

**THE MAIN FACTORS THAT COULD DETERMINE  
THE BEHAVIOR OF A TORTURER**

By

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY  
Department of Political Science

May 2009

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To the Faculty of the Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation/thesis of  
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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This research was only possible to be conducted by the support of numerous people. The list is long and I do not want to forget nobody. The first people that come to my mind are the victims. They showed me the cruelty of human beings, and the magnificent of them that could be resilient from such a level of pain. I try to understand why human beings are able to be the makers of the horror, and I have to say that I can explain it but I can not accept it, and I hope that others that read this study share this feeling.

Another important person is my mentor, Dr. Cottam, few people can believe in others, especially if you come from far away and speak deficient English. Few people are able to understand other cultures and respect them, and she is one of them. She has the patience not only to guide me in this learning process, but also she trusted in my abilities.

My friends, Suzanne and Enrique, they opened their home and gave a warm room. With them I found a place where I knew the legitimate values of friendship and the meaning of solidarity. Suzanne gave me the tools to understand the American culture and how respecting the differences, and also she showed me that the generosity does not have limits.

My husband and my little daughter gave me their time to be done with this study and motivated me not give up. Particularly, my daughter, she inspired me, because I want to share with her those aspects that I learned from this research, which do not have relationship with the scientific findings, those have concern with human life meanings.

Only if we face the evil, we are able to understand it and prevent it. Hence, the participation of the interviewees was a key in this research. Even though they are unable to

perceive their own nature, they gave me the chance to understand them, and share the findings with the scientific world.

The Mayor Tulio Arce from Gendarmerie of Chile was the person who helped me to open the right doors to have access to the prisoners. He was a person able to understand the importance of this research and gave me the facilities to conduct this study. The people who worked in the prison at this time were crucial to understand this type of crime.

The World Bank McNamara Foundation provided me the funds to conduct this study, and only with their financial support it was possible to complete this research.

I thank each of you, because believe me that this study would not have been possible to be conducted without your support.

**THE MAIN FACTORS THAT COULD DETERMINE  
THE BEHAVIOR OF A TORTURER**

*Abstract*

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*This study focuses on the perpetrators of torture. It examines the mentality of a torturer through three levels of analysis: the influences of the institutional structure and ideology, specifically Chilean military and police, on the occurrence of torture; the group influences, which are strongly associated to the institutional effects; and, finally, individual characteristics that determine that the individuals became active participants in torture. The case study identifies common patterns between perpetrators, but also the presence of marked differences between them.*

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Latin American countries were affected by military coups and military interventions in government affairs. At this time, Latin America observed the birth of numerous military regimes (Amnesty International, 1984; Never Again, 1986; Uruguay Nunca Más, 1992; Zagorski 1992; Cottam, 1994; Schirmer, 1998; Rettig et. al, 1991; Valech, et. al, 2004). The results of military intervention were severe damage to the democracy which affected the political and social evolution of each country. However, one of the worst consequences was the violations of human rights, especially among the vulnerable population such the poorer sectors and indigenous population. Unfortunately, Chile was not the exception, the political violence and the military coup in 1973 were accomplished, and a military regime was established lasting seventeen years (1973 to 1990). As a consequence of the military dictatorship 1,322 people was killed, 957 people disappeared (Rettig et. al, 1991) and approximately 27,255 people were tortured and survived the torture (Valech, et. al, 2004).

Was it necessary to incur the crudest human acts as torture and murder? Why do people attack their own people? Why can humans commit such atrocious acts? The questions are innumerable, and very difficult to answer. In an attempt to respond to the question, why can human beings commit torture and murder other human beings? This study examines the causes that motivate the crudest violation of human rights, torture.

The study does not examine in details the macro social factors such as the historical factors and specific social events that triggered the political violence in each Chile. The macro social influences are only mentioned in general terms, although they are important

and relevant influences that affect the social behavior of the country. Instead, the analysis focuses on the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, in terms of the motivations that affect the mentality of a torturer and cause him to perpetrate this type of crime.

Even though the research examines the causes that motivate the consecutive use of torture by the military and police members, the sociopolitical conditions that triggered the coup and kept the military in power for so long time are reviewed. The sociopolitical conditions allow one to explain why the military and police institutions and their intelligence services attributed responsibility to leftist groups for the socioeconomic and political crisis in Chile in 1973. The description of these events sets the context for the use of torture as a tool to destroy the military regime's detractors.

To examine the dynamics of the torture, three levels of analysis are reviewed. The first level is the influence of the institutional structure and ideology of the military and police, and its effect on the institutionalized use of torture. The second level is group influences, which could be strongly linked with the institutional effects. Finally, individual characteristics that influenced isolated from one another the individuals who became active participants in torture acts are analyzed. These three levels are not isolated from one another. Instead, they appear to overlap and are associated in a game of interaction isolated from one another.

The objective of this study is to review these three levels according to the theoretical frameworks presented in the first chapter. Due to the fact that few studies of this nature have been conducted, this research used qualitative techniques in order to detect new variables that could not be detected in other research settings. The second chapter discusses the methodology used to conduct this research. The third chapter describes the

Chilean sociopolitical conditions that triggered the military coup and kept the military in power. This description allows one to explain the criminal behavior of the state agents, and how they accused the people opposite to the military regime for the social, economic and political crisis. To reconstitute the historical moment, this study gathers information from different political tends, that is, from supporters and detractors of the military regime.

Later, in the last chapter the perception of the participants is reviewed in order to detect whether their perception of the enemy is a personal fabrication or an institutional fabrication or a real threat.

The fourth chapter describes the role of the state intelligence agencies in the perpetration of torture. There are three intelligence agencies analyzed in this chapter: CNI (National Central of Informations - Central de Informaciones), DINE (Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército - Army Direcccion of the Intelligence), and DICOMCAR (Carabineers Direction of Communications - Dirección de Comunicaciones de Carabineros). Two of them were directly related within different fields of the army, and the last one was part of the police, Carabineers. The selection of these agencies is based on the fact that the interviewees belonged to them. The agencies structure and functions are described, and the relationship between the institutional variables and the perception of the interviewees are established.

The fifth chapter examines the perceptions of the individuals who perpetrated torture, and the group influences in their criminal behavior (torture). Here the questions of whether or not the group and the groups dynamic favor or deter the perpetration of torture, and how the individuals perceive these influences are examined.

In the sixth chapter, interviews and personal reports of torturers are examined. The review attempts to examine the personal motivation to participate in acts of torture directly from torturers, and here the general patterns that are identifiable are discussed.

In the final analysis, the variables that explain the tortures' behaviors are presented and how they are related each other.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### ***Brief Description of the Phenomenon and Theoretical Frameworks***

In this chapter phase several theoretical frameworks, which attempt to explicate the incidence of torture are reviewed. As has been mentioned, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Latin American countries were affected by military coups and military interventions in government affairs. The military intervention produced severe damage to the democracy. However, the violations of human rights especially among the specific social groups and indigenous population were one of most grave consequences. In the search for an explanation of the military behavior and their involvement in human rights abuses such as torture, the variables most recurrent are the structure, principles, and values that the military apparatus shapes, and the mechanisms utilized in the reproduction of the military patterns and training practices (Baumeister 1996; Calace 1988; Conroy 2000; Crelinsten 1995; García Rivas 1984; Graziano 1992; Haritos-Fatouros 1988; Heinz 1995; Henníngs et al. 1995; Kelman 1995; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Payne 1998; Rosenberg 1991; Schirmer 1998; Staub 1989; Zagorski, 1992). Closely related to the institutional variables, group dynamics within the military forces become a visible element, which encourages the expected behavior. Group structure, rituals, values, the interaction dynamic, enemy's perception and group identity could be reinforced by a perceived threat (real or not), in such a way that the group is able to define who belong to them and who are *against* them (García Rivas 1984; Calace 1988; Conroy 2000; Haritos-Fatouros 1988; Henníngs et al. 1995; Rosenberg, 1991).

Individual motivation also appears as another relevant element in the manifestation of this behavior. The life situation produced by sociopolitical or cultural issues and the

specific scenario coupled with socialization of experiences, such as torture training, could predispose the subject toward predetermined attitudes. Then, when torture is addressed in this particular context it is easily manifested. Coser (1956) refers to realistic conflicts, which emerge when individuals observe that they have scarce status, power, and resources. In other words, individuals perceive that they do not have what they deserve, making their disposition toward violence imminent. This notion is coincident with Staub's (1989) study of genocide and mass crime, where self-protection concepts motivate the people to defend the physical and psychological self against a real or perceived threat. The violence arises from the difficult life conditions, and also from progressive destruction based on powerful ideologies, which make a target group (scapegoat) responsible for the harsh conditions. Attitudes toward torture could be the result of beliefs, stereotypes, and affective disposition motivated from personal interest, values and self-social interaction (Davis, 1973). This feature could explain the reasons why military violence was focused on a specific social group – working class, guerrilla groups and any opponents to the regime.

Haritos-Fatouros (1988) conducted one of the few studies of torturers' behavior. The enormous utility of this research is that it was the first one, which studied a sample of Greek soldiers, who were directly involved in torture. Haritos-Fatouros analyzed the process involved in turning the normal behavior of an army recruit into the deviant behavior of a torturer at the military police training camps during the Junta Regime in Greece.

Based on these results, the researcher concluded that special selection procedures (recruits beginning at the age of 18) and the training process, with a particular emphasis on the binding factors to the authority of violence, result in "the maintenance of the agentic state of the subjects" (p. 1119). The author argues that under these circumstances any one

can be "a potential torturer." Basically this conclusion is supported by the findings, which show that the torturer's behavior is induced by external variables. In the same vein as Haritos-Fatouros and Gibson (1986), Kelman and Hamilton (1989) describe torture as a crime of obedience in which a military system is structured in such a way that the subjects lose their capacity of discernment and follow the orders without opposition. Nevertheless, in the Milgram's studies it was (1977) found that some subjects (35%) refused to continue with the experiment and follow the orders when they believed that they were hurting the victim. Most participants also displayed anxiety and conflict. The disobedience is a difficult path and a minority of people is able to pursue, because according to Milgram the act of disobedience requires the mobilization of inner resources. The subject, who disobeyed, accepted the responsibilities that imply not follow an order and embraced the affirmation of humanistic values. This aspect did not imply that the subjects did not remain troubled by the disruption of the social order – following the order from the authority implies do not break the social order. Nevertheless, they assumed the emotional costs and disobeyed (Milgram, 1977; Milgram, 1974).

Following the Haritos-Fatouros' findings and the influence of the learning process in a torturer, Social Learning Theory is able to explain whether or not an individual is able to become a torturer under the influences of peers and a specific institutional context. This theory proposes that the self-definition of individuals is learned through reinforcement contingencies operating in the socialization process. Definitions operate less as direct motivations than as facilitators or inhibitors "discriminative stimuli." Cues signaling that certain behavior are appropriate and likely to be rewarded or inappropriate and likely to be punished are learned. Past reinforcement or punishment motivates the behavior independent of whatever motivation to engage in or refrain from an act. This comes from its conformity

to or violation of a person's beliefs (Akers, 1998). In according to this principle, the military institution should reinforce the expected behavior in a soldier using reinforcement and/or punishment. For instance, one has to consider the impact of the punishment that dissidents had to receive for refusing to torture –exile, forced retirement, torture, threats on their life or their family. Unfortunately, Akers' view does not allow us to explicate how personal motivations define the type of torture used (psychological, sexual or physical), the degree of cruelty practiced by the perpetrators and why some individuals stay in the system for a brief period.

Even though the rigidity of the system and the type of training determine the behavior in a soldier and police, one is able to observe in this review how personal motivations play an important role in keeping the subjects in the system. Indeed, Haritos-Fatouros (1988) observes in her analysis that the recruits were selected to join the "torture units" based on *antecedent conditions*. That is to say, the recruits were evaluated according to their performance –their capacity to become hardhearted as the torturer-to-be, their political tendencies and endurance during the training. Unfortunately, the researcher did not examine these pre-conditions, which define the selection of the soldiers and their behavior. In fact, the individual features could explain why some individuals are able to perpetrate certain types of torture such as sexual torture and rape and why others desert from the military system despite the punishment. At this point, the interaction between individual interests and group influence appears again as a preponderant factor of torturer behavior.

Psychological theories offer valuable frameworks, which can explain the role of personal motivations in inflicting torture. The self-esteem construction and the definition of locus of control are important factors which could help us to identify personal

motivations and the impact of external influences on the individual behavior. The definition of low self-esteem could be affected by child abuse history (psychological, physical and/or sexual). Indeed, child abuse history is highly associated with adult or parental aggressive behavior and easy loss of control (Coleman, 1971). Self-esteem and type of locus of control could be elemental factors, which would define why an individual is associated with a perpetrator group and explain his personal motivations to be involved with criminal activities as a torturer. The system of beliefs is another element that plays a fundamental role in the selection of group association (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Under this view, it is relevant to analyze how personal beliefs and values are coupled with the group and the military institution.

Two main important tendencies to explain why human beings can commit this type of crime seem relevant. One indicates that every human being can become a torturer (Haritos-Fatouros and Gibson 1986; Haritos-Fatouros 1988; Kelman 1989). On the other side, Heinz (1995) and Staub (1989) argue that individual characteristics, for instance child abuse history, could define whether or not a subject could become a torturer. The first notion gives special attribution to the type of training, which makes any human being vulnerable to learn the mechanisms to perpetrate torture and follow orders. The second statement refers mainly to the personal option of an individual, who wishes to belong to a military or police body, which demand a degree of tolerance to the violence (because of the nature of these institutions). The answer to the question, whether or no the individual features are determinant to perpetrate torture, is not clear if it is separately observed from the social, historical and political culture issues. However, both descriptions about the torture phenomenon help us to show external and internal factors, whose identification is essential to understand and explain the phenomenon. Based on these tendencies, social

learning theory, obedience crime theory, and the contribution of psychology's theories, the main variables that determine the behavior of a torturer in a specific military and/or police system are identified and their dynamic of mutual interaction is analyzed.

The importance to study this phenomenon is fundamental to prevent it, because, unfortunately, the problem with the occurrence of torture in the military system not only belongs to some developing countries but also to developed countries. Indeed, Amnesty International (2000) indicates that people were reportedly tortured or ill-treated by security forces, police or other state authorities in 132 countries and territories, including the United States. Indeed, the Schlesinger Report refers to the investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility in which American military intelligence soldiers and officers tortured prisoners (Danner, 2004). This fact suggests us that it is a problem scattered around the world, despite the fact that torture is one of the cruelest and repudiated human acts, which attacks directly the basic principles of human rights.

Knowing the origin and nature of the occurrence of torture not only allows us to define the phenomenon but also to know its intrinsic complexity and the factors that favor its manifestation, which are the conditions necessary to prevent it. I worked for several years with victims of torture and victimizers, this experience permits me to observe the devastating consequences of these criminal acts in both sides of the group – victims and perpetrators– as well as in general society. The expenses in psych and mental treatments, social reinsertion, special training for professionals and the social scars could easily be avoided if we had the tools to prevent the occurrence of these acts and if we know the problem and its etymology.

The literature review shows a group of variables that can explain in different ambits the expression of torture. From this group of variable, it can be selected three levels of analysis: individual, group, and institutional. In the following segment, it is discussed the most relevant variables that could identify what variables have incidence in the perpetration of torture. In the discussion, it is explained why the variables are selected for this study and how these variables are related.

## **INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES**

The individual variables refer to the psychological features of each subject in particular that could influence his/her behavior to perpetrate torture. To explain the individual characteristics the suppositions of the criminological theories are reviewed in order to explain the criminal conduct. Due to the fact that previous studies argue that the early age of the recruits was a factor to determine their participation in torture (Haritos-Fatouros, 1988), the variables expresses in juvenile crime are examined. Moreover, psychological theories are also reviewed to define which variables could impact the expression of a violent conduct.

## **LOCUS OF CONTROL**

Locus of Control deals with the notion that a person views himself in conjunction with the things that occur to him and the meaning that he makes of those interactions between himself and his experiences (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 29). The locus of control has two dimensions: internal and external.

According to Rotter (1966) the internal locus “refers to the perception of events, whether positive or negative, as being a consequence of one’s own actions and thereby potentially under personal control” (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 29). The external locus “refers to the

perception of positive or negative events as being unrelated to one's own behavior and thereby beyond personal control" (p.29). Social-cognitive perspective indicates that each human being has both external and internal locus of control, which fluctuate depending on the specific events. Nevertheless, the locus of control is also a permanent personality feature, which can indicate the impact of external influences on an individual. Therefore the focus of perception, internal and external, could be a variable that makes some individuals more vulnerable to the influences of a determined group (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).

Lefcourt (1976) conducts an expansive analysis about the locus of control. In his research, the author reviews several behavioral observations and research based on the influences of the locus of control. He asserts that a person who has developed an **external locus**, no matter the experience, does not perceive the results as his own actions. The individual is not perceived to be responsible for altering the ways in which he sees things and consequently functions.

An internal orientation provides a greater potential for exercising the type of self control that will, in the long run, lead to superior planning ability and capacity to delay gratification in the service of greater long-term gain (Phares, 1976). In fact, Miller and Mc Farland (1986) found that persons with internal locus of control are better able to delay gratification and cope with various stresses.

### **Locus of control and child abuse history**

Lefcourt (1976) asserts that when an individual is deprived of his sense of self-determination, he is less able to learn about himself from his own experiences. He is less able to develop a definite measure of his worth (p. 17). This absence of self-determination is produced by deprived social ambiance and severely punishing environment, which creates a sense of fatalism along with infantile and regressive behavior. A link between

deprivation, denigration and perceived control has been observed. In fact, helplessness, a perceived inability to affect one's fate meaningfully, is the natural response to deprivation and denigration. In turn, it is a source of immature and poor coping behavior (Lefcourt and Ladwig, 1965, p 21).

Phares (1957) and James & Rotter (1958) argue that the knowledge of a subject's perception of control was useful for predicting the type of judgments one would make in response to success and failure in a given task. Moreover, the perception of control can predict the manner in which people would respond to their performance outcomes (p. 32).

Later, Phares (1976) prompts that family environments that are characterized by warmth, protection, and nurturance seem to lead to belief in an internal locus of control. On the other hand, "...the excess of control, which implies control by powerful others, can lead to an external locus of control (p. 156)." Nevertheless, this effect may depend upon the gender of the parent and child. These findings show that the development of locus of control can be associated with a child abuse history. Therefore, the parent-child relationship has to be considered in the study of a torturer's behavior.

