon the role of knowledge as shifting power within a social system. Legitimacy is defined as the power one has by virtue of holding an organizational position; referent power is synonymous with charisma and persuasive ability (Drummond, pp. 129-130).
Drummond (1993) attempts an explicit test of the theory with specific hypotheses which are replicable in other research designs in addition to her survey work (pp. 182-183). The expected congruent correlations are found between the type of power relied upon by an organization and the involvement of lower participants (p. 178). Drummond’s review also notes how involvement tends to have both attitudinal and behavioral components (pp. 36-40). Finally, Drummond also critiques Etzioni’s reliance upon structural factors in developing compliance theory’s conceptualization of power. Robbins (1983) is brought in to demonstrate that power in organizations can have a variety of bases (resources of power holders), forms (the source of the resources), and tactics (how the power is exercised) (Drummond 1993, pp. 20-22).

Drummond also addresses one of the most common critiques of Etzioni’s work, which is the extent to which particular expressions of the theory are tautological. For example, is an organization coercive because it uses coercive force to compel lower participants? Or, is it the use of coercive force what makes an organization one that can be classified as coercive? The key to avoiding circular arguments is to clearly specify whether the power used is the independent variable or the dependent variable in the research design. This should allow one to track cause and effect relationships through a process-tracing approach. Another method of working with Etzioni’s deductions is to use a case to test the extent to which the predicted relationship between means of control and involvement exists. In sum, Drummond and Etzioni both ask the researcher “to consider the exceptions to linear and intuitive thinking” as a way to test the compliance theory. One must also examine the results of involvement as means of control shift; this approach lends itself to greater policy relevance (pp. 128-129). Drummond’s approach, clearly
specified research designs, as well as bridge building from compliance theory to other social theories may address the most common criticisms of Etzioni’s work (Hirsch 1977). By clear specification, it is meant that one should note why one is classifying an organization as coercive, utilitarian, or normative and then examine data to see whether congruent relationships exist among logically deduced variables. Etzioni (1975) notes that any causal relationships between given aspects of organizations are merely suitable as hypotheses and should be studied longitudinally in order to move beyond correlations (pp. 394-395).

Power relationships in normative organizations have been a common arena for testing Etzioni’s compliance theory. Azim and Boseman (1975) look for evidence of congruence between power-means and involvement in universities, finding that the universities exhibit dual compliance relationships, rather than being clearly normative as Etzioni theorizes. Zarzycki (1981) also looks at universities as organizations, linking compliance relationships to the concept of affect toward unionization efforts at universities.

William Gamson (1968) and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1965) are cited by Etzioni (1975) as applying variables of interest to compliance theory to total societies. In this conceptualization of the complex organization, a society is the organization and lower participants are mobilized collectivities in society (i.e. subgroups in the original compliance framework). The key concept common to both Gamson and Almond and Verba is the affective orientation of lower participants towards their respective political system. One must also recall the important role of state institutions and social control underlying Migdal’s state-society model. Migdal (1988) asserts that levels of social
control are reflected in a scale of three indicators: compliance, participation, and legitimation (pp. 32-33). This scale is clearly akin to the transition desired under Etzioni’s model of a move from reliance upon coercive means of control towards the normative buy-in of lower participants to the goals of the organization (especially in the state context). Ultimately, it is crucial to note that there are significant indications that the theorized relationships between power-means and involvement can be found empirically and also that the concepts generated by Etzioni’s theoretical construct can be applied to a variety of social systems and correlated with previously unconsidered variables.

It is clear that the state in and of itself is a complex organization worth studying. Stateness consists of that which controls the “principal organized means of coercion,” is “differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory,” is autonomous from society, represents some level of centralization, and whose divisions are “formally coordinated with one another” (Tilly 1981, p. 45). Applying Etzioni’s theory to a study of a state in terms of its existence as a complex organization does not go so far as to suggest that the state exists as a unitary, rational actor. However, the autonomy of the state with respect to society may lead individuals and groups within the state’s territory to perceive sub-units of the state or the state itself as though it were a singular entity. The state is conceptualized here as a nexus of institutions that can produce a myriad of outputs in terms of policy and interactions with other actors within a territory. This judgment is consistent with the conceptualization from Nettl (1968) of the state as a “collectivity that summates a set of functions and structures in order to generalize their
applicability,” an “autonomous collectivity…a distinct sector or arena of society,” and “a sociocultural phenomenon” (pp. 305-307).

Compliance and the study of nation-building

The ideas of compliance theory can be a fruitful lens through which occupation and nation-building cases can be better understood. The mobilized collectivities of a society are the subgroups (lower participants) in the circumstance of an imposed nation-building process overseen by an outside actor. Occupying entities face a dilemma in which governance requires constraints on a populace (compliance), but must not drain resources to the point where pursuing the nation-building project is no longer considered beneficial. An occupier imposes an institutional, and often a social order on a society, but must move towards a more peaceful acceptance of that imposed order to achieve policy success. In other words, in the terms of Table 1, in order to maximize the chances of success the outside actor imposing this order must move the state from an initial position of combination 1 to that of combination 9 to reach congruent, moral involvement with the state. With respect to the combinations of Table 2, the imposed state must move from coercive to normative.

The imposed order generally takes the part of the complex organization of the outside-imposed state, which is really a nexus of formal and informal institutions. Unless the occupier is willing and/or able to invest an extraordinary amount of manpower into managing the institutions of the state, a significant level of support or compliance must emerge within the occupied populace. One would expect that this increased level of positive involvement in the imposed state would be associated with or resulting from that state having the characteristics of a normative organization. At the same time, if the
colonial state is a coercive organization, the occupied populace would be expected to
demonstrate a high degree of alienation and would not willingly support the established
institutions. In the empirical world, this could be represented by conflict or by the
establishment of indigenous institutions which are unsanctioned by the occupier. For this
reason, the concept of consensus in Etzioni’s compliance theory is a helpful component
to the understanding of intra-societal relationships in colonial and other imposed states.

The level of consensus in a society is the degree to which lower participants
(societal collectivities) accept the goals and norms of organizations as their own (Etzioni
1975, p. 231). To what extent do residents of a given polity buy-in to the institutional
order of the imposed state? In this sense, consensus can be seen as synonymous with
perceptions about the legitimacy of a given social and governmental order.

Organizations, in attempting to solve the occupier’s dilemma, seek to “culturally
integrate” lower levels of society into accepting the larger collectivity’s organizational
norms, values, goals, and ultimately its “cognitive perspectives” (p. 231). Elites seek to
use communication processes and socialization in order to modify the orientations of
lower participants (pp. 231-232). Degrees of overall consensus differ among
organizations; importantly for the study of as complex a phenomenon as outside-
imposed, occupier led nation-building, the degree of consensus can vary among
“consensus-spheres” within the same organization (p. 232). Levels of consensus within a
society can be seen in disagreements as to political rules and symbols, values about who
has the right to exercise political authority, and how much political authority a given
office or individual is entitled to exercise. In addition, for a given case of a complex
organization (including that of a total society) there are seven key areas to examine in order to understand the level of consensus.

Table 3: Areas of consensus within complex organizations

1. Consensus on general values in society or community
2. Consensus on organizational goals
3. Consensus on means, policy, and tactics for achieving goals
4. Consensus on participation in the organization
5. Consensus on performance obligations
6. Consensus on cognitive perspectives
7. Consensus on the status of groups in the organization

SOURCE: Etzioni (1975, pp. 233-34)

For each area listed in Table 3, higher levels of consensus are expected to be found in organizations classified as normative. This is a logical deduction from the definition of normative organization, in which moral and symbolic means of control are used to encourage lower participants to accept and support organizational goals and internalize organizational values. Coercive organizations are expected to show lower levels of consensus, while utilitarian organizations are expected to have a middle range of consensus relative to normative and coercive organizations (pp. 240-241).

The second concept from compliance theory which pertains directly to how groups interact in the hierarchy of a colonial state is communication. Etzioni defines communication as “the symbolic process” by which organizations go about changing, reinforcing, and influencing the orientations of lower participants (p. 241). Complex organizations maintain “extensive communication networks and roles and mechanisms especially devoted to the flow of communication” (p. 241). Information moves both upward and downward in the organizational hierarchy, as well as horizontally among participants at each level of the organization. In accordance with the Bales-Parsons
framework, communication networks can serve both instrumental and expressive purposes. Instrumental communication consists of information, knowledge, and cognitive orientations (organizational “facts”) sent through the organization for the purposes of adapting the organization to the environment and providing the data necessary to attain goals. Expressive communication involves attempts to transmit organizational norms, goals, values, and desired attitudes throughout the organization (p. 242). Expressive data on a communication network attempts to integrate and unify the organization. This is extremely important in outside-imposed nation-building projects in which the populace must be convinced in the long-term desirability of legitimizing the imposed institutional order. Communication networks vary from organization to organization. Normative organizations are expected to have a high degree of expressive communication moving downward through the hierarchy. Utilitarian organizations are expected to specialize in instrumental communication moving upward and downward in the organizational hierarchy. Finally, coercive organizations are expected to have little vertical movement of information relative to the other ideal-typical organizations; however, expressive communication is likely to move horizontally among fractured sub-groups of the organization (pp. 240-241, 245). Thus, as organizations move from coercive interactions toward normative interactions, one should expect to see changes in the communication networks throughout society.

Amitai Etzioni’s path-breaking work on organizations and compliance provides a useful tool for those who wish to consider the occupier-imposed state and the process of occupier-driven nation-building. Not only can one analyze the behavior of the colonial state and classify the predominant means of power employed against sub-groups of the
territory, but one can also look for key outcome correlates and see whether the compliance theory makes accurate predictions regarding the patterns of control and involvement. This modest research project applied to a selected case or cases of occupier-driven nation-building would add to the understanding of the role of institutions in the nation-building process, with potentially interesting policy relevance. Accomplishing this investigation requires the longitudinal approach Etzioni advocates for testing the compliance theory. In sum, the historical record may help explain the role of compliance and the occupier’s dilemma.

Case selection in the study of nation-building

The case of occupier-led nation-building by the United States in the colonial Philippines tends to be left out of notable comparative studies of the nation-building process. This appears to be based upon the long-term scope of United States policy in the Philippines. The decades of transition on their face may lead some researchers to omit the case as an example of the nation-building concept; this is a mistake. The U.S. colonial state meets the most widely accepted definitions of nation-building and the case remains unnecessarily ignored. This project is an appropriate venue to “fill in the blank” in the nation-building case studies by focusing on the imposed institutional dynamic in the U.S. occupation.

In RAND’s now famous study of American involvement in nation-building (Dobbins et al 2003), the Philippines is not included among the cases “because the societal transformation attempted there was intended to span several generations” (p. 2). Yet, it would be inaccurate in light of the historical record to say that the cases of post-World War II Japan and Germany, which are included, were not intended to be cases of
long-term societal transformation. John Dower (1999), for example, points out that
nation-building in Japan involved nothing short of a complete overhaul of the political
culture there (p. 25; also Ruoff 2001). Blacksell (1978) points out the same long-term
vision for nation-building in Germany (p. 25).

Robert Orr (2004) provides a more substantive explanation for omitting the
Philippine case by arguing for the existence of five distinct historical eras of nation-
building. The first era is “the era of quasi-imperialism in the Philippines and throughout
the Caribbean and Central America at the end of the nineteenth and the early part of the
twentieth centuries” (p. 4). This era is similar to the “Cold War containment era” of
nation-building, but is substantially different from the “post-conflict reconstruction
rubric” following World War II, following the Cold War, and following 9/11 (p. 5).
However, this conceptual distinction can be challenged on the grounds that a post-
cconflict nation-building case can differ as to the role of a previous combatant as the
occupier implementing the nation-building policies. From the perspective of the
occupied populace, the “quasi-imperialist” nation-building in the Philippines has
substantial theoretical commonality with the cases after World War II as well as the post-
9/11 cases. This is precisely why Roland Paris (2004) chooses to distinguish between
nation-building efforts following a civil war (usually led by an international coalition or
organization) and those efforts held in conjunction with an occupation by a previous
combatant. Theoretically, the latter are more likely to have the problems of insurgency
and questions regarding the legitimacy of imposed institutions.

Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper (2003), as well as Pei, Amin, and Garz (2006), omit
the Philippine case from their list of the population of nation-building cases while
including early-twentieth century interventions in Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Presumably, this omission is due to their definition of nation-building: regime change or survivability of a regime that would otherwise collapse, the deployment of large numbers of ground troops, and the use of American military and civilians in the country’s political administration in the course of the intervention. Perhaps the omission is due to the unique nature of the Philippines as being formally incorporated into the United States during the course of the nation-building experience. By itself, this would not negate the given definition or the conceptual similarities between the Philippine case and those of the pre-World War II era (quasi-imperialist in Orr’s terms).

Ultimately, the argument for including the Philippine nation-building case is stronger than for its omission. The intervention and occupation of the Philippines by the United States meets the most widely accepted definitions of nation-building and the case study could potentially yield valuable insights on the nation-building process in multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, and post-conflict societies. The case will not magically yield the missing link between current research and a universally accepted theory of nation-building; but, it will fill a theoretical and conceptual gap in the literature on nation-building. This project will not be the first to address this gap. Paul A. Kramer (2006) explicitly uses the Philippine case to add to the historical understanding of nation-building; however, his approach to the concept concerns the social construction of race as it pertains to building nationhood. This is an important but theoretically and conceptually different contribution than a study with the focus on institutional aspects of nation-building.
The case study method

Individual case studies have the potential to provide valuable contributions to the understanding of concepts and causal mechanisms. However, with any methodological decision there are important tradeoffs. By focusing on a single case, one loses a significant amount inferential leverage regarding the concepts under consideration within the case. In exchange, a great deal of in-depth knowledge is gained by increasing the understanding of the case under consideration. This tradeoff needs to be made explicit. With respect to the common practice among nation-building experts in overlooking the Philippine case, a single case study concerned with the dynamics of nation-building there would be a valuable addition to the field. From a strictly methodological standpoint, a case study on the Philippines has a value-added to current research on nation-building.

There are logical problems in choosing cases to study based upon the value of the dependent variable (the outcome). This is addressed in a number of methods texts, including Geddes (2003) which explains how single cases chosen on the basis of personal whim or on their outcome can lead to false inferences. A given case may very well sit at one case on a continuum of a given outcome and adding a second case in comparison would therefore yield a more accurate understanding of the concept or dynamic in question. Any time a theoretically valid case is added to the literature, knowledge can be increased. This is true of the literature on nation-building. Literature is plentiful on the nation-building cases of post-World War II Germany and Japan. However, the extensive economic success and pacification effects of Allied post-war policies may be at the positive extreme on the continuum of nation-building outcomes. While it is logical to study these cases for the purposes of setting policy ideals; even given nearly identical
circumstances, the outcome values may not be replicable in new cases (regression to the mean). A greater understanding of nation-building as a concept can only happen when a wider variety of cases are analyzed. On the other hand, one must not be so careless in adding cases that the concept of nation-building is “stretched” beyond its usefulness (Sartori 1970). In sum, the case study method enables the researcher to balance the understanding of a broader concept with the uniqueness of each given case in which a concept is identified. Roland Paris (2006) explicitly advocates using the case study method to add to understanding of the relationship between institutional development and nation-building.

A great deal of discussion over the role of case studies in social science research has occurred in recent years. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) offer a compelling argument for increasing the sample size in social scientific research. Many less quantitatively-oriented researchers saw their argument as denigrating the role of qualitative case studies in social science theory building. Brady and Collier (2004) respond by demonstrating the tradeoffs inherent in larger sample, statistical approaches to social science. In addition, while accepting the argument of King, Keohane, and Verba that research design should be taken more seriously by qualitative-oriented researchers, it is the particular questions and concepts which should drive methodological decisions. Case studies can help build theory by pointing out theoretical flaws, confirming existing theories with new cases, and by uncovering the causal processes which explain the relationships between variables, especially in complex, multivariate theories. These ideas are evident in the arguments of James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003, pp. 332-333) and echoed in Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005). The latter, in
particular, is a most helpful guide in shaping case study and comparative case study research.

A note on scope in the Philippine case

As mentioned by Dobbins et al. (2003), the length of time involved in American nation-building policies in the Philippines creates a significant obstacle to any researcher who wishes to use historical evidence to build understanding of the dynamics of nation-building in that country. The occupation, which stretches from the Spanish-American War in 1898 through and beyond World War II, is prohibitive with respect to the costs and time involved in gathering and analyzing the available historical evidence which could help to answer any questions one has regarding nation-building dynamics. For this reason, the researcher must make limitations on the scope of the study which will directly affect the inferential capability.

The appropriate starting point for a study on the U.S. occupation of the Philippines is 1898; however, there is a definite issue in identifying an ending date. World War II marks a difficulty for assessing the independent affects of institutional development during and after the war. The war becomes a confounding variable that has its own affects on the nation-building project after 1945. For this reason, this project will consider the institutional developments prior to the advent of American and Philippine involvement in World War II in 1941.

The extent to which these institutional developments were enduring, whether there was “buy-in” by the Philippine society must be examined after independence. This buy-in is defined as the extent to which American-imposed institutions endured beyond independence. In other words, once the people of the Philippines had choice, were the
imposed institutions resilient? To what extent did consensus emerge within Philippine society regarding the institutional framework’s legitimacy as well as other important areas of consensus established in theory? Under the compliance framework, those organizations using less coercive means of control in the colonial state would be more likely to endure in the independent Philippine state. In other words, there should be a clear relationship between the extent to which the imposed state was able to employ normative means of control and develop a relationship with society of positive, moral involvement, and the extent to which societal consensus developed over time in the Philippines after independence. Formal independence of the Philippines was achieved in 1946; however there were procedural, economic, military, and institutional strings attached to this independence which were put in place prior to World War II. These policies would be considered within the scope. Making these assessments is heavily reliant upon interpretive methods due to the complexity of the historical data available.

In order to address the narrow question of the relationship between imposed institutions and the subject populace and how this relationship plays into the developing literature on the nation-building concept, a way to classify the operational definition of the institutional buy-in must be constructed. This is where the points of consensus in the compliance literature are most helpful. Specifically, the scope consists of the institutions imposed by the United States in the course of building their desired Philippine nation-state from 1898 to 1941 and the observed level of consensus regarding the constructed state after Philippine independence. Institutions are the organizational entities which form the state and produce policies against which the reaction of societal segments can be assessed. The imposed state can be classified according to the criteria listed in Table 4.
Table 4. Classification of the state as an organization in the compliance framework

1. Coercive-The coercive state relies upon physical force or the threat of direct physical force in order to secure the compliance of society to policies of the state and participation in citizen obligations to the state
2. Utilitarian-The utilitarian state relies upon the provision of material rewards in order to secure the compliance of society to policies of the state and participation in citizen obligations to the state
3. Normative-The normative state relies upon the manipulation of symbols or language and/or non-material rewards or punishments to secure the compliance of society to policies of the state and participation in citizen obligations to the state

Following with this classification, successful state-building is the extent to which consensus can be reached in a state in the absence of an occupying force. The imposed order can not be seen as fully successful if clearly stated occupier goals are not achieved in an enduring manner. Thus, the level of success in a state-building operation, defined in terms of societal consensus, is related to the type of institutions developed by the occupying actor. In addition, coercive state behavior will be less likely to contribute to enduring imposed institutions in the absence of an occupation than is utilitarian behavior, which is then less likely to contribute to enduring imposed institutions in the absence of an occupation than is normative state behavior. In this study, the nature of the state will be classified based upon the predominant means of control employed by the state towards society during various historically validated eras in the U.S.-Philippine relationship.

Given that the intent of state-building is to achieve consensus regarding the interactions between society and the institutions of state, a way of classifying consensus is needed. Consensus is defined as the peaceful agreement among individuals and groups as to the mechanisms for resolving disagreement in a society. Levels of consensus can
vary given the subject area being considered by a group. The areas of consensus for observing the outcomes in the Philippine case are included in Table 5. Thus, the measure for the success of a state-building operation is the presence or absence of consensus in up to seven areas adapted from Etzioni’s compliance theory. Observations for the presence or absence of consensus in each of these areas must be interpreted from the historical record.

