A CONFUCIAN ECUMENE: THE ROLE OF CONFUCIANISM AS A GOVERNING IDEOLOGY IN JAPANESE FORMOSA FROM 1895 TO 1937

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

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IDEOLOGY IN JAPANESE FORMOSA FROM 1895 TO 1937

Abstract

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Economic imperialism remains the dominant paradigm in Political Economy when examining modern empires. The Core-Periphery relationships of World Systems Theory based around exploitation of labor and resources, or capitalist cycles of accumulation is a powerful theoretical tool, and a useful lens through which to view European colonialism. However, the expansion of the Japanese empire into Taiwan did not follow the same pattern of development and exploitation as its European counterparts, and had dramatically different outcomes for the former colonized state. This project compares standard economic analysis of Japanese colonialism with a modified version of Michael Mann’s model of social power allowing for ideological drivers of expansion that incorporates the work of John K Fairbank on the Chinese World Order. Specifically attempting to identify the role of Confucianism as a governing ideology in Japanese imperial expansion from 1895 (the treaty of Shimonoseki) to 1937 (the beginning of Japanese militarism).
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Prologue

In 1867 the Tokugawa government (Bakufu) was overthrown, and the Emperor was restored to power after centuries of Shogun rule. This dramatic change in Japan’s political structure became known as the Meiji Restoration. The Restoration was the result of a combination of factors ranging from the arrival of Western powers, and the bankruptcy of the Shogunate, to the historical dissatisfaction of the powerful provinces of Choshu and Satsuma. For the next thirty years an elite cadre of former samurai ran the Japanese government and ushered in an era of modernization and prosperity. These oligarchs struggled to maintain control over the nation and to attain equal status in global politics with Western Powers.

In 1895 the Meiji government took a significant step forward in its quest to become one of the great Imperial Powers. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded the island of Taiwan to the Empire of Japan in perpetuity. The Meiji government had become a colonial power and began an era of imperialism that would witness experiments in liberalism and democracy but ultimately culminated in the militarism that resulted in the Second World War. Throughout the life of the Japanese Empire the governing elite strove to maintain traditional cultural elements to provide stability while rapidly modernizing economically, militarily and politically.

This struggle to balance the traditional and the modern characterizes the Japanese imperial period and provides an important insight into the nature and style of Japanese colonialism. What follows is a thesis regarding the nature of Japanese imperialism and its links to the ideology of Confucianism using the case of Taiwan.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The Chinese government’s recent declarations of its struggle toward a “Harmonious Society” are indicative of China’s traditional ideological roots. Recently, the Chinese education system has begun reemphasizing Confucian values in primary and secondary schools throughout the country (McGivering 2008, Fan 2007, Xinhua 2004). This resurgence comes in the wake of the rampant materialism that followed the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping beginning in the late 1970s (Schoppa 2004, Roberts 1999). This educational reform is politically expedient because Confucian thought is structured around hierarchical relationships and willing submission (Zhao 2009). The ideal Confucian citizen should be loyal to the state, and the state in turn is expected to provide for the needs of its citizenry (Goto-Jones 2005 & 2007, Woodside 1998, Pye 1991).

In the recent past scholars have focused on the Confucian economic system (Dirlik 1995, Ornatowski 1996). However, little research has been done on modern empires that have employed Confucian values in their governance. In order to understand the implications of China’s renewed interest in the Confucian ideology it is necessary to understand the history of other modern Confucian empires. Japan during the Meiji, Showa, and Taisho periods provides an excellent historical analogue for modern China. Both states have a strong Confucian ethical and philosophical tradition; Japan sought, as China is now seeking, to rapidly modernize economically and militarily and both governments were oligarchic (Duus 1998, Schoppa 2004, Roberts 1999, Sumiko 2008). As important as it is to recognize the similarities between Meiji Japan and modern China, it is equally important that the differences in foreign policy between Japan and the West be examined in historical context to determine whether or not ideology played a significant historical role in Japanese foreign policy.
Imperial Japan’s foreign policy, like that of many of its Western contemporaries, was dominated by colonial relationships. Traditional theories of colonialism express the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized as being primarily characterized by exploitation. This relationship based around labor and resources, or capitalist cycles of accumulation is a powerful theoretical tool, and has proved to be a useful interpretation of European colonialism. However, it is unclear whether the expansion of the Japanese empire into northeast China and Taiwan followed the same pattern of development and exploitation as its European counterparts. Japanese imperial history is often viewed through the lens of World War II; however, Japan prior to the war employed ideological and administrative systems that had dramatically different outcomes from its war time acquisitions. This project compares the colonial history of Taiwan through a modified version of Michael Mann’s model of social power. Using secondary sources and British Consular Reports this dissertation will attempt to identify the role of Confucianism as a governing ideology in Japanese Formosa from 1895 (the Treaty of Shimonoseki) to 1937 (the beginning of Japanese militarism).

Do Western models of colonialism apply to Japan? Was Confucianism merely a legitimating rationale or did it have a tangible impact on Japanese policy? In order to address these issues it will be necessary to investigate Japan’s administration of Taiwan. It is also necessary to define colonialism in order to determine its applicability to imperial Japan.

Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the founders of World System Theory, argues that in sociology a colony is a conquered territory that possesses a single hierarchical power structure comprised of multiple strata which are similar in effect to castes, being hereditary, allowing little mobility and limiting contact between strata. He further states that these strata are almost always determined by race (1966). This definition, which predates his seminal work in World System Theory,
would seem to indicate that Japan was qualitatively different in the administration of its territories in northeast China and Taiwan (Kamachi 1980). The case of Korea however provides an important counterpoint, considering the Japanese limitations placed upon the Korean nationals after annexation (Chang 1971, Henry 2005, Shin 1998).

The Japanese case also diverges from the West in terms of timing of first contact, the use of missionaries, and the imposition of alien forms of government and belief. In Chapter 3 these differences are explored in detail along with alternative explanations for colonialism and a discussion of “colonies of settlement” and “colonies of rule” as they are posited by Philip McMichael (2007). These typologies also do not adequately describe the Japanese situation.

Due to the difficulty in using traditional definitions of colonialism to describe Japanese imperial expansion in northeast China and Taiwan during this period, it is useful to consider a more general model of state behavior, one with the strength and flexibility of existing Western models but without the racial and economic limitations. Michael Mann in his work on the sources of social power provides such a model. Mann outlines four networks of social power: ideological, military, economic and political. Throughout history various constellations of these types of power have led to different styles of government and types of international relations (1986).

This model permits the exploration of a number of possible impetuses for Japanese imperial expansion. Of particular interest is the possibility that ideology -- and not economic motives -- framed Japanese conceptions of ethical governance in the colonies as well as the “co-prosperity” discourse.

One particularly useful concept introduced by Mann is the “Christian Ecumene.” The term ecumene refers to Christianity’s “transcendent power,” consolidation of Christianity’s
ideological power across Europe made possible Christianity’s pervasive social power for several centuries. Mann argues that Christianity was able to resolve, at least in part, the contradictions of empire that led to Rome’s collapse and because of this a new “empire” was constructed based upon ideological power that was able to transcend political boundaries (1986).1

Paralleling in some ways Christianity’s position in Europe, Confucianism in East Asia was also an ideology transcending national boundaries. The Confucian philosophy was initially spread via Chinese military conquest; however, the state philosophy of Confucianism guided non-military international relations as well (Goto-Jones 2005, Woodside 1998, Pye 1991). It was China’s dual role as ideological pole and military power that allowed it to dominate Asia for so long. Confucianism served as a transcendent ideology that maintained China’s role as “civilizer” of regional states and territories. It was China’s position as the cradle of Confucian culture and civilization that allowed for the maintenance of a coherent empire, reducing the need for an ongoing military presence in tributary states (Roberts 2004).

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese empire was in dire straits politically, militarily and economically. While some sociologists have used this period of widespread corruption and oppression to argue that Confucianism’s penetration in Chinese society was superficial (Skocpol 1980), this ignores the events that led up to the collapse of the Qing dynasty, specifically foreign incursion, and bankruptcy (exacerbated by indemnities incurred as a result of military defeats to foreign powers). Confucianism’s influence on China at this time can best be seen in the reaction to it during the May 4th Movement. Revolutionaries of this time cited attachment to traditional Confucian values as the core obstacle to political modernization (Schoppa 2004, Roberts 2001,

1 For a more complete discussion of the Confucian Ecumene see Appendix.
Granet 1959). During this period in the Japanese philosophical and political discourse, there is increased denigration of China’s status as the “middle kingdom” in what can be interpreted as an example of the Japan’s desire to usurp that title and China’s role as cultural “ruler” (Jansen 1988, Goto-Jones 2005).

These developments posed challenges to the Confucian ecumene, but the underlying ideology of the system persisted. While the Meiji period certainly saw the resurgence and codification of the Shinto religion alongside the adoption of Western political, scientific and military techniques (Westney, 1986, Duus 1998), this does not mean that Confucianism was displaced (Sumiko 2008). Rather, as Goto-Jones points out, there was significant blending of the two, primarily in the form of determining the role of the imperial family in the Confucian social structure. “Confucian theory and Shinto mythology were unified to produce a vision of an unchanging natural order with the Japanese emperor as its beginning and end (2005)”.

Confucianism emphasizes ethical governance and the responsibility of the state to the citizenry. It also stresses the submission of the citizenry to the needs of the state. Throughout China’s history, tributary relationships stressed an “older brother-younger brother” relationship: the Chinese court would entertain emissaries from tributary states so that they could learn the ways of a civilized society and cultivate their own society (Schoppa 2005). This may be a useful way to evaluate the role of ideology during the period of Japanese colonial expansion. Confucianism in different states is by no means identical; there are important differences between Japanese Confucianism and Chinese Confucianism (Woodside 1998). The most obvious differences are the devaluation of the virtue of “仁” ren (or jin in Japanese) the primary virtue (usually translated as benevolence or humanity) in traditional Chinese Confucianism and the elevation of loyalty and duty. Despite this difference in emphasis, the virtues themselves remain intact and
the qualities of a virtuous leader are nearly identical. Similarly the ethical responsibilities of the Confucian state remained the same (Benedict 1946).

This being the case, we can use Confucian values as a template for laying out what a colonial system constructed under this ideology might look like and use this as a point of comparison with traditional definitions of colonialism in the case of Taiwan. In the initial phases of expansion it is likely that Confucian Colonialism will bear a strong resemblance to its European counterpart. However, over time, it is expected to diverge substantially particularly in the administration of colonies and treatment of indigenous people. Similarly, a divergence may be seen in the treatment of subject populations based upon national origin. Seven conceptual issues will be investigated in order to provide an adequate comparison of administrative methods: administrative focus, infrastructural investment, colonial government composition, view of colony by imperial power, military presence, treatment of aboriginal population, and rights of colonial population. Below is a brief description of each issue. For a concise comparison see Table 1.

**Administrative Focus:** This refers to the primary concerns of administrators in the colonial territory. According to an economic imperial approach, we would expect that administrators would be primarily concerned with stability and efficiency of production and extraction (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994, McMichael 2007). During the period of conquest and consolidation, a power constrained by the Confucian ideology would certainly have a similar concern about stability and economic efficiency. However cultural assimilation and education would also be a high priority (Chan 1963, Graham 1989).
*Infrastructural Investment:* This refers to the placement of the imperial powers investment. Traditional interpretations of colonialism would assume that imperial states invested in infrastructure to facilitate raw material extraction and shipping (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994), whereas an empire operating within the Confucian ideological network would invest in education (Chan 1963, Graham 1989). This is not to assert that such an empire failed to invest in transportation or extraction, but to draw attention to the Confucian commitment to education, including colonies (Tsurumi 1977 & 1979).

*Colonial Government Composition:* This refers to the national origin of the governing administrators in the colonial state. In Confucian colonialism (colonialism constrained by a Confucian ideological network), we would anticipate initially that the government would be composed almost entirely of natives of the imperial power. As the state becomes more integrated with the imperial power, there is an expectation for more administrative participation by the host population (Chan 1963, Graham 1989). In models of colonialism focused on resource extraction and material wealth we would anticipate the maintenance of a foreign majority in the higher level administrative positions, while lower level positions may possess an increasing number of indigenous people (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994).

*View of Colony by Colonial Power:* This issue refers to how the colonial acquisition is viewed by the citizenry and government of the imperial power. In Confucian colonialism we would anticipate that the colonized state would be viewed either as a “little brother” in need of guidance (Schoppa 2005) or as an integral part of the imperial state. Western colonial powers tended to view their territorial acquisitions primarily as either economic hinterlands or trading centers (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994).
Military Presence: This refers to the size and strength of the imperial power’s military force in the colonial territory. During the period of conquest and consolidation, little difference is expected. That is, both the Western and Confucian approaches anticipate the military to play a pervasive role and coercion to be overt. Once colonial rule has been established these approaches diverge. In Confucian colonialism, we would expect to see a decline in military presence and an increase in the numbers of the subject population participating in military and police activities (Chen 1984) this may also be true for Western colonialism. However, in Confucian colonialism we would expect the military presence to become less overt over time.

Treatment of Aboriginal Population: The Economic Imperial model would assume that aboriginal populations would be exterminated (McMichael 2004), or used for cheap labor (Wallerstein 1966, 1980). Relocations of aboriginal populations when they interfered with the colonizer’s exploitation of resources would be anticipated. The Confucian system would incorporate recognition of superiority of the Imperial power, in addition to investments in education. Indigenous power structures will be left in place, and uprisings are punished swiftly and severely. Punishments for aborigines by the state may be more lenient as they are “uncivilized” and are not expected to behave as educated citizens (Fairbank 1973).

Rights of Colonial Population: This refers to the legal status of the subject population. According to Economic Imperialism, we would anticipate severe limitations on the rights of the indigenous population, determining living locations and rights of property ownership. In Confucian colonialism it is expected that the subject population would become increasingly integrated with the imperial power. As this integration proceeds, the subject population would be granted rights on par with those of native-born imperial citizens (Chen 1984).
Using these seven conceptual issues as points of comparison, historical records are employed to highlight the similarities and differences between European and Japanese colonialism and the administration of Taiwan. This will provide an appropriate test to determine the influence of political ideology on colonial behavior.

**Table 1: Conceptual Issues**

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<th>Western Colonialism</th>
<th>Confucian Colonialism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Focus</td>
<td>Stability, maximization of profit and/or raw material extraction</td>
<td>Stability, cultural assimilation, and profit maximization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural Investment</td>
<td>Transportation and raw material extraction</td>
<td>Education and transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Government Composition</td>
<td>Majority of administrators are native citizens of the imperial power</td>
<td>After establishment of colonial administration, colonial subjects take active role in governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Colony by Imperial Power</td>
<td>Economic hinterland</td>
<td>Fledgling state or part of imperial power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Presence</td>
<td>Obvious and continuous, lower positions of comprised of natives</td>
<td>Gradually decreasing over time, replaced by police force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of Aboriginal Population</td>
<td>Extermination or cheap labor</td>
<td>Lenient with focus on education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights of Colonial Population</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Gradually increasing until equal with those of native citizens of imperial power</td>
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This framework is obviously taxonomic in nature. Scholars of political sociology have been criticized for creating unnecessary taxonomies that add little to our understanding of the processes that lead to social behavior (Tilly 1995). However, a taxonomy that identifies an ideological system that has dominated such a large portion of the globe for such an extensive amount of time is hardly arbitrary. Understanding what it means to be embedded within a Confucian network, and how Confucian social groups interact and respond to outside influences provides vital insight and predictive possibilities regarding a region that is rapidly rising in global prominence. This work represents a necessary step towards a more complete understanding of the Asia Pacific region and the Confucian taxonomy is a crucial part of this understanding.

**Dissertation Research Design**

Research for this dissertation was conducted primarily at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan. To evaluate the influence of Confucian thought on Japanese colonial administrative practices, it was necessary to examine both administrative reports and the environment in which Japanese officials were educated prior to taking office. It was also necessary to assess the penetration of the Confucian ideology in Taiwan prior to Japanese occupation.

This dissertation focused primarily on secondary sources. Extensive histories of Japan and colonial Taiwan were available in English and it was unnecessary to repeat the work of scholars who had engaged in thorough research prior to this study. However, the application of Mann’s theory or social power to the case of imperial Japan has not been attempted by previous scholars.
Reports from the British Consul in Taipei were used in addition to secondary sources to confirm Japanese administrative accounts of colonial policies. These reports proved to be invaluable for their Western perspective on Asian colonial practices.

Existing work on colonialism, particularly World System Theory, provided a solid foundation on which to base an exploration of Western conceptions of Japan’s colonialism. The work of Philip McMichael and other political economists is also used extensively to flesh out the concept of Economic Imperialism.

Using secondary historical sources and the work of contemporary political economists a comparison was conducted using the aforementioned framework. Finding that Japan’s colonial administration of Taiwan bore a strong Confucian element confirms that Mann’s theoretical framework provides a robust and appropriate lens through which to view colonialism.

**Purpose**

In its simplest terms, the purpose of this dissertation is to determine the necessity for a more flexible model of colonial behavior regarding imperial Japan with the use of Taiwan as a case study. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to recognize that Confucianism as ideology cannot be divorced from the bureaucratic structure of China and that the Chinese World Order explored in Fairbank’s (1973) work is in fact a Confucian World Order. For an ascendant state, such as Japan, this Confucian world order constrained and molded colonial administration, especially when the colony was also part of the Confucian world. This dissertation is committed to helping us understand the conundrum of 20th Century Japan. Despite Japan’s well-deserved reputation for brutality and exploitation of conquered lands and people, it also ruled with a
beneficence and generosity that is hard to reconcile with this record of brutality and militarism. To come to terms with this conundrum, it is important to come to terms with the networks of power in which Japan was embedded – especially the Confucian world order.

A comparison must then be made between Confucian Colonialism, or colonialism constrained by a Confucian ideological network and Economic Imperialism. The extent to which Japan’s behavior conforms to the former is an indication of the influence of ideology on Japan’s administration of Taiwan and the inadequacy of strictly economic models of colonial behavior.

**Dissertation Structure**

This dissertation contains six distinct chapters each of which discusses various aspects of the Japanese experience in Taiwan and the role that Confucianism played. This chapter provides an introduction to the dissertation and outlines the intention and accomplishment of this research by providing a rough sketch of the research question, method and findings of this work.

The second chapter discusses Mann’s theoretical framework. Each of Mann’s four networks of social power (Ideological, Economic, Military and Political) is discussed in detail along with how these networks constrain and enable certain state behaviors. This chapter demonstrates the flexibility inherent in such a framework and how it might be applied to systems that are not dominated solely by political economic drivers. The chapter also contains an outline of Fairbank’s (1973) Chinese World Order which meshes well with Mann’s framework. Fairbank’s work is adapted to the case of Japan and a “Confucian” World Order that allows us to speculate on the nature and behavior of “Confucian” colonialism.
The third chapter outlines Economic Imperialism. This chapter discusses some of the leading models of economic imperialism and colonialism in the political economy literature today. Using many of the sources mentioned above a general description of economic imperialism is presented in order to assess how colonial states are expected to behave in the administration of their territories. This chapter also includes Michael Mann’s own discussion of imperialism and explores its inadequacy to accurately explain the behavior of Japan in Taiwan.

Chapter Four provides an analysis based upon the framework mentioned above and discusses the findings of this research. Having found concluded that the Confucian ideology exerted a strong influence in the Japanese administration of Taiwan and that Japan’s colonial behaviors were not consistent with those predicted by theories of Economic Imperialism, an appropriate application of Mann’s theory is advocated.

The final chapter concludes this dissertation. It provides a final statement on the necessity of a more nuanced model of colonialism that can accommodate both economic and non-economic drivers along with recommendations for how this research may be built upon for future enterprises.
Chapter 2: Michael Mann and the Networks of Social Power

This chapter explores Michael Mann’s networks of power and discusses the applicability of each network to the case of Japan, and where appropriate, Taiwan and China. In order to begin addressing the applicability of Michael Mann’s framework to the case of Japanese Imperialism it is necessary first to provide a detailed description of that framework. Michael Mann’s seminal work *The Sources of Social Power* begins with a description of the difficulty in determining an appropriate unit of analysis for sociology. Ostensibly Sociology is the scientific study of societies, however determining what is and is not a society is a difficulty that has plagued Sociologists since the birth of the discipline. Mann asserts that human societies are inherently “messy” and that in order to escape the difficulties associated with determining the attributes of a society, Sociologists should focus instead on Social Power. Below is a brief excerpt from the beginning of his first volume providing an outline of his framework.

“We start with humans pursuing goals. I don’t mean by this that their goals are ‘presocial’ – rather that what the goals are, and how they are created, is not relevant for what follows. Goal-oriented people form a multiplicity of social relationships too complex for any general theory. However, relationships around the most powerful organizational means coalesce to form broad institutional networks of determinate, stable shape, combining both intensive and extensive power and authoritative and diffused power. There are, I suggest four such major sources of social power, each centered on a different means of organization. Pressures toward institutionalization tend to partially merge them in turn into one or more dominant power networks. These provide the highest degree of boundedness that we find in social life, though this is far from total. Many networks remain interstitial both to the four power sources and to the dominant configurations;
similarly, important aspects of the four power sources also remain poorly institutionalized into the dominant configurations. These two sources of interstitial interaction eventually produce a more powerful emergent network, centered on one or more of the four power sources, and induce a reorganization of social life and a new dominant configuration. And so the historical process continues.” (p.30)

The shift in focus toward the stable organizational networks is a logical and beneficial one that likely provides more explanatory and descriptive power than other models of human society. At this point it is important to discuss the four networks that he asserts are the main types of social power, these are: Ideological, Economic, Political, and Military and the attributes of these networks. The following section first summarizes the attributes of power and then details the networks of power and their applicability to Japan, Taiwan and, where appropriate, Imperial China.

Types of Power

Each of these networks of power has different ways in which it may manifest. These attributes are distinct from the organizations of power described above and are equally applicable to all networks though they may differ in form and influence dependent upon the network. According to Mann, power may be collective or distributive or both (often both), Extensive or Intensive (the latter referring to levels of commitment and the former to geographic reach), Authoritative or Diffused (the former referring to direction by an actor, the latter without active direction).
The Networks of Power

Economic Power

Economic power in Mann’s framework revolves around the use and availability of natural resources and material goods necessary initially to meet human needs. In the excerpt below Mann describes his notion of economic power and the use of the term class that he employs in his framework (this terminology will be maintained in this work as well, in the few situations where class is relevant to the overall thesis).

“Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature. A grouping formed around these tasks is called a class – which in this work, therefore, is purely an economic concept. Economic production, distribution, exchange, and consumption relations normally combine a high level of intensive and extensive power, and have been a large part of social development. Thus classes form a large part of overall social-stratification relations. Those able to monopolize control over production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, that is, a dominant class, can obtain general collective and distributive power in societies.” (p.24)

Mann is careful to skirt the debates regarding the relative importance and nature of class throughout history and though he is a Neo-Weberian, he appears to be sympathetic to the exchange based root of economic power based on the work of Karl Polanyi, rather than the production based origin espoused by many Marxist theorists. Mann outlines four stages of class relations that he uses to expand upon the role of economic power in the development of human societies: latent, extensive, symmetrical, and political.
**Latent:** Class struggle in a hierarchical system does not outwardly manifest. Classes fail to organize due to other power organizations (clan, tribe, region) that cross class boundaries.

**Extensive:** Classes overcome other power organizations and organize. There are two types of extensive class organization: *unidimensional* and *multidimensional*. Extensive class organization can be considered unidimensional when there is “one predominant mode of production, distribution, and exchange.” (p.217) When there is more than one the organization is multidimensional.

**Symmetrical:** When extensive classes possess similar structure (i.e. when the organization of producing classes resembles that of the merchant class or vice versa).

**Political:** The class organizes for the purpose of political transformation or defense of the status quo.

Economic organization for Mann revolves around what he calls: circuits of praxis. This term embodies the extensive nature of the various paths (or circuits) or production, distribution, exchange and consumption with the intensive nature of praxis (or “practical, everyday labor”) (p.25). A particular group’s relation to the circuit of praxis dictates its position as a class. A “ruling class” in this framework is an economic class “that has successfully monopolized other power sources to dominate a state-centered society at large” (p.25). Thus, for our purposes the ruling class in Imperial Japan was constructed mainly of former Samurai and some merchant families, together they formed the upper strata of Japan’s class structure during the Tokugawa and Meiji periods and monopolized political and military power during those periods (Hane 2001, Jansen 1968, Yates 1994).
Economic Power in Japan and Taiwan

The ruling class of imperial Japan had clearly reached the extensive (multidimensional) political phase as the alliances of the Meiji Restoration were formed for the purposes of political transformation. However, it is difficult to assert that economics was the primary driver for the transformation here. As mentioned above, the leaders of the Meiji Restoration were largely Samurai from regions historically hostile to the previous Tokugawa administration (Yates 1994, Hane 2001). For most of the Meiji period the ruling class was asymmetrical having no real parallel in the other classes, and had almost complete control over the circuits of praxis. The merchant class was largely under the control of the Meiji oligarchs and the proletariat was entirely latent. It isn’t until the Taisho period that labor organization really takes place beginning in the urban centers and gradually spreading to the countryside (CR XIX, Hane 2001, Beasley 1987, Craig 2000).