### **Locus of control and theory of obedience**

Kelman et al. (1989) suggests that the dimension of actor-pawn may well define those who can resist orders and accept responsibility from those who are more complaint but responsibility-eschewing individuals. Lefcourt (1976) adds that individuals that perceive themselves as the active determiners of their fates should more readily accept responsibility for their outcomes and, therefore, should be more discriminating about what they will and will not do in obedience to others (p. 40). Lefcourt concludes that "when a person believes that he is the responsible agent or source of his own life's fortunes, he will

resist influence attempts which aim to bypass his own sense of moral justice, and will only respond to those appeals that address themselves to his own beliefs and values” (p. 50).

Ritchie and Phares (1969) found that internals are not simply resistant to influence, but are discriminating about what influences they accept. They tend to trust more in their own judgments than the externals. On the other hand, the externals are likely to succumb under the outside influences and tend to conform more than internals. Similar results were found by several studies (Odell, 1959; Crowne and Liverant, 1963; Gore, 1962). Authority per se has little direct effect upon the internals’ readiness to accept a point of view (p. 43). Indeed, internals do respond positively to reasoned arguments, regardless of the status of the source. They also readily respond to directives that seem congruent with their own perceptions (Lefcourt and Wine, 1969). Based on these findings, it is relevant to take into account two elemental principles. First, military officers who have an external locus of control can be highly vulnerable to training, “military-torture” ideology, and group influences. Nevertheless, it is also important to observe whether individuals who present an internal locus of control were involved in torture acts because this practice and their moral values are absolutely congruent with their own beliefs about torture. Therefore, military training and indoctrination would only come to confirm their own beliefs. In order to control these two different sources of motivation, which could determine their participation in torture, the results of the Rotter’s test (Lefcourt, 1976) will be complemented with interviews. That is to say, one of the sections of the interviews will focus on the personal motivations to be a member of the Army and specific units of intelligence.

Johnson et al. (1968) investigate the relationship between locus of control and the resistance to temptation as part of a project concerned with moral development and personal adjustment. They found that the internals are more likely to complete stories in

which the hero resisted pressure and they are also more likely than externals to have the hero acknowledge guilt about his having yielded to pressure (p.48). Furthermore, internals are more tolerant of discomfort in doing what they consider to be correct than their externals counterparts. These findings should alert one about the presence of the hero notion in some torturers, who present an internal locus of control. In addition, individual motivations based on the beliefs that torture is a legitimate activity which has the final objective to protect the nation could be the explanatory reason to explicate the participation of a group of individuals in these activities. At this level, the impact of the indoctrination process will be evaluated, by asking the individuals in which ways the training and military values confirmed their beliefs. Another research procedure will compare these findings with the non-torture military who presents an internal locus of control. The comparison should allow one to identify personal motivation versus the impact of the military ideology in their beliefs and behavior.

Since the locus of control is related to cognitive activity, self-direction should entail more active cognitive processing of information relevant to the attainment of valued ends and should be reflected in the types of strategies that characterize an individual (Lefcourt, 1976). Based on this hypothesis, Seeman and Evans (1962) found that internals require more information, while externals are more readily accept dependency on more competent others and thus have less need of information. Hence, externals present a poor cognitive process that would enable them to examine and evaluate their choices and decisions.

According to Lefcourt (1976), the individual perception of their inability to choose makes externals to yield easily to outside pressures regardless of whether they are for good or evil.

One of the considerations that should be taken into account is the fact that the locus of control can be changed throughout time. Smith (1970) suggests that environmental

events, such as life crises, can turn externals toward a major level of internal control (p. 116).

### **Locus of Control and Power**

Goodstadt and Hjelle (1973) conducted an experiment in which internals and externals were given power. The internals were more persuasive and less coercive in their relations with others. Instead, the externals used significantly more coercion. Solar and Bruehl (1971) found a significant correlation between externality and Machiavellianism. Externals might resort to coercive or manipulative strategies when placed in a situation to obtain a goal. Internals utilized coercion of others only after trying to achieve control by acceptable means (p. 101).

The type of locus appears as a tool which might explain the different levels of cruelty showed by some torturers. Nevertheless, it is ventured if we try to study the locus of control as an isolated element of personality, in turn it will explain personal motivations to participate in torture. In order to avoid reductionism, self-esteem will be studied as another feature of personality.

### **Self-Esteem and Locus of Control**

Since internals tend to show a greater resistance to group pressure and also a greater confidence level, it is not surprising that externals are generally more anxious and less proficient to achieve successes. Phares (1976) argues that these findings could indicate that “a chronically insecure person with a history of less than successful attempts at attaining rewards from his or her environment would yield to pressure or become conforming” (p. 82).

In this discussion, self-esteem appears as another element which could be associated with the type of locus. Therefore, the next variable studied is self-esteem and its relation with aggressiveness and abuse of power.

## **SELF-ESTEEM**

Self-esteem “is an affectively laden self-evaluation. It is, at heart, how a person feels about himself...*trait self-esteem* refers to how a person generally or most typically feels about him-or herself” (Leary and MacDonald, 2003, p. 401).

Self-esteem is vulnerable and defined in response to events, which are evaluated by a person. The individual interprets and gives a level of relevance to these events. The events can be external (such as achievements, setbacks, altered circumstances), or internal (such as own perception, beliefs, values) (Crocker and Park, 2003). Successes and failures are one of the most important factors that lead to the increase and decrease of self-esteem. Crocker et al. (2001) found that trait self-esteem depends on both individual contingencies of self-worth and on whether the person’s circumstances enable him to satisfy his contingencies.

According to Crocker and Park (2003), the development of contingencies of self-worth depends on numerous factors. This includes the forms of socialization and social influences (Bandura, 1986, 1991), such as parent-child interaction (Bartholomew, 1990), cultural norms and values and observational learning (Bandura, 1991). People tend to seek the increase in self-esteem and positive effects that follow from success in dominants of contingency (Leary and MacDonald, 2003).

People tent to respond to negative outcomes such as perceived threats, with anger and hostility, and often lash out against others following threats to their self-worth

(Baumeister, et al., 1996). This does not mean that poor self-esteem is the cause of aggressive behavior (Bushman and Baumeister, 2002). Nevertheless, the tendency to focus on others as a threat to self-esteem extends to the derogation of out-groups and expression of in-group favoritism (Aberson, Healy, and Romero, 2000; Crocker and Luthanen, 1990). People are more likely to stereotype others, when they experience a threat to the self-concept (Fein and Spencer, 1997).

The self-protective biases are developed based on the different impact that positive and negative events have on people of low and high self-esteem. Negative events appear to produce self-esteem differences, whereas positive events do not (Campbell, 1986). Even though high and low self-esteem people tend to attribute positive events to internal factors, they diverge in their explanations of negative events. Whereas those high in self-esteem attribute negative events to external and unstable factors, those low in self-esteem are more likely to attribute failure internally (Campbell, 1986). Several studies found that people, who temporarily deflated self-images, are more likely to disparage other people or to express heightened racial prejudice. People who are negative about themselves also tend to be thin-skinned and judgmental (Baumeister 1996; Baumgardner et. al. 1989). Individuals with low self-esteem could be more prone to justify their own behavior based on the enemy perception and their lack of empathy. In addition, Maslow (1970) purports that a positive self-concept is the key to happiness and success, and that self-acceptance and empathy help nurture positive feelings about oneself. In this approach, it is possible to infer that individuals with high self-esteem have developed empathetic feelings not only towards themselves but also towards other people. This condition could be a constraint factor in the participation of torture acts.

People with fragile self-esteem are highly responsive to events that have potential responsive their feelings of self-worth (Greenier et al., 1999). An example is when a non-returned greeting is viewed as reflective of one's own unlikeableness and not the recipient's distractions (Kernis and Goldman, 2003). Another form of response can be aggressive and defensive by attacking the validity of the threatening information or the credibility of its sources (Kernis et al. 1989). On the other hand, people with relatively stable self-esteem typically have less extreme reactions to potentially evaluative events.

Kernis and Goldman (2003) incorporate the concept of unstable self-esteem, which refers to the high tendency of an individual to be influenced by external events. This instability is expressed in the propensity of a subject to present depressive systems when he faces negative stressful events (Kernis et al, 1997; Roberts and Monroe, 1992). Furthermore, daily positive and negative events have a greater immediate impact on feelings about the self (Greenier et al., 1999). Those with unstable self-esteem tend to avoid potential self-esteem threats (Ryan, 1993) and the magnitude of fluctuations is associated with the size of fluctuations that the individual experiences in his domain specific self-evaluations (Whisenhunt and Kernis, 1996). Finally, the authors maintain that an individual with unstable self-esteem has a weaker sense of self expression and impoverished self-concept.

According to Fiske and Taylor (1991), to create a positive self-impression, individuals are motivated to increase power to obtain approval and validate a positive self-image. The strategies used to achieve these goals are to match the target's behavior, convey the most positive image possible, appreciate or flatter the target and be consistent with these strategies. Hence, low self-esteem could be an important element that motivates

individuals to be associated with a group which encourages and accepts their aggressive behavior.

In the studies reviewed, external locus of control and fragile self-esteem appear associated with a history of child abuse. Even though we can not categorically maintain that a child's abuse history by itself is a predictor of aggressive behavior, it can be hypothesized that the presence of these three factors could explain the personal motivation to participate in torture and keep some in the military in the system for a longer period. Moreover, the correlation between these variables may explain the propensity of some members of the military involved in torture, but not others.

## **CHILD ABUSE HISTORY**

The following forms of violence would be considered child abuse:

- Type of Categories: Physical, psychological, verbal, sexual, negligence, parental abandonment and/or destructions of possessions.
- The aggressor: parents, tutor and/or older brother or sister.
- Magnitude of the abuse: type of abuse and frequency.

### *Self-esteem and child abuse history*

Traumatic experiences have profound effects on multiple aspects of self and identity such as, physical and sexual abuse, combat experiences, assault or motor vehicle accident (Westen and Heim, 2003). Self-esteem appears to be a key area affected by the child's abuse experience (Johnson et al., 1999; Bolger et al, 1998). Based on these findings, the child's abuse history and its association with adult aggressive behavior will be reviewed.

### *Cognitive-Neoassociation Model*

According to Berkowitz (1989) during the early stages, an aversive event produces a negative affect. This negative affect may be due to physical pain or psychological

discomfort such as being a witness of domestic violence or verbal insults. Unpleasant feelings or negative affects presumably then give rise, almost automatically, to a variety of feelings, thoughts, and memories that are associated with fear and anger.

Hans Toch (1992) theorizes that most violent episodes can be traced to well-learned, systematic strategies of violence that some people have found to be effective in dealing with conflictual, interpersonal relationships. Thus, violence is not simply the act of a person acting on impulse. Instead, it is the way of one whose habitual response patterns are reacting violently in particular situations. Toch argues that if the history of violent persons is reviewed, a surprising consistency in their approaches to interpersonal relationships will be found.

In an analysis of longitudinal studies conducted by Berkowitz (1993), the results show that from the proportion of children, who were highly aggressive, their tendencies were more apparent from the age of 17 as well as at the age 21. In the follow up stages, it is observed that the people who had been highly aggressive in early adolescence were more likely to have been convicted of a violent crime by the time they reached age 32 (Farrington, 1989). These same findings were achieved in Eron's et al. study (1987).

Some people may act quickly on the basis of these initial emotions without further deliberation, sometimes engaging in violence. During the late stages, however, cognitive appraisal may go into operation and substantially influence the subsequent emotional reactions and experience after the initial automatic responses. Like Berkowitz, Beck (1999) refers to the tendency of adults, who suffered child abuse to over interpret other people as hostile. Progressively, this perception became a consistent cognitive pattern.

Beck (1999) purports that "children are most likely to become delinquent when the punishment is extreme and capricious (p. 134)." On the other hand, non abusive parents

trend to buffer a child's misbehavior. Megargee (1982) observes that abusive parents and abusive spouses have themselves been the victims of family violence during their childhood.

Based on this theoretical framework, we could explain why a child, who has opportunities to observe aggression, is reinforced for his/her own aggression, or is the object of aggression could be more prone to engage in aggressive behavior as an adult.

## **AGE**

The age of the recruits appears as another recurrent factor in the Haritos-Fatouros research and several personal testimonies. The age fluctuates between 17 and 23. This variable could define, in some degree, the participation of soldiers in torture. Erickson (1963) purports that the adolescent identity stage is followed in young adulthood by developing a capacity for intimacy, the ability to form emotionally close relationships. Between 13 and 23, the self-concept usually becomes more positive, especially among boys and those who belong to a satisfying peer group. A clearer, more self-affirming identity is forming, and with it comes greater sense of control over one's future (Baumgardner, 1990). Several studies of juvenile delinquency suggest that young people are less influenced by some threats of bad consequences than adults (Tittle, 1980; Tittle and Paternoster, 2000).

In this phase, the group influences in the identity of the youth play a fundamental role, which could have more impact if the individual distances his contact with his family once he joins the military or police training. The isolation from the civilian world and the indoctrination process, coupled with the individual needs of personal identification, accentuated by the age could be essential factors in the behavior of a torturer.

## **GROUP LEVEL**

Since age appears as a recurrent fact, which can be associated with the impact of indoctrination process and peer influences in the torturers' behavior, several criminological theories are reviewed. The theoretical frameworks may explain the impact of peer on deviance behavior and how this relationship can be applied on the young recruits.

### **Frustration-Aggression**

Berkowitz (1989) points outs that the person engages in aggressive actions will depend in part on his/her learning history, interpretation of the event, and individual way of responding to frustration and the presence if aggression-eliciting stimuli in the environment. To express an aggressive behavior, the presence of rewards is necessary. The rewards could come from the parents and also from the peer groups. This premise could help one to evaluate the impact of group influences and the reinforcement given by the military institution through rewards in order to perpetrate torture.

Berkowitz emphasizes two important components to frustration-aggression equation: the extent that a person perceives the mistreatment as intentional; and to the degree that frustration experienced is aversive. Therefore, self-restraint comes into play when people think they have not been deliberately mistreated or that the blocking of the goal was legitimate. If it is assumed that an individual is motivated to engage in an aggressive act, it is relevant to identify why he perceives the victims as an agent of aggression. Since in the torture room, the aggressor is under absolute control of the victims, the perception of threat should be absent. Therefore, to explain his behavior, it should necessary review the cognitive aspects, which identify the form of threat and his reaction against it.

To understand the impact of group influences on the individual, criminological theories allow one to identify personal motivations that drive a person to carry out deviant behavior. Deviant behaviors are likely to take place in company of others, particularly the first time. Group support is essential for learning how to do the deviance and for sustaining its practice. Furthermore, while peer associations are particularly important for youthful deviance, it continues to affect the probabilities of deviance throughout the life course (Tittle, C., 1980; Tunnell, K. 1993).

Tittle and Paternoster (2000) describe the presence of several variables in the perpetration of juvenile deviant conduct. These variables permit one to identify how group interactions and influences are an important key in the rise of deviance behavior.

#### *Group Necessity*

Most deviance requires other people, often organized groups, in order to learn how to perpetrate these activities (Tittle and Paternoster, 2000). The group also provides social support, a body of supporting beliefs for deviant activities and simulation of courage (Matza, 1984). Such groups often have well-developed procedures for recruiting new members. Many forms of deviance are at least particularly organized in subcultures that feature some recruitment.

Huggins et al. (2003) conducted a study, which focuses on a sample of Brazilian police workers – torturers and death squad murders. The sample was composed of twenty-three policemen who participated in the era of the repressive military regime (1964-1985). The objective of the research was to understand the transformations that make a man into a perpetrator of evil, and to identify the broader social and political contexts that facilitate the production of state-sanctioned evil.

In this study, the researchers observe that **informal daily socialization** in elite police organization was a key to nurture atrocities. In fact, a number of valuable insights into when, how, which policing techniques and attitudes had been informally communicated to atrocity perpetrators (p. 172). Moreover, most consist and useful information was gained from other police in routine settings. Oral tradition passed the information from one to another. Even they were able to learn how to handle the emotional repercussions of their behavior.

### **Group Social Control or Group Pressure**

Acceptability: Groups are important to people to the extent that they uniquely fulfill important needs. A person who has many groups that meet a particular need, such as companionship, is less dependent on any given one and is therefore less likely to fear rejection and less subject to group pressure. Peer influence is very powerful during the adolescent years, because adolescence is a transitional period between childhood –when one's needs are met in close, intimate kinship groups- and adulthood. Youths are breaking free of childhood familial bonds and have not yet established new adult familial relationship. Hence, peers groups come to have a great influence on adolescents, especially the need for social acceptance (Tittle and Paternoster, 2000 p. 399).

Status and Prestige: the group has the ability to grant recognition, prestige, or status ranking to its participants (Kiesler and Kiesler, 1969). Since adolescents generally suffer from subordinate status in the larger society, they are especially attuned to peer group who can provide recognition and prestige (Tittle and Paternoster, 2000 p. 400).

Unfortunately, the age of the Brazilian police recruits is not pointed out in the study. Nevertheless, it is observed that the internal institutional standards provide a sense of self-satisfaction and self-worth. Behavior becomes self-regulated even in the absence of

external surveillance or authority controls by means of our own moral compass (Huggins et. al., 2003, p. 250). This also can be related with the “Self Esteem Thesis” previously discussed.

Testing: adolescent group members are often engaged in masculinity testing to overcome anxiety about sexual identities; such anxiety is particularly acute among those denied adult opportunities to demonstrate such claims. These challenges attempt to physically intimidate others. The result is an increased chance of deviance (Tittle and Paternoster, 2000 p. 401). In the review of torturers' features (Reyes, 2001), one of the consistent aspects pointed out by the individuals was the role of the group to promote masculinity as a form of power, which emphasized competition, dominance and control. No expression of emotions of compassion, caring, concern, or empathy with a victim was also observed in the Huggins' study.

Undermining External Control: Minor (1980) and Sykes and Matza (1957) developed the process undermining social control and self-control called “techniques of neutralization,” which is a cognitive mechanism that serves the function of releasing deviants from constraints. According to the authors, the techniques include:

1. denial of responsibility
2. denial the victim
3. denial the injury
4. higher loyalty (I had to defend my mother's honor or the fatherland)
5. metaphor of the ledger (look at the good things we have done)
6. condemning the condemners

Moral disengagement is another variable observed in previous researchers. Huggins et al. (2003) argues that moral disengagement resulted from the segmented jurisdictional

nature of the atrocity system itself. The particular strategies used by the interviewees to explain and excuse atrocity were identified:

- Diffusing responsibility
- Blaming individuals, whether victims or perpetrators, citing as a cause
- Asserting that professionalism had correctly guided their and other's violence (p. 192).

