

THE CHANGE OF SOUTH KOREAN IMAGE OF
NORTH KOREA AFTER THE COLD WAR:
IDENTITY, IMAGE, AND POLICY

By

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Abstract

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There has been a change in image of North Korea after the Cold War. The image of North Korea as the evil enemy during the Cold War still holds its value, but another image of North Korea, ally has rapidly gained in strength. This dissertation examines why there has been a change in image of North Korea by South Korea. Tajfel's social identity theory provides an explanation for hostility during the Cold War as well as for reconciliation during the post-Cold War between the two Koreas. Based on the concept that identity is socially constructed, and the further assumption that individuals engage in a continuous attempt to enhance social identity for self-esteem and pride, this dissertation intends to

examine the changed social context and resulting political discourse. My hypothesis is that for South Korea, rapid economic development, democratization (anti-military dictatorship), and information flow through globalization and internet use have caused a change in self-identity resulting in a change in the image of North Korea held by South Korea. Cottam's image theory is used to investigate this change. The image change of North Korea results in different South Korean policy behaviors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	v
LIST OF TABLES	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of Problem	1
Existing Literature	4
Social Identity Theory	7
Nationalism	17
Image Theory	19
Self-image	23
South Korean Self-image and Strategic Choice	28
Self-image and Images of Others	30
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	35
Image Change and Policy	44
Factors that Cause the Change of Image	46

Hypothesis.....	55
Methodology.....	57
3. KOREAN IDENTITY AND NATIONALISTIC VALUES.....	63
Common Creation Myth.....	68
Geographical Location.....	72
Language.....	76
Religion.....	79
Technological Innovation.....	84
Culture.....	86
4. THE IMAGE OF NORTH KOREA AS ENEMY (1948-1987).....	99
Threat or Opportunity.....	99
Domestic Developments and Images.....	101
Capabilities and Intentions.....	109
Capabilities and Intentions from 1953-1987.....	115
Political Structure and Leadership 1961-1987.....	124
Conclusion.....	135
5. THE IMAGE OF NORTH KOREA AS ALLY (1988-2000).....	139
Threat or Opportunity.....	139

Domestic Developments and Images.....	147
Capabilities and Intentions.....	153
Political Structure and Leadership.....	160
The Emergence of New Outgroups.....	171
Conclusion.....	176
6. CONCLUSION.....	178
Three Theories.....	178
Four Hypotheses.....	186
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	198

LIST OF TABLES

1. <Table 1> Images.....	20
2. <Table 2> Images and Strategic Preferences.....	29

Chapter One

Introduction

1. Statement of Problem

In an effort to bring peace and prosperity to the Korean Peninsula, the historic project of reconnecting the railroad between South Korean Capital of Seoul to the North Korean city of Shinuiju that borders with China began with the ground-breaking ceremony on September 18, 2000. President Kim Dae Jung said that “the severed Seoul-Shinuiju Railroad reconstruction is a milestone marking the end of Cold War hostilities and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula” (Korea and World Affairs, 2000: 681). The restoration of the railroad was believed to contribute to economic progress in the Korean Peninsula by combining South Korean capital and technology with North Korean labor and resources. The project finally materialized on the 17th of May, 2007 when the historic test run of trains crossed the inter-Korean border.

It took fifty-six years to reconnect the railroad between the two Koreas. What seems normal now, such as train crossings of the inter-

Korean border, was unthinkable during the Cold War in which the two Koreas participated. The Korean Peninsula was the place of superpower rivalry. South Korea was the client state of the United States, while North Korea was the equivalent state of the Soviet Union.

The involvement of superpowers contributed to the shaping of the confrontation between the two Koreas. The United States played a role in supporting part of the South Korean leadership that was against Communism. The first president of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, was chosen because of his stance against communism. In the beginning of the Cold War, due to a lack of national power, each Korea wanted to absorb the other with the help from a superpower, which in turn desired to extend the sphere of influence in the Korean Peninsula. Weak client states relied heavily on superpowers for economic aid and military assistance for their survival and the possibility of unification in their ideological rivalry.

South Korea before the Korean War viewed the North as an arch enemy and desired to unify the two Koreas by force. The National Security Law, which still exists, was established in the December of

1948 to prohibit any activities that are presumed to be attempts to subvert the South Korean government. Since North Korea was a threat to the survival of the South, South Korea considered activities against the South Korean government as procommunist activities and dealt with them severely based on the National Security Law, which prohibits activities related to subversion of the government. The hope of the Korean unification turned out not to come true when the armistice treaty was signed at the end of the Korean War, resulting in the division of the Korean Peninsula. The acts of hostility and brutality during the Korean War exacerbated the preexisting image of each other, with an increase of emotional elements and experiences. Frequent military incursions, kidnapping, and terrorism by the North after the Korean War solidified South Korea's existing image of North Korea as examples of North Korea's hostile intention of unifying the Korean Peninsula by force.

This dissertation intends to examine how and why the South Korean image of North Korea changed over time. During the Cold War, South Korea regarded North Korea as a diabolical enemy, but beginning in the late 1980s, South Korea began considering North Korea as a

troubled partner to coexist with. Each image has produced distinct South Korean foreign policies toward North Korea; the image of North Korea as an enemy resulted in the policy of containment during the Cold War and that of North Korea as a troubled partner produced the policy of the Sunshine Policy of reconciliation and cooperation during the post Cold War era.

2. Existing Literature

The causes of the change in the South Korean image of North Korea over the two decades after the Korean War can be found in the study of dynamic and rapid developments in and around the Korean Peninsula. The external settings around the Korean Peninsula have undergone a change such as the collapse of the USSR. The dominance of ideology as a center of foreign policy between the Koreas has dissipated. Internally, South Korea has experienced remarkable economic development, successful democratic transition, and globalization. There is literature that deals with these changes, accomplishments, and the analysis of the impacts on the future of the

Korean Peninsula. It is fundamental to understand the phenomena as a whole and as a continuum, not as separate parts, as most of the literature has done. At its core, the process of understanding and explaining the change inevitably involves the Korean identity and its change.

Social identity theory provides us with a tool to understand the change in the Korean identity over time. Nationalistic leaders facilitate change in the Korean identity. Nationalism, thus, becomes an essential component of understanding the change in identity. Image theory is useful in determining the change in image and its resulting policy. When a leader holds a certain image over others, his/her foreign policy decisions are patterned in preconceived ways.

The theories to be drawn upon in analyzing the change of image in South Korea are social identity theory, nationalism, and image theory. These theories are used to investigate my hypotheses that image changes over time in social conditions wherein threat or opportunity occurs. And, significant enhancement of self-image or identity relative to the target country serves to motivate change in the image held.

In social identity theory, the enhancement of self or ingroup starts

with group categorization. The enhancement of social identity leads to the increase in expectation level. If attainment is maintained at the previous level with the increase in expectation level, Davies' J-curve (1969) predicts that there exists relative deprivation. The higher the relative deprivation, the more unstable the country becomes. The relative deprivation is susceptible to nationalistic mobilization of prestige and pride that cause change in social identity. The change in social identity leads to change in the categorization of outgroup, which then helps to form another image, possibly a pre-existing image, which has been dormant but can now be used for fostering national grandeur. Political structure that can accommodate or take advantage of the changed social identity enables to reduce relative deprivation. Nationalistic leaders then can further enhance social identity for their popularity and control. Image theory uses variables and attributes that are available through research in examining the connection between image and policy pattern. Thus, the change in image is ultimately reflected in altered policy behaviors.

The key concepts that connect social identity theory with image

theory are ‘self-identity’ in social identity theory and ‘self-image’ in image theory. These two concepts are both based on cognition, which “is central to understanding how people process information and understand the world around them” (Cottam et al., 2004:38). It focuses not only on how people perceive and process information as individuals, but also on how people behave as a group. The former includes attribution theory, consistency theory, and cognitive categorization such as stereotypes. The latter involves social identity theory and image theory. The former and the latter are not separate; rather, they are interwoven into a single process just as human activities are.

A. Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory holds that each individual pursues their inclusion in the group in which they find themselves in order to enhance their self-esteem, identity, and sense of security. This tendency to be in the group generates categorization as a group rather than individual. Members of the group (ingroup), thus, employ a collective view of members of out groups (outgroup) so that members of the outgroup are

viewed not as individuals, but as a group (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Tajfel (1970) postulated that “individuals are likely to act in a discriminatory manner whenever they are in a situation in which intergroup categorization is made salient and relevant” (Cottam et al., 2004:45). Saliency and relevancy in the process of intergroup categorization are important concepts because these contribute to the rise of conflicts in times of threat or opportunity.

The road to conflict starts with categorization, which involves discrimination toward outgroups. The process of discrimination inevitably results in mistrust, which strengthens the negative perception of a target country. The South Korean view of North Korea was negative during the Cold War because the categorization process generally tends to absorb information that is consistent with the image previously held. When motives behind public gestures of North Korea are questionable, South Korea sticks to their meaning and processes information based on the previous image of North Korea as an enemy. In such an environment, the elements of mistrust and perceptions of hostile intentions are susceptible to ‘security dilemma’ (Jervis, 1976). In

addition to the exaggerated differences as a result of the categorization process, political leaders utilize sources from historical antagonism and past experiences to provoke a perception of threat (Fisher, 1990; Pruitt, 1965; Rothbart, 1993). The presence of a threat plays a role in strengthening ingroup cohesion while discriminating the outgroup.

The relationship between groups can become hostile only if there is a common dispute and relevancy. In the perspective of the United States and Korea, the United States and Korea were an ingroup during the Cold War, while the Soviet Union and North Korea were an outgroup. The Korean War served as a dispute that the outgroup was consistently categorized as that of enemy. After the Korean War, North Korea was considered as an enemy by South Korea because of the perception that North Korea would attack South Korea again, should the opportunity arise. North Korea as a comparison group was relevant because it posed a direct threat to the survival of South Korea.

Categorization does not result in a hostile relationship between ingroup and outgroup. Even if there exists a hostile relationship between groups, it is still possible to have a change in categorization

when the old categorization no longer holds its effectiveness or draw support from the public. Creation or realization of a new dispute and relevant comparison group could make pre-existing categorization obsolete. For example, after the liberation from Japanese occupation, Korea categorized Japan as hostile, inhumane, and brutal. The Korean War changed the meaning of Japan as a reluctant partner in the US-led world community. South Korea reached an agreement with Japan by signing the Normalization Treaty in 1965 and received \$800 million, in a combination of grants and low-interest loans, as reparations from Japan (Oberdorfer, 2001:34). Consequently, South Korea replaced Japan with North Korea as the greatest enemy in the South Korean perception.

The process of change in relevant comparison groups and a dispute can be initiated either endogenous or in combination of endogenous and exogenous actors. The Genocide in Rwanda provides an example of the influence of an endogenous factor. In the case of the genocide in Rwanda of 1994, extremist Hutus compared themselves with Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Extremist Hutus were not satisfied with the outcome of the presidential election in July 1994. By provoking

historical injustice exercised by the Tutsis during the Belgian colonial rule from the end of WWI to 1959, the Hutus mobilized themselves with a militia known as the *Interahamwe* and conducted mass killings of the other ethnic group when faced with a threat of losing or sharing power. Though there was a history of foreign influence in Rwanda, the ethnic groups that were involved in the genocide were mostly internal actors. Rwanda was overpopulated and one of the poorest countries in Africa. When faced with the life or death decision either joining the *Interahamwe* or not, most Hutus chose to take part in the massacre (Peterson, 2000:247-303). The Hutu leadership was a main initiator of this genocide.

An example of both endogenous and exogenous influences can be found in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians realized the opportunity for independence and for their own unity and wanted to take advantage of that opportunity because they identified “a realistic cognitive alternative” (Cottam et al., 2004:205). Having seen the UN and NATO come to help the Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo Albanians used the analogy and related the instance to their cause. Kosovo Albanians perceived that it would

be better for them to declare and achieve independence. External circumstances were critical in the process of decision-making and so were internal factors such as the rise of nationalism and the change in the image of Serbia.

Another example of both endogenous and exogenous influences that played a role can be found in Korea after the World War II. Hypothetically, Korea in the 1950s without superpower involvement was likely to become a communist country partly due to the fact that bitter historical experiences with Japanese and Korean collaborators. Those Korean collaborators who worked for Japan at the expense of the majority of the Koreans were considered as objects of condemnation by nationalists and intellectuals who naturally leaned toward the ideology of communism (Cumings, 2005). At the time, landlords who cooperated with Japan owned most of the wealth in Korea, while peasants suffered harsh treatment, such as extraction of labor, under Japanese rule. Public dissatisfaction with landlords was high. The involvement of superpowers presented South Korea with a new comparison group of North Korea instead of fierce hostility toward Japan. The perception of

threat coming from North Korea was more imminent and significant than the Korean image Japan as enemy. As a consequence, the image of enemy shifted from Japan to North Korea. Korea in the 1950s was, thus, exposed to both internal and external influences in the change of the relevant comparison group and a dispute.

This dissertation focuses on domestic factors and the relationship between the rise of social identity by identity enhancement and the categorization process. Domestic developments in South Korea can be an excellent example of social identity theory. Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) identified individual reactions to threatened or negative identity; social mobility, social creativity, and social competition. Before the establishments of the two Koreas, Koreans moved to a place where they felt strong attachments or identity. Intellectuals who were not satisfied with Syngman Rhee left South Korea to join forces with North Korea. It was a period of social mobility and was possible because the border along the 38th parallel was open for traffic. After the two Korea's establishments of government in 1948, it was a period of social competition. Each wanted to win the hearts of people by

providing security and material wealth. When the South was militarily and economically weak compared to the North from 1948 to the end of the 1970s, it employed social creativity of “comparing the in-group to the out-group on a different dimension” as ideology (Cottam et al., 2004:47).

There is, however, a scarcity in literature concerning how to take into account the change in the process of social identity over time. For example, there is not much discussion about the results of social competition. What happens when one group appears to win the rivalry? Does one group simply accept the result or continue to employ the process of social creativity? Instead of focusing on one group’s categorization of a target group chronically, studies emphasize temporal effects of the group comparison process. The identification of bias effects toward outgroup, ingroup cohesion, and outgroup discrimination were the main topics of research in social identity theory (Brewer, 1979; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Linville & Jones, 1980; Rabbie & Wilkins, 1971; Tajfel & Billig, 1974).

This is partly due to the lack of case studies to delve into. Most

theoretical findings were from group experiments, which are important and insightful, but possess a limitation in the long term effect of the theory and its applications to the real world. In another way, even if there are case studies, it is difficult to approach them methodologically because it would take too long and costly to simulate the change in the real world in an experimental setting.

For social identity scholars, the contextual factor has often been simplified by focusing upon perception in times of opportunity or threat. The end product of perception matters to the theorists, while the process of change in social identity was not fully appreciated because perception of threat or opportunity shaped the behavior of group, not the process. It is rather easy to determine the outcome of group comparison if one notices behavioral patterns such as conflicts. Changes that are short of becoming such conflicts are also important and should be examined to further prevent conflicts from occurring. After all, it is better to understand the process and to be cautious of the development so that one can react before the undesirable outcome takes place.

One of social identities that contribute to this issue is

superordinate identity. As Sherif has shown in his “Summer Camp” studies, the idea of having a greater identity benefiting both ingroup and outgroup is the source of self-enhancement for both groups (1966). In other words, “the awareness of alternatives enhances group self-image, increases the salience of group membership, and leads to increased mutual ethnocentrism” (Turner and Brown, 1986:108). The creation of superordinate identity, however, does not always contribute to the resolution of conflicts. First, it depends on contextual factors of prior history of cooperation, competition, or independence in creating the atmosphere of superordinate identity (Worchel et al., 1975). Second, such contextual factors do not always ensure the development of a superordinate identity because people sometimes are reluctant to change their ingroup to a superordinate group for no specific reason (Blake et al., 1964). These shortcomings, however, can be overcome by assigning distinctive roles, which contribute to the promotion of friendliness towards outgroup (Brown and Wade, 1987). Thus, the success of creating a superordinate identity relies on three factors: history of cooperation, people’s willingness, and role specification.

B. Nationalism.

Nationalism is a radical form of superordinate identity from the perspective of the minor identities within a nation state. Nationalistic leaders who realize the benefits of national mobilization consolidate power by appealing to the people with nationalistic values. Various identities within a nation are absorbed into national identity as a whole because it provides a sense of national grandeur, security, and power. Nationalism is, however, different from superordinate identity in an international setting because nationalism is itself a strong ingroup attached to their nation and nationalists give their primary loyalty to their perceived nation. Nation states become ingroup and other states become outgroup. In other words, group comparison between ingroup and outgroup begins, and sometimes leads a country into conflict with other countries. Superordinate identities, however, are to serve the role of reducing the source of tension and conflict by benefiting both ingroup and outgroup. It is more flexible and benign, thus used for conflict resolution.

Nationalism is composed of nationalists, emotion as a catalyst, and government as an enforcing mechanism. Nationalists who live in a territorial boundary are members of ingroup and try to enhance self-esteem in the area of “the unity, independence, dignity, and well-being of the national community and the nation state” (Cottam et al., 2004:192). Because of the fact that social mobility is almost non-existent, “the permeability of group boundaries” is restricted (Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1990). To overcome this lack of opportunity of self-enhancement by joining a different or better group, nationalists are motivated to find sources of pride in a “common heritage” and a “common destiny for the future” (Emerson, 1960:95).

Emotional involvement makes nationalists overreact to a threat or an opportunity and motivate them to “consider the option to expand state influence at the expense of others” (Cottam et al., 2004:193). Emotion requires the sense of prestige and higher status in excessive form. Global recognition is a way of enhancing national pride. Economic development and winning international sports competition are other sources of national joy and happiness. Leaders are equipped with tools

such as media, agenda setting, and bureaucracy to fill this emotional need by taking risks in acquiring and defending national interests in association with politics.

Government leaders are given necessary means and they are capable of mobilizing the population with symbols and historic events to promote nationalistic values of independence, unity, and dignity. The presence of outgroup or the creation of outgroup “was sufficient to increase group members’ adherence to their own group’s norms” (Cottam et al., 2004:193-4). Government leaders are aware of the group’s norms and act accordingly to promote positive attributes of the image.

C. Image Theory

The political behaviors in a nationalistic country depend on the policymakers’ image of other countries. Images act as perceptual filters “that organize our environment and enable us to predict and respond to that environment” (Cottam, 1994:10). Image influences how policymakers form and carry out their strategic goals. Thus, the change in social identity and image of others can be examined by image theory

because it is a political and psychological approach that connects images with political behaviors (Cottam et al., 2004). The change in the image is manifested in the change in foreign policy.

<Table 1> Images

	Capability	Culture	Intentions	Decision Makers	Threat/ Opportunity
Enemy	Equal	Equal	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
Barbarian	Superior	Inferior	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
Imperialist	Superior	Superior	Harmful	A few groups	Threat
Colonial	Inferior	Inferior	Benign	Small elite	Opportunity
Degenerate	Superior/ equal	Weak- willed	Harmful	Confused, differentiated	Opportunity
Rogue	Inferior	Inferior	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
Ally	Equal	Equal	Good	Many groups	Threat

Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology* 2004:45

Image is “similar to a stereotype in that it provides the perceiver with a body of knowledge about the perceived item” (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:88). As shown in <Table 1>, when policymakers hold the enemy image, the target country is equal in capability and culture, while its intentions are harmful and decisive because it is ruled by a small elite. (Cottam et. al., 2004:45).

Martha Cottam's *Images and Interventions: US Policies in Latin America* (1994) examines US policy towards Latin America. The images of the US toward Latin America are not specific sets of values, but are "bundles of cognition organized as images of types of states" (Cottam, 1994:10). Images of countries in Latin America are dependent or colonial, because they are viewed as "childlike people, incapable of making and implementing decisions without guidance from one's own state" (Cottam, 1994:10-11). As image theory stated, policymakers in the US used coercive intervention in conflicts toward the countries of Latin America.

Images have an impact on the US-Mexico relationship with respect to drug enforcement. Martha Cottam and Otwin Marenin examine the conflicting nature of the problem between the two countries. They argue that "difficulties in trans-national cooperation are caused, in the main, by conflicting evaluation of the causes and impacts of the drug problem, competing nationalisms in the U.S. and Mexico, and perceptual imagery" (Cottam and Marenin, 1999:209). The US has had a dependent or colonial image of Mexico, while Mexico perceives the U.S. in the

imperial image, which most Latin American countries have held as well. Because the dependent image is defined as “weak in capability, culturally backward, good intentions but incompetent and also run by a small elite,” the US is predicted to “instruct the colonial people” because countries with the dependent image are believed by the US not to be trusted to run their own affairs (Cottam and Marenin, 1999:217). Another example of images and policies between the U.S. and Mexico is in the certification process of authorizing transactions of the U.S. monetary funds to countries that are cooperative with the U.S. in narcotics control (Cottam and Marenin, 1999:224).

After examining the relationship between the US images of El Salvador and the USSR and Ronald Reagan’s policy toward these countries, Blanton (1996) argues that US policy was tied to Reagan’s images of both the USSR and El Salvador. Because the US held the enemy and the dependent images of the Soviet Union and El Salvador, respectively, Reagan implemented aggressive policymaking and support for right-wing forces within El Salvador. During the decision making process, Blanton found Reagan’s positive self-image of the US.