In Taiwan during the colonial period and the period preceding, it can safely be asserted that class consciousness was latent. While there was a nascent class consciousness present in the ruling class, social organizations based upon clan were dominant prior to 1895 (Roy 2003). What little labor organization does take place during the colonial period is largely initiated by class organizations either on the Chinese mainland or in Japan. Unlike in Japan, there was not a dramatic difference in the fostering of class consciousness in the countryside and the city. Labor organization was actually more successful with the rural peasants than with the unskilled laborers in urban Taiwan (CR XIX, Hane 2001).
Military Power

Military power in this framework refers to the organization of power that develops as a society meets its needs for physical defense and as territorial states require tools for new geographic acquisitions. Mann’s summary of this form of power is below:

“[Military power] derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggression. It has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns questions of life and death, as well as the organization of defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces. Those who monopolize it, as military elites, can obtain collective and distributive power.” (p.26)

Military organization is, as Mann says, “essentially concentrated-coercive” and it relies upon violence as its primary tool. Military power is important not only during times of armed conflict but in historical empires has served to coerce semi-free and non-free members of the state to construct extensive infrastructure projects. The Great Wall of China built initially during the Qin dynasty and the construction and dredging of the Grand Canal are two obvious examples of this (Roberts 1999, Ebrey 2010). Without the threat of violence from the state these projects may well not have occurred, or would have taken considerably more time to complete. In order for a state in the Confucian world to fulfill its obligations to the citizenry (and thus maintain its legitimacy), it was necessary for it to carry out extensive infrastructural projects, this does not imply however that there was ample willing labor to engage in these projects.

The threat of violence also serves the state in the form of protection from neighboring powers. Maintenance of a powerful military force capable of significant acts of destruction serves as a substantial deterrent for potentially hostile neighbors. However, as Mann points out, this
deterrent is largely dependent upon the maximum effective striking range of the military. When populations are close to the center of military power they may be more likely to concede to requests, however willingness declines the further away the military power center is based. Mann summarizes this point in the excerpt below:

“Thus, military power is sociospatially dual: a concentrated core in which positive, coerced controls can be exercised, surround by an extensive penumbra in which terrorized populations will not normally step beyond certain niceties of compliance but whose behavior cannot be positively controlled.” (p.26)

Colonial Japanese and Imperial Chinese Military Power

The success of colonial Japan was doubtless enhanced by its military prowess. The power demonstrated by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war, had a strong deterring effect on other foreign powers, and accomplished many of the goals for Japanese recognition set forth by the Meiji oligarchs (Irye 1997). The acquisition of colonial territories through the use of force on the Korean peninsula similarly deterred interference from mainland neighboring states. However, in colonial Taiwan it was the judicious use of force (and the replacement of military personnel with civilian police) that contributed in part to the docility of the population.

Political Power

Political power networks form as groups of people attempt to regulate in a territorial fashion. While this may be done by any of the other networks of power, political power networks are
unique in their ability to delimit societies. Political power demarcates the boundaries of a society (in a limited fashion). In the following excerpt Mann addresses this in more detail:

“As here defined, political power heightens boundaries, whereas the other power sources may transcend them. Second, military, economic, and ideological power can be involved in any social relationships, wherever located. Any A or group of As can exercise these forms of power against any B or group of Bs. By contrast, political relations concern one particular area, the ‘center.’ Political power is located in that center and exercised outward. Political power is necessarily centralized and territorial and in these respects differs from the other power sources. Those who control the state, the state elite, can obtain both collective and distributive power and trap others within their distinctive ‘organization chart’ (p.27).”

In this framework political power is much more limited in dimensionality, and thus less complicated, than the other networks of power. While certainly feedbacks are in place acting from the periphery of the state toward the center, the dominant flow of political power is outward from the center. This allows a limited means of power identification when observing state behavior.

Political power networks, according to Mann, are also necessarily sociospatially dual. Since states must deal both with internal (domestic) and external (international) pressures, different organizational structures must develop to deal with the peculiarities of each type of pressure.

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2 Mann defines the state in the following way: “The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence” (Mann 1986 p.37).
Domestically states use authoritative power, and the centralized power elite focus not only upon the maximization of resources within the territorially bounded region but with the prevention of developing alternative political power structures. Internationally political power is organized in what Mann refers to as *Geopolitical diplomacy*, this organizational structure may take many forms, from the relatively egalitarian structure of the United Nations, to the domination oriented structure of Nineteenth Century imperialism. While the two organizations of power networks are certainly related, in Mann’s view the nature of a state’s behavior in one organization cannot necessarily be reduced to the mechanisms that drive behavior in the other.

*Political Power in Imperial Japan and Taiwan*

In imperial Japan the dualism of political power is particularly clear. After the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853, Japan went through a crisis. The existing policy of alternate year attendance in Edo for the Daimyo had enriched the merchant class and allowed them limited access to the power elite (Beasley 1987, Duus 1976, Jansen 1980) through the dependency of impoverished samurai. The Tokugawa administration was unable to cope with foreign pressure combined with domestic uprisings and ultimately collapsed. The administration which replaced it, while ostensibly under the leadership of the emperor, was in fact comprised of members of the same socio-economic segment of society that had made up the *bakufu*, and it was these former samurai who held the reins of power. During this period the new administration had to deal with instability within the state as well as a new international political reality. For the two hundred years prior the Tokugawa administration had effectively isolated themselves from the rest of the world maintaining limited direct contact with only Korea and Holland. This isolation allowed the state the flexibility to focus on domestic power networks and led to a period of peace and
stability in medieval Japan. Unfortunately it also led to a vast underestimation of the West and its geopolitical goals. This was a major contributing factor to the Meiji Restoration.

In order to maintain domestic power the Meiji government fostered the development of a state ideology “State Shinto” which stressed emperor worship and added ritualistic reverence for the imperial family to the existing fragmented Shinto religion (Kasahara 2002, Goto-jones 2005, Fujitani 1998). State Shinto was a codification of the Shinto mythology attached to the Confucian ethical structure in a calculated attempt to instill in the populace a sense of national identity that was closely linked to the State (Takayama 1998, Miller 1992). Since the emperor of Japan served as the divine father of the Japanese people, and the government was the tool of the emperor, the people should be as loyal to the administration as they were to the emperor. In this way the ideological network that the Japanese state developed within constrained the approaches to developing a national identity in such a way that they were dependent upon the pre-existing Confucian ethical system. While the racial component of State Shinto on the surface appears to undermine the Confucian focus on education, it must be noted that “Japaneseness” is something that came with citizenship in the empire (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993). The mythology of State Shinto did not merely provide a coherent cosmology but a myth of Japanese unity as well. What it meant to be Japanese was extended to all imperial citizens and the colonial focus on “Japanization” ensured equality among imperial empire.

While State Shinto worked well to maintain a sense of unity within the state it did nothing to secure Japan’s position in the larger international world. Geopolitical diplomacy of this period was oriented around imperial domination, and while Japan domestically wrestled with the difficulties of sudden exposure to Western political views, and a conservative backlash within the public, the political elite were fragmented. There were elements in the political elite that
sought to maintain Japan’s traditional identity and ties to Asia in order to combat the Western influence that was infiltrating Japanese society, others felt it was wiser to learn from the West in order to gain insight into the new geopolitical system that might allow Japan to gain an advantage over the West (Beasley 1970 & 1987, Jansen 1980, Hane 2001). This latter faction ultimately won the day, partly through the widespread recognition of Japan’s military weakness and Asia’s inability to hold the West at bay, and partly through the influence of more progressive thinkers among the Meiji oligarchs.

The state’s first priority was the elimination of the unequal treaties. In order to accomplish this Japan needed to demonstrate that it was a “Western” power (Irye 1997, Jansen 1988). Japan reorganized its government in attempt to become more recognizable to the West; it modeled itself on the constitutional monarchy of Germany, and modernized its economy through both technological adoption and state sponsorship of international commercial development (Jansen 1980, Colegrove 1937). During this period Japan also liberalized its attitude towards “Western” learning (Mehl 2005, Rubinger 1986), while there had been a longstanding dissatisfaction with traditional methods of education, it wasn’t until the Meiji era that serious attention was paid to Western science.

The modernization of the economy and military were all carried out in an attempt to be recognized as a modern state by the West and to avoid further economic depredations. It is clear that the two organizations of political power in Japan certainly had feedback mechanisms that enhanced or dampened existing trends as neither power organization is completely autonomous. However, the fact that domestically Japan relied upon traditional Confucian values to maintain a sense of national identity and unity, while it was at the same time attempting to modernize in
order to secure itself geopolitically lends credence to the dualistic nature of political power networks.

Governance in colonial territories is of particular interest here as the influences on policy clearly do not belong entirely to one or the other organizations of political power, and yet are influenced strongly by both. The very existence of Japanese colonies was the direct result of Japan’s desire to demonstrate itself as a modern state to the West (Irye 1997), and while historically Japan had territorial interests on the Asian mainland it had never succeeded in acquiring anything significant (Jansen 1980, Beasley 1987).

Domestically Taiwan was of small commercial interest and the Japanese government initially had difficulty encouraging both investment and migration to the colony. As time progressed investment became more forthcoming but immigration never became substantial (CR XXXIX, Roy 2003, Lamley 1999). As Taiwan developed there were competing political interests within the colony, there were many among the intelligentsia who desired a separate governing body for the island rendering it somewhat autonomous, while other, more moderate thinkers expressed a desire for Taiwan to gain status equal to that of provinces on the Japanese mainland (CR XXXIV, IV, Kerr 1986, Ching 2000). The majority of the mainland power elite were apathetic regarding Taiwan, due in part to the islands stability. Similarly, from a geopolitical view it was the acquisition of Taiwan that gave Japan credibility as an imperial power, while the means of administration were important they were hardly the focus of intense international scrutiny when examining the position of the Japanese empire in the geopolitical hierarchy.

This leads to the question: Which organization of political power dominated in the administration of Taiwan? As discussed below the colonial government was comprised entirely
of Japanese nationals, and they were placed or recalled at the whim of the home government.\footnote{This had an adverse impact on the development of self-government in Taiwan. Despite the fact that Taiwan experienced a progression of increasingly liberal Governors-general in the 1920s, changes in party power back in Japan led to repeated changes in Taiwan’s government. As a result policies implemented by one governor general may be put on hold or abandoned by his successor.}

As noted above, the home government was largely apathetic regarding governance in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese were similarly politically disinterested (CR XXXV). While there was activity among the educated elite (both Japanese and Taiwanese), it was generally policies developed by various Governors-General that catalyzed administrative change. Doubtless Taiwanese administration was impacted by both political power organizations, but only weakly so; in essence political power in colonial Taiwan developed in the shadow of the power organizations acting upon the Japanese empire. Perhaps political power in Taiwan may best be understood as a weak reflection of the Japanese response to both the geopolitical diplomatic and domestic pressures acting upon the empire (CR XXVII) and the behavior of imperial administrators reflected the Confucian system in which they had risen to power.

While Taiwan was acquired in response to the geopolitics of imperialism, it was governed with the same emphasis on national unity that dominated the domestic organization of political power in imperial Japan. While some Governors-General, the more successful ones, recognized the uniqueness of the Taiwanese citizenry, there was an ever present emphasis on the unity between the colony and the mainland (CR XXIX, IV), the Japanese administration focused heavily on the Japanization of Taiwan, encouraging the use of the Japanese language and the practice of State Shinto (Goto-Jones 2005, Ching 2000, CR VI, VIII, XXXVIII Tsurumi 1977). While Japan achieved only limited success in this regard, it does demonstrate again the coupling of political and ideological power (discussed in detail below) for the purposes of governance. The existing
Confucian ideological network that Taiwan was embedded in may have rendered the island more amenable to Japanese imperialism.

**Ideological Power**

Ideological power refers to the organization of ideas and explanations of phenomena (both natural and social) that provide meaning in human societies. Ideological power can be collective and distributive, and may be powerfully intensive and extensive when a specific group controls the orthodoxy. Ideology as understood in this framework is not a tool employed to maintain power by deceiving subscribers, nor is it only a legitimating rationale for other forms of power, though it may be used for both. Mann points out that in his understanding “[k]nowledge purveyed by an ideological power movement necessarily ‘surpasses experience’ (as Parsons puts it). It cannot be totally tested by experience, and therein lies its distinctive power to persuade and dominate. But it need not be false; if it is, it is less likely to spread. […] And though ideologies always do contain legitimations of private interests and material domination, they are unlikely to attain a hold over people if they are merely this” (p.23). In order for an ideological organization to have power it is necessary that subscribers genuinely believe in its tenets, or at least behave as if they do.

The organization of this form of power comes in two forms, the first which is the most relevant for the purpose of this study, is *transcendent*. This means that the ideology transcends the boundaries set by other organizations of social power and exists in relative autonomy. A collapse of one of the other power organizations may certainly impact a transcendent ideological system but will not necessarily result in its own collapse, and may not even provoke any
response at all⁴. This organizational structure is strengthened by “universal infrastructures” formed by other organizations of power and, Mann argues, is dependent upon diffused power techniques as the limitations of secular power bases also curtail the development of direct power techniques. The second organization of ideological power Mann refers to as morale, and serves to intensify the power of an existing social group. This organization of power is closely linked to other organizations of power as it is primarily a tool of a social group to solidify and codify its position within a society.

Mann argues that Ideological power was on the decline during the 19th century (35). This may be true for Western states (provided that we ignore the ideological nature of capitalism itself)⁵. However, it is only by incorporating ideology into our understanding of Japanese colonialism that we are able to begin to understand its nature.

Gorski in his 2006 article further examines Mann's framework and how his notion of ideological power can be applied to the rise of the West and how the protestant work ethic aided it. He provides a number of criticisms to Mann's theory including the time frame for the “decline” of ideological power in the West and questions whether such a decline did in fact occur. Similarly he criticizes Mann's conception of ideological power in that he explores only “authoritative” and “extensive” forms. Gorski feels that the potential benefit of elaborating upon “intensive” and “diffuse” types of ideological power may be beneficial and may cast doubt upon the assertion

⁴ Christianity serves as one example of this as it was a transcendent ideology that developed during the late Roman Empire. When Western Rome collapsed the transcendent ideology of Christianity survived and prospered in its wake.

⁵ The nature of capitalism is necessarily ideological as it depends upon values and possesses articles of faith. Capitalism with its focus on individual ownership of the means of production implicitly places more value on the individual than the community and depends upon the Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” to overcome accusations that individualism may result in a negative impact on the community.
that ideological power declined in the late modern era. He suspects that while, as Mann asserts, authoritative ideological power did in fact decline at this point, it was replaced by the diffuse ideological power of political parties and social movements. This form of ideological power was almost entirely domestic however and did not serve to legitimate colonial policy in the West. The legitimating rationale employed by Western colonial powers varied from state to state, but often revolved around “civilizing” the colonial subjects, and generating wealth (Chatterjee 1993a & 1993b).

Much of Gorski’s criticism revolves around the timing of events. He does not dispute the overall assertions of the theory and in fact supports the framework, arguing that it provides a robust methodology for analyzing social power. In particular he argues that the normative pacification that occurred prior to the advent of capitalism occurred much later than Mann suggests (early modernity rather than the middle ages). Gorski also stresses the role that ideology played in the formation of the modern military, which has important repercussions for colonial expansion as the modern military was the primary tool of early colonial “diplomacy” and was the primary feature of Western international dominance. The case of Japan is not dissimilar as the Confucian ideology contributed not only to the development of a Japanese national identity but facilitated the development of a modern military due to the intense Confucian focus on hierarchy and loyalty (Chan 1963, Smetherst 1974). This in turn impacted how Japan was able to expand and maintain dominance throughout the Confucian world. In order to address the influence of the Confucian ideological network it is necessary to understand its origins and nature. Fortunately John K. Fairbank provides just such a framework, addressing the behavior of the Chinese empire, an empire that revolved around the Confucian bureaucracy. Fairbank’s work addresses the geopolitical and domestic behavior of the Chinese empire constrained as it was by the Confucian
The Confucian World Order

Fairbank (1973) examines the implications of a Sinocentric system of foreign relations, paying particular attention to the role of China as the ideological center of the Asian interstate system throughout its imperial history. As Confucianism is the ideological pillar of the Chinese system, we can thus assert that the “Chinese World Order”, as it is called by Fairbank, is in fact a “Confucian World Order”. The fact that China served as its pole may or may not be incidental, however it can serve as an archetype against which colonial Japan can be measured. Using Fairbank’s framework coupled with Mann’s theory may also shed light on the intentions of the Japanese in East Asia during the imperial period prior to World War II.

Fairbank examines relations between China and Korea, Vietnam, Japan and Ryukyu. Arguing that these states were the ones most influenced by Chinese culture both in their writing systems and (Confucian) ideology. China’s age, size and wealth made it the natural center of the East Asian world and geography limited contact with the rest of the planet, while the creation of the grand canal facilitated intra-Asian continental trade (Fairbank 1973, Roberts 1999, Ebrey 2010, Wiens 1966). What contact China had with other cultures was dominated by the view that China was the central state, how civilized a non-Chinese culture was could be determined by how similar it was to China. Since no other state could be China, no other state could negotiate with China on an equal footing. Thus the Chinese world order was necessarily hierarchical (Schwartz 1973).
Fairbank (1973) groups the states that China had dealings with into three groups: The Sinic Zone, which consisted of the closest and most similar tributary states (Korea, Vietnam, Ryukyu and sometimes Japan), The Inner Asia Zone made up of tribes and states of nomadic or semi-nomadic people. This second group was ethnically and culturally quite different from the Chinese although geographically they were often quite close, similar in many ways to Japan (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993). The Outer Zone which consisted of South and Southeast Asia and Europe who were expected to send tribute when trading but otherwise maintained minimal contact with China (Mancall 1973).

All cultures were expected to be tributary to the Chinese empire. However, this tribute was often little more than lip service as the Chinese frequently lacked the military capacity to enforce their will upon the tribes of central Asia. Fairbank points out that when it was impossible to force foreign states into tributary positions, as it was with the Western Europeans during the latter days of the Qing empire, court records still recorded events as if the representatives had behaved in a manner appropriate to ambassadors from a tributary state.

Fairbank provides a set of assumptions upon which a preliminary framework must be based on in order to examine the Chinese system of foreign relations (p.5-10). Numbers 6 and 7 (discussed in detail below) are particularly important as they stress the importance of ritual and law. For the proper Confucian administrator it was necessary to understand when ritual, principal and regulation could be most appropriately used. Fairbank’s discussion of the dual systems of administrative structure using both hereditary vassals and civil servants is particularly interesting as this was similar in many ways to the structure of the Japanese Meiji government as a constitutional monarchy (Hane 2001, Beasley 1987). Though again, it must be stressed that the
class system set up during the Tokugawa period limited class mobility much more severely than the examination system of Imperial China did.

Fairbank’s description of the Chinese method for maintaining political control in situations where they did not have military superiority is particularly interesting as this effectively maintained China’s position as ideological pole during periods of military weakness. The types of relationships and the methods used for maintaining them are also quite telling (p.13) and we can see that China’s relationships with various states on its periphery have varied significantly over time.

The Chinese world order was not maintained by military, economic, or political power alone but it was these in conjunction with ideological power that enabled the empire to endure. Even in times of military weakness when China was conquered by non-Chinese tribes, the Chinese culture and ideology survived and determined the governing strategies of foreign dynasties (Ebrey 2010, Roberts 1999). When political power was weak ideological power compensated through the maintenance of pretense (Fairbank 1973).

By examining Japanese colonial history we can identify whether or not Japan had “Sinic”, Inner and Outer zones. If so we can determine the extent to which Japan resembled Imperial China in its treatment of states belonging to each of these three groups. It is clear that Japan during the imperial period shared the same self-image as Imperial China, but this does not necessarily indicate that treatment of foreign powers occurred in a similar fashion. We are somewhat at a disadvantage here, for while Fairbank had the better part of two millennia to examine, we are limited to under fifty years. Using the above framework we can thus argue that the extent to which Imperial Japan mirrored the behavior of Imperial China, was the extent to which it
behaved as a Confucian Empire. Using Mann’s theory we must also allow for contextual differences between the two empires. The Western political, economic and military networks of power that had extended their influence into East Asia without doubt exerted a profound influence on the shape of Japanese colonialism.

In order to begin this comparison we must first identify factors which make appropriate points of examination. Fairbank details 15 indicators of the origin and growth of the Chinese World Order, since Fairbank is focusing on feudal China in the (mostly) pre-modern era not all of these indicators will provide useful points of comparison. Fairbank’s framework is described below and an explanation of which indicators will be used is provided.

Fairbank’s Indicators:

1. System’s point of origin was an agrarian “culture island”.

2. System maintains sense of unity and cultural identity despite internal strife and external pressure.

3. System from origin is hierarchical and anti-egalitarian (in Confucian sense).

4. Emperor was an “omnicompetent” divine agent at the apex of the system.

5. System is sustained by heavy ideological components and a stress on “orthodoxy”.

6. Education and indoctrination in the classics maintained social order.

7. Emperor was the leader of the System both ideologically and administratively.

8. Emperor used both informal (personal) and formal (bureaucratic) relations to administrate.

9. System’s bureaucratic structure spread throughout and developed uniformity in governing methods.

10. Confucian indoctrination of elites prevented local uprisings.
11. Foreign representatives making contact with system expected to behave as adherents of system’s ideology.

12. Exterior vassal states of one period were often fully integrated into the system proper by the next era.

13. In periods of military weakness leaders from outside of the system proper may assume the role of empire without causing disruption.

14. The extent of the system is reflected in official terminology.

15. Non-system rulers participate in system only by following appropriate rituals and having their status formalized within system ideology.

Points one and two, while not directly related to the colonial era of Japanese history, do provide a solid starting point for system comparison. Japan, like China, began as an agrarian “cultural island”, though Japan’s geography made the “island” nature of its isolation more literal. While during prior feudal eras Japan did maintain contact with neighboring states, the majority of these states shared the same Confucian ideology as Japan itself and during the Tokugawa period Japan developed in near isolation. Japan’s isolation during the Tokugawa period is particularly notable as this period immediately preceded the colonial era (where I argue Japan took on the attributes of metropole in the Confucian World Order).

Regarding point two, Fairbank points out that during the warring states period (403-221 B.C.) the many competing governments “retained the theory of their subordination to the Zhou dynasty ruler” (Fairbank 1973 p.5). During Japan’s own warring states period (1467-1600 A.D.), each of

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6 Japan during this period did maintain some contact with both Korea and Holland. Korean emissaries were permitted to visit the island though there was no extensive trade between the two countries. The Dutch were confined to an island near Nagasaki and some limited trade between the two countries was permitted but cultural exchange was deliberately minimized.
the warring shogun acknowledged the supremacy of the emperor and maintained their legitimacy by their ideological loyalty (Duus 1998).

The hierarchical nature of the system acknowledged in point three clearly applies to the Japanese system as well as the Chinese. The Confucian system of relations is deeply hierarchical and anti-egalitarian in nature, however this is not to say that there is no complementarity within each of them. The relations typically discussed in the Confucian classics are: Ruler-Subject, Father-Son, Elder-Junior, Husband-Wife, and Friend-Friend (Chan 1963, Graham 1999). With the possible exception of the final relationship all of these relations have a hierarchical component, and yet a deeper examination of Confucian philosophy has shown that virtuous subordinates are often those who do not accept unquestioningly the superiority of their superordinate, but strive to correct them and lead them to behave in a virtuous fashion. The Japanese hierarchy followed identical guidelines to the traditional Chinese system, though with a more immediate family rather than clan focus (Benedict 1947).

The fourth point stresses the divinity and competence of the emperor in the Chinese system. As Fairbank points out the emperor ultimately functioned as “military leader, administrator, judge, high priest, philosophical sage, arbiter of taste, and patron of the arts and letters, all in one” (Fairbank 1973, p.6). During the colonial period the Japanese emperor functioned in much the same way, or at least he was portrayed by the oligarchy as functioning in this way. While the imperial family certainly played some role in the military (Hane 2001), the majority of decision making was done by the oligarchy. While the emperor’s assent was required for all legislation as

The Mencius specifically discusses this, stressing that a loyal minister as with a loyal wife will be the first to notice the virtue of their superior and it is thus their responsibility to correct the behavior. However, should the ruler prove unwilling or unable to act in a virtuous fashion the good Confucian minister withdraws from court.
well as for declaration of war, the emperor possessed very little ability to initiate or prevent these
state activities. Similarly while the emperor certainly served as a patron of the arts and a sage,
his real role in the state was primarily that of spiritual figurehead (Hane 2001, Beasley 1987,
Fujitani 1998, Jansen 1980). While this presents a possible Japanese departure from the Chinese
system, we must remember that Fairbank’s framework is condensing more than one thousand
years of Chinese history into axioms. There were periods in Chinese history where the emperor
was even more limited in power than the Japanese emperor was\(^8\) (Roberts 1999, Ebrey 2010).