Undermining external control is a characteristic explained by the dynamics of authority. Kelman and Hamilton (1995) define the dynamics of authority as the legitimacy of the system, the demands made by authority in the society, and the consequent communication between authority and individuals in an organizational context. This definition is based on the characterization of a structural model of the processes of social influence, which includes compliance, identification, and internalization (Kelman 1961, 1964). Compliance refers to situations in which “an individual accepts influence from another person or group in the hope of achieving a favorable reaction, or avoiding an unfavorable reaction” (p. 104). Identification occurs when “an individual adopts behavior associated with a satisfactory self-defining relationship to another person or group” (p. 104). Self-definition involves a person’s self-image, and the relationship in which the roles of two persons or groups are defined with reference to each other. The interactions between social members cause the group members that surround the individual to become a mirror image that defines his/her behavior pattern and personal identity (Scheier and Carver, 1988). Internalization occurs when a person accepts the social influences because the induced behavior is congruent with his/her value system. These values reinforce their beliefs, and are socially derived and shared. Moreover, these values have the function generating a set of personal standards by which the person rejects or accepts the induced behavior. The

acceptance of the induced behavior will depend upon its usefulness for solving a problem, whether or not those fit within her/his worldview and moral conviction, and whether or not it maximizes his/her values (auto-confirmation). “The same individual may be susceptible to influence via each other of the process at different times and in different contexts” (p. 109). Then, they may be observed in the behavioral outcomes.

Beliefs/Values: The control that social alliances have on a person’s potential deviant behavior depends on the tendency for people who are integrated in social networks to incorporate the norms or the values of those groups into their own internal moral systems (Braithwaite, J., 1989; Felson, 1986; Hirschi, 1969; Nye, 1958). Cialdini and Trost (1989) and Latane and Wolf (1981) found that group pressures are able to persuade the individual to act against his own best judgment, but often it is because his own judgment about reality is colored by perceptions of how others view it.

Another mechanism of influence is fear. Tittle (1980) argues that fear of certain, severe and quick bad consequences produce conformity, and that effect is enhanced when individuals’ fears match that of their peer group. These factors could explain why Uruguayan soldiers (Calace, 1988; García, 1984), the Chilean agents (Hennings et al. 1995), and the Brazilians reported that they would be jeopardized by a peer who was too interested in his own interests. In the case of Brazilians, this permanent fear was nurtured by the socializing police, which encourage them to be mistrustful of one another and of an ever-expanding set of dangerous others, which created a mind-set in which every one was under suspicion.

F.E. Zimring (1981) asserts that peer group pressure has a strong correlation with male antisocial behavior and similar findings were pinpointed in Akers’ studies (1985). Later, Elliot and Scott (1996) and Warr and Stafford (1991) found that peers whether help

produce misbehavior or whether misbehaving people select friends and associates who also misbehave. Based on these finding, one can argue that individual motivations coupled with a group are strong determinants to drive young individuals to perpetrate crime.

### Desindividuation

Zimbardo (1970) conducted numerous studies to test the process of losing one's identity and becoming part of a group, as a situational variable.

Desindividuation follows a complex chain of events:

1. The presence of many other people encourages feelings of anonymity.
2. Then, the individual feels s/he loses identity and becomes part of the group
3. Under these conditions, s/he can no longer be singled out and held responsible for behavior.
4. This feeling generates a loss of self-awareness, reduced concern over evaluations from others, and narrowed focus of attention (Baron and Byrne, 1977).
5. When the processes are combined, lower restraints against antisocial criminal behavior arise. They are the basic ingredients in mass violence.

According to the literature review, the military institutions have specialized unities in charge to perpetrate torture. The machinery implemented creates instances in which each member is responsible to execute a specific task. Simultaneously, they are unaware about the tasks carry out by other members of the same or other units. In fact, in the Chilean report of detentions and final whereabouts of disappeared victims, the agents indicated that they were unaware of the complete procedure implemented to detent, torture, kill and disappear the victims.

Furthermore, Zimbardo (1970) in a study conducted in New York City and Palo Alto, observed that an abandoned car in New York City was looted within 26 hours, by

well-dressed, middle class Whites, rather than delinquents. In Palo Alto the abandoned car was untouched during seven days. Zimbardo suggests that the anonymity of the New York residents worked in combination with situational cues implying that they could get by without repercussions. In contrast, a person in Palo Alto could be more easily identified, and this kind of behavior would expect to be the target of social disapproval or gossip.

A relevant aspect of desindividuation is that it is not only a feature of massive behavior. The effect may be achieved by a disguise, a mask, or a uniform also worn by others. Zimbardo argues that people tend to be more abusive, aggressive, and violent when their identity is hidden. Watson (1973) explains that contemporary soldiers, guerrillas and military advisers are desindividuated by their uniform.

Brazilian group anonymity encouraged the elite squad's insularity and supported policemen's bonding, dependence on one another, and separation from outsiders (Huggins et. al., 2003, p. 185). This isolation and secrecy facilitated the individuals becoming morally separated from the consequences of their behavior (p. 188).

The group dynamic is not expressed in a vacuum. Instead, it is framed into the military or police institution. Hence, the group variables analyzed here should be examined in the military or police setting.

## **INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL**

In the search for explanation of the military behavior, the structure, principles, and values that the military apparatus shapes and the mechanisms utilized in the reproduction of military and police conduct, including torture, training practices are examined. In spite of the difficulty in isolating each variable from the different levels of analysis, it is possible to observe how indoctrination processes and the nature of military or police institutions can determine a common pattern of behavior that sponsored the perpetration of torture. In this section, obedience theory and other studies are reviewed in order to observe what variables are expressed.

Haritos-Fatouros and Gibson (1986), H. Kelman and V. Hamilton (1989) describe torture as a crime of obedience in which a military system is structured in such a way that the subjects lose their capacity of discernment and follow the orders without opposition.

A crime of obedience is "an act performed in response to orders from an authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community" (Kelman and Hamilton 1995, p. 21) such as the case of torture. However, the authorities of the same state order, encourage, and/or tolerate systematic policies or sporadic acts of torture. This type of crime takes place within a hierarchical structure that makes it difficult to pinpoint responsibility on specific individuals.

Kelman and Hamilton (1995) describe authority "as a role relationship between two sets of actors within a social unit" (p. 77). This role requires that the role of ordinary members be obligated to comply with their demands. Power is used by the authority members within certain constraints, in such a way that the "ordinary members" perceive, in the authority the right to command them, and also they accept the coercive power.

Therefore, the perception of the use of authority is legitimized, the authors called this *legitimate influence*, which is defined in a determined social context.

Social influence, in these circumstances, is the result of the inducement by the authority that determines that subordinates change their behaviors, attitudes or beliefs. Inducing, according to the authors, may take place through direct or symbolic contact with the influencing agent. The agent offers behaviors that are linked to the preferences, values or social position that the individual wills and shares with the group, making possible the induction of points that the agent expects from the subordinate individuals.

The important aspects to consider in the influence process are the influencing agent's characteristics such as prestige, status, special knowledge or expertise, and control of certain resources, which enable the agent to apply sanctions. However, these characteristics are not decisive by themselves. That is, the influencing agent must be in a position that recruits perceive that this is the agent who facilitates or impedes their goals. The power of the influencing agent over subordinates depends on his capacity to affect some of the conditions for subordinates' goal achievement, and the use, in fact, of this capacity. The characteristics of the influencing agent are automatic and visceral, and these also implicate the use of manipulative and responsible strategies (p. 84).

People react to authority situations under which they are governed by submitting to the demands of the authority. Here, the role of the individual reflects his or her desire to maintain his or her relationships to the group for which s/he has loyalty, and her or his self-definition as a good group member. In this level of group identification individuals cannot choose to disobey, because such actions constitute violations of the norm of loyalty. Resistance becomes possible with an active redefinition of the situation, which in most

cases does not happen, due to the fact that authorities implement and reinforce penalties in case individuals disobey.

Not only are sanctions utilized to obtain obedience, but so are positive reinforcements, such as medals or other awards that reinforce compliance. Under this umbrella, individuals may consent to the authority, which defines a political system that delineates antisocial and immoral behaviors (p.98).

Another factor that helps people to cross the line to commit violence is an imposed system to keep the perpetrators in ignorance of what they are doing. This tactic, according to Baumeister (1996), makes the instructions become clear only moments before the action is to be done, so the time and the opportunity to reject the order is reduced. Another tactic is the use of group perpetrators. When "the perpetrator" is a group of individuals, the opportunities for ambiguities to arise increase. The ambiguity involves multiple meanings, making the individual uncertain about a correct one. This tactic permits the responsibility to be divided up into small parts and pieces so that no one seems to be to blame even for horrific results.

When individuals in a society commit criminal acts they assume that the punishment will be applied to them. However, in a torture crime often nothing out of the ordinary happens, and then the perpetrators are surprised by the absence of condemnatory reaction (Baumeister, 1996, p. 291). These aspects also act as facilitators in the torture actions. Moreover, the institutional framework offers them the necessary conditions for one agency and its members to be entirely responsible for the whole behavior, but at the same time no one is identified as directly responsible.

If the results of Huggins et al. (2003) and Haritos-Fatouros (1988) are compared, the role of the institution appears to be the triggering factor, which promotes and supports

the occurrence of torture. The common features are the training, the system of recruitment, organizational structure, ideology, reward/punishment system, infrastructure's facilities, hierarchical structure and the distribution of command. In the following segment, these characteristics are discussed.

### **Training**

In the Haritos-Fatouros' study (1988) the learning model based on principles of behavior change was observed in the following expressions: Overlearning, in which obedience without question to an order without logic was the ultimate goal, so recruits were prepared to carry out orders for acts of cruelty that had little meaning to them; desensitization, so that the servicemen were gradually desensitized to the idea of torture in such a way that they had to endure torture as if it were an every or normal act; role modeling, older servicemen flogged and degraded the freshmen; and reinforcement, negative and positive reinforcement were used to maintain the behavior of the torturers once it had been acquired (direct or indirect threat, intimidation, punishment, threat to inquire their family) as well as material and social gains were used.

In the case of Brazilian police, the training was received only by a proportion of the interviewees and by only a segment of the atrocity perpetrators among them (p. 169). In-service training does not appear to be a single determining factor in shipping serial atrocity perpetrators. Instead police organization has an important role in their socialization. Training was often given as reward after a good service, usually in association with promotion to a more prestigious position.

A relevant difference was observed between the Greek military and Brazilian policemen. That is, Brazilian torturers did not receive formal pre-service training and very

little in-service instruction. The researchers assume that the learning outcomes were derived primarily from the on-duty informal socialization (p. 239)

In the Latin America officer schools, "the early socialization of the military is indeed isolating with both heavy indoctrination and a rigorous selection procedure employed to weed out unsuitable material and mould accepted officers" (Philip, p. 190).

The age of recruits, which varies between 16 to 18 years old, appears as a factor determinant of the impact of character formation to be considered.

The characteristics of discipline, Philip argues, involve an arms-length relationship between the military and all civilians. The style of military officers tends to create a psychological military sense of distance from civilians. That is, early training recruitment in terms of age, intense training, frequent postings to often remote parts of the country, the content of military training and indoctrination, the intensely meritocratic nature of military promotion and the discipline itself are elements that construct a social environment around the civilian world. This aspect is clearly illustrated in Haritos-Fatouros (1988) and Creslistens' work (1995) in which the age of recruits has the same range. Moreover, isolation during the military training focuses on creating a sense of pride in belonging to a group of professionals, generating a gradual movement from one world or view (civilian and empathic feelings) to military beliefs.

The members of the military in Latin America are strongly socialized to their discipline. Officers spend a large part of their career going to school and most of their career advancements depend on their academic performance. Under this umbrella, training has the function of keeping the officers busy and supposedly raising the effectiveness of the forces. Most Latin American countries, Wesson (1986) argues, teach military tactics, armed strategies, broader matters of national problems and purposes in order to qualify generals

for the position of national political leadership, whether or not this will materialize (p. 20).

Unlike the United States or other democratic countries, in most Latin American countries the military as a profession participated actively in the political matters. The civil society expected that they took control of the political system and led it if it was necessary, especially when the political leaders were unable to achieve agreements to rule the country.

In fact, in Brazil, President Figueiredo in 1984 determined that a promotion of a soldier has as a requirement participation in the National Information Service (SNI), a service that he directed during 1974 to 1979. Therefore, the promotion to general in Brazil had a political connotation, during the military regime (Fleischer, 1986). In the case of Chile, officers' promotion depended on the continued evaluation of their superiors. Moral, education, professional and emotional, and administrative qualities are considered in the evaluation process.

The Chilean geopolitical ideology had an important influence on military doctrine. Military nationalism, linked with possible armed conflict with the neighboring countries (Argentina, Peru, Bolivia), pushed the diplomats and military to prevent hostile actions. The Chilean military had been opposed to Marxist doctrine, opposition that was reinforced by the United States influence. Public statements by Chilean military leaders after the coup (September 1973) referred to the necessity of the extirpation of the Marxist cancer. The Pinochet regime's actions against the leftists included the most brutal system of torture, imprisonment, assassination and kidnappings (Sigmund, 1986; Rettig et al., 1991).

Like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay present common patterns (Kaufman, 1979; Millet, 1986; Philip, 1985; Yelvington, 1997). The first commonality was the early age at which the officers begin the military training. Second, most of members of the armed forces belonged to the upper and middle classes, with the

exception of Uruguay. Third, ethnicity and racial background have an important connotation in the selection of officers, especially in Guatemala and Argentina. Both countries restrict higher officer corps to white and non-indigenous people. Fourth, despite the limited information, it is observed that a significant numbers of students are military sons. Finally, the military institution offers students the opportunity to reach some degree of status and, hence, political power.

Even though each country has its own features, the military role and political repression during military regimes were manifested in very similar ways. That is to say, the way in which the military handled the legal bodies, the interpretation of National Security doctrine, the violation of human rights, and the economic and social benefits obtained by its members are very similar in these countries.

### **Isolation**

In the Chilean officer school, the military training and the early socialization of the military soldiers are isolated (Philip, p. 190). The style of military officers tends to create a psychological military sense of distance from civilians. Indeed, in the interviews conducted by Rosenberg (1991), the Argentinean officers describe that the military training was offered in isolated places, and the individuals were separated from the civil society, creating their own “word.” Haritos-Fatouros (1998) and Creslistens’ works (1995) argue that isolation during the military training focuses on creating a sense of pride in belonging to a group of professionals, generating a gradual movement from one world or view (civilian and emphatic feelings) to military beliefs.

The **secrecy** and insularity of atrocity work organizations shielded operatives from potentially dangerous outsiders, guaranteed operatives’, anonymity, disguised victims’

humanity, and morally disengaged an operative's sense of responsibility for his violence (Huggins et. al., 2003, p.183).

### **Recruitment**

Like Greek soldiers, none of Brazilian policemen in specialized teams were directly selected to have a predisposition to cruelty. "Those in such organization or units were selected or promoted by others (especially if considered trustworthy or fortuitously chose, that is, by chance, or through just following orders to carry out violence" (Huggins et. al., 2003, p. 163). Other, atrocity-committing interviewees neither asked for nor desired their first assignment to one of the specialized, violent organization. Huggins et al. (2003) argue "Among Greek and Brazilian recruits, the more sensitive and fragile men were weeded out, leaving the rest to become atrocity perpetrators" (p. 239). In this argument, we can identify a priory system of selection which excludes people who can resist following orders. Therefore, their resistance or questioning order can be an indicator, which identifies individual features that make vulnerable to a group of military or policemen to perpetrate torture. This aspect is clearly illustrated in Haritos-Fatouros (1988) and Creslistens' works (1995).

### **Institutional infrastructure-organization**

In the literature reviewed, it is noted that specific police and military structure were designed to torture, assassinate or disappear victims. Each police and military organization had specialized social control units and teams with their own internal division of labor. They had financial support as part of institutional budget.

## ***LEGAL IMPUNITY***

The law also provides the military legal entitlement to force compliance, even to the point of physical injury or death, making the law part and parcel of the operations that provide security and peace (p. 136). These same notions provide the restriction of rights, which encourage the military status quo and offer members of the military impunity. Similar patterns are also observed in the Chilean military regime. Another important characteristic is that military government, such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile passed self-amnesties prior to the transfer of power to civilian authorities. This action gave absolute legal impunity to those crimes, which implicated severe human rights violation (Zagorski, 1992), In the case of Greek military, after the military regime they were sentenced. Nevertheless, light sentences were applied (Creslistens, 1995).

During the coup and military regime, not only legal corpuses are created but the institutions or “special tribunals” are also implemented. Special tribunals, in the cases of Guatemala, have the function to provide “rapid justice” and to “cleanse the courts of the guerrilla, even if its means a diminishing of rights” according to the Colonel-lawyer Girón Sánchez. Names of the judges were not made known to the public, nor were lawyers able to meet with the prisoners or provide them due process (Schirmer, 1998). In the case of Chile two situations were common. First, “terrorist” were processed by Military Court (Fiscalía Militar). The second instance was Ordinary Court, where most cases were not received or even not ordered a full investigation such kidnappings and missing victims.

## **Ideology**

During the 60's in Latin America, the military modified its role and started to participate in political decision-making. As a result of this new approach, Security-Development ideology created a strong central government organized along military lines

and fully responsible to the armed forces. The civil sectors demanded the military intervention in economic and political affairs, and then later they lost control of the military intervention (Fleischer, 1986).

National Security Doctrine defined targets who are the enemies of the state and the operative laws against the “delinquent subversives” and against “common delinquency” (Schirmer, 1998). Kelman argues (1995) that the perceived threat to the security of the state provides a national policy, which supports torture. The purpose and justification of torture is established for the protection of the state against the internal and external threats of its security. The practice is justified by reference to the particular doctrine of the state’s legitimization.

The military’s mission is to maintain the state’s and military’s institutionality. One way to do it is interpreting of law and order according to strategies, which include arbitrary or illegal acts. Therefore, any operations are placed within a “situation of almost war (in words of Captain Mozariegos) and war (in the words of General Pinochet). Self-defense appears as an army’s tool to fight “a war.” Torturers followed the crime-control ideology and technical militarization. Militarized professionalization fostered police violence, by giving them autonomy (Huggins et. al., 2003).