Table 5. Defining consensus in the Philippine state

1. Consensus on societal values
2. Consensus on state goals
3. Consensus on institutional structures
4. Consensus on participation in the state
5. Consensus on duties of citizens to the state
6. Consensus on legitimacy of the state
7. Consensus on the status of groups in the state

Each of the areas of consensus in the post-independence Philippines is assessed in an ordinal manner based upon the preponderance of available data which can be used as an indirect measure of each consensus area listed in Table 5. There is always the pitfall that as history unfolds, more and more exogenous variables will throw off interpretive assessments regarding the relationship between causes and effects. This is addressed in more detail in Chapter Four with respect to each area of consensus evaluated using several available, widely employed datasets, including the World Values Survey and Polity IV.

Presuming the components of nation-building, as delineated in the literature, one must recognize that state-building has independent effects on nation-building outcomes (as measured by consensus) as well as interaction effects with the other aforementioned
components. This is seen in any case study; building effective state institutions fosters economic development, for example, both directly (as a result of the policy component of nation-building) as well as indirectly by creating stable, predictable returns in governance. State institutions also must interact with other variables in their societal context. These exogenous variables in this study include security and geography. Theoretically, state-building can increase the level of societal security by enabling the peaceful resolution of political conflicts through the institutional mechanisms. At the same time, the level of security, whether it exists or does not in a given context, can undermine the functioning and legitimacy of the state. Geography is a similar variable; geography eases or complicates each of the components of nation-building and shapes policy considerations. Figure 1 shows state institutional development in the theoretical nation-building component context.
Figure 1 represents a framework for understanding how state institutions interact with other components of nation-building (C1, C2…Cx), relate to the security and geographic contexts, and reinforce nation-building outcomes. At any given time, the complex interactions provide a feedback loop which can affect the components and the context; in other words, the level of consensus then affects one or more of the nation-building components as well as the security environment. As stated, this study is centered on the component of state institutions in the interest of crafting a feasible analysis. The other components revealed in the literature, nation-building as social construction, as economic development, and as policy output, are not diminished by addressing them through the lens of one primary independent variable. Figure 1 shows
how the “mess” of politics can complicate the examination of nation-building outcomes as a function of only one component of nation-building. Therefore, this construct must remain in mind when linking state institutions, society, and outcomes as defined.

More specific notes on research design

The compliance theory yields a specific hypothesis regarding the relationship over time between organizations and lower participants which can be made analogous to the relationship between the imposed state and important subgroups in society. This hypothesis is that organizations compliance structures will be associated with the societal involvement levels. In other words, as policies which are more coercive are implemented, groups in society will see an increase in negative involvement with the imposed state. As institutions become more utilitarian or normative in their interactions with the populace, involvement of groups in society will become more positive. A more normative nation-building project may be characterized by a dynamic of increasing returns and be more peaceful; as institutions rely to a lesser degree on coercion to bring about compliance, more segments of the populace should “buy-in” peacefully to the nation-building process. This needs to be assessed longitudinally, with ultimate evaluations of success taken in terms of the compliance framework; is the imposed state able to move from one of coercion to a normative compliance relationship?

There are both inductive and deductive approaches at play in using the historical case study to assess the hypotheses associated with compliance theory. Substantial data regarding institutional development and societal feedback is required. This data is available, but must be consolidated by going through the historical documentation of the era. The most cost effective means of obtaining historical data on the societal feedback.
(positive or negative shifts in orientation) is also available in both primary and secondary sources; however, precision requires that the particular classification of the imposed state be paired with particular feedback in an accurate manner.

Classifying institutional outputs in accordance with the compliance theory can be done through the development of consistent coding rules. These coding rules must be analogous to coding rules explained in Etzioni (1975) and fellow compliance studies. For example, a policy of using unpaid conscript labor to build a road would be coded as coercive, and the reaction from an observable segment of society would be expected to be negative (alienative). Meanwhile, the manipulation and use of symbols, such as creation of a national flag or anthem by the Philippine Commission would be coded as employing moral means of power (normative). The expected reaction would be less negative than the reaction to a coercive policy. Because the theory argues that there is a longitudinal dynamic, the action-reaction relationship is what must be investigated in the case. Each relationship which can be identified clearly in the historical data can be looked at longitudinally as well in order to view the compliance pattern over time and see whether the pattern fits the one predicted. There is a genuine problem, though, when one is trying to code at the level of the individual policy as opposed to at a higher level of abstraction. For example, if one is trying to determine whether a particular policy output is encouraging of coercive, remunerative, or normative means of control, that, in the clearest of circumstances may be simple enough to accomplish. However, pieces of legislation and executive orders more often than not contain several line items, each of which could be evaluated separately at enormous costs of time and increasing the chances of interpretive error. In the Philippine case, for instance, budget allocations grew over
time to fill hundreds of pages with line items that could reasonably be classified in multiple ways. For this reason, the classification of the imposed state is based upon the predominant patterns of the means of control involved throughout society, rather than at the level of the policy output; although, in future work, this may present an intriguing challenge to the researcher. In short, some precision is sacrificed in the name of feasibility.

If successful nation-building is seen as increased economic development, greater democratic representation, peaceful resolution of internal political conflict, and the takeover and support of imposed institutions by the once subject population, then any observed compliance pattern can be related to these outcomes of nation-building success. However, it should be noted that at this point the project as envisioned would only provide an assessment of the role of institutions and the outcomes; the compliance theory is used to frame one manner in which institutions matter to the outcome, not a direct relationship between compliance structures and nation-building success. This is a subtle, though crucial distinction which must be understood. Finally, the areas of consensus listed in Table 3, redefined in a manner analogous to the imposed state, will be valuable indirect measures of the outcomes (societal reaction to the imposed institutions at a given time).

The data available on the institutions as well as what those institutions actually produced in the way of policies in the imposed colonial state in the Philippines is taken from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include historical archives located at the National Archives annex in College Park, Maryland. These sources include official records of the Philippine Commission, special records of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, executive orders and correspondence from the Governors-General of the Philippine Islands, as well as acts and reports of both American and Philippine officials working within the framework of the colonial state. Papers and secondary sources related to prominent officials of the colonial state, including William Howard Taft (Governor-General) and Elihu Root (Secretary of War) are also included among the consulted sources for this study.

Data collection and validity

Obtaining the necessary documents in sufficient quantity marks a significant logistical issue for this research project. In addition, any documents not obtained from which appropriate data may have been drawn mark a key threat to the validity of findings.

The data available on the institutions (and what those institutions actually produce in the way of policy) of the colonial state in the Philippines during the specified scope is largely located among government documents in the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. These sources include the official records of the Philippine Commission, War Department, and papers of prominent officials of the colonial state, including William Howard Taft and Elihu Root. Data on the effects policies have on key segments on Philippine society are complicated to gather. While some data may be culled from the aforementioned historical documents, Filipino sources and documents, secondary sources, and other sources cited within secondary accounts of the era can be key to gathering the appropriate data. Financial costs and time are the most significant obstacles to obtaining this data in its purest, most original form. However, high quality secondary sources (e.g. the oft cited work by Glenn May (1980) on political education in the
Philippines from 1900-1913) help to identify the most crucial material and sources of the era (e.g. magazines, newspapers, and other secondary and primary accounts). This said, this study represents the results of a good-faith effort to examine and assess for importance the appropriate documentation available in U.S. government archives related to the imposed colonial state in the Philippines. Finally, any study using historical records, government documents, or secondary sources must routinely stress the interpretive aspects of using such data.

Certain archival sources located in the special collections have not been included in this study, with varying effects on validity. Detailed customs records are not employed in this study due to the fact that the information on relevant trade policies is available from other sources in the National Archives. A review of all copies of the U.S. sponsored Gazette is not included based upon the availability of such information elsewhere in the Archives, with the primary risk being an under appreciation for the scope of the U.S. propaganda effort in available print media in the Philippines. One year’s worth of constabulary reports was not included on the basis that the minutiae of the reports added little to the understanding of the institutional dynamic of the colonial state. However, these reports do provide some fascinating individual-level perspective on the day-to-day functioning of that particular bureaucracy. The bottom line is that it is the judgment of the author of this study that these records, which upon first examination yielded a miniscule amount of pertinent data, could be safely omitted without sacrificing solid explanatory leverage.

Another methodological issue concerns the very nature of archival research. Conducting the most systematic analysis of available documents represents an extremely
daunting task. Single line items are often dual purposed; it is purely interpretive to
determine which of two particular line items (e.g. acts of a legislature or executive
orders) is the most important from among thousands. In other words, unit homogeneity is
a genuine concern and an interpretive approach is crucial. This can introduce a level of
subjectivity and a problem of coding error. The procedures in place at the National
Archives, compounded by time and cost issues, limit the amount of systematic analysis
which can be given to each individual document.4 With archival work, there is always
the opportunity for errors of commission, where the researcher places more importance
on a given document than is warranted, as well as errors of omission, where the
researcher places less importance on a given document than is warranted. To conclude,
the risks of increased error due to the nature of the methodology are genuine. These
risks, however, are moderated substantially in this study through the ability to corroborate
different documents against one another as well as against other scholarly work.
Ultimately, replication of these findings is the ideal solution.

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4 There are other considerations when dealing with sources at the National Archives. First, there are only
so many document pulls which are allowed during a given day. Second, the researcher assumes the risk
that the document finding aids are appropriate and accurate given the best background knowledge
available. Third, there is the risk that necessary documents are unavailable or misplaced. On several
occasions, I located several documents which were improperly categorized or filed; federal regulations
prohibited me from making appropriate changes which would have made the research process easier for the
next person.
The nation-building agenda in the Philippines is better understood when one breaks down the concept of nation-building. Constructing nationhood is a process of long-term social change in which the building of state institutions is one component. The geography and history of the Philippine archipelago shed some light on the difficulties possible in building nationhood as well as establishing a state. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief historical overview of the political and social condition of the Philippines as of the time when the United States interjected itself into the role of occupier in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War.

The unique diversity of Philippine society is in part based upon successive waves of migration to the 7,000-plus islands of the archipelago over a period of hundreds, if not thousands of years. Those who settled the islands were of multiple ethnic backgrounds, spoke multiple languages, and, especially after the arrival of Islam in the fifteenth century CE, religious affiliations. Subsequent centuries of Spanish colonial rule somewhat lessened the diversity of the islands; Christianity made more significant inroads in the Philippines than in any other Asian country (Karnow 1989, p. 47). As of 2000, over 80% of the population identified itself as Roman Catholic, 2.8% were identified as Evangelical Christian, and 5% as Muslim (CIA 2007).

According to the 2000 Philippine census, approximately three-quarters of the population is distributed among seven ethnic groups, with the largest single ethnicity being Tagalog at 28.1% (CIA 2007). There are eight major dialects spoken in the country in addition to English. The ethnic groups and dialects tend to be associated with
particular islands and island groupings in the archipelago (CIA 2007 and Oct. 9, 1898 telegram to Hay).

The geographic distribution of ethnicities and languages in the archipelago represented a significant barrier to the establishment of Philippine nationhood. The geography led to pre-colonial political divisions based upon tribes and kinship groups which were largely limited to particular islands or topographically defined sections of islands. The geography and diversity directly relate to the manner in which Spain gained control of the islands. As Spain took aim at occupying and colonizing the islands to take advantage of the trade routes upon which sat the Philippines, representatives of the crown made bargains with individual chiefs and tribes in order to gain complicity for Spanish rule. Spain played one village ruler (datu) off another and a politically divided archipelago fell under Spanish governance, at least nominally.

There was no separation of church and state in the Spanish-governed Philippines. Spanish governmental authority rested in a governor-general, who along with religious authorities held nearly absolute power. The position title was based upon the fact that from the end of the seventeenth century onward, the governor always held a military commission. The islands of the archipelago were divided into provinces under the control of alcalde mayors or magistrates (corregidores). In 1886, the office of alcalde mayor was abolished in favor of a new office of gobernador civil, which was directly accountable to the governor-general. Provinces were formed around the linguistic patterns and were subdivided into municipalities which were divided along similar lines. These municipalities were placed under the control of cabezas de barangay, tribal chiefs.

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5 Information on the structure of Spanish government in the Philippines is consolidated from the Philippine Census of 1903, pp. 361-368.
confirmed by the Spanish crown and responsible for collecting tribute and providing labor to the colonial government. Following three years of service, the local cabeza de barangay became exempt from collecting tribute and joined in la principalia, a local municipal governing body. Towns also had chiefs (gobernadorcillos) elected by the cabezas de barangay. In 1782, gobernadorcillos became known as alcaldes. In 1850, a royal decree created a board of advisors for the governor. In 1863, Spain created a public administration council (consejo de administración) to assist the head of the Army in the Philippines. By 1874, the position of director-general of civil administration was created to manage civil affairs, public works projects, education, and other policy implementation. In addition, in 1893, a law reorganized municipal government under military auspices. In larger towns, a municipal tribunal of military officers was elected by twelve delegates chosen by la principalia. Thus, while political development took slowly increasing forms of inclusiveness, the actual electorate able to participate in selecting leaders was miniscule at best.

Spain’s colonial state was set up in a manner which reflected the metropole’s priorities of economic resource extraction and religious conversion of the Philippine population. The dominant social and political forces of the Spanish-controlled islands were Catholic monastic orders (Karnow 1989, p. 49). Upon the American occupation of 1898, four particular orders, the Augustinians, Dominicans-Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits, were seen to be most important in the Spanish colonial administration. The Jesuits held exclusive jurisdiction over education in the Spanish-controlled islands of the archipelago (Oct. 9, 1898 telegram).
The orders controlled most of the available land and had that control backed by the Spanish government. The orders would rent the land out to native farmers then proceed to raise rents in order to “capitalize tenants’ labor.” This practice led to widespread de facto servitude, eventually leading to discontent and insurgency by peasants against Spanish rule (Oct. 9, 1898 telegram). The colonial land management system (encomienda) entitled elite landowners to tax those who lived on their land; although, the owners were responsible for the physical and spiritual well-being of the natives in a feudal arrangement (Karnow, p. 50). This discontent was also fomented by the use of unpaid labor and judicial corruption. The systematization of forcing natives into corvée labor in service of the colonial state (repartimiento) was a staple of the Spanish colonial administration throughout their empire. Bureaucratic rivalries between the orders and other Spanish elites were resolved in favor of the orders in the late sixteenth century CE (p. 51). Ideally, natives would eventually be able to obtain their own land; however, subservience to Spanish elites or to the orders became the norm, exacerbating inequality in the archipelago. This legacy of quasi-feudal inequality (caciquism or caciquismo), while a periodic concern of the American colonial administration, has not been completely eliminated in the archipelago (May 1980; Anderson 1988).

Manila developed into an important transit point for East Asian products heading towards Europe. By the mid-eighteenth century, enterprising priests and businessmen began to develop domestic Philippine agriculture. Tobacco, hemp, and sugar, among other products, increased in demand throughout the world (Karnow, pp. 58-61). Interest in Philippine resources was also encouraged during the initial opening of Manila to
foreign investment during its occupation by the British during the Seven Years’ War. This economic opening was frowned upon by a significant proportion of the orders. However, the shift towards increased trade of Philippine products had occurred for good by the conclusion of the British occupation (p. 58). In fact, by the time of the Spanish-American War, it was a common belief among American expansionists that if the United States did not take charge of the entire archipelago then any number of other colonial powers would do so for their own economic interests (Morris 2001; Oct. 9, 1898 telegram).

In addition to the Spanish bureaucracy, Catholic orders, and economic interests, the era of Spanish occupation inadvertently led to the beginning of nation-building in the social constructive sense of the term. The 1868 revolution which overthrew Queen Isabella II in Spain led to a temporary, destabilizing chain of events in the Philippines. Liberal elements took charge of Spain, leading to a split in the administrative elements of the Philippines. The opening of the Suez Canal enabled quicker transit of people and ideas between Spain and the Philippines; liberal ideas reaching the archipelago from the revolution inspired similar movements by 1870. Spanish born clergy and representatives were not supportive of the liberalization occurring back in Spain; meanwhile, clergy native to the Philippines and the Spanish-educated, Tagalog elite (ilustrados) hoped that new rights resultant from the revolution would make their way to Spanish colonies. A number of ilustrados had been able to attend universities in Spain, exposing themselves to the liberal ideals of the revolution. The ilustrados envisioned a Philippines with representation in the Cortes with “Filipinos” treated equally to native Spaniards, as well

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6 This section on the ilustrado revolutionary era is consolidated from information in May (1980, pp. xxiv-xxv), Kramer (2006, pp. 42, 47, 50-59, 76-77, 81), and the 1903 Philippine Census (pp. 35, 374-385).
as expulsion of the orders. *Ilustrado* writers, led by the iconic José Rizal, openly advocated reform of the Spanish colonial system. On January 20, 1872, a soldier revolt at Cavite’s San Felipe fort led to a profound reaction by conservative interests in the Philippines. The suppression of liberal ideas under strengthened Spanish orders and reactionary Governor-General Izquierdo between 1871 and 1873 consolidated power and influence in the hands of the orders. Rizal, his family, and others sympathetic to the ilustrado cause were exiled to Hong Kong.

An *ilustrado*-led revolution began in the Philippines by 1892 under several leaders, the most noteworthy being Andrés Bonifacio and his faction *Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan nang manga Anak nang Bayan* (Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People), or *El Katipunan*. José Rizal, who had returned to the Philippines, was executed on December 30, 1896. Far from squelching revolutionary fervor in the archipelago, Rizal became a martyr to the Filipino cause and the *Katipunan*. By 1896, many islands were in full revolt against Spanish rule. Meanwhile, Emilio Aguinaldo began gaining influence among the revolutionary movement.

The *ilustrado* movement is the intellectual origin of a particular narrative of Filipino nationhood. *Ilustrado* writers’ groups consciously constructed the meaning and history of the Filipino people. This construction had both benefits and flaws with respect to the quest for legitimizing a more equal status for the Philippines within the Spanish empire. The movement was a boon to those who argued that educating colonials was possible and that the universalism of liberal ideas could take root in colonial societies, at least among the educated classes. Revolutionary organizations such as the *Katipunan*
later demonstrated that the ideas of liberalism could also spread outside of the elite to the peasant class. However, the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-sectarian realities in the archipelago meant that the influence of the Tagalog majority was limited. Non-Tagalog peoples could be skeptical of the Tagalog narrative of Filipino history (Kramer 2006, pp. 63-64, 66-71, 76-78).

Just as there was no unifying political power for the islands prior to the arrival of Magellan (who was killed while interfering with an inter-tribal rivalry), the Spanish were never able to completely subdue each tribe through force nor buy the loyalty of each village in the archipelago. In particular, the Muslim population, which was largely concentrated in the southern islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, became a persistent thorn in the side of the Spanish throughout the centuries of occupation. These Muslims, who were called Moros by the Spanish (from their religious comparison to the Moors of reconquista era Spain), intermittently rose up against the Spanish and were never completely subdued by the Spanish (Magdalena 1994). Moros in Mindanao actively resisted Spanish rule during the three centuries from 1578 to the Spanish defeat of 1898 (p. 347).

As the Spanish-American War concluded, the First and Second Philippine Commissions were tasked to survey the new territories considered legally transferred to the United States (in the eyes of other colonial powers) by the Treaty of Paris of 1898. The 1903 Census of the Philippine Islands, overseen by the Second Philippine Commission estimated a population of approximately seven million in the archipelago, of which approximately 700,000 were literate in Spanish. Only 7,000 individuals were considered “educated” by the standards of the leading Church official, the Archbishop of
Manila (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1905). This Census also reveals that despite the enormous influence of the Catholic orders, the Spanish civil administrative apparatus was also influential in the archipelago. The ultimate disposition of the territories ceded by Spain would have to be decided in the course of American domestic politics and by the interactions between the United States and a fractured polity with no experience in unified government in the absence of the Spanish. At the same time, a growing societal force in the form of an educated, liberal class from the majority ethnic and religious group had emerged with “national” icons and a desire for independence from colonial rule. The United States took control of an archipelago with countless islands in or recovering from revolution; American reticence to grant independence to the Philippines led to a new insurgency which shaped the context of early institutional development in the U.S. led colonial state.