According to Blanton, the “interaction of the dependent image with the self-image often results in the perceiver closely identifying with the dependent. The dependent is seen as inferior to the perceiver’s state and is therefore viewed as needing its careful guidance” (Blanton, 1996:26).

Blanton’s finding is significant because it shows that the role of self-image has an impact on images of others. Reagan’s positive self-image of the US has been consistent during his policy toward El Salvador. The US has maintained its positive self-image since achieving its status as a superpower, or possibly even early. Although, for countries like South Korea, the self-image has shifted from negative, as one of the poorest countries in the world after the Korean War, to positive, as the twelfth largest economy in the world. The change of the South Korean self-image must be examined further to discover the role in the formation of images toward other countries.

3. Self-image

The change in self-image as nationalists form ingroups within a

nation state can be either from positive to negative, or from negative to positive. Nationalistic governments and leaders constantly feed the ingroup with information about how proud and capable they are compared to the past by directly or indirectly controlling and manipulating symbols and the source of information. When tangible evidences are hard to find, such as economic growth and winning international competitions, nationalistic leaders still boast public self-esteem with their spiritual, ideological superiority, or a common heritage. So, it is likely that ingroup normally feels that their self-image is better than before, and superior to outgroup. The sense of a positive self-image can lead ingroup to identify their power instruments (Cottam, 1994:25).

Although there is a general trend of improving self-image, there is also cases of self-image deteriorating. When there are times of unchangeable negative self-image, people decide to submit to those who they see as more powerful (Bandura, 1981). Thus, for social competition to begin, two states should be relatively equal in power, and have hostile intentions towards each other. If the gap is too big to overcome, the competition of improving self-image is less convincing

and persuasive for ingroups.

The psychological perception of a positive self-image comes from two different sources; power and control (Cottam, 1994:24). Power is considered to be the ability to mobilize and exert influence on others. It can include materialistic assets such as economy, military, diplomacy, and natural or human resources. It can also include the non-material assets such as morale, religion, history, and culture. Both materialistic and non-materialistic assets can be employed to show the willingness to creatively solve impending problems. Nationalist governments strive to increase their degree of power. The notion of having control over issues with powerful instruments encourages nationalists to “directly tackle or confront adverse events...and this promotes a confrontative rather than a repressive response to stress” (Taylor, 1989:132).

Power is a relative and psychological concept. When it is mixed with nationalism, power is the source of pride and national prestige. Anything that promotes national grandeur is symbolized with political purpose. In the case of South Korea, economic growth was a symbol of success and pride. The growth in Gross National Product (GNP) helps

to increase military spending, which is an effective instrument of national power. In addition, official diplomatic relations with foreign countries powered by the growth of economy increased dramatically at the end of 1980s.

Government bureaucracy was able to control the self image to an extent as South Korea faced challenges and mounting pressures from both home and abroad. A high level of social competition against North Korea for regime survival required top-down bureaucracy for efficiency since its establishments in 1948. This political structure allowed the South Korean government to completely control South Korea much more like the Weberian bureaucracy during Park Chung Hee's rule (Wilson, 1989:334). As social competition remained intense and emotional, South Koreans became less aware of it. The process of social competition becomes a normal routine in everyday life. With changes in domestic settings due to economic development, South Koreans started looking for a better and different life-style with more freedom and political changes. Public awakening to reality due to education and the increase in the amount of information flow challenged the existing values of the growth

driven economy-oriented government leadership.

When a government fails to accommodate those views or effectively suppress them, control becomes obsolete and those who value the freedoms of religion, press, and political participation more than economic growth, form opposition to government policies. Nationalist governments become defensive and hostile towards those who threaten governmental legitimacy. In a sense, economic growth serves the government for legitimizing purposes because of the rise in living standards, but at the same time it provides sources of dissatisfaction in society because of the issues of labor extraction and violations of human rights (Clough, 1987:61-62).

The end of military bureaucratic rule as well as the democratic and peaceful transition from military to civilian government allowed South Koreans to become more participatory in South Korean politics. The passive and obedient model of citizenship has changed to a dynamic and active pursuant of higher values in democracy. South Koreans were exposed to a vast amount of information through travel, education, and the Internet. Self-image restricted to a comparison group of North

Korea was exposed to that involving much broader comparison groups. People want a different self-image of South Korea that exists in the world, not just one confined to the Korean Peninsula.

With increases in the power from industrialization and democracy, people naturally tend to desire more control of their destiny or future. Sovereignty and independence become important to the minds of people. Insults or aggressive behaviors by other states provoke nationalistic sentiment to become cohesive and make people willing to make sacrifices for their nation (Searle-White, 2001). Government leaders are aware of such provocation and sometimes abuse it for political control.

4. South Korean Self-image and Strategic Choice

South Korea has gained a positive self-image. South Korean self-image has been boosted due to economic development, democratization, and globalization. Coupled with nationalism, the image of the North has changed from the enemy image to colonial or dependent. Economically inferior and diplomatically isolated North Korea became a neighbor that

badly needed help to exist in the global community. The change in the South Korean self-image, thus, causes change in the perception of North Korea in the post Cold war era and is discussed further in detail in Chapter 4 and 5.

<Table 2> Images and Strategic Preferences

Images of Other Political Actors	Threat/Opportunity	Strategic Preference
Enemy	Threat high	Containment
Barbarian	Threat high	Search for allies, augment power
Imperialist	Threat high	Submit/revolt when possible
Rogue	Threat moderate/low	Crush
Degenerate	Opportunity high/moderate	Challenge, take risks
Colonial	Opportunity high	Control, direct, exploit
Ally	Threat/opportunity (Will help in either context)	Negotiate agreements Common strategy

Cottam et al., *Introduction to Political Psychology*, 2004:52

This dissertation intends to examine this process by evaluating strategic preferences after the Cold War as shown in <Table 2>. During the Cold War, South Korea held the enemy image of North Korea and the strategic preference, therefore, was containment. During the post-Cold

War period, the enemy image of North Korea has changed to either Colonial or Ally implying that South Korea wants to control or to negotiate with North Korea as a negotiable partner.

5. Self-image and Images of others

As mentioned earlier, self-identity and self-image are important concepts in the development of the theory of image change. Cottam argues that “the organization of issues depends greatly upon the trends in images of self and others” (Cottam, 1992:92). Kenneth Boulding also mentioned that images of self and others could have an influence on the foreign policymaking process (1956). This dissertation assumes and has argued that “self-image” in image theory is closely connected to “self-identity” in social identity theory. By identifying these two concepts together, it is possible to explain changes in self-image and self-identity as well as images of others.

First, self-identity in social identity theory provides explanations for the change in self-identity because social identity theory assumes continuous individual pursuit of a higher identity when the environment

allows. To achieve a positive image in their group, people tend to engage in “group-enhancing biases or distortions when faced with a threat to their collective identity” (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990:51). When the self-image of the country is not positive, such biases are less likely to occur.

South Korea improved its self-identity. During the Cold War, South Korea was dependent both militarily and economically on the US. Before the end of the Cold War, South Korea achieved remarkable economic development, which fostered increases in defense expenditure. South Korea has also made a successful transition from dictatorship to democratic government. When faced with the collapse of the North Korean regime in the 1990s, with the realization of power and control, South Korea was determined to “directly tackle or confront adverse events” such as the difficult problem of unification with North Korea (Taylor, 1989:132). It is a significant departure from previous practices such as relying on the US for security in the Korean Peninsula. In the perspective of the US, the self-image of the US has not been changed as drastically as South Korea and, thus, the image of South Korea still

remains as dependent or colonial (Cottam, 1992). This perception gap is viewed by some scholars as the cause of the friction between the two countries in the area of weakening military alliances (Cha, 2002; Sanger, 2006).

Second, because self-identity is closely related to self-image in image theory, a change in self-image as well as images of others can be examined with the help of image theory. The Korean self-identity during the Cold War was shaped by the Cold War ideology. The reliance of the South on the US for security was the best option available at the time. South Korea adopted the containment strategy of the U.S. against communist North Korea. North Korea was in fact more industrialized after the Korean War and a superior economy and military to South Korea until the 1970s. The watershed point came when Park Chung Hee successfully implemented an export-oriented economic structure. Under the US security umbrella, South Korea was able to enhance its self-image. The changed self-image resulted in a different policy toward North Korea, especially after the Cold War.

Another factor that involves the change of self-image is affect.

The role of affect in the self-image is significant because “the self-image is more affect-laden than are images of others” (Cottam, 1994:24). Although the position of affect has not been exactly located, it is believed that affect also plays a role in information processing and categorization in general. Thus, a positive emotional state enables positive information processing, while a negative emotional state causes negative information processing. The South Korean view of the North Korean as compatriots derives from a positive South Korean self-image internally and conciliatory North Korean behaviors toward the South. The current impending nuclear issue must be resolved quickly and peacefully to propel the process of reconciliation and prosperity. In addition, when the target group or person is easily categorized, the affect influences such process as image-based, but when the other is hard to be categorized, it causes the process to be more attribute-based (Fiske et al., 1987:403). The increase in positive information about self, thus, can be even more positive due to the role of affect.

In summary, the inertia of possessing positive self-esteem allows changes in self-identity, whose process can be catalyzed by affect. By

synchronizing the concept of self-identity with self-image, this dissertation aims to determine the changes in policy behaviors toward North Korea as they relate to the change of self image.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework

A change in the image of North Korea occurred after the Cold War. Public perception of North Korea as enemy is no longer dominant, but another image of North Korea as negotiable partner has rapidly gained its strength especially after the Cold War. This dissertation examines why there has been a change in the image of North Korea by South Korea. This dissertation uses social identity theory, nationalism, and image theory to examine causes of the change.

Based on the concept that identity is socially constructed and members within a group continuously strive to enhance social identity for self-esteem and pride, Tajfel's social identity theory provides explanation for hostility during the Cold War as well as for reconciliation after the Cold War in the relationship between the two Koreas. This dissertation intends to examine transformation in self identity in South Korea by focusing on both its social context over time and its resulting political discourse. My hypothesis is that for South Korea, rapid

economic development, democratization, and information flow through globalization laid the foundation for alteration in the South Korean self-identity resulting in the change in the image of North Korea.

The improvement in social identity is natural and can be achieved through the process of group comparison. Government leaders constantly feed the public with information that boosts legitimacy of their government with values of security, material wealth, ethnicity, and loyalty. The changes in social identity and self-image of South Korea, thus, are product of both intentional and unintentional elements within society. How to distinguish one from the other is not an easy task. It is, however, more important to notice that exercise of political power is closely associated with the changes in social identity. Political involvement plays a positive role in enhancing pride and prestige for people. Involvement of politics, however, contains psychological, illusionary, and emotional elements, that can inevitably lead a country into violence and conflict.

This dissertation intends to distinguish South Korean image of enemy toward North Korea during the Cold War from that of a partner

after the Cold War. The shift occurred from 1948 to 2000 during which six different Presidents of South Korea helped to form South Korean identity and its foreign policy toward North Korea. Critics, however, would argue that it is hard to distinguish social identities from one generation to another during the period because people in a certain generation do not completely disappear in the next generation. Actors of one generation can still play a role in the next generation. For example, the majority of the military leaders during the Cold War era with a strong belief and image of North Korea as enemy of South Korea have formed a powerful conservative force in current South Korean politics. Some of the executive leaders in the businesses who established strong ties with militaristic governments during the Cold War era still favor bureaucratic and militaristic governments over loose civilian government. They believe that North Korea is not worthy of trust and would not change unless there are strong external pressures. Thus, it is believed that the Sunshine Policy not only helps North Korea to overcome mounting domestic difficulties and regain their strength, but also wastes South Korea's opportunity to dominate the Korean Peninsula.

Critics are right in that there co-exist dual or multiple social identities in South Korea such as liberal groups of people who hold an image of North Korea as partner and conservative groups of people that view North Korea as an enemy. During the Cold War, conservative groups dominated South Korea, marginalizing liberal and progressive groups. After the Cold War, however, the situation has almost reversed. Groups that regard North Korea as compatriots emerged as dominant voices in South Korean politics and as a result weakened the conservatives and their view of North Korea. This momentum is to continue for a while.

This dissertation examines the gradual shift in governmental image and policy toward North Korea. By focusing on decision makers and their view of North Korea in the South Korean government, it is possible to code images of North Korea held by South Korean governments. The hypothesis that this dissertation has is that social contexts such as economic development, democracy, and globalization modifies existing social identity. An alteration in social identity subsequently leads to change in images and image theory provides tools

to measure image-based political behaviors.

Another critique is that social identities and nationalism are Western concepts, and they are not applicable to Korea. Korean culture and history are different from European or American culture and history where Western theories are originated (Kang, 1965). Their argument is valid in that culture and history are important variables in social identities and nationalism. Regardless of cultural and historical origin, however, common denominator is that a state strives to enhance the sense of national unity and prestige, which is similar to social identities (Cottam, 2004:192). As the social identity theory can be applied to diverse social conflicts in general, nationalism as a part of social identity is no exception. A nation state becomes an in-group and compares itself with other states to form a positive identity.

In consideration of extreme nationalism such as Germany during World War I & II, modern Korea has not been strong enough to exhibit violent nature associated with literature in nationalism. Critics can still challenge nationalism by questioning the uniqueness of traditional Korean history of non-aggressiveness. This, however, does not suffice the fact

that Koreans are as nationalistic as most European countries, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3. Koreans believe that they are unique and special and nationalism has been in the blood of the Koreans throughout the Korean history.

Lastly, critics would argue that it is hard to tell whether identity or image has changed or not because it is an on-going process. The starting and ending points of change in social identity are not as precise as natural sciences might be able to provide. For example, one can argue that the change in image of North Korea started in the 1970s, not after the Cold War, based on the first-ever negotiations between the two Korea. The details of these negotiations will be further discussed in Chapter 4, but it is clear that this political gesture was not “productive” (Clough, 1987:110). Another case is dealing with an inter-Korean summit, which was proposed during the Chun Doo Hwan administration in the 1980s. Some would argue that he initiated the process of reconciliation. It is true that the public was not happy with Chun’s authoritarian rule and called for more democracy during his tenure. But, he was not able to do so because he lacked legitimacy. Roh Tae Woo’s

decision to announce Northern Diplomacy deserves a credit to begin the process reconciliation. The landmark “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation” between the South and the North signed in December 1991 for the two Koreas to respect each other’s political systems and to never use force or threaten military action was a substantial departure from the previous negotiations because of its detailed agreements and sincerity.

Determining the exact timing of the change in social identity is not the focus of this dissertation. The focus is how change is brought about over time and what causes it. By identifying the initial South Korean image of North Korea as an enemy during the Cold War as well as the changed South Korean image of North Korea as a partner, this dissertation can serve the purpose of examining the causes of this shift. Although the exact timing of the change may not be clearly identified, it has occurred due to developments in domestic and international affairs. The analysis does not intend to predict the future of the two Koreas. It certainly does provide analytical tools in understanding political activities in the Peninsula, and projects ideas that are necessary to making North

Korea a reliable partner. After all, South Korean transition can be as close a model as North Korea can possibly follow. Though ideological rivalry during the Cold War stopped the two Koreas from exchanging ideas, they share ethnicity, common myths and history, culture, and language.

Though the main focus is on the South Korean developments, developments in North Korea cannot be ignored because social identity theory deals with the out-group. It is, however, difficult to assess capabilities, intentions, and political structure in North Korea partly because North Korea has been isolated after the Korean War in 1953 and partly because South Korea did not allow information regarding North Korea to spread in South Korea. The National Security Laws prohibiting any activities that presumed to tell antigovernment movements from emerging are still in effect in South Korea.

Without violating the National Security Laws, however, the Roh Tae Woo administration allowed inter-Korean trade for business interests that started in 1989. Since then, inter-Korean trade totaled 425 million dollars in 2000 (Department of Unification Home page). The

number of South Korean firms trading with the North is 581 as of the end of 1999(vol24, no1,). Personnel exchanges have slowly increased to 7,986 as of 2000 excluding tourists to Mt. Kungang in North Korea. Though the trade and exchange in personnel was lowest in numbers during the nuclear crisis of 1994, trend shows that the exchange in business and personnel has been on the gradual rise overall.

There are uncertainties in the future of the two Koreas. Denuclearization of North Korea is paramount. Domestic dissatisfaction with the Sunshine Policy is another. It is possible that South Korean presidents in the future will stay away from the course of reconciliation and cooperation. Even if the opposition party takes control of the government in 2008, the process of reconciliation and economic exchanges between the two Koreas is likely to continue, according to the new policy of North Korea in the main opposition party, *Hanara*, released on July 4, 2007. Despite nuclear threats, South Koreans no longer consider North Korea as an enemy. A survey conducted by Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) in 1999 shows that while 48 % South Koreans view North Korea more positively, 36.9 % of South

Korean view North Korea negatively (KINU, 1999:9). Positive perception contains South Korean views of North Korea as a partner to cooperate with and a partner to provide support to. Negative views are those that consider North Korea as a subject for animosity and watch. Both ruling party and opposition parties are aware of the public opinion in South Korea. It was natural for the main opposition party to soften its conservative stance of hard line policy toward North Korea. By distancing itself from the previous position of reciprocity, “no denuclearization, no economic exchanges,” *Hanara’s* new policy allows dealing with denuclearization and economic exchanges separately (The Hankyoreh, 2007).

1. Image Change and Policy

During the Cold War, because policymakers held the enemy image of North Korea, they came up with the deterrence policy. The end of the Cold War brought the change in image that replaced deterrence policy with unification policy. This dissertation examines the causes and effects of the change in the South Korean image of North Korea.

1. What caused the changes in the image of North Korea?
2. How will these changes impact policies?

Policymakers' image of a target country has been extensively examined (Blanton, 1996; Cottam, 1994; Herrmann, 1985). The image of one country over a period of several decades has been few. When one examines the image of one country over a period of time, such as a span of five presidencies in South Korea, change in image and factors that cause it can be analyzed. The case of North Korea is remarkable because the change in image was drastic in nature considering an enemy image of North Korea during the Cold War and a partner image of North Korea after the Cold War.

This dissertation begins with examining the first president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee and his image of North Korea. During the Cold War, South Korean Presidents maintained the image of North Korea as enemy throughout. Beginning with Roh Tae Woo in 1987, the South Korean image of North Korea has changed from an enemy to a troubled

partner to coexistence. This period is especially imperative to South Korea because it includes not only newly elected president, Roh Tae Woo and his leadership, but also the systemic factor of the collapse of the USSR ending the Cold War. This caused North Korea to lose its most reliable ally. Domestic developments in economy and democracy in South Korea enabled to take a initiative in South–North Korean relationships. Gradual improvements in relationship between the two Koreas ultimately led to Kim Dae–jung’s Sunshine Policy of reconciliation toward North Korea in 2000, which was a strict contrast to the policy of containment that thrived during the Cold War.

2. Factors that cause the change of image

The change of social identity and image involves factors that influence such phenomena. Social identity theory argues that a positive sense of identity derives from a favorable comparison with other groups (Tajfel, 1978). The comparison process is a deliberate attempt of differentiation from the other groups. Groups seek sources of pride that come from the past, present, and future (Brockelman, 1985; Heidegger,

1962). The past is about history, which is abundant with nationalistic values that promote uniqueness and superiority of race, ethnicity, and culture. Conway (1990), Freeman (1993), and Gillis (1994) argue that identity is not just about the past, but also about the future (Condor, 1996:303). Thus, the self identity of present in context contains elements of the past and future. For example, national grandeur in the past reminds current national governments to pursue equal or better status in the future. Nationalistic governments intentionally remind their people with a sense of superiority in the past and promise of better future to overcome their impending hardships and difficulties. Social identity, thus, is a continuum, connecting the past with the future. Nationalism plays an important role in the progression with nationalistic symbols and propaganda. This dissertation examines Korean nationalistic values in Chapter 3.

When one group is threatened or viewed negatively, but believes that there is a realistic chance to change the status quo, social competition is a way of reacting to that identity. Time becomes significant when social competition prolongs intense mobilization of

resources for survival and positive identity. Duration of time provides a room for change in such variables as capabilities, political structure, leadership, threat perception, education and generation gap. South Korea was able to overcome economic inferiority to North Korea by implementing the Five-Year Economic Development Plans since 1962 with supports from allies in financial aids and cheap domestic labor (Kih, 1984:138). For instance, Japan provided South Korea with “\$300 million in grants, \$200 million in government loans, and \$300 million in private commercial credits over a ten-year (1966–1975) period” (Koh, 1984:215). The average annual growth rate in real Gross National Product from 1962 to 1976 in which the third Five-Year Economic Development Plan ended was strikingly averaging more than 7.8 percent (Koh, 1984:34). The increase in GNP subsequently powered military expenditure. South Korean military expenditure was 20,474 million won in 1962 and steadily grew to 738,000 million won occupying approximately 30 % of total governmental expenditure during the period. As a result of social competition, South Korea increased its power and capabilities, which are viewed as sources of control (Levine & Moreland,

1998). The components of capabilities include economic characteristics, military strength, domestic political stability, effective policy-making and implementation, which will be utilized for further analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 (Cottam et al., 2004:44).