Rouquié indicates that the military instruction isolates the officers from civilian surroundings, values, and references, raising the level of knowledge and diffusing the military ethic. “The existence of a specialized military educational system also introduce (s) methods of recruitment in which civilians had no part” (p. 65). Indeed, the military officer schools select their peers, and political recommendations determine this selection. In the description of Rouquié, we can observe that the military has their own selection system and ideological structure and doctrine in which civilians are unable to interfere. On the other

hand, we observe that military intervention within political affairs is tolerated, accepted, and in most cases supported by civilians. This unbalanced power “distribution” could be a significant source of conflict since civilians appear subordinate to the military power. The isolation of individuals from their civil community during military training is also observed in Haritos-Fatouros (1988) and Creslistens’ research (1995). The training of torturers is based on the identification with the military subculture, its ideology, its intended structure and worldview. The isolation from the civilians represents the “old world view,” and constitutes the relational keystone from recruit’s old ideology, diminishes these norms among the recruits.

Dixon (1976) describes the influence of the code of honor in the armed forces. The code of honor, according to Dixon, is a set of rules for expected behavior. These rules are relevant for their followers because to break them provokes the distressing emotions of guilt or shame. The guilty feelings are the product of knowing that a member of the army institution has transgressed the code of honor and, hence, might be found out. A feeling of shame results from being found out (p. 197). Another function of the military codes of honor is to serve to reduce fear. Dixon explains that military members are designed to ensure that threatening situations are met by fight rather than “flight”. “Whereas the latter might lead to physical pain, mutilation and death, the former eventuates with far greater certainty in personal guilt and public shame” (p. 197).

García (1988), an Uruguayan soldier, shows in his testimonies that not only feelings of guilt and shame determined his participation and permanence in the armed force, but also the fear to be punished for breaking the loyalty toward the institution, loyalties that involved the realization of brutal crimes towards civilians.

Philip (1985) describes the military discipline in South American countries as rigid, and oriented to indoctrinate the young recruits with military values. One of them is the perception that the high commander position (i.e. colonel) defines the absolute law, not only within the institutional system, but also in personal life and overall behavior as well. The discipline has the function of reinforcing the values (p. 178). The organizational body provides a “specialized training in a particular body of knowledge, a rigid division of labor, hierarchy of decision making, self-imposed occupational standards, and impersonal and universalistic rules for appointments, promotion, demotion, and remuneration” (Huggins, et. al. 2003, p 207).

Two basic principles appear relevant in the manifestation of the dynamic of power: personal interest and the enemy perception. The personal interest principle is clearly explained by the roots of the military system in which the status quo and authoritarian structures give social privileges to those in the high military hierarchy. The enemy figure principle is attached to individuals that simply disagree with the military principle. “Acts of torture, murder, rape, kidnapping and detention without judicial sanctions led both national and international law, and in some cases they occurred on a massive scale” (Zagorski, 1997, p. 108). However, the armed forces perceive their actions as absolutely necessary for the defense of the nation and remain unrepentant. Therefore, the institutional features have to be examined focusing the structural organization and the perception of individuals inside the system.

The next chapter presents the methodology utilized to conduct this study.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **MATERIALS AND METHODS**

The research attempts to identify the most relevant factors which motivate individuals in a military system and/or police associated with military structure to perpetrate acts of torture, and describes the general context in which these acts occur. Furthermore, the objective of this study is to identify what are the direct and indirect variables that arise during the perpetration of acts of torture. Hence, this study focuses on the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, in terms of the mediating motivations that reach into the mentality of a torturer to perpetrate torture.

The study is not based on macro social variables such as the historical factors and specific social events that triggered the political violence in Chile. The macro social influences are only mentioned in general terms, although they are important and relevant influences that affect the social behavior of the country. Instead, here the perception of individuals about the political and socioeconomic crisis in Chile is reviewed in order to know how these facts are perceived by the individuals; and how these perceptions encouraged or deterred their violent behavior.

To examine the dynamic of the torture, three levels of analysis are reviewed. The first level is the individual characteristics that determine that the individuals became active participants in torture's acts. The second level is the group influences, which could be associated to the institutional indoctrination. Finally, the third level is the influence of the institutional structure and ideology, specifically military and police, on the occurrence of torture. These three levels are not isolated one to another. Instead, it is expected that they appear to be overlapped and associated in a game of interactions. To better describe the impact of these levels on the criminal behavior, the variables are reviewed from the

institutional level, group level and individual level. This order tries to detect the influences of variables on the individuals from a general view to a specific variable. In this research it is not possible to determinate the specific impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable, although, the organizations of the data following this order allows one to detect the main influences that motivate the behavior.

### Type of Design

An experimental design would be an ideal design to conduct this research, because this design allows one to generalize results. Unfortunately, it was not possible to achieve a sample with a large “n” of interviewees, and it only was feasible to achieve a smaller number of case study interviewees. Under these conditions, this research will utilize a **case study approach**, which provides an in-depth description and analysis of an individual with a reduced group of participants (Brown, et. al. 1999).

The selection of this design is based on the difficulty in recruiting people available to participate in the research. That is to say, some individuals who committed acts of torture during the Chilean military regime are still active in the military or police system. Another situation is that the confessions of their acts could threaten their physical or psychological integrity since they are prohibited to refer to this topic. Moreover, public confessions of illegal acts could provoke the legal prosecution against the perpetrators. Most perpetrators could not trust in the confidentiality of the researcher.

The military institution in Chile, as well as police, is characterized as a closed group, which separates civilians from the military (Vargas, 1997). Hence, the way to reach this group is asking the individuals who are in prison serving a sentence for the killings of civilians. The access to the prisoners has to be authorized by the prison’s authorities, and an individual letter was written to them in order to ask their voluntary participation in this

study. The letters were written with the advice of a Social Worker, who worked for five years with the group of inmates. She helped the researcher to write the letter based on the fact that she knows the individual characteristics of the inmates.

### **Brief description of the Chilean prison system**

In Chile, the state has the direct administration of the prisons and probation system through Gendarmerie. A National Director is appointed on the top of this state agency, and this position is designed by the President of the Republic, therefore, this is a political position. The Security Department depends on the National Director and this department is in charge on the two special prisons for military or police inmates, who are condemned for human rights violations. Today, the judicial trials that handle cases of human rights violations during the military regime are under permanent public scrutiny and this fact demands political dividends. Under this umbrella, the prisons authorities try to avoid any element that could question their procedures; therefore, they denied the access to interview the prisoners for this study. In spite of this fact, the authorities are unable to make this decision. The only way to have access to the prisoners, following the requirements of the WSU Institutional Review Board (IRB), was with the approval of the Gendarmerie's authorities. This aspect delayed the study due to the fact that I had to wait until the governmental authorities changed once a new President of the Republic was elected.

The personnel of Gendarmerie of Chile are trained by the School of Gendarmerie. This School is divided into two categories: Official School and Sub-official School. The Official School prepares the people that would be appointed in the directive positions; and the Sub-official School trained the individual who would be prison guards and the administrative personnel. They have military instruction, but the requirements to apply this field are lower than those for the military. It is relevant to highlight this point because the

personnel are submitted to the decisions of the high command. Even though the professional team does not have the Gendarmeries' training they are subjected to the authorities' decisions. Therefore, the approval of the official in charge of the prisons was very important in order to have the open access to the prisoners, prison's personnel and the files.

To have access to interview the prisoners was one of the most difficult barriers that I have to pass in order to conduct this research. The prison was outside Santiago, about one and half hours from Santiago city and the access to the prison was only by vehicles. The prison is in countryside and the access to the prison must be authorized for the prison's authorities. One time per week a prison's car picked up the professional team and me to drive us to the prison. At this time, I interviewed the prisoners, one or two at a time. I stayed the full day in the prison's units. The rest of the week, I worked in the prison reading the prisoners file and the judicial files. Having the access to the court's judicial files was very difficult due to most of them were filed and very hard to find.

The second barrier that had to pass was to obtain the confidence of gendarmerie staff and the interviewees. This was the first chance that someone from outside the prison interviewed them, and it generated lot distrust. One way to break the ice, it was to explain the Gendarmerie staff the objective of this study and the relevance of the results, and I had also lunch with them in order they could know me into an informal frame. They became an important source of information.

In the case of the interviewees, I had several interviews and I allowed them to talk about their own matters of interest (personal, political, etc.). Once I could achieve to certain level of confidence, I was able to conduct this study.

## **Descriptions of Measured Variables**

The focus of the study is the Chilean military and police institutions and units, which carried out torture during the Chilean military regime (1973 to 1990). Based on the literature review and several interviews with torturers and victims, this research distinguishes three possible levels or *independent variables*:

- 1) Institutional Level: hierarchical distribution of power according to ranks, which could affect special benefits and reinforcements, how they follow orders without questioning, communicational system and distribution of command. The definition of enemy and the torture objectives, and the absence of punishment for the perpetration of these acts. Values such as honor, masculinity, perception about the social role of civilians, protection to innocents and antidemocratic view. Indoctrination and training in terms of physical and psychological isolation, dehumanization, desensitization, and routinization of torture. Infrastructure, facilities, organizational structure, work socialization and legal impunity.
- 2) Group Level: rituals, structure of group-perpetrator, emotional bonds, values, beliefs, complicity/secrecy, cohesion, definition of in-group and out-group, enemy's perception and identity.
- 3) Individual Level: age of enrollment, rank, educational and socioeconomic level, history of child abuse, personal history, self-esteem, locus of control, expectation to handle control and power, self-explanation of the torture's objective, the enemy's perception and any other type of motivations, tolerance to violence.

## **Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is the perpetration of torture. The concept of torture is defined according to the United Nations (1975). For the purpose of the Declaration, torture

means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanction to the extent consistent with Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

The categories of the independent variables previously mentioned embrace a set of variables. This does not imply that all of the variables are observed in the torturers. The individual variable is formed by a set of variables such as locus of control, history of child abuse, etc. Some of these variables could not be observed in a torturer's behavior or if they are expressed, the presence in their manifestation varies from participant to participant.

In addition, the presence of a variable such as personal motivation under a specific scenario helps to distinguish the conditions under which torture occurs. However, this variable can not be identified in an isolated manner. The research takes into account the presence of other variables and the relationship between them. Moreover, the presence of two variables could generate another, which triggers the criminal behavior.

The detection of these variables provides different views about how the presence of one or more independent variables could affect the dependent variable and how this relationship by itself could be a third variable. This feature is presented in this study, because each set of variables separately could have a specific effect on the dependent variables. For example, the influence of locus of control associated with the institutional ideology could be a factor determinant in the torture's occurrence. Therefore, the relation between these independent variables could be considered in a causal modeling that explains the studied behavior.

## **Unit of Analysis**

Due to the fact that the variables are grouped into the three different levels, and this research attempts to determine what the main factors that motivated an army soldier and/or policemen to torture, the unit of analysis is the subjects who perpetrated torture during the military regime in Chile.

## **Statement of the Questions**

In the literature review two main tendencies describe the possible causation of torturer behavior; this study suggests the following hypotheses:

The first hypothesis searches for the identification of institutional, group and/or individual variables that intervene in the occurrence of torture.

Question1: What are the main factors that trigger torture (institutional, group and/or individual)?

Once the main variables are identified and described, the second hypothesis is shaped. This phase attempts to identify relationships between variables.

Question 2: How do institutional, group and individual factors determine the acts of a torturer?

Through the results shown by the hypotheses, we will be able to support or deny the theoretical frameworks here presented and determine whether or not any individual is able to become a torturer or whether personal characteristics associated with exogenous variables favor the incidence of this type of crime.

Since this research is a case study, which has the characteristics of an exploratory research, the data analysis is conditioned to the possible new and unexpected information. Therefore, the researcher had to be able to be flexible in the application of methodology of

analysis in such a way that allows the incorporation of new variables, which help us to understand better the torture etymology.

### **Collection of data**

Due to the numerous measured variables and their mutual interaction several measuring methods are utilized. The use of a number of measurement instruments allows one: First, to reduce the risk of nonresponse due to the fact interviewees could refuse to respond to certain type of questions, because they refuse to answer them or because they may not have access to the required information or because simply they could lie. Second, the opportunity to have access to the sample is very difficult and the chance to gather information face to face is also reduced; therefore it is necessary to utilize measurement instruments which permit the researcher to obtain detailed information. Third, the perception of interviewees about torture could be affected by their personal bias, and then it is relevant to recall data from other sources of information in order to verify and determine the presence or absence of the studied variables. The measurement instruments are:

1. In-depth interviews with the inmates, who perpetrated torture during the Chilean military regime.
2. Interviews with Gendarmerie personnel: They are the professional team, guardians, and prisons' authorities who have direct relation with the prisoners.
3. Interviews with the prosecutor lawyers.
4. Reports of psychological, social and/or forensic evaluations
5. Prisoners' files review
6. Judicial files review: the copies of sentences are analyzed. They were emitted by the Court.
7. Psychological Tests

8. National Archives

9. Research Reviews

### **Description of Measurement Instruments**

#### **1. Depth interviews with the inmates**

Several and depth interviews have advantages of giving flexibility in the questioning process, control of the interview situation, high response rate and fuller information. This latter aspect is one of the most important aspects for this research, because like it was mentioned above the opportunity to conduct an interview with this type of participant is difficult. Therefore, it was unfortunate if the information could not be adequately recalled.

The interviewer had to create a trustworthy atmosphere in the conduct of the interview in such a way that the absence of anonymity could play a secondary role. This same element had to be managed to overcome the suspicion some subject felt about the interviewers. Such interventions were achievable because it was possible to control the interview situation. Additionally, several interviews were conducted, and depending on the results of the first, it was possible to structure the second interview to reduce problems experienced in the first interview. This technique permitted the researcher to evaluate the best time to conduct the interview or reformulate questions, preventing nonresponse. This method also facilitated the acquiring of several measures and reduces bias.

Other potential advantages of personal interviewing were the incorporation of multi-method data collection, which includes observations and visual cues, and the statement of rapport. The structure of the survey interviewing was built by an item of semi-structured questions, which helps the interviewer to focus on the major issues of data and follow a

common trial. However, this fact did not mean that the interviewer was unable to recall new information and reformulate new questions.

Six prisoners accepted to participate in the research. They are:

Participants	Position	Born year	Intelligence Agency	Sentence	Crime	Interviews Number
Participant 1	Army Mayor	1951	CNI	Life	Homicides	Five
Participant 2	Army Brigadier	1938	DINE	Eight years	Accomplice of homicide	Five
Participant 3	Police Captain	1953	DICOMCAR	15 years and two sentences of 541 days	Homicides	Seven
Participant 4	Police Mayor	1946	DICOMCAR	Life	Homicide	Seven
Participant 5	Police Sergeant	1954	DICOMCAR	Life	Homicide	Two
Participant 6	Civil	1952	DICOMCAR	Life	Homicide	Seven

Table N°1: Sample

## 2. Interviews with Gendarmerie personnel

The interview with Gendarmerie personnel has the following purposes:

- a. Gathering information about the daily routine of the prisoners, and recalling personal information.
- b. Knowing the professional team's evaluations of each prisoner in order to detect individual characteristics. This aspect includes obtaining information about the type of social relationship that inmates keep inside and outside the prison. Moreover, the professional could have their own hypotheses that explain the criminal conduct of prisoners which could not express in the written reports. The Gendarmerie personnel are:

*The professional team:* two psychologists, two social workers, and a medical physician.

*Gendarmerie functionary:* two prison authorities who had have direct relation with the prisoners and a guardian.

- c. Comparing the information recalls from the personal interviews with the information gathers from the Gendarmerie personnel to detect differences and similarities between them.

### 3. Interviews with the prosecutor lawyers

These interviews have the objective to recall information about the attitude of the inmates during the judicial trials. The two prosecutor lawyers have a large experience in the victims' defense of the human rights abuses, even during the military regime. Today, they still carry out the defense of some cases. Both lawyers know the criminal patron of the prisoners interviewed.

### 4. Reports of evaluation psychological, social and/or forensic

The reports are evaluation conducted by the psychologists and social workers of the prison and by the forensic psychiatrists from the Medical Judicial Institute (*Instituto Médico Legal*) during the judicial trial. The reports give information about the manifestation of some variables, which could explain the criminal behavior. Moreover, these reports describe psychological features of the inmates that are measured for this research, for instances, self-esteem.

Unfortunately, not all the prisoners' files have the psychological and social evaluation reports. Therefore, the information is used as a secondary data. However, all of them during the judicial trial were evaluated by a forensic team to determine psychiatric illness.

### 5. Prisoners' files review

The Gendarmerie has an individual file of each inmate. These files describe the physical and social conditions of inmates at the moment to enter the prison and during their

stay. The files have a report of court's petitions of the inmates and describe the general conduct of them.

Since most of the prisoners stay in prison for long time, the files are a good tool to perceive how the inmates adhere or reject their stay in jail, and how they behave into the prison, especially if they show violent conduct.

#### 6. Judicial files Review

The copies of sentences are analyzed. They were emitted by the Court and the testimonies of the victims and offenders are written. The defense lawyers' position of both sides, victims and offenders, are openly expressed. The forensic evaluations are also filed in these copies. The files offer a good view about the process of the judicial trial, and how the offenders defend the crimes perpetrated by them. Moreover, these are a good toll to perceive how the institutions support or not their criminal conduct.

#### 7. Psychological Tests

Due to the difficulties in creating a trustworthy atmosphere during the interviews, the application of a psychological instrument could threaten the level of trust achieved by the researcher. Moreover, some of subjects refused to take the instrument tests. Therefore, the researcher during the personal interviews asked the individuals a set of questions which allowed the determination of the type of locus of control and self acceptance. The field of psychology has largely tested both tests, giving to them a strong internal validity.

- The locus of control test is a questionnaire, which measures the extent to which the individual believes that events are under her/his control (internal locus of control) versus not under her/his control (external locus of control). Those who have an internal locus of control are less susceptible to influence from other, less likely to conform, less likely to respond to the prestige of a person, and exhibit greater self-

control. The down side to having an internal locus of control is self-blame if events are really uncontrollable. The version utilized was the Rotter Locus of Control Scale, 10 questions (Lefcourt, 1976) . The instrument was adapted to the Spanish language.