The Japanese system as well as the Chinese system possessed the heavy emphasis on orthodoxy
required by assumption five, and the ability of both systems to maintain their integrity was
dependent upon the government’s ability to fulfill their ideological responsibilities. While the
Japanese empire did not use a Confucian entrance examination for selection of administrators,
_kangaku_ (Chinese learning) was still a primary part of the curriculum until the late Meiji era
(Mehl 2005, Rubinger 1986), and the maintenance of the Confucian classics as the moral
component of the Japanese curriculum even after the centralization of the education system
ensured that students were indoctrinated in Confucian virtues (Wei-Ming 1996). The recitation
of the imperial rescript on education and the pageantry developed by the Meiji Oligarchs ensured
that loyalty was directed toward the Emperor and his “servant” the state (Fujitani 1998, Goto-
Jones 2005).

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\(^8\) During the late Han dynasty and the late Qing various factions at court possessed more real
power than the emperor. In the case of the Han the court eunuchs held all of the real political
power, which was facilitated by the emperor’s isolation. During the late Qing, despite being a
woman, Cixi was the real head of state and the emperor was little more than a figurehead
(Roberts 1999).
As per point six the indoctrination and education of administrators as well as the populace in general served the purpose of maintaining stability within the state both during the colonial era and the Edo period prior to it. The pageantry and ritual created by the Meiji oligarchs as well as the development of State Shinto (Garon 1986, Fujitani 1998, Kasahara 2002) would have been of little use without the background Confucian values that encouraged reverence of these things as Shintoism was a ritual based mythology and not an ethical system. Points five and six are closely related as the stability of the system is contingent upon the understanding and exploitation of the Confucian hierarchy by the administrators. Orthodoxy in moral education ensures that the governors understand what is expected of them and that subjects know what they can anticipate from an ethical government, and to a lesser extent the populace will know when the State is failing to fulfill its responsibilities.

The seventh point is a point of apparent departure between the two systems. In the Chinese system Emperors were administrators. In Japan the Emperor served an almost entirely ideological purpose. While the Meiji era saw the return of the Emperor to a position of prominence in government and legislation required his approval, in reality, as noted above, he wielded little real power (Norman 2001). However, there were points in the Chinese system as well where administrators or household members ruled the empire in the name of the Emperor, the Empress Dowager Cixi being the most obvious example (Roberts 1999). The reality of the situation notwithstanding people within the system, outside observers (Benedict 1947), and even some early historians (Mayo 1970) saw the Emperor of the colonial period as a central figure both administratively and ideologically.

Point eight is a genuine point of departure from the Chinese system. The Japanese emperor did not actually govern directly and therefore informal methods of governance were not used. The
Japanese government during the Meiji and later periods was a bureaucracy. In fact beginning in the Taisho period the true path to power for aspiring administrators lay in the bureaucracy (Duus 1968). The Meiji oligarchs certainly took advantage of informal social networks in order to secure their grip on power, and the elites in Choshu and Satsuma that had started the Meiji Restoration likely had power bases structured around informal, especially kinship, networks (Craig 2000). Nonetheless it was the bureaucracy that administered the colonial empire, while hereditary titles were granted as rewards and kinship played a role in determining social networks, by the colonial era it was not a major governing technique for either the Japanese Emperor or the Meiji Oligarchs.

The bureaucratic nature of the Japanese empire during the colonial period was consistent throughout the Japanese mainland. Based upon geography and population, regions of the archipelago were divided into administrative districts uniformly and the legislative ability of each district and sub-district administration was identical (Jansen 1980, Duus 1987). The uniformity of administration within Japan was also one of the aspects that allowed for the bureaucracy to become the primary route to administrative power in the Empire. The colonial regions did not share divisions as the Japanese mainland, however the bureaucracies within each of the colonies were very similar and in Taiwan towards the end of the colonial period the colony came to increasingly resemble the Japanese mainland administratively (CR XXX, XXXI, XXXIV). In this way the Japanese system corresponds quite well to the Chinese system on point nine.

Point ten also applies to both systems: the uniformity and Confucian nature of indoctrination in the Japanese system, as with the Chinese system prior also prevented local administrators from seizing power and declaring autonomy. Administrators and subjects were indoctrinated with the
same Confucian orthodoxy, if a governor attempted to rebel in the Japanese system, he would likely be seen as behaving in a fashion inconsistent with Confucian ethical standards. Indoctrination did not prevent all uprisings by administrators or local elites, however it did make it more difficult for them to garner support. This is not to say that the orthodoxy itself could not be manipulated by rebellious members of the population to justify their ends. The Manchurian Incident of 1937 proves this point quite well. The military could act independently of the Tokyo government and even disobey directives given by the Prime Minister, and argue that the Emperor’s will was being usurped by the civilian government. In this way the military could avoid accusations of disloyalty and still effectively rebel against the government (Hane 2001, Smetherst 1974).

Point eleven is another point of departure from the Chinese system. China, unlike Japan during the colonial period, had the luxury of being the most powerful figure (ideologically, militarily, politically or economically during various periods) for most of its history. It therefore had the ability to deal with foreign powers on its own terms and to force foreign visitors to behave in a fashion appropriate to the ideological sphere. This became increasingly less true during the Qing dynasty as China no longer possessed the power to stand against foreign encroachment (Schoppa 2000, Roberts 1999, Ebrey 2010, Jansen 1980). Japan was in a dramatically different position by the time of the Meiji restoration. During the Edo period the government behaved in a fashion not inconsistent with the Chinese system, however by the time of the restoration the Japanese government had acknowledged the military and economic (though certainly not ideological) superiority of the West, and the reality of Japan’s new position demanded the adoption of a Westernized political system (Iriye 1994). While China began dealing with the West from a position of strength, it ended in one of weakness. Japan’s imperial history is quite different,
beginning as it did from an inferior position and securing its station as a “Great Power” by the early Twentieth Century (Hane 2001, Beasley 1970 & 1987, Iriye 1994).

Point twelve presents a further departure from the Chinese systems. As China progressed through various dynasties, vassal states that had been tributary to previous dynasties had a tendency to become increasingly incorporated into China proper. Fairbank’s points out that outer vassal states would become inner, and inner would become part of the empire. The Japanese system did not endure long enough to accurately determine its similarity to China. We do see that Japanese efforts to “Japanize” its colonies met with varying degrees of success, and that, in the case of Taiwan at least, they were moderately successful (Ching 2000). The comparison here is further complicated by the movement towards Westernization of international geopolitics. Vassal states and tribute were no longer part of the global structure; they had been replaced by “Spheres of Influence” and colonies; while the deviation from the Chinese system must be acknowledged, the gradual incorporation, economically and politically of Taiwan into Japan through the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa eras hints at some similarities to the Chinese system.

Criterion thirteen is clearly not met by the Japanese empire, neither before nor during the colonial era. This is largely due to the historical peculiarity of Japan. China as a robust bureaucratic empire throughout its history experienced multiple dynastic changes and so the idea that a foreign leader might assume the position of empire was not unusual. Particularly during times of weakness, China would be “conquered” by foreign powers and the position of emperor assumed by their leaders (the Jurchen, the Mongols and the Manchu are the most obvious examples of this), provided the leaders maintained the existing bureaucratic structure the system changed very little and, as history has shown, the invaders often become increasingly Sinicized. This is not to suggest that there was open acceptance of foreign leaders by the Chinese citizenry.
The Mongols in particular were the target of much criticism, particularly by the literati, during the short-lived Yuan dynasty (Roberts 1999, Ebrey 2010). Japan had a markedly different imperial history than China. There is no record of dynastic changes within Japan, and the myth of the unbroken lineage of the emperor from the sun goddess Amaterasu is the source of the emperor’s divinity. In the Chinese system the emperor is not divine by descent but rather is given the “mandate of heaven” and in effect earns his divinity. In the Japanese system it would be difficult for a usurper to claim the same divinity as the previous emperor. As Japan’s geography made it difficult to conquer prior to the Nineteenth Century there is no evidence of a foreign leader ever trying to usurp the Emperor’s position, let alone succeeding (Hane 2001, Reischauer 1981). Therefore point thirteen is clearly not applicable to the Japanese system.

Point fourteen speaks to the linguistic expression of the centrality of the state in the Chinese system. Fairbank discusses at length the use of the term *fan* for foreign and how its use in describing not only vassals living outside of the system proper but the types of behaviors and tributes that they gave. The Japanese system behaved in a similar fashion. While due to the differences in era mentioned above it never possessed tributary states⁹, nonetheless its language did reflect the extent of the Japanese system’s sense of itself as the center of civilization. Japan, though acknowledging the superior military strength of the West, clearly saw itself as more civilized than the other Western powers. This was reflected in the rhetoric of the “expulsion” movement (Hane 2001, Beasley 1987, Matsumoto 1970, Jansen 1980). Japan’s use of Confucian rhetoric in reference to its colonial states (Hane 2001), further supports this assertion. Here again we can tentatively draw a connection between the two systems.

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⁹ Okinawa and the Ryukyu islands during this period were semi-tributary territories but as Japan modernized they became colonial possessions (Sakai 1973).
On point fifteen we also see that the Japanese system differs significantly from the Chinese system. Foreign rulers when making contact with China were forced to assume positions within the Chinese ideological system. Fairbank provides a detailed example based upon Qing foreign policy:

Non-Chinese rulers were given or required to:

a. A patent of appointment and official seal for use when contacting the Qing government.

b. Noble rank in the Qing hierarchy.

c. Date correspondence according to Qing calendar.

d. Present tribute memorials on appropriate occasions.

e. Present symbolic tribute of local products.

f. Be escorted to court by the imperial post.

g. Kowtow to the emperor and observe appropriate rituals.

h. Receive imperial gifts in return.

i. Granted rights of trade at frontier or capital.

One particularly important fact that Fairbank brings to the reader’s attention is that the imperial records, particularly during the late Qing when the empire was at its weakest, record foreign powers acting in accordance with the demands of the system even when they actually did not. Japan, beginning its colonial enterprise as it did, from a position of weakness would have been unable to force rulers of foreign states to acquiesce to their ideological demands.

We can see from the above comparisons that the Japanese system does differ from the Chinese one in several ways. Points four, seven, eight, eleven, twelve, thirteen and fifteen represent deviations from the Chinese system. However, as noted above, many of these distinctions are
due to the brevity of the Japanese system and the era in which Japan began its colonial enterprise. When we consider the fact that Japanese expansion began in the modern era and from a position of international weakness it can be argued that points eleven, twelve, and fifteen do not represent significant challenges to the assertion that the Japanese system shared a fundamental similarity to the Chinese system. Points four, seven and eight must be acknowledged as challenges. However, even in these discrepancies there is similarity to the Chinese system. The role of the Emperor in Japan while different from that of the Emperor of the Chinese system was not entirely unique as the Chinese Emperor also experienced periods where the administrators or the military held power rather than the Emperor. Certainly the persistent powerlessness of the Japanese Emperor is different from the occasional periods of administrative dominance in China, and so we must be cautious with our assumptions about the similarity of the systems, particularly regarding the role of the Emperor in governance. We are now left with one major difference regarding the criteria set forth by Fairbank and that is the lack of any example regarding foreign usurpation of the Imperial throne. This difference, while important, does not call into question the overall Confucian nature of the system, nor its similarity to the Chinese system as the right of rebellion still exists, though it is directed against the “ruler” and not the Emperor.

Since the differences between the Chinese and Japanese systems do not contradict the overall Confucian nature of the Japanese system, we can cautiously assert that the systems were similar enough that the behaviors and drivers of one might correlate to those of the other. If we accept that the Chinese system was effectively a Confucian system and we accept the similarities between the Chinese and Japanese systems, we can then assert (cautiously) that Colonial Japan was a variant of the Confucian system. It is therefore useful to compare how each system dealt with foreign powers and vassals.
Table 2: Fairbank's Political Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aim in view</th>
<th>A Control</th>
<th>B Attraction</th>
<th>C Manipulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means used</td>
<td>A-1 Military</td>
<td>B-1 “Cultural” and Ideological</td>
<td>C-1 Material interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-2 Administrative</td>
<td>B-2 Religious</td>
<td>C-2 Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal means, used in relations with foreign areas in the Chinese world order of the Ch’ing period. (Parentheses indicate means used briefly or secondarily.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sinic Zone</strong> (Chinese Culture Area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu-ch’iu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above charts are taken from Fairbank’s (1973) work on the Chinese World Order. Using this chart of foreign relations we can see the intentions of the Qing empire towards foreign territories and the means with which it attempted to achieve those ends. As can be seen when comparing tables three and four (seen below) the Qing empire and the Japanese empire have some important differences. Japanese Confucianism and Chinese Confucianism were not
identical and in the case of the Japanese empire the religion of State Shinto was used in conjunction with the Confucian ideology to reinforce the notion of a divine head of state. The use of religion during the Qing dynasty was quite different as it focused on Buddhism and was not used as a means to bolster the Confucian ideology.

A still more prominent difference is the nature of relations with states in the Outer Zone. China began diplomatic exchanges with the West from a position of power, and gradually throughout the course of the Qing dynasty it began to lose ground until it came to rely upon manipulation and diplomacy as its only means to maintain its sovereignty (Roberts 1999, Perdue 2003). Japan’s situation was completely reversed. Japan began from a position of weakness. Its first interaction with the West in the modern era came from the forced opening of its ports, and it was immediately subjected to unequal treaties. Japan labored until the early Twentieth Century to overcome this obstacle. When it finally succeeded it maintained its diplomatic and material ties to the West on more equal terms. As Japan expanded into Asia it attempted over the role that China had been forced to surrender. Using a combination of ideological and military tools Japan dominated the region with some success. However, because of the history of the Confucian World Order there was some resistance in countries that had previously occupied a superior position to Japan.
Table 4: Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal means, used in relations with foreign territories in the Japanese Imperial period</th>
<th>Sinic Zone (Chinese Culture Area)</th>
<th>Outer Zone (Distant Places)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>A-1&lt;br&gt;A-2&lt;br&gt;B-1&lt;br&gt;B-2&lt;br&gt;C-1</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu-ch’iu</td>
<td>A-1&lt;br&gt;B-1&lt;br&gt;C-1</td>
<td>Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>A-2&lt;br&gt;B-1&lt;br&gt;B-2&lt;br&gt;C-2</td>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>A-1&lt;br&gt;C-1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>A-1&lt;br&gt;A-2&lt;br&gt;B-1&lt;br&gt;B-2&lt;br&gt;C-1&lt;br&gt;C-2</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>A-2&lt;br&gt;B-1</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hierarchy of the Confucian World Order during the period of Chinese dominance is depicted below in figure 1. The Sinic Zone has been divided into two parts and a periphery of semi-states has been added. This can be compared with the Confucian World Order that Japan established during its Imperial period (figure 2). Position within the hierarchy is dependent upon ideological similarity to the metropole (how “Confucian” the state is), economic and political ties to the metropole and stability of state government. Figure 2 represents the attempt by the Japanese empire at establishing a modern “Sinic” zone at which it was only partially successful.
Understanding the historical nature of this system provides valuable insight into the relative passivity of the Taiwanese subjects and the resistance of the Koreans. The Taiwanese had always existed along the periphery of the Chinese dominated system, Japan had ranked above them as it was an independent and stable state. However, Korea in the Chinese system had always been superior to Japan. It had been the “good” younger brother of the Chinese empire acknowledging China’s superiority and setting up a system of government more faithful to the Confucian bureaucracy than Japan’s military bureaucratic structure. The dramatic power reversal that occurred in East Asia within the span of a few decades was difficult for the Korean elites to accept. Japan’s superior position was not related to how Confucian it was, but rather its ability to reconcile Confucianism with modernization.

Mann’s theory when combined with Fairbank’s research and the work of other historians and social scientists on the Chinese empire grants us a solid basis for speculating on the nature of Confucian Colonialism, this will be explored in more detail in Chapter Four. Fairbank’s framework provides a useful model for understanding the influence of Confucianism on the geopolitics of East Asia. While his research focused primarily on the Qing dynasty his model is equally applicable to dynastic periods as early as the Han and to the Japanese Empire especially when combined with Mann’s framework. In the following chapter we will explore contemporary economic approaches to imperialism and Mann’s own explanation of modern empires. This will allow us to develop attributes of comparison that will facilitate the analysis of Japan’s colonial enterprise in Taiwan.
Chapter 3: Economic Imperialism

Below is a discussion of the classical narratives describing colonialism, this chapter will address their inadequacy in the case of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan. It must be noted that these narratives may be seen as inadequate when describing Western colonialism in East Asia, particularly in the case of Hong Kong. However, in general, these narratives have provided an accurate framework for Western colonialism in regions large enough to sustain large scale raw material exploitation, as was the case with Taiwan.

In order to be able to properly compare Economic Imperialism with Confucian Colonialism from Michael Mann’s framework laid out in the previous chapter it is necessary first to define what is meant by the term Economic Imperialism, and second, to understand the history and general assumptions of the system. While it has been argued that latter era colonialism employed a “civilizing rationale” in its rhetorical justification (Chatterjee 1993a), the generally accepted narrative of the period revolves around resource extraction and wealth generation for the bourgeoisie in the colonizing powers, regardless of the legitimating rationale of the time. The concept of Economic Imperialism refers to colonial exploitation focused upon the generation of material wealth without embracing any one explanatory narrative.

World Systems Theory (WST) is one of the most dominant narratives and it is thus important to understand the origin and development of this theory before discussing other elements of Economic Imperialism (including Michael Mann’s approach to imperialism) and finally examining their applicability to the case of Japanese Taiwan.

In his early career Wallerstein offered stated that in sociology a colony is a conquered territory that possesses a single hierarchical power structure comprised of multiple strata which are
similar in effect to castes, being hereditary, allowing little mobility and limiting contact between strata. He further states that these strata are almost always determined by race (1966). This definition, which predates his seminal work in WST, circumvents the difficulty associated with economic exploitation assumed by contemporary WST however the lack of mobility among strata poses a similar difficulty as this was not seen in Taiwan (Kamachi 1980).

Wallerstein further argued that European powers viewed colonialism along comparative lines, and finding that the European civilization possessed more technology, military and economic prowess they were therefore more civilized and deserving of colonial expansion (1966). The Japanese clearly saw their civilization as being necessarily superior to the Chinese and Koreans at the time of imperial expansion, however it is clear from the dialogue of politicians and philosophers at the time that the culture of these other nations was viewed as similar to that of Japan (Goto-Jones 2005) if not identical (Henry 2005). It was the inability of the Chinese to adapt to the modern world and to manage domestic issues that was the main sign of weakness to the Japanese. In fact Japanese political philosophers at the time readily acknowledged the cultural debt that was owed to China by Japan (Goto-Jones 2005, Mehl 2005). It is interesting to note that while the Japanese may well have considered state superiority via a technological-military hierarchy a reality of the modern world, in the minds of the Japanese morality was also of primary concern (Wei-Ming 1996). Thus, Westerners were still considered barbarians and education on ethics and morality, based around Confucianism was part of the national educational curriculum (Mehl 2005, Helgesen 2003, Marshall 1995).

Providing a bit more flexibility, Philip McMichael (2004) defines colonialism as the “subjugation of one culture by another… through military conquest of territory and caricaturing
the relation between the two cultures.” He argues that there are two types of colonialism: “colonies of settlement” and “colonies of rule.” (4)

“Colonies of settlement” generally involve the conquest, subjugation and often destruction of the indigenous population. This type of colonization clearly differs from early feudal forms of imperial expansion, where the concern was over land claims and resources and usually did not involve the relocation of groups of people from one place to another. The primary example of this type of colonialism is the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Spain, and to some extent Portugal upon arriving in the Americas attempted to subjugate and eradicate the indigenous civilizations of the Americas. There was little attempt made at reconciliation between the existing lifestyles and the European imposed resource demands. The same was true, though to a lesser extent, in the English colonization of North America.

“Colonies of rule” by contrast do incorporate some measure of reconciliation on the part of the colonizer. “Colonies of rule” are regions administrated by the colonizer in order to facilitate resource extraction and wealth generation, for the primary benefit of the imperial power. This does not mean that the colonizer deliberately prevents the colony from gaining wealth (though that may occur). According to McMichael, “colonies of rule” are characterized by the reorganization of existing indigenous power structures by the colonial power. These new hierarchies impose new inequalities to facilitate exploitation. British India is the primary example of a Colony of Rule. The British government possessed little man power in the Indian subcontinent, but maintained its position of authority by placing itself at the top of the existing Indian hierarchy. By providing economic incentives to cooperative natives the British introduced a foreign economic ideology that both prevented challenges to their authority (to a limited degree) and maximized their ability to extract resources from the colony.
Both types of colonialism laid out by McMichael were economic in nature, and designed to maximize profits for the imperial power. While “colonies of rule” may on the surface appear to be more benevolent than those of settlement (this is a reasonable deduction as “colonies of rule” seldom resulted in genocide), it is likely that this was due more to a desire to make use of indigenous labor resources rather than through any beneficence on the part of the colonizers. Where colonial subjects resisted foreign rule, colonizing powers whenever possible brought in labor from other colonial states.\(^\text{10}\)

The distinction made by McMichael is useful and his typology is accurate as far as it goes, however it is still an oversimplification. While his description of “colonies of settlement” may be accurate for our purposes, his discussion of “colonies of rule” is brief and he does not address the various methods of rule employed by colonial powers. The most obvious oversight here has to do with assimilation. While some imperial powers preferred to maintain their colonial subjects as second class citizens, others sought to assimilate them into the parent state. Japanese statesmen of the imperial period commented on this while contemplating different methods of incorporating Formosa into the Japanese Empire, noting that the assimilatory techniques employed by the French in Vietnam had mixed results compared with the relative consistency of the hierarchy implemented by the British in India (Takekoshi 2007).

\(^{10}\) Colonial powers in the Americas soon discovered that using local source of labor often could lead to instability as their familiarity with the area and local power structures could facilitate resistance to foreign domination.
World Systems Theory

Immanuel Wallerstein is generally seen as the father of World Systems Theory. His conceptualization of modern political economy being dominated by a European capitalist world system is powerful, and has led to valuable insights into the history and economic development of Western Europe and the Americas. WST is based upon the exploitation of peripheral (weaker, less developed) states by core (stronger, wealthy) states. This theory is Marxist at its heart as the core-periphery exploitative relationship mirrors the bourgeoisie-proletariat relationship of classical Marxism. Wallerstein traces the origin of the capitalist world system to the sixteenth century and the need for raw materials, particularly silver bullion, in the Iberian Peninsula. This led to colonial expansion into Africa and the Americas (1974), which led to access to labor and resources that further enriched the core states leading to more investment in technology and intensive development. As the core developed the labor of the periphery was used to produce bulk goods necessary for industrial development and as a market for surplus goods from the core (Wallerstein 1980).

The WST hierarchy is not static and often incorporates a third state status, the semi-periphery. During the colonial era, peripheral states were undeveloped, and often sparsely populated. The semi-periphery however, was comprised of states that had either slipped from core status or had been regional powers (like India and China) or peripheral states that were working their way toward the core as was the case with Britain in the early colonial era.

While WST owes its foundation to Wallerstein, it is not monolithic and scholars disagree as to the scope, age and origins of the world system (Abu-Lughod 1991, Frank 1998, Arrighi 2009,
Christopher Chase-Dunn has argued for a view of world systems that makes room for regionalism. Using anthropological information as well as modern economic data Chase-Dunn makes the case that throughout human history every time one society interacted with another there was the development of a world system. He makes a case for world systems comprised of overlapping networks that are stateless and in which hierarchy is variable, fluid, and modes of accumulation vary over time. He identifies four types of exchange networks: Political/Military, Bulk Goods, Information and Prestige Goods. Chase-Dunn’s greatest contribution is that the multiple world system framework allows for comparative empirical study between regions. He advocates an approach that takes multiple world systems of various sizes into consideration, and while these world systems are still economic in nature they pre-date the modern era. In this model different modes of accumulation will have varying emphases on the types of exchange networks (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). With a little doctoring it is possible that the overlapping trade networks could resemble the sources of social power that Mann identifies. However, the primary difficulty in marrying the two systems lies in the exchange basis of WST. While having multiple world systems comprised of various constellations of exchange allows for more flexibility in the theory, it becomes difficult to address the possibility of non-economic (or non-exchange) dynamics between societies. Where Chase-Dunn has developed a comparative tool for the theory, other scholars have focused on identifying patterns within the world system.

In 1997 Giovanni Arrighi published The Long Twentieth Century which reformulated some of the earlier work in WST. Based upon historical and economic analysis Arrighi argued that state behavior in the world system was cyclical in nature. In particular he made the case that there
have been three complete cycles of capitalist development beginning in the thirteenth century and that currently we are in the midst of a fourth cycle that will witness the economic rise of east Asia and China in particular (2003).