When a significant shift in power is apparent, an old image loses its dominance. For example, South Korean image of North Korea as the enemy lost its dominance after the Cold War because South Korea was more powerful economically, militarily, and diplomatically. A more detailed analysis of economy, military, and diplomatic relations will be in Chapter 5. A new image of partner begins to emerge when old image cannot address relevant issues in existing relationship. The Containment Policy of the Cold War was no longer applicable to North Korea when South Korea seized an opportunity to “open talks and trade with North Korea” (Cumings, 2005:477). Failure in policy and realization of it causes a new image to appear with a new approach. The first factor that contributes to the alteration in image is capability in case of South Korea.

Increase in capability is not alone in causing change in image.

Structural change in political system becomes important when the change is induced by public uproar. During the social competition between the two Koreas, South Korean political structure was authoritarian to achieve maximum efficiency in economy for survival (Kihl, 2005:50). South Korean society itself became one huge army. It was an ideal fit for rapid economic developments and at the same time served for politicians' grip on power. Gregory Henderson described it as a political "vortex," which is an "upward-sucking force active throughout the culture" (1968:193).

South Korea's heavy dependence on the world markets required human capital to respond accordingly to fluctuations in the world economy. These technocrats who received education from abroad were many in the government by the 1960s and knew how to direct economic activities (Cumings, 2005:317). The governments before globalization in 1990s intervened in the domestic markets to secure economic developments. During the course of economic development, "the authoritarian regime acted to repress and exclude certain popular sectors in civil society, denying their active and participatory role in

politics” (Kihl, 2005:50). Intellectuals, students, scholars, and religious leaders, who were relatively free of government control, accessed information that was critical to government policy and voiced such issues in society as human rights, democracy, labor protection, and growing disparity in income. Economic growth and travel abroad for business and study provided opportunities of experiencing outside world. The increase in the use of Internet in the 1990s further expanded chances of exposure to foreign cultures. Public demand for more freedom and democracy rose to a level that South Korean Government had to change its political structure. Roh Tae Woo’s decision to allow free election was the result of growing public awareness and its commitment to bring about change in political structure. The second factor that causes change in image is political responsiveness to its people. The South Korean tradition of “the politics of vortex” was proved to be wrong at least in this case (Henderson, 1968). Public dissatisfaction with the top stirred anxiety among them to change the system of South Korea’s ruling behavior to accommodate their voices.

Awakening of the South Korean public played a role in challenging

authoritarian rule. The change of course in government leadership starts with the realization that something went wrong in the previous administration and that there is a realistic chance to change the status quo. When the gap between what government leaders want such as economic growth and what the people want, for instance, democracy, grew, it reaches a point where social competition in the domestic politics kicks in between the government and groups of dissident people. If the government wins, the course stays the same at the moment. But, when groups of discontented people win, the course is likely to be altered toward democracy. In the era of democratic representation, political leaders have to follow public opinion. Presidential candidates set out goals to accomplish during their tenure to appeal to the public. Social comparison to the previous administration is unavoidable and necessary to positively distinguish them. One popular way is to stay away from the policy failures of the previous administration. Thus, the third factor is the change of leadership in the government. The leader of the South Korean government contributes to the shaping of foreign policy. Persuasion, not propaganda becomes important for decisive leadership

because gaining support from the public is prerequisite to his foreign policy. For example, the Weberian bureaucracy of South Korea clearly faced rising student demonstrations in 1987. Student leaders called for democratization, which became “the main political analysis in the 1980s” (Kihl, 2005:26). Once the change in the South Korean political structure of authoritarianism occurred in 1987 by allowing election, presidential candidates had to appeal to public need for change.

Persuasion begins with understanding others because government leaders are keen to public opinion. Because time provides changes in domestic landscape through economic development, democratic movement, and globalization, government structure has to evolve over time to respond to different and changing needs. Political systems have to adapt to accommodate changed social contexts to enhance pride and self-esteem, which inevitably leads to change in out-group comparison as a by-product. The fourth factor is the change in out-group. The group, once regarded as out-group, has to be recategorized according to the standard of culture, intentions, decision makers, and existence of threat or opportunity. During the process, nationalist political leaders

accumulate their power by emphasizing common fate, similarity, and proximity to consolidate public mind to make once-out-group to be included in as an entity (Campbell, 1958:14-24). The creation of a new out-group usually derives from historical experiences.

One of the main areas of change in the South Korean domestic social context involves a generation gap among different generations in the period of 1948 to 2000. Each generation has a different set of experience in the development of South Korean society as a whole. Some of them directly participated in the Korean War, while others scarcely heard about it. The world view for these two different groups is likely to be dissimilar. The sense of pride and prestige, therefore, comes from different sources. The young generation tends to be more independent and liberal-minded. Part of the reason is that they have been through a different system of education. Some of the teachers who have taught this new generation could have possessed ideas that are not consistent with those of old generation. The formation of Teachers Union in the late 1980s is an example of advocating different social values in education. Thus, the last factor that changes the image comes

from age and education.

3. Hypotheses

This dissertation intends to test four hypotheses. First, the change in image results in a change in policy. Image theory predicts policy outcomes based on the images held by policymakers. Thus, according to image theory, a difference in image should result in a difference in policies. In addition, it is meaningful to discuss the process of image change because world-wide environments tend to change in either the short term or long term due to globalization, which allows more interaction and interdependence.

Second, the change in image is influenced by the change in self-image. Because self image tends to lean toward the enhancement of self pride and prestige, self-image is naturally adjusted to variation in attributes to have a more positive view of self. When there is a gap between the improvements in positive self image and the devaluation in out-group image, it is likely that the widening gap can cause a change in image of out-group when the two groups are relevant and share a sense

of similar destiny. Politicians are, in turn, aware of such change and provoke public mind with nationalist values for more control and legitimacy.

Third, a newly formed image constantly struggles with the old image in order to maintain its dominance. As a result of this process, people who hold the new image regard the old image as threatening, and vice versa. The groups with the new image try to persuade the public with positive signs of their accomplishments, while those of the old image focus on negative aspects of the new image and its policy. When the public is weary of the groups with the new image, those of the old image can reclaim its dominance in foreign policy. But, drastic change would not occur because previous accomplishments still act as sources of pride and esteem. The change of image inherently involves competition between images at least in the initial stage of the image change phase, which may be a significant finding in image theory.

Fourth, a new and dominant image is not completely new because it originates from old images. A newly emerged image has been laid dormant when other images prevailed and surfaces when either threat or

opportunity arrives. The image of the enemy has existed for a long time in Korean history. Some Korean images of old Chinese kingdoms in history were as the enemy. Before the liberation of Korea from Japan, Japan constituted the image of the enemy or imperial for many Koreans. After the Korean War, North Korea became the enemy. Now, after the Cold War, North Korea has become a partner of South Korea. As the image of the enemy has existed throughout the Korean history, the images of partner and ally have also existed in the Korean minds. The failures in policy and realization of the irrelevance in dealing with issues require a new image. The process of shift in image involves political struggle between groups that do not share the same image with each other. Even when the object of image remains the same in this case of North Korea, the South Korean image of North Korea has changed. The changes in self or a comparison group causes change in self-image when self and a comparison group are relevant and have a common dispute to resolve.

4. Methodology

This dissertation focuses on only one case, which deals with South Korea and its policy toward North Korea. The chronic development of South Korean image toward North Korea can best be approached by a qualitative method, whose goals include “giving voice, interpreting historical or cultural significance, and advancing theory” (Ragin, 1994:83). Because the two Koreas have not been the main actors in international relations, the U.S. foreign policy toward the two Koreas has not been as important as toward neighboring major powers. For example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from its defense line in the Pacific on January 12, 1950, about five months before the Korean War. As the Melian debate illustrates, South Korea is surrounded by major powers, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan as Melos was cornered by Athens and Sparta. The Athenian reliance on pure military might to subdue the Melians cost them the fall of its empire in the long run (Thucydides, 1972:400-408). The use of military in the Korean Peninsula without understanding the developments within South Korea is detrimental not only to the Koreans but also to neighboring countries. Hypothetically, the Athenian interests could have

been served by its willingness to understand and work with the Melians, who were not against them.

Realists have shaped the course of international politics during the Cold War and had the assumption of power politics, which often disregards the weak powers in the world. Lack of understanding between the powerful and the rest causes dissatisfaction and mistrust. For example, since having been under the security umbrella of the U.S. during the Cold War, South Korea was the forefront of power politics, which excluded domestic factors and the changes. Constructivists understand the importance of social norms and its role in foreign policy. Considering domestic changes within South Korea such as economic development, democratization, and globalization, constructivists are better-suited for the discussion of the domestic developments and changes in identity. Social norms, identity, and security are, however, all ambiguous concepts that are vague and vulnerable to manipulation. As Alexander Wendt argues that “anarchy is what states make of it,” there are some cases when presidents of South Korea exaggerated North Korean threats in order to maintain military control of the government

(Wendt, 1992:391).

As described, social norms are hard to define and may vary depending on region and time. To overcome this difficulty of definition, this dissertation focuses on social identity, self identity, and self image because there are attributes that can measure such concepts. For this dissertation, five factors are identified to examine the causes of the change in South Korean policy toward North Korea. They are, as discussed earlier, capabilities, political participation, leadership, outgroup formation, and age and education.

The independent variable is the image held by policy makers. This image can be defined by image indicators (Cottam, 1994). These are valuable in analyzing the change of image of self, as well as the image of North Korea because “a self-image is composed of the same kinds of attributes used to form images of others” (Cottam, 1992:87).

By coding contents from interviews, speeches, press releases, and secondary sources such as newspapers and journal articles by policymakers defined as president, ministers (diplomacy, military, and unification), and members of National Security Council, images of self,

others, and policy behaviors can be determined. The Internet is available to gain access to different kinds of newspapers and government documents written in English. *Korea and World Affairs* is another source of Korean government-released materials translated into English. Korean newspapers or journal articles are also available for coding, but it involves bias. To cope with this, people who know Korean as well as English are asked to translate the Korean into English, and therefore double check the validity of the translation.

Major events (crisis) in the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War such as missile firing, armed incursion or conflict, and significant policies, are focused before and after the crises because during those time frames policymakers exhibit pure images without much deliberation. Subsequently they are to be coded for image analysis and policy outcomes. The separation and distinction between sources of the independent variable and the dependent variable helps distinguish cause from effect in the study of image theory (Young & Schafer, 1998).

Since the change in South Korean image of North Korea inevitably involves nationalism, it is first necessary to examine the source of

nationalism, which is the context of Chapter 3.

Chapter Three

Korean Identity and Nationalistic Values

Social identity changes because it is “not fixed or bounded...instead, identity is fluid, responding to a combination of our own needs and of the situation around us” (Searle-White, 2001:51). The situational factors that change social identities will be examined in chapters 4 and 5. Once the governments or leaders who understand people’s need and have tools to shape social identity, it becomes a ritual or habit for them to control it in a way that can help them draw public support and sustain their political power by utilizing symbols and images. Political leaders are not alone in this venture. Nationalists are ardent supporters of shaping national identity in a way to preserve positive past identity for the future.

This chapter focuses on such symbols and images, which are Korean nationalistic values that political leaders and intellectuals have repeatedly initiated throughout Korean history in times of crises. It is necessary, thus, to identify such nationalistic values in order to

understand the changes in the Korean identity during and after the Cold War. Identity has been influenced by such values, and the trend is likely to continue in the future. These values will be discussed later in detail.

The search for positive sources of identity is rampant, especially in times of crises, because national survival depends on uniting people under common ideals. Searle-White argues that “the social circumstances in which we live serve to reinforce certain identities—and especially national identity—as being most salient” (2001:52). The reinforcement of national identities is likely to have sources that can be found in history. Brockelman (1985) and Heidegger (1962) have pointed out that human self-image contains elements of the past. Nationalists revive values from the history to instill feelings of grandeur and pride in order to lead the country to a destination point in the future by overcoming current hardships. Social identity is composed of both “retroactive” and “proactive” elements (Gillis, 1994). The alignment of national identity from the past to the present and to the future starts with common beliefs, which might include “mythological beginnings or some kind of destiny toward which the nation is perceived to be marching”

(Searle-White, 2001:49). The sense of unity and cohesiveness derives from a common background in the past, and a common destiny in the future. By examining appearances of symbols or nationalistic values throughout Korean history, nationalistic values can be categorized. These sources are usually taught in schools or shown in symbols throughout Korean society.

By understanding the sources of national identity, one can predict the role of those sources in the formation of identity and expectation. The understanding of identity can be useful in the analysis of foreign policy. Alastair Johnston points out that “there is no sense, then, in analyzing images, perceptions, worldviews, doctrines, norms, and other ideational variables unless this is part of a broader research program that links these to the behavior of individuals, groups, organizations, states, and systems” (1995:171). Similarly, James Rosenau argues that any single-country developmental foreign policy theory “must synthesize idiographic and nomothetic knowledge, that is, the most salient aspects of a country’s uniqueness as well as the dynamics it shares with other countries” (1987: 53-74). The study of identity is, therefore, contextual

and important in understanding foreign policy-making.

To find out contextual characteristics, it is necessary to examine their components. These components are related to the fundamental features of a nation. Anthony Smith defines fundamental features of a nation as “a named human population sharing a historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Searle-White, 2001:52). These features serve to make up a nation, but national identity is also psychological and bonding in its nature. Psychological dimension is not, however, free from materialistic features that make up a nation such as location. Cottam & Cottam distinguish nation states from non-nation state and argues that “nationalism carries with it a package of values producing clear predispositions in terms of identification of threats and opportunities to the nation and responses to those threats and opportunities” (2001:123). The focus of this dissertation deals with nation state and nationalism because it presents clear connection between image and policy.

Nationalistic values possess special meaning to a nation state.

Timothy Baycroft, for example, argues that “specific nations may stress ethnicity or race, language, culture, historical traditions, religion, a particular shared territory with natural or historic frontiers, specific institutions, or indeed an opposition to any of the above” (2004:3). Cottam & Cottam identified four elements of nationalistic values: “unity, the independence, the dignity, and the prestige of the state and the material well-being of the members of the national community” (2001:127). To apply these concepts to Korea, Gregory Henderson asserts that “smallness of dimension, stability of boundaries, ethnic and religious homogeneity, and exceptional historical continuity mark Korea” (1968:13). In sum, the positive aspects of ethnicity, language, culture, traditions, religion can be brought up by the policymakers in the proper social context to ignite the sense of nationalism.

The evolution of national identities relies on two factors: social conditions and the policymakers’ explicit efforts to influence social identities (Searle-White, 2004:58). The modern Korean identity has been shaped “in opposition to outside influences, most notably Chinese, Japanese, and recently, Americans” (Pai and Tangherlini, 1998:10).

Hypothetically, if Korea had not been exposed to such external interferences, the Korean identity would have been different. In reaction to such crises, nationalists and policymakers desired to instill nationalism to overcome national crises by uniting the people under a common banner. By studying ancient Korean history, nationalistic leaders recovered uniqueness and strengths of the Korean identity. Examples of such nationalistic values include common creation myth, territorial geography, language, religion, technological innovation, and the Confucian culture.

1. Common creation myth

The origin of Korean history is based on Tangun's myth, which dates back about 5000 years. The long history is a source of pride for many Koreans because it represents the unity and longevity of Korea. Due to Korea's strategic geographical location, it has been attacked more than 900 times by foreign invaders throughout its history. The source of perseverance can be found in Korean creation myth.

In ancient times Hwan-in (Heavenly King...) had a young son whose name was Hwan-ung. The boy wished to descend from heaven and live in the human world...With three thousand of his royal subjects Hwan-ung descended from heaven and appeared under a sandalwood tree on T'aebaek Mountain...He led his ministers of wind, rain and clouds in teaching the people more than 360 useful arts, including agriculture and medicine, inculcated moral principles and imposed a code of law...In those days there lived a she-bearer and a tigress in the same cave. They prayed to Sin-ung (another name of Hwan-ung) to be blessed with incarnation as human beings. The king took pity on them and gave them each a bunch of mugwort and twenty pieces of garlic, saying, 'If you eat this holy food and do not see the sunlight for one hundred days, you will become human beings.' The she-bear and the tigress took the food and ate it, and retired into the cave. In twenty-one days the bear, who had faithfully observed the king's instructions, became a woman. But the tigress, who had disobeyed, remained in her original form...But the bear-woman could find no husband, so she prayed under the sandalwood tree to be blessed with a child. Hwan-ung heard her prayers and married her. She conceived and bore a son who was called Tangun Wanggom, the King of Sandalwood...Tangun came to P'yongyang...set up his royal residence there and bestowed the name Chosun upon his kingdom (Ilyon, 1972:32-33).

The descendants of bear that overcame the difficulties to become a woman have been reminded of the source of perseverance for Koreans in wartimes. According to Kim, intellectuals "invoked this myth to instill patriotism and unify the country" in the times of crises (Kim, 2005:14). The myth about the bear first appears in the text of *Samgukyusa*, written

by the Buddhist monk called Ilyon in the thirteenth century. His experience in the suffering of the people by the Mongols from 1250 to 1356 was likely to serve as a motive to write the book as a narrative of resistance. According to Yi Kibaek, this “strengthened their sense of identity as a distinct race (*minjok*) and gave force to the concept of their descent from a common ancestor” (Lee, 1984:167).

Another national crisis in Korean history occurred in the late nineteenth century when Japan was moving to annex Korea. The feeling of losing Korea to Japan provoked one of the nationalists, Sin Chaeho, to emphasize the importance of independence, dignity, and identity. Koreans traditionally valued loyalty to the king, attached themselves to the village, clan, and family, and accepted hierarchic status distinctions among them. Sin sought to change this tradition and to “arouse, unite, and mobilize the entire Korean population” and “endeavored to redirect the people’s loyalty toward a new, all-embracing identity of Koreans as a unique ethnic group” (Em, 1999:342). As Schmid points out, it was “the bloodline, the genealogy of the racial nation that provided unity to Sin’s new narrative” (1997:33). In Korea, it is believed that all Koreans are

the descendants of Tangun. The importance of the bloodline served to unite Koreans as a whole to rise up against Japanese colonial rule in the early twentieth century.

The symbol of Tangun persists in modern Korean culture. Rhee, Syngman, the first South Korean president, authorized the use of a calendar in which the year that Tangun was born constituted year one—setting the date back at 2333 B.C. National Foundation Day is commemorated on the 3rd of October every year to commemorate Tangun’s creation of Korea. These symbols are used in a way to legitimize the South Korean government as a true descendant in the long history of Korea. “President Rhee’s reference to Tangun, the mythic founder of the Korean people, was not an accident; rather, it reflects a deep-rooted sense of ethnic national identity and unity shared by Koreans” (Shin, 2006:2). It was also served as a symbol of Rhee’s intention to unify the two Koreas by emphasizing the fact that the Koreans were brothers and sisters from the same ancestor.

As a whole, the common Korean creation myth was used by nationalistic leaders and intellectuals throughout Korean history to

bolster the unifying identity of people for independence, unification, or legitimacy and resistance against foreign invaders during crises. During the Cold War period, South Koreans had to learn the Tangun creation myth, but the hostility against the North was so strong that the idea of a common ethnicity was not fully appreciated, nor emphasized. The policy of containment effectively suppressed any favorable South Korean sentiments toward North Korea from forming. The same myth can be applied contextually, depending on the situation.

The establishment of the presumed tomb of Tangun in Pyongyang, North Korea in 1993, which was three years after the end of the Cold War, served as a starting point for invoking a sense of unity between the two Koreas. Historians from both Koreas participated in a joint conference that was held in Pyongyang, North Korea in 2007 to discuss the topic of “Tangun’s offsprings.” The common creation myth plays an essential role in promoting a superordinate identity for Koreans.

2. Geographical Location

The location of the Korean peninsula has been subjected to

constant battles for dominance in the region by neighboring countries or kingdoms. According to Steinberg, “Korea has been the nexus in the power relationships between north and south, between east and west” (Steinberg, 1968:1). When China was strong enough to control the region, it considered itself to be the center of the world, and expanded its power to its periphery by forcing other countries in the region to accept suzerainty with military might. Korea was also exposed to Japanese piracy and invasions. It is the feeling of threat and annihilation that prevails in the minds of Koreans and is the source of xenophobia (Cumings, 2005:104). The longevity of Korea in these hostile surroundings constitutes a source of pride itself.

Despite numerous invasions from the North or the South, Koreans are proud of its strong military power, territorial size, and leadership in its history. For example, Koguryo (57BC-668) was strong enough to defend itself when the Sui Dynasty (589-618) of China attempted to invade Koguryo three times between 598 and 614. These victories against the Chinese, as well as the power of Koguryo have provided Koreans with the pride, tenacity, independence, and glory. In addition,

Koguryo King Kwanggaeto (375–413AD) achieved great territorial expansion “including the Sungari River to the north, the Liao River Valley to the west, the maritime coast to the east, and the Han River Valley to the south” (Kim, 2005:25). Koguryo was the largest kingdom yet in Northeast Asian history (Kim, 2005:25). Sin Chaeho, of the early twentieth century, argued that Koguryo was the true descendant of the Tangun, even though the Silla unified the three Korean kingdoms (Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla) and lasted from 668 to 935. According to Sin, Silla’s unification undermined the glory of Koguryo in Korean history and geographically marginalized itself from Manchuria, which is a strategically important location in Northeast Asia. The Tang dynasty subsequently took control of the area.