- The self-acceptance test assesses the self-perception and the feelings that others have about her/himself. Higher scores are correlated with less insomnia, less depression, less pressure to conform, more persistence, and more positive view about other. The version utilized was the self-acceptance, 29 questions. The instrument was adapted to the Spanish language.

#### 8. National Archives:

In order to understand and explain how the perception of the historical moment motivates the criminal behavior, the national archives are examined. These elements help to have a general overview about how the political crisis rose and how the political violence was triggered. The decrees law, supreme decrees and except decree emitted from the Ministry of Interior and Defense were examined. The decrees describe the measures adopted by the Allende Government in order to face the socioeconomic crisis, previous to the coup – January to September 11<sup>th</sup> 1973. The decrees also refer to the different violent conflicts between the government authorities and the interest groups.

The decrees emitted for the military regimen from the days after the military coup, September 11<sup>th</sup> 1973 and 1976 were also reviewed. These decrees show how the military authorities took the absolute control on the country, and how they perceive the political parties opposite to them in terms of a real threat and a dangerous enemy.

#### 9. Research Reviews:

Like the review of the National archives, the research reviews is another too, which can help one to describe the historical moment. These descriptions can be compared with the interviewees' perception of these events, and how the perception of the historical moment motivates their criminal behavior. These publications describe the different perception of the historical moment and how each tendency (military regime supporters and detractors) perceives the danger of the opposite contenders and how the violent behavior is justified and denied for them.

In addition, two State National Reports were analyzed: The Report of the Committee of True and Reconciliation and the Report of the National Committee of Political Prison and Torture. Both reports describe the political violence and human rights violations perpetrated in Chile during the military regime. The elaboration of these reports is built up from numerous interviews and testimonies from the victims and their families.

Based on these measurement instruments this study is conducted. The following section presents the general description of Chilean socioeconomic crisis and political violence in 1973.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CHILEAN SOCIOECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN 1973**

In this chapter, the sociopolitical conditions that triggered the coup and kept the military in power for so a long time are reviewed in order to attempt to explain the use of torture by state agents. To undertake this goal, the military perception of the threat of the left movements is assessed. The military and police institutions and their intelligence services attribution of responsibility to these groups for the socioeconomic and political crises lived in Chile in 1973 are examined. The description of these events tries to provide the context for the use of torture as a tool to destroy the military regime's detractors.

In addition, the decrees dictated by ministers of the republics are reviewed in order to obtain information that describes the national situation of the country during the period previous to and following the military coup. The ministry decrees let one know the decisions taken by the government in order to respond to the national demands. Moreover, these indirectly reproduce the mood of the government authorities and describe under what kind of pressures these authorities took the decisions they did.

The other period examined corresponds to the years after the military coup. The intention of reviewing this period is that the decrees indicate which types of decisions were taken by the military Junta. In other words, the decrees reflect the level of power that the authorities had and how they implemented the political of repression throughout the country.

In Chile, two main tendencies developed to explain the use of military force to achieve power. One group of people, who are associated with the tendency of the right,

mainly justify and support the use of violence, and approve the human rights violations, as a legitimate form of action to overthrow the elected Allende's government in 1973 and to maintain the military regime for seventeen years (1973 to 1990). This is clearly observed during the Pinochet funeral, in which a large group of people in attendance offered him and his family their support and in some way to give him their thanks (Web pages).

The other group of people, related to the left trend, is constituted of the detractors of the military regime, defended the victims of human rights violations.

Both views are in opposition and allow one to distinguish the differences between their perception of the actions that occurred in the years examined and paint the context under which violence is established as a form of government. Moreover, those trends permit one to know how the torturers found an explanation for their acts

#### THE SOCIOPOLITICAL SCENARIO PREVIOUS TO THE MILITARY COUP

Patricia Arancibia, a supporter of the military regime, argues that the political violence experienced in Chile between the years 1960 to 1973, did not simply appear one day. The idea of using violence as a way to take governmental power began in the first quarter of the 20th century with the foundation of the Communist Party, in 1922. The Communist Party enjoyed the thoughts of the 3<sup>rd</sup> International Statute, which proclaimed that the only way to turn down the established social regime was using violence. To achieve this objective, the peasants and working class should be armed and they thus became a part of an army. The subversive character of the Communist Party invited the lower classes to participate in the formation of the proletarian dictatorship. To set up a proletarian dictatorship, it was necessary to go through a bloody and violent war, but at the same time this war should be pacific in the fields of education and state administration (Arancibia, 201, p. 15).

The formation of the Socialist Party in 1933 encouraged the Communist ideology proposing “the dictatorship of the organized workers.” Meanwhile, the Communist Party followed the instructions of the Komintern Congress, 1935, which proposed a new tactic to achieve power: appointing political party members in governmental and nongovernmental institutions to encourage their participation. The Chilean Communist Party implemented the strategy to infiltrate the armed forces through the establishment of a group (cell) in the military. This strategy allowed them to incorporate young political party members in the armed forces. They would be able to fight against the imperialist side, and ensure the establishment of a group (cell) in the military the Proletarian Revolution – Participant 6 also refers to this strategy. In 1956, the Communist Party tried to reach power through the electoral system. However, the Socialist Party refused to follow the electoral route because to the socialists the bourgeois were allied with the oligarchy and would not make the necessary social transformations. The Communist Party, the Socialist Party and The Central Union of Workers (*Central Única de Trabajadores*, CUT) set up a political coalition and created The Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular, FRAP). The FRAP would be responsible for implementing the fight against imperialism, oligarchy and feudalism. From the decade of the 1960’s, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution brought in Chile the valuation of armed violence as an essential alternative and inevitable process of the revolution. The words of Che Guevara argued that a group of people, supported by the country and not afraid to die, were able to fight against an army and defeat it.

In this decade the Left Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria*, MIR), was created: the MIR in 1968 decided that the situation was adequate for creating a revolutionary army and went into hiding. The financial support came from Cuba and appropriations of banks and other bourgeois institutions. Its

procedures left a trial of innocent victims. The MIR's members did not belong to the Socialist and Communist parties. They were mainly undergraduate students who believed that the people from the lower class were able to govern and they should not be discriminated against. The MIR followed the armed revolution and its members had paramilitary training during 1967 to 1970. As a result of MIR's beliefs, the country had to face the illegal occupation of agrarian fields and bank appropriations (Hernández, M. & Naranjo, 1984).

In 1968, Salvador Allende was a member of the Socialist Party and the President of the Senate. He attended the Tricontinental Conference organized in La Habana, Cuba, at which he proposed the creation of the Latino American Organization of Solidarity (*Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad*, OLAS). The OLAS supported the armed fight to achieve power.

The Socialist Party did not accept as legitimate the Presidential Mandate of Eduardo Frei-Montalva, member of the Christian Democratic Party (1964 – 1970), and proclaimed openly the use of violence. In 1967, the agrarian reform was decreed. This sought to solve the problem of the concentration of land ownership held by only a few owners. It also hoped to change the low agricultural productivity which existed due to the non-use of technologies along with speculation in land prices that prevented improved productivity. Towards 1960, while the national population grew at a rate of 2.56 % per year, agricultural production only grew at a rate of 1.8% (Armijo, G. and Cavieres, H., 1997). This discrepancy resulted in the importation of large volumes of food products, clearly reflecting the existence of an archaic agrarian structure accompanied by the misuse of both natural resources and the workforce. These problems demonstrated the inability of Chilean agriculture to absorb the growing rural population in productive activities. The agricultural

population began to decline, while accelerating the migration to the city. The rural peasant habitat, due to the process previously noted, lacked the minimum conditions to live and the poverty increased not only in Chile, but also elsewhere in Latin America. The social implications of the agrarian problem were enormous. By 1960, for example, the illiteracy rate in urban areas stood at 8%, while in rural areas it reached 30% (Armijo and Cavieres, 1997).

The period of the Frei government was characterized by openness, legalization, and growth and strengthening of the peasant organizations (unions and cooperatives). It was the beginning of the process of Agrarian Reform. As a result, the peasant unions and the implementation of agrarian reform saw a strong rise of social struggles in the countryside, a process that continued from 1968 to 1973. Strikes went from 3 in 1960 to 142 in 1965 and 1,580 in 1970: the occupations of land from 0 in 1960 to 13 in 1965 and 456 in 1970 (CORA, 1970).

At the end of Frei's mandate, the strikes, shots or occupations of land in northern and central parts of the country, "runs fences" or attempts to recover the land by the native communities (*Mapuches*), generated social activation and political struggles in the countryside, as never before seen in the country. New political actors were added in rural areas, such as the Unitarian Popular Action Movement (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria*, MAPU) and the MIR, later the Left Christian (*Izquierda Cristiana*, IC) joined these groups. The MIR took the decision to fight through armed insurrection and underestimated the electoral support for Allende and *Union Popular*. In the years of Allende's government from 70 to 73 of all of these forces would be important protagonists in the actions implemented in rural areas with trade unions, cooperatives, community councils and the government committees or other related organizations (Radovic, I., 2003).

The Report of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig, et al., 1991) alleges that the political discourse of the Socialist Party resembled the MIR. The MAPU and IC took similar position in the years 1970-1973.

Allende reached power with a new coalition: Popular Union (Unión Popular, UP). The Communist Party, the Socialist Party, Radical Party and Social Democrat Party and the MAPU movement joined this coalition. In the presidential election, the UP achieved 36% of the votes. This percentage obligated the UP to ask for parliamentarian approval. One of the most relevant aspects of this election was that it showed that the voting population was divided into three factions, and the votes of the Christian Democrat Party allowed the triumph of Allende's coalition.

As indicated above, the UP coalition brought together diverse groups. The most radical groups prompted the use of violence while others supported the use of institutional channels to conduct the social revolution. The latter group was made up by the Communist Party, the MAPU with workers and peasants, most of the Radical Party, and of course, President Allende. However, to deal with the final period of the crisis, 1970-1973, these sectors were displaced, overwhelmed and - sometimes - seduced and dragged by those who wanted to force a confrontation (Rettig, et al., 1991). Both groups were irreconcilable and Allende oscillated from one position to another, and finally lost the control of the violent groups, making it very difficult to manage the government (Arancibia, 2001).

During Allende's government, the Committees of the Popular Unit were established. These had the function of representing in the electoral system the different social sectors such as factory workers, office workers, school members and peasants. The Committees also represented the claim of the popular sectors and they were prepared to

exercise popular power. Moreover, the government adopted numerous new policies and procedures, such as:

1. Increasing the taxes for upper class.
2. Preventing the rise of prices that the business sector desired.
3. Reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba and China.
4. Intervening in the capitalist companies with illegal management.
5. Nationalization of copper and iron companies and of banking.
6. Encouraging loans for small businesses.
7. Accelerating the agrarian reform by the expropriations of land.

These procedures clearly jeopardized the interests of business sectors, which were associated with the parties of the right. Marta Hanecker (1998), a supporter of the Allende mandate, says that many people forgot that the left had won the government, but not the power. The legislature and judiciary were in the hands of opposition forces, and the army was the fundamental pillar of the bourgeois. Allende had made an agreement with the Christian Democrats (to get their votes) that he would not intervene in the media, education nor the armed forces. The Comptroller General of the Republic decreed that the government should not be paying compensation for expropriation of mining companies in the hands of Americans. This situation toughened U.S. policy which sponsored the overthrow of the Allende's government.

The Right supported the idea of a military coup and sought to dismantle the political and social forces of the UP and to achieve this goal the Right adopted the following strategies:

1. Use of anticommunist propaganda.
2. Control of the media (newspapers, radios and television).

3. Defense of private property by limiting the expropriation process.
4. Creation of an anti-UP awareness within the armed forces, provoking the impression of an anarchic state.
5. Inducing the middle class acted against the government.
6. Inducing the failure of the economy through the cessation of imports and stopping industries from producing normally.
7. Creating fear in foreign and domestic investors.

The Allende government had no alternative other than increasing the currency in circulation, which led to inflation and supply problems. By 1972, the Index of Consumer prices (IPC) increased 164% and between January and March of 1973 it increased 30% (Decree 399/ 1973). Under this scenario, the UP raised the need to modify the institutional legacy with a radical constitutional reform. This implied the need to dissolve the parliament and set up an assembly of the people, and the creation of communal commands in order that the people could directly assume its affairs (Hanecker, 1998). But none of these measures were taken. The right organized public protests like the “cacerolazo” (women from their homes beat pans as a sign of not having food). Public transport stopped (as the bus and taxi drivers were paid by the US unions not to work) and Allende called the armed forces to intervene in the strikes. Numerous public and private companies also went to strike and the military intervened due to the Presidential order (Decrees of Interior Ministry, 1566/72, 436/73, 623/73, 901/73, 1109/73, 1116/73, 1135/73 and Supreme Decree 637/73).

The intervention of the military in civil affairs was not an isolated case in the Allende government. Indeed, the military were appointed in the ministerial cabinet. This aspect is clearly observed in the Decree of Interior Ministry 399/73, in which the entire

ministerial cabinet was changed and new ministers were appointed (1134/73, 1160/73, 1161/73). Moreover, Allende also had to face a severe storm, which affected the south of the country. Two cities were isolated and great material losses were reported. The area was declared an “area of catastrophe” (Decree 822/73).

In the Right sectors, there were also groups that led the end of the crisis through an armed confrontation. One of them, called "Tacna", published in the newspaper of that name an article that asked for a military coup. The same position had the leaders and activists of the Nationalist Movement Homeland and Freedom (Movimiento Nacionalista Patria y Libertad). Indeed, they participated in the foiled attempt of military uprising known as “El Tanquetazo” (June 29<sup>th</sup>, 1973), and perpetrated selective murders (Valech et. al., p. 174). Contrary to these groups, the rest of the Right did not participate in any similar action (or even the last and decisive). However, the right always prompted a mindset conducive to solving certain problems (some of a social nature) through the use of the force. The sectors centrists manifested same ideas, but in a smaller scale (Rettig, et al., 1991). Indeed, the Christian Democrats asked for a military intervention.

There were repeated assaults against property rights through the illegal occupations of real estate, urban and agricultural companies. In most of these cases, the owners were not protected, nor were the offenders punished. The court orders were not complied with by the police or administrative authorities. Often these events had, for both sides, bloody consequences: homicide deaths, serious injuries, suicides; there were also kidnappings and harassment. Nevertheless, these crimes were treated in terms of being political conflicts rather than judicial. For example, the murder of a communist student by a MIR member, on the campus of the University of Concepción, was declared publicly that it was a political problem, not criminal, and in fact received no penalty.

The mass media from both sides (right and left) spread widely with the destruction of the adversaries reaching incredible limits and transgressing moral values. The figure of a political enemy deserved his or her physical annihilation. The Rettig Report concluded that, at the end of 1973, Chile had a climate that would lead to civil war (Rettig, et al., p. 40; Valech, et al., p. 174).

On the other side, the Armed Forces and Order Forces<sup>1</sup> professed an anti-communism tradition. The anti-communist ideology was deliberately reinforced, on the grounds of “Cold War,” due to the training of Latin American officers in the U.S.A. According to this ideology, the repression was a legitimate response against subversion and respect of the human rights was irrelevant. In the words of General Gustavo Leigh, Commander in Chief of the Air Force and a member of the military Junta, the military must remove the Marxist cancer, which threatened the life of the nation, applying extreme measures, until the last consequences (Valech, et. al., 2004, p. 173).

In the eyes of the armed forces and forces of order, the guerrilla groups did not respect the law or morality. They killed prisoners, tortured, and harmed innocents through terrorism. The state must understand the immense danger of guerrillas, and respond to it through counterinsurgency at the local level, but also at the national level.

The military argued that the insurgency needed to respond to the guerrillas using the same methods, because if it did not do so it would not be in a position of inferiority, and thus the fundamental values of the nation would be threatened. Under these beliefs, those who fought against the guerrillas came to be thought of as heroes who sacrificed not only

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<sup>1</sup> The Forces of Order are the police’s institutions. In Chile, the police depend on the government. They had military instruction that make them be close to the military forces. Next chapter explains these characteristics.

their physical life, but their moral integrity, so that others could enjoy the benefits of free society (Rettig, et al., 1991).

In this section, I tried to build the elements that triggered the military coup. To achieve this goal I included information from people from different political tendencies (including right and left trends) and the reports elaborated by the national research commissions. The contribution of this review is that it helps one know what factors motivated the military intervention and how these factors are used for state agents to justify the perpetration of torture. In the following section, I will describe the way that the armed force took power and how they developed a strategy of violence to keep this power.

#### THE COUP AND THE POLITICAL REPRESSION

The crisis finally ended with a military coup on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 1973. The military intervention was met without great opposition. Only small groups of Allende's supporters fought back, but those groups lacked the power of an army, making it very easy to defeat them. Once in power, the Army General, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte took the monopoly of governmental and administrative functions. A military Junta was established and it was in charge of the Legislative and Constituent functions with Pinochet at the head a dictatorship. After the military coup, through various decrees laws, the National Congress and the Constitutional Court were dissolved. The political parties that made up the UP were outlawed. The other political parties were declared in recess. The electoral rolls were destroyed. The municipal authorities were forced to stop in their office in order to appoint mayors, who supported the work of the Junta. All Public Administration officials were declared interim in their position, with the exception of the members of the Judiciary and the Comptroller.

The citizens lost power to elect their leaders through elections. The military Junta also took control of the activities of trade unions and intervened in public and private universities. High ranking officials of the three branches of the Armed Forces (in active service or retired) were appointed to positions set by the President. They had wide powers to expel any faculty and students with leftist sympathies from their campus.

A strict censorship on the press, radio and television was established. This measure put an end to any mass media and consequently eliminated the possibility of questioning or control the actions of the military regime (Valech et. al., 2004, p 170).

Each of these measures is evidenced in the emission of decrees from the Minister of the Interior (See Appendix 1). One of the aspects that the decrees reviewed reveal (after the coup) is the rapidity with which the military authorities appointed military officials in strategic positions. They were able to control the country at the local and national levels. The use of the armed forces was spread throughout the nation and allowed them to control the Allende supporters: Thus, the effectiveness that the military and order institutions worked shows that the coup was planned in details.

Some of the officials who respected the constitutional order and the Allende government were isolated within their own institutions and forced to resign. Additionally, cases of soldiers of all ranks were recorded as victims of political repression perpetrated by their own colleagues (Valech, et. al., p. 173).