The American imposed colonial state in the Philippine Islands emerged out of a combination of strategic calculations, imperialistic legalism, and ambiguity. Strategically, as the war with Spain was winding down, it became believed in influential corners of McKinley’s administration that the economic and military position of the United States in the world would be tied to global naval reach and the accompanying access to raw materials (i.e. possession of colonies). The world was in the process of being carved up by the forces of imperialism in a zero-sum game; if the United States wanted to keep its hemispheric hegemony, it would have to engage in the scramble for colonies and the associated trade rights and market access privileges. Among the key thinkers shaping the Republican Party position on the post-war role for the United States were Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, President of the nascent Naval War College,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy and eventual Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Secretary of War Elihu Root (Morris 2001; Strand 1994, pp. 294-296; Morgan 1993, p. 15).

The resulting policy debate regarding the Philippines ran the full spectrum from outright independence under the idea that the American ideology and Constitution were morally and legally incompatible with other nations’ concepts of imperialism, to any number of other solutions. After all, the excesses of Spanish imperial rule were a driving force in fomenting public opinion in favor of the war. The independence position eventually found its way onto the Democratic Party platform as it became clear that influential GOP leaders were clearly falling into the “expansionist” camp (Jessup 1938, pp. 234-236).

Yet, even the expansionist camp was divided among policy options in the Philippines. The strategic “minimum” for a U.S. role in the islands was arguably the seizing of Manila or the island of Luzon as a coaling station for naval operations in the Pacific (Beede 1994, p. 295). This was one position (among many) considered by the appointed Peace Commissioners negotiating the end to the war with Spain in October 1898. Of the Commissioners, William R. Day advocated the seizure of Luzon while George Gray argued that there was “no place for colonial administration or government of subject people in [the] American system” (October 25, 1898 telegram from Peace Commissioners to Secretary of State John Hay). However, two key arguments made by expansionists (who made up a majority of the Peace Commissioners) eventually won McKinley’s favor. First, pro-business supporters of the Republican Party desired the raw material wealth of the Philippine Islands. How could U.S. business compete in a global
market without the colonial advantages of the other major trading nations? Second, the strategic and economic rise of Germany and Japan seemingly placed the U.S. in the zero-sum position of seizing the entire archipelago or leaving what wasn’t taken to other colonial powers. This would be a political untenable position. Eventually, the Republican position became not only one of complete seizure of the Philippines, but “benevolent assimilation” (Ibid; Morgan 1993, pp. 14-16, 103-106; Abinales 2003, p. 150).

The international legal framework of the early twentieth century was a key factor in the transition in the Philippine Islands from Spanish to American dominance. Ideas of self-determination had not yet permeated the international jurisprudence of the imperialist countries; colonial possessions were treated as any other piece of property under contract. Thus, when Spain negotiated its obligations in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the disposition of colonial holdings was handled as a property transaction. However, just because “property” rights were settled by the stroke of a pen, the on-the-ground status of the Philippines was completely in limbo from the moment of the end of active Spanish resistance in Manila. Simply because major hostilities ended between the United States and Spain, this does not mean the end of armed conflict. The revolution of Aguinaldo and his allies continued all the way to Manila. Disagreements arose over the legal and moral authority in the islands. These disagreements are quite clear given the declaration of the Philippine Republic by Emilio Aguinaldo in January of 1899 and the contrasting diplomatic exchanges between Spain and the U.S. during the treaty negotiations. Spanish representatives repeatedly complained about American obligations to protect Spanish
citizens and their interests in the Philippines against actions by the revolutionaries (Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1901).

The legal ambiguity of United States control over the Philippines combined with the *de facto* control of much of the archipelago by revolutionaries gave way to open warfare between Aguinaldo’s forces and the U.S. Army. The Philippine-American War commenced as the U.S. tried to assert its sovereignty over the former Spanish colonies. Thus, the beginning of colonial state-building occurred simultaneously with combat operations where required to subdue various revolutionary groups. Two of the first institutions of state-building, the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts emerged within this context. The Philippine Constabulary, officially established in 1901, emerged out of the need to develop a policing capability in the islands. The Constabulary was led by American officers and served the dual purpose of internal law enforcement and counterinsurgency (Olson 2007; Fort Sam Houston Museum 2008). The Philippine Scouts represented a similar institution in that they were comprised in order to defeat those forces which opposed American occupation and consolidation of the nascent colonial state. However, the Scouts, rather than being a force with a dual mission, were actually constituted under the United States Army. These were Philippine forces under American military command. It is noteworthy that units of Philippine Scouts were drawn from ethnic groups (e.g. Macabebe) which were used to oppose the largely Tagalog insurgents. In this way, the United States played one group off of another in order to gain strategically. The Philippine Scouts are the historical forerunners to the Philippine Armed Forces.
The Schurman and Taft Commissions both believing that the insurrection by Aguinaldo’s forces was largely confined to the Tagalog people, actively sought Pampangan and Ilocano recruits for the Philippine Scouts. This actually followed the Spanish precedent for dealing with insurgent people groups. However, it must be noted that the racial and tribal distinctions within the Scouts did impact the unit cohesion as U.S. officers rarely delegated authority to non-White counterparts (Kramer 2006, pp. 113-114).

Five eras in the evolution of the state-society relationship

It is clear that the state-society dynamic between 1898 and 1941 can be delineated by understanding the key issues which drove the American policies and institutional framework, as well as the societal response in the Philippine Islands to those policies and institutions. Specifically, in no way did the people of the Philippines acquiesce unconditionally or unanimously to the idea that the colonial state was legitimate. What changed throughout the time in question are the mechanisms of dissent and the arena in which society responded to the state. Archival evidence reveals the shift over time from the armed combat of Philippine forces under Aguinaldo to the utilization, largely by elites, of the imposed institutions for the purpose of asserting Philippine independence. The dynamic can be roughly described as being broken up into five significant eras. The first era is one of armed conflict and state imposition. This era runs from the assumption of U.S. control over the Philippines in 1898 until approximately 1903. A second era of elite collaboration runs from approximately 1903 to the birth of the Philippine Assembly in 1907. These initial two eras are characterized by the unilateral imposition of state institutions by the Philippine Commission and are marked by multiple periods of violent
conflict throughout the archipelago. The third era is one of nascent representative colonialism. This era is characterized by the growth in importance of the Philippine legislature and expansion in the sophistication of the imposed state. This third era is marked by a notable decrease in violent conflict outside of the Moro islands and increased cooperation between the Filipino elite and the United States. The years of the third era roughly span from 1907 to 1916. The fourth era is best described as one of established representative colonialism. This fourth era is one of increased policy-making authority being placed in the hands of Filipinos and the start of a transition toward self-rule. During this era, the tug-of-war between independence and incorporation manifests itself most clearly. This fourth era roughly spans from 1917 to 1941. A fifth, turbulent era which is not discussed in too much detail with respect to institutional development is that of World War II, from 1941 to 1945. However, one cannot reach the final transition to independence in 1946 without appreciating the complexity of the Philippine experience in World War II.

Armed conflict and state imposition

From the American perspective, institutional development in the Philippine Islands was part of a coherent, comprehensive program of foreign policy following the war with Spain. The occupation of the Philippines represented a significant strategic opportunity for the United States. At the same time, the United States assumed sovereignty from Spain in Puerto (Porto) Rico and Cuba. In each of the three territories there was a period of insurgency (to a lesser extent in Puerto Rico) and concurrent institution building. However, each of the three cases experienced a different outcome with respect to that institutional development. In the case of Cuba, the goal of the state-
building policy was that of creating a loyal, but nominally independent Cuba. Puerto Rico was incorporated into the governing structure of the United States as a commonwealth, and maintains that status to this day. The Philippines experienced the incorporation of Puerto Rico; however, the nominal goals of the American occupation included the ultimate vision of self-governance. It was the envisioned timeline which differed from the Cuban policy.

Both the occupations of Cuba and the Philippine Islands fell under the auspices of the Secretary of War. Governors-General Leonard Wood in Cuba and William H. Taft in the Philippines reported to the Elihu Root in the War Department upon his confirmation in 1899. Root’s experiences in the War Department merit discussion with respect to his conceptualization of his role in managing colonial affairs as well as his views of public administration. Root was appointed to the position by President McKinley largely because of his legal background. At the same time, Root grappled with the realization that his role would have serious ramifications, far beyond wrangling over legal codes and constitution writing. Writing to his wife in 1899, Root stated, “When I consider the power now placed in my hands and its tremendous effect on the lives of millions of poor creatures who are looking to this country for civilization and freedom and the blessings of law and order, the little sacrifices I am making seem small indeed” (Jessup 1938, p. 223).

The security situation in the Philippines faced by Root upon taking office drew the new American expansionism into a historical confluence with the demands for civil service reforms in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. This confluence played and important role in shaping the vision for Philippine state institutions. The counterinsurgency in the Philippines required an influx of troops to be provided by the
War Department. These troops required commissioned officers. Root was forced to fight the politicization of officer commissions; requests for political appointments constantly found their way to Root’s office (Jessup 1938, pp. 228-230). Root was influential in pro-civil service reform circles. He maintained a close working relationship with Theodore Roosevelt who had previously been the Civil Service Commissioner prior to the turn of the century. Root himself was a Vice President of the Civil Service Reform Association (p. 230; Morris 2001).

In keeping with his desire to increase merit-based appointments in the civil service, Root sought out to reform the process for appointing military officers in the U.S. The war with Spain was tarnished by a number of logistics and supply problems including tainted beef, bad sanitation, and deployment errors. The Army, the lead agency in the Philippine counterinsurgency and colonial “insular” occupations required a top-down reform in the area of professional development. Root’s taking charge of insular appointments and his concern with professionalism and merit-based promotion led to the creation of the General Staff and systematic military education for senior officers through the Army War College (pp. 240-243, 258-259). Root’s reorganization of the Army led to rotations of officers between line units and staff positions, minimizing the political fiefdom’s that his rivals in the War Department had controlled (pp. 251, 253).

The consequences of Root’s concerns with civil service reform were not limited to the United States. The technical expertise and politicization of the Philippine colonial state were constant concerns throughout the U.S. occupation. The Report of the Philippine Commission from 1900, headed by Jacob Gould Schurman (the Schurman Commission) and preceding the Second Philippine Commission under William H. Taft
included “honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent practicable, natives shall be employed” as an item “deemed of cardinal importance” (Schurman Commission, p. 5). The Schurman Commission consisted of Schurman, Admiral Dewey, General Elwell Otis, who had been military governor of the areas of American control, Charles Denby, U.S. minister to China, and Dean C. Worcester, an ethnographer from the University of Michigan (Jessup 1938, pp. 332-333).

The Schurman Commission marked the first civilian foray into assessing the political, social, and economic realities for the United States’ occupation of the Philippines. In addition to the priority of civil service, the Commission’s report exuded the philosophy of “benevolent assimilation,” stating that “The purpose of the American government is the welfare and advancement of the Philippine people.” This was, of course, couched with the warning that “The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout ever part of the Archipelago, and those who resist can accomplish no end other than their own ruin.” Meanwhile, the civil service would concern itself with the establishment of modern public works and the education system (Schurman Commission, p. 5). There was little respect for both the capacity for self-government by the Filipinos as well as an outright rejection as to the very existence of a national identity in the archipelago. Root asserted that, “There is no Philippine people. The hundreds of islands…are inhabited by more than eighty different tribes, speaking more than sixty different languages.” Also, quoting from the Schurman Commission report, Root argued, “Only through American occupation…is the idea of a free, self-governing and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable.” The expansion of U.S. imposed state
institutions was necessary to prevent anarchy in the minds of American policy makers (Jessup 1938, pp. 332-333).

During June of 1900, the Second Philippine Commission landed in Manila, picking up where the Schurman Commission left off. The new Commission consisted of William H. Taft, Luke E. Wright, Worcester, the only holdover, and Henry Clay Ide, a former judge on Samoa and a student of Spanish colonial history (pp. 332-333).

Prior to the arrival of the Taft Commission, the Army had begun a muddled process under Otis of building local governments (Kramer 2006, p. 148; May 1980, pp. 4, 43-45). These municipal governments had at least some precedence under Spanish rule; it was at the local level where substantial self-rule existed where the Spanish made agreements with local elites (Morgan 1993, pp. 98-99). The Taft Commission, known as the Philippine Commission upon taking charge of civil government, envisioned ever more extensive self-government as time progressed. Municipal government would eventually coalesce around larger, provincial units, and ultimately into national institutions as the populace was pacified and acknowledging of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands (May 1980, pp. 7, 14, 16-17). The early impressions of the Philippine Commission were that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule in the absence of significant evolution in their “political education.” This assessment was in spite of the existence of the Aguinaldo-led Philippine Republic (pp. 9, 14, 16-17). Adequate capability for self-rule was clearly concomitant with acceptance of American style institutions and a modern state apparatus (pp. 16-17).

The capture of Aguinaldo in March of 1901 led to a rapid decrease in the scope of the insurgency against the nascent colonial state (Schirmer and Shalom 1987). This
security development enabled President McKinley to establish the civil government under the Second Philippine Commission (Taft Commission) on July 4, 1901. Specifically, the Taft Commission assumed both executive and legislative authority over the Philippine Islands, decreasing the role of the military in executive decision making. This transition facilitated rapid implementation of Root and Taft’s full vision of the colonial state (Jessup 1938, p. 355, 358).

There were three pillars to Taft’s conceptualization of the colonial state which once achieved may allow for a sort of quasi-independence of the Philippines in his view. These pillars were political education and training in the practice of government and passing legislation, the establishment of a robust public education system in order to unify the nation and teach democratic citizenship, and economic development through the building and enhancement of national infrastructure (May 1980, pp. 14-15). Root’s priorities overlapped strongly with those of Taft. Root encouraged the continuation of the bottom-up, municipal and provincial establishment of government; this model had begun under the Army in 1899 in “pacified” parts of the archipelago. Root was enamored with the federal model in the United States and saw it as beneficial to the diversity of the Philippines (Jessup 1938, pp. 335-336). Notions of federalism were also displayed in the manner in which non-Christian areas of the archipelago were treated with respect to self-government, or lack thereof. Root noted that “degrees of civilization” were to be taken into account when delegating any political authority to the local level (p. 356). “Uncivilized” tribes were to be allowed to maintain their own customs and political organizations while colonial officials would work to prevent “barbarous practices” (pp. 356-357).
The policy areas which Root saw as most crucial to bringing political stability to the Philippines were those of revenue, public education, creation and staffing of the civil service, establishment of a competent judiciary and legal system, and public works. With respect to education, Root insisted upon free primary education in both local languages as well as English, which was seen as a potential unifying force in the nation over the course of multiple generations. Tax policy was intended to be kept simple while avoiding undue burdens on the populace and spending locally raised revenues in the given municipality (pp. 355-357).

It was quickly realized that the Spooner Amendment, the amendment to the Army Appropriations Act of 1901 which had transferred executive power from the military to the Philippine Commission, was not sufficiently detailed for the purposes of establishing the modern state apparatus envisioned by Taft and Root. A more comprehensive framework was necessary if administrative gains were to be effective beyond the tenure of the individuals in charge at that time. Specifically, Taft had overseen dozens of Commission acts related to civil service regulations, individual appropriations and public works projects, the establishment of several municipal and provincial governments, school divisions, all while interfacing with the Army to handle continued insurrection in at least three provinces. Root and Taft realized the necessity of the U.S. Congress to legislate the authority for selling bonds for the purposes of raising money for economic development in the wake of the waning revolution (pp. 362-363). This was all prior to Commission Act Number 222, which established the basic framework of the colonial bureaucracy (Acts of the U.S. Philippine Commission, 1900-1907).
Taft established four bureaucratic departments which encompassed the early colonial state’s backbone, the Departments of Interior, Commerce and Police, Finance and Justice, and Public Instruction. These agencies of the state were each assigned specific, comprehensive functions. Taft pushed hard for a policy which opened up the civil service to native Filipinos to fill positions when at all possible. The Department of Interior was assigned the Bureaus of Health, Quarantine, the Marine Hospital Corps, Forestry, Mining, Agriculture, Fisheries, Weather, Public Lands, Government Laboratories, and Patents and Copyrights. In addition, a Bureau of Pagan and Mohammedan Tribes was placed in the Department of the Interior, similar to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States.

Elihu Root assumed an analogous relationship between the non-Christian tribes and the Philippine state as Native Americans encountered in the United States (Jessup 1938, p. 364; Morris 2001, pp. 441, 466-467). This analogous relationship involved treating non-Christian tribes and their vicinities in the same pattern as Indian reservations in the United States. Amoroso (2003) and Kramer (2006) research the importance of racial distinctions and the connections between American mindsets and policies towards the Philippines. Ethnic and religious divisions could be minimized insofar as some groups where allied with the United States against groups that actively opposed occupation. However, in the absence of this need to divide and conquer, racial hierarchy was often on display in ethnographic displays, including the 1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis. The various cultural displays were shown as evidence of the need for America’s civilizing influence in the archipelago. Kramer’s research skillfully explores the
To the Department of Commerce and Police, Bureaus of Island and Inter-Island Transportation, Post Offices, Telegraphs, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Engineering and Construction of Public Works, Insular Constabulary, Prisons, Light Houses, and Commercial and Street Railroad Corporations were assigned. To the Department of Finance and Justice, Bureaus of the Insular Treasury, Insular Auditor, Customs and Immigration, Internal Revenue, Cold Storage and Ice Plant, Banks, Banking, Coinage, and Currency, and Justice were assigned. Finally, to the Department of Public Instruction, Bureaus of Public Charities, Libraries and Museums, Statistics, Public Records, Public Printing, Architecture, and Construction of Public Buildings were assigned. To put it succinctly, the Philippine state was undergoing massive growth and formalization in a short time frame (Acts of the U.S. Philippine Commission, 1900-1907).

Each of these agencies as well as their overseeing Departments required regulations on staffing requirements, appropriations, and delegated areas of authority. The colonial government was forced to use the Mexican peso as a unit of currency in the absence of legislated coinage authority or the extension of the National Banking Act in the United States to the Philippines. Taft desperately needed legislation in Washington (pp. 362-363).

July 1, 1902, the Philippine Government Act, also called the Organic Act, went into effect. The Organic Act provided for an archipelago-wide census to be followed in two years by elections to a national assembly (The Census of the Philippine Islands of
1903). Authority on disposing of public lands and resource extraction was delegated to the Commission, as well as the authority to create bond issues and some coinage. A comprehensive Coinage Act was passed in March of 1903. Additionally, the Organic Act codified into legislation the instructions on civil liberties which were drafted by Root in his instructions to Taft at the creation of the Second Philippine Commission. Most guarantees for civil liberties in the U.S. Bill of Rights were extended to the Philippine Islands with the notable exceptions of trial by jury and the right to bear arms (pp. 354-355).

Even as the Aguinaldo-led revolution came to an end, sectarian divisions and insurrections among the non-Christian peoples had genuine ramifications for the state structure and behavior. The relationship between the United States and the non-Christian peoples of the Philippine Islands is difficult to categorize in a simple fashion. The U.S. Army remained the lead agency in governing non-Christian areas in the southern islands and the Philippine Commission maintained separate control over the area which became known as “Mountain” province in the north. There was debate as to whether the Muslim Moros were an uncivilized minority group which needed to be integrated into the Filipino society or a quasi-independent group which needed to be protected and insulated from the rest of the Philippines. The policy approach of the U.S. Army appears to have incorporated the ideology of the former with the institutions of the latter; the Moros were never seen as equal, while institutionally the non-Christians were kept in separate provinces to be brought into the Philippine state at a later date (Amoroso 2003, pp. 119-121). In October of 1901, Commission Act 253 created a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes to fall under the Department of Interior in the colonial state. This new bureau was
tasked with learning the name, territory, population, social organization, language, beliefs, manners, and customs “with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity.”