Arrighi’s cycles consist of three distinct phases. In the first phase there is an expansion of trade coupled with the collapse of the old regime which leads to the rise of a new regime. In the second phase there is reinforcement of the new regime and territorial expansion and in the final stage there is an expansion of capital in the form of financing and a decline in trade. This new framework provides a fresh point of view and new insights into how colonial powers managed to maintain dominance even after the decline of maritime trade. In recent years (2009) Arrighi has begun focusing on his incomplete fourth stage and has explained how core behaviors have contributed to the rise of certain semi-peripheral states. In particular he examines the relationship between the US led war on terror and how it has contributed to China’s rise in economic and political power (Sugihara 2003).

Andre Gunder Frank and Pomeranz (2001) also focused on the role that Asia plays in the world economy but from a slightly different position, arguing that the trade networks that allowed the West to rise and dominate the capitalist world system were in fact built upon existing networks developed by the Chinese and Indian Empires (1998). Following the primary argument of his book ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, what we are witnessing currently in China and India is not the beginning of a new cycle of accumulation but rather a return to an Asia dominated Political Economy from an epiphenomenal period of Western dominance.

These three critics have added considerable flexibility to WST, however it still remains to be seen whether or not models of colonial expansion put forth by World Systems Theorists can be
appropriately applied to Japan at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The difficulty arises from the economic basis of the theory. While Western powers expanded into Asia seeking various raw materials (spices, silk, etc.) or access to markets (particularly the enormous Chinese market), Japan’s expansion into Taiwan focused on neither of these (Schoppa 2004, Matsusaka 2001, Duus, Myers and Peattie 1989, Kamachi 1980). While the Japanese certainly took advantage of the island’s sugar and rice production, this enriched the peasants of Formosa sometimes at the expense of the lower classes in Japan (CR XIV, XXI). Additionally the economic benefits of acquiring Formosa were outweighed by the resources necessary for taking advantage of Formosan labor, pacifying the island, road construction and most importantly dredging the harbors were expensive public works projects that needed to be completed before significant trade with the island could take place (CR I, XIV, Takekoshi 2007). While this was also true for the treaty ports constructed on Chinese territory, it is rare for large colonial possessions to require such extensive investment for such a long period of time.

So where does this leave us regarding Japanese Formosa? In a position where it is necessary to consider other models of colonialism.

**Was Japanese Expansion Economic Imperialism?**

McMichael lumps twentieth century Japanese imperial expansion in with Economic Imperialism however in his very general overview he fails to deal with the unique case of China. China even under Western authority was not subject either to the “settlement” or “rule” mentality. It managed to maintain its sovereignty over the bulk of its land mass, though certainly the unequal
trade agreements and the granting of treaty ports (along with extraterritoriality) demonstrated the weakness of the Qing regime.

Nonetheless while the racism inherent in the colonial system was present in China, it did not witness destruction of indigenous populations. Similarly although the treaty ports were administrated by the colonizers there is little evidence that they introduced new inequalities, though they certainly accentuated existing ones. (7)

Japan is an ill fit for this model if we use it to explain expansion in northeast Asia. The investments in infrastructure and education without the focus on raw material production predicted by McMichael’s colonial division of labor pose a problem. If Japan was imposing an alien belief system and system of government upon its colonial possessions we might be able to argue that they were “colonies of rule”, but since they lack both the economic exploitation predicted by this style of colonialism and the alien background this is unlikely. While State Shinto was introduced to Japan’s imperial possessions, the mythology surrounding the religion was less important than the observance of rituals indicating loyalty to the emperor, rituals which were consistent with the Confucian ethical system that existed in the territories prior (Kasahara 2002, Goto-Jones 2005). The administration set up by Japan as a colonizing power in Taiwan, Manchuria and Northeast China was similar in function and nature to power structures that had existed in China prior to the chaos at the end of the Qing dynasty (Duara 2004, Takekoshi 2007, CR II, VII)

Wallerstein states that the basic sociological outlook on colonialism is that the colony is viewed as a single power structure possessing multiple strata. “These strata were often caste-like and were almost always distinguished on racial grounds.” He goes on to describe numerous colonial
cases in Africa, the Americas and Asia where the colonizers subjugated the indigenous population on color lines, when these were hard to draw racial lines were arbitrarily created.

This was not the case for Japanese imperialism in East Asia. Viewing the colony as a single power structure with multiple strata is still accurate however the various strata were far more diverse culturally in the Japanese colonies than in European due to advisory council composed of cultural subjects. While it is true that the number of Formosans permitted to serve in government were limited, by the end of the colonial period self-governance had been granted, with the possibility of Taiwan being granted the same administrative structure as Japanese prefectures in the future (CR II, Kerr 1986).

Wallerstein argues that European powers viewed colonialism along comparative lines, and finding that the European civilization possessed more technology, military and economic prowess they were therefore more civilized and deserving of colonial expansion (2). The Japanese clearly saw their civilization as being necessarily superior to the Chinese and Koreans at the time of imperial expansion, however it is clear from the dialogue of politicians and philosophers at the time that the culture of these other nations was viewed as similar and in no way inferior to the Japanese (Goto-Jones 2005). In fact Japanese political philosophers at the time readily acknowledged the cultural debt that was owed to China by Japan.

The timeline for colonialism via European powers and the Japanese also differs. According to Gluckman and Blandier (1966) European colonies begin with limited contact with indigenous populations by traders, missionaries and settlers. However, over time these Europeans begin to demand the establishment of a colonial administration in order to provide them with familiarity and stability (3). This is quite different from the Japanese experience in East Asia where Japan
historically had extensive contact with its colonies, and had been viewed as a semi-tributary state during various periods of history (Pollard 1970, Schoppa 2004).

The pattern laid out by Wallerstein for Western colonialism does not hold for Japan (Tanin and Yohan 1970). Japan already possessed numerous political and economic ties to China and Korea at the time of imperial expansion, it did not use missionaries, and did not divide the colonial power structure along racial lines. It was similar to European colonialism in that the Japanese dominated the colonies using ideological as well as military and economic means, however throughout the course of colonial governance by Japan we do not see the Japanese imposing alien systems of governance or belief upon the colonies (Nish 1990), and we see (perhaps token) efforts at state development (CR XXX, XXXI, XXXIV, Myers et al. 1987, Cumings 1984).

**Mann on Imperialism**

As this research focuses on Japan’s colonial behavior it is necessary to explore Mann’s typology of imperialism and the proximate cause for its development. Mann asserts that the tension between Capitalism and Geopolitics leads to various types of state behavior that may or may not lead to the mobilization of military forces or territorial acquisition.

The root of economic imperialism according to Mann is the drive of capitalists to pursue profit regardless of geopolitical organization. As capitalist classes within states exert pressure on state elites the domestic and geopolitical diplomatic organizations of political power interact in ways to alleviate this tension. Below Mann’s typology is discussed followed by a discussion of the applicability of this typology to the expansionist behavior of imperial Japan.
Mann’s strategies for accommodating the tension between capitalism and geopolitics\textsuperscript{11}:

1. **Laissez Faire**: State endorses or is unable to change existing market terms, and does not attempt to authoritatively.

2. **National Protectionism**: State intervenes authoritatively in a pragmatic and peaceful fashion within existing market terms to protect its economy.

3. **Mercantilist Domination**: State attempts to dominate international markets authoritatively controlling resources. State uses diplomatic sanctions and shows of force but not actual war.

4. **Economic Imperialism**: State conquers territory for economic profit.

5. **Social Imperialism**: Conquest is oriented around distracting from internal class conflicts.

   Motives are primarily internal to nation state while outcome is geopolitical in nature.

   **Geopolitical Imperialism**: The state attempts to conquer territory as an end in itself.

*Imperial Japan*

Using the typology and explanation provided above to explain Japanese imperialism provides a number of difficulties. While clearly there may be some applicability regarding Japan’s later territorial acquisitions (Matsusaka 2003), the case of Taiwan is problematic. As mentioned above, while there is a robust debate regarding the cause and nature of Japan’s colonial expansion, it cannot be asserted that it was in any way led by, and probably not even strongly influenced by, domestic capitalists (Jansen 1988) concerned with profit seeking abroad.

Japan’s position in 1895 was unique among colonial empires as it was still laboring under unequal treaties imposed upon it during the mid-Nineteenth Century (Duus 1976). The conflict

\textsuperscript{11} The first three types are common in most political economic regimes as they do not spark war. Making them more convenient for a stable geopolitical system.
with China over Korea was intended to establish sphere of influence and perhaps gain a territorial foothold that would grant Japan a bargaining chip when it came time to attempt a renegotiation of the unequal treaties. It was the realities of the geopolitical structure that had been forced upon it that catalyzed Sino-Japanese conflict in Korea (Irye 1997, Oka 1970, Chang 1971). While Mann’s explanation for imperial behavior is inadequate to explain Japan’s initial venture into colonialism his typology may still be useful in a cross comparison with the European powers and the former Chinese empire.

Using the categorization described above Meiji Japan appears to be a mix of Geopolitical Imperialism and Social Imperialism in East Asia. However, if Japan was truly interested in developing China, Korea and Manchuria how would we categorize it? The desire to build a pan-Asian political economic system does not clearly fall under any of these categories and the Japanese infrastructural investment and attempt to Japanize the populace of Taiwan clearly alludes to a genuine state desire to form a cohesive Asian sphere with Japan at the center.

**Japanization in Formosa**

While the similar cultural background between Japan’s Asian territories and itself are obvious, the influence of the West on the way that Japan chose to justify its colonial policy on the international stage is equally obvious. In Taiwan in particular the temptation to over simplify Japanese colonialism is particularly poignant. The Japanese attempts to “Japanize” the Taiwanese are often considered more successful than contemporary European attempts in their territories, but this may have more to do with Western perceptions of Asian culture than the truth (Pollard 1939). Leo Ching (2001) further disputes the notion that Japanese colonialism was
fundamentally different from other forms of colonialism and imperialism, though he does concede (to some extent) that the particulars of individual cases make it difficult to develop general theories in colonial studies.

Ching provides an interesting and thorough summarization of competing theories of colonialism and imperialism acknowledging that simple economistic characterizations of imperialism would certainly be inadequate to encompass all forms of colonialism. Using Lenin and Wallerstein as examples he points out that earlier form of imperialism had different motives however their existence led to the development of historical capitalism. In particular Wallerstein's assertion that the nation-state is a tool of the world economy which is organized into “core and periphery”, the core establishes nations as it competes against other core nations for dominance over the periphery. In this way imperialism is not necessarily about the economics of a single nation-state. Ching asserts that this is how Japan was able to develop an “imperialist consciousness” without reaching the phase of monopoly capitalism. This blends quite well with Iriye's (1997) description of the “realism” of Japanese foreign policy in the Imperial period. Having been exposed to the unequal treaties of the West it became important for Japan to free itself from the possibility of becoming a completely peripheral state, in order to do so it was forced into becoming a “modern” power, which meant, within the existing world economy, that it would need to become an imperial power.

Yanaihara supports this argument stating that Japanese colonial development did not occur via an intrinsic process of capitalist development but rather through the extrinsic ideological influence of Western imperialists (Townsend 2000, Yanaihara 1977 and 1948). Ching summarizes the argument as follows:
“What Yanaihara is suggesting, then, is that despite not having the appropriate content (export of financial capital, formation of monopolies, patterns of overproduction, etc.), Japan, by its annexation of Taiwan, had more than assumed the form of Western imperialism. In this regard, Yanaihara argues that the Sino-Japanese War cannot be conceived simply as a “national war” (kokumin senso), but must be seen as having the characteristics of a “premature imperialism” (sojuku teikokushugi), an “earlier stage of imperialism (teikokushugi zenki) that relied predominantly on political decisions and militaristic behaviors.” (p.23-24)

Ching goes on to stress Yanaihara's finding that by the 1920s Taiwan was a colony like any other in the imperial world system. These arguments are compelling but ultimately flawed, clearly the desire to avoid peripheral status was present in the governing elite of Meiji Japan and this certainly had an impact on foreign policy, this however was likely not the only reason for the pursuit or “great power” status. The debates about the causes for Japanese imperialism are robust and while the realist argument has its supporters it is important to remember that there were other ideological and historical factors at play in Japan's decision to acquire colonial territories. Some authors stress the historical desire for Korea (Jansen 1970), others the external threat of foreign ideologies (Kublin 1970 & 1959). Concern over China's loss of status and its inability to stave off the Western threat also played a role in Japan's decision to colonize the region.

Ching overlooks the historical context in which Japan was operating. The Chinese World Order that existed prior to Western imperialism centered around an ideological pole, not necessarily an economic one (Fairbank 1973). This metropole was no longer capable of extending its political and ideological authority to the states within the existing order. Japan, while competing against
Western powers in the fashion necessary to gain their respect and acknowledgment as an equal power, was also attempting to assert its dominance in the Asian World Order. This gave rise to the Pan-Asianism in the Taisho and Showa periods (Jansen 1970, Doak 2007, Hashikawa 1980, Hotta 2007). In this way Japanese colonialism is different from the colonialism of the Western powers. Additionally Japan was operating within a geography of similar ideological roots which gave it a common ethical understanding between the imperial core and colonial periphery, this will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.

Ching's refutation of the cultural similarity between colonial subjects and imperial Japanese is weak. While citing Goto Shimpei and emphasizing the efforts that the Japanese went to in order to stress the commonalities between the governing and the governed Ching overlooks the fact that in the mind of many Japanese it was the lack of modernization and education that hindered the assimilation of the colonial subjects. The common cultural background could also be seen in the treatment of colonial subjects in the *toa dobun kyokai*\(^{12}\), Taiwanese students were registered as Japanese at these institutions. And while it's true that there was certainly discrimination against the colonial subjects, this had more to do with their perceived “backwardness” rather than racial or intellectual inferiority, this is quite different from the discrimination perpetrated by Western powers, and is caused by the necessary acknowledgment that much of Japanese culture owed its origin to China (Duus 1989, Mehl 2005). Furthermore the difficulties with Korea can be better understood as a refusal to accept Japan's hegemony in a system where Korea had historically held a superordinate position. The common Confucian culture here actually caused

\(^{12}\) The *toa dobun kyokai* was an international university dedicated to the concept of “pan-Asianism.”
difficulty for the Japanese, for while they shared a common culture with their colonial acquisition they did not agree upon who maintained authority within that ideological system.

Ching states that the Taiwanese intellectual community further confused modernization with Japanization. This may be true, and is likely true for the colonial acquisitions of the Western powers as well. However, this is not unique to colonialism. Historically in the Chinese/Confucian World Order, sinification was considered the distinguishing feature of civilization. A nation's relative position in the Chinese World Order was relative to how sinified they were. Again this points to the similarity of Japanese imperial system to the Chinese World Order existing prior. The concepts of doka and kominka\textsuperscript{13} were crucial to Japanese efforts to modernizing Formosa and instilling colonial subjects with the appropriate “national spirit” (Rubinstein 2006, Lamley 1999).

Ching's discussion of the processes of doka and kominka is summarized below:

“The conflation of the two colonial ideologies, I maintain, only reiterates the official discourse of a consistent and continuous colonial policy of equality and benevolence. More important, it also erases the strife of the colonized subjectivity under kominka, where ‘identity struggle’ emerged as a fundamental and a predominant concern.” (p.91)

He states that doka was a failed ideal and that kominka received a similar fate but the blame lay on the colonizer and colonized respectively. In describing it thus, Ching fails to acknowledge the actual cultural similarities and more importantly the Confucian background of the Japanese government. It is not simply that Confucian rhetoric was used to mask or justify imperialism,

\textsuperscript{13} Doka refers to the common culture of the Asian people kominka refers to the Japanization of the colonial subjects.
but the Confucian influence on government constrained the treatment of colonial possessions in such a way as to actively encourage the colonized states to develop into modern imperial possessions which contributed on equal footing to the empire (Takekoshi 2007). This is epitomized by the development policies of the early governors-general of Taiwan and Korea (CR I, II, XIV).

This is not to assert that colonial policy in Japan was entirely benevolent, however considering the educational background of the Genro, the influence of Confucianism on governing policy the concepts of kominka and doka should not be disregarded as hollow rhetoric, nor only as a tool for maintaining the pacificity of the colonized. These concepts may not only be a rationale but a symptom of the underlying ideology of the imperial system.

The Comparative Questions

In order to determine how economically oriented Japan’s colonialism was, it is necessary to define the characteristics of Economic Imperialism, and Confucian Colonialism. In developing a typology for each of these categories of imperialism we can than compare the Japanese case in Taiwan and see which set of characteristics Japan’s behavior corresponds to. It is of course possible that it will correspond to neither or both, or as is most likely, that it will have elements of each type of imperialism in its colonial policy.

Based upon the elements of Confucianism that are explored more fully in the next chapter and the nature of Economic Imperialism that has been addressed above, the following framework is proposed. Each of the elements below differ between the two categories of imperialism and
provide a basis for determining the extent to which Japan’s behavior corresponded to the Confucian or Economic Imperial system.

Below is a restatement of the attributes evaluated for the purposes of categorization mentioned in the first chapter:

*Infrastructural Investment*: This refers to the placement of the imperial powers investment. Traditional interpretations of colonialism would assume that imperial states invested in infrastructure to facilitate raw material extraction and shipping (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994), whereas a Confucian state would invest in education (Chan 1963, Graham 1989). This is not to assert that a Confucian state failed to invest in transportation or extraction, but to draw attention to the Confucian commitment to education, including colonies (Tsurumi 1984).

*Colonial Government Composition*: This refers to the national origin of the governing administrators in the colonial state. In Confucian colonialism, we would anticipate initially that the government would be composed almost entirely of natives of the imperial power. As the state becomes more integrated with the imperial power, there is an expectation for more administrative participation by the subject population (Chan 1963, Graham 1989). In Economic Imperialism we would anticipate the maintenance of a foreign majority in the higher level administrative positions, while lower level positions may possess an increasing number of indigenous people (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994).

*View of Colony by Colonial Power*: This issue refers to how the colonial acquisition is viewed by the citizenry and government of the imperial power. In Confucian colonialism we would anticipate that the colonized state would be viewed either as a “little brother” in need of guidance (Schoppa 2005) or as an integral part of the imperial state. Western colonial powers tended to
view their territorial acquisitions primarily as either economic hinterlands or trading centers (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994).

*Military Presence:* This refers to the size and strength of the imperial power’s military force in the colonial territory. During the period of conquest and consolidation, little difference is expected. That is, both the Economic and Confucian approaches anticipate the military to playing a pervasive role and coercion to be overt. Once colonial rule has been established these theories approaches diverge. In Confucian colonialism, we would expect to see a decline in military presence and an increase in the numbers of the subject population participating in military and police activities (Chen 1984), this may also be true for Economic Imperialism; however, in Confucian Colonialism we would expect the military presence to become less overt over time.

*Treatment of Aboriginal Population:* The Economic Imperial model would assume that aboriginal populations would be exterminated (McMichael 2004), or used for cheap labor (Wallerstein 1966, 1980). Relocations of aboriginal populations when they interfered with the colonizer’s exploitation of resources would be anticipated. The Confucian system would incorporate recognition of superiority of the Imperial power, in addition to investments in education. Indigenous power structures will be left in place, and uprisings are punished swiftly and severely. Punishments for aborigines by the state may be more lenient as they are “uncivilized” an are not expected to behave as educated citizens (Fairbank 1973)

*Rights of Colonial Population:* This refers to the legal status of the subject population. According to traditional colonialism, we would anticipate severe limitations on the rights of the indigenous population, determining living locations and rights of property ownership. In
Confucian colonialism it is expected that the subject population would become increasingly integrated with the imperial power. As this integration proceeds, the subject population would be granted rights on par with those of native born imperial citizens (Chen 1984).

In the following chapter the comparison is completed and Japan’s colonial activities in Taiwan are addressed to identify the extent to which Japan was constrained by its ideological network influenced its colonial behaviors. If the constraint was minimal no modification may be necessary to existing models of Economic Imperialism.
Chapter 4: The Analysis

In order to properly assess the impact of the Confucian ideological network on the colonial behavior of Imperial Japan it is necessary to understand the nature of the Confucian ideology itself. This chapter will provide a brief overview of the tenets of Confucian thought and an analysis of the two types of colonialism mentioned in previous sections. Below is a brief description of Confucianism and a discussion of the extent to which the Confucian ideological network influenced Taiwan and Japan.

What is Confucianism?

In the history of East Asia, no system of belief has wielded as much influence on private and public life as Confucianism (Elman et al. 2003). Yet this philosophy remains largely misunderstood by social scientists (Sun 2009, King and Bond 1985). Without a proper understanding of the nature of Confucian thought, one might wonder why this research revolves around a comparison between an economistic explanation for colonialism and an ideological one (Weber 1951, Chan 1963, Sun 2009). In the West Confucianism is often treated, correctly or incorrectly as a religion. However Confucianism does not address issues surrounding the afterlife, the existence or deities or lack thereof 14 nor does it have churches or religious organizations (Sun 2009). Confucianism is a humanistic ethical system that is as difficult to divorce from the Chinese imperial bureaucracy as it is from the family structure of East Asia. It was this lack of cosmology that made that rendered the ideology amenable to the Shinto

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14 Confucianism does use the term “Mandate of Heaven” in reference to the divinity of the Emperor and his right to rule in the eyes of “Heaven”. However in this case heaven is an impersonal judge and does not indicate the existence of a deity but represents the will of the universe. The mandate may also be revoked if an emperor fails to act in accordance with the “Way” by going against the will of the universe (Chan 1963, Graham 1999).
mythology. Shintoism lacked a coherent ethical system\textsuperscript{15}, and while the cosmology manufactured by the Meiji oligarchs in the form of State Shinto provided a national religion, it was contingent upon the interpersonal relational structures of Confucianism for its stability (Kasahara 2002, Elman et al. 2003, Fujitani 1998, Goto-Jones 2005).

One of the difficulties in addressing Confucianism is the fact that it is not, nor ever has been a static ideology. From the Han dynasty to the present Confucianism has provided a coherent ethical structure for interpersonal relationships however, emphases and orthodoxy has changed dependent upon time and place. Any description of Confucianism must necessarily be an oversimplification, yet there are certain aspects of Confucianism that can be identified as constants: The Confucian Virtues, The Confucian Classics, and The Hierarchy.

For the purposes of this study, the Confucian orthodoxy refers specifically to those changes and emphases put forth by the Neo-Confucian scholars Wang Yang Ming and Zhu Xi during the Song dynasty and adopted during the Ming. Zhu Xi in particular is responsible for codifying which elements of classic Confucian thought would be most important for the Civil Service Examination (Ebrey 2010, Chan 1963, Graham 1999). The Confucian virtues remained more or less constant throughout Chinese history and while different regions may stress or devalue certain virtues, the nature of the virtues remains constant. The primary virtues are: 仁 rén, benevolence or humanity, 礼 lǐ, rites or propriety, 恕 shu, reciprocity, 义 yi, righteousness, 智 zhi, wisdom or learning.

\textsuperscript{15} Here we see an important distinction from Shintoism and Taoism. While Taoism’s cosmology was amenable to the Confucian ethical system, Taoism came packaged with its own set of values and relational structures which were incompatible with those of Confucianism.
In Confucian thought benevolence is the most important virtue, and is the primary characteristic of the ideal man (君子), it is this virtue that allows the ruler to maintain harmony within the state, and it is a gestalt of the other virtues. The second primary virtue of ritual or rites does not actually refer specifically to religious activities, but rather to the rules of propriety that govern society. This virtue is very important in Confucian cultures as it is essentially the glue that binds the society together and dictates what is appropriate behavior when interacting with individuals of various statuses. It also encompasses activities that ensure loyalty to the state, and holidays honoring the emperor. The virtue of reciprocity is essentially the Confucian “golden rule” it is the ability to sympathize with others as well as acknowledging social debt. Righteousness refers to honor and honesty, and the virtue of wisdom is reflective of the Confucian emphasis on education (Graham 1999).

The Confucian classics as laid out by Zhu Xi are: The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects of Confucius, The Mencius. These classical texts served as the primary study materials from the Ming dynasty until the collapse of the Examination system in 1905 (Roberts 1999, Ebrey 2010). These texts were accepted as the orthodoxy not only in China but in the greater Confucian sphere of influence, and most importantly for the purposes of this study in Japan (Jansen 1988, Mehl 2005).

Confucianism is first and foremost a hierarchical system of interpersonal relationships which dictates the rights and responsibilities that parties within a given social system have. It provides a guideline for economics and government that details appropriate ethical responses to everything from natural disasters to taxation. With its emphasis on education the Confucian ethical system encourages the development of an informed and literate populace that is aware of the responsibilities owed to it by the state. This is made explicit in several of the analects, but
most clearly in The Great Learning which focuses on ethical governance of the state and its’
analogue the family.

The Confucian Social Contract

In Confucian thought there are five classifications of relationships, all but one of which are
hierarchical in nature: Father and Son, Elder brother and Younger brother, Husband and Wife,
Friend and Friend, Ruler and Subject. Each of these relationships exists in parallel to the others
and the rules governing one are generally applicable to the others. These relationships consist of
complementarities, the subordinate in each of them is beholden to the superordinate only
provided that the dominant party fulfills their responsibilities. These relationships are essentially
contractual and it is clear that the teachings of Confucius, Mencius and Zhu Xi regarding
governance essentially constitute a social contract.