With the establishment of the Koryo Dynasty (935–1392), the current territorial border was shaped and maintained for almost 1,000 years irrespective of foreign invasions. For example, the Mongols invaded and took control of the Koryo for almost 100 years in the thirteenth century. Toyotomi Hideyoshi of Japan invaded the Chosun, but failed to conquer the Chosun after the six-year long Imjin War in the

late sixteenth century. In the early twentieth century, Japan invaded the Chosun and occupied Korea for thirty six years. The current North Korean border with China and Russia remains the same even after the division of the peninsula following the Korean War. Despite this location being in the middle of a power struggle, Korea has maintained its national borders within the same perimeters as few other countries in the world have. According to Steinberg,

the continued maintenance of the Korean nation is testimony to the resilience and cultural strength of its people. That they have managed national survival while maintaining a distinctive culture and contributing to world civilization in the arts, is one of the remarkable facets of Asian history (1968:1-2).

The geographical location was a cause for continuous external influences on the Korean peninsula, but the Korean people were able to maintain its geographical integrity with distinctiveness and uniqueness.

The desire for unification is motivated by the historical perspective that Korea has been a unified country for almost a thousand years. It was a source of nationalism and security especially after the Cold War. Free movement of Koreans across the DMZ for business or

leisure would enhance the feeling of unity. The number of South Korea who visited Mt. Kumgang in North Korea in 2000 alone numbers about 210,000 (Ministry of Unification home page). These exchanges help to instill South Koreans with a feeling of North Korea as one Korea.

3. Language

Both North Koreans and South Koreans use the same language called Hangeul. King Sejong created this native Korean alphabet in 1446. He is remembered by many Koreans as one of the most influential kings in Korean history for his role in creating Korean alphabet and promoting scientific inventions, which will be explained later. Before the creation of Hangeul, Koreans used Chinese characters, but the use of Chinese characters was difficult that most commoners were not able to use them. King Sejong recognized this problem and ordered his staff to scientifically create Korean alphabet for easy and common use throughout Korea. His staff “newly devised a script of twenty-eight letters, only that it became possible for anyone to readily learn it and use it to advantage in his everyday life” (Lee, 1984:192). King Sejong

contributed to the formation of Korean identity by creating Hangul so that almost all Koreans could easily communicate with each other in everyday life.

Since it is a product of one of the brightest scholars of the Chosun dynasty, “it is one of the world’s premier alphabets for accurately representing the sounds of words, and has attracted the interest of many linguists” (Cumings, 2005:61). Hangul was useful for instructions and diaries for peasants and military men in the Choson Dynasty. With help from the first invention of movable metal type printing in the world around 1234, books of all sorts were printed for public consumption. The opposition from the intellectuals, however, prevented Hangul from officially and commonly being adopted as the mother language at the time.

It was because of Korean nationalism in the early twentieth century that valued Hangul was fully emphasized for the purpose of defining Korean identity. One of the biggest proponents of Hangul was Chu Sigyong, a linguist who argued that Hangul should be valued, loved, and used by the people of the entire country including the ruling class. “For him, Hangul should be the basis for a new Korean national identity,

and its use should be encouraged to make Korea as strong and prosperous nation” (Shin, 2006:37).

Hangul books written during this period contained text that stressed the importance of a national language, independence, and identity such as *Chodungsohak*. Thus, most nationalistic political figures at the time such as Yu Kil-Chun, So Chae-pil, and Yun Chi-ho wrote on language and language reform. They were “language entrepreneurs” because they worked “linguistically in order to create and manipulate linguistic symbols for the promotion of political interests” (King, 1998:35). Chu himself perfected Hangul while working at the *Tongnip Sinmun*, a newspaper whose Hangul-only policy helped spread Hangul. His topic of writing includes “the reigning orthographic chaos, the instrumental advantages of the Korean script, the awakening of consciousness about the ‘national language’ and the need for language reform than with broader philosophical issues” (King, 1998:51). Hangul is an important source of the Korean identity because it is a unique and efficient tool of conveying nationalistic ideas among Koreans. According to World Factbook in 2002, the emphasis on Hangul has produced the

literacy rate of 97.9% in South Korea.

4. Religion

Both Buddhism and Confucianism have been embedded in the Korean national identity. Religion was the spiritual foundation for national security and mobilization. Because Korea was under the influence of foreign powers, Korean history is replete with cases of monks and Confucian scholars voluntarily mobilizing militias to defeat invading foreigners. Religion in Korea served as a spiritual bondage that united the people of Korea to rise against outside powers with their religious beliefs. The origins of this can be traced back to the youthful warrior and elite military group called Hwarang and their role in the unification of Silla in the seventh century. Silla, relatively weak in capability compared to adjacent Koguryo and Paekche, institutionalized elite nationalistic military organization to lead military and political affairs in the sixth century. Their training curriculum included learning traditional values, military arts, poetry, and patriotism by touring the country's famous mountains and rivers.

Hwarang's five moral codes were developed in the seventh century by Buddhist priest Wongwang (542-640) who combined ideas from both Buddhism and Confucianism (Cumings, 2005:34). The value of Confucianism is expressed in the first three codes; loyalty to king, filial piety to parents, and fidelity to friends. The other two codes are no retreat in the face of battle and no taking lives indiscriminately. The Buddhist creed forbidding the killing of living creatures was compromised in the name of national defense. Loyalty to the king was emphasized in the first place, and it served as a point of solidarity. Kim points out that "the Hwarangdo, endowed with leadership and solidarity between social classes, well portrays the seventh-century spirit of Silla, whose national identity spurred the kingdom in the eventual conquest of the Korean peninsula" (2005:37). One of the main contributors in the process of Silla's unification was Kim Yusin, a member of Hwarang, had an especially strong belief that he was called by the heavens to carry out the eventual conquest of the rival kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula.

The co-existence of the two religions continued in the Koryo Dynasty. Threats from the outside demanded from religion not only

spiritual comfort, but also national solidarity in order to overcome the difficulties. The concept of “King is the Buddha” in the Silla Dynasty was descended down to the Koryo Dynasty (Kim, 2005:60). The Confucian idea of loyalty to the King meant loyalty to the Buddha. The unity of power and religion provided strong bondage within the people “perhaps bequeathing to modern Korea its characteristic eclecticism of religious belief” (Cumings, 2005:43). Royal families of the Silla and the Koryo tried to institutionally pave the way for spiritual value and importance by ordering official ceremonies of *Yondung* on January 15 according to the lunar calendar to worship the Buddha (Kim, 2005:61). One example of praying to Buddha for peace as a state religion is the production of some 81,137 pieces of woodblock printing plates of the Tripitaka (Buddhist scriptures), the Koryo dynasty completing them in 1251 when the Koryo were under attack from the Mongols (Kim, 2005:60).

The role of religion during peacetime was to maintain stability in society by emphasizing loyalty and hierarchy. Korean hierarchical social structure was the outcome of Confucian tradition. As Hwarang’s

first moral code of loyalty to the king illustrates, since the three kingdoms era, society was influenced by the Confucianist teachings of bureaucracy and the loyalty to the great for their position and knowledge. The king becomes the father in the kingdom just as the father is the ruler in the family affairs. According to Chung, the level of analysis in Confucian teaching originates from the family, and the Confucian kingdom itself operates as family does (Chung, 2004). Confucius believed that one who effectively deals with family affairs would also be eligible to effectively govern a nation. Blood lines were thus emphasized in families as well as in kingdoms. Bureaucrats who are from different families became brothers by tracing their place of origin, ancestors, schools, and political orientations. Making brother-like and sister-like relationships in the work place was normal in the Confucian bureaucracy.

As the father was the leading figure in the family, the ruling class called Yangban enjoyed the privileges of power, while the rest were categorized as either common people such as peasants or the untouchables, slaves. The main purpose was to set up a hierarchy to control the whole population, stabilizing society with bureaucratic social

status differentiation. This system was fully institutionalized in the Chosun dynasty. The center of the hierarchy was the king himself, domestically, just as China was the center in the world. The ruling elites in the Koryo and the Chosun strategically aligned themselves with China to legitimize their rule and maintain their status of the ruling class.

The enforcing mechanism of the Confucianism was education. “Education meant socialization into Confucian norm and virtues that began in the early childhood with the reading of the Confucian classics, for king and commoners alike” (Cumings, 2005:60). The substance of the examination system was “mastery of Confucian classical texts, along with disquisitions on statecraft, bureaucracy, and ritual” (Cumings, 2005:60–61). The passion for child education has been strong throughout the history of Korea, but human resources inadvertently helped the reproduction of the existing order rather than challenging it.

Overall, religion has shaped Korean identity to be nationalistic during times of crisis and to maintain the existing order during times of peace. The arrival Christianity in the Chosun in the late eighteenth century and challenged the dominance of Buddhism and Confucianism.

“Christians now number over 1.5 million Catholics and 8 million Protestants—nearly a quarter of the south Korean population” (Macdonald, 1996:102). The Christianity brought Western values of “freedom, equality, and human rights” to South Korea, which influenced democratic movements (Macdonald, 1996:102). Despite the rise of Christianity, Korean identity is still subjected to the long history of religious influence on nationalism and hierarchy.

5. Technological Innovation.

In a country where natural resources are scarce and territorial size is small, human resources and technological innovations become sources that make people feel proud. The focus on education as a way to promote one’s status has produced competition resulting in academic achievements such as scientific discoveries and inventions as well. The habit of a strong work ethic and perseverance are also reflected to the advancement of technology. One of the most respected national heroes, Admiral Yi Sun Shin (1545–98) was the creator of iron clad warships known as Turtle ship.

Admiral Yi had at his disposal the world's first armor-clad warships, the famed 'Turtle Ship'—with iron plates on its top, a large sail reminiscent of Chinese 'junks,' a dozen sailors pulling long oars from within, cannon at every point to blow the Japanese out of the water, and a dragon at the head to scare the hell out of everyone (Cumings, 2005:76).

Yi was able to utilize advanced ship skills, strategy, tactics and technology in defeating the Japanese invasion. It was a symbol of creativity and national pride. Park Chung Hee instituted Yi as a national hero and instilled Koreans with patriotism and unity during his presidency.

Other technical advancements can be found in the areas of printing, scientific devices, weapon systems, and medicine. First, "Korea had movable type long before Gutenberg's celebrated Bible" (Cumings, 2005:64). Second, Chukwugi was invented in 1442 to measure the amount of rainfall about two hundred years before the similar invention in the West. Third, Chang Yong-sil, a scientist during King Sejong's rule developed sundials and astronomical clocks. Fourth, "military technicians produced new forms of cannon and artillery" and

“scientists codified Korean medical science in encyclopedia” (Cumings, 2005:64). Before the discovery of the New World in the West, Korea is believed to have been more advanced in scientific technology than some of the Western world.

The history of scientific inventions was a source of emphasizing Korean ingenuity. During the economic development in South Korea, technological innovations set the tone for businessmen and scientists to accomplish seemingly impossible goals. The historical examples in Korea have given an impetus to South Koreans to proudly repeat challenging tasks to the best of their ability. The technological successes in the areas of semi-conductors, ship-building, and other manufactured goods in the world are employed as proofs of the Korean technological innovations in modern Korea.

6. Culture

According to Alastair Johnston, “Culture consists of shared decision rules, recipes, standard operating procedures, and decision routines that impose a degree of order on individual and group

conceptions of their relationship to their environment, be it social, organizational, or political” (1995:35). His focus was especially on strategic culture that controlled Chinese foreign policy in the Ming dynasty. Strategic culture is important because it is “an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs” (Johnston, 1995:36).

Because Korea was also influenced by the Chinese in the past, there is likely to be Korean strategic culture as well. If so, it would be necessary to examine “pervasive and long lasting grand strategic preferences” in the Korean strategic culture in order to understand its policy. Though Johnston’s argument inevitably leads to strategic preferences, Korean strategic preferences are limited compared to the Chinese Kingdoms. There is, however, likely to be strategic culture to the Korean history that persists in the Korean mind.

To understand the Korean culture, it is easy to understand the components of strategic culture, which include “such cultural dimensions

as religion, architecture, cuisine, holidays and festivals, dress and leisure activities such as sport... to form a part of the national image” (Baycroft, 2004:8). In other words, inventions, historical events, and activities in human history become sources of pride and prestige, while simultaneously contributing to the formation of strategic culture. These components are channeled in a strategic cultural way to form Korean strategic culture.

Korean strategic culture is about unity. It is unity for the top elites in the social class as Gregory Henderson (1968) described the conditions of Korean society as a “vortex.” The examples the Korean culture being unity can be seen throughout Korean history. Yi Kwang Su argues that “Koreans have been without a doubt a unitary ethnic nation, *tanil han minjok* in blood and culture for thousands of years” to provoke nationalism in times of Japanese colonialism (Shin, 2006:49). One of the most honored national heroes in Korean history is Admiral Yi, Sun Shin of the late 16th century, who successfully defeated the Japanese at sea when they attempted to conquer Korea. He helped the Chosun Dynasty maintain its territorial unity. It is a unity for the kingdoms, not for the

people.

Sinified government magnified unity. Ruling through carefully standardized institutions and relatively uniform means, its spirit was that of jealous centralism dedicated to the obliteration of any “unorthodox” activities. Not only political but also economic activities that would have encouraged regional growth, the accumulation of individual wealth, or diverse influences from abroad through trade were forbidden or rigidly controlled (Henderson, 1968:20).

It came from total reliance on China for its security and was an attempt to maintain the status quo by minimizing the changes in domestic order. Culture of unity serves as a symbol for the ruling class for its ultimate control of society. The South Korean culture of unity prevailed during the Cold War when South Korea engaged in regime rivalry against North Korea. The end of the Cold War naturally ushered in this strategic culture of unity to the Korean peninsula for the purpose of unification.

The Korean strategic culture of unity can be summarized as loyalty and obedience to the people of the ruling class and protection of the existing order. Confucianism in the Chosun Dynasty replaced Buddhism as the state Cult. Loyalty to the king comes from the idea

that the status of king equals that of the Buddha before the Chosun Dynasty. It is recognition of divine power in human form. Therefore, even if Korean people saw their king kowtowing to the haughty barbarian conqueror in China and their disdain toward their incompetent monarch and the ruling Yangban class, they did not blame the king for mismanagement, but instead turned their strong animosity against the invaders. King is an object of reverence, and beyond the target of public criticism. In the Chosun Dynasty, Confucianism maintained this hierarchy by introducing family values to society as a whole. Within a family, a son must obey his father, as in society people must obey the king or the ruling class.

Confucianism's numerous texts, even its codes, in Korea as in China, took these relationships as their central theme, constantly comparing one with another and supporting them with an elaborate ethical code accompanied by exacting standards of propriety that approached the force of law (Henderson, 1968:24-25).

Commoners existed simply to serve and sacrifice, not realizing that they were used to maintaining the status quo. "This factor of dynastic

resilience is an important feature of Korean history that is seen repeatedly” (Kim, 2005:86).

Second, the legitimacy of a ruler comes from blood lines, not from public support. The ruling class of the Great Silla was a group of people from the True Bone class, which meant that both of their parents were from the royal family. Because they dominated national power, people with talents and skills could not participate in the political process if they were not from the True Bone class. The attempt to recruit bright young people by adopting the Tang-style test of the Confucian classics in 788 turned out to be ineffective because the youth of the True Bone could easily marginalize those without royal lineage by taking office merely by getting a recommendation from the True Bone relatives (Kim, 2005:49).

The structure of keeping other classes from diluting purity of the ruling classes was established when Silla was a small kingdom, one of the three kingdoms competing for the hegemony of the Korean peninsula. It was, however, ineffective in recruiting a more competent bureaucracy in the expanded territories of the Great Silla after unifying the Koguryo and the Paekche. As a result, social rigidity inadvertently led to social

instability in the Great Silla.

Beginning in the late eight century, this social rigidity initiated domestic political instability...During the last 150 years of Great Silla, as many as 20 kings took the throne in a series of fierce succession struggles during which some of them were killed” (Kim, 2005:50—51).

When the leadership does not have systematic way of recruiting talented government officials from outside, the ruling group is vulnerable to political instability caused by a struggle to dominate power among royal families. The struggle causes the weakening of power, and ultimately leads to the collapse of the kingdoms.

The attempts to dominate the privileges of the ruling class and nullify discontent from the local warlords continue in the Koryo and the Chosun dynasties.

The yangban attempted to exclude themselves from the other statuses in order to maintain their privileges. Unlike China and other East-Asian societies, the Chosun kingdom discriminated against the soja, descendants of secondary wives or concubines...Given that most of the soja were descendants of yangban, this effectively restricted the number of true yangban who competed for limited posts in the court (Kim, 2005:96).

In addition, the ruling class unlike other Asian ruling class of the times passed on their status to their descendants. By systematically advocating their privileges, Yangbans blocked the commoners from ascending to the ruling class by prescribing that “the right to sit for the examination should be limited to Yangban descendants” (Henderson, 1968:37). The base people, therefore, had no opportunity to change their hereditary status. Loyalty to the king and the authority of the ruling class erased the possibility of questioning the legitimacy of the kingdom.

Wars and the industrial developments, however, stirred the traditional social-status system, particularly that of the Nobi, slave. Slaves were promised to be freed for their service during the Imjin War by the government (Kim, 2005:95). Because the number was minimal, it failed to have a great impact on the society that the ruling class still maintained. The Korean War finally destroyed the class system, and subsequent democratic trials and economic developments shaped the new open social structure.

Third, the protection of the existing order is a source of unity. The Confucian idea of respecting the father in the family still remains in the Korean society today. The practice of perfecting the ideal of Confucianism has given the state and society great stability in the past.

The Chosun dynasty was one of the longest and most stable of dynasties in the history of the world...much of that success is due to its Confucian underpinnings and Confucian transformations that continued to unfold throughout the 500-year history of the dynasty (Kim, 2005:98).

It was stable because the ruling class enjoyed autonomy, while the rest served them without questioning the system. It was designed to preserve the status quo. The consequence of this system was best characterized by Henderson:

The atomized upward streaming, with its hemophilic consequences for Korean social coagulation, had led to foreign annexation by depriving society of the instruments of resistance. It had, in fact, more than Japan herself, destroyed the two vital components of a nation: the national integrity and the viability of social institutions (1968:209-210).

Family values can be applicable in the level of family and local

community, but they are not applicable to the political sphere, especially to the large size of a nation or kingdom. Rather than acknowledging the limitation of the Confucianism, Confucian scholars turn to the emphasis of “family to the point of rampant nepotism” (Kim, 2005:98). Unlike the Founding fathers in the U.S. who replaced the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution to accommodate changing needs, the ruling class in Korea was hesitant to change the status quo resulting in the loss of opportunity of change and development (Wood, 2002).

Loyalty is a positive value in society, but when it becomes a rule, it is unhealthy for the society because it serves only for a certain group for “their particular need more than the needs of wider society” (Kim, 2005:98). The Confucian ideal was helpful in managing ancient society at the level of village. At the national level, Confucianism had to be reevaluated to serve its proper role. Critics would argue that “by idealizing the golden age of Confucius...Korea failed to modernize and was left behind when the industrial revolution and modernization came knocking at the door” (Kim, 2005:98). Due to the economic development, the rise of the middle class presented South Korea with new challenges.

The middle class became more participatory in politics. The call for unity, thus, became less appealing to them if it was not based on understandable causes or common interests.

Nationalistic leaders are aware of maintaining unity in the modern Korea. “Despite twists and disruptions in political life, an old theme can still be detected under the new forms: continued and almost exclusive concentration on central power” (Henderson, 1968:57). Park Chung Hee called for unity when he set out for economic development. He also called for unity against communist North Korea. *Yushin* allowing him for permanent rule was again from the Confucian concept of religious-political authority and centralism. The North Korean regime is not far from this traditional Korean value. Kim Il-sung established himself as the King with divine power status, forcing people to worship him with blind obedience.

Another way of changing the small group oriented Korean society to a national level has been sports. The 1988 Seoul Olympics is especially memorable to Koreans because Korea became the host country of such a large scale international event. For the first time in

Olympic history, Taekwondo, the traditional Korean martial art, was chosen as an official game by the Olympic Committee. Another example is soccer, especially against Japan or China. The 2002 FIFA World Cup was, again, a moment of national unity and pride. People around Seoul gathered at the City Hall square to cheer for their team and displayed Korean power and unity all over the world.

In conclusion, nationalistic values found in Korea history have existed and influenced the minds of Koreans. The listed values of common creation myths, geographical location, language, religion, technological innovation, and culture have been the main sources of instilling Korean nationalism in times of crises. These nationalistic values are used selectively by policymakers for the maximum effect. For example, the Confucian ideal of loyalty and hierarchy, technological innovation, and religion were especially important during the Cold War for military leaders to speed up economic development and deal with North Korean security issues. After the Cold War, common creation myths, geographical location, language, and culture became more

dominant. The application of these nationalistic values is contextual. Leaders are ready to use nationalistic values that can be traced back in history to serve the purpose of instilling pride and esteem in the public.