Many of the southern Muslims were never truly conquered and ruled by Spain. Both Spain and the United States used their presumed legal sovereignty to negotiate treaties with particular local leaders in order to prevent rebellion. The Sultan of Sulu was but one of the important leaders with whom the United States negotiated agreements with in the southern part of the archipelago. Army liaison officers worked hard to convince the Moros, who had continuously resisted Spanish efforts at subjugation, not to implement their own insurgency campaign against the U.S. Moro Province was eventually created in 1903, but it would take a full ten years to transition from military to civilian rule there due to widespread rebellion by the Moros who had grown unhappy with the American presence (pp. 121-143).

Yet, to say that each of the Moro tribes formed a unified front against the United States is to paint with too broad a brush. Many Moro datus fought against the Spanish; the U.S. took advantage of this to negotiate the 1899 Bates Treaty with the Sultan of Sulu which guaranteed tribute payments and non-interference in Moro affairs, laws, and customs in exchange for recognizing U.S. sovereignty in the islands. This treaty held until the creation of Moro Province in 1903 under General Leonard Wood and the spreading of insurgencies in the Moro areas. In restoring U.S. control, the Army pitted datu against datu and engaged in some of the same “reconcentration” strategies so decried by Americans when used by the Spanish in Cuba. At the same time, Army officers tend not to interfere with religious practices, although coerced labor was
employed in the building of road and telegraph infrastructure (Kramer 2006, pp. 216-218).

The American response to Moro rebellion was often brutal; controversial tactics such as interrogation by the “water cure” were extremely controversial among anti-imperialists in the United States. Secretary Root believed that the media reports of excessive force against rebels were overblown, though he agreed to conduct his own investigations of atrocities (Kramer 2006, p. 218; Jessup 1938, pp. 248, 336, 341-342). The historical evidence indicates a widespread reluctance within Moro society to accept the legitimacy of the American occupation and the perceptions of those opposed to the occupation that U.S. forces were often unnecessarily brutal to local populations appear accurate. It is likely that the ten years of rebellion in the southern islands is part of an ongoing legacy of failed consensus as to the legitimacy of the Philippine state as established by the United States.

Another policy area addressed by the early colonial state in the Philippine Islands was that of land reform and the disposition of the lands belonging to religious orders at the time of Spain’s defeat. Issues related to land owned by Catholic orders were delegated to Taft himself under the Philippine Commission (November 30, 1900 Commission Report). Taft feared a lack of cooperation as it was believed that most of the Catholic bishops and the Papal delegate in the Philippines opposed his selection as Philippine Governor-General (Correspondence of the Philippine (Taft) Commission, 1901-1906). Nevertheless, the legacy of caciquismo and American views on homesteading as a contributor to national development necessitated planned disposition of public lands; it was known that the Catholic orders maintained the titles to
approximately 420,000 acres of the best land of the archipelago. The Philippine Commission’s Municipal Code kept clergy from holding office, significantly decreasing, but certainly not eliminating orders’ influence over governance (Acts of the U.S. Philippine Commission, 1900-1907, No. 22). Approximately 60,000 tenants were living and farming on order lands and refusing to pay. Taft negotiated the purchase of nearly all the orders’ land for just over seven million dollars and U.S. based clergy assumed ministerial roles from the Spanish clergy over time (Jessup 1938, pp. 364-365).

Subsequent research into the distribution of land and its ramifications for Philippine society does not support the conclusion land reform efforts by the Philippine Commission eliminated the legacy of caciquismo (e.g. Anderson 1988).

The shift to elite collaboration

The Filipino elites that became empowered during the American occupation were not dissimilar to the revolutionary elite under Aguinaldo. They were educated, and many had held at least some degree of influence under the Spanish. With most of the violence coming to an end after the capture of Aguinaldo, the U.S. began to work with wealthy, educated Filipinos whose patronage networks greatly expanded the capacity of the Philippine Commission. Intra-state conflict largely became subsumed into state institutions as well as into the working relationships between the Commission and non-revolutionary Filipino leaders.

The 1903 census provided for by the Organic Act represents an impressive compilation of data and history on the Philippine Islands and their inhabitants. In addition, it represents an enormous feat in terms of individual and group efforts as well as an example of incorporating Filipinos into the operation of the colonial state. At least
outside of the Moro areas, 1903 marks a significant shift in the nature of the relationship between the occupying United States and Philippine society. It is at this stage in the American occupation that active steps were taken by the Commission to work with those in society, especially collaborative elites, in order to consolidate the state and conduct “political education” which would lead to self-government in Taft’s vision.

Just as the Army had done, Root continued the policy of focusing state-building efforts at the local (municipal) level. Once conditions permitted, larger provincial levels of government were created as it became safe to transfer power to civilian authorities. Root directed the Philippine Commission in the implementation of a federal vision for the Philippine state in the image of the United States (Jessup 1938, p. 355). Taft fully shared this vision with Root; evoking Tocqueville’s notions of American democracy at the Philippine municipal level (May 1980, p. 41). The common purposes demonstrated by Taft and Root are not of miniscule importance. Taft succeeded Root as Secretary of War in 1904 under Teddy Roosevelt. Root, meanwhile, became Secretary of State in the same administration in 1905.

The census of 1903 fully complemented this federal vision through its focus on the municipal and provincial levels in data gathering and analysis. The judicial system which was developed starting with Act 136 of the Philippine Commission in 1901 provides further evidence of a desired federal vision. Courts of first instance were organized at the provincial level as provinces were established. Offices of justice of the peace were created in each municipality. At the national level, a supreme court was established with one chief justice and six associate justices (Census, p. 409).
Many municipalities were established by the United States Army during the fight against the insurgency led by Aguinaldo. Local governments were believed to co-opt support for the new Philippine colonial government while undercutting Aguinaldo’s support among local elites who received at least a measure of influence over policy making (May 1980, pp. 43-45). The Army set up several hundred municipalities, forming the backbone to the new Philippine state (pp. 43-45).

The Army’s structural plans for municipal governments shaped both the Municipal Code passed by the Philippine Commission in 1901 as well as the Provincial Government Act of 1901. However, the municipal and provincial focus on local elites being brought into the state institutions served to reinforce power structures and elite networks in place prior to the American takeover. The interaction between Americans establishing municipal governments and landed elites is considered to have reinforced the legacy of caciquism throughout the Philippines. This was precisely the opposite outcome intended by the various land reforms implemented by Taft (pp. 41-42). Corruption was widely perceived at the municipal level where family ties were stronger than ties to the new state institutions. Interestingly, the tug-of-war between the goals of merit-based governance and personalistic clientelism echoed the same dynamic in many American cities (pp. 52-54; Anibales, pp. 148-50).

The continuous interaction between the American imposed state and the various local and provincial governments, combined with the ultimate vision of a Philippine Assembly following the 1902 Organic Act, paved the way for an emerging influence for those Filipino elites who collaborated with the colonial state. Ilustrados increasingly found themselves working hand-in-hand with the state. As early as September of 1901,
there was Filipino representation on the Philippine Commission by Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera and Benito Legarda Y Tuason. Tavera was instrumental in founding the Federal Party (Federalistas), whose early platform supported Taft’s policies and even advocated statehood for the Philippines (May 1980, pp. 24, 28). Many Federalistas received political appointments from the Philippine Commission, intertwining their influence with the power of the Commission (p. 31).

Other factors crucial to the consolidation of local elite influence included the nature of the Philippine civil service and the electoral laws leading up to the 1907 establishment of the Philippine Assembly. In September of 1900, Act 5 of the Philippine Commission established the civil service; within three years, 9,366 individuals had been examined with two-thirds of those examinations coming in Spanish. Filipinos had hiring preferences under the system set up by Taft. Almost sixty percent of those who qualified were offered positions in the young, growing bureaucracy (Kramer 2006, pp. 165-166). Corruption became and remained a constant struggle as the state began working with contractors and sub-contractors in the development of public works (pp. 167-168). Those elites with the right personal networks had access to funding and contracts.

The census was a unifying factor for the bureaucracy and elite collaborators with the state (p. 221). Of the 7,627 individuals working on the census, all but 125 were Filipinos (p. 225). The census preceded the election of the National Assembly, where the Federalistas, who had a close working relationship with the state, were able to establish a wide political base. The electoral laws assisted in the consolidation of elite collaborators’ influence with the institutions of the state. Suffrage was limited to those literate in either English or Spanish, as well as to those holding municipal or provincial office. This
meant that only about 1.4 percent of the population was eligible to vote in the Assembly elections in 1907 (p. 301).

Taft’s transition out of the role of governor-general at the end of 1903 opened the door for surge in elite influence over the relationship between the state and the societal elites. Meanwhile, a rivalry within the local elites emerged over time, become more important politically as the 1907 elections approached. This intra-elite rivalry developed between the Federalistas and a new group which saw the Federalistas as too closely tied to the colonial administration. Luke E. Wright, who took over as governor-general from Taft, alienated Filipino elites in several ways. First, Wright refused to engage in the sort of interpersonal politics common among elites who viewed themselves as fully capable of governing. Second, Wright was seen as defending Constabulary behavioral excesses (i.e. abuses of authority). Third, Wright set to running the Philippine Commission in accordance with best “business principles” of the day; the increased emphasis on efficiency had the consequence of centralizing U.S. control of the state and included a lessening of Taft’s hiring preferences for Filipinos in the civil service in favor of Americans who were largely concentrated in Manila. Even the collaborative Federalistas were displeased with Wright’s style of governance, successfully encouraging Taft’s removal of Wright in favor of Henry Clay Ide (pp. 248, 291-292, 299).

During this time leading up to the 1907 Assembly’s inception, provincial governorships were opened up for election by municipal officials. These new layers in the insular state gave rise to two key figures in the next phase of colonial state-building in the Philippines following the establishment of the Assembly, Sergio Osmeña of Cebu and Manuel Quezon of Batangas (p. 299).
Even though this second era saw increased elite collaboration with the colonial state, this does not mean that this time was devoid of outright coercive methods of state imposition in society. Continued failure to consolidate power in the Moro areas, as well as increased levels of crime throughout the archipelago by small groups (ladrones) which were both politically and apolitically motivated, led the Commission to adopt a series of acts which dramatically constrained liberties in the Philippines. In 1901, the Sedition Law (Act 292) banned all secret political societies and advocacy of independence by even the most peaceful means. In 1902, the Brigandage Act gave the Army the authority to treat politically motivated insurgents in the same manner as criminals. In 1903, the Reconcentration Act gave the Army the authority to engage in the same repressive measures against entire towns and cities which had, in 1898, directly influenced the decision to go to war against Spain. Finally, in 1907, the Flag Law banned displays of unauthorized banners and symbols not approved by the colonial state. Dissenting groups in society, especially pro-independence groups took to underground and subtle methods of displaying their imagery, including the use of skits and plays (pp. 174-176, 292). Despite, this creative dissent, it remains clear that the United States was wary of any argument stemming from the local population in favor of self-government and was willing and capable of using controversial tactics in order to establish its authority throughout the Philippines. While elite collaboration increased substantially and was the predominant pattern of state-society relationships during this era, it is important to remember the role of coercion by the state at this time.
Nascent representative colonialism: 1907-1916

When the nascent Philippine Assembly first convened on October 16, 1907, it was an impressive collection of elites in the sense that the *ilustrado* vision of Philippine self-government had taken an important step forward. As noted, the suffrage regulations virtually ensured the election of the landed and influential. At the same time, those empowered elites found themselves tied directly to the imposed colonial state in a way that had seemed highly unlikely just a couple years prior. Of the 75 seats in the Assembly, 16 went to the Federalistas, marking a switch in which faction of local elites would set the tone for a significant portion of society. The remaining 59 seats went to the Nacionalistas (Partido Nacionalista), who had as part of their platform a demand for immediate independence for the Philippines. 94 percent of qualified electors voted in the Assembly elections; befitting of an elite driven legislative body, a significant percentage of new office holders were not new to representative politics. 25 percent of the new Assembly had held offices under Spanish rule; a full 75 percent had held positions under Aguinaldo’s short lived republic. Finally, 90 percent had held a position in the state under American rule. The political experience under multiple regimes tempered the independence platform of the Nacionalistas with a sense of pragmatism and a willingness to collaborate with the colonial state (pp. 301-302).

Sergio Osmeña, elected Speaker of the National Assembly, couched the Assembly as the outcrop of the national liberation movement. This fit directly with the *ilustrado* narrative of the construction of the Philippine nation. This narrative argued that language and dialect alone do not make nationhood, an argument which ran counter to American policy towards the archipelago. Taft’s vision was that the Assembly would be a vehicle
for “political education,” training the Philippine population for eventual self-governance over the span of multiple generations (pp. 302-308; May 1980, p. 58). Despite the rhetoric of independence, the United States worked diligently to influence both the Federalistas as well as the more independence-oriented Nacionalistas. The Nacionalista majority pushed legislation desired by the Philippine Commission; for their purposes, the Nacionalistas used collaboration with the Commission as a tool to prove their capability to govern. Between 1907 and 1910, Nacionalista leadership suppressed much of their independence platform while the Federalistas, renamed the Progresistas, made political gains by criticizing Nacionalista collaboration with the United States (May 1980, pp. 35-36, 57, 60-64).

By 1909, the tension had begun to grow within the Nacionalistas for more recognition of the Assembly as the legitimate representation of the Philippine people. Osmeña ceased self-suppression of his desires for Philippine independence in 1910, both as a result of politics and frustration with the theories of “political education” espoused by the Americans (pp. 36, 38, 61-64). The debate as to which political body was appropriate for selecting the Resident Commissioner who would represent the Philippines in a non-voting capacity to the U.S. Congress pitted Osmeña against the Philippine Commission (Kramer 2006, pp. 324-326).

The 1912 election of Woodrow Wilson in the United States marked both a change from Republican to Democratic control of foreign policy as well as a significant shift in the relationship between the Philippine Commission and the National Assembly. Wilson’s appointee as Governor-General, Francis Burton Harrison, put a Filipino majority onto the Philippine Commission. In addition, Harrison increased the hiring of
locals in insular and provincial government employment, marking an important increase in putting a Filipino face to the civil service (pp. 352-353; Karnow 1989, pp. 14-15). The more constructive working relationship was likely affected by the Democratic Party’s more amenable opinions on Philippine independence. Representative William A. Jones, Chair of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced an independence bill for the Philippines prior to the 1912 presidential election (Kramer 2006, p. 353). The 1912 party platform of the Democrats explicitly supported Philippine independence so long as the United States retained rights to coaling stations and naval bases (Peters 2008). U.S. occupation was referred to as “imperialism and colonial exploitation.” Once again, however, lofty pro-independence rhetoric did not appear to shape the debate over American colonial policy when international strategic considerations were brought into the debate. Increasing concern over Japanese and other possible foreign interests in the Pacific seemed to trump the concerns over occupation’s morality (May 1980, p. 37).

Investments in infrastructure in the Philippines were significant. Of note is the poll tax used to raise revenues during this era. The poll tax was actually a renewal of an old tax employed by the Spanish colonial regime. The poll tax further exacerbated the elitist nature of suffrage in the Philippines, entrenching the Assembly’s elites. These funds, along with other Commission expenditures, totaled to approximately two million pesos annually towards the building of roads in the archipelago. These poll taxes were brought about after other funding sources had been inadequate in the face of other investments in infrastructure, including port and railroad facilities. Investments were also made in improving mining capacity and agricultural research and development. However, the two most pressing economic issues of the Philippines, widespread poverty
and inequality as well as debt bondage, were not adequately addressed by the fiscal expenditure of the Commission and the Assembly. Part of the reason for lack of the availability of funds was continuous wrangling in the U.S. government over the proper level of economic integration of the colonial state with respect to tariff and trade policies; this became a recurring theme of U.S.-Philippine relations from this era until independence (pp. 130-131, 133-180). Over time, the Philippines became inexorably dependent upon the U.S. market while certain domestic interests in the U.S. became more threatened by Philippine competition in areas such as sugar and tobacco. By 1920, the U.S. market accounted for approximately 70 percent of Philippine exports (p. 160).

This era marks the time of inception of the strange bedfellows of economic interests and humanitarian interests which eventually led to U.S. legislation leading to Philippine independence. The Democratic platforms were not forgotten in the domestic political debate over the nature of American occupations. In a 1913 article by Moorfield Storey entitled “The Democratic Party and Philippine Independence,” it was argued that the Democrats couldn’t afford to go back on their party platform; however, banks and other profiting entities were making it more difficult to let go of insular possessions. Governor-General James F. Smith (1906-1907) was quoted in the article regarding a “growing gulf between the two peoples…an era of ill feeling has started between Americans and Filipinos, and, I hesitate to say it, ‘race hatred.’” Storey also quoted Herbert N. Witt of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, and opponent of Philippine independence, as saying that “The greater part of our population in the islands is…social outcasts from our big cities, a host of political parasites.” Finally, Storey also critiqued the relationship between the Philippine Constabulary and the Filipino population, calling
them, “decidedly hostile to the Filipinos and are hated by the people, being identified with the Spanish side of internal strife in the past” (General Records Relating to more than one island possession, Legislative Enactments of the Congress of the U.S. Relating to Island Possessions, 1914-32). It is against this backdrop of humanitarian disgust and economic policy debate that the Jones Law saw its development.

The Jones Law, officially known as the Philippines Autonomy Act went into force on August 29, 1916 when signed by President Wilson. This law fundamentally restructured and further empowered Philippine governmental institutions and marked a shift in the relationship between society and the state in the Philippines. The Jones had originally proposed this legislation prior to the 1912 election; however, the bill, reworked in conjunction with Manuel Quezon in 1914, eventually found enough support in the Congress in a more restrained form (Kramer 2006, pp. 353-354). The Jones Law disbanded the Philippine Commission in favor of establishing the bicameral Philippine Legislature with a Senate as a second house to the Philippine Assembly, retaining the appointed office of the governor-general who could veto legislation. The bill also reiterated the American policy of eventual independence for the Filipinos, although it remained the last major piece of Congressional legislation pertaining to the islands until 1934 (p. 362).

This era also witnessed a significant institutional shift in the management of the Moro areas. The U.S. policy of religious bifurcation began to shift as the Moro department moved to civilian control in the guise of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1913 and eventually to the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes under Filipino direction in 1917 (pp. 379-380). The Moro areas did not become completely pacified
during this era to the same extent as the northern islands of the archipelago. Taken as a whole, however, the nature of the conflict between the Americans and those opposed to American rule transitioned significantly with respect to the level of violence and the extent of collaboration at all levels of society, but especially at the elite level of society.

Established representative colonialism: 1917-1941

The era of established representative colonialism is noteworthy for what appears to be a paradox. On the one hand, there appear to be significant shifts in the institutional structure and of the colonial state as well as high-stakes debate regarding the strategic and economic realities concerning American control of the Philippines. On the other hand, the era spanning from the inception of the Philippine Legislature until the Japanese invasion of 1941 also appears to be a time of policy stagnation when one looks at the policy debates in the United States surrounding the extent to which the Philippines should be prepared for independence. It was both a time of neglect and crucial importance for the Philippines; during these competing trends, the colonial state continued an evolutionary process which led towards independence following World War II. In addition, significant developments in the societal response to the colonial state foretold whether the ultimate outcome of the state-building process would be one of consensus or disjointedness.

World War I helped to solidify the relationship between the United States and Philippine colonial state. The U.S. entered the war in April of 1917; the Philippines declared its loyalty to the United States and contributed a division worth of troops to the American Expeditionary Force. These forces did not muster until the armistice of 1918
and never deployed. Nevertheless, the pattern of inter-military cooperation was set through the brief experience of World War I (pp. 383-384).

By 1920, President Wilson became increasingly vocal on the issue of Philippine independence. In his message to Congress on December 7, 1920, Wilson stated, “Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government…and have thus fulfilled the condition set by Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the islands…it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.” Joint hearings on the matter were held sporadically during this era.