“Decide on standard weights and measures after careful consideration and reestablish
official posts fallen into disuse, and government measures will be enforced everywhere.
Restore states that have been annexed, revive lines that have become extinct, raise men
who have withdrawn from society and the hearts of all the common people of the Empire
will turn to you.

What was considered of importance: the common people, food, mourning and sacrifice.

If a man is tolerant, he will win the multitude. If he is trustworthy, in word the common
people will entrust him with responsibility. If he is quick he will achieve results. If he is
impartial the common people will be pleased.” (Confucius, XX1b)
The above quote is an example of the social contract inherent in the Confucian ideology. This analect is divided into two halves. The first portion describes two of the great leaders of antiquity (Yao and Shun). The second portion, quoted above, provides a formula for the restoration of the Empire. While the author does not specifically mention restoration, it is implied through the connection with the first half of the analect. Confucius repeatedly refers back to antiquity, and frequently uses Yao, Shun, and the Duke of Zhou as examples of exemplary leadership. The actions advised by Confucius in the second portion of the analect should be seen as advice on how to restore the Empire to the state it was in during the tenure of Yao and Shun. The reference back to an ideal history which occurs frequently in the Confucian classics, is an appeal to the reader to model themselves on the leaders of antiquity, a time when the responsibilities and boundaries of station were clearly known and observed by all.

The first piece of advice Confucius provides is that the leader should determine appropriate weights and measures. It seems here that the author is indicating that care should be taken regarding the economy and the ability of the Empire to facilitate trade. Standardizing weights and measures removes a significant obstacle to the spread of trade and enables the citizenry to more easily profit from their livelihoods, providing a stable tax base for the state. The second piece of advice is to reestablish official posts that have fallen into disuse. I interpret this statement as indicating that the sovereign should increase regulation, to ensure the rule of law. There is a Chinese idiom that alludes to a problem faced by all sovereigns: The Mountains are high and the Emperor is far away. This idiom reminds us that an Emperor is only sovereign in regions where his reign is recognized. By reinstating administrative and military posts the ruler is expanding his power base and spreading his sovereignty. By restoring states that have been annexed and reviving lines that have gone extinct Confucius encourages the ruler to make
alliances furthering his rule. In the restoration of states and bloodlines those who have regained power will be indebted to the ruler and less likely to disobey the sovereign. Finally, when Confucius speaks of raising men who have withdrawn from society it is important that we couch our interpretation in the context of the rest of the Analects. Confucius many times reminds the reader throughout the Analects that benevolent men and men of virtue withdraw from society when society no longer follows the “way”. By raising these men to official positions the ruler will bring the state back to the “way”.

While these recommendations are interesting, it is the final statement that may demonstrate Confucius’s true feelings regarding the nature of the state. He argues that by performing the actions mentioned above the “common people” of the Empire will turn to the ruler. Confucius here is indicating that the approval of the people is desirable. This should not be interpreted as a case for democracy, however, though the writings of Mencius later do lean in that direction. It is more likely, considering the other Analects, that Confucius finds the approval of the people as being indicative of the state following the “way”. It is interesting to note that if we allow for this interpretation, a state is only following the “way” when it is providing for the material and social needs of the people. Providing food, a stable economic background, a stable legal environment, and proper education regarding the rites are considered basic requirements for the restoration of the Empire. Confucius indicates that when a state fails to follow the “way” the mandate of heaven may be revoked from the ruler, this leads to rebellion and the eventual collapse of the state.

Confucius is effectively advocating a social contract in his discussions of ethical governance. This is further strengthened in The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning, and The Mencius. The Confucian classics argue that the ruler should provide for the basic material and social needs
of the people, and that the people should in turn respect and honor the sovereign’s right to rule. This type of state-citizen relationship is as applicable now as it was in ancient times and the consequences of a failure to live up to the guidelines of ethical governance have changed very little since antiquity (Bell 2006, Bell and Chaibong 2003). Provide the citizenry with basic needs and moral leadership and they will follow.

As the Confucian ideology dictated conceptions of good governance, interpersonal relations and international relations it necessarily exerted a powerful influence over the political, military and economic networks much as Christianity did in Medieval Europe (Mann 1989, Wakeman 1998). This understanding of the Confucian ideology combined with Fairbank’s description of the Confucian World Order allows us to speculate on how the Western political, economic and military networks of power might combine with the Confucian ideological network to develop a unique form of colonialism in Japan.

**Confucianism and Japan**

Confucianism in Japan has a long history its roots can be traced back more than one thousand years, and the Chinese style of Education dates back to the Seventeenth Century. During this period Japanese scholars copied Chinese methods of education. One scholar would accept a number of disciples and they would often live together. These schools eventually evolved in to juku. Teachings in these schools focused primarily on Kangaku, or Chinese Learning, this centered on the Confucian classics which served as educational canon during this period (Mehl 2005). Despite Confucianism’s influence during the early Tokugawa period various schools of Confucian thought were persecuted by the Shogunate. This led some scholars, including the
Western philosopher Immanuel Kant to believe that it was Confucianism itself that was under attack (Bodart-Bailey 1993), this was however not the case. The early Tokugawa Shoguns showed now special preference for Confucianism over other philosophical schools of thought, and certain Neo-Confucian scholars were persecuted for pro-Christian and anti-Bakufu thought, yet the core of Bushido, the cornerstone of Japanese ideology during the Edo period, was based upon Confucian ethics (Mehl 2005). The Neo-Confucian philosophers were in fact more conservative in many ways than their earlier counterparts, and thus it is unlikely that the Tokugawa administration would find it necessary to persecute the ideology itself rather than a few radical scholars.

Toward the end of the Tokugawa period hints of “anti-Confucian” sentiment can again be seen, particularly in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. During this period many Japanese scholars became increasingly focused on the superiority of the Japanese people and sought to restore “purity” to Japanese culture (Hane 2001, Fukuzawa 1998, Harootunian 1980, Ooms and Kurozumi 1994). This period saw two distinct scholarly traditions, on the one hand a renewed interest in the “privileged position” of the Japanese people in the world and an attempt to weed out foreign influences in philosophy and education and on the other a new interest in “Western” learning and science. While the new “Western” learning was not embraced by many in Japan, it was more successful than the purity movement which was ultimately doomed to fail from the beginning, for while the Japanese culture was certainly distinct from other foreign cultures, it was difficult, especially regarding China to arrive at a clear point of division as many of the literary, artistic and educational techniques had evolved directly out of the Chinese culture (Mehl 2005, Hane 2001). Even some of the myths regarding creation and religious revelation had evolved from a Chinese source. These divisions in scholarly circles were mirrored by
political divisions in the late Tokugawa and Meiji period as well, the question of how best to deal with foreign interference remained a prominent one until Japan solidified its status as an imperial power with the defeat of Russia in 1905 (Hane 2001, Irye 1997).

During the Edo period political power rested solely in the hands of the Samurai, the most educated (and most heavily armed) class in Japan. Over time the merchant class grew in power, due in part to the Edo system\(^ {16} \), and intermarriage between poor Samurai and wealthy merchants increased in frequency. The merchant class became increasingly well educated and grew in economic power. Ultimately the bakufu collapsed due to external and internal pressures culminating in the Meiji Restoration (Hane 2001).

The term “Restoration” in this case is somewhat misleading as the Meiji Emperor was not placed in any position of real power. The Emperor became a more prominent figurehead than he had been during the Edo period, and officially all legislation needed to be approved by him, however the real power lay in the hands of the Meiji Oligarchs. The Oligarchs were a small group of Samurai from Choshu and Satusma (the final fiefdoms to acknowledge Tokugawa suzerainty at the battle of Sekigahara). As Samurai they had been educated under the same Confucian system as their Tokugawa predecessors and in fact many of them had been educated at the same schools (Mehl 2005). Even in the late Meiji period, the mark of an educated individual was the ability to write and compose poetry in Chinese, and as education became increasingly institutionalized by

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\(^{16} \) During the Tokugawa period the government mandated that the Daimyo spend alternate years in Edo. The constant travel back and forth to the capital and the pageantry that necessarily accompanied such a journey by the Daimyo led to the development of a robust travel industry catering to the needs of the traveling samurai. As salaries did not increase for the samurai and position was hereditary, by the 19th Century many samurai lived in a state of semi-poverty and were forced to borrow money from the burgeoning merchant class in order to maintain appearances.
the Meiji government the class system began to break apart, and education became less militaristic (despite Bushido’s roots in Buddhism and Confucianism it maintained a militarist bent due largely to its class target).

As education moved away from the teacher-disciple system and became a national institution Western learning gained prominence in the classroom. The natural sciences became the focus of many institutions in Japan, Chinese learning was still taught in many schools and students were encouraged to learn to read and write Chinese however this was no longer considered necessary for the educated Japanese. The decline of kangaku did not lead to a decline in Confucian education. The teaching of the Confucian classics was maintained in Japanese schools both on the mainland and in the Japanese colonial possessions as a necessary “moral component” of education.

Mehl (2005) also points out that Confucianism and Chinese learning were important not only from an abstract and moral point of view, but also in policy formation particularly in the early Meiji period:

“[ ] the use of kanbun reflected the influence of Confucian education and thought. And since Confucian thought inspired many measures taken by the new government, this in turn helped perpetuate the necessity for reading and writing kanbun. A good example of this is the criminal law proclaimed in 1871 in the Shinritsu Koryo. This was based on the Chinese law of the Ming (1368-1644) and hardly influenced by Western concepts before its partial revision in 1873. This meant that in order to work with these laws and to take part in government, a knowledge of kanbun and Chinese language and culture was essential.” (Mehl 2005, p.27)
Due to the educational background of the Meiji Oligarchs it is reasonable to assume that the Confucian ideology may have exerted some influence over the means and goals of governance. The limited nature of the Japanese government at this point and the fact that power rested almost entirely in the hands of the Genro (elder statesmen)\(^\text{17}\) makes it easier to support this assertion. The Genro held sway in Japanese government from 1890 until 1915, they were comprised entirely of retired elders who had formerly held state positions (many of whom had been granted hereditary titles). The views of these statesmen held sway over all important political decisions (Moody 2007). While it might be difficult under other circumstances to assess how embedded a state was in an ideological power network, the history of Meiji Japan, the extreme power wielded by the Meiji Oligarchs (who later became the Genro) and their homogenous background simplifies this issue.

Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo make idea candidates for such an examination. Not only were they dominant figures in Meiji politics, and prime movers during the restoration, but they came from similar backgrounds, having both attended Yoshida Shoin’s juku and educated in the traditional samurai fashion. Most interestingly, these two statesmen came to represent two dramatically different factions in Japanese politics. The life of Ito is particularly important for this research as he negotiated the acquisition of Taiwan and the method of administration in Korea (Hane 2001, Beasley 1987, Roy 2003). Ito Hirobumi was often described as the ideal Confucian minister, especially in publications designed for domestic Japanese consumption. However, he was also a realist (Iriye 1997) while he believed in the superiority of the Japanese people he also acknowledged the technological advantage of the West. This led to his defection

\(^{17}\) The term Genro here is not to be confused with the Genro In. The Genro In was a pseudo-governmental body formed to advise the emperor during the early Meiji period (Silberman 1967).
from the “Expulsion” faction\textsuperscript{18} in the mid-Nineteenth Century (Hane 2001, Nakamura 1910). At this point he saw the advantages of Western technology and the inability of the Japanese empire to defend itself against the predations of the West. This is unsurprising if we look at this period in Japanese history from Mann’s perspective. In order for a minister to come to power in a state embedded in the Confucian ideological network, it would be necessary to demonstrate their Confucian credentials. The growing strength of the political, economic and military networks from the West similarly constrained the shape of policies a Japanese leader would advocate at this time.

Concern for other states in the Confucian ideological network was clear in many policies and in one quote in particular Ito alludes to concern for the region in a matter that indicates support for the expansion onto the Asian continent in order to protect the region from Western imperialism:

“Whether constitutional government may work well or not in China, whether she may be preserved or divided, Japan’s voice should be first heard and most respected in the matters of the Chinese Empire. Not only China but it is Japan’s natural duty to safeguard all the Oriental nations, including Korea and Manchuria. So the domination of the Sea of Japan, China Sea as well as the Pacific, is a matter of most vital importance for our own protection.”(Nakamura 1910, p.72)

\footnote{\textsuperscript{18} During the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods as Japan opened to the West under the threat of force by foreign powers a widespread reactionary response developed into a political faction that called themselves the “Expulsion” faction as their goal was to “honor the emperor and expel the barbarians”.}
This sentiment was echoed by many politicians during the expansionist phase of Japan’s imperial venture (Conroy 1970a & 1970b). Regardless of whether or not Japanese imperialism was a means to preserve the ideological integrity of the region, it is important to note that the rhetoric within Japan had a decidedly Confucian flavor, and that the states that Japan was primarily concerned with preserving were other states within the Confucian network.

Matsumoto’s (1970) research supports this argument and stresses the role that philosophy played in encouraging Japan on the path to expansion. Again, this is consistent with Mann’s framework. Japan, embedded as it was in a Confucian network, would likely see philosophers representing the flows of the various networks rising to prominence. Two philosophers in particular, Okakura Kakuzo and Tokutomi Soho, were prominent figures in civil society and advocates of pan-Asianism (Hotta 2007, Saaler 2007, Takashi and Akita 1981). Both of these philosophers acknowledged the superiority of Western science but also pointed out the superiority of Asian thought. Matsumoto argues that the rise of pan-Asianism in Japan gave rise to a corresponding expansionist desire to protect the Asian mainland from the influence of Western imperialists. In their early works there is definite encouragement of involvement in continental governments; however they stress a “careful and light-handed influence rather than brute militarism”.

Matsumoto points out that this distinction in types of influence is lost as we enter the twentieth century. This does not represent any decline in Confucian influence, but rather a rise in prominence of the militarist faction in Japanese politics. The crucial point of Matsumoto’s argument is that Japan felt that its superiority to other Asian nations was not in its ability to quickly adopt Western scientific practices and military equipment and methods, but rather its ability to maintain its traditional culture while it did so. The “national mission” of Japan in this case became the desire to spread this ability and perhaps curtail Western cultural encroachment
(1970). Other scholars have emphasized the role that Japan’s sense of itself as Asian played in overseas expansion (Jansen 1970) and how sympathetic individuals were found in China. The idea of Asian resistance to Western imperialism is well known and the victory of the Japanese over the Russians was considered a victory for all of Asia. Jansen (1970) argues that one of the drivers of Japanese expansion was the desire to develop Asia in order to protect it from Western imperialism much in line with Matsumoto’s research. Using the case of Sun Yat Sen Jansen demonstrates that there were powerful individuals in the Chinese mainland who, while not specifically condoning Japanese expansion, at least sympathized with it and considered it preferable to Western imperial intervention.

The view of the Asian continent put forth by many in the intellectual community and shared by Ito portrays neighboring states as in need of Japanese assistance due to their inability to reconcile Western technologies with superior Confucian ethics (Sachiko et al. 1988). In the case of China, as noted above, there was an inability to maintain traditional practices. In the case of Korea, the government was unwilling to modernize sufficiently to protect its interests (Fogel 1982).

Japan’s belief in its own superior Confucian background and its adoption not only of Western military practices but of diplomatic practices as well led to difficulties in some areas, particularly in colonial Korea. Nelson (1970) points out that China had traditionally held sway over Korea through the younger brother – older brother Confucian relationship. This relationship had confused foreign powers, as China did not claim suzerainty over Korea and yet Korea consulted with China in all dealings with foreign states.

Western powers had developed a system of international law that did not allow for such non-codified relations between nation states and so began to deal with Korea without direct contact
with China. By the end of the Sino-Japanese war Japan had secured its position as the great
Asian power but was unable to extend its position substantially on the mainland due to the
tripartite intervention (Hane 2001, Beasly 1991, Hamashita 2003). Following the Russo-
Japanese war the Japanese took over Korea and Manchuria. The Western powers acknowledged
Korea as a colony of Japan, however internally the Japanese had difficulty gaining the older-
brother position they coveted from the Koreans. Nelson (1970) argues that this was due to a lack
of historical precedent, the Japanese emperor was only considered divine in Japan and the
Japanese did not extend their influence through the virtue of benevolence but rather through the
raw militarism of the West. This would appear to undermine the argument that Japan behaved in
a Confucian fashion during its expansion. Despite the contention over the causes for Japanese
expansion, the refusal of Korea to acknowledge Japan as an imperial power, for Confucian
reasons, must necessarily lead us to question the thesis that Japan was behaving in a Confucian

Whether or not these perceptions of the Japan’s neighbors were accurate, Japanese rhetoric from
the 1890s on paints her Confucian neighbors as wayward younger siblings (Hane 2001). This
when combined with the “lips and teeth” relationship that many politicians and philosophers felt
Japan shared with China provided sufficient justification for Japanese involvement in politics on
the Asian continent, if not outright possession (Beasley 1987, Matsumoto 1970, Hane 2001,
Crowley 1970). While the Japanese may not have been “Confucian enough” for Korea, they may
have felt that Korea was hiding its anachronism behind ideology. Mann’s theory again allows us
to add nuance to the differences in the Korean and Japanese perspective. The Japanese, located
as they were on the outskirts of the Confucian World Order, were deeply embedded in the
Confucian ideological network but during the Tokugawa era had isolated themselves from the
political, military and economic networks. This lack of embeddedness rendered Japan less resistant to the influence of the same networks originating from the West.

Nakamura (1910) often references the concern that Ito had for Korea in this text, particularly his desire to see it strong and independent, however little detail is given on his dealings as governor general of Korea. Conroy’s research supports this assertion and he points out that Ito along with other diet members were not only hesitant in their use of military force in Korea, but in Japan’s use of force even in the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1895 that resulted in the acquisition of Taiwan (Gordon 2009, Gardella 1999). There appears to be no evidence that the Ito faction was particularly against a military solution on the Korean peninsula when their adversary was the Russians, however the “light handed” policy when dealing with Confucian neighbors hints that pan-asianism may have been more than just rhetoric within the Ito faction (Matsumoto 1970, Conroy 1970a, Hashikawa 1980, Hotta 2007, Saaler 2007). It should be noted that the strengthening of the Korean state was allegedly his primary goal and ironically led to his assassination by Korean nationalists (Hane 2001). This is important as it indicates Ito’s desire to see a strong East Asian sphere perhaps under the ideological dominance of the Japanese empire but not necessarily administered by them.

As the Meiji Oligarchs retired and became the Genro they began to train the next generation of politicians. Many of the factional divides persisted after the Genro period came to a close. Many of the Genro In had supported party government and this had been embraced later by members of the Oligarchy like Ito, while the protégés of Yamagata sought to increase the role and power of the military in the governance of Japan and its colonial territories. Yamagata even persuaded early Japanese liberal philosophers, like Tokutomi Soho, to subscribe to more statist perceptions of the national interest, this change does not represent a distancing from the
Confucian ideology, but rather a change in political direction. The militarism of the Yamagata faction was as dependent upon the Confucian ideology for acceptance as the benevolence of the Ito faction was (Norman 1970). Smethurst (1974) demonstrates the role that the rural community had in bolstering Japanese militarism under the influence of the Yamagata faction. He elaborates on how the reserve army, national youth association, and the national defense women’s association provided a social basis for militarism in Japan. These organizations, while originally sponsored by the military, capitalizing as they did upon traditional Confucian loyalty to state, became so embedded in the social structure of rural Japan that activities sponsored by these organizations became a part of daily life. This stands in stark contrast to the behavior of urban Japanese, who were much more likely to join labor organizations, and despite the fact that urban population density was much higher than that of rural areas, social ties were much more tenuous and there was a lack of community in Japanese urban environments. This sense of community contributed to the sense of obligation to the military that made these organizations such a success.

In order to ensure the loyalty and support of the rural community, the reserve organizations needed to capitalize on the sense of community that already existed in these areas. To do this the army did not attempt to tamper with existing social bonds but rather modified the Confucian communal culture to include the emperor and the nation in a clear and dominant position in these communities. The imperial rescript on education became a required part of the curriculum and Japanese rural communities began to feel increasingly tied to the nation, and while they still retained the social networks they had possessed in previous generations there now was an overriding sense of loyalty to the nation that surpassed loyalty to the village (Smetherst 1974, Hane 2001, Beasley 1987, Maki 1970).
The military went out of its way to educate the populace beginning with the schools but eventually branching out to women as well. This education stressed the loyalty and obligation that Japanese citizens should feel to the nation and to the emperor, and by extension to the military. However, this education would not have been successful if it had not successfully embedded itself in the local culture. The heads of local reserve groups were overwhelmingly local individuals, and local organizations made themselves seen often performing public services like disaster relief and road maintenance as well as providing for local security by having night patrols. These organizations were also partly financed by the local government rather than the military (Smetherst 1974).

In order to maintain membership and to instill members of these organizations with patriotism a number of patriotic events were held. Drills to ensure military preparedness and viewing patriotic films and literature ensured that reservists felt that they were serving their nation and that their nation truly needed them.

While acknowledging the usefulness of the existing ideology, they also realized that in order to maintain loyalty they needed to ensure that reservists and the rural community felt that the nation was acting in a manner that was consistent with their world view. This was accomplished through the education modifications of the military but also through the patriotic activities mentioned above and the propaganda regarding the emperor’s concern and appreciation for his people. It is likely that the manipulation of the rural community was easier than the urban due to lack of prior exposure to politics and the oppressive tendencies of the Meiji government toward political opposition, as well as a general lack of education in rural Japan. Thus rural citizens were less likely to be aware of the more hostile acts of the government and less likely to have exposure to the outside world (Smetherst 1974).
The Yamagata and Ito factions held sway during different periods of the Japanese Colonial era. The Ito faction dominated during the Taisho period (Duus 1968), culminating in the democratic experiments in the colonial territories, while the Showa period witnessed the rise of militarism as those sympathetic to the Yamagata faction gained control over the government. This indicates that we must be careful when asserting the influence that Confucianism had over the government. It should be noted that both Ito and Yamagata were Confucian and acted in a manner consistent with the Confucian ideology even during the militarist periods. Subscribing to the same ideology does not preclude dramatic disagreements regarding foreign and domestic policy. The Confucian network shaped both the militaristic expansions into China in the late 1930s and the limited self-governance granted to Taiwan in the 1920s. Both behaviors were Confucian in nature but had dramatically different rationale (Chen 1970 & 1972).

The Confucian militarist rationale of the Yamagata faction continued most obviously into the war-time government of Japan and is explored in-depth by Ruth Benedict (1947), she discusses not only the ideology’s impact on the Japanese psychology but also the uniqueness of the Japanese Confucian Ethic. Published in the immediate aftermath of World War II Benedict is one of the few scholars devoted to the study of the Japanese during the war period. She was forced to make use largely of secondary sources as well as interviews with Japanese immigrants and accounts of Prisoners of War. She provides a detailed examination of Japanese society and correctly identifies the role that Confucianism played. While her research pertains primarily to wartime Japan, the cultural roots of the Japanese of ideology are in the Meiji period (Mehl 2005).

Benedict stresses the importance of hierarchy and the Japanese identification of hierarchy with stability and ties this into the Confucian virtue of \( Li \). She argues that Japanese Confucianism was different in many respects from Chinese Confucianism, most notably in the elevation of \( Li \) and in
the devaluation of Ren. The elevation of Li can be seen in many respects, and Benedict correctly demonstrates how the nature of on can be tied to the importance of Li. Her explanation of gimu (debts that are impossible to be repaid in full) and giri (debts that must be repaid but only in their direct mathematical equivalence), provide important insight into how dominant Li was in Japanese society. She further asserts that chu (duty to the Emperor) and ko (duty to one’s parents and ancestors) are categorized as gimu and that chu supersedes ko. While this may on the surface appear to contradict traditional Chinese Confucianism, where loyalty to parents (and clan) are often considered of paramount concern, it is important to recall that in traditional Confucianism loyalty to the emperor surpasses that of family, hence the tale of Boyi and Shuqi19.

Benedict explores in depth the “degradation” of the virtue ren, arguing that in Japanese society it had become something that was above and beyond law and well outside of the realm of the Japanese ethical system. She states that “[Practicing ren is used for describing] [t]he honor among thieves of the raiding and slashing swashbucklers of the Tokugawa period—they were one-sword men as contrasted with the two-sworded swashbuckling samurai” (p.118). This exclusion of ren from the Japanese ethical system would set the Japanese Confucianism far apart from its Chinese counterpart, as in the Chinese system ren is the highest possible virtue and the prime indicator for the virtue of a ruler and whether or not the emperor carried the Mandate of Heaven.