Chapter Four

The Image of North Korea as Enemy (1948–1987)

This dissertation intends to prove the change in South Korean image of North Korea. First step toward that direction is to identify South Korean image before the change. South Korean view of North Korea has been consistent from its establishment in 1948 to the end of the authoritarian rule in 1987. This chapter intends to identify the image of South Korea and its policy toward North Korea during this period.

Because South Korean nationalism reacts to the threats or opportunities, this chapter is organized to begin with international and domestic environments that provided South Korea with either threat or opportunity. By examining image attributes explained in Chapter 1, this chapter intends to set the basis for further analysis including changes in image attributes.

1. Threat or Opportunity

Koreans who had long waited for the end of the Japanese colonial rule saw the end of World War II as an opportunity to become independent. But, there was a more powerful systemic factor that determined the fate of Korea for another forty years. The superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged after the dropping of the Atomic bomb in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6, 1945. The Soviet troops subsequently surged into Manchuria and Korea, which caused alarm to the United States.

For fear of the dominance in the Korean Peninsula by the Soviet Union, the United States proposed to draw the 38th parallel as a temporary line to divide the Korean Peninsula for the responsibilities of receiving the surrender of Japanese forces. The agreement of General Order No. 1 between Truman and Stalin led the deployment of the U.S. 24th Army Corps under Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge's command from Okinawa, Japan to Inchon, Korea. "As a result of the de facto division of the Korean Peninsula into two zones of foreign military occupation, the prospects for Korean unification and independence became inevitably conjoined with the subsequent unfolding of U.S.-

Soviet relations” (Lee, 2006:20). The developments were a surprise for many Koreans who expected subsequent liberation and independence after World War II. Contrary to their hope, the two Koreas became the subject of superpower rivalry in ideology. South Korean image of North Korea was, thus, greatly influenced by the U.S. images of the Soviet Union, which was enemy (R. Cottam, 1977; R. Herrmann, 1985; Shimko, 1992).

2. Domestic Developments and Images

While systemic changes were beginning to emerge around the Korean Peninsula, intellectuals and policymakers of different backgrounds within Korea had their own ideas on how to rebuild the country when Korea was given independence by the victors during the World War II. One of the leading figures respected by the people throughout Korea by both left and right was Lyuh Woon Hyung, who led underground organization called Korean Restoration Brotherhood (KRB) in 1944. Though he had participated in both left and right, his political line was to remain in the center and was willing to cooperate to gain

support from both left and right for the Korean unification. His organization had prepared for Korean independence a few weeks before Japan's demise and had active local organizations called "people's committee" in the countryside for wider support throughout Korea. After Japan's surrender to the Allies on August 15, 1945, it was Lyuh that Deputy Governor General Abe transferred his government in exchange for safety of Japanese in Korea. He promptly formed the Committee for Preparation for Korean Independence.

The Korean political landscape changed unfavorable to Lyuh when the Soviet troops occupied north of 38th parallel, which promoted communism. The idea of Korea becoming a Communist state was further strengthened by the actions taken by the Soviet Union in the North. The Soviet Union sent their troops to defeat existing Japanese troops in the Korean Peninsula and supported the activities by the people's committee in the North. Koreans in the North became favorable to the Soviets due to these supportive behaviors and indigenous inclination to communism. The Soviet Union and Koreans in the North shared common enemy of Japan as well as ideology of

socialism.

Contrary to the role of Soviet Union, General Hodge of the U.S. was indifferent to the culture of the Koreans. Strategically, he did not receive a clear blueprint for political democratization and social and economic reforms in Korea unlike MacArthur who led the reconstruction of Japan after World War II. Replete with misperceptions of the Korean reality, Hodge decided to suppress any political groups or activities associated with the Communists and to promote and strengthen the rightist forces. This meant the exclusion of politicians in the center such as Lyun Woon Hyung and Kim Ku. General Hodge preferred domestic conservative politicians, who later formed the Korea Democratic Party (KDP) only because they were against Communism. The decision to support KDP inherently contained the source of confrontation among Koreans because most domestic conservative politicians were wealthy landlords who benefited from the Japanese occupation of Korea by collaborating with them.

The Korean public was infuriated when they learned about the decision by General Hodge to temporarily use Koreans who had previous

experience in the Japanese police and colonial officials to maintain law and order despite the public anxiety and bitterness of Korean experience of suffering under brutal Japanese police. In addition, for independent minded Koreans, the establishment of a military governor in South Korea by the U.S. for direct government was believed to be the likely cause of endemic cycle of violent demonstrations, labor strikes, political assassination, and armed insurrection such as ones in Cheju (1948) and Yosu (1948). The view of the U.S. was just another imperialist for some Koreans just like Japan.

To overcome this shortcoming of nationalist credentials, the KDP absorbed exiled nationalists. One was Kim Gu, who headed the Shanghai Korean Provisional Government for nineteen years and the Korean Restoration Army during the Japanese Domination of Korea. He was nationalist and pro-independence.

If God asked me what was my wish, I would reply unhesitatingly, "Korean independence." If He asked me what was my next wish, I would again answer, "Our nation's independence." If He asked me the same question for the third time, I would reply in an even louder voice, "My wish is our Great Korean Nation's Complete Independence"···This is because living a humble life in one's own

independent nation is happier, more glorious and more hopeful than living a life of luxury under someone else's rule in another nation. In former times, Park Je-sang, when he went to Japan, declared, "I would rather become a pig in Korea than live a comfortable life as a retainer of the Japanese king" (Kim Koo Museum & Library).

For those who were against the independence of Korea such as Japan and later the U.S., he held the image of "imperial." Because of his willingness to use terrorism and assassination to achieve his political objectives, Kim directed the bombing of the Emperor Hirohito's birthday ceremony in Shanghai to remove Japanese military leadership on April 29, 1932. After the liberation of Korea, he orchestrated the assassination of the head of the Korean Democratic Party, Song Chin-u. Despite his reliance on terrorism to achieve his political objectives, he is considered the first president of South Korea instead of Syngman Rhee by the leftists for his view of independence. Kim Gu was neither leftist nor rightist and worked against the U.S.-Soviet trusteeship as was also the case for Lyu Wun Hyung. His view of maintaining national integrity, history and culture is still remembered by many as the true hero of Korea in the twentieth century.

The U.S. supported Syngman Rhee who had maintained relationships with intelligence people in Washington for his view of anti-Communism (Cumings, 2005:194). M. Preston Goodfellow, then deputy director of the Office of Strategic Services considered Rhee had more of “the American point of view” than other Korean leaders (Cumings, 2005:195). Because of Syngman Rhee’s strong advocacy of anti-Communist forces, he was allowed to position himself to be a preeminent political leader in South Korea. The Republic of Korea under President Syngman Rhee was proclaimed on August 15, 1948, providing the legal basis for the U.S. troop withdrawal. About a month later, in the Soviet-controlled zone, People’s Republic of Korea under Premier Kim Il Sung was established.

As a result, the 38th parallel was completely closed ending the operation of the weekly train between Seoul and Pyongyang. The end of exchanges through the 38th parallel between the South and the North aggravated misunderstanding and distrust. The two Koreas viewed each other not as an independent government, but as an illegitimate, ill-willed, and “puppet regime” that had to be crushed should the opportunity arise

(Korean Frontier, 1970:23). Syngman Rhee's desire to attack and subdue Kim Il-sung was expressed during the border skirmishes in 1949, but the U.S. did not approve the idea of attacking North Korea first. The threat of war and opportunity of unification by force coexisted during this period. It was in 1950 that Kim Il-sung finally seized the long-awaited opportunity to attack South under the permission from Stalin.

Overall, the creation of the 38th parallel was for the benefit of the superpowers that could institutionally interfere with Korean domestic shaping. The fate of the South began to rely heavily on the United States.

The Americans would not turn Korea to the Koreans, and so they got on with the "positive action" necessary to create an anticommunist South Korea. Korea thus became a harbinger of policies later followed throughout the world—in Greece, Indochina, Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua—where Americans came to defend any group calling itself anticommunist, because the alternative was thought to be worse. And fifty years later the Korean problem remains unresolved (Cumings, 2005:200).

The image of North Korea as enemy was strong enough to suppress inherent Korean identity especially with the components of

violence and emotion. Such nationalistic values as ethnic homogeneity, the sharing of the same history, culture, language, and religion turned out to stay dormant during this period of regime survival. The thirty six years of Japanese imperialism was only to precede the Cold War rivalry. The image of Japan as “imperial” by the Koreans was replaced by that of North Korea as “enemy” by the South. The South was not superior in capability, but Syngman Rhee believed that he could gain as much support for the unification from the United States as he was entitled to rule the South.

The systemic factor was again strong and contributed to the division in Korea during the Cold War. Independent and pro-reform movements existed, but failed to become dominant political forces partly due to political power base, the middle class. The support for their client state by the superpowers was powerful enough to legitimize the course of division. South Korea was able to sustain the regime because of the aid given by the US. The ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR became a prevalent factor in the Korean affairs exogenously. Endogenously speaking, political rivalry between Syngman Rhee and Kim

Il Sung institutionally strengthened the separation of the Korean Peninsula for both ideological and political reasons.

Syngman Rhee was allowed to give a strong anticommunist speech at General Hodge's welcoming ceremonies from the United States (Cumings, 2005:195). The suppression of Communism appeared to be increasingly successful to mobilize South Korean forces and public opinion in many ways. For example, anticommunism and anti-North Korea were used to suppress insurgencies in Cheju and Yosu. In addition, public activities from their dissatisfaction toward bureaucracy were monitored by the Great Korean Youth Corps and the Student's National Defense Corps in the name of patriotism, military discipline, and watchers for communist behavior. The use of anticommunism slogan "the drive against Communists" was sometimes used for political purposes such as purging the power of political rivals (MacDonald, 1992:106). This trend of using anticommunism slogan for political purpose was only the beginning and continued throughout the Cold War.

3. Capabilities and Intentions (1949–1953)

Unification of the Korean Peninsula was the goal for both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung. Syngman Rhee was against Communism and wanted to get rid of the Communists from the Korean Peninsula, while Kim Il Sung considered the South as the puppet state of the United States and wanted to defeat the South to achieve the unification and independence of the Korean people from the foreign interferences. The hostilities continued along the 38th parallel since the border was set up. The pull-out of troops by the superpower in 1949, thus, provided the two Koreas with opportunity of unification by military means.

North Korea gained more military strength when the Chinese Communist victory resulted in the return of the Korean troops that were dispatched by Kim Il Sung starting in early 1947 to participate in the war for the Communists in China. North Korean troops had valuable real war experiences in guerrilla warfare as well as the addition of the number of troops, somewhere between 75,000 and 100,000, to the existing DPRK army. The morale was high. Choe Yong-gon, the first Korean People's Army (KPA) commander made a statement about the significance of this event, later quoted by an American informant.

Korea will be soon ours. At present there is not a single unit in the United Democratic Forces now driving the Kuomintang from Manchuria that does not have my troops in it. At the end of the Manchurian campaign these troops will be seasoned, trained veterans. When the Americans and the Russians withdraw, we will be able to liberate (South) Korea immediately (Cumings, 1990:359).

Choe was confident that KPA would be able to defeat ROK forces should war break out. His judgment proved right because South Korea since November 1948 suffered guerrilla war against leftists in the Jiri mountains where rebels fled from the insurgencies in Yosu and Cheju in 1948. Unlike North Koreans who were fighting in China with the legitimate purpose of establishing a Communist state, South Korea was exposed to internal turmoils such as police brutalities as well as guerrilla terrors. The division was caused by leadership in the military composed by officers who had prior experiences in the Japanese army. Chong Il-gwon, who commanded a suppression force of 3,000 men, had Japanese army background. It is a sharp contradiction to the military leadership in North Korea who had experiences in guerrilla warfare against Japanese army and Kuomintang later. The difference in leadership

background provided legitimacy for people who were not satisfied with the Rhee government policy to denounce Rhee by joining guerrillas.

The number of ROKA was almost 100,000 by the end of August in 1949, which is about the same as that of KPA. The increase in military power on both sides resulted in frequent fights along the 38th parallel in 1949. Intense relationships produced the potential for strong hostile emotions. Both Koreas had the idea of occupying the Ongjin peninsula, strategically important location near the 38th parallel first, and then proceed to unify the other. “One can expect politically motivated emotions to be intense when important political identity groups face threats or unusual opportunities” (Cottam et. al., 2004:49). The same ethnic people with the same language and territorial boundary for almost one thousand and three hundred years fought against each other ferociously as if they had nothing in common.

Syngman Rhee had a strong belief of marching North. He expressed his desire in the letter to his adviser Robert Oliver in September 30, 1949.

I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an offensive measure and join with our loyal communist army (sic) in the North to clear up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il-sung's men to the mountain region and there we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu River (i.e., the Sino-Korean border) (quoted from Cumings, 2005:252).

Rhee's logic was likely based on the success of guerrilla warfare in the Jiri Mountains, his strong antagonism against Communism, or his messianic belief. He did not recognize the fact that KPA were not ill-trained guerrillas. In reality, they were battle experienced and loyal to Kim Il-sung. It was not just Rhee, however, that held such a view. Many of ROKA commanders were "full of ideas of recovering the North by conquest" (Cumings, 2005:250). The U.S. warning that it would cut off all American aid could only have prevented ROKA from attempting to attack across the parallel.

Syngman Rhee's intention to unify the Korean peninsula by force with the support from the U.S. "ran counter to the prevailing desire in the United States to demobilize forces and reduce the military budget" (Clough, 1987:17). Rhee wanted to have a guarantor from their

supporter and believed that they could succeed.

It was the South Korea anxious to go into N.K, because they were feeling sharp with their army of well-trained 100,000 strong (sic). But U.S. Govt was most anxious to restrain any provocation by the S.K. and Goodfellow had gone there lately to do just that. I asked how great was the possibility or danger of war breaking out in Korea. G(oodfellow) said U.S. Govt. position is this: avoid any initiative on S. Korea's part in attacking N.K., but if N.K. should invade S.K. then S.K. should resist and march right into N.K. with III World War as the result but in such a case, the aggression came from N.K. and the Am(eric)an people would understand it (quoted from Cumings, 2005:254).

The threat of stopping American aid to prevent the South from attacking North was powerful tool for the U.S., which sought to strengthen the South Korean economy through economic aid and continued equipping and training a South Korean military force in preparation for the American troop withdrawal from South Korea.

During the Korean War, all parties in the War were guilty of atrocities and worsened the existing images of others. KPA was known for brutal executions of several hundreds of American POWs, although they were supposed to be treated in humane manner. North Koreans allegedly slaughtered between 5,000 and 7,000 people in Taejon, notably

one of the greatest mass killings of the war. The view of the U.S. toward North Korea was shaped by these experiences combined with emotions of fear, frustration, and contempt. Contempt led to depersonalization and dehumanization of others making it possible to motivate people to commit murder and mass destruction of others (Izard, 1977:340).

4. Capabilities and Intentions from 1953 to 1988

Three years of the War left the country in ruin. Buildings were all leveled off. People were displaced. Economic infrastructure was destroyed. The ideological war against the North and the notion of cruelty in war were dominant factors over the long history of Korean identity after the Korean War. It was so strong that it could break up the relationship even among family members.

One of the most important consequences of the war was the hardening of ideological and political lines between North and South. The antipathy that had developed between the opposing regimes was deepened into a blood feud among family members, extending from political leaders to the bulk of the ordinary people who had suffered at the hands of the other side. The thirteen-

hundred-year old unity of the Korean people was shattered (Oberdorfer, 2001:10).

The sense of unity was less important than the survival of regime. Psychologically, the end of the war that cemented the feeling of fear that the other side might attack at any time and repeat the brutal atrocities could become a reason why Rhee relied so heavily for financial support from the United States. He knew the value of ROK to the U.S., naming him a past master at this business, “wheedling so many direct grants out of the United States that by the end of the 1950s they accounted for five-sixths of all Korean imports” (Cumings, 2005:306). Knowing that the US had no one but him to rely on anti-communist stance, Rhee, according to John Foster Dulles’ description of him “an Oriental bargainer,” “a master of evasion” was able to extract maximum aid from the global hegemon using the ROK’s immense geopolitical leverage granted by the Cold War and the strategy of containment.

The size of the ROKA required nearly eighty percent of the budget for the fiscal year 1953-54. The increase in size came along with the increase in the role of ROKA starting from the war period.

At a level more specific to the daily lives of most Koreans, the increased importance of the military was evident in the scope and magnitude of military control over activity and property under the warrant martial law, which was extensively imposed throughout the war...The use of military units for blatantly partisan purposes, as in the employment of military forces against recalcitrant Assemblymen opposed to constitutional amendments that greatly enhance Rhee's power, highlighted the hypocrisy of his democratic pretensions (Lovell, 1975:166).

In addition to the corruption in directing financial aid from the U.S., Rhee's use of military for political control weakened the basis for his political support and angered the military. As a result, the military did not to take much action against demonstrators when public dissatisfaction with Rhee's authoritarian control and corruption, especially in the general election in March, 15, 1960, resulted in the student revolution in April 19, 1960, though martial law was declared. The Korean Army took advantage of the opportunity and overthrew the Chang government on May 16, 1961. The Military Revolutionary Committee upheld anti-Communism as the foremost national policy realizing the importance of receiving aid from the anti-Communist U.S. as well as proclaiming the legitimacy of the military government for the

job (1961).

Park Chung Hee, however, recognized that rapid economic improvement would justify a regime that had been established by force and therefore lacked legitimacy.

I want to emphasize and re-emphasize, that the key factor of the May 16th Military Revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in Korea. Since the primary objective of the revolution was to achieve a national renaissance, the revolution envisaged political, social and cultural reforms as well. My chief concern, however, was economic revolution (Park Chung-hee, *The Country, The Revolution and I*, Leon Snider, ed. (Publisher not indicated, 1963:177)

Economic growth would enhance national prestige and provide tools for diplomacy. The winner of economic rivalry between the two Koreas would feel more comfortable and affordable to armaments and foreign policy. Self-reliance was the ultimate goal for Park government and shaped the foundation for economic development in South Korea.

A country devastated by Japanese colonialism and the Korean War required strong leadership partly due to the North Korean military

threats from the outside and partly due to the lack of centralized development plan from the inside. One positive aspect of the Korean War was that landlords lost significant amount of ownership over lands.

In place of aristocracy came entrepreneurs who had built up wealth through the auxiliary supply of warfare, a small but growing middle class of people engaged in commerce or attached to the enormous foreign presence and its many organizations, and rough people who had prospered at the nexus of human despair through moneylending and corruption, or simply the provision of services otherwise scarce in wartime (Cumings, 2005:302).

Traditional class differentiation no longer was applicable to the Korean society in part due to the collapse of landlords and elite group in society.

Park's economic plan, which started in 1962 with the Five Year Plan, was a substantial departure from the agrarian Korean economy. According to *Economic Statistics Yearbook*, the share of agriculture in population in 1965 was 55.1% (Bank of Korea, 1965). Despite rapid urbanization and industrialization averaging over 10% in the growth rate of GDP annually from 1963 to 1975, 37.5% of the total population still made their living by farming in 1975 (Bank of Korea, 1975).

The emphasis on light industry in the beginning of the economic

development plan required cheap labor for mass production. People left traditional villages for work near the city and sped up the process of urbanization. “The farm population declined from 62 percent of the total population in 1955 to 38 percent in 1975” (Mason, 1981:211). In 1995, the share of agriculture in the total population was only 11.6% (Bank of Korea, 1995).

The seemingly unbreakable cycle of poverty was broken during the 1960s. By 1970s, GNP per capita had risen to \$266.72, an average annual growth rate of 12.6 percent since 1961. GNP increased nearly fourfold, from \$2.33 billion in 1961 to \$8.60 billion in 1970. Over 13 percent of the labor force was now working in the industrial sector. Most remarkable was the growth in exports, from \$53 million to \$1,227 million. Furthermore, the composition of export products changed in that period from primarily agricultural and natural resources (86 percent in 1961) to largely manufactured products (83.6 percent in 1970) (International Monetary Fund, 1979).

Another positive aspect was the growth of Korean military that swelled from 100,000 in 1950 to well over 600,000 by 1953 due to the Korean War. It functioned like a factory and influenced the thinking of individuals to be disciplined, patriotic, anticommunist, and authoritarian. Because almost all males were drafted, the military played a role in

instilling the idea of North Korea as enemy. Former military leaders took over governmental posts and shaped bureaucratic structure in military style. “It was Max Weber, after all, who once likened the modern factory to a military organization, so the military’s relevance to Korea’s economic development is abundant” (Cumings, 2005:303). Korean people worked for the survival of South Korea and the value of hardworking was essential within the structure.

By applying discipline and managerial skill, the military leaders utilized the human capabilities and economic infrastructure. Continued external economic aid from the U.S. and new aid from Japan after normalization of relations in 1965 provided capital investment and technology. The decision to shift emphasis from import substitution to export-led growth, beginning with traditional labor-intensive consumer goods was proved to be right.

Despite some early mistakes, the new South Korean leadership achieved an economic takeoff by 1965. For the next twenty years, annual real growth of gross national product ranged from a high of over 15 percent (1975) to a low of 5 percent (1983), with one year of unaccustomed negative growth (1980) resulting from the second oil crisis and internal problems (MacDonald,

1996:20).