In May of 1924, Report 709, accompanying House Resolution 8856, addressed the findings of an investigative report on the capabilities of self-government by the Philippines. H.R. 8856 was a bill which granted independence to the Philippines within twenty years of passage. Among the important factors cited by the congressional investigators was the extent to which a single national language was a prerequisite for national unity and independence. The majority finding was that out of 11 million residents in the Philippines, 1.5 million were English speakers, 800,000 spoke Spanish, and approximately 9 million others spoke approximately 87 other dialects. This factor led the majority to argue that independence and nationhood in the near term was impossible, arguing, “Unity of language is essential to national security.” The report mentioned the potential of war with Japan as their influence spread through the region.

The minority report countered that most of the dialects referred to were similar and that the Filipino nation was existent. Fifty-three percent of the population had
obtained the literacy qualifications to vote and of those eighty-six percent turned out in
the most recent elections, signaling support for the democratic process. Racial, ethnic,
and linguistic heterogeneity compared well with other countries in the world and should
not be used as a reason to oppose independence. Despite the heterogeneity, the
Philippines saw an unparalleled emphasis on education in bringing their society together.
Critics of the majority view saw the Japanese threat as overblown and argued that the
Filipinos needed to be turned loose in order for them to build lasting relationships with
the Moros in the southern islands of the archipelago. Vicente Banuan stated, “The
unifying influences of common grievances against Spain, of a common religious faith,
and of a common political ideal far outbalance the disintegrating forces of an alleged
multiplicity of dialects which exist more in the imagination than in the realm of fact.”
The passage of Hawes-Cutting and the new Philippine Commonwealth

Philippine legislators grew increasingly bold in both their demands for
independence as well as their assertion of economic and trade rights during this era. If
the Philippine Islands were going to remain under the rule of the United States, then the
Filipino elites intended to see to it that Philippine goods received favorable terms of trade
from exports to the United States. At the same time, domestic interests in the U.S.
became increasingly displeased with competition from Philippine goods, especially
sugar, and grew increasingly hostile towards the influx of labor from the Philippines.
These domestic interests, in conjunction with those who opposed U.S. rule on
humanitarian and moral grounds, saw to it that one independence bill ultimately passed
over the veto of President Hoover in 1933. When that bill was rejected by the Philippine
Senate, a new independence bill was finally agreed to by all the institutions involved and
became law in 1934, leading to the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 and eventual independence in 1946.

The two issues which stand out the most when reviewing resolutions of the Philippine Legislature between 1918 and 1935 are the desire for independence from the United States and the manner in which Philippine exports are treated by American tariff laws. On a regular basis, Philippine office holders passed resolutions demanding immediate independence. The increasing boldness with which the topic was broached belies earlier eras in which such talk was banned outright. The major difference was the channeling of such demands into the formal institutions established by the colonial power. These issues continued to be raised by the Legislature on at least an annual basis, with demands for independence among the first resolutions passed forward at the opening of each legislative session. The protesting of sugar import quotas by the United States, opinions on appointments related to the Philippine Islands, and symbolic expressions of thankfulness towards pro-independence American politicians were also regular subjects of legislative resolutions (Special Records Relating to the Philippine Islands). There was remarkable quiet on the subject of independence demands by the appointed governors-general during this time frame (Proclamations of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, 1925-1935).

In spite of the clear support for independence from the Filipino elites, it required domestic political forces in the United States to drive through the independence agenda in the U.S. Congress. Labor unions, specifically, were not pleased by the influx of cheap labor from the Philippines and sought restrictions on their numbers coming to the United States. This view of Filipinos did not mesh with the vision traditionally held in which a
colonial power enabled the flow of labor among its territories and from colonies to the home country. In other words, it was extraordinarily difficult to reconcile the image of a colonial power protecting its politically developing dependent while also excluding the dependent from trade and labor benefits. Being a colonist entitled colonial citizens to certain rights. However, interest groups, including the American Federation of Labor, saw immigration as a threat. This threat from immigrant labor was compounded by the Great Depression and was evidenced by significant incidences of race-based violence in California. By 1930, approximately 75,000 Filipinos had immigrated to Hawai‘i and approximately 60,000 had immigrated to the West coast of the United States (Kramer 2006, pp. 398, 400, 407, 413, 418-423).

The sugar industry’s interests were also affected directly by favored status afforded to Philippine sugar. Sugar producers in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawai‘i and elsewhere lobbied to encourage Philippine independence as well as the tariffs which would go along with it (p. 396). Newspapers of the era continuously followed the debates on sugar import quotas and the consequences of the Philippines’ status on commodity trading. The evidence indicates that all that was requested by the Philippine elite was consistency in the way in which Philippine products were treated by U.S. law. Either the U.S. should give the same treatment to Philippine products as all other protectorates, or the Philippines should be given the legal authority to make its own decisions on public policy and trade. Eventually, it was the combination of economic and humanitarian interests which drove through independence legislation, starting with the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill and ending with the Tydings-McDuffie Act.
The ultimate goal of both the Hare-Hawes-Cutting and Tydings-McDuffie Acts was to provide for independence for the Philippines within a ten year timeframe. During the interim, the Philippines would inaugurate a commonwealth relationship with the United States in which ultimate sovereignty was not granted, although an increased level of autonomy would move to the Philippine Legislature. A new executive office, the Presidency, would take on much of the authority of the Governor-General; however, the American appointee would retain veto authority over several key areas of legislation. Commonwealth military forces would remain under the training and guidance of the United States and basing rights would be protected pending negotiation of future leasing arrangements. What truly set the two bills apart were their respective outcomes. The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was first vetoed by President Hoover, but then was overridden into law by Congress in 1933. Interestingly, the Philippine Senate rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, of which acceptance was a prerequisite to its enactment. One reason for the failure of passage by the Philippine Legislature was a divide within the Filipino elite. Osmeña and Roxas supported Hare-Hawes-Cutting while Quezon and others, including Aguinaldo, supported rival U.S. legislation from Senator King which granted independence on a much quicker basis. The eventual compromises regarding terms of trade and military basing rights led to the development of the Tydings-McDuffie legislation on the grounds that it would be more acceptable to the leaders of the Philippines. Critics had argued that the details of Hare-Hawes-Cutting were more concerned with taxing Philippine sugar than with detailing a workable plan for independence (New York Times editorial, January 5, 1934, Abstracts of Newspaper and
The Tydings-McDuffie Act retained most of the basic framework from Hare-Hawes-Cutting. In anticipation of independence, the Philippines would have to develop a new constitution which guaranteed “republican government,” a bill of rights, and allegiance to the United States. The Philippines would have to agree to assume its debt and place its foreign affairs under the United States during the duration of the commonwealth status. Tariffs would slowly be phased in on Philippine goods going to the United States. Finally, independence would be granted on the July 4th, ten years following the passage of its constitution. Tydings-McDuffie was signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 24, 1934 and approved by the Philippine Assembly on May 1st of that year (p. 425).

Japan and U.S. views on independence for the Philippines

An interesting outcrop of the World War I experience was the growing fear, both in the United States as well as the Philippines, of Japanese imperial designs on the archipelago. These fears emerged in spite of the fact that the Japanese were allied with the U.S. during World War I. Japanese militarism and expansion of Japanese spheres of influence in East Asia during and after World War I were alarming developments in the United States.

The importance of Japan in the region was fully understood by American policy makers by the early 1890s (Morris 2001, pp. 592-602). This focus reached new heights during the 1920s. On February 3, 1922, House Joint Resolution 266 called upon the United States to fulfill the purpose of the Jones Act by moving towards the granting of
independence to the Philippines; to this end, the U.S. was to negotiate trade and sovereignty guarantees between the Philippines, Spain, Japan, China, Great Britain, Italy, France, and others. Failure to do this would “seriously embarrass the United States.”

In December of 1925, House Joint Resolution 69 noted that Japan “has expressed her willingness to enter into a treaty recognizing the independence and guarding the neutrality of the Philippines.” This language, acknowledging the growing influence of Japan in the Pacific while also seeing the potential for a positive working relationship between Japan and the United States, appeared regularly in legislative statements supportive of Philippine independence. This view of Japan was not unanimous by any stretch of the imagination. Fear of Japanese expansion increased throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. In particular, Japanese economic expansion was perceived by those who opposed Philippine independence as a threat to U.S. interests during the Great Depression.

American newspapers regularly reported on the tone and content of Japanese proclamations regarding their strategic and economic interests in the Pacific. Editorialists took revealing stances which help in understanding the nature of debate in the United States regarding the potential independence of the Philippines. In January of 1933, Manuel Roxas, an influential legislator who traveled to the U.S. along with Sergio Osmeña to lobby Congress for Philippine independence, editorialized that he did not fear Japanese interests in the archipelago. In particular, Japanese cabinet officials had been quoted as saying that it was “Japan’s natural mission to exploit the Malay Archipelago.”

In March 1934, a visiting Japanese admiral to the Philippines stated that “Japan has no selfish ends to serve and does not desire the Philippines. Talk of conquest by
Japan should not be an argument against independence” (Washington Post, March 4, 1934, Abstracts of Newspaper and Magazine Articles Published in the U.S. and elsewhere Relating to the Philippines, 1933-1937). This position was not believed by a significant portion of American policy makers, leading to increased apprehension regarding Philippine independence after the Hawes-Cutting Act was signed into law. In July of 1934, the Far Eastern Review published an article entitled “Japan’s Back to the Wall” in which it was argued that there needed to be a Monroe Doctrine-type statement regarding U.S. interests in Asia. Japan repeatedly expressed disagreement with trade and tariff regulations which kept Japan at a competitive disadvantage in the Philippines. The New York Times in September 1934 reported that the Philippine Islands were a possible “theatre of operations in a trade war between Japan and the United States.” Just a week and a half prior to this assertion, the Washington Herald reported a Japanese military exercise in which an attack on Manila was rehearsed.

Fear of Japan continued to linger amidst debates regarding the inception of the Philippine Commonwealth and the development of a new constitution. The New York Times wrote in November that there was a “more aggressive” attitude by Japanese officials towards the U.S. in the Philippines exhibited by the Japanese consul there. This story was followed in January 1935 by a report that Commissioner Guevara informed the U.S. House of Representatives that the consul had warned the “Filipinos that they must please Japan in order to have independence like Manchuria.” The New York Herald Tribune editorialized in March of that year that the new Philippine Commonwealth was an “occasion for rejoicing only among Filipino politicians, American sugar and cordage lobbyists, and Japanese expansionists,” reiterating the strategic and economic concerns of
those who opposed Philippine independence. The World Herald editorial page echoed this argument in June and Senator Key Pittman wrote in the Washington Post in December that Japan’s “ambitions [were] similar to those of the former Kaiser” and included seizure of the Philippines, Mexico, and South America (Abstracts of Newspaper and Magazine Articles Published in the U.S. and elsewhere Relating to the Philippines, 1933-1937).

Society reacts in the Philippine Commonwealth

There were two prevailing trends in the manner in which society in the Philippines reacted to the institutional developments of the state during the time surrounding the initiation of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1936. The first trend was that of increasing Filipino control of state institutions, especially the more powerful institutions of the presidency and legislature. The second trend, however, was troubling from the perspective of societal consensus, a key measure of successful long-term nation-building. This second trend was one of increasing civil strife, often characterized by violent insurgency against the state, just as it was gaining some minimal level of independence from the colonial rulers.

In 1935, following the passage of Tydings-McDuffie, the Philippines set out to develop its own constitution in preparation for eventual independence, ten years after its adoption through national plebiscite. In July of 1934, 202 candidates were elected from approximately 600 in order to draft the new constitution. The constitution was hailed by some observers as notably progressive, reserving control over natural resources to the state, renouncing war as a tool of foreign policy, and its single-term presidency (New York Herald Tribune, December 2, 1934, Ibid). In spite of the progress made with
respect to the writing of the constitution, there were rumblings in Philippine society expressing a lack of total consensus as to the legitimacy of the process and the upcoming Commonwealth government.

The total American population in the Philippines had dropped to under 2,000 by February of 1935 (New York Herald Tribune, February 10, 1935, Ibid). By necessity, an increasing amount of responsibility for governance had transitioned to native Filipinos. One of the most important policy areas in which Americans worked in conjunction with the Commonwealth government was in the area of defense. With reticence towards the Japanese increasing, General Douglas MacArthur became the military advisor to the Commonwealth.

Numerous societal cleavages emerged during this era in the Philippines. The first divide was between those who were more wary of Japanese expansion in the Pacific and a vocal minority that welcomed a potential pan-Asian movement which would push out the United States and European powers (New York Times, March 31, 1935, Ibid). A related, but more violent, societal divide was that of the Sakdalista movement. Sakdalista leader Benigno Ramos drew from a base of disaffected peasants in favor of a platform of opposition to the Commonwealth’s legitimacy. The New York Times argued that Ramos sought “moral” support from the Japanese for the movement, which clashed on multiple occasions with Constabulary forces. In May of 1935, dozens were killed and hundreds more arrested as a result of Sakdalista-Constabulary clashes (New York Times, May 5-7, 1935; New York Herald Tribune, May 3-4, 1935, Ibid). The unrest surrounding the Sakdalista movement continued after the inauguration of the Commonwealth through the rest of 1935. During this same time, Communist dissent was growing amidst the same
disaffected population in the agricultural peasantry (Washington Post, May 15, 1935; New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 1935; Ibid). The legacy of caciquism appeared to have reached a critical threshold upon which the worldwide ideological battles of the 1930s played out in the Philippine context.

Acts of the Philippine National Assembly during the first years of the Commonwealth served to enact several significant institutional changes in the country. Remaining friar properties were subdivided for the purposes of final disposition, courts were reorganized at the appellate level, the *cedula* tax, ostensibly a poll tax, was abolished, and a plebiscite was authorized on women’s suffrage. In addition, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was abolished and reorganized under new commissions for Mindanao and Sulu, the Moro provinces (Acts of the Philippine National Assembly, 1936-1937). Despite the wide ranging areas of authority passing to the Filipinos, the policies of the Commonwealth were unable to mitigate growing societal conflicts rooted in longstanding inequalities, religious differences, and ideological dissent.
CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE IN THE COMPLIANCE CONTEXT

Taken as a whole, the nation-building process from 1898 through the outset of World War II, from the institutional perspective, is comprehensive, yet incomplete as understood as a function of societal consensus. Compliance patterns between a state and a society are not static; however, a reasonable determination can be made as to the predominant compliance pattern during each of the important eras in the Philippine case. This determination consists of identifying the most important forms of power employed by the colonial state in pursuit of its goals and indentifying the corresponding scope of societal involvement. Compliance theory has clear expectations regarding the patterns in these relationships. There should be greater breadth in areas of societal consensus as the pattern of power employment shifts from coercive to remunerative and normative. Consequently, as the colonial state moves from an overall coercive relationship with society to that of utilitarian and normative, greater degrees of consensus, measured by the presence of consensus in seven predicted areas, should be exhibited.

Any evaluation regarding the compliance pattern between an institutional apparatus imposed from without on a collective group must begin with the understanding that ultimately there is some level of coercion underlying the entire state-society relationship. This is clearly true with respect to the colonial Philippines. Even though coercion was not the most predominant form of power employed in the Philippine Islands by the state throughout every era in question, so long as the islands remained under the control of the dominant political entity, the prospect of coercive force against pro-independence groups and individuals is a constant feature of the occupation. One can not
definitely state that coercive power was ever entirely removed from the relationship between the colonial state and Philippine society without looking at the counterfactual question, if there was no chance or capability for the United States to use violent force in order to shape the will of Philippine society, would significant sectors of society have pushed for outright independence and rejected American rule? The answer, in accordance with the documentary evidence available, is a resounding yes. The spirit of independence among Filipino elites was constantly evident during the time in question in the guise of rhetoric and symbols. As time progressed, broader segments of society exhibited the determination to be free of the colonial state and its institutional descendants. These segments included religious and ethnic minorities as well as disenfranchised members of the peasantry. While each era of the colonial state can be understood in terms of a predominant compliance pattern between the imposed state and society, it must be acknowledged up front that there was a continuous, underlying current of coercive forms of power and a lack of complete societal consensus at all points during the time in question.

Table 6. The eras of relationship between state and society from 1898-1946

1. Armed conflict and state imposition (1898-1903)
2. Elite collaboration (1903-1907)
3. Nascent representative colonialism (1907-1916)
4. Established representative colonialism (1917-1941)
5. World War II in the Philippines (1941-1945)
6. Movement to independence (1945-1946)

The first era of the colonial state in the Philippines is best characterized by being one of armed conflict and imposition of the colonial state institutions by force throughout the archipelago. During this era, the most visceral and relevant form of power employed
by the state was coercive. The tools of this power employment included the United States Army as well as the Scouts and Constabulary. Despite the fact that the Spanish-American War was fought and settled within one calendar year, peace in the Philippines took much longer as revolutionaries fought to establish an independent country. Using a combination of brutality, clever tactics, and taking advantage of ethnic rivalries, the United States was eventually able to subdue the Filipino revolutionaries. Just as this was happening, unrest in the Muslim Moro region of the archipelago increased substantially. The Moro had never entirely submitted to Spanish rule, nor did they ever entirely submit to American and Filipino rule. As time passed and the U.S. consolidated its control of the Philippine Islands, coercive means of control became relatively less important compared to remunerative means of control. A significant portion of the Filipino elite was ready and willing to work with the new colonial state, bringing a secondary aspect to the dominant compliance pattern. In other words, the primary means of control during this era was coercive and the secondary means was remunerative.

The second era, which is defined by elite collaboration, represented a subtle but distinct shift in the compliance pattern in the colonial Philippines. During this time a greater emphasis was placed on remunerative means of control by the colonial state towards Philippine society. The Census of 1903 and the growing state administrative apparatus gave greater opportunities to those few, though significant, members of the local population who were literate and willing to be part of the imposed state. Greater numbers of Filipino elites began working actively with the Philippine Commission in the course of developing new representative institutions under the guise of political education. The desire for self-rule was not mitigated by remunerative means of control;
however, the response from society by the increased emphasis on remunerative means of control was greater readiness to cooperate with the colonial state so long as independence remained an ultimately feasible goal for the Philippines.

It is important to note that governance continued to fall to the United States Army and its affiliates in areas of the country which were not pacified, specifically the Moro areas. This division of the Philippines makes it difficult to judge to what extent coercive means of control represent the driving force behind the compliance relationship as opposed to remunerative means of control. It can definitively be said that during the second era, coercion marks a relatively smaller part of the compliance relationship between the colonial state and society compared to the first era. As for remunerative means of control, they became relatively more important when compared to the first era. Thus, during the era of elite collaboration, the compliance relationship makes a shift from a predominantly coercive pattern of compliance to one where there is a dual-compliance pattern. The colonial state of this era is both coercive and utilitarian.

The third era of the Philippine colonial state, nascent representative colonialism, is typified by the inception of the Philippine Assembly and a relative decrease in the use of military coercion to control the society. During this time the Filipino elite developed two major political parties with varying views on the extent to which they should push towards outright independence from the United States and the rate at which independence should be pursued, if at all. At the same time, the arrival into office of the Wilson administration in the U.S. steered policy towards colonial possessions in a new direction. While the strategic reality of a rising Japan and the worldwide grab for colonies prevented too great of an allowance for moves toward independence for the Philippines,
there was an increase in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism. This occurred particularly in the Democratic Party, where anti-imperialists found the proverbial strange bedfellows in organized labor and racist interests which opposed colonialism on the grounds that it enabled immigration from the Philippines. At the same time, business interests such as sugar and tobacco producers discouraged the providing of beneficial terms of trade which supposedly accompany colonial occupation. Together, all of these interests served to push the United States towards granting greater autonomy for the Philippines.