19 The tale of Boyi and Shuqi as told in the Zuo commentary describes to sons of a feudal lord who abdicate following their father’s death. The elder abdicates in favor of his younger brother whom he views as more virtuous and the younger refuses to accept the position as it was his father’s will that the older brother inherit the kingdom. They live in seclusion and are renowned as virtuous sages. They ultimately starve themselves to death after refusing to take part in a rebellion against a corrupt sovereign. Here they commit the ultimate Confucian sin against their family by committing suicide because of their loyalty to the emperor.
In Japan during this period while the emperor served primarily as a figurehead it is important to note that the validity of the Japanese government hinged upon the support of the emperor. The divine emperor would be assumed to possess the Mandate of Heaven by the Japanese people, and while Benedict argues that ren was unimportant in Japanese Confucianism we must carefully examine how the emperor was portrayed. When we hear Japanese POWs speaking against their government and the war, they do not criticize the emperor. The emperor is beyond criticism; those soldiers who were militarists believed that they were serving at the behest of the emperor, those who were in favor of peace asserted with equal fervor that the emperor had been misled by those in government (p. 31-32). Any failings of the Japanese government were not the fault of the compassionate emperor but rather his corrupt government, the portrayal of the emperor in Japanese society was utterly consistent with the virtue of ren. The emperor would not sacrifice his people without need because he possessed the Mandate of Heaven; the government through its use of pageantry did its best to maintain the image of the emperor as aloof yet compassionate. These are the attributes of a virtuous Confucian father and head of state.

The importance of the Emperor and the Emperor system cannot be overstated in pre-war Japan (Fujii 1970, Yamamura and Yasusuke 1984). The created pageantry and ritual served to codify not only the Emperor’s divinity but also his overriding benevolence and his passive worthiness of the loyalty of populace (Fujitani 1998, 2009). In order to accomplish this State Shinto was the primary tool employed by the Japanese government (Kasahara 2002). As noted by Smetherst (1974) both military and civilian organizations played a large role in providing the populace with the proper “national spirit” and loyalty to the Emperor was extended to the state as it was the government and military who (to a limited extent) carried out the will of the emperor.
This ideological reinforcement occurred not only on the Japanese mainland where State Shinto formalized the fragmented Shinto religion into a single mythology with the Emperor at its apex, but also in the colonial possessions. In the colonies State Shinto placed the Emperor at the top of the local mythology (Goto-Jones 2005) and rituals (like the reading of the imperial rescript on education) were designed to instill loyalty rather than enforce religious views. In fact the Japanese government showed no special favoritism to Shintoism outside of state rituals, and Shintoism experienced the same restrictions during politically sensitive periods as did Buddhism and Christianity (Garon 1986).

The criticisms of POWs aimed at their superior officers and the government demonstrated the perception of soldiers that these individuals were not virtuous, and while they may act with Li the criticisms seemed to indicate displeasure at their lack of Ren. I would argue that this willingness to criticize one’s superiors stems from the fact that loyalty owed to them belongs merely to the giri whereas loyalty to the emperor is gimu. I would further assert that the reason loyalty to the emperor is gimu stems from the belief that the emperor is virtuous and practices Ren otherwise he would not be able to remain the emperor.

Thus, I disagree with Benedict’s overall assertion regarding the changed status of the Confucian virtues in the Japanese system. In fact considering the maintenance of the Confucian classics as canon for ethical courses in the education system it is unlikely that this would have been possible (Mehl 2005). The primacy of Ren in the Classics is not something that could be easily overlooked or modified without losing much of the ethical message.

This is not to say that Japanese Confucianism and Chinese Confucianism were identical, certainly I concede Bendeict’s point regarding the elevation of Li and the fundamental
importance of loyalty to Emperor and state in the Japanese system, although (as mentioned above) I would argue these are based upon the Emperor’s benevolence. Many changes in the Confucian system occurred during the centuries of Japanese isolation, this is certainly true. I would argue that the largest distinction between the Chinese and Japanese Confucian systems exists in the structure of the state prior to the Meiji Restoration.

In China the Confucian system since the Han dynasty (Weber 1951, Sun 2009, Roberts 1999) had been closely associated with the examination system. The primacy of Confucianism as an ideology was supported by the state through the civil service examinations. In order to serve as a civilian administrator in the Chinese government it was necessary to pass these examinations, and the examinations were based entirely on the Confucian classics (Ebrey 2010, Roberts 1999). In imperial China the court was divided into civilian and military branches, it was rare that the military would take precedence over the civilian (probably due to concerns over usurpation), and it was rare for an official to hold a position in both branches.

This differs dramatically from the Japanese system where examinations were not the path of advancement. In fact, during the Edo period status was hereditary (Hane 2001, Beasley 1987). Confucian education was the primary form of education; however since the Samurai were both the educated and military elite of the Japanese government Bushido (the ideology with which they were indoctrinated) adapted the Confucian ethical system to the militaristic ideology of the Shogunate. This difference between the Chinese and Japanese systems provides insight into the structure not only of the Japanese government and the behavior of the Meiji Oligarchs but the rise of militarism in the Showa period. The militaristic bent of Confucianism in Japan and it’s continued embeddedness in the Confucian ideological network explains the reverence for
military personnel that led to their privileged position in the Japanese government and ultimately their resurgence in the 1930s.

Confucian Taiwan

“In a word, the Formosan religion is nothing but a meaningless tissue of superstition and devil worship. It is true, ancestral worship is retained, and the head of the family has supreme control over all the other members, but otherwise no trace of Confucianism remains. Taoist beliefs have been changed into a mass of myths and senseless stories, and all good religious principles have become corrupted.” (Takekoshi 2007 p. 300)

The quote above, taken from a Japanese statesmen in the early Twentieth Century, indicates that the question of the Confucian influence in Taiwanese history (prior to the Japanese administration) is not as simple as it might at first appear. While the population of Taiwan was largely Chinese, and during the early Qing dynasty large numbers of Chinese migrants fled to the island, the island was still considered an unimportant backwater to the Qing government (Brown 2004). The Chinese did not spend considerable resources on the development of the island, and their expressions of sovereignty came mostly after the colonial interests of the Dutch, who administered the island for a brief period of time prior to its seizure by Ming loyalists in 1662\(^2\). The Qing dynasty successfully established sovereignty in 1683, however they ignored the island

\(^2\) Zheng Cheng Gong, was a powerful Ming loyalist who set up a short-lived state on Taiwan initially with the intention of restoring the Ming dynasty. During his lifetime the Qing was unable to defeat him and was forced to relocate coastal populations inland to protect them from his depredations. After the death of Zheng Cheng Gong his son succeeded him but the government became corrupt and weak falling to the Qing soon after its formation.
until the 1800s and only made it a province in 1885 (Gardella 1999, Roy 2003, Takekoshi 2007, Shepherd 1999).

In fact it was not until the decade immediately preceding the treaty of Shimonoseki that the Qing dynasty paid any real attention to the island21 (Speidel 1976). Prior to the colonial period the island of Taiwan was inhabited primarily by aborigines and pirates, both Chinese and Japanese (Roy 2003, Takekoshi 2007). While the non-aboriginal inhabitants hailed from Confucian cultures, it is safe to say that education and ethics were not of primary concern when it came to governing their territorial possessions.

This was not true of the colonial governors and missionaries from the West who were interested in the island as a trade location. The Portuguese and Dutch both invested resources into improving infrastructure and spreading Christianity throughout the island. They were largely unsuccessful, though this may have been due more to the brevity of their tenure rather than any failing on their part. Schools were constructed and the Formosan Chinese were encouraged to attend (Wills 1973 & 1999, Takekoshi 2007, Roy 2003, Lamley 1999). Under Chinese rule towards the end of Qing possession efforts were made to develop the island, which included more education, this education was done in the household Confucian method common on the mainland, however it was primarily only available to the wealthy (Takekoshi 2007).

Despite Taiwan’s position as a cultural backwater during the majority of the Qing dynasty, the population during this period was still overwhelmingly Chinese (Takekoshi 2007, Roy 2003, Shepherd 1999).

21 From the collapse of Zheng Cheng Gong’s government until the late 19th Century the Qing government banned all immigration to Taiwan. The rationale behind this was that only barbarians would want to live in such an undeveloped place and being so far from civilization would only encourage barbarous and potentially criminal behaviors.
Shepherd 1999). Family structure and interpersonal relationships maintained the Confucian elements of the neighboring mainland. The administrative structure during the Qing period maintained its similarity to the mainland, although those living on the island lacked the ability to easily sit for the civil service exams (Roy 2003).

Having provided a baseline description of the Confucian ideology and the influence that this network exerted over Japan and Taiwan we can move on to an analysis of the assumptions of Economic Imperialism and Confucian Colonialism. The following section discusses the dimensions of colonialism described in previous chapters and compares it with the historical record to determine the accuracy of the assumptions made by Economic Imperialism and Confucian Colonialism. The attributes examined below are: Infrastructural Investment, Colonial Government Composition, View of Colony by Colonial Power, Military Presence, Treatment of Aboriginal Population, and Rights of Colonial Population.

Japan’s imperial presence in Taiwan spanned fifty years and three different imperial periods in Japanese history. During this time Japan’s geopolitical position and domestic politics changed dramatically. This certainly had an impact on its’ colonial possessions making any generalization about Taiwan’s colonial situation necessarily an oversimplification. However, Taiwan was remarkably stable from the period of 1915 to the late 1930s (Eskildsen 2005, CR I, IV, V, VIII, XIX, XXIII), lending validity to the generalizations made below.

**Infrastructural Investment**

Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan was not accompanied by frenzied investment on the part of Japanese capitalists, but rather after a brief period of instability the Japanese government set
about constructing roads and increasing sanitation (Takekoshi 2007, CR XIV). The Japanese government experienced difficulty encouraging domestic investors to supply capital to colonial enterprises initially (Jansen 1988).

*Economic Infrastructure*

The first major act of infrastructural legislation in Taiwan was land reform. Under Count Kodama new land laws were passed, preventing landlords from extorting tenants and tenants from deceiving landlords. Land ownership was given to the farmers, having been purchased by the Administration. This legislation standardized lot sizes and recorded the names of land owners as well as the names of those who worked the land. This facilitated government collection of taxes and while it certainly impacted the social hierarchy of Taiwan it also bought the Japanese administration some good will among the peasantry (Takekoshi 2007).

Prior to Japan’s acquisition, Taiwan’s agriculture was primarily subsistence based. The Japanese administration in the Meiji and Showa period intended to take advantage of the islands climate and soil by developing a large scale agricultural industry exporting rice, sugar and tea to Japan and abroad (Ho 1968 & 1975, CR XIV, XVI, XIX, XXI). In order to accomplish this the Japanese administration (under various Governors-General) encouraged the peasantry to grow commercial crops by providing them with favorable price guarantees, seeds at low prices and favorable loan terms for land development (Ho 1968 & 1975, CR XIV).

In order to facilitate trade, both domestic and international, it was necessary for Japan to engage in not only road construction but also in the development of Taiwan’s natural harbors. Under the

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22 By focusing on agriculture in Taiwan Japan would be better able to focus on industrialization in the home islands. By creating a food surplus more peasants could be moved to urban centers to work in factories.
Qing dynasty little attention had been paid to trade development and thus the Japanese Administration found it necessary to improve the harbors at Keelung, Tam Sui and Kaoshiung so that they could accommodate greater numbers of vessels of varying sizes (CR I, II, IV). The dredging of these harbors was done at considerable expense to the Japanese government, but ultimately succeeded in encouraging trade (Ho 1975).

The Japanese administration also spent considerable resources constructing railway lines and attempting to link the East and West coasts of the island. The latter project was complicated by geographic elements and the hostility of the aboriginal inhabitants of Central and Eastern Taiwan (CR I, III, XI, XXIV). The linking of the two coasts was seen as necessary by the Governors-general to maintain Japan’s control over the entire island and to be able to quickly respond to emergencies.

*Educational Infrastructure*

Through the course of its tenure on Taiwan the Japanese administration spent considerable resources on education (CR X, XV). Early on in the imperial period the Japanese colonial government sought the support of the educated Formosan Chinese through the formation of *Yobunkai*, an organization designed to convey the importance of education and cooperation in the development of Taiwan. Tsurumi’s description of the inaugural ceremonies describes the lengths the Kodama administration went to in securing the cooperation of former Qing elites in establishing a suitable education policy.

“The aim [of the Yobunkai] was to win the understanding and cooperation of the literati for the new regime’s reform programs including, of course, the new education. To this end, the government general invited all gentry holding the grade of ling-sheng or higher
according to the Ch’ing examination system to be guests of honor at the society’s eight
day inauguration ceremonies. Those who accepted- and approximately half of the island’s
top gentry did so- were wined and dined extensively and shown over the colonial
government’s new buildings and facilities.

Both Kodama and Goto addressed the Yobunkai members at the opening meeting
on March 15 [1910]. Although they paid respectful homage to the group’s Chinese
classical learning they also urged the members to take advantage of the new schooling the
Japanese offered. Goto compared the curriculum of the Chinese private schools with
theirs to the disfavor of the former and asked the gentry to stop patronizing Chinese
schools. Cultured Taiwanese should not, he implied, be afraid to learn from other
civilizations.” (Tsurumi 1977 p.38)

The efforts by the Kodama administration to reconcile the traditions and desires of the Formosan
Chinese with the needs of a modern state developed into a dual educational system consisting of
a vast network of common schools for the Formosan Chinese, who would receive basic
education in Chinese studies, mathematics, history, morality and Japanese, and a second set of
primary schools for the children of Japanese nationals (Tsurumi 1977). This second category of
schools would follow a curriculum identical to that of primary schools of the home island. This
dual system along with the colonial administration’s slow response to Formosan Chinese
demands for higher education maintained the economic dominance of the Japanese in Taiwan
(CR IV, XXXV, XXXVI). Japanese expenditures on education continued to grow throughout
the colonial period, and the expansion of the education system along with a rising focus on
assimilation increased the popularity among the Taiwanese, particularly the elites seeking equal
status of the Japanese. However, as Japanese living in Taiwan were reluctant to give Taiwanese
students equal access to higher education, wealthy Formosan Chinese sent their children to Japan to be educated in an environment without the status based limitations present in the colony (Tsurumi 1977).

By the 1920s the position of the government regarding the two systems had changed dramatically. Baron Den’s accession to the position of Governor-general was followed by a series of very liberal policies in Taiwan. The previous Governor’s-general had advocated a gradual approach to assimilation. One that would maintain Japanese superiority in Taiwan until the colonial subjects had enough exposure to Japanese civilization to understand the rights and responsibilities of a Japanese citizen (Takekoshi 2007). Den was openly sympathetic to the Taiwanese and to the burgeoning self-rule movement. He abolished bans on intermarriage and restructured the Taiwanese education system providing full integration23. This integration had problems of its own, for while legally the Taiwanese would have access to the same facilities as the Japanese, the number of Taiwanese that could speak and read Japanese fluently remained quite low (CR XXXII). This meant that when it came to applying for employment or acceptance to universities Taiwanese applicants were still at a disadvantage.

Den’s policies maintained themselves throughout Taiwan’s colonial period, and the colonial administration increased funding for higher education facilities. The universities in Taiwan were predominately attended by Japanese students, as most educated Formosan Chinese who could attend these universities could also afford to attend better Japanese institutions that provided a greater degree of freedom in course work (CR VII, X, XII, XXIV, XXVI, XXXIII).

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23 Despite the integration separate primary schools were provided for the education of non-Japanese speaking students (Tsurumi 1977 p.105).
By 1937 the education system was fully integrated and Chinese studies which had been a staple of the “Common” schools attended by non-Japanese speakers had been banned. Although Vocational and Normal schools began attracting Formosan students the student bodies retained a Japanese majority. In the mid-1920’s as Japan was beginning to militarize colonial policy began to more accurately reflect events on the home islands as all normal schools were required to have a military instructor on staff and military drills at school began in 1926 (Smetherst 1974, Tsurumi 1977).

Military Infrastructure

During Japan’s first decade of colonial administration in Taiwan troop levels remained quite high (Maki 1970). It wasn’t until Taiwan had been pacified in 1902 that the Kodama administration made the move towards a civilian police force that incorporated large numbers of Formosan Chinese (Roy 2003, Takekoshi 2007). From the beginning of civilian administration in Taiwan until the mid-1920s the military had very little impact on Taiwan’s domestic policy. Count Kodama had implemented a specific policy limiting the voice of military personnel to matters directly involving their branch of service.

The military during the colonial period was primarily used to deter aboriginal uprisings. In particular, early investments in air strips and flights over aboriginal areas were conducted with the intent to instill awe in the aboriginal tribes of Central Taiwan (CR I, XI). Initially these forays were successful, however as their impact declined the government gradually abandoned the practice. There were military parades held occasionally by the colonial government, but these did not amount to significant consistent expenditure. The presence of the military increased in the late 1920s and 1930s reflecting changes in the government of the Japanese home
islands and a growing concern over the international presence in Taiwan (CR XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXX, Roy 2003, Lamley 1999).

In sum Japan’s infrastructural investment in Taiwan was focused more around the incorporation of the colony into the empire than in the exploitation of the island’s resources. While the Japanese government was certainly concerned about economic development in Taiwan, it was also concerned with the indoctrination and education of colonial subjects in order to facilitate their assimilation. While there are elements of Economic Imperialism in the investments there is a stronger Confucian element, in that education was seen as the primary tool for assimilation by the colonial government.

Colonial Government Composition

The composition of Taiwan’s colonial government varied throughout the Japanese tenure. In the early period of colonial rule (1895-1905), the colonial administration was comprised almost entirely of Japanese nationals, and of these the majority were active military personnel. It was not until Count Kodama initiated civilian rule on Taiwan that this changed (Takekoshi 2007, CR I, II). With the onset of civilian administration Kodama allowed local clan and village leaders to maintain authority over their respective areas, and both he and Goto Shimpei sought the advice and consent of the indigenous intellectual community regarding Taiwanese customs.
While Kodama allowed the Taiwanese to maintain some of their legal customs, cultural traditions and local hierarchies, the Taiwanese did not have any official voice in legislation or policy and they had no formal mechanism for voicing complaints about the administration or local authorities. It was not until Baron Den took office that the Taiwanese began to play a role in governance.

Along with his liberal focus on education Baron Den felt that self-rule, as a province of the Japanese Empire, was the fundamental goal of the colonial exercise in Taiwan. To this end Den formed advisory councils which included in their number native Formosans, that could serve as a voice of the colonial citizenry. The following quote from the British Acting Consul describes the formation of these councils.

“Another entirely new departure is the institution of a system of Councils to assist and advise in matters pertaining to the local Government. There will be Provincial Councils, City Councils, Town Councils, District Councils and Village Councils in each Province, City, Town, District, and Village. The Provincial Council will consist of not less than 25 and not more than 35 Counsellors, the number to the fixed by the Governor-General in each Case. The provincial Governor will be President of the Council and the Counsellors will be appointed by the Governor-General. Their period of office will be two years and they will be unpaid, though expenses incurred by them in the execution of their duties will be defrayed by [the] Government. Counsellors will be selected from among influential citizens of the Province and may, of course, be either Japanese or native

24 The Kodama administration resisted Tokyo’s insistence on full implementation of the Japanese legal code. Instead the administration enforced the existing Taiwanese legal system for the Formosan Chinese and the Japanese legal code for Japanese residents.
Formosan. The Provincial Governor is to refer to the Provincial Council matters relating to local revenue and expenditure, public works, education and sanitation. The Governor may, however, act without consulting his Council in matters deemed urgent and not admitting of delay. Provincial Counsellors' duties will be consultative only and they will have no power to carry measures against the judgment and opinion of the Governor. The members of City, Town, District and Village Councils will be appointed by the Provincial Governor from among influential and educated citizens and the scope of their duties will correspond to that of the Provincial Councils. Though the new system is officially described as one of local self-Government, it will be seen that it in no way corresponds to what we understand by the term in the West and the authority remains as hitherto in the hands of the official. Indeed any real system of local autonomy would be utterly impractical in an Island like Formosa.” (CR II)

The final portion of this excerpt is particularly important, for while the development of these councils was a step forward in the process of generating a politically enfranchised Taiwanese population, the selection process and limited responsibilities of the councils precluded the possibility of a strong Formosan voice in government. Despite these limitations the councils did encourage the development of a politically active Formosan population, and this population organized itself into the Taiwanbunkakyokai (Taiwanese Cultural Association) (CR V, Kerr 1986, Roy 2003).

The Taiwan Cultural Association was formed in 1921, its purpose was to further the interests of the Taiwanese people and to achieve some measure of self-governance (Chen 1972). To this end one particularly influential Formosan, Lim Ken Do introduced to the Imperial diet in 1922 a petition for the self-governance of Taiwan. The Taiwan Cultural Association desired a separate
diet on the island. This petition was repeatedly tabled in committee by the Tokyo government and signatories were viewed with suspicion by the Japanese authorities. The petition was submitted annually until 1934 when it was finally vetoed by the Japanese Diet in Tokyo (CR XXVIII, Roy 2003, Kerr 1986). Partially in response to the apathy of the Japanese government toward Formosan self-governance a more moderate faction of the Taiwan Cultural Association began to push for an extension of Japanese suffrage to colonial citizens in 1925.

The 1920s were a decade of turmoil politically in Taiwan, not due to colonial instability but rather due to the parliamentary upheavals caused by party politics. As parties changed power in Tokyo Governors-general were frequently recalled to the home islands. Following Baron Den five other Japanese politicians filled the role of Governor-general\textsuperscript{25}. All of these administrators were liberal in their views towards colonial governance. However, they greeted the self-determination movement with mixed feelings. Governors-general Uchida and Izawa saw the separate diet agitation as a violation of colonial prohibitions on organization, and having recently come from Tokyo were cautious of the spread of “dangerous thoughts” like communism and Chinese nationalism. The quote below from Consul Phipps describes Izawa’s reaction to the movement.

“The ‘separate Diet’ agitation culminated in the arrest of a number of Formosans on the ground of their having disobeyed the local Government's prohibition of the society formed by them to demand a separate Diet for Formosa and having continued their agitation under cover of an organisation in Tokyo nominally independent of but really identical with that prohibited in Formosa. The defence of the accused was that the Tokyo

\textsuperscript{25} See Appendix for complete list of Governors-general and their tenure.
society was a *bona fide* ne, organised under the sanction of the Tokyo police, unconnected with the Formosa society, whose existence was forbidden by the Government, and that no step taken by the accused infringed law or order in any way whatever. The bulk of the accused were acquitted at the preliminary investigation, but eighteen were committed for trial. At the hearing before the Taihoku District Court, all the accused were acquitted, but, on an appeal being lodged by the Public Procurator, the finding was reversed by the higher court. The accused then appealed in their turn, and the final hearing, before the Supreme Court of Formosa, is to take place in January 1925. The prosecution have a poor case, and the accused are defended by advocates of the very front rank of the Japanese bar. On the other hand, the weight of the Government is behind the prosecution, and it will be interesting to learn the final outcome. The accused have no doubt disobeyed the spirit of the Governor-General's prohibition, but they have kept the letter, and they have been studiously careful to avoid any form of violence or rowdyism. The Government would probably have done more wisely to ignore them completely. The affair is known as the ‘Security case,’ owing to the fact that it was under the provisions of the Security Police Law, enforced in Formosa early in 1923, that the proceedings were instituted.” (CR IX)

Ultimately only a handful of activists were found guilty and these served short sentences (one or two years), some of which was deferred. In the early 1930s the splinter group of the Taiwan Culture Association, the *Minshuto* was disbanded by the government. However, in order to accommodate, to some extent the feelings of the Taiwanese the powers of the advisory councils were expanded and the number of Formosans sitting on the council of the Governor-general
numbered nearly half. In 1932 a preliminary plan to allow the election of council members was introduced and ultimately carried out in 1935 (CR XXV, XXXI, XXXIV, Roy 2003, Kerr 1986).

In 1935 the Taiwanese intellectual community made the decision to abandon the petition for a separate diet in favor of supporting the expansion of Japanese suffrage. This is received far better by the Japanese administration and in 1935 for the first time a Formosan Chinese is nominated to the imperial diet House of Peers (Go Ken-ei). The drive for the extension of Japanese suffrage to the Taiwanese came from Governor-general Nakamura, and it was he who pleaded the case to the Japanese diet (Craig 1986).

Under the Nakagawa administration Taiwan also sees the first dramatic reforms in government that can be considered democratic (in a limited sense). While there were limitations to the ways in which the uneducated Formosan Chinese could participate (Japanese was the language of politics and campaigns), there was certainly more opportunity than ever before.  

From the beginning of the colonial administration until the militarization of 1937 the Formosan Chinese had very little voice in government. Even after the implementation of the election system by the colonial government, very few Taiwanese participated in the political process. The intellectual community in Taiwan remained the most active and they made up only a small minority of the Taiwanese population. The political apathy of the Taiwanese was commented on by British consuls, and to some extent lamented by the Japanese (CR XXXV, Roy 2003, Kerr 1986).

The Formosan Chinese population for the most part neither rejected Japanese rule nor embraced colonial efforts at education and assimilation. Due to the economic growth in Taiwan

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26 See Appendix for detailed description of government structure.
throughout the colonial period, peasant families did not see education as a route to economic success. Having a child focus upon agriculture seemed just as good an investment as education to the average peasant as wages continued to rise, even during the Great Depression. When it came to politics the average Formosan had only to look across the strait to see the dire position that the mainland Chinese were in. With massive instability, starvation, corruption and rampant banditry visible in China, a non-democratic political system that provided stability and growth must have seemed, if not desirable at least less objectionable. This, coupled with the fact that democracy was largely outside of the Formosan experience doubtless had a dampening effect on the desire to revolt against the Japanese (Roberts 1999, CR XXXV).