The threats coming from North Korea along the 38th parallel by way of armed intrusion and clashes provided the Park regime with enormous public support for tight control for security. In January 1968, North Korean intruders attempted to assassinate President Park, followed by the seizure of the USS Pueblo two days later. An American reconnaissance airplane was shot down in April 1969. North Korean agents hijacked a Korean passenger airline in December 1969. There were numerous guerrilla landings along the South Korean coast including one landing of about 130 North Korean commandos. According to John Lovell, a prominent scholar in Korean affairs,

the imminent possibility of a renewed outbreak of war with North Korea strengthens the voice of ROK military leaders in the councils of government, and provides a major incentives for all politicians to advocate maintenances of the armed forces at top levels of strength and readiness (1975:192).

Park mobilized the country in order to defend itself from North Korean attack. He organized the Homeland Reserve Force of about 2.5

million in reaction to the commando raid against the Blue House and the infiltration elsewhere of armed units from North Korea in 1968 and 1969. The force was manned by veterans of active duty service, some 150,000 to 200,000 of whom were discharged annually from the armed forces during the 1970s, and commanded at the field grade level and above by regular army officers. “The Homeland Reserve’s primary function was to defend against infiltration into rear areas” (Clough, 1987:95). The country itself became one huge army.

The Vietnam War, the Nixon Doctrine, and the pressure to cut US military aid forced Park to build up self-reliant military capabilities in the 1970s. Park launched the Force Improvement Plan (FIP), *the Yulgok Project*, in the period of 1974 to 1981 by allocating \$5.5 billion, which “enabled it to outspend the North on defense since 1976” (Hamm, 1999:80). FIP I was subsequently followed by FIP II (1982-6) and FIP III (1987-92). According to Hamm, “the ROK arms buildups were achieved rather easily, thanks to rapid economic growth, compared to those of the DPRK whose economic growth came to a standstill in the 1980s” (Hamm, 1999:84). South Korea was able to take a lead in

military spending in the late 1970s and the trend continued since then (Park, 1986:839).

5. Political Structure and Leadership (1961–87)

The Weberian bureaucracy led by Park Chung-hee was reluctant to share his power. Two pillars of his propaganda were economic development and anti-communism. The tie between the government and conglomerates called *chaebol* that formed a foundation for rapid economic growth proved efficient when they dealt with the threats posed by external environment such as the changes in oil prices in the 1973 and 1979 as well as North Korean threats, but turned out to be resilient to domestic developments such as the demand for democracy. Economic development proceeded individual freedom and rights in the name of political stability. The growth-minded state and interest-minded businesses worked together to maximize economic development.

Park Chung-hee instituted a political system that does not allow dissident voices. Though the authoritarian political system has opposition parties, elections, policy debates and subsystem autonomy of

various official and non-official groups, their roles are oriented toward preventing anti-government activities (Han, 1977:2). It derived from South Korea's experiences after liberation. The Syngman Rhee's government was overthrown by student uprisings on April 19, 1960. The Chang Myon government was overthrown by the military coup led by Park Chung-hee on May 16, 1961. For Park, both external and internal threats shaped his choice for authoritarian political structure, which inevitably created the imbalance between material abundance and human rights.

Though "Park's success in promoting growth was the primary source of support for his continuance in office," it reached the point where resentment among politicians, intellectuals, and students at his authoritarian practices could be no longer suppressed (Clough, 1987:34). Park responded by tightening internal security and by declaring a state of emergency on December 6, 1971 in the name of national security.

His stated reason was to maintain law and order in the face of mounting domestic disturbances, including campus demonstrations, to be suppressed by using military troops against students. Park argued that these emergency measures were necessary because

of rapid changes in the international situation and North Korea's "aggressive" intentions to exploit the weakness of South Korea, timed with the initiation of the North-South Red Cross negotiations in August 1971 (Kihl, 1984:60)

Anti-government student demonstrations persisted during Park Chung-hee's rule, but they got worse especially after the *Yushin* reconstitution allowing him to stay in power permanently. Intellectuals, Christian leaders, and students joined together to call for democratic reforms. Opposition leaders such as Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung protested against the *Yushin*. President Park issued emergency decrees as a response to mounting pressure from the leaders from various social sectors. "Under the decree, advocating, proposing or discussing the desirability of the Constitutional revision was to be punishable by imprisonment of up to 15 years" (Han, 1975:36). The Park regime put leaders such as former President, Yon Bo-sun and an opposition leader Paek, Ki-wan in prison for their constituted attempts to subvert the government.

North Korea was the object of denouncement because President Park's perception of North Korea linked internal instability to North

Korean communist threats. He called the North Korean authorities “puppets” in a liberation address in August, 1970 (Clough, 1987:111). The image of North Korea as enemy was consistent throughout his presidency. Park ordered more intense anti-Communist indoctrination program arguing that “the covert objective of the (North Korean) Communist party is to induce the (South Korean) people to...lower their guards and then launch an invasion anew” even three month after the most dramatic diplomatic gesture during the Cold War came in July 4, 1972 when North-South joint statement of principles for the reunification of our fatherland was reached (Koh, 1984:101). Years of experience in antagonizing against each other with military threats contributed to the lack of trust between the two Koreas in mapping out reunification strategy. Neither side was ready to change “their images of each other’s ultimate goals” (Koh, 1984:101).

Park’s view of North Korea as being “bent on reckless schemes for Communization of the whole of Korea” posed a constant threat to the security of South Korea (Koh, 1984:101). Park also perceived North Korea as “the most isolated and irrational of all the countries of the

world” (Koh, 1984:101). Based on his experiences in the Korean War and incursions after that Park believed that “the north Korean Communists will try to overrun us militarily, when they decide they stand a good chance, and they will offer to talk when think they are in a weaker position...This is their standing modus operandi” (Koh, 1984:102).

To cope with North Korea, Park suggested a South Korean strategy of economic development, military strength, and political viability. Then, he anticipated that the North had no choice but to change its unification strategy by reconciling and cooperating with the South to reach peaceful unification formula (Koh, 1984:102). International environments such as the end of American economic aid in 1971, withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and radical change in relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic China influenced President Park to pursue self-reliance ideology that South Korea has to its own destiny in the Korean Peninsula.

Overall, Park Chung-hee was “just the man Korea needed” (Gregg, 1999). Economically, Korea was able to improve per capita income by nearly three folds in real terms from less than \$100 in 1961 to about

\$700 in 1976 (Koh, 1984:35). Because North Korea possessed more mineral resources and industrial base after the Korean War, South Korea was in a weaker position in terms of economic power. The imbalance was reversed when President Park successfully implemented the Five Year Economic Development Plans. By achieving economic growth and self-reliance, the legacy of President Park toward North Korea was his confidence in dealing with North Korea (Kamiya, 1980:746).

His eventual successor, Chun Doo Hwan was “a longtime acolyte and loyalist of Park Chung Hee” (Cumings, 2005:380). Both Park and Chun were from the same region, Taegu, North Kyongsang Province and had ties as officers in the Korean Army. Under Park’s rule, because he relied on people who shared the same regional origin of the Kyongsang Province of the southeast rather than the Cholla Province of the southwest and schooling ties in high school and college level, Chun naturally became the perfect choice. In addition, Chun had both ambition and political acuteness.

On May 16, 1961, when Brigadier General Park Chung Hee and his followers led the military coup, Captain Chun took the initiative to contact General Park to offer him his allegiance and service. Chun was credited with having persuaded the cadets of the Korean Military Academy to stage a procoup march through the Seoul streets in support of General Park Chung Hee. During the junta rule in the following months Captain Chun was appointed as one of Park's senior secretaries in charge of civilian petitioning affairs (Kihl, 1984:125).

Even after Chun turned down Park's suggestion that he embark on a political career, his personal relationship with Park continued throughout Chun's smooth and rapid career.

While in Vietnam, Chun Doo Hwan allegedly suggested in a letter to President Park the idea of establishing 'democracy Korean style.' President Park responded favorably, later writing to Chun that he had made an address on this theme before to the graduating class of the Korean Military Academy in 1971 (Kihl, 1984:126).

Chun worked for Park as assistant director for operations of the presidential security force at the Blue House and was able to maintain frequent personal contact with him. Park's trust in Chun materialized when Chun became commanding general of the powerful Defense Security Command, which Park used for political control and as a check

on his politically active bodyguard force and the KCIA (Oberdorfer, 2001:121).

After the assassination of Park Chung Hee by former KCIA director, Chun continued Park's policy toward North Korea. Because Chun had been a career military officer and loyal to Park, his view of North Korea was profoundly distrustful and argued that national security must override all others

No matter how fine our goals, they are meaningless unless our national security is unflinchingly preserved. We must not relax our guard for even the most fleeting moments; in light of our unique geopolitical position, we must keep an unblinking watch on the volatile situations surrounding the Korean peninsula, as well as on the unpredictable global scene in the 1980s. There is no substitute for national security: it is fundamental to national survival. The overriding importance of national security must be indelibly ingrained in our minds (inaugural speech on March 3, 1981, *Korean Newsreview*, March 7, 1981, p. 8).

The Korean society that had experienced the economic development now produced rapidly growing urban middle class who believed in establishing a democratic political system that could accommodate diverse political voices after Park's assassination. For

Chun, the threats coming from the North were not the only concern. The Kwangju uprising in 1980 questioned Chun's motive to acquire political power by demanding that martial law be lifted and an early date be established for a presidential election. To ensure his ascension to the power, Chun fabricated the threat from North Korea by publicizing that Pyongyang was the hidden hand behind the students in Kwangju and that the decisive moment for a North Korean attack on the South might have arrived, which American intelligence turned up no sign of preparation for attack. The exaggeration of North Korean threats was effective enough for him to take control of power and at the same time purge political rivals.

Another factor that contributed to the strong leadership rather than democratic leadership was the Korean economy hit by a world wide recession. As a result, the Korean economy suffered in an unprecedented negative growth of 5.2 percent in 1980. "The need for vigorous government action to remedy the economic decline was widely recognized, and most people were willing to give Chun a chance to see what he could do" (Clough, 1987:130). The Korean public needed a

strong leadership to overcome economic difficulties as well as security.

Unlike Jimmy Carter, who insisted withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Korea and was critical of human rights and democracy, Reagan warmly embraced Chun by legitimizing his takeover as a fait accompli. Contrary to his predecessor, Reagan also increased US troops in Korea to 43,000 and allowed sale of F-16 fighters. But, those who opposed Chun felt a sense of betrayal and bitter antagonism toward the U.S. because Chun was responsible for December 12 military coup and the suppression of Kwangju uprising.

North Korean backed terrorism, however, justified a government effort to politicize North Korean hostilities. The shooting down of KAL 007 by the Soviet Union fighters and the detonation of a powerful bomb to kill Chun in Rangoon, Burma by North Korean agents in 1983 caused public anxiety over the Communists' brutality. In an address on the 37th Armed Forces Day, October 1, 1985, Chun reminded South Koreans that

needless to say, the greatest threat to us since the 1945 liberation has always come from the North Korean Communists....they are scheming to militarily provoke the South through means fair or foul under a strategy for communizing the

entire Korean peninsula by force. At the same time, they are forcing inhumane lifestyles and thoughts on the North Korean residents. Accordingly, it can only be concluded that the South-North confrontation represents an uncompromising struggle for us who oppose antinational and dehumanizing activities (Korea Textbook Co, 1986:173)

Many Koreans were shocked to find out that the bombing was ordered by Kim, Jung-il, a new boss in charge of clandestine operation in North Korea because one day before the bombing North Korea suggested to take part in three-way talks with the United States and South Korea through Chinese diplomats. Though it was a major departure from long-standing policies, South Koreans doubted their true intentions.

To hide their aggressive intent, the North Korean Communists pretend to be positively interested in a dialogue with us. In truth, however, they are building new airfields and underground fortresses and have moved massive combat forces forward to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone and radically stepped up offensive training of commando units. They are thus making all-out preparations to launch surprise attacks on the Republic at any time. We must always keep in mind the fact that North Korea has readied a strategy to infiltrate 100,000 commandos deep into the South with the aim of simultaneously turning our frontline and rear areas into battlefields. Their sinister scheme has been graphically illustrated by their recent acquisition of helicopters of the same models as the ones we have on hand” (Korea Textbook Co., 1986:159).

Thus, Chun was skeptical of the involvement of formal talks with Kim, Il-sung. In addition, he was also leery of debating unification issues with the North, even though he put forward a new unification strategy on January 22, 1982. His appointment of Lee Bum-suk, an anticommunist refugee from North Korea and former minister of national unification, as his new secretary-general in the Blue House signaled his stance toward North Korea (Kihl, 1984:178).

tying the unification question to the security issue gave Chun a new formula for enhancing his claim to legitimacy. This strategy of linking issues is expected to be rewarding to Chun because Korean unification is an important issue for the Korean people and thus he can readily manipulate and exploit the theme of unification to his political advantage (Kihl, 1984:178).

The public, however, became aware of this political manipulation of North Korean threats and wanted to end such practices as Chun was closing in his presidential term.

6. Conclusion

South Korean image of North Korea from 1948 to 1987 had

remained consistent as the image of enemy. The systematic rivalry between the U.S. and USSR contributed to this outcome. The involvement of superpowers in the establishment of the two Koreas resulted in the Korean War, which hardened and maintained the preexisting image of enemy against each other. Syngman Rhee's view of the North as enemy, *wonsu*, which was manifested in his inauguration address, was most intense in emotion among Presidents since the chance for unification in the Korean Peninsula was shattered and the survival of South Korea was at risk. He wanted to unify the Korean peninsula by force, which was impossible without the support from the United States. The U.S., instead, formulated the policy of containment, which Syngman Rhee had to adopt for its survival by receiving financial aids from America.

Park Chung Hee, who experienced the Korean War, knew the value of the U.S. in the fierce rivalry between the two Koreas. In order to win the regime competition, he emphasized development of economy, first. Then, North Korea had to be absorbed by superior South Korea. As the support from the U.S. declined, Park had to rely less on the

United States. Force Improvement Plan was initiated in the 1970s. Industrialization, however, had some drawbacks. The income disparity widened and human rights were sacrificed as government geared toward economic development. The rise of dissident voices and demonstrations only made Park harden his grip of power until the end of his rule, which abruptly ended by assassination. During his tenure, the threats from North Korea were abused to consolidate his political base.

Chun Doo Hwan maintained Park's view of North Korea as a hostile enemy with intention of unifying the Korean Peninsula by force throughout his presidency. The rise of the middle class in South Korea due to industrialization, however, caused the public to question his legitimacy by demanding more freedom from the government. Students participated in demonstrations to call for democracy and peaceful transfer of power to civilian. Threats from North Korea and the trouble in economy contributed to people's demand for strong leadership in the beginning of his tenure.

Since its establishment in 1948, South Korean image of North Korea was enemy. As South Korea began to develop its economy,

image attributes began to change. The impact of such changes will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Five

The Image of North Korea as Ally (1988–2000)

South Korean image of North Korea as enemy began to change to ally with the Roh Tae Woo administration. This chapter examines the new image of North Korea as an ally and intends to find causes of such phenomena. The change in image was prompted by threat and opportunity that South Korea faced in the late 1980s. This chapter examines the change in the rise of a new image by looking into image attributes and social contexts.

1. Threat or Opportunity

The successful hosting of the twenty-fourth Olympiad from September 17 to October 2, 1988 provided South Korea with a chance to engage in setting up diplomatic relations with the allies of North Korea. The world environment was changing favorable to South Korea “as a new pragmatism and efforts at reform swept over communist regimes in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe” (Oberdorfer, 2001:186).

Ideology no longer was a dominant factor in South Korean foreign policy. South Korea could provide communist countries around world with economic aid at the cost of their switching side from North Korea to South Korea. By participating in the Olympics, these communist countries came and saw South Korean economic miracles. The next step was to establish diplomatic ties between South Korea and these countries. The announcement on July 7, 1988 was the beginning of an intensified effort to establish relationships with North Korea's communist allies, which altered the landscape of the North and South Korean relations.

Praising the leadership of Roh Tae Woo in preparation for the Olympics and subsequent South Korean foreign policy of Northern Strategy, Clough argued the change in status of South Korea in the world. "For almost three decades after 1945, South Korea was a virtual client-state of the United States...Korea was equipped to play an independent role in Pacific and world politics" (Clough, 1987:110). One piece of evidence was the increase in the number of countries that South Korea established diplomatic relations with by the beginning of 1990, which was

133, outnumbering the number of diplomatic relations of North Korea of 102. “The number of countries maintaining diplomatic relations stood at 117 for South Korea and 104 for North Korea as of May 1982” (Kihl, 1985:151). From 1982 to 1990, South Korea increased its diplomatic relations with 16 more countries, while North Korea did so with only 2 countries.

Contrary to South Korean emergence in the international arena, North Korea faced the brink of the fall of regime after a Collapse of the Soviet Union followed by floods in the middle of 1990s. The Northern policy turned out to be successful in gaining diplomatic recognition in the world community and cornered North Korea. South Korea had to realize that the actual collapse of North Korea became a threat to the security of South Korea because it would generate massive infusion of refugees to the South as well as China, which in turn brings economic burden and instability to the region. For instance, the sudden unification of Germany brought hope to the Korean unification, but German unification showcased the problems in the process of sudden transition simultaneously.

German unification led to weakening of the overall health of the German economy because of the condition of East German economy was weak in terms of foreign debt.

East German foreign debt turned over to a unified Germany amounts to \$20 billion, and roughly \$10 billion is also needed for the support of Soviet troops to be stationed until 1994 and to provide vocational training and housing when they return home. In 1990 alone, more than 100 billion marks (equivalent to 4 % of GNP) was estimated to be needed to finance East German budget deficits, to provide unemployment benefits and to invest in such social infrastructure as roads and communication facilities (Kee, 1991:32)

Considering estimated cost of German Unification over 10 years being from \$542.4 to \$609.4 billion, the source of income has to involve collecting more tax. (Kee, 1991:32-33). According to Allensbach survey in West Germany in 1990, 69 % of West Germans favored unification and 75 % anticipated tax increase (Kee, 1991:29). Even with such high level of support, rapid transition resulted in “inconveniences in shopping, increased traffic congestion, worsening unemployment, housing shortage and other social tensions” (Kee, 1991:33).

The economic and social problems in Germany occurred even

after a relatively long period of official and unofficial contacts between the two Germanys. The two Korean leaders met in 2000, but two German leaders met in 1971, which is about 30 years earlier. This is not the only difference between Germany and Korea. In terms of income disparity, “East German per capita, GDP is estimated, with a wide margin, at around one-fourth of that for West Germany, while the disparity is even larger (one-fifth) between South Korea and North Korea” (Kee, 1991:36). Moreover, in case of unification South Korea is responsible for the North Korean population, which amounts to 50.5 % of that of South Korea, while only 26.5 % of the West German population matches the East German population (Kee, 1991:36).

With this in mind, after the Cold War the South Korean government began questioning the survivability of North Korea and unification in the Korean peninsula. The main question is how to maintain stability in the peninsula and achieve unification with North Korea in the long term. Various political groups have designed their own unification scenarios, which are explicitly wrapped up in ideological tones (Kim, 1991).

Among them, Woo categorizes four unification strategies (Woo, 2003). The first group is those who emphasize the U.S.-ROK alliance and favor containment and absorption of North Korea, which was the prevalent unification strategy during the Cold War. South Korea can not trust North Korea because its intentions are harmful, though both Koreas share history, culture, language, and ethnicity for almost 1,000 years. Only strong U.S.-ROK alliance can deter threats coming from North Korea. The image of North Korea is, therefore, enemy.

The second group prefers minimal intervention from neighboring major powers and immediate and independent unification. This idea, called progressive nationalism, stems from left-wing intellectuals during the Japanese occupation. Without the Korean War and subsequent division in the Korean Peninsula, immediate and bilateral unification could have been desirable and possible as nationalist like Lyun Woon Hyung and Kim Ku. Capability and culture are equal and intentions are good. The two Koreas had to counter threats from superpowers. The image of North Korea is the same people as South Korea, compatriots or ally.

The third is conditional engagement, which focuses on strict

application for reciprocity principle. The widening gap between North Korea and South Korea in capability and culture due to division after the Korean War has to be minimized with economic and personnel exchanges, but the intention of North Korea is not as trustworthy as ally. Both Korea share the ultimate goal of unification between the two Korea through dialogue and reconciliation. The conservatives in South Korea maintain this position. Their image is located in between the image of enemy and ally, but proximate image of ally.

The last one is gradual integration by engagement. Though North Korea is relatively weak in capability, it possesses powerful military to inflict massive damages on South Korea. Both Koreas share same language, history, ethnicity and culture. The two Koreas can not afford another war in the Korean Peninsula and want to reduce tensions and hostility by building trust through reconciliation and cooperation. The image of North Korea is ally. According to Woo, the last strategy would best serve South Korean national interests in the long term. The difference between the third and the fourth is that the third has the image of North Korea as a “tricky partner,” while the fourth has the

image of the North as a “negotiable partner.” Since 1998, after the election of Kim Dae Jung, South Korea has adopted the fourth strategy, called the “Sunshine Policy.” Roh Moo Hyun maintained Kim’s policy but changed the name to the “Peace and Prosperity Policy.”