There is little doubt, especially when compared with other eras, that the predominant means of control employed by the state towards Philippine society was remunerative. As this era developed, the Moro areas saw decreasing violence and greater institutional development and incorporation into the central government. There is some evidence that there may have been a genuine increase in the employment of normative means of control and the pursuit of cultural goals during this time, but not to the extent that a solid judgment of a secondary normative compliance pattern during this time. It is safe to assert that the dominant compliance pattern during this era was one of clear use of remunerative means of control in the pursuit of economic stability throughout most of the archipelago. A diminishing use of coercive means of control persisted in the Moro regions.

The fourth era, established representative colonialism, sees its own distinct experience with respect to the interactions between the state and society in the Philippines. The coalition of interests which initially began to push for Philippine interests within the United States achieved legislative success with the passage of the Hawes-Cutting bill and the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth. Greater
executive powers then consequently passed into the hands of Filipino leaders. The symbols and perceptions of nationhood became more important during this era in the Philippine state than during the previous three eras. In this respect, as a generation of Filipino elites had risen and fallen in political influence, collaboration could be seen as less rooted in remunerative means of control than in normative means of control. However, this may also be a function of removing Americans and inserting Filipinos from key institutions in the executive of the state.

At the same time, there is the fascinating diversification with respect to what direction the Filipino nation and Philippine state would take over the course of the next couple decades. The Philippines was not immune to the worldwide ideological battles of the 1930s. Consensus across major groups in society actually saw a decline towards the end of this era. Violence increased as various groups challenged the legitimacy of the political order. These challenges were rooted in economic, ideological, and other sources, occurring just as fears of Japanese invasion were about to become realized. State concerns with maintaining social order as well as economic development in the face of the global depression suggest that by the close of this era a retreat away from normative means of control towards coercive and remunerative means of control. Indeed, this is borne out by the historical events. Thus, within this fourth era of the colonial state in the Philippines there is a dramatic reversal in the behavior of the state towards society that both influenced, and was influenced by, societal responses.

The fifth and sixth eras, World War II and the year leading up to the granting of independence for the Philippines, respectively, are not explicitly within the scope of the data gathering on institutional development, state, and nation-building in the course of
this research. However, there are two key observations from these eras which are most relevant to a discussion of institutions and their interactions with society. First, it is nothing but remarkable that the interruption and violence of World War II did not by itself lead to a postponement of Philippine independence beyond the initial ten year mark from the inauguration of the Commonwealth. Second, the war had its own independent effects on the cohesion and influence of armed leftist groups which remained beyond 1946. Several dozen guerrilla groups formed in various combinations of Americans and Filipinos upon Japanese invasion of the islands. However, just as there were countless examples of cooperation between the U.S. and remnants of the Philippine Scouts, so were there also several guerrilla groups opposed to the United States during World War II. In addition, there were groups opposed to both American and Japanese control of the islands. Records pertaining to the many guerrilla groups in the Philippines during this time were gathered by the United States government in the course of investigating the merits of compensation claims by those who fought on behalf of U.S. interests during the war (Philippine Archives Collection 2008).

At the same time, it is naïve to suggest that World War II by itself accounted for the ideological and motivational interests behind anti-U.S. guerrilla movements in the Philippines. It has already been established that an impoverished, disenfranchised peasantry had already become a receptive audience to revolutionary methods by the 1930’s. Decades-old failures at land reform and the failure to sufficiently expand the electorate sowed the seeds of insurgency long before World War II and the ideological battles of the Cold War had begun.
Any assessment of the state-society relationship in terms of the compliance relationship during the final two eras of colonial occupation of the Philippines would be cursory at best due to the fact that significant data was not obtained relative to the other eras of the occupation as well as World War II bringing in its own independent effects to the understanding of institutions and the state-society relationship in the Philippines. These independent effects include, but are not limited to the issue of the Japanese takeover of the state by 1942. Nevertheless, for the purpose of argument, a conditioned evaluation of the predominant means of control by the U.S. should be attempted. Assuming that the most important state-society interaction between the U.S. and the Filipinos occurred at the level of the anti-Japanese insurgency, then the predominant means of control can be argued to be normative as Americans and Filipinos fought together for common purposes and with only the hope, never the guarantee, of remuneration. This compliance relationship arguably did not dissipate as the war concluded and a quick transition to independence followed. A secondary pattern of compliance rooted in coercive means of control also persisted during these eras in two ways. First, remnants of the U.S.-imposed state that persisted actively fought against those societal elements opposed to U.S. rule. Also, following the war, the United States ensured a robust, ongoing military presence beyond independence by negotiating basing rights through a ninety-nine year treaty and a military assistance agreement. These treaties both went into force in 1947 at the beginning of the Cold War; leftist interests and guerrillas were actively opposed throughout the Cold War, continuing the pattern of

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7 This echoes the argument surrounding the limitation of the scope of the study with respect to looking at independent effects of the imposed state institutions in Chapter Two.
conflict that had initiated prior to World War II (Schirmer and Shalom 1987, pp. 69-70, 105, 111).

Table 7 gives the overall assessment of the predominant means of control utilized in the course of the state-society relationship with respect to each of the major eras in the colonial Philippines.

Table 7. Predominant means of control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Predominant Means of Control</th>
<th>Secondary Means of Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict and state imposition (1898-1903)</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>Remunerative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite collaboration (1903-1907)</td>
<td>Remunerative</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nascent representative colonialism (1907-1916)</td>
<td>Remunerative</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established representative colonialism (1917-1941)</td>
<td>Remunerative with shift to Normative</td>
<td>Normative with shift to Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II and Pre-Independence (1941-1946)</td>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With this overall compliance pattern between the colonial state and society in the Philippines, the application of Etzioni’s framework would predict a clear rise in the level of participation by society in the goals of the state. In addition, any “buy-in” by society into the legitimacy of the state would likely be tempered by the return of coercion as a means of control towards the end of U.S. rule. Third, an assessment of the success of the state-building and nation-building efforts by the United States would be expected to
report modest long term success, tempered by the observed rise in the importance of coercive means of control to gain adherence to the state. Finally, this assessment can be seen in terms of the presence or absence in theoretically grounded areas of consensus across the state and society over varied intervals of time, acknowledging the difficulty in controlling for independent effects as the assessment of consensus is taken at ever later points in time. Table 8 lists the areas of consensus which are deemed important in the compliance framework for measuring the commitment of significant elements of society to the constructed state over time.

Table 8. Defining consensus in the Philippine state

1. Consensus on societal values
2. Consensus on state goals
8. Consensus on institutional structures
9. Consensus on participation in the state
10. Consensus on duties of citizens to the state
11. Consensus on legitimacy of the state
12. Consensus on the status of groups in the state

There have been four broad trends that cut across each of the seven dimensions of consensus in the post-World War II Philippines. First, it has been a struggle to incorporate ideologically disparate groups in a peaceful manner into a consensus on all dimensions. Second, there has been an inability to consolidate and maintain democratic institutions, specifically with respect to the executive branch of government. Third, there has been a steady, continuing stream of violent activity by Muslim separatist groups opposed to the state, carrying on centuries of sectarian division in the archipelago. Finally, despite the return to democracy in the 1980s after the exile of Ferdinand Marcos, values of transparency and rule of law have not completely consolidated at the highest
levels of government. While these trends are broad and clear, a solid assessment of the existence and endurance of consensus over time must take account of the pre-Marcos era in the early years of Philippine independence, the years of martial law under Marcos, as well as the post-Marcos era of renewed movement toward democratic consolidation.

Nominal judgments on consensus are simpler to make with respect to the seven consensus dimensions due to the fact that different levels of precision in the data exist across various time frames. Specifically, well developed survey research on societal values is far more deeply developed in later time frames through such sources as the World Values Survey (2006). At the same time, this more recent data is tougher to link directly to the colonial state’s behavior due to the independent effects of other variables that come in to play as history progresses (e.g. the independent effects on societal consensus due to the Marcos regime or governmental corruption). Therefore, a modest attempt at categorizing consensus in each of the seven areas in question is potentially insightful so long as the methodological challenge is understood. In this case, consensus in each of the seven areas is categorized as high, medium, or low. High consensus is defined by the absence of challenges from significant sectors of the population (e.g. class, ethnicity, religious affiliation, political groups) in the given area. Low consensus is marked by the presence of challenges on dimensions of consensus from one or more significant sectors of the population. Challenges are viewed as more relevant when accompanied by organized violence. An assessment of medium consensus on a particular dimension is due to the presence of challenges on that given dimension that are accompanied, at most, by sporadic or disorganized violence.
Consensus on societal values

Of the seven dimensions of consensus which compliance theory links to the normative acceptance of state organizations, consensus on societal values ranks as the dimension in which there is the least evidence of lacking consensus. During all three time frames (i.e. World War II and the early years of independence, the authoritarian regime under Marcos, and the post-Marcos electoral democracy) there is evidence that religion and national pride are widely held as important societal values. The strongest evidence, not surprisingly, is located in survey research data obtained from the World Values Surveys in 1996 and 2001. Information averaged across both surveys indicates that upwards of ninety-four percent of those surveyed claim membership with a religious denomination. The same surveys indicate that upwards of eighty percent claim to be proud of their nationality; upwards of eighty-three percent claim the willingness to fight on behalf of their country. With respect to the role of women in society, across the two surveys an average of over seventy-three percent of respondents indicate having either “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of confidence in the women’s movement. Over ninety-two percent of respondents on the average indicate having either “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of confidence in churches.

At the same time, there are some troubling trends related to societal values during the same, most recent time frame. In the 1996 World Values Survey, 36.9 percent of respondents indicated that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that using violence for political goals was not justified. In that same survey, a roughly equal amount of respondents indicated that society must be “radically changed” as opposed to “valiantly defended.” These responses (22.4 percent for the former and 21.8
percent for the latter) stand in contrast to the majority of respondents who seek gradual improvement of society through reforms (55.2 percent).

This theoretically challenged, but methodologically compelling evidence from more recent sources confirms the perceptions of a Filipino society that is patriotic and committed to religious faith. There is nothing to discredit this assessment during earlier time frames, leading to the assessment that there is the presence of a high degree consensus on societal values throughout all the time frames in question.

Consensus on state goals

Post-World War II Philippine society has been deeply affected by division on the preferred goals of the state. During each of the three broad eras in question, the relationship between the state and society has been shaken by divisions rooted in economic class. In the earliest years of independence, the *Hukbalahap* movement, rising out of the peasantry, presented a significant and violent challenge during the 1940s and 1950s. The revolutionaries’ rejection of the Philippine state followed their fighting against the common foe during the Japanese occupation of World War II. Inspired by Communist ideology, the “Huks” carried out a guerrilla campaign that required substantial intervention and support from the United States in order for the Philippine government to prevail (Greenberg 1987; Gojo 1984).

Even though the bulk of the violence occurred prior to the Marcos regime, the origins of the *Hukbalahap* movement go back to the failure of the colonial state to remedy gross economic inequality in the area of land ownership. The gap between wealthy elites and rural peasants that evolved under Spanish rule, and was pointed out
specifically by American governors-general, was never resolved during the entirety of American occupation.

Inheriting the mantle of the *Hukbalahap* movement is the New People’s Army, which was formed during the 1960s and became more influential during the authoritarianism of Marcos. As the military wing of Communists rejecting the legitimacy of the Philippine state, even after Marcos, the NPA is considered by many to be a terrorist organization that confounds the ability of Philippine leaders to unite society (FAS 2008; Jane’s Information Group 2006).

World Values Survey data from 1996 reflects the long legacy of class-based division in Philippine society and the relationship of that division to state goals. Among respondents, 20.9 percent answered that the government was doing too much to fight against poverty while 35.9 percent believed that the government was doing too little against poverty. Respondents show similar division when asked to choose between competing goals of government, such as having private or state ownership of government or promoting an egalitarian or competitive society.

There is strong historical evidence to indicate a low degree of consensus on state goals, particularly when these goals pertain to the relationship between government and the distribution of wealth in society. This low consensus is marked by disaffection and violence from significant portions of society. In time, this may devolve into violence of a more sporadic nature, in which case there would be no problem with classifying this area as having a medium level of consensus.
Consensus on institutional structures

The endurance of the basic institutional structures of the American imposed state is testament to two important factors. The first factor is the conscious incorporation of Filipinos into the civil service from an early time, along with crucial investments in the infrastructure of education in the Philippines. This factor, moved by a slow recognition of many people in the United States, particularly the Democratic Party, of the ethical incongruence between colonialism and democracy, enabled a prepared selection of the citizenry to take over the reins of the state quite quickly following World War II. This is not to dispel the fact that the highest levels of the Philippine state were not controlled by wealthy elite; rather, the conditions were fostered for a critical mass of Filipinos to take advantage of the second factor that enabled the endurance of the state institutions.

The second factor is the path-dependence of institutions. This phenomenon of institutional development involves the increasing returns of efficiency gained as participants become familiar with, and increase the routinization of, institutional structures. The state institutions which evolved slowly from the time of the Philippine Commission were incrementally expanded from American hands to Filipino hands over the course of the occupation. What is truly exceptional about the endurance of the way government institutions remain organized in the Philippines is manner in which they survived the Marcos autocracy and “People Power” revolt that restored democracy in the country.

While the basic institutions of the state remain remarkably consistent over time, public feelings about the institutions reflect a fascinating ambivalence towards their efficacy. World Values Survey data from 1996 shows that on a one-to-ten scale, with
one being representative of the political system being “bad” for governing the country and ten being “very good,” over fifty-four percent rated their political system between four and six. In 2001, over fifty-four percent of respondents reported being either “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” with the way democracy develops in the Philippines. However, this should be juxtaposed with responses in the same year which indicate that over eighty-one percent of those surveyed prefer having a democratic political system. Thus, it may be a matter of ambivalence towards the way the government conducts its business rather than a matter of the institutions of democracy themselves being in question.

It is clear that according to the given criteria there exists a high level of consensus with respect to the institutional structures of the Philippine state. In this sense, the state-building process can be seen as remarkably successful, overcoming numerous obstacles, not the least of which being repeated abuses of the executive office for personal gain, a subject to be covered shortly.

Consensus on participation in the state

Despite the initially restricted nature of electoral laws in the American occupied Philippines, Philippine society has shown itself ready and willing to participate in the political process. Voter turnout in elections held has regularly surpassed that of the United States, a fact that when combined with Filipino support for democracy and democratic institutions should lead to a hopeful forecast for the viability of the Philippine state. However, there are significant challenges to this otherwise positive trend (International IDEA 2008).
There are sizeable elements of the Muslim population in the archipelago which actively oppose participation in the state. Voter turnout, one key measure of participation in the state, was below expectations in a referendum on a reorganization of the regional autonomous regions for Muslims was surprisingly low in 2001 (BBC News 2001). Many Muslims desire complete independence from the Philippines, typified by the actions of the Moro National Liberation Front which has sought to secede since the 1960s. Other key militant groups include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as well as Abu Sayyaf, a group affiliated with al Qaida (Turbiville 2002).

These observations are unsurprising in the light of history. Much like the failure of land reform leading to disconnects between the state and elements of society based on social class, the disconnects rooted in religious affiliation are rooted in centuries of intergroup conflict. The repeated attempts at quasi-autonomy for Muslim areas of the country have not been sufficient to encourage full participation in the state for religious minorities.

Muslims are estimated to only be approximately five percent of the population. However, because of the disproportionate effects that the lack of integration into society of religious minorities has on the Philippine state and society, consensus on participation in the state is classified as medium. Methods ranging from brute force to granting autonomy have not settled the question in the minds of Philippine Muslims.

Consensus on duties of citizens to the state

The strongest inferences with respect to the level of consensus in Philippine society on duties of citizens can be drawn from much of the aforementioned information that was used to assess other dimensions of consensus. Filipinos show a clear readiness
to serve their country; the overwhelming majority expresses pride in their nationality. To the extent that consensus on citizen duties exists, it stems from three primary sources. The first two of these sources are not surprising. Religious and ideological separatists that do not ascribe legitimacy to the Philippine state by definition do not accede to that state any responsibility to support it. The third source must be indirectly inferred. This is the disconnect created between the societal majority and societal elites due to corruption, both real and perceived.

There are troubling signs regarding the extent of corruption perceived within the Philippine government. According to World Values Survey data from 1996, approximately two-thirds of respondents indicated that most or almost all public officials were engaged in political corruption. That same year’s survey shows that nearly fifty-seven percent of respondents believed that the country was run by a few big interests, rather than on behalf of the people. More recently, in 2007, Transparency International ranked the Philippines 131st out of 179 in its Corruption Perceptions Index. Global Integrity’s 2006 report issued a scathing indictment on the extensive nature of corruption among governmental elites, including the public’s deposing of President Joseph Estrada who was later convicted of plundering the state. The Philippines received an overall rating of “Weak” from the Global Integrity Index on anti-corruption measures (Global Integrity 2007; Transparency International 2007).

Corruption among the elites is not new in the Philippines, and its continuance represents a failure of the state-building process to the extent that an attempt to reform the institutions occurred under American guidance. The corruption has led to a crisis of confidence in several institutions of government, as reported by World Values Survey
data. For example, averaged across the 1996 and 2001 surveys, over fifty-three percent of respondents had either not very much or no confidence in political parties. Over thirty-eight percent had either not very much or no confidence in the legislature. Over forty-one percent had not very much or no confidence in the police. Over thirty percent had not very much or no confidence in the civil service. On the whole, over forty-three percent had either not very much or no confidence in the government as a whole.

It is a must to note that any lack in confidence could also be affected by any number of factors, in addition to corruption. Also, even in a healthy democracy there can be wide ranging dissatisfaction with various institutions of the state. Nevertheless, when taken within its complete historical context, the Philippines consistently underachieves compared to other electoral democracies in the area of public corruption. This perception did not begin recently; and, the existence and perceptions of corruption by significant sectors of society represents a clear lack of consensus between governmental elites and large portions of the population related to the duties citizens have towards the state. This is why, at best, an assessment of a medium level of consensus is applied to this dimension.

Consensus on legitimacy of the state

The challenges to consensus on state goals and participation in the state have a direct bearing on the challenges to consensus on the legitimacy of the state. The greatest challenges to the Philippine state come from those significant sectors of society which reject the government’s authority outright, Communist-based insurgents and Muslim separatists. However, even within other elements of society, survey data reveals deeper perceptions about the viability of Philippine democracy in its current form.
Averaging across the World Values Survey data from 1996 and 2001, sixty-three percent believed that it would be “fairly” or “very good” if the political system had a strong leader who didn’t have to answer to elections or a legislature. Nearly sixty-two percent expressed a positive attitude towards having non-governmental experts make decisions about policy. Shockingly, nearly fifty-one percent thought it would be “fairly” or “very good” if the army ruled the country. Over forty-seven percent agreed or strongly agreed with the notion that in democracies, the economic system runs “badly.” Just under forty-nine percent agreed or strongly agreed that democracies are not good at maintaining order; over fifty-two percent agreed or strongly agreed that democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling. However, there is a silver lining in the survey data; over seventy-six percent state that they agree or strongly agree that democracy remains the best political system despite its problems.

Democracy has struggled in post-World War II Philippines, disappearing under the Marcos regime and continuing to face serious actual and perceptual challenges. However, pro-democracy values remain just as prevalent as ever, which would ordinarily mean a rating of a medium level of consensus on the legitimacy of the state. Yet, when one considers the other challenges to legitimacy from various insurgents and separatists, under the rubric used here, the assessment is that of a low level of consensus on this dimension. Corroborating the worrisome conclusion here is the Fund for Peace Failed State Index, which ranks the Philippines 56th out of 177 in terms of likelihood of becoming a failed state. Corruption, crime, and socioeconomic inequality are among the most important factors in the ranking, one that places the Philippines in the second-highest, “Warning” category (Fund for Peace 2007).
Consensus on the status of groups in the state

Decades-old tensions along social, economic, sectarian, and ideological lines continue to disrupt the consolidation of the Philippine state to this day. Much like during the time of the *ilustrados*, a clear understanding exists as to the presence of Filipino nationhood and the commitment to the state of the educated, pro-democracy elites. There is also clear evidence of an enduring national spirit among the ethnic and religious majority which, if it could bridge the gaps with other groups, could potentially yield a stable, prosperous, and unified Philippine state. Unfortunately, this is a standard that has not quite been met. For example, when asked in the 1996 World Values Survey to name the “least liked group in society,” nearly nine percent selected “capitalists,” over twenty-seven percent selected Communists, and over ten percent selected Muslims. Then, when asked whether members of the least liked groups should be allowed to demonstrate, over ninety-four percent said no.