For this attribute of colonialism, we can see elements of both Economic Imperialism and Confucian Colonialism. While the government composition mirrored the similar expectations of both types of colonialism, there are reasons to speculate on Taiwan’s eventual accession to the empire proper. However, it is impossible to say for certain what might have occurred had the Formosan population been less apathetic or had the Japanese tenure endured beyond World War II. The naming of a Taiwanese citizen to the House of Peers may be indicative of a Confucian Colonial process, but only weakly so.

**View of Colony by Colonial Power**

Considering the complexities of Japanese politics during the colonial period, any generalization about the Japanese view of Taiwan during this period must be applied cautiously. Certainly there were elements in the Japanese government who saw Taiwan as a rich source of raw materials ripe for plundering. However, this perception was colored by the shared cultural
history of the region. The Japanese population within Taiwan also had a very different opinion of the Formosan Chinese than those residing elsewhere.

Despite the difficulties in generalizing the Japanese view of its’ colonial acquisitions it is clear that the government was primarily interested in assimilation (CR XXIX, Roy 2003, Tsurumi 1977, Takekoshi 2007). The colonial authorities were clearly also concerned with Economic growth (Ho 1975), particularly in the agricultural sector and later in the extraction of various minerals (CR XXXIX). However this focus was no greater in Taiwan than it was on the Japanese home islands.

The Japanese officials in Tokyo tended to view colonial subjects as uncivilized siblings in need of education and guidance before they could become productive members of the Japanese Empire (Hane 2001, CR XXXV, Takekoshi 2007). In Japan the Taiwanese were entitled to many of the same rights as Japanese citizens and though in the case of some more active political agitators they were observed by local police forces, this was also true for Japanese agitators (CR IX, Hane 2001, Jansen 1995).

When enrolled in Japanese run international universities like the Toadobunshokai, Taiwanese students were registered as Japanese and were treated as such (Reynolds 1989). The situation was somewhat different in Taiwan. As noted above, the Taiwanese were disadvantaged by the Japanese education system in Taiwan, due in part to the dual system used in the early colonial period and also to the necessity of Japanese fluency in attending institutions of higher education (CR XXXII, Tsurumi 1977). Japanese living in Taiwan saw the Formosan Chinese as a potential political competitor (though not necessarily a threat). While the Japanese lived side by side and intermarried with the Taiwanese, there was still a desire for those living on the island to maintain
their economic and political dominance over the Formosan Chinese (Barclay 2005, CR IV).

Japanese nationals living in Taiwan may have seen the Formosan Chinese as younger siblings, but they had no desire to see them gain equal status, thus the early resistance to the assimilative policies of the Nakamura administration (Takekoshi 2007).

*The Greater Asia Movement*

The Japanese “Greater Asia Movement” was an institutional movement initiated by the Japanese government in the 1930s. While there were elements of this movement, stressing cultural similarities and the importance of Asia for Asians in prior periods it was not until the 1930s that the Japanese government made a concerted effort to spread this sentiment throughout Asia\(^{27}\) (CR XXIX, Iriye 1997, Brown 2007 & 2009). It did this via a number of mechanisms including the Japanese international schools and increasing funding for Chinese and Korean students to study in Japan (Reynolds 1989, Peattie 1989, Iriye 1994).

The rise of this movement in Japan gave rise to a corresponding expansionist desire to protect the Asian mainland from the influence of Western imperialists. In the Nineteenth Century there was definite desire by the government to become more directly involved in continental governments. However, the intellectual community stressed a “careful and light-handed influence rather than brute militarism”. This distinction in types of influence is lost as Japan entered the twentieth century (Matsumoto 1970). The advocates of this movement felt that Japan’s superiority to other Asian nations resided not in its ability to quickly adopt Western scientific practices and military

\(^{27}\) The West had responded negatively to Japan’s desire for institutional sentiments of racial equality in the Treaty of Versaille and the League of Nations. This combined with a US immigration policy biased against Japan led to a feeling of geopolitical alienation and a strong conservative response advocating a regional approach to foreign policy.
equipment and methods, but rather its ability to maintain its traditional culture while it did so (Matsumoto 1970).

The “national mission” of Japan at this time became the desire to spread this ability and perhaps curtail Western cultural encroachment. This aim was likely related to Japan’s embeddedness in the Confucian Ideological network, and the perceived superiority of Confucianism over other ideologies. Other scholars have emphasized the role that Japan’s sense of itself as Asian played in overseas expansion (Jansen 1970) and how sympathetic individuals were found in China. The idea of Asian resistance to Western imperialism is well known and the victory of the Japanese over the Russians was considered a victory for all of Asia (Roberts 1999). Jansen (1970) argues that one of the drivers of Japanese expansion was the desire to develop Asia in order to protect it from Western imperialism much in line with Matsumoto’s research. Using the case of Sun Yat Sen Jansen demonstrates that there were powerful individuals on the Chinese mainland who, while not specifically condoning Japanese expansion, at least sympathized with it and considered it preferable to Western imperial intervention. In Taiwan this is mirrored in the case of Lim Den Do, who ultimately pushed for equality within the Japanese legal system, while Lim and Sun did not necessarily subscribe to the idea of an Asian cultural sphere, they at least found themselves in a sympathetic position regarding Japan’s resistance to the West.

While there was virtually no active resistance to this movement in Taiwan, there was also no encouragement. The political apathy of the Taiwanese noted in the previous section extended to the vision of Asia as a coherent cultural sphere independent of and superior to the West. There were indications that many of the Taiwanese were waiting to see how China responded to this assertion before they would commit to this idea (CR XXIX). The “Greater Asia Movement” and its coupling with Japanese aggression in Asia did nothing to encourage Taiwanese acceptance of
this concept. However, by the late 1930s the concerted assimilation policies of the colonial government began to bear fruit and by World War II, Taiwanese citizens were serving in the Japanese military.

The Japanese clearly viewed Taiwan as belonging to the same culture despite differences between Japanese residents in Taiwan and on the home islands. The Taiwanese were seen as younger siblings of the Japanese empire, and the assimilative efforts demonstrate the Japanese desire to incorporate the colony into the empire proper. While economic development was a concern, it was also a concern for the development of the home islands, and Taiwan was no more used as an economic hinterland than were rural areas of Japan. Industrial development of Taiwan did not begin until the late 1930s with the formation of the Taiwan Development Company (CR XXXX), however this development coincides with the militarization of Japan and the onset of World War II so it is difficult to speculate on the role that Taiwan might have played had it been maintained as a Japanese territory.

**Military Presence**

In the initial period of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan there was an active and large military presence on the island. Immediately prior to the Japanese acquisition of Formosa a group of Qing loyalists attempted to declare independence and prevent the Japanese occupation. From 1895 to 1902 there was a great deal of violence and instability throughout the island. When concentrated opposition to Japanese rule was defeated, there were still significant amounts of banditry by armed inhabitants taking advantage of the lack of centralized authority. In order to deal with this, the military maintained a large and obvious presence and frequently conducted
campaigns into the less settled areas of Taiwan to eradicate the bandit threat (Roy 2003, Takekoshi 2007).

In order to ensure the judicious use of military force, and to cope with the difficulties involved in dealing with a threat that was identical in appearance to the civilian population, the Kodama administration significantly curtailed the use of military in October of 1897 by instituting political reforms that prevented the military from recourse to arms without the express request of the civil administration. At the same time the military voice in government was limited. The administration determined that in all Councils the military would have no voice in policy excepting only their specific sphere. This made the civil administration the true power in Formosa, this was obviously unpopular with military authorities, however, Count Kodama’s credentials as a soldier and statesman bought him credibility with leading officials both in Taiwan and Tokyo (Takekoshi 2007). The implementation of this policy bought the new Japanese administration some good will among the Formosan leaders, and the Restoration of rural administration to the native Formosans for the purposes of policing furthered this. Under the Kodama administration brigands were shown clemency and if they surrendered were allowed to return to a normal life, with their living information recorded in case they returned to their former lifestyle. Although public opinion in Japan was against this, it worked well for quieting the brigands and limiting public sympathy to resistance against the Japanese (Takekoshi 2007). Takekoshi describes the transition below:

“In April 1898, then General Nogi left and Viscount Kodama succeeded him as Governor, and Baron Goto succeeded Mr. Sone as chief of the Civil Administration Bureau, the despotic system which had been in force was done away with, a democratic system being adopted instead. The Triple guards were also discontinued and the old Chinese village
guard system was restored, under which the people themselves were the rural police and were made responsible for the preservation of peace and order. The brigands were also invited to come in and surrender. Many of them came one after the other out of their strongholds, and expressed their desire to change their life.” (Takekoshi 2007 p.96)

By the 1910s the position of the military had been greatly limited and the Kodama administration witnessed a massive draw-down. Civilian police officers replaced their military counterparts and Formosan Chinese were employed as sub-policemen and interpreters in order to assist the local leadership in law enforcement. Over the course of the Kodama administration the number of police officers also decreased due to the peace and stability of the island (Takekoshi 2007).

“At present there are in Formosa 185 police sergeants, 278 lieutenant sergeants and 3,319 policemen, 47 of whom can serve as interpreters when occasion arises; also a force of gendarmes consisting of 18 non-commissioned and other officers and 213 privates, so that the total force of both branches is only 4,013 men. Comparing these figures with the force employed in 1897, we see that at that time there were 3,408 gendarme, consisting of 99 officers, 565 non-commissioned officers and 2,744 privates. In addition to these 3,375 police sergeants and police were employed. Thus the total force then numbered 6,783. The present force is therefore only about half the former, and the gendarmes are less than a tenth as numerous as they were.” (Takekoshi 2007 148)

Significant troop increases were non-existent until the 1930s and most military activities during this period take the form of pageants intended to instill the populace with a sense of national pride, or military parades and reviews by the Governor-general or members of the imperial family visiting the island. As Japan began to militarize in during the Showa period, retired
Admiral Kobayashi assumed the position of Governor-general. While his policies were generally moderate (CR XXXX) the insistence by the Japanese home government on having military instructors at all Normal schools (Tsurumi 1977), and the increasing concern over the international presence in Formosa led to a troop increase.

Military interest in education became particularly keen during this period as well. As one British Consul noted, the focus on assimilation for the Japanese military had been particularly important, and the government remained frustrated by the obstinacy of the Taiwanese who desire the privileges of Japanese citizenship without the responsibilities associated with it (CR XXXV). National service was a primary concern for the military during this period, and they were largely concerned with Taiwanese sympathizing more with the Chinese during the war on the continent than with their Japanese rulers.

However, by 1937 Formosan Chinese were serving in the Japanese military and sympathetic concerns were somewhat assuaged. Military presence in Taiwan at this point was related more to the war on the continent, and concerns over Western interference in an “Asian” matter than it was to concerns over the colonial uprisings (Roy 2003).

It is difficult to gauge the influence of Confucianism on the military presence in Taiwan. Certainly the rapid reduction in troop levels and implementation of civilian rule may imply a Confucian ethic of governance, especially regarding the self-policing encouraged during the Kodama administration. However, Western colonial powers may have engaged in similar policies given similar circumstances. The reduction in police forces, is perhaps more telling as the pacification of the island, the rapidity with which the Japanese were able to secure the island and establish their authority coupled with their willingness (whether through expediency or not)
to cede local authority to traditional leaders is indicative of a common cultural understanding more likely in the Confucian system.

**Treatment of Aboriginal Population**

Japan’s treatment of the aboriginal tribes of Taiwan was very similar to that of China during its imperial period excepting the period just prior to the acquisition. During this time the Qing government in Taiwan treated the aboriginal people cruelly (Takekoshi 2007). For the most part Japan maintained the Confucian loose-reign policy, encouraging the aborigines to become part of “civilization” through example, and deterring violence through swift and brutal use of force when provoked. Throughout the island Japan set up a network of guard stations and fences to maintain a border between the aboriginal occupied areas and the territories settled by the Formosan Chinese and Japanese (Chen 1975, CR I, III, XI, XXIV).

The Japanese also made concerted efforts to “civilize” the aborigines, by placing policemen (and their families) in aboriginal villages. The policemen were responsible for not only maintaining order, but also teaching the aboriginal population the Japanese language, agriculture, history, and currency. These guard stations also served as trading posts where the indigenous people could trade handicrafts and weapons for grain. The selling of guns to the Japanese was encouraged in order to provide an incentive for the aboriginal tribes to give up hunting as a way of life and pursue agriculture (which was far more profitable for the Japanese), it also discouraged future acts of violence against the civilian population (CR XI). The Japanese often used less violent

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28 The loose reign system was a policy of barbarian appeasement. Non-Chinese neighbors maintained their traditional culture and customs provided they did not act against the empire. Barbarians were rewarded for obedience and punished harshly for aggression.
displays of force to deter aboriginal uprisings. One particular practice that was initially quite successful but gradually wore thin, was aerial demonstrations. The Japanese would invite members of the local tribes to visit the air field and demonstrate to them the power of the Japanese military through the use of airplanes (CR I). Eventually this practice was abandoned as the aborigines grew accustomed to the technology.

In order to truly grasp the colonial policies of Japan toward the aborigines it is helpful to look at their treatment in comparison to that of the Formosan Chinese on the island. Japanese policemen in Taiwan were not required or encouraged to learn Chinese, the first and only language of the overwhelming majority of the population. While they lived side by side with the Formosan Chinese there was very little interest in learning the nuances of Formosan cultural beliefs or sensitivities. The opposite was true of the Japanese relationship with the indigenous tribes. As mentioned above, Japanese police officers stationed in aboriginal districts were responsible for education, and as such were required to speak the language and learn the culture of the aboriginal people (CR XI). The fact that these police officers often lived far from the developed cities of Taiwan and were alone except for their family, certainly led them to be more sympathetic toward the aboriginal peoples than their counterparts policing the Formosan Chinese who could easily immerse themselves in Japanese cultural distractions similar to what they might have found on the home islands.

Even aborigines who had committed crimes against the Japanese were often shown clemency, and alongside a policy of encouraged disarmament the Japanese provided opportunities for the native peoples to advance in Formosan society. If the aborigines performed well in school they could be sent on for higher education in Taiwan, possibly even to a medical university. They were also encouraged to serve as policemen and teachers.
However, when the scholar of Taiwanese history examines the policy towards the aborigines the first thought that often comes to mind concerns the Musha uprising\(^29\) (Ching 2000, Katz 2005). This uprising provoked a rapid and merciless response from the Japanese colonial authorities, clemency was shown in the wake of the incident and a restatement of the Japanese goal for the indigenous inhabitants of Taiwan was made by the Governor-general.

“The goal of savage governance is to enlighten and educate the savages, to secure their livelihood and to immerse them in the imperial virtue of equality. Although there have been some changes in the savage governing policy, its ultimate goal has always been to enact the imperial wish of equality and to honor them with imperialization [Japanization]. This has always been the consistent and fundamental spirit.” (Ching 2000 p.803)

There had been small scale uprisings periodically throughout the colonial period, however none of them had the impact of the Musha uprising. Yet even after this incident the policy of conciliation and encouragement continued. In fact in the period prior to the Musha uprising there had been moves toward encouraging the aborigines to abandon their land to make room for development and road construction. Following the incident development of aboriginal lands progressed more slowly (CR XXIV). When one examines the occasional uprisings by the Formosan Chinese, it is clear that the Japanese colonial government responds with less patience. While in cases of small scale crime clemency was often shown in the courts, issues of protest

\(^{29}\) The Musha uprising was an indigenous uprising in 1930 that claimed 150 Japanese lives.
against Japanese rule in Taiwan were punished swiftly and without mercy when the law was violated\(^{30}\).

During this period the Japanese made no effort to exterminate the aboriginal population, nor do we see the Japanese attempting to exploit them as a source of cheap labor. Certainly the Japanese were interested in the resources of the tribal lands, however there is little evidence of coerced relocation. In fact while the Japanese provided incentives for the aborigines to leave the forest lands and pursue agriculture on the developed plains, they also allowed the aborigines to return if they were dissatisfied with their new life (CR XI).

The colonial administration in Taiwan, constrained as it was by the ideological network necessarily operated in a Confucian fashion. The Japanese policies were entirely consistent with those of the imperial Chinese (Yang 1973, Chen 1975), and those advocated in the Confucian classics. The disparity between the treatment of the aborigines and the Formosan Chinese can be explained easily within the Confucian framework. Within the Confucian system the Formosan Chinese were educated and were expected to know what their responsibilities were in a stable society. Having been educated in the Confucian fashion they should be aware of how to show respect and allegiance, and how to behave appropriately toward superiors. As noted earlier, it can be accurately said that the Japanese saw the Formosan Chinese as younger siblings in need of guidance. They may be wayward but they at least had a baseline understanding for what is appropriate and what is not, therefore when they violated the law and threatened to destabilize the society they were treated harshly, as they should have known better. In the Confucian system

\(^{30}\) The Ta-pa-ni uprising was an uprising by Formosan Chinese in 1915 which claimed 1,000 Japanese and Formosan lives. Following the uprising nearly 1,000 participants were sentenced to death though only 135 were executed before the emperor granted clemency many more died in prison.
however the aborigines were viewed as children (and in some cases they are described as animals). Children cannot be expected to understand what is appropriate or not, they should be educated and punished when the situation warrants but they should also be shown mercy. The policies of the Japanese, the focus on education and conciliation were designed in a Confucian fashion with the ultimate goal of assimilation (Ching 2000).

**Rights of Colonial Population**

The Japanese regime in Taiwan by no means encouraged free expression nor promoted what the West might consider Civil Liberties. The Formosan Chinese were limited in their ability to organize, express themselves via the press and form public gatherings. The Japanese placed tight controls on Taiwanese expression due to concerns over the threat of “dangerous thoughts” and sympathies toward the Chinese mainland (CR VIII, Ching 2000, Roy 2003) these limitations were similar to legislation passed on the home islands ostensibly for the sake of security (Altman 1986, Berry 1998).

Although the Japanese maintained tight controls over expression and press they were not entirely unsympathetic to the plight of the Formosan Chinese who suddenly found themselves in a dramatically different legal and political system. Early Japanese administrators determined that it would be best to allow village elders to remain in control of peacekeeping and dispute settlement, and for Formosan Chinese to be tried according to Taiwanese custom rather than Japanese law. This was implemented under the Kodama administration against strong opposition from Tokyo (Takekoshi 2007).
While Japanese residents in Taiwan were tried under Japanese law, the Governor-general felt it was unreasonable to rapidly change the legal system and expect cooperation from the populace. As a result the Japanese administration began enforcing Formosan Chinese legal practices, which in itself was a change from the system before where bribery and corruption were rampant (Roy 2003, Takekoshi 2007). In addition to this enforcement they also changed the penalty system of the judiciary. While criminality remained unchanged the penalties for committing a crime were quite different. The quote below demonstrates the Japanese concern with rehabilitation of criminals. There was doubtless an element of expediency in this policy, but it was well received by the Formosans.

“There are at present prisons in Taihoku, Tainan and Taichu, with branches in Shinchiku, Giran and Kagi it is a mournful fact that the number of criminals is increasing year by year. Most of the Formosans have been left entirely untrained by their parents and have grown up almost like wild animals, without being taught to obey. But, when they are brought to prison, they learn for the first time in their lives what discipline and order mean. They are taught some useful handiwork, and allowed to communicate with their relatives and friends by post. Since the Japanese occupation, such trades as are required to meet Japanese needs are learned principally in the prisons and so in a certain sense the prisons in Formosa may be said to be Industrial Training Homes.” (Takekoshi 2007 p. 196)

Providing criminals with a means for gainful employment served the dual purpose of making them less likely to commit crimes and provided the Japanese with a small workforce of skilled laborers. As the Japanese tenure in Formosa went on, Japanese customs of rule and law became more familiar to the Formosan Chinese. However, the Formosans saw only a gradual increase in
their freedoms. While the Formosan Chinese were banned from publishing newspapers, organizing and expressing public political opinion in Taiwan, the increasing numbers that went abroad to be educated were subject to no such restrictions, or to be more precise, they were subject to little more restriction than the average Japanese citizen (CR XIII).

In Japan beginning in the mid Taisho period there was an increasing concern about the spread of “dangerous thoughts”. Socialism and communism were thought to be of the greatest concern, and labor organizations in Japan were seen as a threat to economic development. This concern was also felt in Taiwan and organizations formed for the preservation and furthering of rights for the Taiwanese were regarded with deep suspicion by the Japanese government. However, it is clear that the Japanese gradually increased the freedoms of the Taiwanese population (CR V, VI, XVI, XVIII, XXII). The year 1927 is a landmark for the development of Taiwanese rights as it saw the publication of the first Formosan newspaper (under heavy censorship by the government of course), and the first formation of a legal Formosan political party (CR XVIII).

The following year saw numerous strikes spread throughout the island, but these were largely instigated by Japanese labor agitators, particularly the Japanese communists and members of the Japanese peasant union who sought to organize the Taiwanese peasantry (CR XIX). These strikes did not last very long and the agitators were quickly jailed by the colonial administration. The same resistance that made it difficult for the Japanese to assimilate the Formosan Chinese, also provided resistance to labor and political agitation as well.

The gradual increase in political freedom, coupled with exposure to foreign means of colonial governance also made the intellectual community more docile.
“Mr. Lim Ken Do, the founder of the Formosan Culture Association, has returned from Europe. He is said to be more moderate than ever after seeing conditions in the colonial possessions of other Powers. His Popular Party seem to have confined their activities this year to agitating for reforms in local government.” (CR XX)

However, even during the most liberal periods of colonial administration the Japanese kept a close watch over political leaders, and political parties particularly when they were expressing identification or sympathy toward foreign powers. In 1932 the Japanese administration ordered the closure of a political party due to its radical nature (CR XXV). Even Formosan Chinese in good standing with the colonial administration were not free from scrutiny. The quote below details an issue regarding a speech given by Mr. Lim Ken Do in 1936:

“In March Mr. Rin Ken-do visited shanghai, and at a welcome banquet was [quoted] in the press as making a speech beginning with the words: “Though living in a foreign country, I have not ceased to interest myself in the affairs of the fatherland (“sokoku”). Now I have returned to the fatherland, and ....” The Government-General received the report, but the inaccuracy of the newspapers is notorious, and, as he had violated no law, they did not think action necessary. The Japanese military police in Shanghai, however, also made a report, as a result of which the military police in Formosa took the case up. Mr. Rin Ken-do and his sons were examined; he denied that he had used the words “fatherland” and “return,” but the military police decided that he had, and that the use of such words indicated a state of mind among leading Formosans prejudicial to the safety of national defence. A report was presented to the Government-General accordingly, but the civil authorities were evidently still very reluctant to make any move. At last on the occasion of an official celebration at Taichu on the 17th June of the inauguration of
Japanese rule in Formosa a Japanese patriot committed an assault on Mr. Rin Ken-do. The latter had hitherto felt that any action on his part would constitute an admission of guilt, but after further adverse criticism at a mass meeting at Taichu a few days later he decided that his position was untenable, and he has now resigned from the Governor-General's Advisory Council, the directorate of the newspaper Taiwan Shin-mimpo, and other public activities. This seems to have closed the incident. The civil policy of conciliation has thus yielded to the military policy of repression...” (CR XXXVI)

This account is indicative of two things, the first being the scrutiny under which prominent Formosan Chinese intellectuals operated, and the second being the increasing power of the military in colonial affairs by the mid 1930s. The rise of military influence in Taiwan was reflective of political events in the home islands (Hane 2001, Janesen 1995), and the paranoia over national defense was in no way limited to the Japanese colonial possessions. Despite this the Formosan Chinese did not witness any severe reversal of the political progress they had made during the tenure of the Japanese.\(^{31}\)

The experience of the Formosan Chinese under the rule of the Japanese colonial administration clearly resembles more the Confucian model than the Economic Imperial model. The Formosan Chinese had no restrictions on property ownership or living location.\(^{32}\) The Formosan Chinese were gradually introduced to the Japanese legal system and were gradually granted limited

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\(^{31}\) By the Showa period the Japanese citizenry had lost their voice in politics. Partially as a result of political alienation militarist elements in the government were able to capitalize upon the Confucian background of the populace and appeal to the nationalist elements of society to silence opposition in civil society (Iriye 1994, Barnhart 1988).

\(^{32}\) Beginning with the Kodama administration Formosan Chinese were permitted to marry Japanese, additionally in the treaty ports in China the Japanese often lived side-by-side with Chinese residents. This was significantly different from the behavior of other imperial powers in the treaty ports were districts were designated for Chinese or foreign residents (Peattie 1989).
political freedom. Ultimately the final move towards assimilation made by the Japanese was to allow the Taiwanese to serve in the military in 1937. Despite this there should be no confusion regarding the status of the Formosan Chinese living on Taiwan during the colonial period. This society was in no way free and open. It was stable, and largely the rule of law held sway, but it was also oppressive and could be harsh when issues of national defense were raised. This however, was not so different from the political situation that dominated in Japan during the Meiji and Showa periods (Hane 2001, Hane 2001, Beasley 1991), and is not at all inconsistent with the Confucian ethical system wherein stability and harmony outweigh personal freedom.