The official South Korean unification policy is to first engage with North Korea in the area of economic and cultural exchanges in order to strengthen cooperation between the two countries. In the end, North Korea would become more stable and friendly state to coexist with the South (Ministry of Unification, 2001:24). One of the lessons learned from the unification of Germany is that the quick and unprepared unification of Germany had unfavorable consequences in the process of unification such as financial burden. Dialogue and cooperation were the first steps to promote understanding and reconciliation in the Peninsula.

Considering the size and strength of South Korean economy being weaker and smaller than that of West Germany and that of North Korean economy being in worse shape than East Germany, the situation of unification in the Korean peninsula would take more time and energy than experts can predict. Thus, unification policy by South Korea is to get

rid of tension and crisis in order to foster the sense of peace and prosperity until both countries are independent and stable enough to unify

2. Domestic Developments and Images

At the end of the Cold War, the South Korean government ran into the dilemma of whether to maintain closed system for tight control or to open up the system for growth and development by sending people outside for further learning and expertise. The growing numbers of students studying abroad realized the gap between the environment that they had grown up in and the environment that they encountered in the U.S. or other European countries. Export driven economy also prompted frequent exposure to new cultures. For example, employees in the Korean construction companies moved around the world to work for businesses. Korea became interdependent with countries around the world. Korean Air lines provided world-wide services to 30 cities in 20 countries in the world carrying almost 3 million passengers in 1980 (Clough, 1987:313).

Government had to limit the number of people who wanted to travel outside of Korea for leisure. The rise of the middle class, due to the economic development, was restricted from going abroad until 1989 when the freedom of travel abroad without government permission was granted. According to the Korea Tourism Organization that kept the data from 1961, the number of people who went outside of Korea was 10,242 in 1961. The number kept increasing to 101,295 by 1973 with expansion of contacts with countries around the world. After the passage of bill that allows free travel abroad, the number of people who traveled outside of Korea jumped to 1,213,112 in 1989 (www.knto.or.kr/index.jsp). Even after the law passed, the government exercised restrictions on people such as putting a limit on the number of items one can buy from foreign countries to protect domestic industries. In addition, government officials who got a chance to go abroad for either business trips or school usually had to spend one day before the departure to take security classes to know how to behave should North Korean agents approach them.

The rise of personal income and GNP enabled South Korea in

general to improve educational system and literacy rate. For many parents, sending their children to college was one of their basic responsibilities. The government institutionalized education in such a way that individuals were indoctrinated to become comfortable with Confucian work-ethics, anti-Communism ideals, and less likely to become hostile to government policies. The government wanted citizens who could be obedient to the government policy of prioritizing economic growth and anti-Communism. The highly educated work force contributed to the efficiency of running businesses. Externally, the reliance on the U.S. and Japan for financial aid and technology forced Korea to learn how to conduct businesses with them by learning their culture and social systems.

The educational system, however, allowed students and teachers who recognized this discrepancy between democratic profession and authoritarian practices to mobilize themselves domestically to change the status quo in the late 1980s (Cumings, 2005:385). They have roots dating back to military regime.

Human rights organizations and churches were critical sanctuaries for dissidents, with the former relying on international support and the latter often being the only institution relatively immune from intrusion by the regime. Otherwise the Chun regime intruded everywhere: no visitor to Seoul in the mid-1980s could miss the warlike atmosphere of resistance and repression (Cumings, 2005:392).

Teachers in high school organized Korean Teachers Union, *Chungyojo* to strengthen their stance against authoritarian rule and threatened to resign from their jobs in group as a whole. It was a significant departure from Confucian tradition of loyalty, and at the same time it gave a chance for their students to realize that something was not right.

The Korean public needed more information as they participated in various kinds of activities in the work place and leisure due to the rapid growth of the Korean economy. Supported by the educational system, skill, and cognitive sophistication, the public was able to gain access to various communication media such as TV, newspaper, radio, and the Internet in the 90s. Public awareness of politics, economy, and diplomacy built up pressure for government to give up its authoritarian practice and open up for democracy. “The daily newspaper circulation rates in 1990, for instance, [were] ten times higher than the rates in

1955. The telephone subscription rates also increased 60 times between 1965 and 1990” (Lee, 1995:224). The public opinion became to play a role in South Korean politics.

Students who were active in this period usually did not have any experience with the Korean War and were more exposed to the Western culture of individualism and material wealth relative to their previous generation. These students learned about North Korea and their hostility, which was superficial and indirect to them because it lacked the emotional element. In addition, their self identity was different from those who experienced the Korean War. Regime survival and ideological rivalry between the two Koreas seemed remote for them and it was easy for them to disregard the values and lessons learned and cherished by old generations. Young generations are much more susceptible to the idea of prestige, autonomy, and national pride, while old generations are inclined to the values of security and survival.

The hostile governmental policy toward North Korea with the image of enemy started to change in the Roh administration (1988-1993). He initiated a more amicable relationship with not just North Korea, but

also communist countries in Eastern Europe. The reason for the change in image results from the change in Korean self-identity. Because individual or group constantly pursues to enhance self-identity, the existence of threat or opportunity brings about a chance to form group comparison resulting in positive in-group identity compared to out-group devaluation. Changes within in-group also affect the modification in self-identity of the in-group.

The formation of in-group is not an end-product. In-group itself, in this case, South Korea strives to change its identity to a better one when the public is aware of the need and possibility of change. The need for South Korea was first of all security of regime survival, and economic development to maintain and support security measures under Park, Chung Hee who adhered to a strong anti-communism stance and controlled the country with an iron fist. Threats posed by North Korea were so strong and the need for strong leadership was justified in the area of security and economic development during the period.

As constant threats of regime survival from North Korea had lasted for more than 30 years, it became apparent that security threats

from the North diluted due to the loss of urgency and democratic movements within South Korea accompanied by the change of generation. According to the survey conducted by Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) in 1994, the view of North Korea as enemy was only 7.1 percent, while that of North Korea as cooperative partner was 20.4 percent (KINU website). When KINU conducted the same survey in 1999, the view of North Korea as enemy almost did not change with 8.2 percent, but the view of North Korea as cooperative partner increased to 32.6 percent (KINU website).

Domestic change, however, occurred unilaterally within South Korea even though the security environment and defense hardware of North Korea remained very much unchanged. Military supremacy over the civilian sector has disappeared, and the decision making structure of national security policy has been decentralized. While defense spending has been gradually reduced, social welfare spending has been on the rise (Moon and Paik, 1995:264).

3. Capabilities and Intentions

The percentage of defense spending over GDP was on a downward trend from 5.6 percent in 1979 to 2.7 percent in 2000, but the actual amount of money that was spent in the defense sector has increased by almost ten folds from \$1.5 billion won in 1979 to \$14.4 billion in 2000 (Ministry of National Defense, 2000). Except three years in 1998, 1999, 2000, when Korea suffered from the Asian financial crisis, the rate of increase in defense budget exceeded the increase in prices. Reagan administration's policy to build a strong military against communist Soviet Union found a parallel in Korea, which commissioned the Force Improvement Plan in 1974. Under the three phases of FIP, South Korea was able to build up its arms successfully supported by a strong economy. South Korea was able to manufacture M-16 rifles, surface to surface missiles, K-1 tanks, and training aircrafts. In addition, Korean Navy was equipped with patrol boats, corvettes, frigates, mine hunting ships, logistics support vessels, submarines, and Lynx helicopters and P-3C aircraft for three dimensional warfare during the period.

The pressure from South Korean military buildup forced North

Korea to turn to the Soviet Union for support. Though suffering from an ailing economy, the Soviet Union was determined to provide aircrafts such as MIG-23, SU-25, MIG-29 and air defense missiles such as SA-3 and SA-5 as a show of counterbalance. These were, however, believed to be “marginal capability for defending North Korea airspace and a limited ability to conduct air operations against South Korea” (Arrigoni, 1994:232). Unable to balance power, North Korea turned to terrorism to obstruct South Korea from becoming superior to North Korea. The bombing of the Korean Air Line in November 1987 was a frantic effort to block the rise of South Korean power before hosting the Olympics in 1988.

North Korea was further isolated diplomatically because South Korea took advantage of the opportunity of competition between the two Koreas with economic and diplomatic power in the world. The proposal to join UN membership as two separate nations was an example of South Korea’s bold step to take initiative in Korean affairs. Another example of changing nature of South Korea was the pursuit of regaining complete operational control of military under the Roh Tae Woo administration

(Cheong Wa Dae Office of the President, Republic of Korea, 5/14/07).

Force Improvement Plan was a requisite step toward that direction because it guaranteed the enhancement of South Korean military capabilities.

The only option for North Korea to compensate for the inferiority of conventional military power especially after the loss of its ally, the Soviet Union, was to build nuclear weapons. Contrary to South Korea who enjoyed nuclear umbrella from the U.S., North Korea was unable to receive nuclear guarantee from either the Soviet Union or China. Nuclear development was powerful enough to make instantly conventional military doctrines of air superiority, forward deployment, special force, tunnels, dams, and man power obsolete.

New threats rising from the North Korean nuclear program were perceived by the U.S. as high because of the concern that North Korea would possess nuclear weapons for hostile intentions such as directly attacking South Korea, Japan, or even the U.S., and transferring nuclear weapons or technology to terrorists. Acknowledging North Korean possession of nuclear weapons meant a nuclear arms race in northeast

Asia. Japan would quickly arm itself against a possible threat from the North and so would South Korea. In order to promote peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula, Roh Tae Woo announced the Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in January 1992 to avoid escalation of the arms race in the Peninsula.

For North Korea, giving up the nuclear program required security of regime and revival of economy. While South Korea enjoyed the growth of economy and military power annually, North Korea suffered a declining economy, flood and famine, and a constant threat of military invasion from the U.S. and South Korea allegedly manifested in their joint exercise in the 1990s. It was simple and easy for South Korea to give up nuclear weapons because the U.S. provided nuclear guarantee to the South, but North Korea lacked allies that could provide a nuclear umbrella, and its domestic situation such as economy was in dire condition. Nuclear program was the ultimate bargaining chip for the North for their security and survival.

After the end of the Cold war, North Korea was predicted by many that it would collapse soon. Contrary to their expectation, North

Korea showed no sign of weakening its social and political structure. Despite its declining economy, North Korea was believed to have capability to inflict significant damage on the capital city of South Korea with conventional weaponry because Seoul was located within the range of their forward deployed artillery. North Korean expression of “sea of fire” in Seoul made in March 19, 1994 is indeed a credible threat. The power to attack and inflict damages on South Korea gave North Korea significant leverage and forced South Korea to find strategy that could prevent the occurring of another war or military confrontation. It was time to start diplomacy to change existing policies toward each other.

The first civilian president of South Korea, Kim Young Sam was unable to make a progress in the direction of peace and prosperity. Shortly after his inauguration in March 1993, North Korea announced the plan to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. North Korea, since then, had succeeded in gaining attention from the U.S., which left South Korea in a diplomatically weak position. “The exclusion of Seoul from the US-North Korean nuclear talks has been a blow to South Korea's prickly national pride” (Burton, 1995). Coupled with his

experience of his mother being killed by North Korean agents when he was young, Kim was dubious about North Korean intents during the nuclear crisis. His contempt almost materialized after the submarine incursion of 1996 when he secretly prepared for military strike against North Korea (Oberdorfer, 2001:390).

Kim Dae Jung, who was known for his democratic credentials, announced the Sunshine policy toward North Korea. His steadfast commitment bore its fruit in 2000 for the first ever summit meeting between the two leaders after the Korean War. The summit was still a moment to celebrate, because it contributed to the reduction in tension and hostile activities. Critiques argue that the change in South Korean policy toward North Korea should be reciprocated by the change within North Korea, which does not show any signs of such drastic changes as the rise of middle class or changes in political structure.

The military threat from North Korea still exists. The gap in military spending between the two Koreas is generally deepening, while nuclear issues remain as a large concern for South Korea and others. The unification by force, however, is not likely because having another

war in the Peninsula assures massive destruction for both. How to avoid another war becomes more of an urgent issue now and the two parties have begun to step in that direction by reducing tensions and animosity where political structure and leadership come into play.

4. Political Structure and Leadership

The government policy of prioritizing economic development inadvertently caused the rise of the democratic movement. As Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens argue, economic developments bring about pressure for democratization through changes in class configuration and in class relations (1992). Park's insistence on economic sufficiency required a strong government, corporations, and cheap labor in order to sustain export-driven economy. The in-group of state and corporate businessmen wanted to protect their interests. The state wanted to maintain power, while businessmen focused on making more money. The out-group of people who supplied cheap labor was left without protection. The in-group wanted to maintain the status quo, while the out-group wanted to change the political system.

For the working class, one of the many ways to change the society was to change government leadership by mobilization, which was made easy because of urbanization. When the way to change it was constitutionally opposed, like Park's *Yushin* did, they rose up against it. For workers in the process of economic development, their targets were both Park and conglomerates because they were categorized as out-group. Korea has a historical case of April Revolution of 1960 by students that overthrew Rhee regime for his corruption.

The workers, aided initially by student and church groups, formulated their class interests as against both the capitalists and the authoritarian state. Thus, their participation in the democracy movement was vital and enabled the democracy movement of the mid-1980s to be a broad-based coalition, including students (and intellectuals), religious leaders, workers, and the urban middle class (Kim, 1995:218).

Though there was a flow of information through various kinds of controlled communication media, Koreans began to feel the need for more freedom, which was sacrificed for the value of national efficiency and power to sustain bureaucratic structure. This need is partly due to the rise of the middle class in South Korea after rapid industrialization.

This change is reflected by the proportion of people who felt that they belonged to the middle class—58 percent in 1985, increasing to 60 percent in 1987, and again to 61 percent in 1989, indicating a steady growth in middle-class consciousness (Lee, 1995:224).

This data do not contain the percentage of the middle class in the 1960s, but still proves the rise because the percentage of the middle class in the 1960s was almost negligible considering the fact that South Korea then was stricken with poverty throughout. These middle class citizens were aware of democratic movements outside of South Korea and some of them became critical of existing dominant militaristic and Confucian culture of paternalism. They expressed their dissatisfaction by siding with the student demand for democracy (Young Whan Kihl, 1988:75-79).

Although Koreans in general gained benefits from economic development, it was conglomerates that were able to gain the most, while the workers suffered because their voices were not represented equally. Labor strikes exploded in 1987 after years of repressive labor policies and relatively inactive labor organizations. The death of student, Park Chong Cheol and the nomination of successor, Roh Tae Woo by Chun

Doo Whan caused massive demonstrations.

In the spring of 1987, thousands of angry demonstrators filled the streets of Seoul and other major cities. Scenes of political unrest were broadcast daily around the world, just as South Korea was preparing to host the 1988 Summer Olympics (Kim, 1995:205).

It was an embarrassing moment for Korean government who wanted to enhance the image of Korea. The call for a change in the government from authoritarian to democratic political structure was ripe.

The authoritarian government faced a rising group of dissident voices and was forced to make changes to stabilize the country in order to host the Olympics. “The value change over the last three or four decades played a central role in shifting mass political attitudes, thus enhancing the propensity to engage in political action” (Lee, 1995:240). For fear of civil revolution, on June 29, 1987, Roh Tae Woo with Chun’s deliberation and ideas announced the Declaration of Democracy, allowing free elections and ended nearly three decades of dictatorial military rule. In December of that year, South Korea, for the first time after the military take-over for almost two decades, held direct presidential

election and marked the historic political water-shed point in the Korean history.

Efficiency and growth-driven top-down bureaucratic Korea faced rising discontent from the public because of their lack of freedom and human rights. Government felt the pressure from the people who violently demonstrated against the militaristic government or anything that dealt with the government. In this sense, the coming of Roh's free election was a significant departure toward democracy. After successful and peaceful transition of power from Chun Doo-hwan to Roh Tae Woo, on February 25, 1988, Roh distanced himself from the previous authoritarian presidents by calling himself "an ordinary man" in the era of "the common people" (<http://www.answers.com/topic/roh-tae-woo>). In order to gain legitimacy, he appealed to the people that he was reform-minded and ready to work for change in regard to policy toward North Korea.

The free election, however, was only the beginning of the democratic movement. For the new-born democratic Roh government to continue walk in the direction of full democracy, there were many

steps to take. Among them, it was considered imperative to eliminate authoritarian bureaucracy and to limit strategic control of freedom of press and speech by employing the police and military intelligence—especially over the academic community and over religious groups (Kim and Kihl, 1988:247). This new step toward democracy was the slipping away of power and protection that conservatives enjoyed during the old military governments as labor’s demands for a welfare state grew stronger.

In addition, Roh had to face a defeat to the ruling Democratic Justice Party in the thirteenth National Assembly Election held on April 26, 1988. It was the first time in forty years of constitutional history of the Republic of Korea that the ruling party lost the majority in the National Assembly (Kim and Kihl, 1988:246-7). Internationally, Roh first introduced the concept of “Northern Diplomacy” during the campaign for the presidency in 1987 declaring in a speech in Inchon that “we will cross the Yellow Sea” to China (Oberdorfer, 2001:187-8). Roh understood Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented reforms in China and envisioned the benefits of strategic ties between the two countries. It

was also a right time for Roh to spawn relationships with Mikhail Gorbachev whose reformist “new thinking” in foreign policy was sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

“Nordpolitik” was first used by former Foreign Minister Lee, Bum Suk in 1983 and was modeled after West German “ostpolitik.” It is the outcome of the rise in South Korean national power and planning. Getting a hint from 1964 Tokyo Olympics, President Park Chung Hee desired to “to demonstrate Korea’s economic growth and national power” and “to create favorable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with both communists and non-aligned nations” (Oberdorfer, 2001:180). South Korea has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries after the Korean War to one of the newly industrialized countries in the world. Northern diplomacy is an extension of previous policy but, also a significant departure from the previous policy of containment. Contrary to the previous policy of isolating each other in the international community, it asks South Korean allies to induce North Korea into international society. At the same time, South Korea reached out to China and Soviet Union who were allies of North Korea for their support.

Northern diplomacy was possible because South Korea established the new image of North Korea as a potential partner in the pursuit of common prosperity. In the Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives in November 8, 1991, Roh called upon North Korea in the name of “seventy million fellow Koreans” to immediately abandon the attempt to develop nuclear weapons. The name calling of “seventy million fellow Koreans” include both populations in the South and the North. It signifies the equal and same relationship between the two. Roh Tae Woo went on to the landmark “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North” signed in December 1991 for the two Koreas to respect each other’s political systems and to never use force or threaten military action.

Under the military rule, the rise of conglomerates and military accompanied corruption in government bureaucracy. Kim Young Sam who succeeded Roh Tae Woo by joining his party before the election set out the goal of his presidency to be anticorruption campaign. Former president Roh Tae Woo was caught for receiving political bribery for his

retirement. Military officers who were the members of *Hanahoe* (unity) were purged of their military power. With a closer look, however, Kim Young Sam manipulated the anticorruption campaign to punish his political adversaries both in the civilian and military community.

Busy dealing with domestic corruption, Kim Young Sam showed inconsistency toward North Korea. In his inaugural address February 1993, Kim argued that “no alliance can supersede our nation; neither ideology nor ideal can assure happiness as our nation can” (Yoon, 1996:513). Contrary to his statement, when faced with North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993, Kim Young Sam changed his mind asserting that “we can not shake hands with a partner with nuclear weapon” (Yoon, 1996:513). He supported the idea of economic sanctions against the North in Tokyo and of dialogue in Beijing during his state visit in 1994 (Yoon, 1996:513).

The nuclear crisis in 1994 presented Kim Young Sam with a brink of war in the Korean Peninsula because he could not effectively communicate with either North Korea or the United States. Both North Korea and the United States could not trust the shifting position of South

Korea. Jimmy Carter's effort in resolving the nuclear issue leading to the Geneva Accord in October 1994 was applauded by Foreign Minister Han, but criticized by National Unification Board Minister Na Ung Bae (Yoon, 1996:514). It is yet another example of disarray in political decision making especially toward North Korea.

As Roh Tae Woo's pick for his successor, Kim Young Sam was believed to continue to support Roh's policy of dialogue and reconciliation, but nuclear crisis, first of all, constrained his space for maneuver. In 1995, when South Korea heard devastating floods in North Korea, Kim Young Sam sent 150,000 tons of rice. North Korean response of detaining the ship that delivered rice, demanding the ship to fly North Korean flag, arrest of crew member on charges of spying angered the South Koreans (Jordan, 1997).

Perhaps most importantly, it changed President Kim's thinking. His ruling party was trounced in local elections that year, largely because people believed he was too soft on North Korea. Hewing closely to staunchly anti-North public sentiment, Kim has been hawkish toward Pyongyang ever since (Jordan, 1997).

Lacking in confidence and understanding in international affairs, Kim

Young Sam's concern over public opinion and his rating hampered his reputation as a first true civilian president after the end of military rule.

In terms of decentralization of political power, local autonomy election was held on June 27, 1995 as a part of June 29 declarations. Democratization involves decentralization of highly centralized power. As it turned out, the ruling party lost the elections and region-based political party reemerged. Kim Dae Jung was able to come back after the success of his party, which was located in the southwest and Kim Jong Pil formed his power based on his support group from the middle part of South Korea. With this strong foothold in the Cholla provinces and public disappointment from Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung was able to win presidential election in December 1997. Power was decentralized, but it was only replaced by regionalism.

Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated in the midst of the Asian Financial crisis. His experience in Korean politics and values obtained during his democratic movements previous to his presidency enabled him to engineer political power more effectively and consistently toward North Korea:

Our North Korean policy, which in the past, repeatedly caused our people and our allies to be confused, was carried out more consistently over the past 10 months than any time before and has reaped favorable results...I will continue to maintain the position of active engagement if North Korea shows a positive attitude (vol 22 no 4 winter 98 Kim Dae-Jung Government's North Korea Policy and Security Issues).

Even the North Korean firing of missiles on August 31, 1999, Kim Dae Jung Administration "reaffirms its position of keeping politics separated from economic cooperation in handling inter-Korean relations (Sep 1, 1999 *ibid*). Kim Dae Jung's image of Kim Jung-il was based on his belief that even though the two Koreas has been officially at war for 50 years, Chairman Kim was "a pragmatic leader with good judgment" (Struck, 2000).

5. The Emergence of New Outgroups

As the view of North Korea changed from enemy to partner, the process inevitably accompanied the change in outgroups. The image of North Korea during the Cold War held for almost forty years influenced South Korean identity with a sense of competition and survival. Because

the image was changed, the sense of competition and survival is less suitable. Two Koreas as a whole now need a new comparison group for their cohesion and unity. Historical experiences are abundant with sources of cohesion and unity. Since Japan was involved in the colonization of the Korean Peninsula in the early twentieth century, it is natural for the two Koreas to consider Japan as a new comparison group.

Korea and Japan have common roots in the ancient history. It is believed that royal descendants of Baekje kingdom escaped to Japan and formed the royal families of Japan when it was subjugated by the Shilla. Despite common ancestry between the two countries, frequent Japanese piracy along the Korean coast, major military campaigns in the late sixteenth century, and the colonial rule in the early twentieth century made the Koreans suspicious, hostile, and dehumanizing toward the Japanese.

During the Japanese rule, Korean culture and history were fabricated. Nationalists resisted such movements by creating Korean nationalistic values. Such values tend to appear when the time is right. Park Chung Hee who designed the concept of self-reliance provoked

nationalistic values. For example, Admiral Yi, Sun Shin who defeated the Japanese invasion in the late sixteenth century with his bravery and leadership, was publicized as a national hero. Members of anti-Japanese movements and independence fighters in the early twentieth century were also reevaluated as national heroes. The Independence Hall was established and almost all students were encouraged to visit to pay their respect. National holiday was designated to commemorate them on the 6th of June annually.

Animosity toward Japan was provoked recently by the Japanese prime minister's visit to Yasukuni shrine that honors war criminals. Other issues involve never apologizing for war crimes conducted during WWII, justifying Japanese invasion of Asia in textbook, unwilling to pay for comfort women that Japanese Army abused during WWII, territorial dispute over Dokdo, and the arming of Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. Just as South Koreans were suspicious of North Korean intents during the Cold War, they were suspicious of the Japanese intentions now.

China also constitutes one of the new outgroups. The rising

economic power was viewed as inferior to South Korea in the twentieth century. But, Koreans remember that when China was strong, it demanded peripheral states to pay respect. Suzerainty was the reason behind their invasions to Korea in the past. In the early twentieth century, China was weaker than Japan. When Japan created Manjuku in Manchuria, it forced Koreans to move to Manchuria. There are still many Korean descendants who can speak Korean and live in the region North of North Korea. Korean pride of Koguryo once ruled over the region, which is the source of Korean territorial integrity and pride, can emerge to consolidate a new Korean identity of expanded territory. China, however, erased such historical evidences of Korean domination in Manchuria, which in turn provoked South Korea nationalism.

The U.S. forces in Korea are viewed as a symbol of imperialism in Korea. As the role of stabilizer is waning, Koreans start asking future role of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK). The animosity toward the U.S. and USFK began with the Kwangju massacre in May 18, 1980 when the U.S. allegedly allowed the movement of military away from the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) to suppress the democratization

movement. More recently, the death of two Korean school girls who were hit by the USFK armored vehicle during the military exercise on the way home in June 13, 2002 shook the country. South Koreans protested demanding the handover of the two USFK soldiers whose armored vehicle killed the two girls. The deaths of two Koreans girls ignited the problems in SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), which does not allow Korean legal system to prosecute American soldiers who committed illegal acts. Because the agreement was signed in 1966, South Koreans demand the change that not only allows South Korea to prosecute the U.S. soldiers that commit illegal acts, but also recognition of South Korea as an equal partner similar to Japan or Germany.

Overall, the enemy image of North Korea is disappearing, while the enemy image of other target countries is replacing the vacuum. The role of these new outgroups strengthens the changed image of North Korea. The initiator of creating the new outgroups is a political leader who understands the dynamics of outgroup comparison in political psychology (Cottam & Cottam, 2001). News media that understands the changed mind of public can appeal for the nationalistic values for

commercial or political reasons. There lies a danger because these new comparison groups are more powerful than South Korea.

6. Conclusion

South Korean image of North Korea as an enemy started to change due to economic development, democratization, globalization, and age in South Korea. Park, Chung Hee's effort to develop economy inevitably resulted in the rise of the middle class, which demanded more freedom and political participation from the authoritarian political structure. Chun Doo Whan was able to extend the course set by his predecessor, but reached the point where military dictatorship was no longer tolerable.

The rise in economic and military power in South Korea became the basis to help Roh Tae Woo to initiate democratization process as well as northern diplomacy. The change in political structure allowed the public to voice their concerns. Internationally, the end of the Cold War enabled South Korea to become an active member in the international community.

Kim Young Sam tried to continue to walk in the road toward reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea, but he was unable to do so due to the nuclear crisis of 1994 and lack of consistency in his policy toward North Korea. He heralded globalization of South Korea by implementing anticorruption campaign and globalization, *segye^hwa* to internationalize standards in business procedures in the government to be competent internationally.

Kim Dae Jung consistently pursued to normalize relations with North Korea and his policy bore fruit in June 2000 when the two leaders met in Pyongyang. The summit implied that the image of ally replaced the image of enemy. The change in the Korean social identity coupled with political structure and leadership led to the change in image of North Korea.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The image of North Korea as diabolical enemy during the Cold War has gone a dramatic change to ally after the Cold War. This dissertation intends to find the causes of such change in image and their impact on South Korean policy toward North Korea by utilizing three theories: social identity theory, nationalism, and image theory.

During the examination of images and policies in South Korea, this dissertation intends to test four hypotheses. First hypothesis is whether a change in image results in a change in policy. Second, when a change in self-image occurs, it contributes to a change in image of outgroup. Third, a new image struggles with a previously dominant image. Last, images are derived from the past in history.

1. Three Theories

Social identity theory introduces the concept of ingroup and

outgroup and its relationship when two groups engage in a dispute. According to social identity theory, when ingroup identity is viewed negatively by outgroup, both ingroup and outgroup participate in social competition when capability between two groups are equal and intentions are hostile. The two Koreas competed for their regime survival and unification of the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War. During the course of ideological rivalry, South Korea succeeded in economic development. The Five-Year Economic Development Plan designed by Economic Planning Board started in 1962 improved South Korea's economic standing in the world. The phrase called "the miracle in the Han river" best describes South Korean success in government-driven economy.

The success in the South Korean economy propelled its military buildup and strengthened its diplomatic posture. South Korea developed Force Improvement Program to equip itself with self-reliant military forces. South Korean military became modern and capable of resisting North Korean hostilities. The imbalance caused North Korea to be afraid of South Korea-US joint exercise for fear of attacking North

Korea. South Korean economic development became a model for third world countries. Their interests in South Korean economy led to establishing diplomatic ties to South Korea.

Increase in GDP ushered in development in education, which increased literacy rate. The economic development also produced the rise of the middle class in South Korea. The increase in circulation of newspapers and the media in South Korea such as T.V. helped the public to be aware of politics. Growing American influence on the Korean culture such as Christianity saturated in the public.

Prioritizing economic development for the sake of national security was successful when the degree of hostility against North Korea was intense. The rise in economy, military strength, and diplomatic stance around the world enhanced South Korean self-image. The military government successfully advocated its accomplishments in government programs. These developments in Korean identity, however, faced unexpected obstacle of democracy. Intellectuals and religious leaders became ardent supporter of the values of freedom and equality, which have been long neglected during the course of

government-initiated economic development only policy.

Discontented workers students, who were educated to follow rules and not to question authorities, mobilized themselves to demonstrate the change in political system. The exaggeration of the North Korean threats and symbols of the Confucian ethics lost their appeals to the public. In the face of growing income disparity and violations of human rights, the feeling of national security was remote and weary. The emotional intensity of hostility toward North Korea weakened as new generations of South Korean without the experiences in the Korean War began to be politically active. The authoritarian South Korean governments were not flexible enough to react to the rising public demand. The Chun Doo Hwan administration was able to lengthen its militaristic control with rhetoric of North Korean threats, but was left without a choice but to allow free elections for his successor, Roh Tae Woo.

Nationalism played an important role in consolidating public support for the South Korean governments. Nationalistic values and ideology were sources of positive distinctions toward North Korea.

Syngman Rhee demonized North Korea for its ill-intentions and the ideology of communism. Peace loving nature of the Koreans and their anti-communism were rationale behind the legitimacy of his government. Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan prioritized national security with symbols of the North Korean threats. Economic development was believed to be essential to lead South Korea to national grandeur and legitimacy.

The change in social identity due to economic development required new symbols. Political structural change in 1987 allowed Koreans to voice their views in political leadership. Increase in South Korean capabilities compared to North Korea coupled with changes in international environments especially in China and Soviet Union allowed South Korean leadership to promote nationalistic values that could accommodate such views. Korean nationalistic values such as ethnicity, common creation myths, history, culture, language became important to the two Koreas for their ultimate unification. The Northern Diplomacy is an outcome of such endeavors.

The Summit between the two Korean leaders in 2000 marked a

historical water-shedding moment in the Korean history. It was the first time since the two Koreas were established in 1948 and contributed to the change in image of North Korea and its leader Kim Jung-il. This meeting was the result of changes in South Korean image of North Korea as enemy. The image of North Korea as a diabolical enemy and its policy of containment have been weakened significantly compared to South Korean view of North Korea during the Cold War. The new image of North Korea as compatriots or ally produced agreements in negotiation and reconciliation ultimately leading to the common strategy of unification.

The image of North Korea during the Cold War perfectly fits the image of enemy as capability and culture are equal, and intentions are harmful. North Korea constituted as threats and decision makers were small military elites. Experiences in the Korean War solidified the image of North Korea, and subsequent arms provocations and terrorism reenergized such image.

The perception of North Korea has changed to ally, but the degree of image as ally is not as strong as the image of enemy during the

Cold War. According to image attributes in image theory, capability should be equal between South Korea and North Korea. In terms of military spending, South Korea exceeded North Korea since the 1980s. Due to Force Improvement Plan, South Korea modernized its military weapons that they are more accurate and fast in firing rate compared to North Korean weapons. Thus, it is safe to say that South Korea maintains conventional superiority in military weapons. North Korea, however, is believed to have superiority in special forces, biological and chemical weaponry, and, more importantly, nuclear weapons. Seoul, where half of South Korean population lives, is located well within the range of North Korean artilleries. Overall, it is hard to argue that which side is more superior in capability, but the two Koreas possess enough military capability to inflict significant damages on each other.

South Korea is superior to North Korea in terms of economic characteristics. North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world, while South Korea is the twelfth largest economy in the world. This is a strict contrast, but the collapse of the North Korean economy presents serious threats to neighbors such as China and South Korea

because of its massive infusion of refugees. In consideration of economy, North Korea does not have an option to attack South Korea because it lacks such economic sustainability to support military campaigns. The signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North on December 13, 1991 was the outcome of recognizing each other as a legitimate government with a right to coexist.

Decision makers in South Korea are many groups such as National Security Council, ministers in each ministry, public opinion leaders, and the media. South Korea beginning with the Roh Tae Woo administration has begun to implement the decentralization its power. Kim Jung-il is believed to have a strong grip of power in North Korea. North Korea has to open up its border in order to promote economic exchanges and development, while minimizing sources of resistance and dissatisfaction toward the North Korean government. It is an interesting idea to ponder whether or how much South Korean model of economic development and transition to democracy may be applicable to North Korea.

2. Four Hypotheses

The view of North Korea by the South Koreans has changed due to several factors. Internationally, the end of the Cold War provided opportunity for change in government leadership from military to civilian. The Cold War as a systemic factor, as neo-realists argue, dominated Korean peninsula where democracy confronted communism after the Korean War. The support of the U.S. for South Korea militarily and economically acted as a basis for subsequent economic development growth in South Korea. The image of North Korea as enemy was in line with the U.S. policy of containment.

The Rhee regime was able to gain economic aid from the US for its anti-communism stance and enemy of North Korea, but could not materialize it due to corruption, which resulted in the downfall of his power. Because the rise of military lacked the legitimacy, Park Chung Hee focused on economic development to gain support from the people and to extend control of power, which lasted until Chun Doo Whan of the 1980s. Contrary to North Korea's policy on military priority, South Korea took economic development as a key to its success in regime

rivalry. The military regime in South Korea from 1960s to 1980s contributed to the advancement in capabilities. South Korean economic development and military spending were believed to have surpassed that of North Korea in the 1980s.

The growth-driven economy superseded democracy and brought forth dissatisfaction from the public in the area of basic human rights, especially the freedom of expression. The government excused itself of anti-communism slogan in order to eradicate dissident voices. Economic development, however, caused the rise in the middle class, which sought for more freedom in their life by way of travelling to foreign countries. With economic abundance and passion for education, these people in the middle class sent their children to foreign countries for furthering their education, which in turn shaped their values and ideas apart from those who were educated within South Korea. Those students educated abroad came back to become either upper or middle class. Dissatisfaction with militaristic governments exploded in 1987 in the form of student demonstrations. In the end, the military government had to allow democratic presidential election to accommodate public

opinion, which is composed of mainly the middle class.

Globalization was the outcome of democracy and economic development. The web of connections in the areas of international trade as well as personnel required Korea to open up and cooperate with others in the world. Flow of information was strictly controlled during the period of military regime. With the rise of globalization and the Internet, however, people were bombarded with information and knowledge that the government was not able to control as effectively as before. The first civilian leadership, Kim Young Sam understood this domestic need and wanted to capitalize it by officially announcing *seggyehwa*, globalization. It was South Korea's determination to think abroad in terms of economy by closely cooperating with different regions of the world. For example, Korea participated in the activities of both the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Asia-Europe Economic Meeting (ASEM). Korea also joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

With these changes in the environment in South Korea came the importance of domestic factors such as age and education in shaping the

value systems in Korea. Age is a factor because Koreans have a generation gap among those who experienced the Korean War, those who did not experience the War, but were exposed to the education during the military regime, and finally those who were born ignorant of the War during the industrialization period of Korea. Those who suffered brutality of North Koreans generally view the North as enemy or barbarian and they have maintained the image for their entire life with conservative voice in the formation of government policy toward North Korea.

The second group of people who lack the experience of the War, but were exposed to the educational system that enforce the image of North Korea as enemy have generally hostile stance toward the North due to the incursions and threats posed by the North, government propaganda and mandatory education. The degree of belief in the image toward North Korea is not as emotional as the first group because it was shaped by outside influence based on the degree of threats posed by the North. Thus, the image is rather passive and lacked congruence, logic, and emotion compared to the first group. Scholars and religious leaders

who were critical of the government suffered harsh treatment by the South Korean government, but were able to spread their ideas to the people in the second group in the name of democratization. Massive demonstration by the college students in the 80s became the examples of the changes in their view of the government and government policies of North Korea.

The third group of people who were born in the age of creativity rather than obedience in the previous regimes, could not share the image of North Korea with the previous two groups due to lack of experience and difference in the educational system. Teachers in the second group became the dominant force in the late 1980s democratization movement and taught their students to be more critical of government policy in general. The formation of the teachers union was the symbol of rebellion against bureaucratic educational system by high school teachers.

It is interesting to note that the change in the image of North Korea by South Korea is partly due to the result of age and education because each generation was exposed to the stream of rapid events such

as democratization, economic development, and globalization. Each group had their time in view of the North, but the change in citizen's age and education also contributed to the change in the view of the North per generation. Age had more natural impact on the perception of North Korea, while education was more artificial and shaped goal driven behavior.

The conservative group with a strong image of North Korea as enemy emerged with the first president of ROK, Rhee Syngman, and later strengthened their power by military regime of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan from the 1960s to 1980s. This reappeared in the 90s because this generation was active and alive due to its accumulated wealth and power over the years. Rhee with the national independence movement and strong nationalism was a bitter antagonist against communism. He wanted to crush North Korea and unify the Korean peninsula under the banner of democracy. The notion was purely psychological and was not supported by realistic assessment of power comparison. Rhee was able to get support from the U.S. and started his presidency in the period of the superpower rivalry, the Cold War. The

conservatives remained immune to the changes within and around the Korean Peninsula. The emotion was still strong and maintained suspicious stance toward North Korea. Compromise and dialogue were seen as appeasement.

Some of the conservative voices were descendants of so called Japanese collaborators during the Japanese rule of Korea. The existence of the Korean War and bitter antagonism toward the North Koreans contributed to the shift from popular image of anti-Japanese to anti-North Korea. The change provided them with a room for creating South Korea as ingroup and North Korea as outgroup. Both anti-Japan and anti-North Korea were based on real and emotional aspects. The Korean War, which lasted comparatively shorter than the Japanese rule of thirty six years, had more impact on the Koreans psychologically because it was brutal and resulted in mass casualties and chaos. South Korean and North Korean governments led the ideological propaganda to solidify, legitimize, and mobilize resources for the war by demonizing the other throughout the Korean War.

The division between the landowners, who mostly worked with

the Japanese, and farmers who were the object of labor extraction before the Korean War, was replaced with one between South Korean democracy and North Korean communism. The Korean War served as a water shedding point and a new prevalent image toward North Korea appeared as enemy. The new categorization of democracy versus communism effectively cornered the old categorization of pro-Japanese versus anti-Japanese. For example, Park Chung Hee himself worked for the Japanese Army during the Japanese annexation, but was able to lead the economic growth without public dissatisfaction over his background. The primary standard of categorization was the ideology of communism. The imperial image of Japan, however, did not completely disappear, but remained dormant until the next threat or opportunity in which a new situation allows somewhat different categorization or exploitation by either external or internal actors.

The change in capabilities, political structure, leadership, generation, and educational culture causes South Korea's image of North Korea to change from enemy to ally. The Korean peninsula has been under the enormous pressure of anxiety of entering into war for too long

and South Koreans wanted to avoid the possibility of entering another war. During the process of change, there was a realization of the limit in the previous policy of confrontation, which precipitated the process after the end of the Cold War.

The growth of economy produced the rise of the middle class and the need to show the economic miracle to the world. The summer Olympic of 1988 was moment of pride and prestige for many Koreans and served as launching pad for northern strategy of diplomatically isolating North Korea. The power of South Korea surpassed that of the North and it was South Korea that was able to finally initiate and lead the relationship between the two Koreas.

Kim Young Sam's administration unlike previous Roh Tae Woo regime posed ambivalent stance toward North Korea. He was incoherent toward the North partly due to the Nuclear crisis of 1994. Kim Dae Jung who fought for the end of Park regime with Kim Young Sam took a different stance when he became the President of South Korea. The end of confrontation and the rise of reconciliation was the motto of his administration. North Korea is still considered as threats,

but the notion of fellow countrymen became a more dominant force.

The policy of reconciliation and prosperity contains economic activities between the two Koreas across the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). South Korea has experienced the limits of authoritarian control of the government when it embarked on economic development. North Korea is in perfect position of duplicating such a process because the government wants to maintain its strong grip of internal affairs. North Korea inevitably has to face dissident voices if it succeeds in maintaining top-down bureaucratic government structure, while accomplishing economic adventure with South Korea. North Korea may have to face public outcry for more freedom and democracy as was the case for Rhee Syngman, who stepped down because of his corruption, and Park Chung Hee, who was assassinated for his authoritarian rule. As not many scholars expected the longevity of North Korea after the end of Cold War, North Korea could also maintain its power and succeed economic development. There exists difference in context between South Korea and North Korea because they were under different political system for more than fifty years.

In conclusion, South Korean image of North Korea has changed from enemy to ally. The degree of intensity in image of North Korea as enemy is stronger due to the fact that the two Koreas participated in the Korean War. Animosity with strong emotional element during the War dominated their hostility toward each other. The new image of ally, however, lacks such a strong emotional element partly because the image of enemy still holds its ground supported by the conservatives in South Korea and partly because the division and hostility between the two Koreas for more than fifty years weakened a sense of unity.

South Korean view of North Korea as ally has gained its share of recognition since in the late 1980s. Domestic developments in South Korea such as economy, democracy, and globalization have caused changes in South Korean self-image. Capabilities of South Korea in the areas of economy and military have increased. The democratic movements in South Korea bore its fruit when the change in political structure occurred in 1987. The Northern Diplomacy was the outcome of confidence in South Korean self-image. Nationalism that sustained integrity of South Korean economic developments during the ideological

regime rivalry also contributed to this shift in image. Old values of security, efficiency, and self-reliance were replaced by unity, peace, and prosperity.

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