The tool used by the military authorities to commit and join together all the soldiers and officials of the Army Forces was the invention of Plan Z. The military authorities made their subordinates believe that the leftist groups secretly planned to usurp power by force – Participant 1 confirms this fact. The creation of this *imaginary* plan allowed the authorities to acquire the unconditional support of the military and their civilian collaborators.

Moreover, Plan Z excused the Pinochet government's use of repressive measures by making the military abuses appear to be an act of self-defense. The Plan Z was highlighted among the alarming findings showed by the White Book. This book was written to elicit emotional support for the military coup and its consequences. The book illustrated, with pictures, the weapons of war found by heavy and light military and order forces in the arsenals of the UP. The book's revelations have never been empirically validated (p. 171).

In September 22<sup>nd</sup>, Decree Law N°5 was published in the Official Journal. The Decree Law established the state of siege because of internal disturbances within Chile and the belief that the national situation should be viewed as a state of war. The decree subjected the legal regime to the Code of Military Justice and Military Courts were those responsible for administering justice. In addition, under the state of war, the war councils also were able to administer justice. Nevertheless, in Chile none of the conditions for declaring a state of war were manifested, such as occupation of lands by enemies, external attack or internal disturbance, or foreign territory being occupied by the Chilean armed groups. Hence, the declaration of state of war acted as legal fiction and political justification for repressive actions. The war councils contradicted their own rules: they did not recognize the legitimate use of force by their opponents, nor the nature and respect of the prisoners' rights, nor were international conventions on war considered. The analysis reveals that in their judicial proceedings, acting with systematic neglect of the fairness of due process, prosecutors allowed and even encouraged torture as a valid method of interrogation. Neither recognized the right of self-defense (p. 172).

The states of emergency were renewed without interruption for fifteen years. Meanwhile, the state of siege was implanted until March 1978 and subsequently was restored on two occasions in the 1980s. The difference between the state of war and state of

siege is that the state of siege gave an ample discretion to the authorities in the use of the power. They could order arbitrary arrests, censor the press and suspend civil rights. Analysis of the judicial proceedings utilized during the Pinochet regime, revealed that the judicial authorities denied due process and the right of self-defense; the prosecutors allowed and even encouraged torture as a valid method of interrogation (p. 177).

The defense lawyers did not have access to their clients. They did have control over where their clients were detained and they had to visit them in numerous detention centers. Later, the defense lawyers had to probe that they were actually being detained, because the authorities denied the detentions. Then, the lawyers pushed the court to put to some form of trial in order to complete the stage of "investigation." During the investigation period, the detainees were tortured (p. 179). The most aberrant of this "legal" process was that in Chile until 2003 the judicial system was inquisitorial. This means that the detainees should declare themselves guilty and the use of the torture clearly help to achieve this purpose.

### **The Role of the Judiciary**

The Supreme Court ignored abuses committed by military tribunals, not only in their operations, but also in their resolutions. The connivance of the highest authorities of the Judiciary with the military in part was a response or reaction to their common rejection of the overthrown government. That is to say, the Allende mandate did not control the violations of private property by their supporters, and ignored for political reasons numerous court orders. Now defense lawyers who strongly denounced human rights violations, by accepting the legal force of wartime, tried unsuccessfully to respect international treaties signed by Chile in this area (p. 183).

By two decree laws, the Supreme Court acquired the power to dismiss judges and officials, without even informing the concerned of the charges for their removal. Thereby,

they were not allowed any possibility of reply. The judges did not adopt any form of coercion against state agents<sup>2</sup> who refused to give any relevant information, and who did not investigate the defendants' charges; or practice reconstructions of scenes; or take note of the traces or footprints, or print portraits taken of offenders. Nor did they even request witnesses. Meanwhile, the perpetrators could put pressure on the victim to desist from proceeding with the lawsuit. The guarantees of impunity of the Judiciary offered to agents of repression encouragement towards the continuation and intensification of political imprisonment and torture, (187).

The Catholic Church, through the Vicariate of Solidarity, between June 1978 and December 1989, had presented more than 1,300 cases of torture in court, without any satisfactory results (p.188). When faced with such accusations, the military government always responded by denying them any validity, implying that they were part of a campaign mounted by international Marxism to discredit the Chilean military government. Denial was a regular practice of the military regime. In fact, Decrees 545/76 and 1308/77 illustrate how Pinochet and the ministerial cabinet openly declared that the accusation of the United Nation and exiled people were absolutely false even though the human rights violations showed the contrary.

In 1987, the Law 18.623 prohibited the National Intelligence Center (CNI) from maintaining detainees in detention centers. However, CNI could carry out arrests, as long as those affected were handed over to police or to the court which had issued the order in question. Nevertheless, the CNI kept their secret detention places and continued perpetrating torture.

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<sup>2</sup> The state agents could be policemen, any member of the armed forces or intelligence services.

The evidence collected by the Commission about Political Prison and Torture confirms that torture operated as a system for obtaining information and annulling any form of resistance. This was a “teaching” ritual, which was used to scare the people in order to deter opposition to the regime (p. 192).

All this suggests that the political imprisonment and torture constituted a state policy of the military regime, defined and driven by the political authorities of the era. The military mobilized staff and resources of various government agencies, and issued decree laws and laws that then encouraged such repressive behavior. All of these measures were supported by the judiciary.

### **The use of torture**

Chilean law prohibits torture, which has been expressly forbidden since 1876, the year of entry into force of the Penal Code. The Article 150 punishes those who rule or unduly prolong an *incommunicado* detention of an accused person. This article applies both to torture and to the use of an unnecessary strictness.

The Report of the National Commission on Political Prison and Torture (2004) argues that torture was a recurring practice during the military regime. Nevertheless, the number of persons injured and characteristics of victims vary, but not the methods used. For purposes of analysis of the records compiled by the above mentioned commission separated the use of torture into three different times. This temporary separation responds to the changed security agencies involved in the crimes, including the volume and pattern of victims who were subject to torture and in the national context where the facts are perpetrated. The periods are the following:

- First Period: the year 1973
- Second Period: 1974 to 1977
- Third Period: 1978 to 1990

### *FIRST PERIOD: THE YEAR 1973*

In this first phase, the military carried on a massive onslaught against all those who could be classified as political dissidents. Many people were executed without trial or following flawed trials. Even unarmed prisoners were murdered by claiming the "law of flight" and mass arrests were carried out. The searches and other operational massive registrations, both in the capital and in provinces, were carried out in industries, universities, public buildings, farms, and mining centers. Due to the fact that the thousands of prisoners were gathered, the military and police improvised numerous detention and torture centers. Meanwhile, concentration camps in northern, central and southern areas of the country were implemented. The last prisoners were not released until the end of 1976. People in positions of responsibility in the Allende government, the leftist militants, and representatives from grassroots organizations with participation in social movements were detained.

In late 1973, political repression began to lead toward more selective criteria, both in terms of victims and victimizers. The improvised repressors of the first hours ceded their places to practitioners of torture, who later became "professional" in their agencies applying more "sophisticated" methods of torture. The atrocities continued, although they affected fewer people, usually those who had some sort of political-party affiliation. In this context, the intelligence services had the mission of establishing a police state. Those agencies were specially created for that purpose. This was the case of the National Direction of Intelligence (DINA), under the leadership of Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, soon promoted to general. The DINA was established formally in June 1974,

but was in operation since late 1973. The DINA led the repression until its dissolution in 1977.

The DINA was controlled by the army personnel and coexisted with other intelligence services. The DINA systematically sought to eliminate, those people who tried reorganizing the political parties and movements. They mainly looked for members of MIR and the Socialist and Communist partisans. Often torture resulted in deaths and in disappearances. Sometimes, under pressure from torture and death threats, the militant became a collaborator (p. 195).

67.4% of the testimonies qualified by the Commission have been regarding those arrested between September and December 1973 (18,364 persons). During that period, the practice of torture was executed by members of the Armed Forces, police and the Investigative Police, responding to a widespread national practice (p. 231). In November 1973, the center with the largest number of detainees, the National Stadium, was closed; London 38 was the first operation of secret detention center implemented; and the Direction of National Intelligence (DINA) was articulated, although still only informal officially speaking.

During this period, the states of emergency were invoked to make arrests. Some detainees were tried in court-martials. Others were detained for varying times in stadiums, fields of detainees, regiments, police stations or jails, but they were never prosecuted. Some had administrative measures such as relegation imposed upon them. It was also common that, once they technically recovered freedom via their release, they nonetheless underwent house arrest or other restrictive measures, such as the prohibition on leaving the city of ones residence. Some of those arrested during this period, even after having spent years in detention, were expelled from the country and obligated to live in exile.

It should be pointed out that most of these arrests were made by order of the heads of state of siege without charge or charges. Some of these arrests were ordered by military prosecutors, but were outside any judicial process under vague charges denominated, for example, as unlawful and Marxist activist. The testimonies received for this period indicated that torture and ill-treatment began to take place from the moment of arrest, lasted through transfer to detention centers, and continued until their release or disappearance.

The stories presented on torture indicate that interrogations began with questions about: weapons, the possible preparation of military or paramilitary, and details of the alleged Plan Z, followed by other more specific questioning, such as the activities of the detainee, political militancy, and questions arising from their own answers. The teams of interrogators were formed with members from all branches of the Armed Forces and Order. There was also collaboration by the Investigative Police (p. 238).

#### *SECOND PERIOD: 1974 TO 1977*

Unlike the first period, which routinely carried out massive arrests, the second period utilized a modus operandi of selectivity. The arrests were denied because there were no "records" of these having taken place. The DINA powerfully contributed to the entrenchment of personal power of General Pinochet, leading the "war against Marxism." The DINA was able to successfully neutralize the potential rivals of the military regime.

The DINA was a governmental agency serving General Pinochet, but not serving or responsible to the other Board members, nor the other commanders of the Armed Forces and the Judiciary. The DINA received the full legal recognition and control of the financial budget itself. The detention camps, characteristic of the first period, remained in place even until 1976. The primary objective is to put out of commission the managers of the MIR and

parties Communist and Socialist, and to prevent the reorganization of clandestine networks opposition to dictatorship.

Five thousand two hundred and sixty six people were detained during this period. They are equivalent to the 19.3% of the total validated testimonies of the Commission (p 240).

The agents led to the repressive environment of everyday life of the suspects. They knew their occupation, their usual routine, and the places they frequented, the names of their relatives and friends, their political militancy. In other cases, arrests were made through raids in places of assembly, which both militants and sympathizers of leftist parties and movements declared illegal by the authorities.

During this period, the arrests were carried out by agents in civilian clothes, which were not identified, so they could belong to any of the intelligence services of the Armed Forces or Order, or DINA. The arrests were decided by the same agencies, without an order of any court or authority, and in many cases, the arrests were not recognized even before the court injunction. However, other military officials and police declined significantly in their participation in the repression. Although, they continued to collaborate with this entity with delivering information and the *Comando Conjunto* or Joint Command (a partnership formed by members of different branches of the Armed Forces and Carabineros, police).

Witnesses reported that after being interrogated and tortured the detainees were used to bring in vehicles to conduct patrols on the streets in order to identify persons who were also arrested later. These initial detainees were forced to work by threats of death or more and worse torture.

The persons detained in this period were suspected of involvement in banned political parties or movements. In addition, persons accused of having given any collaboration with these militants were arrested, for example, accusations of having hidden

militants. For these same reasons, family members and friends or mere acquaintances were also detained, under the pretext of removing information on the whereabouts of an individual or in order to pressure detainee himself.

The DINA and the Intelligence Service of the Air Force (SIFA) concentrated their actions on suppressing the MIR, the Socialist and later the Communist Party, in whose prosecution the Joint Command (*Comando Conjunto*) also took part.

During this period, the methods of torture identified by the Commission were the beatings and the application of electricity. The beatings were no longer haphazard, but were directed towards specific body parts, causing blackouts and injuries on internal organs. Techniques were adopted to avoid the blows that leave visible injuries in the body. The routine of the torturers included subjecting detainees to the electrical grill. By this time, the torturers had consolidated the use of devices that allowed them to graduate voltage and reduce marks or burns. Doctors or health personnel were present during the torture sessions and evaluated the resistance of detainees. In addition threats, choking, and hanging were applied.

In this period, like in the previous one, the sexual assaults were perpetrated, including aberrant practices as violations with dogs specially trained for this purpose; or the introduction of spiders in the vagina or anus.

#### *THIRD PERIOD: 1978 TO 1990*

By 1976, the modus operandi of repression began to acquire new patterns. The prolonged periods of detention started to diminish, while the apprehensions for a few hours or a few days increased. During this time, torture was common and the application of mostly electricity was a common practice. The law enforcement agents' intromissions in

the domestic life of its victims became more frequent. The victims were also sometimes tortured and interrogated in a moving vehicle.

In 1977, the DINA was dissolved and its dissolution responded to the conviction that its detrimental procedures debilitated the position of the military regime in the international community. Nevertheless, Pinochet replaced the DINA with the CNI. The CNI was also an intelligence agency, but it was under the Ministry of Interior. General Contreras ran this agency but was quickly replaced.

The CNI, which would not be disbanded until February 1990, inheriting from the DINA its staff and its facilities. The CNI was empowered to arrest people for up to twenty days in their own homes or in places other than prisons without a court order. When the court called the agents to appear in the court room due to their illegal procedures, they presented false identities. In other instances, their superiors transferred them to distant places for in order to hinder or prevent them from appearing in court.

Between 1978 and 1980, the CNI was able to concentrate initially on intelligence work, marking an apparent decline in enforcement activity in relation to the preceding period. This decreased the number of arbitrary and illegal arrests and torture in secret locations. However, the CNI intensified short-term detention of people, who were later released without ever being handed over to the competent courts although they were being tortured during these days of captivity.

The victims of this time were normally militants or members of political parties, trade union leaders, relatives and friends of victims. In particular, relatives of missing detainees and political prisoners and people linked to complaints against human rights abuses. The torture was routine as a preliminary tactic to force confessions or other sign self-incriminating statements. The dictatorship sought to validate its repressive policy

increasing the number and scale of its enemies. However, the picture changed when the MIR began its reorganization in 1979. The MIR was now determined to offer armed resistance to the military regime through clandestine entry into the country and the militants came back with military training, it was called "Operative Return." At this time, the MIR became the target for the military regime.

Pinochet would defend the intelligence agencies saying that they protected the lives of Chileans and public order in the nation. For the first time, terrorist actions against selective representatives or agents of the military regime, bank robberies, and the placement of explosive devices increased, allowing the regime to prove the need for harsh repressive measures. The Patriotic Front Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR) was created in 1983. It was an armed group linked to the Communist Party. The FPMR had resolved to impose all kinds of resistance to the regime. Its strategy was to penetrate the sectors of the population, mainly from urban sectors, to struggle against the regime. The emergence of MAPU Lautaro favored using the same type of *confrontational policy* used by General Pinochet, who used it to win ground to validate the need for repression and reject calls for political openness as a danger to the country. The Catholic Church warned repeatedly about the dangers inherent in the "spiral of violence." The violence was marked by attacks on security officials, military and police by insurgent groups, whose actions in turn unleashed reprisals, such as the murder of opponents and massive raids and violence in some popular sectors.

The Direction of Communications of the Carabineers (DICOMCAR) was established in 1983 to cope with the new scenario. That is, the emergence of armed groups from the extreme left. DICOMCAR would be dissolved after the involvement of its agents in the cases of "*Degollados*." In 1985, three members of the Communist Party were killed

by having their throats cut. Two of them were teachers and the other victim worked in the human right organization (Vicariate of Solidarity). These homicides had a large impact on the country and provoked a huge national disturbance and discontent. Hundreds of people went to the funerals and declared their discontent with the military repression (Lunecke, 1999).

In 1983, national protests were organized by trade unions initially and then by partisans' leaderships. They tried to push the authorities back to the democracy (p. 246). Nevertheless, the military repression came back as well as the torture. The massive raids were directed toward the popular suburbs in 1983. However, this form of repression was used in previous years by police, military and agents of the CNI against leaders and popular organizations. The mass arrests were carried out during massive protests motivated for the collective discontent with the economic crisis. This figure announced the emergence of social protest movements. The military authorities diminished the public protests classifying them as simple criminal behavior. The use of lists of "wanted persons" was implemented into the context of the raids. Furthermore, they offered a platform to local dissent to the military regime. Torture would no longer be used only by the intelligence services. It was widely applied by the police in the police stations, as well as the neighborhood, the soccer fields and plazas in Santiago and, occasionally, in provincial towns. Of the total testimony validated by the Commission, three thousands six hundred twenty five people were detained for political reasons. A total of three thousands fifty nine people remained in the centers of the CNI (p. 246).

In the end of eighties the context changed. It was marked by the growing complaints of human rights violations, the gradual emergence of the armed opposition, and the development of a social mobilization process that sought to force through peaceful means

the achievement of a return to democracy. Police and the Carabineers intervened again but more actively in the work of actively pursuing those involved in resistance to the regime. They detained people to make them available to CNI and the courts in order to be processed.

In the popular suburbs, by contrast with what happened in wealthier neighborhoods, the manifestations of dissent were spread out. The popular sectors put barricades and bonfires on the streets to block the access of repressive agents inside the neighborhoods. People were harshly repressed.

The CNI devoted more effort to persecution to three groups engaged in armed opposition against the military regime: MIR, MAPU and FPMR. They attacked mainly through bombings, and the result of their attacks was the death of persons accused as agents of the dictatorship, especially officials of the Carabineers. CNI conducted selective arrests involving members of those organizations directly, but also the most extensive networks of people linked to them. Detainees of CNI could also be referred to military prosecutors or, if they were charged with violating the Internal Security of the State. Moreover, there were still restrictions on constitutional rights, across the states of emergency renewed permanently without giving justification. Moreover, on two occasions, the state of siege was declared again, and remained in effect for some months. Those rules were applied to order arrests and relegation of opponents of the regime, regardless of all judicial review.

At least during the 1980's, the CNI and the police in general admitted the arrests; they even received wide coverage in the media. However, in the early years of this period, the detention centers under the CNI still maintained the character of secrets; until June 14, 1984, when the CNI was authorized to arrest people in those places.

After a period of detention at CNI's centers, people could be available to military tribunals or civilian courts based on the crime that they are charged. One of the particularities of this period was the growing opposition, and the intelligence services and law enforcement officials should adapt its methods to the new context.

In this period, the sophistication in the use of legal instruments to facilitate the deprivation of liberty for political reasons and even torture were implemented. This corresponded to the effort to give a framework of legality to political repression. However, the recourse to rules contrary to due process and the requirements of international law concerning the prevention of torture and the permission to keep isolated the detainees for long periods were regularly used. Despite of this fact, the CNI usually recognized and recorded their arrests, preferably by appealing, as official justification for them.