**Discussion**

The analysis above indicates that the situation in colonial Taiwan more closely resembles Confucian Colonialism than Economic Imperialism. Infrastructural Investment, View of Colony by Colonial Power, Treatment of Aboriginal Population, and Rights of Colonial Population all clearly fall under the category of Confucian Colonialism, while the attributes of Colonial Government Composition and Military presence are only weakly Confucian and constitute borderline cases. The following chart details the categorization of these attributes and classifies each attribute as Weak, Moderate, or Strong.
Table 5: Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Issue</th>
<th>Economic Imperialism</th>
<th>Confucian Colonialism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Focus</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural Investment</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Government Composition</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Colony by Imperial Power</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Presence</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of Aboriginal Population</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights of Colonial Population</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While most of these attributes contain moderate elements of Economic Imperialism, this is not surprising as the Japanese colonial government found it expedient to couch its expansion in the rhetoric and methodology of the time to ensure its legitimacy in the eyes of the Western powers (Irye 1997). Here, again, Mann’s theoretical framework proves useful: the Western political, economic and military networks had extended to East Asia and exerted a powerful influence over Japanese modernization, thus constraining the shape of the modern Japanese state. However, the Western ideological networks did not extend to Japan which remained embedded within the pre-
existing Confucian network shaping the manner in which Japan interacted with its colonial acquisitions. This demonstrates the superiority of Mann’s model as an explanatory tool for Japan’s colonial enterprise in Taiwan.

Considering the manner in which ideological networks constrain elite selection criteria the behavior of imperial Japan is not surprising when viewed from the perspective of Mann’s framework. However, as existing models of late imperialism revolve around Economic Imperialism with the occasional employ of “civilization” as a legitimating rationale, reconciling genuine ideological influence becomes problematic.

Mann’s framework provides a robust theoretical model that can accommodate both the classical Economic Imperial models of colonialism and the ideologically influenced behavior of Confucian Colonialism. The application of Michael Mann’s framework of social power provides a unique insight into the colonial situation in Taiwan as well as a broader theoretical framework for Japanese colonialism in East Asia. The following chapter concludes this work with recommendations for future research as well as a discussion of how Mann’s framework when coupled with the empirical tools of Complex Systems Theory might be able to provide stochastic models of state behavior.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation has used secondary historical sources combined with the theoretical frameworks of World Systems Theory, Michael Mann, Philip McMichael and John Fairbank to explore the role that ideology may have played in the Japanese colonial enterprise in Taiwan.

Using existing theories of political economy a model of calculated colonialism was created based upon anticipated behavior of imperial states trying to maximize profit making and stability. This was then compared with a model of Confucian colonialism extrapolated from John Fairbank’s work on the Chinese World Order. These two models were then compared with Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan. While there were certainly economic elements to Japan’s colonial expansion, overall the behavior of the Japanese administration clearly possessed strong ideological elements that were inconsistent with Economic Imperial models. In particular Japan’s treatment of the Formosan aborigines and its heavy investment in educational infrastructure run contrary to the behavior of most Western states in Asia. This indicates that existing models of colonialism that cannot accommodate non-economic factors are insufficient and that more nuanced theoretical frameworks must be used.

This is where the work of Michael Mann becomes invaluable. Mann’s networks of social power are easily adaptable to historical context of the Japanese imperial experience. The fact that Mann has already applied his framework to late imperialism in a manner that is also unable to accommodate the historical reality of the Japanese imperial experience does not indicate a flaw in the framework, merely in the application (Mann 1993). His application is sufficient to explain

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33 The United States’ experience in the Philippines is the one exception to the statement regarding educational investment. It was the only Western power to invest heavily in education in the Asia Pacific region (Tsurumi 1977).
the economic nature of Western imperialism; however he assumes a decline of ideological power in the modern era that prevents thorough exploration of the influence of Confucianism in modern Asia.

The ideological influences on the Japanese empire are doubtless due to the historical particularities of the formation of the modern Japanese state. The overlapping networks of power exerting influence of the Japanese state contained strong economic and political influences from the West. However the underlying ideology of Japan remained Confucian and this continues to the present (Bell 2006). This influence also provided an ideological basis for Japanese aggression in the Second World War. Japanese Confucianism, as discussed in Chapter 2 was different from Chinese Confucianism in a number of ways. The Confucian bureaucracy in China had been divided into Civilian and Military wings of the administration, in feudal Japan the bureaucracy consisted entirely of military personnel. Thus, the educated elite had a strong militarist bent from the beginning, despite attempts at fostering a robust civilian government during the Taisho era the privileged position of the Japanese military ultimately led to the inability of the government to control the military (Barnhart 1988). The used Confucian rhetoric to justify its hostility to the civilian government by arguing that their loyalty to the emperor superceded their loyalty to the government and contemporary propaganda indicates that the militarist elements in the Japanese government accused the civilian administration of getting between the will of the emperor and the people (Benedict 2006).

Confucianism like any ideology can be used to justify a great many actions taken by the elite. However, when we examine the history of East Asia ignoring the Confucian influence on both feudal and modern states prevents us from accurately understanding the drivers of policy and administrative behavior. Confucianism was just as calculated as economic imperialism.
The implementation of State Shinto and the reification of the pomp and pageantry associated with the imperial family were calculated methods through which the ruling elites justified their position and legitimized their government (Kasahara 2002, Fujitaini 1998, Goto-Jones 2007). The maintenance of the Confucian hierarchy may not have been deliberate on the part of the Japanese oligarchs in Taiwan, however in this case it served them well.

The influence of the Confucian ecumene and its hierarchical nature provides a more contextualized view of the Japanese imperial experience. It can accommodate both the relative ease with which the Japanese were able to maintain and develop Taiwan as well as the problems they had in the administration of Korea (Kimura 1993 & 1995, Shin 1998 & 1999).

**Why Does This Matter?**

This case may prompt the reader to ask the question: “So what?” The argument for a more flexible tool in modeling political-economic systems may seem academic to some, especially when it is applied to historical cases. However, the case of Japan is particularly important as it represents an example of a rapidly modernizing state in East Asia where ideology and Western exposure combined to form a unique regional foreign-policy based in part upon historical regional patterns and in part on a contemporary geopolitical hierarchy.

The case of Japan here bears some resemblance to that of China in the past twenty years. More striking is the recent “Confucian Revival” mentioned in the introduction. Understanding the influence that Confucianism had on maintaining loyalty to the state and state legitimacy during the Japanese imperial period and how it was supported and encouraged by the administration both in the home islands and its colonial possessions may provide insight into future attempts by
the Chinese Communist government. Some similarities are quite clear between the Japanese Imperial administration and the Chinese Communist government:

1. Rapid Economic Development
2. Oligarchic Power Structure
3. Capitalist Economy
4. Focus on Stability over Freedom
5. Lack of Tolerance for Dissent
6. Multi-Ethnic State Composition
7. Strong Political and Economic Influences from Western Powers
8. Struggle for “sovereignty” against Western Powers\textsuperscript{34}
9. Violent revolution removed former regime from power
10. Strong Confucian influence in social structure, from family to state.

Understanding the nature of the Confucian ecumene and how active it is currently will assist researchers in modeling the behavior of the Asia-Pacific region and provide insight into the goals and desires of the Chinese Communist government. Furthermore recognizing the differences between Confucian democracy and Western democracy and the illiberal nature of human rights in Confucian states will provide a more robust and nuanced understanding of foreign relations (Bell 2006, MacAuslan 2009). In order to accomplish this there are several fruitful avenues which may be pursued based upon the research provided in this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{34} For China this refers to the West’s interference in what it considers “domestic” matters (i.e. its treatment of political dissidents or its view on human rights).
Recommendations for Future Research

The most obvious way in which this research could be broadened and improved upon would be to expand the scope of the research to include all of Japan’s colonial possessions and spheres of influence. By examining the various methods Japan used to administer Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and the Liaodong peninsula and comparing it to the administrations of the Sakhalin islands, Liu-ch’iu, and Hokkaido would be very useful. This research would provide scholars with knowledge of how the Japanese administration dealt with various ethnicities with varying degrees of incorporation into the previously existing Confucian World Order.

The administration of these territories could be compared in a variety of ways. Some of the most fruitful would include educational investment, treatment of indigenous aboriginal populations (where appropriate), types of administration (civilian vs. military) and the number and severity of uprisings. Such a comparison would provide us with a valuable understanding of how much of Japanese colonial policy can be generalized and whether or not Confucian foci of administration were used in traditionally non-Confucian regions.

One of the most useful comparisons would be between Korea and Taiwan. Both regions were held by the Japanese for a considerable length of time, and experienced similar, proportional levels of investment and emigration making them comparable in a number of ways. However, as noted above, the Japanese had considerable difficulty in the administration of Korea, whereas Taiwan was recognized has peaceful and stable colonial territory.

A second productive way to build upon this research would be to explore the Japanese colonial administration’s policies from the point of view of the colonial subjects. By analyzing the reaction of colonial subjects (both from the Japanese home islands and indigenous) to the
Japanese colonial administration, scholars can then compare the stated intentions of the colonial administration with the viewpoint of the subject population in order to determine how well administrations communicated with the citizenry. This would also allow us a contextualized view of what the subject populations felt was needed versus what the imperial power aimed at achieving.

Building upon Michael Mann’s framework would also be useful for the discipline of Sociology. It would be beneficial to develop an empirical method for applying his framework to existing social systems and developing falsifiable models of social behavior. This would be useful for the advancement of the discipline and provide future researchers with a valuable tool in the analysis of state behavior both historical and contemporary.
Appendix A: Description of provisional steps towards Formosan self-governance

“The Government-General is not affected by the present reforms, but its constitution presents certain features analogous to those of local units, which will be briefly mentioned. The sole executive authority rests with the Governor general, who may at his discretion consult his Advisory Council, the “Sotoku-hyogi-kai”, but is in no way bound by its views. This is an effete body, whose members are nominated by himself. It appears that under Mr. Nakagawa this council has seldom been called together, the view being held that its meetings involve waste of time and money in entertainment without achieving any useful result. It will however continue to exist in name, and it is possible that by the policy of some future Governor-General it may be revived in fact. The new system of local government will best be understood by building up from the bottom. In all cases the Governors and, unlike Japan, the Mayors have hitherto been and still remain officials appointed by the Government. The Town (Gai) and Village (Sho), administered by Mayors (Gaicho and Shocho). The lesser towns of Formosa to a total number of thirty-eight are known as “Gai”, while the “Sho” are the sub-divisions of the purely rural districts. These units have hitherto each had advisor councils (kyogikai), but all the members were nominated by the Government; the Mayor need not consult them, and was in no way bound by their advice. Under the new system to be enforced from October 1st next, the functions of the Councils remain advisory but their composition is altered. Fifty per cent of the members remain Government nominees, but the other fifty are elected by popular franchise. The vote is limited to Japanese subjects of the male sex, who are not less than twenty-five years of age, have resided within the district for at least six months, have an independent means of livelihood, and may at least five yen per annum in municipal land, family and business taxes. Under the family system no person, whatever his wage, is deemed to have an independent means of livelihood, who lives in the same
premises with a senior member of his family. Members of the councils are unpaid, and are elected for a period of four years. The “Gun”, controlled by the “Gunshu”. This is and will remain a purely administrative office, serving as a link between the Provincial Government and the smaller country units. No councils or assemblies of any kind are attached to it. The “City” (Shi). The nine larger towns of Formosa ran as cities, and it is here that the most interesting developments of the new system are to be found. Hitherto the City has been administered by a Mayor (Shi-in), a Government official – who like ther other Mayors and Governors had an Advisory Council, but was in no way bound by its advice. Under the new system to be enforced from October 1t next, the old Advisory Council (Shi-kyogikai) is replaced by a City Assembly (Shi-kai), half of whose members are government nominees, while the remaining half are elected by a franchise on the same basis as the franchise for the Town and Village Councils. But unlike the Town and Village Councils, the City Assembly has actual control of municipal bye-laws, the broad outlines of civic policy, an the municipal budget. It may also address memorials to the various executive departments of Government on any matters affecting municipal welfare. The Province (Shu). Formosa is divided into eight provinces, each administered by a Governor (Shu-chiji). At present he may at his discretion consult his Council (Shu-kyogikai), which like the others is nominate by himself and purely advisory. Unlike the Cities, Towns and Villages, the reformed system is not to be applied to the Provinces, until experiences has been gained in the working of the smaller bodies. It is supposed the extra delay will be about a year, but meanwhile the reforms contemplated have been made public. The “Provincial Assembly” (Shu-kai) will have the same executive control as the City Assembly, and half the members will be directly nominated by Government. The remaining half will be elected by the City Assemblies and town and Village councils within the Province from among their own number. As half of the
membership of these latter are already direct nominees of Government, it follows that the popular element in the Provincial Assembly shrinks in theory to 25 per cent, but its actual influence is likely to be further diminished by the indirect method of election. The government General retains the right to dissolve all assemblies and councils at will, while a further safeguard is provided by the ruling on the question of language. All election addresses must be in Japanese, and all proceedings o the Assemblies and Councils will be in Japanese. The only concession to the language of the vast majority of the population is that in the town and village councils the use of interpreters will be allowed “for the present.” even this concession is denied to the city and Provincial Assemblies which alone have executive powers, and it is clear that the compulsory use of a strange language must act as a powerful damper on the self-expression of the discontented elements. This ruling is in line with the Government's avowed policy of doing everything possible to induce the Formosans to adopt the Japanese language, but one suspects that it may at the same time become a source of irritation and discontent. The first elections for the new City Assemblies and the town and Village Advisory Councils will take place in November. The attitude of the Press to the reforms has not been unfavorable, but the press is too much under official control to be much guide to public opinion. So far as can be judged, Japanese opinion in the island, while still inclined to regard the whole scheme as ill-timed and undesirable, is resigned to the inevitable, and feels that, in view of the very extensive safeguards, things might be very much worse. Formosan opinion can be under no delusion as to the real value o the concessions, but would appear to welcome them as a useful initial step in the right direction. It will already have been apparent that the electorate forms only a very small percentage of the population. The latest newspaper estimates place the figure around 230,000. The total population of Formosa includes about 256,000 Japanese, 4,600,000 Formosans of
Chinese race, and 147,000 savages. Of the latter it may be assumed that none are eligible. Of the Japanese, after deductions for women, children, wage-earners living with senior members of their families, and officials disqualified by their profession (this includes police, some school teachers, and all local government officials), at most twenty per cent would be eligible, say about 51,000. This would leave somewhere about 179,000 Formosan electors, i.e. about 3.8 per cent of the whole. Finally, the newspaper estimate itself may well err on the high side. The distribution of the two races among the electorate must of course vary widely with the district. In recently developed cities like Keelung, the Japanese would be numerous, perhaps even a majority, and in all the cities their percentage must be fairly high. In the country on the other hand the Formosans would always far outweigh the ruling race, and one may surmise that in some of the remoter villages the only Japanese would be a handful of policemen and local officials, all alike debarred by their profession from exercising their vote. Here is one very evident reason for the more liberal attitude adopted in the treatment of the cities than in that of the towns and villages.”

(CR XXXIV)
Appendix B: Governors-general of Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabayama Sukenori</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>5/1895-6/1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsura Taro</td>
<td>Lt. General</td>
<td>6/1896-10/1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nogi Maresuke</td>
<td>Lt. General</td>
<td>10/1896-2/1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodama Gentaro</td>
<td>Lt. General</td>
<td>2/1898-4/1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samata Sakuma</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>4/1906-5/1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadami Ando</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>5/1915-6/1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akashi Motojiro</td>
<td>Lt. General</td>
<td>6/1918-10/1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den Kenjiro</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>10/1919-9/1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uchida Kikichi</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>9/1923-9/1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izawa Takio</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>9/1924-7/1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamiyama Mannoshin</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>7/1926-6/1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawamura Takeji</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>6/1928-7/1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishizuka Eizo</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>7/1929-1/1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ota Masahiro</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>1/1931-3/1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minami Hiroshi</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>3/1932-5/1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakagawa Kenzo</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>5/1932-9/1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobayashi Seizo</td>
<td>Admiral (Retired)</td>
<td>9/1936-11/1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasegawa Kiyoshi</td>
<td>Admiral (Retired)</td>
<td>11/1940-12/1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ando Rikichi</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>12/1944-8/1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chen 1970)
## Appendix C: Percentage of Government Budget Spent on Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Central Government</th>
<th>District Government</th>
<th>City Government</th>
<th>Town and Village Government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>0.88</td>
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<td>1901</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>0.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>0.81</td>
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<td>1904</td>
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<td>1905</td>
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<td>1907</td>
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<td>1908</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>0.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<td>1917</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1.26</td>
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## Appendix D: Per Capita Educational Expenditure

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Appendix E: The Confucian Ecumene

Mann explores the collapse of the Roman Empire through his networks of power using the concept of the Ecumene. He explains that the collapse was due to inherent contradictions within the imperial structure. Contradictions that were later resolved by Christianity and led to the formation of a Christian *ecumene*. Mann uses the term Christian *ecumene* to describe Christianity’s “transcendent power” meaning the ability of Christianity as the embodiment of ideological power in Europe to become the dominant form of social power for a given period in European history (1986). He argues that Christianity was able to resolve, at least in part, the five contradictions of empire that led to Rome’s collapse and because of this a new “empire” was constructed based upon ideological power that was able to transcend political boundaries.

The contradictions:

1.) Universalism vs. Particularism
   a. Empires strive to be universal in nature extending citizenship broadly when they are of a territorial nature, however this can undermine hereditary rule. This can be overcome by adopting a class structure.

2.) Equality vs. Hierarchy
   a. *Active* Universalism leads to perceptions of equality which undermine the authority of ruling elites.

3.) Decentralization vs. Centralization
   a. With weak infrastructure regionalism and private property can counterbalance tendencies toward centralization and provide alternative channels of power.

4.) Cosmopolitanism vs. Uniformity
a. Territorial empires contain large numbers of varying ethnicities. This leads to a non-uniform culture however much of the citizenry is excluded from officialdom. This can lead to a larger attachment to community than to empire.

5.) Civilization vs. Militarism

a. Empires expand through military power but also provide civilization. If military power weakens, since civilization is desirable the empire could be taken over by outsiders. Peaceful means for the spread of civilization becomes important.

Confucianism also resolves the five contradictions of empire. Or perhaps it would be more correct to state that the structure of the Chinese Empire differed from that of the Roman Empire in such a way as to render some of these contradictions irrelevant. The territorial Chinese Empire strove for universalism in a manner not unlike that of the Roman Empire, and a class structure was indeed employed for the maintenance of stability. The Confucian ideology codified and reinforced a class structure based around education, more than association by blood to the emperor. While the Chinese empire was semi-feudal in nature, there was less tension between Universality and Particularism since the path to power lay in the Civil Service Examination rather than through heredity. The ruling elite in the Chinese system was made up of bureaucrats placed into position through their performance on the examination, and while performance was certainly related to the position of the family in the social hierarchy the examination itself was open to all, and thus ostensibly allowed for social mobility alleviating some of the tension in Mann's first contradiction.

The examination system likewise resolves the second contradiction put forth by Mann. The perception of equality that Universalism inevitably leads to is certainly present in the Chinese
empire. However, the examination system allowed an outlet for these desires for equality. The fact that the Civil Service Examination was open to any Chinese citizen meant that the system itself had a built in means for accommodating Mann's second contradiction (Roberts 1999, Ebrey 1999).

The tension between the centralization required to maintain a large territorial empire and the alternate routes to power that develop in regions far removed from the imperial metropole is the third contradiction of empire. The Chinese empire wrestled with the same administrative difficulties as other territorial empires. However, it was the bureaucratic structure and the ideological hegemony of Confucianism and its values regarding education that prevented this tension from leading to imperial collapse. The examination system combined with the various tributary means employed by the Chinese empire (mentioned previously) allowed the imperial system to respond appropriately to this contradiction. In fact dynastic shifts were more often the result of corruption in the capital and military weakness than fragmentation caused by regionalism. The Confucian system also had a mechanism for coping with dynastic shifts that lent the empire as a whole a robustness lacking in its European counterparts.

Mann claims that the problem of cosmopolitanism vs. uniformity was non-existent in China due to the relative uniformity of the citizenry. He argues that the question of the imperial subjects was not “What community do I belong to?” but “Am I Chinese?”. This however fails to take into consideration the vastness of Imperial China and its relations with tributary states as far away as Thailand for which Confucianism served as the basis of communication and understanding.
By the Tang dynasty the Confucian ideology had spread throughout East Asia, extending northward to Korea, and Eastward to Japan. During this period the Chinese Empire established tributary relations with states throughout Asia (Roberts 1999). Even within China proper there were a multitude of ethnic groups, ranging from those closely related to the Han Chinese (like the Hui and Kejia, to those distinctly separate like the Miao). To be Chinese during the imperial period was to claim a common cultural background, not necessarily an ethnic background but a cultural and linguistic one. Subscribing to the Confucian ideology (regardless of religious beliefs) and being able to speak Chinese made one, in effect, Chinese (Fairbank 1973). There certainly was a tendency towards regionalism however, the Chinese idiom “The mountains are high and the emperor is far away” provides some evidence for that. Particularly in times of political weakness people were likely to rely on regional contacts and elites rather than more traditional centralized elites. Community had long been a part of the Chinese Confucian tradition, clan and one's position within the clan determined relative position in the social hierarchy. However, even loyalty to clan was tied to the Confucian values of filial piety and this by extension included loyalty to the empire and emperor. Even in times of fragmentation when citizens were likely to seek refuge in local communities, there was a nostalgia for the stability provided by empire. It was ideology that maintained the coherence of the Chinese empire, even through periods of instability (Fairbank 1973, Roberts 1999).

Mann's final contradiction of empire: the tension between the Military and Civilization, is also resolved by the nature of a Confucian Empire. As Fairbank points out China maintained its' position as cultural metropole even during periods of military weakness. It was the perception of China as the cultural cradle and as the final arbiter regarding matters of Confucian orthodoxy that secured the Chinese position as the most civilized state. Civilization in East Asia during this
period was associated with Confucianism, thus when China was conquered by foreign powers desiring the benefits that accompanied civilization, they only achieved success when they became Sinified. The ability of the Manchu to rule China and maintain the Chinese Empire was directly related to their ability to effectively become Chinese, or more accurately, to become Confucian.

China as the center of Confucian the Confucian ideology was clearly able to resolve the contradictions of empire. If we accept the basis of the contradictions laid out by Mann, and we accept that the Chinese Empire was Confucian in nature we can deduce from the tenure of the Empire that Confucianism was capable or resolving these contradictions. While the latter part of the Qing dynasty was a period of political and economic weakness brought on through economic hardships, foreign predation and internal instability, this is not a condemnation of Confucianism but rather an example of a weakened state’s inability to cope with external and internal strife.

Confucianism was a transcendent ideology similar in its effect on Asia to Christianity and its influence on Europe. The Confucian philosophy transcended geo-political boundaries and while initially spread by Chinese military conquest, the state philosophy of Confucianism dictated the nature of international relations. It was China’s dual role as ideological pole and military power that allowed it to dominate Asia. Confucianism served as a transcendent ideology that maintained China’s role as “civilizer” in distant states and territories. It was China’s role as the cradle of Confucian culture and civilization that allowed for the maintenance of a coherent empire without the need for the constant presence of military forces.

Using the concept of a Confucian ecumene is useful because it allows an exploration of the Japanese colonial process in a manner that maintains the strong ideological influence with the
geopolitical context Japan was operating within. Japan was the dominant power in East Asia, and since the Tokugawa period Japanese scholars had seen contemporary China as inferior to Japan (Irye 1998, Marshall 1995, Jansen 1988, Jansen 1968). The successful modernization of Japan and its recognition as a sovereign power, gave Japan the military and economic ability to usurp the position of metropole within the existing Confucian ecumene.

China was no longer the pole of the Confucian ecumene as it had demonstrated its inability to cope with Western encroachment, demonstrating its unwillingness to adapt and its military weakness. Japan had successfully incorporated the Western sciences with a Confucian ethical system to produce a modern Confucian state capable of standing on its own against the Western powers. The existence of the “Greater Asia Movement”, the colonial policies in Taiwan (and less successfully in Korea), and Japanese designs on Vietnam can be seen as an attempt by Japan to usurp China’s previous dominance and establish a “modern Confucian ecumene”, one which held true to the ethical basis of the prior ecumene but was coupled with the military and economic strength that came with modernization.

The maintenance of the Confucian system was not only inevitable due to Japan’s position within the Confucian ecumene but also expedient in the colonization of Taiwan as it capitalized upon a similar ethical discourse. The monotheistic, individualistic nature of the Western religions were indeed alien to China (Roberts 1999), while the flavor of Japanese Confucianism was different from that practiced in China, the underlying orthodoxy was the same and provided a common moral background which ruler and ruled could draw upon.
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