For the same reasons given in explaining the assessments of the other six dimensions of consensus, it is reasonable to state that a medium level of consensus exists in society regarding the status of groups in the state. Intra-state violence and dissent does exist in the history of an independent Philippines; but, it is largely due to the factors of state legitimacy and disputes over state goals, rather than due to the status of groups within the state. This subtle distinction is important for the rating of medium consensus, whereas there is low consensus in those other two dimensions. Table 9 summarizes the assessed levels of consensus in the seven areas suggested as important by the application of compliance theory.
Table 9. Assessment of consensus areas in the Philippine state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of consensus</th>
<th>Level of consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal Values</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Goals</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Structures</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the State</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties of Citizens</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of the State</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Groups in the State</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status of democratic consolidation

Given the lack of high levels of consensus in each of the seven key areas of consensus deemed important to a state under the compliance framework, it is not surprising that the Philippines has faced significant challenges to democratic consolidation since independence. Ratings from two of the more commonly used databases which assess the nature of regimes, those of the Polity IV Project and Freedom House, corroborate these difficulties. Table 10 summarizes these databases’ ratings of democracy in the Philippines. In the Polity database, regimes are classified on a continuum from autocracy (-10) to democracy (10). Periods of regime transition, internal, and external disruption are scored with a negative integer outside of this continuum.
Table 10. Polity IV and Freedom House ratings, 1935-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polity IV</th>
<th>Freedom House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935-1941</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1944 (World War II)</td>
<td>-66</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-1950</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1969</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1972</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1981</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1986</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 (anti-Marcos revolt)</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1989</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Marshall and Jaggers 2002; Freedom House 2008)

It is interesting to note that it is not until 1987 that the independent Philippines surpasses the Polity IV regime score from the Commonwealth years prior to independence. One should not attribute this finding to any single factor given the independent effects of the Marcos regime and Cold War foreign policy of the United States; however, it is equally important to point out that the mixed record on consensus and the mixed record on democratic consolidation is precisely what is predicted by the failure to shift entirely to normative means of control in the imposed pre-independence Philippine state. In other words, it is highly likely that there is at least some causation by the state-society institutional relationships behind the correlation between the compliance relationship prior to independence and the state development of subsequent decades.

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8 Due to lack of congruence between country-years between the two datasets, some years are listed twice in Table 10 to represent a change during that year in one of the datasets.
Competing explanations for the Philippine case

It is entirely appropriate to address potentially competing explanations to the pattern before determining that the compliance pattern between the institutions of state and society had an impact on later state development and nation-building in the Philippine case. One possible alternative explanation is that the struggle to achieve high levels of consensus on the Philippine state is due to the interruption of World War II in the archipelago. The independent effects of the World War II experience are truly worthy of exploration; there is a definite tradeoff in only utilizing a cursory look at World War II, as in this study. According to the evidence presented here, the argument stressing World War II is not that great a potential threat to validity for two reasons. The first reason is that, if anything, the wartime experience should have bolstered national identity. Anti-occupation insurgencies were fought from both ends of the ideological spectrum. This should have increased the likelihood of higher levels of consensus. A second reason is the remarkable manner in which World War II did not influence the ultimate date of independence. The endurance of the institutional framework imposed by the United States, in spite of the interruption of World War II, is a clear testament to the path-dependence of institutions, and is worthy of further study.

A second alternative explanation is that other components of the nation-building process played a much greater role than the imposed institutions in determining the outcomes in the Philippine case. This has the potential to be a compelling challenge to the argument presented here, that the state institutions and their interactions with society determined the outcomes. This explanation could be approached from two avenues. First, is there something about the very nature of outside imposition and foreign
occupation that inhibits normative compliance relationships? Second, does the component of national identity play a significantly larger role than the components of state-building in explaining ultimate outcomes?

To believe that acknowledging either of these two questions necessitates a rejection of the approach used in this study overlooks the deeper interconnectedness of society and the state. Group dynamics is, in and of itself, a useful take on the questions of nation and state building; that approach would form a productive complement to the research done here. The question of the extent to which institutions influence and shape group interactions in an environment of inter-communal interactions is actually at the core of compliance theory. It is about more than simply taking a snapshot of an institutional framework and checking for stability. One must understand that it is the way in which the imposed institutions in the Philippines interacted with society, a society with multiple, overlapping identities embedded within, that affects the manner in which a society accepts or rejects those institutions as legitimate. In the Philippine case, the answer is in the middle, between outright acceptance and rejection, on the basis of a partial transition to normative compliance relationships between society and the many actors throughout society.

The comparability of outside-imposed nation-building cases

Of the various cases of outside-imposed nation-building undertaken by the United States, none are more often cited as the exemplars of success than the post-World War II cases of Japan and Germany. These cases are regularly analogized to contemporary cases underway since 2001 and 2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Yet, several major social and institutional factors undercut these analogies in a way that belies the argument
from Dobbins et al. (2003, 2007) that there exists a set of “best practices” that enables replicable inputs which, all else being equal, will lead to similar outcomes in all new nation-building cases.

Recognizing the state as a nexus of interacting institutions, both formal and informal, the process of outside-imposed nation-building is highly affected by the developmental paths of each institution within the state being built. The extent to which there are surviving institutions and clear national identities in a given case of outside-imposed nation-building should indicate the extent to which the outside actor with its given amount of applied force will be able to direct the occupied state in a desired new developmental path. The experiences individuals have with both their formal and informal institutions, including identities, shape the nature of the interaction between occupier and the occupied.

All of this leaves researchers with at least three clearly interrelated factors to consider when comparing across cases of outside-imposed nation-building. These include the magnitude of the effects of conflict on society in the case, the presence or absence of surviving political institutions, and the extent to which there is a high level of salience in the collective identity in the building nation. The quicker an occupier is able to move away from coercion in securing compliance from society, the smoother any transition to legitimization of the newly imposed state can be. The more extensive the surviving institutional framework is that survives an intervention, the more likely a new state will be built at lower costs to all actors involved and the presence of a strong, salient collective sense of nationhood should increase the likelihood that the building of a nation will proceed with minimal internal conflict among societal groups. These variables are
observable in nation-building cases following both World War II and the current occupations of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, revealing the inadequacy of explanations of nation-building outcomes which either underemphasize or do not consider the state-society relationship.

After World War II: Japan and Germany

Dobbins et al. (2003, pp. 20-21) draw several important lessons from the German case: democracy can be transferred, and societies can be changed; defeated populations can sometimes be malleable to imposed change; enforcing accountability for war crimes can facilitate societal transformation; divided countries can be difficult to reunite; defeated countries often require large-scale humanitarian assistance following the cessation of hostilities; immediate reparations by defeated states can be counterproductive to economic reconstruction; and, decision making on economic policy should not be diffused among multiple powers. Unfortunately, even these lessons did not necessarily lead to successful or timely democratization in countries like Haiti. Each wartime situation, and each occupation, has a different starting point from with nation-building commences. Any attempt to understand post-war reconstruction and nation-building must address the impact of the war upon the society being built. Germany and Japan are countries that suffered mightily during World War II and were dramatically reconstructed during foreign occupation. These reconstructions were so dramatic that they have captivated policy designers dealing with nation-building ever since then. They are the models of coercive democratization and outside-imposed nation-building.

By several measures, World War II was the costly war in history to the most affected societies. Francis Castles (1998) distinguishes in a measure of war impact
between those societies that suffered from World War II versus those which were utterly
defeated and occupied. In this latter category are Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, and
Finland. World War II also stands out in Monty G. Marshall’s logarithmic scale of the
full trauma of war to society in terms of human and infrastructure costs (Hampson and
Malone 2002).

Quantifying the actual damage to these countries is exceedingly difficult. John
W. Dower (1999) gives estimates for Japan of 1.74 million military deaths, 2.7 million
total deaths, thirty percent of the population left homeless, and forty percent of the urban
areas destroyed. These numbers are staggering by themselves, and they don’t even
include the numbers of refugees; according to Presidential Envoy Edwin Locke, “The
entire economic structure of Japan’s greatest cities [was] wrecked. Five millions of
Tokyo’s seven million population have left the city” (p. 44). The German experience is
clearly comparable. When Lord Beveridge toured the British zone of occupation in post-
war Germany, he found that, “There is at the moment in practically every town in the
British zone (and it is largely an urban zone) desperate material want; deficiency of all
the necessities of healthy life, and almost total absence of all its forts” (Blacksell 1978,
pp. 30-31). Allen Dulles, visiting the American zone, gave an equally dank assessment
of the situation on the ground in December of 1945 (Dulles 2003 [1945]).

In conjunction with the American occupation of Japan, all major political,
cultural, and economic institutions were weakened or dismantled. Dower’s assessment of
the Japanese political culture during this time was one of trying to “start over in a ruined
world,” and that occupation was the “touchstone [for] years for thinking about national
identity and personal values” (Dower 1999, pp. 25, 27). The language barrier led to
American reliance on Japanese professional bureaucrats as an intermediary with policy implementers; this in turn strengthened the bureaucracy as an institution, and inhibited any thorough purge of wartime participants in governance. Kenneth J. Ruoff (2001) notes that the end of the war and the imposed Constitution led to “major disjunctures” regarding the role of the Emperor in society and the imperial family as an institution.

Despite the utter destruction of infrastructure and the American goal of completely remaking Japanese political culture, there was an impressive array of past experience to draw from in imposing new institutions. According to Frank McNeil (1994), Japan’s historical experience held parties and party-based cabinets, independent press, and trade unions prior to the rise of militarism; also, a limited base of civil liberties and rule of law could be traced back to the Imperial Constitution of 1889 (Shillony 1981, p. 1). McNeil argues that the economic and social reconstruction was led by the redistribution of land to a system based on small plot ownership. At the same time, the Americans sought to decentralize the command economy (McNeil 1994, pp. 125-131, 133-137). The new constitution imposed by General MacArthur inverted the direction of sovereignty, officially renounced war as a policy instrument, and guaranteed civil and political liberties. The Diet and executive cabinet conveniently resembled their Meiji era counterparts.

As for the German experience, just as in Japan, the effort to purge the state apparatus went incomplete. Michael Ermath (1993) points out that despite the limitations of denazification of the state apparatus, other institutional changes, such as the decentralization of the state and the enabling of regional integration served to reinforce the collective rejection of fascism and militarism by the end of formal occupation.
Germany possessed institutional memory of legitimate political opposition; however, not all of the popular political parties of the Weimar era were supportive of democracy. Under occupation, all political activity had to be authorized by occupying military commanders in order to prevent the resurgence of antidemocratic political parties (von Oppen 1995, pp. 14-19, 20-28, 163-164). Against this backdrop in the western zones of occupation, Germans were left to form, and reform, their own political parties; it was ordered that all political parties “must be democratic in character and must be recognized as voluntary associations of citizens clearly distinguished from, rather than identified with, the instrumentalities of government.” Political parties were becoming active in the Western zones as early as mid-1945. British forces reportedly maintained strong working relationships with key members of the German Social Democrats in their zone. Konrad Adenauer and the Christian Democratic Party vied with the Social Democrats to replace the old Centre Party at the mainstream of the German political spectrum. Anti-Nazi leaders that survived the war were sought out by the Allies as liaisons between the military and the German populace. In this way, the Allies legitimized more than one party, while shutting out extremist parties from the political process. However, the parties themselves were not an imposition of the occupiers.

The German states (Länder) were empowered to form their own constitutions by 1946. Strong states within a federal system diffused power away from the executive, mitigating fears that a strong central government in the one-party fashion would return. Additionally, the Electoral Law established by the Allies resulted in the adoption of a modified proportional representation system, encouraging more parties than the two largest to participate in elections (Golay 1958). The Basic Law divided the powers of the
executive into two offices, which in combination with strong subnational governments and the electoral rules diffused power and authority.

Nation-building in both Japan and Germany was both social and economic in nature, with several threads of continuity in the policies. One crucial issue that policy makers in the United States saw as necessary to security a democratic future for Japan and Germany was changing the political culture from militaristic ideals. One major tool that was used to instill democratic values and root out militarism was educational reform. In Germany, for example, schools were ordered closed and systematically reorganized with the strictest control of the curriculum (von Oppen 1955, pp. 20-21). In Japan, the Americans removed all ideologically disapproved material from the national educational curriculum. Other educational “legacies” of the occupation of Japan in the realm of education include the Teachers union, parent-teacher associations, and boards of education (McNeil 1994, pp. 14, 27).

Another common thread in the two cases is the clear hegemony and influence of the United States on institutional development, the extent of which is commensurate with the length of formal occupation. Reconstruction efforts were as much devoted to institution building as they were to economic reconstruction. American economic investments, especially those in the guise of the Marshall Plan, were geared as much toward strategic considerations as humanitarian considerations. The United States successfully rebuilt a system of interdependent, international trade in accordance with its strategic and economic interests. In doing so, the United States altered the socioeconomic, institutional, and psychological paths of the occupied states. The investment framework, including enormous sums of money and a robust institutional
framework with the founding of the OEEC, formed part of a comprehensive nation-building strategy led by the United States.

With respect to the importance of established, salient collective identities in Japan and Germany, the evidence of clear national identity is undoubted. Despite other clear societal cleavages with respect to political ideologies, socioeconomic class, and other important elements of identity, there is a long history of both nationhood and statehood in both the Japanese and German cases. In both cases, therefore, there is commonality with respect to three variables of interest in a path dependence framework relevant to outside-imposed nation-building, these being the extreme effects of the conflict on the society, the previous historical existence of some elements of liberal institutions, the presence of a clear national identity, along with the further presence of a comprehensive strategy for incorporating the rebuilt nations into the international political and economic order.

Contemporary cases: Iraq and Afghanistan

There are two key reasons why the case of Iraq is quite dissimilar to the cases of Japan and Germany with respect to the effects of the conflict leading up to its occupation. The first reason is that Iraq at the aggregate level, the war in Iraq has yet to remotely approach the level of damage to human and economic infrastructure seen in World War II. This is not to say by any means that the situation is easy; it is just that the situations in the nation-building environment are extremely different. First, be it due to exhaustion, unconditional surrender, or another factor or combination of factors, Japan and Germany did not experience anything resembling the violence that Iraq has seen during its occupation. Rates of homelessness and starvation were much higher in Japan and Germany at the outset of their occupations; yet, the level of security and occurrences of
violence have been fluctuating drastically by comparison in Iraq. A second reason that
the level of devastation was so different in Iraq is the differing technologies and
corresponding tactics employed by the United States during the combat leading up to the
occupation. Instead of the strategic bombing of World War II, “smart” weaponry enables
wars to achieve strategic ends without necessitating equivalent levels of devastation seen
in the past. Despite the length of the occupation in Iraq approaching those of Japan and
Germany, pacification resembling Japan and Germany has not occurred.

The lack of an unconditional surrender in Iraq is a reflection of the lack of a clear,
overriding national identity commanding loyalty among all major subgroups, especially
when compared to Japan and Germany. Despite decades of authoritarian rule, the capture
of Saddam Hussein did not abate violence stemming from a variety of sectors in society.
Many analysts (e.g. Anderson and Gareth 2004) argue that there are three distinct
identities, the majority Shi’a Arabs, the now deposed Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds.
However, even these distinctive identities make for an overly simplistic view of Iraq
collective identity (or lack thereof). Field observers, scholars, and journalists (e.g.
Vincent 2004; Rubin 2004; Rosen 2005) describe the importance of tribal and familial
connections, as well as micro-sectarianism (adherence to the teachings of particular
clerics) as forming the strongest bases for individual and political identity in post-Saddam
Iraq. This facet of Iraq’s political culture has been manifested in political party formation
that has occurred predominantly around these identities, as well as the inter-group
conflicts pervasive throughout the country.

These same observers also note that political parties have a history in Iraq beyond
simply the Ba’athists, who were comprised largely of the al-Tikriti clan of which Saddam
Hussein was the leading member. These parties include the Dawa party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Iraqi Communist Party, as well as several political-religious militia groups which compete with the imposed state for legitimacy in various parts of the country. Members of opposition parties suffered mightily during the Hussein regime, though competing political parties did survive and play important roles in the attempts at political reconciliation in post-2003 Iraq. In the predominantly Sunni province of Anbar, once a center for anti-U.S. insurgent activity, “Awakening Councils” have emerged in opposition to al Qaida affiliated forces.

Just as the bureaucracy played a crucial role in reconstruction of Japan and Germany, especially due to the less than wholesale purge of minor members of the ancien régime, the old Ba’athist bureaucracy and security apparatus play an important role in a path dependence framed understanding of nation-building in Iraq. The dismissal of military and police forces at the outset of the American occupation turned out many government workers who were relatively untainted by the cruelties and crimes of the Hussein regime. In hindsight, various administration officials have bickered over the extent to which the debaathification efforts and the failure of state capacity were necessary or inevitable (e.g. Bremer 2006; Feith 2008; Ricks 2007; Chandrasekaran 2006). Acting in haste, much bureaucratic chaos ensued as Baathists were purged from the state, ultimately leading to a strengthening of religious institutions, insurgent, militia, and other anti-U.S. groups, as well as the reborn political parties. Lessons of the past indicate that former technocratic experts will have to be brought back into the administrative fold in order to give Iraq a greater chance to hold together. Against this backdrop, the path dependence framework would led to a prediction of minimal change
in the direction of institutional development compared to the post-World War II cases based upon the fractured collective identity and the difficulty in drawing on previous institutional experiences in liberal self government, exacerbated by the shortsighted depletion of intellectual capital from the state apparatus. On top of this, there are likely to be class-based societal cleavages which need to be investigated further due to the shock nature of economic liberalization of state owned industries in Iraq (Chandrasekaran 2006).

Afghanistan, while a contemporary case with Iraq, represents a different sort of challenge to the nation-builder. These differences are revealed by looking at the variables uncovered by the path dependence approach to the subject. Decades of war against the Soviets and against itself had turned Afghanistan into the proverbial “failed” state with nothing remotely resembling the infrastructure of Iraq. If anything, the urban infrastructure of Afghanistan was closer in resemblance to the burned out shells for cities found in Japan and Germany after World War II (Orr 2004). In fact, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointedly referred to half-hearted military intervention in Afghanistan prior to Operation Enduring Freedom as “bouncing the rubble,” a crude remark demonstrating the weaknesses of “Western” styles of warfare in the context (9/11 Commission 2004).

If misunderstandings regarding the effects of modern weaponry were pervasive in the Afghan case, then many argue that the Bush administration’s misunderstandings about the Afghan political culture were even more inept. Area specialists (Scheuer [Anonymous] 2004) assert that the complete lack of a coherent Afghan collective identity will inevitably lead to more inter-group conflict and will undermine the Karzai (or any
imposed) regime. Meanwhile, the limited scope of the U.S. nation-building strategy has enabled the Taliban to regroup amidst the safe harbor of friendly Pashtun tribes. Warlord and narco-politics tends to dominate outside of the areas of major U.S. and NATO military presence; this condition leads some pundits to refer (only half-jokingly) to Hamid Karzai as the “mayor of Kabul” (GlobalSecurity.org).

The tribal entity, loya jirga, gives the strong impression of consensual democracy in action, albeit with few of the liberal guarantees for anyone save the male tribal leaders. Presidential and parliamentary elections have occurred with few violent incidents; however, the Taliban’s resurgence in outlying areas has put significant strain on U.S., Afghan, and NATO strategists’ efforts to consolidate gains since 2001. These events highlight an interesting and seemingly contradictory path of democratic development in Afghanistan. On the one hand, the massive devastation and lack of infrastructure has enabled a limitation on the violence Afghan civil society has been accustomed to experiencing; this would compare favorably to Iraq with respect to the proper antecedent conditions for new institutional development and the legitimization of the work of the loya jirga. On the other hand, the arguably crucial variable of collective identity is at least as fragmented as the Iraq case and bears no resemblance to the cases of Japan and Germany.