During this period the CNI used the same methods of torture of the previous stages, among which the most frequently utilized was the application of electricity. It was common practice nude and blindfolded the detainees for a long time. It also relied strongly to other methods of torture such as sexual assault, hanging, suffocation and burns. The use of torture began at the time of arrest, through beatings and threats. The victims, immediately deprived of vision with bandages or hoods, could begin to be questioned as early as the vehicle of the agents. The detainees just entered the detention centers, those affected were tortured with electricity.

### **Territorial Setting of the Intelligence Agencies**

To understand how the intelligence agencies operated in Chile, it is necessary to know how the country is politically and administratively organized. Chile is a nonfederal republic; this means that the country is not divided into states. However, during the military regime, the need to divide the country into regions was considered in order to encourage the

local development. Then in 1974 the country was divided into twelve regions and a metropolitan area. The Capitol city, Santiago, is localized in the metropolitan area and one third of the total population of the nation lived and lives in this area.

Each region had a gubernator or *intendente*. She or he was appointed by the General Pinochet<sup>3</sup>, and today by the President of the Republic. The region is divided into the provinces and each province has a gubernator and they are also appointed by the General Pinochet and today by the President. None of these positions are elected by popular voting.

The idea of dividing the country in regions in order to improve local development was not fully implemented and still is not. Indeed, in 2008, two new regions are including, making fourteen regions and a metropolitan area. During the military regime most of the political and economical decisions were taken for the central government in Santiago city. Therefore, it is expected that the intelligence agencies have the main intelligence agency in Santiago (i.e. DICOMCAR) and in each region a branch of this (i.e. SICOMCAR).

The next chapter presents the results of this research based on the three levels of analysis: Institutional, Group and Individual.

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<sup>3</sup> The appendix 2 shows the decrees, in which Pinochet appointed the regional and provincial governors, who also belonged to the armed forces or order.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS**

This chapter examines the institutional level variables, which could motivate, or deter, the perpetration of torture by the intelligence agencies. Since the unit of analysis is the subject who carried out torture, the presence or the absence of variables based on the individual's perception are reviewed below.

The written documents such as judicial sentences, law decrees, and National Committees Reports are also used as sources of information. Those allow the researcher to define structures and functions of intelligence agencies. Finally, the relationship between the institutional variables and the perception of the interviewees are established in order to define whether or not the variables have impact on the perpetration of torture.

The following variables are based on the literature reviewed; however, new variables arose during the conduct of the research. These variables are examined in the context in which they emerged.

<b>THE VARIABLES STUDIED</b>
<i>Bureaucratic authoritarianism</i>
Hierarchical Structure
Distribution of command
Communicational system
<i>Values and indoctrination</i>
Professionalization
Infrastructure and facilities
Organizational structures
Legal Impunity
Ideology
Work socialization
<i>Military Training</i>
Type of training
Reward/Punishment system
Political interests

Table N°2: Institutional variables

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

At the time the coup occurred, each field of the armed forces and the police (Carabineers and Police of Investigations) had their own agency or division in charge of the intelligence tasks. Even though during the military regime these agencies were involved in the repressive system, most of them implemented their actions during the first and second periods. The following list indicates the agencies and the institution related with the intelligence agency:

Institutions	Agencies
Army	Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército ( <b>DINE</b> ), Army Direction of the Intelligence.
Army: It depended on the high commander (Estado Mayor)	Dirección Nacional de la Defensa (DIDENA), Direction of National Defense.
Navy	Servicio de Inteligencia Naval (SERVINA), Naval Intelligence Service.
Air Force	Dirección de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Aéreas (DIFA), Air Forces Direction of Intelligence.
Carabineers (Police)	Dirección de Comunicaciones de Carabineros ( <b>DICOMCAR</b> ), Carabineers Direction of Communications.
Military Junta	Dirección Nacional de Investigaciones (DINA), National Direction of Intelligence. Between 1974 and 1977
Ministry of Interior	Central de Informaciones, ( <b>CNI</b> ) National Center of Information. Between 1977 to 1990

Table N°3: Intelligence Agencies

Of these agencies, three are the intelligence agencies analyzed in this chapter: CNI, DINE and DICOMCAR. Two of them were directly related with different fields of the army and the last one to the police, Carabineers. The selection of these agencies is based on the fact that the interviewees belonged to them.

NATIONAL CENTER OF INFORMATION  
(CENTRAL NACIONAL DE INFORMACIONES, CNI)

**Description of Participant 1**

The person interviewed belonged to the CNI from its beginning, and he was also, and still, is a member of the army. The army does not expel its members from the institution, despite their being condemned for felony crimes related with human rights violations. In the CNI, he led a group of people from different armed forces and carabineers, and his mission was to investigate and exterminate the members of a specific guerrilla group.

Participant 1 was condemned to be in prison for the homicides of several people, such as the murder of a labor union's leader by three shots and cut his throat, a worker by pretending his suicide in order to make responsible him for the dead of the labor union's leader, the homicide of a truck driver by use unnecessary of force (torture). He also participated in the murders of numerous people by open fire (*fucilamiento*) and torture of detainees and political prisoners, but he was not legal persecuted for these crimes.

**General Description of CNI**

CNI was one of the intelligence agency from which information can be gathered. The Reports of the National Commissions allow one to gather antecedents about the organizational structure. Moreover, the review of the judicial files and the copies of sentences about the crimes perpetrated by the interviewees offer relevant information about the *modus operandi* of CNI.

As was mentioned in the third chapter, the DINA was questioned for its mechanisms of repression and human rights abuses. In 1977, General Pinochet received international pressures to close the DINA, and he closed it, but at the same time CNI was

created, Law Decree 1.878/77. When the democratic government in Chile was reestablished, the CNI ceased to exist legally in February 1990.

CNI received from the DINA its personnel and its material possessions, including places to detain and torture people. CNI was very similar to DINA in respect to its definition, characteristics, roles and objectives. The most important differences were its reporting lines. CNI depended on the Ministry of the Interior, rather than the Governing Junta. A new function was given to CNI: maintaining the actual military regime. CNI was a military agency specialized technically and professionally, and it belonged to the government. CNI was responsible for collecting and processing all information at the national level from different fields of action: political, economic, civil daily lives, etc. This information was required for the military government to formulate the state policies, plans, and programs. Moreover, CNI could adopt any measures necessary to safeguard the national security, and the normal performance of national activities, in order to keep the governmental system settled by the military regime (Rettig, et. al., 1990).

### **CNI's Functions:**

CNI had the following functions: intelligence, counterintelligence, behavioral analysis, monitoring and intervention in political parties and social organizations, including the Catholic Church and religious movements. CNI had also an organic structure to infiltrate Chileans, who lived in exile, and continuously monitored the activities of organizations and people who supported the government's opposition.

When the MIR reorganized a new strategy to fight back against the military regime, and implemented the "return operation," the MIR increased armed actions, such as placement of explosives in public places, bank robberies, and the murder of Army Lieutenant Colonel Roger. In response to the MIR's attacks, a new CNI's Director was

appointed, and the focus of attention was on the fight against counterinsurgency and CNI implemented harsh and repressive actions against the government's detractors (Rettig, et. al., 1990).

From 1983, the number of the arrests and human rights violations attributable to CNI increased. They arrived at their peak between the years 1986 and 1987. The left movements clandestinely brought a large number of weapons into the country. In addition, the FPMR carried out an act of terrorism against the General Pinochet. In the attack, five bodyguards were murdered and Pinochet was not even hurt. CNI counterattacked FPMR and five members of the guerrilla were killed and disappeared. In the operation named Albania, 12 militants were killed.

The methods of torture were varied. One of them was the violent beatings that produced fractures and bloodshed; the detainees had to stay lying face down on the floor, upside down or standing, for long hours without moving; remained naked hours or days, under constant light or blinded by bandages or hoods, or tied; stayed in cubicles so close it was impossible to move; remained incommunicado; denied of food or water or shelter or health facilities; hanging detainees by the arms for long time was also common, various forms of semi suffocation in water, foul-smelling substances was used. Sexual harassment and rape were reported frequently; the application of electricity and burns and the mock firing squad was often used (*fucilamiento*). In some centers the *pau de arara*<sup>4</sup>, and the torture of detainees' families were practiced.

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<sup>4</sup> The hands around the legs by introducing a rod into the opening formed between the knees and elbows. The prisoner is suspended upside down and then it is applied electric power to the penis, vagina, anus, breasts, and the most sensitive parts.

## **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES**

The National Director was at the head of CNI, who had the rank of an army general. As DINA, CNI was formed with personnel from institutions of the Orders (police) and Armed Forces, and also civilian personnel (Rettig, et. al., 1990, p. 980). Nevertheless, this agency was ruled by the army and most of its procedures were commanded by this armed institution.

CNI organized teams to monitor and suppress the guerrilla groups such as the FPMR and MIR. For this purpose the Metropolitan Intelligence Division had hundreds of people. Each region in the country (a total of twelve) had an Intelligence Division. This feature is clearly showed in the judicial sentences and participant 1 confirmed such information. Participant 1 explicates that CNI units had the same distribution and structure of a high command. Each unit functioned under the orders of a chief of division.

## **COMMUNICATIONAL SYSTEM AND DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND**

The organizational structure defined mainly the forms of the communication between the high command, the chiefs and the subalterns, and allowed the chief to control the subalterns' works, and determined that the information went up and down. Therefore, an order was easily received and distributed downward. Probably one of the differences between the army and this agency was that the information was kept **compartmentalized**. That is to say, if one group had the mission to watch a suspect the rest of the members, even from the same unit, did not know it. This strategy was not only used for CNI, but also for other intelligence agencies and guerrillas. Thus, if one subject was captured he could give information during the torture session, and if he did not know the entire operative, he could avoid putting the mission at risk.

In the case of the agents, they assumed a distrustful attitude toward the rest of their colleagues as well as the other people with whom they had relationships. They believed that a person with or without intention could repeat information to inappropriate people, thereby informing the enemy and risking an operative. This impression is also shared by participant 3, who belonged to another intelligence agency and worked in CNI. Therefore, the system of communication was not related to the military system, instead it was related to the objectives of an intelligence agency.

One of the aspects that CNI maintained from the army was the ranks. Always a superior should have highest rank and more seniority than the subalterns, and people from other military forces and carabineers followed this rule. This structure permitted one to distribute responsibilities and made subalterns not question an order.

Keeping the information reserved and compartmentalized also gave them the alternative to be safe from punishment for the perpetration of a crime. If other agencies, or even the military authority, questioned them about their “excesses” or their violent behavior, they may not know who committed that act, nor had vague information about the responsible person, the perpetrators were free from sanction. However, this dynamic worked between groups in a same agency (each agency has different groups) but not between people that belonged to the same group. This aspect will be reviewed in the group variable.

## **POLITICAL INTERESTS**

Most of CNI's personnel carried out only intelligence analysis. These analyses included political information, political parties, religions, labor unions, private companies' managements, general culture, international relations, etc. The political background of the

citizens was also gathered. This information was made available to state institutions for the purpose of hiring employees.

The other relevant function of CNI was operational. This refers to the direct actions against the leftist groups, who fought back against the regime. CNI's actions were directed against the leftist groups and included infiltration, monitoring, arrests, torture, armed repression, and executions. To carry out these activities, CNI moved within and outside of the law. Actions of intimidation tried to disarticulate organizations and movements, as well as the infiltration and interception of private communication between politicians, trade unions or churches' members.

Participant 1 believes that he was manipulated by the authority of this time. That is to say, he did "his work" because he defended the nation from its enemies, and he never questioned the nature of the enemy. Today, he believes that the authority used this intelligence agency for blocking and even eliminating the political enemies. This perception is shared by other interviewees, who belonged to other intelligence agencies.

## **LEGAL IMPUNITY**

CNI's agents systematically committed illegal actions, carrying out the functions demanded by the military authorities. To develop all these tasks, CNI's agents had the absolute certainty of impunity. Its agents were acting under false names, and they did not reveal their identities even in the courts. They acted without being subject to rules, with unlimited power (Rettig, et. al., 1990, p. 981). Indeed, in the decade of the eighties CNI faced armed actions of extreme leftist groups and a lot members of these groups died. CNI's agents had the power to arrest people (without a judicial order). They could search for places inhabited or uninhabited, when it was presumed that there were in existence illegal firearms, explosives, chemicals or armed groups.

Participant 1 argues that he never ever thought that he could be judicially processed and condemned for crimes perpetrated by him. He always felt free of any judgment or sanction. He explained that he received from the army economic support to travel to Argentina and stay there in order to avoid the judicial trial. The Army paid the air tickets for him and his family and gave him a false identity to travel. This information is also consigned in the judicial file.

Even though he had absolute certainty that he and the people that he commanded acted outside the law, he felt backed by the military authorities in the fight against “the enemy.” CNI’s formation and development required that the governmental authorities’ support. This was the only way that CNI could have the facilities for the implementation of its work. Moreover, the military authorities used diverse legal strategies in order to make it possible for them to act illegally, and if the agents were surprised in some criminal conduct, the government procured the conditions (at legislative and operative levels) to avoid their legal prosecution. For instance, the Law 18.314 allowed CNI and other members of the law enforcement to detain people with an order from the Interior Minister, the regional governors, the provincial governors, or the Garrison Commanders – all of whom belonged to the military or Carabineers. At this time, it was not necessary to have a judicial order.

## **LINKAGES OF CNI WITH OTHER SECURITY SERVICES**

CNI acted in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies (Rettig, et. al., 1990). Indeed, one of the interviewees worked in CNI and in another intelligence agency, and two others worked in two different intelligence agencies. The intelligence agencies not only exchanged personnel, but also they exchanged information and conducted some operations together. Nevertheless, the degree of loyalty between them was very limited. In fact, in the judicial files it was evident that one agency

gathered information (even false information) in order to denounce another agency and make it responsible for the same crimes. In several opportunities one agency accused to the other for crimes committed by its own personnel. This situation generated serious friction between these services, particularly during the judicial trials.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE AND FACILITIES**

### **CNI's Funding and Resources**

The funds were allocated by the Budget Law, and funds could be allocated by special laws. CNI could also acquire or receive any resources; nobody questioned the origins of these resources, nor was the CNI audited. These funds and resources were administered by the National Director, who had broad powers to administer the properties and funds (Rettig, et. al., 1990). In fact, in judicial files it was established that CNI was the owner of numerous business companies. CNI received the material dependencies (prisons) and the real estate of DINA. Nevertheless, CNI established its own detention places.

In Santiago, CNI worked in many precincts. The principal headquarters was in Santiago's downtown. The other was in Borgoño 1470, also in Santiago. In this place several extreme-left militants died. The other place was Villa Grimaldi, this which was known by the victims as a place where they experienced the crudest form of torture (Valech, et. al., 2004). Indeed, during my work with victims of torture, Villa Grimaldi was remembered for the elevated level of cruelty. In Villa Grimaldi physical conditions were implemented to perpetrate torture. An example was the tower, a place people were forced to remain for a long time (days) in a small place, where they sat on their heels in the darkness. Even though the methods of torture used did not require huge implementation, certain objects like the electric apparatus used to torture were acquired by the agents. This procedure required an organization dedicated to acquire the apparatuses and administer

their use. To do it, CNI had funds that allowed it to administer and acquire any supplies and it was not audited. The open access to administrate funds without following the rules of the bureaucratic state system clearly gave CNI ample power not only for the supplies' acquisitions, but also the absence of control led to opportunities for corruption. For example, in 1974 DINA made the requisition of Journal Company "*El Clarín*," which belonged to the members of the opposition. The Decree 276 of the Interior Minister backed this procedure. Later, between 1984 and 1985 this place was used for CNI as a place of detentions and torture (Valech, et. al., 2004, p. 534 - 535).

## **BENEFITS AND MOTIVATIONS**

Participants 1 and 6 indicate that a CNI's member had a salary 30% higher than a regular soldier in a same rank. Indeed, participant 1 said he could easily obtain financial loans. Indeed, the Army supported his efforts to buy real state by giving him access to a state loan at a low interest rate.

He felt absolutely free from punishment. To the contrary, he received several notations of merit, even for murdering people. This was consigned in the judicial file which also included the following list of benefits:

1. Loan of CORFO.
2. Loan from CNI, the money was not paying back.
3. A loan to buy a farm with a low interest rate.
4. 15,000 dollars from a total of 100,000 dollars.
5. Financial support and false passport to stay in Uruguay and Argentina during the judicial investigation.
6. Airplane tickets for him and his family.
7. Payment of the expenses and salaries of the defense lawyers.

## 8. Notations of merit.

### **Psychological reward**

Self image – Self esteem: He believes that he was doing something really good for country, “I was not playing war.” His orders were real and they had concrete results. He was very careful about his personal image, and the job in CNI allowed him to project an image of a strongman, like “James Bond,” he says.

Power and control: He could be out on the street using special identification (similar to the police identification), which permitted him to avoid being questioned by the law enforcement authorities. Moreover, he could use weapons, and car siren (alarm). These elements are important since a military member does not have these privileges.

He led a group of men, and he had a lot power to take decisions and create different methods to investigate and interrogate the prisoners. Therefore, he and the agents were able to decide who could live, or not, and were absolutely free of punishment.

### **IDEOLOGY AND TRAINING**

Participant 1 relates that he enrolled the army official school at the age of 14. He was one of the best Sub Lieutenants at the age of 22, which made the authorities appoint him to a Division of Artillery as a positive recognition for his abilities. Later, he was assigned in the military quarter in the north of country, in 1973. It was the first time that he killed someone and he was 22 years old, when he refers to this crime. He does not express any emotional commotions or remorse, and a similar attitude is showed when refers to other crimes. This feature will be reviewed in the Chapter Individual Characteristics.

The military ideology generated in him the notion that he was a hero and acted in true love of the nation. In the system of training and teaching, the figure of the enemy

recurred frequently. This enemy image had properties that could destroy the country and its people. Nevertheless, at this time he never heard about Marxist ideology and the danger that it represented for the entire nation. The training did not address the Marxist ideology, because at this time the army did not participate directly in Cold War matters. According to participant 1, the anti-Marxist ideology was taught by the School of Americas. Previous the School of Americas, the military National Security doctrine did not focus on the concept of internal enemy in terms of Marxism.