It remains to be proven whether Afghanistan will continue on a relatively optimistic path, or will revert back to Scheuer’s pessimistic, violent, and fragmented-identity political culture. If the decades of warfare have made the various groups there amenable to change, then Afghanistan is starting from a similar place as Japan and the loya jirga holds parallel to the Meiji era institutions as a guide for future democratic
development. If the collective identity cannot be forged under Karzai’s banner, as Scheuer predicts, then a far more rigorous and forceful application of military power will be prerequisite to any long-term institutional development in the Western image, if at all possible.

Bringing the cases together: A continuum of outcomes

When Allen Dulles (2003 [1945]) reported back to President Truman on the progress of reconstruction efforts in post-World War II Germany in December of 1945, his report eerily resembled the state of affairs seen in today’s nation-building cases. Media reports and government assessments contradicted one another concerning the existence of an underground movement in Germany. The economy was not simply damaged, but also stagnant. It was difficult for the Allies to find strong, credible leaders who lacked a “political taint” from the Nazi regime. Those individuals who had either the experience and/or the desire to build a liberal market economy had been “liquidated” by the Nazis; essential human capital for the democratization process was in short supply. There existed a controversy concerning the legal status of detainees; and, in another similarity to today, in spite of the massive political persecution by the Nazis, many Germans did not consider themselves to have been liberated. Dulles perceived a sense of bitterness towards the occupiers combined with ambivalence towards the political process. Of those political leaders without connections to the Nazis that actually survived persecution, many were more leftist than was desirable to American elites. This reminds observers of the situation in Iraq where many charismatic political and religious leaders who survived Hussein’s oppression maintain fundamentalist Islamic views undesirable to current U.S. wishes. Finally, Dulles also noted that identical to what reporters and
pundits assert today, the U.S. Army was apprehensive and inadequately prepared to administer the rebuilding of a civil government in Germany. If it wasn’t for the clear differences between the cases of outside-imposed nation-building, it is easy to fall prey to the temptation of over-analogizing the cases.

Rhetoric by the Bush administration has been replete with analogies rooted in the success of nation-building policies in Japan, Germany, and other cases of occupation less often considered, such as South Korea (Bush 2002, 2007). These analogies are designed to evoke in the listeners’ minds the tremendous social, political, and economic development in Japan and Germany with the assumption that these results can be replicated time and again if only the correct recipe for the occupation and imposition of institutions can be applied (e.g. Dobbins et al. 2003, 2007). In looking at the available information, it is necessary, however, to address the facts and underlying assumptions behind the analogical reasoning of the Bush administration as it pertains to nation-building cases during and following the transition to new leadership in the United States.

Among the lessons implied by the post-World War II analogy is an orthodox understanding of the measure of successful post-war reconstruction. The scope of devastation has major psychological, economic, and strategic consequences. The more traumatic a conflict, the more resources must be invested to rebuild. Damaged and defeated states find it more difficult to rebuild without help, which when combined with punitive actions by the victors, can lead to resentment.

A second major lesson is the understanding that long-term strategic vision will guide the form that a reconstruction effort takes. The U.S. sought to ensure its long-term peace and security by remaking Japanese and German political institutions as well as
societies. Democracy went hand-in-hand with a vision for integration into the capitalist trading economy. Efforts today are following an equally self-interested strategic plan rooted in the goal successfully rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan into democratic, secular states along the lines of Japan and Germany.

The evidence leads to a reconsideration of the assumption that there is a set of best practices that can be employed in order to replicate the successes in Japan and Germany. There are distinct variables at play in cases of outside-imposed nation-building which go unheeded in the absence of solid historical grounding and an appreciation for the influences of both formal and informal institutional development. Table 11 compares the effects of conflict on infrastructure and society, key surviving institutions drawn upon by the occupiers, and the relative clarity of national-level collective identity in the four cases discussed here.

Table 11. Four cases of outside-imposed nation-building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Effects of conflict</th>
<th>Key institutions</th>
<th>Collective national identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Bureaucracy, Meiji era influences</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Bureaucracy, political parties</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ethnic and sectarian groups, exiles</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Loya jirga, ethnic and sectarian groups, exiles</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A look at the factors discussed here suggests that instead of a formula for replicating the successes of Japan and Germany, it is more likely that there is a continuum for the likelihood of approaching those levels of success based upon the extent to which the effects of conflict on infrastructure and society have left the polity amenable to wholesale change from outside, whether there are substantive, democratically oriented institutions upon which an occupier can draw to guide the building nation, and the clarity of a unifying national identity. It is more likely that Japan and Germany represent a “perfect storm” of these variables and that other cases of outside-imposed nation-building will lead to a regression towards a mean outcome. In fact, as nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan has looked less and less likely to follow the developmental paths of Japan and Germany, new models have been proposed, including South Korea and the Philippines. However, a breakdown of the latter analogy can be of further use in clarifying the continuum of nation-building outcomes.

A cursory view of the United States’ occupation of the Philippines has become a popular analogy employed to predict possible nation-building outcomes in Iraq (e.g. Ricks 2007). At first glance, this makes sense given that both are examples of multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian societies; both are also cases of outside-imposed nation-building against the backdrop of a significant insurgency. Reflecting on the variables highlighted by a path dependence approach, the Philippines again appears similar to Iraq with lower cumulative effects on infrastructure as a result of conflict and an unclear sense of collective identity at the time of the occupation. There is, however, a major difference in the relationship between the occupiers and the local institutions drawn upon in the course of imposing the new state. In the Philippines, control was never fully established across
the entire archipelago, with sporadic violence particularly in the Muslim regions that continues today. At the same time, the initial insurgency which caused so much difficulty for the American efforts to engage in their policy of colonialism, termed “benevolent assimilation,” was largely confined to one major ideological faction of one ethnic group. Enough collaborative elites from the wealthy, landowning and educated class cooperated with the U.S. in the course of establishing the imposed state that it was several decades before socioeconomic class divisions again threatened American control of the islands prior to World War II. A final factor that clearly sets the Philippines apart as a nation-building case is yet another variable associated with path dependence, that of time. The United States invested heavily over the course of half a century to construct its desired state and consolidate political and economic control under the collaborative ilustrado elite. Tremendous advances in communication and transportation infrastructure were completed under the watchful eye of an ever expanding, largely locally staffed bureaucracy. Much like in Japan and Germany later, education policy formed a crucial aspect of nation-building policy, with the accompanying vision of generational change in the political culture (May 1980).

Yet, in spite of the focused, long term efforts of the American occupiers, democracy, stability, and economic growth in the Philippines has not reached the standards later set by Japan and Germany, suggesting that given the particular conditions of the case, Japan and Germany likely represent not the replicable norm of outside-imposed nation-building, but a positive extreme based upon the confluence of favorable factors and development over a significant length of time. The outcome seen in the Philippine case may represent the mean and it remains to be seen whether Iraq and
Afghanistan can aspire to even that level of success in terms of democracy, stability, and economic development without a serious and candid reassessment from U.S. policymakers regarding the length of time required to achieve those levels of consolidation. The evidence suggests that applying a formulaic set of best practices to outside-imposed nation-building will not yield desired results in such a way as to negate the important factor of time; attempts to portray nation-building efforts as a quick process leading to an inevitably Marshall Plan-esque conclusion are foolish at best and disingenuous at worst in the light of an approach to the concept guided by path dependence. Policy makers must refrain from their glorious overuse and misapplication of thin analogies if they are to maintain any credibility on the topic.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

This research has employed a case study of an overlooked example of outside-imposed nation-building in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the argument that institutional creation leads to nation-building successes, as defined in various ways by policy makers. First, it has been shown that by utilizing the compliance theory of complex organizations and extending it to the context of the nexus of institutions that is an imposed state, a stronger explanation of the relationship between institutions and outcomes in pertinent cases can be found. Specifically, the manner in which the imposed state interacts with and attempts to control society will affect the response of the society towards the imposed institutions. Ultimate success in terms of stability, legitimacy of the institutional order, and higher order goals, such as the consolidation of democratic values stem from the ability of an occupier to move beyond coercive means of control, through remunerative means of control, towards the normative use of symbols and values as the primary way to secure legitimacy.

The case study of the colonial Philippines reflects this dilemma in which the occupier needs to make this transition in means of control in order to achieve stated goals; all the while, there remains the tendency to become trapped in reliance upon coercion due to failures in institutional design and policy implementation. The United States was able to move beyond coercive means of control in the colonial Philippines, but never entirely. Institutional designs and policy implementation were such that deep-rooted socioeconomic and sectarian divisions in society were never entirely mended. Whereas democratic values were consolidated in much of society, long term trends
indicate that this consolidation is incomplete; democratic government was eliminated for a significant length of time after independence and there have been several issues with the executive power’s abuse since independence. While Muslims represent approximately five percent of the population, religious divides represent a disproportionate level of inter-societal strife to this day.

At the same time, to call the nation-building policy in the Philippines a failure is as inaccurate as calling it an unqualified success. Tremendous investments in communications and transportation infrastructure have yielded economic growth and helped to tie together society throughout the archipelago. The impressive focus on education fostered a positive legacy despite policies being rooted in beliefs about race and culture that no longer stand the test of moral hindsight. Rule of law and corruption, while still issues facing the people of the Philippines, are not to the extent that the state is massively oppressing society and transitions of power are largely peaceful. The Philippines is not a significant threat to its neighbors, notwithstanding its role as a major front in Operation Enduring Freedom. Altogether, the case of the Philippines represents a theoretical middle ground in the scale of imposed nation-building successes, so long as the case is understood in its context and in detail, without key factors glossed over or ignored as can be the case (e.g. Medved 2008). Brief looks at other cases of outside-imposed nation-building undertaken by the United States demonstrate that several variables need to be addressed before one can reasonably assert that outcomes are replicable across societies. These variables are revealed by looking at institutional approaches to the concept.
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the primary theoretical and policy relevant concerns which stem directly out of this study. It is important to reflect upon future avenues of research as well as the uses and misuses of research on the nation-building concept by those who would actively seek to recreate and impose real and alleged “successes” on a global scale. Misusing historical cases in the guise of simplistic analogies is done at the policy maker’s own peril.

A review of this study

Sociological bridges to the study of political phenomena are not new. However, from concepts such as legitimacy to the construction of group identity, interdisciplinary connections can strengthen the understanding of complex social and political events in a way that is fruitful for both the scholar and the policymaker. This is the case with the concept of nation-building and institutional theories of constructing states and nations. Effective political institutions are theorized to mitigate societal conflict, promote economic development, and do both in a manner that has increasing returns for societies that are forging a state and national identity. These ideas are well established in the nation-building literature; however, what is missing is a stronger grasp of how and why institutions have these effects on a society, particularly given that in many circumstances of nation-building, the institutions are imposed on a society by an outside actor. This purpose of this paper is to review the concept of nation-building and propose the application of organizational theory to further the understanding of nation-building mechanisms. Specifically, Amitai Etzioni’s theory of compliance in complex organizations is one example of a sociological theory which can assist researchers in
understanding how building states interact with societies, explaining in more detail the outcomes of nation-building policies.

This study attempts to extend Etzioni’s compliance framework by looking at the nexus of institutions comprising a state. It is argued that an analogous relationship exists between the organizations considered by Etzioni, as well as other studies of compliance, and states. This study narrowed its focus by looking at a particularly relevant type of state, that which is imposed upon a society from the outside, as happens in a foreign policy of nation-building. This application of the compliance theory reveals an occupier’s dilemma in the course of explaining the state-society relationship under the given conditions. An occupying entity must subdue and eventually win over the occupied society to the legitimacy of the imposed state; however, actions taken in the course of subduing and imposing tend to lead to the rejection of that state by significant sectors of the society being imposed upon. The prescription for overcoming this dilemma is for the imposing entity to maximize the use of normative means of control and to move towards these means of control as quickly as possible. The failure to achieve a state-society relationship based upon normative means of control would ultimately lead to a failure of complete consolidation of support for the imposed state, with several long-term effects.

In order to test this theory, this study conducts a case study of the colonial state imposed upon the Philippines by the United States between 1898 and 1941. This case is one which has been unreasonably overlooked in the literature on nation and state-building. The findings here accomplish two tasks. First, this study shows that there are compelling linkages between the state-society relationship in terms of means of control
and nation-building outcomes, as predicted by the extension of Etzioni’s compliance framework. Secondly, there are several ways in which the findings here relate to potentially fruitful future research on important concepts discussed throughout. This chapter explores the ramifications of the Philippine case and the method of its study here on related issues of theory, research, and policy.

Theory and research

The findings of this study support the viability of Etzioni’s compliance theory, especially the value of its potential application to political questions. It can be a useful investigative framework and guide to researchers exploring questions related to the relationships between institutions and individuals subject to those institutions. In this sense, compliance theory, as well as other theories of organizational behavior, represents a valuable addition to institutional theories of nation and state-building. It is worthwhile for looking at both how and why institutions matter in nation-building cases.

This application comes with a caveat. The application of the compliance framework necessitates careful longitudinal research designs in order to avoid a chicken-and-egg problem. In other words, are the institutions driving behavior in society? Or, are actions in society driving institutional behavior? The truth is that it’s likely both. For the compliance framework to work best, one must identify critical historical junctures at which institutions are created and/or imposed at the inception of the case. This is because the actions of institutions will affect society, which in turn will elicit feedback of the state.

Further investigation into potential independent variables which may impact the occupier’s dilemma and the importance of the state-society relationship in nation and
state-building outcomes would be a fruitful way to expand on the research here. These research extensions also hold real policy relevance. First, more study needs to be incorporated in the details of coercive behavior by outside actors in state and nation-building. Nation-building operations start behind the proverbial “eight-ball” because of the emphasis on coercion in imposed state construction. Secondly, theories of group dynamics and collective identity will likely prove useful in differentiating the circumstances under which outside actors are able to both overcome a coercion bias and quickly achieve societal consensus on an imposed state framework. In other words, to what extent does national identity already exist within a case of state imposition and to what extent does that matter?

A third potential avenue of related research concerns tapping into the extensive literature on the path-dependence of institutions to explain the relative levels of difficulty in state construction by outside actors. The extent to which there are prior experiences with various state frameworks and social structures could be associated with the ease with which an occupier can impose a particular state structure upon a society. Also, this could explain, at least in part, circumstances under which the coercion bias may be overcome and the occupier’s dilemma solved. A good example from the Philippine case of this factor is how various societal divisions endured the transition from Spanish to American rule, mitigating several attempts to change Philippine society in the American image.

A fourth potential linkage between this study and other research can be made by addressing the discourse of surrender. Is there something particular about those societies which peacefully buy in to an imposed state in the wake of international conflict? This
may yield answers as to why some occupiers are able to escape from the circle of violence and illegitimacy of imposition inherent in outsider imposed nation and state-building.

Yet another possible next step for research in this area is to continue to assess the validity of the component model of understanding the nation-building concept (Figure 1). This project provides support for the idea that state institutions have independent effects on nation-building outcomes. However, the other components which interact with each other, within society and between the occupier and society should be investigated both individually and in concert across several cases in order to refine and test the theorized context of nation-building.

Finally, this research reveals a possible challenge to the perspective on the state from Charles Tilly (1975) along with possible support for other work which challenges the “Tillyan” perspective on state development (Taylor and Botea 2008). Tilly theorizes that the development of stateness is rooted in its success in warfare and mastery of the coercive apparatus of a territory. In other words, the state grows out of its success in war. Challenges to this theory include the possibility that intra-territorial conflict is at least as likely to destroy a state as create it. The data here could be completely reassessed in this light to reveal a new finding on Tilly’s theory, beyond the scope of what is sought here.

Policy relevance and nation-building research

Policy relevance is not necessary for research to be interesting. However, in the study of imposition’s effects on the state-society relationship, there is ample opportunity to see how building on the lessons revealed by research will lead to a richer and more peace-oriented understanding of international and inter-group politics. American foreign
policy in particular would benefit from a stronger, more rigorous look at the societal impacts of forced regime change and occupation. The popularity of analogies between nation-building cases in American foreign policy history, as well as the popularity of a thin, glossed over understanding of the Philippine case, are both genuine obstacles to the application of nation-building research to better quality foreign policy decision making.

Stephen R. Shalom (2006) compellingly argues that contemporary U.S. policy makers misrepresent the nature and the details of the American occupation of the Philippines. Shalom argues that the case is one in which the U.S. was inconsistent (to put it mildly) in the support for democratization in the Philippines. In fact, if anything, the U.S. sought to undermine democracy in the post-independence era. The Philippine case has referred to as a model for how the U.S. should behave by writers from such disparate political backgrounds as Max Boot (2001) and Thomas E. Ricks (2007). If the Philippine case represents a “best case scenario” for Iraq, as Ricks states, based upon the successful creation of the Constabulary, then Iraq is not likely headed for a role as a beacon of regional stability within a time frame of several decades.

These gut-level comparisons between the Philippines and Iraq, and by extension Afghanistan, are appealing because of the multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian nature of the cases. It is equally interesting to consider the possible comparisons between the ideological cohorts which helped to drive policy in both the Philippines and Iraq. These cohorts include the Roosevelt-Mahan naval expansionists of the late nineteenth century and the neoconservatives of the post-Cold War era. However, it has been even more common for the Bush administration to draw analogical comparisons between today’s cases with South Korea, Germany, and Japan (Bush 2002; Chandrasekaran 2006, p. 183).
This demands a better grasp of the continuum of nation-building outcomes and theories regarding those factors that lead to cases ending up at a particular point on that continuum. Consider, for argument’s sake, the eerie similarity between the moral quandary of interrogations during the insurgency in the Philippines and today. As noted by Roosevelt biographer Edmund Morris (2002), the negative fallout of atrocities in both cases threatened to totally undermine the moral rationale for occupation and war in both situations. President Roosevelt and Elihu Root immediately recognized the political ramifications of the failure of even the smallest minority of American forces to uphold their “civilized” standards of decency (pp. 99-102). Under the vantage point of the compliance framework by Etzioni, the sociological understanding embedded in the theory combines with the vivid nature of Roosevelt’s individual response to teach a striking lesson to today’s policy makers; one risks losing one’s grip on an already tenuous situation if one does not hold to the conduct publicly professed as the minimal standards of human dignity. There is no level of provocation that justifies lowering one’s own moral and legal standards; the act of doing so will reverberate for decades and the grandest, most enlightened vision will fail to be realized.

At the same time, if one is to bring up the Philippine case as a model for realistic policy expectations, one must understand the Philippine case as a model of difficulty, incomplete consolidation, and colonialism. There are normative implications to equating any case of contemporary nation-building to colonialism; however, if the occupation and institutional imposition fits, policy makers should be aware of the ramifications involved from the perspective of those being occupied and imposed upon.
Amitai Etzioni’s own recent work advocates for a move away from the idea that outside actors can easily interject themselves into a society for the purposes of forced democratization (2007a; 2007b). Not only is democracy not easy to impose, neither is stability or a sense of stateness or nationhood. As Putnam (1993) argued in his study of institutional development in Italy, institutional development is a factor measured in decades, not years. This logic can be extended to say that if institutional development is a matter of decades, then national identity may be a matter of centuries. What this means in the most practical terms is that not only must nation-building policy be realistically approached, but the expectations of its difficulty must be realistically communicated to the public with respect to the length of time and investments required in most cases. This means that nation-building cases in which there is little to no resistance and an intact national identity (e.g. Germany and Japan) are actually the extreme on the continuum of potential outcomes and not the norm. It also means that if these operations are to be undertaken that, at least with respect to the way it is viewed in the occupied society, there may be little distinction between today’s actions and colonialism. This should lead observers to take a step back and reassess the nature of American foreign policy.
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