In 1971, he and other army officials attended the School of Americas in Panama. In this place, he learned about the concept of the enemy of the state and the role of the Communist Party in the destruction of society. The training gave him information about “the dictatorship of the working class” through the use of arms. Until this day, he argues that the Army had not given him information about the dangers of Marxist ideology and the urban guerrilla, and it was in the School of the Americas where he learned about them. He also recognizes that in the Panama School, he learned techniques of torture. Once the training was concluded, he was in charge of teaching other military officers.

Since the army gave him the notion of the enemy, it was not difficult to him introduce the image of the enemy based on the concepts given by the School of the Americas. That is to say, this enemy, according to him, did not recognize the values of life and if they do not kill the enemy, the enemy would kill them, and they would destroy society. Therefore, when he participated in the shooting of civilians he did not have any doubts. It was the first time that he killed someone, and he says that he did not feel anything, because he was killing the enemy.

During the coup, they were remanded to army quarters and isolated from society. Therefore, when General Pinochet talked about the “Plan Z,” wherein Cubans and leftists

would destroy country using arms, all of them believed it. The perception of the enemy became a concrete reality. The Marxists became a real threat and they must defend the country from them. Today, he is able to perceive that the Plan Z was a creation made up for the military authorities to obtain their absolute obedience to fight against that enemy.

In 1978, he took courses in intelligence in the military dependences. He was motivated by the concept of spies. He recognizes that some fictional stories about spies (like James Bond) made him feel attracted to these topics, and he also wanted to have an important role in the changes of society. This motivated him to join the CNI. He had to lead a group of military officers and policemen charged with exterminating the members of the guerrilla group. In 1985, he flew to Taiwan to receive training in political war.

In the interview, it was evident that it was not the ideology given by the military training that motivated him to assassinate, instead it was the idea about whom he was killing. Even though it was discussed in the literature review that the military ideology is one of the facts that determine that a soldier was able to torture and kill someone, here was evident that this single fact is not a determinant in this type of behavior. The subject had to have the conviction that the tortured person represented a threat and deserved to be killed or to be tortured.

The military ideology about the concept of enemy (in general) is a facilitator that helps one to exterminate or torture the enemy, but the determining factor is the perception of the enemy. If the enemy represents the tremendous danger, s/he would be stripped out from his/her humanity. It can be one of the explanatory factors that tell us why other people who did not have military training were also able to perpetrate torture.

The training gave them information about what type of enemy they would fight and the methods that they should be use to defeat them. The conviction about the danger of the Marxist enemy was produced by the training and reinforced by the group.

The training has two different dimensions:

1. The first dimension refers to the military training that the army offered. The hypothesis is that the type of training used for the army endures the soldier, making him more tolerant of the violence. If this variable is observed separately from others, it does not explain why some military soldiers did not perpetrate torture and others did. Therefore, it is necessary evaluate individuals' personal characteristics, which may make someone more susceptible to appeals to commit this type of crime than another person. Here the premise is the criterion of selection used for the intelligence agencies, which could require that a subject had specific traits or characteristics. This hypothesis is reviewed in the chapter of individual characteristics.
2. The second dimension is the training given by other institutions in matters of torture. The training in torture not only considers the techniques that indicate how a subject should be tortured, but also the training defines the danger of the enemy. This aspect was clearly observed in participant 1 and the other participants. In the case of the participant 1, he says that he had training in the School of Americas and Taiwan. In both places he learned torture's techniques. The most relevant of the training was to learn about the characteristics of the enemy, and how the torture would allow him to reduce or annihilate the enemy. At this level, the most relevant is to identify the enemy in terms of a threat and the degree of danger that s/he represents to him and society. The torture appears as a tool to fight against the enemy, and according to participant 1, the perception about the danger and the level of evil that represented the enemy was produced by the training in the School of Americas.

For him and for his trainers, they had to fight back the war against their enemies, using the same methods that they use, and the torture was one of these methods. However, neither, the Reports of the National Commissions nor other interviewees reported that a guerrilla member had tortured an agent.

Participant 1 was unable to perceive a guerrilla member as a human being. Indeed, when I asked him about one of his crime again a civilian, he did not question killing him because the victim was perceived as the enemy of the state. After a long time in jail, he is now able to perceive the magnitude of this homicide, but not the other crimes. He dedicated much of his career as an intelligence agent to the study the behavior and mentality of the guerrillas in order to counteract it. Indeed, he fought with his superior because they disagreed about how to fight back against the guerrilla. He argues that he knew the enemy very well that he knew much better how to fight the enemy.

## **OBEDIENCE CRIME**

Participant 1 openly assumes that he killed people, but even he does not remember how many victims there were. Moreover, he admits to the torture of the captives. When the interviewer asked him why he did it, he argued that he **received the order** from the superiors in terms of killing the enemy of the state, and then he just did it. He did not question the order nor ask about the reason why he had to kill someone. He explains his attitude as a result of the type of military indoctrination that he received, the main objective of which was to protect country and the people that he killed were a threat for country. Indeed, he wrote a paper, in which he refers to his crimes in the framework of the obedience crimes. The same arguments were used by the defense lawyers in the several judicial trials that he had. From this point of view he felt betrayed by the army; because he followed an order and thus he should not be condemned for those actions by the courts.

However, later in a second interview, he says that he does not feel betrayed and argues that “I did what I did it, because I knew what I was doing.” These arguments are very inconsistent. From one side he admits to have a clear conscience about his “job,” and from the other side he makes the army responsible for his actual condition, sent to prison with a life sentence.

He argues that he never felt obligated to do what he did, because he believed in the need to defend the nation from Marxism and the guerrillas. Moreover, he never felt that his life or the lives of his family would be threatened if he left CNI or if he refused to do same “task.” Moreover, he tried to remember someone that was forced to work in CNI and he does not remember any. He even says “I never obligated any to work in CNI against my wish.” He worked in the CNI, because he liked this job. When he refers to the obedience crime, he is referring to the fact that certain orders were commanded by the authority and he just followed the order, without questioning it, because he believed what the head of the army said. He is convinced that, according to the rank and hierarchy, each man was responsible for what he did, “because the rank position gave us the access to the information and knowledge.” Due to this logic, he was unable to question the Augusto Pinochet arguments, and “if Pinochet said that the guerrilla was a true threat I believed him, and he transformed the myth into a reality.”

The interviewee does not believe that Pinochet by himself had the capacity of making up a false reality. He thinks that Pinochet had the civilians’ advice in order to manipulate the armed forces and the intelligence agencies to ensure that he remained in power.

Participant 1 did not feel obligated to perpetrate a specific crime. Indeed, the mission to kill a civilian leader was assigned to other soldiers, who refused to accomplish

it, and then the authorities assigned him and others, who accepted it. He voluntarily participated in the perpetration of the homicide and he knew very well the magnitude of the crime (homicide). This information was obtained from the statement of the judicial sentence and he confirmed this information.

The defense asked for the dismissal of the charges, arguing that he followed military orders and he was unable to disobey Code of Military Justice, art. 344 and art. 355. However, the judge indicated that the order should be based on military needs and it did not have this feature.

## **PROFESSIONALIZATION**

In 1985, he left CNI because he disagreed with the superiors about the way how they should fight against the guerrillas. It was not because he cared about the lives of the people or because the use of excessive violence was against his values. It was because he had a conflict with the authorities, who did not recognize his level of knowledge about the enemy. His superior wanted to exterminate the enemy, meanwhile he believed, and believes, that if the subversives were arrested and identified, the guerrillas would expulse them from its group, because one of most important requirements of the guerrilla was the anonymity of its members. Moreover, if they killed the guerrillas they would be unable to identify others members and the movements or strategies used by the guerrillas. Hence, they would lose information about the enemy's plans.

In the arguments, he shows that he perceived his role in the context of his job. The idea of obtaining better knowledge about the enemy come from the level of professionalism that he had achieved. Indeed, he saw torture as a tool that they needed to obtain information as fast as they can. Therefore, the torture was the method used to achieve this goal, but also they want to destroy the enemy physically and mentally and the way to do that also

called for using torture. In this case he did not want to kill enemies, but he wanted to handicap them mentally or physically so that they could not fight back.

The torture session was structured and they looked for specific information, such as the identification of guerrilla members, type of organization, or the plan of action. Therefore, the torture followed a logical strategy.

According to him, two forms of torture exist:

1. Professional: the excesses were not allowed, because people received training to obtain information (School of the Americas and Police of Investigations).
2. Unprofessional: the subject lacked self control, and s/he finally killed the person tortured. In the torture dynamic, it was easy for someone to lose control and this type of behavior was not punished.

Even though training taught how to torture, how it was implemented by the agents depended on the type of agents. Hence, the level of professionalization depended on the individual characteristics. However, the absence of punishment for some “excesses” (including rape and robbery) were indirectly allowed for CNI. This variable will be reviewed in the chapter of individual characteristics.

## **ISOLATION**

Essentially, participant 1 perceives himself as isolated from the general civilian world. Indeed, the close friends belonged to CNI or the army. Therefore, his referent people in implicit or explicit form agreed with his behavior. Even though the army did not prohibit having relationship with civilians, he felt close to the military people. This feature would be better examined in the chapter of group influences.

## **CRITERIA FOR ENROLLMENT**

According to the interviewee, the best qualified military men enrolled CNI.

However, in fact, the better military officers were those best indoctrinated by the army, those who did not question the orders, followed discipline, and those who believed in what the army said about the enemy.

Participant 1 says that CNI asked the police institutions to send people, because they were the ones who best knew the methods of torture (Valech, et. al., 2004), because they used torture techniques to interrogate the regular criminals.

The Police Institutions and the other armed forces selected the men who would be assigned in CNI. Generally, the police selected the worst men, because they saw the new assignment as an opportunity to separate the worst officials from the institution. Meanwhile, the army sent the best men, who did not have any negative record in their military career.

Unlike participant 1, participant 2 says that the CNI's criterion of selection was to choose the individuals who had the worst records. They selected those whose behavior the military institutions could not control, those who did not follow the internal norms, were undisciplined, and did not dress as the institution required.

ARMY DIRECTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE  
(DIRECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA DEL EJÉRCITO, DINE)

**Description of Participant 2**

The person interviewed belonged to the DINE from 1981 to 1982, and he was also, and still is, a member of the army. In the DINE, he led a department, which integrated a group of army officials and sergeants (sub officials). This participant denies all the charges for which he was condemned. Despite the fact that he does not recognize the crimes, other prisoners refer to his participation in the criminal acts, and in the judicial trial the charges were probated.

Participant 2 was condemned to be in prison for giving the order and the institutional facilities to perpetrate homicide of a labor union's leader, a civilian to cover the crime of labor union's leader, and gave the order to kill ten members of the guerrilla group. He also tortured detainees and political prisoners and was responsible for bribery, but he was not legal persecuted for these crimes.

**General Description of DINE**

The DINE was created in 1901 and its mission was to advise the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, through the General Staff. Participant 2 explains that General Pinochet was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and General of the Army, and he had a group of officials who advised him, the General Staff.

The General Staff has and had the following attributions:

1. Intelligence
2. Advisory at personal and organizational levels.
3. Plan of war at operational level
4. Logistical support with the purpose of implement the orders.

The DINE's functions are:

- Guiding and directing the intelligence planning during peace and war times.
- Evaluating the effectiveness of new methods of intelligence system recommended for action.
- Advising the Commander in Chief of the Army in decisions related to institutional planning and internal security missions, derived from the state of siege (Gallardo, M., 2001).

The plan of war was a political tool and followed the purpose that the military regime gave it. Therefore, Pinochet used this army direction for his own purposes to attack his political adversaries.

The DINE had a department named Army Intelligence Body (Cuerpo de Inteligencia del Ejército, **CIE**). Later, this institution changed its name to Army Intelligence Battalion (Batallón de Inteligencia del Ejército, **BIE**). The BIE had the tasks of obtaining intelligence information about foreign armies, counterintelligence, detection of the foreign operative networks that were settled in country, and it kept the security inside the army.

During the military regime, the several members of the DINE worked in the *Comando Conjunto*. The Report of the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation indicates that this group is responsible for the murder of 30 people (p. 485). The modus operandi of the *Comando Conjunto* was kidnapping, torture and murder. Today, the DINE's ex-agents had several ongoing judicial trials for the selective deaths of the members of the political parties.

## **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES**

Participant 2 argues that the DINE was and is part to the army, and the army is a strongly disciplined and structured institution. Hence, it does not allow one to improvise any action or make decision without the orders of the high command or the authority in charge of a unit. DINE was an intelligence agency that served the high command directly and its dependencies were centralized in Santiago. Because of its centralized structure, the people could be mobilized to regions and gather information at the local level with the support of the local army authorities.

## **COMMUNICATIONAL SYSTEM AND DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND**

Participant 2 explains that the army has and had a regular procedure named **daily reading**, which is a reading of the all activities planed for a day. In the daily reading the routine is reported, the actions are discussed and the new activities and written and oral orders are discussed. Each company<sup>5</sup> sets its daily reading so that each man knows which are his own activities and the company's activities as a whole.

The daily reading is not only an activity performed by the army company, but also this is set by entire institution according its hierarchy (Division, Brigade, Regiment, Battalion, Company and Squadron). In this structure, the group knows the nature of the order, but the way that they accomplish the order it is not necessarily defined by the authorities.

According to the interviewee, in the army it was not possibility that someone who belonged to a company did not know the daily activities. Moreover, there was no way that these in authority would not know the planned activities. Even though participant 2 is very emphatic in highlighting this norm, later he would contradict this argument, because he

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<sup>5</sup> A company is a group around of 30 soldiers, leaded by a Lieutenant.

argued that he did not know the actions of by the soldiers under his command. This aspect would be reviewed in the chapter of individual characteristics.

## **POLITICAL INTERESTS**

The current judicial trials makes responsible to DINE for a number of people assassinated, for instance the death of the ex-president Eduardo Frei Montalva. The DINE's agents killed people who Pinochet perceived as a threat to his regime. The homicides were selective and used methods more selective in order to hide crimes (e.g. sarin gas). Indeed, the current members of DINE, who had been judicially condemned, respond to this patron.

## **LEGAL IMPUNITY**

The impunity is something already given in the daily life of the criminals due to the fact that regular people who are called to condemn this type of crime justify them. According to the prosecutor's allegation, consigned in the judicial file, the army ascribed to the concept that the institution was responsible for keeping the traditional values of the nation. If this role was threatened by any one, the army members had the ability to use any form of violence in order to repress the offender, and they would not be questioned for doing it. As a result, the individuals did not receive social sanctions, because they acted according to the facts; hence, they did not expect that they would be punished by the legal system.

Participants 1 and 2 agree with this explanation.

In the judicial trial, it was proven that people in command of the institution authorized the use of the infrastructure and facilities of the army, and they knew what their subalterns did, because the subalterns were commanded to inform the superiors. Hence, both levels knew what it has been required and how they had to do it. A clear example of legal impunity refers to the homicide perpetrated against a Communist by two other army

members of the DINE. In the judicial file, it was consigned that the weapon used in the murder of the labor union leader was bought in the store that a member of the Communist Party worked in it, who later was assassinated. The army officials who acquired the weapon did not participate in the crime consigned in this trial (homicide of labor union leader). Nevertheless, they bought the weapon which was used to kill the labor union leader, and when their participation was probed they were removed from their positions in order to protect them from the judicial trial. Nobody was condemned for the murder of the Communist member, despite the fact that the arm was found in the dependencies of DINE.

### **LINKAGES OF DINE WITH OTHER SECURITY SERVICES**

This operation was led by the DINE, but an agent from CNI was assigned DINE to conduct the “mission” at the operational level. It is evident that the intelligence agencies had close relations. Nevertheless, during the judicial trial CNI accused the DINE and presented proofs to implicate it in the crimes.

### **INFRASTRUCTURE AND FACILITIES**

Participant 2 denies all the charges for which he was sentenced, that is, the murders of a labor union leader and a worker. His argument is that he did not know what his subalterns did, despite the fact that in the army system it was impossible to ignore the activities of the subalterns.

DINE had different departments in charge of giving support to the people who were assigned in an operative. In the judicial file was noted that these departments gave them the support required for them and the authorities. They provided them all the equipment to perpetrate the crime, that is, the costumers, the vehicles and the arms.

To cover the murder of the labor union leader, which provoked a massive disapproval, the soldiers involved in the crime killed another civilian in order to incriminate him for the crime. In both assassinations, DINE's members received the institutional support. Indeed, the army gave a notation of merit to the officials and sub-officials who participated in crimes. Later, they were protected by DINE to avoid judicial charges and the army provided the defense lawyers during the judicial trial.

### **BENEFITS AND MOTIVATIONS**

When the interviewer asked participant 2 why he stays in the army, because after all, he is in jail due to his position in the army, he says: "In the army if you refuse to execute an order, then you are asked to go into retirement, and when you are 40 years old and have exclusively a military career and you do not have a profession that allows you to work in the civilian world; under these circumstances, you follow orders to avoid being fired from the army and be sure to keep your job."

In this answer he implicitly recognizes that he must follow an order to avoid being fired for the army. On the other hand, during his military career he became one of Pinochet's trusted men, and he was appointed in the highest administrative position of the region (equivalent to state governor). This position provided him a good salary and social recognition, and power. He remembers that time with a lot of satisfaction.

After the crime, he was able to develop his military career with important successes. In 1990, he was appointed in the Chilean Embassy in Ecuador as a military representative. During this time, the judicial investigation of the death of the labor union's leader pointed to DINE as responsible for the crime. The army provided the conditions to prevent him from trial, as well as the rest of the suspects, and the army provided him with the defense lawyers.

## **IDEOLOGY AND TRAINING**

These aspects are difficult to establish since participant 2 denies perpetrating any crime. He does not admit to knowing the type of work that DINE and CNI, which is impossible given to his position and his long career into the army. Therefore, it is very difficult to observe these variables. However, one of the aspects that are observed is his positive perception of the army. To him the army is an institution which pursues the most traditional values that endorse the respect for the family and the country.

## **OBEDIENCE CRIME**

He was found guilty for being responsible for giving the order to kill a civilian. Despite the fact that he does not recognize it, in the judicial trial it was proven. If one follows the arguments that he makes to describe the way that the army gives orders, it is possible to support the idea that the crime was perpetrated under an order. But this situation does not appear that clear. The members who perpetrated crimes received important benefits as did he. According to participant 1, the refusal to follow an order would jeopardize your career, and probably the individuals would not achieve certain level of success, but he never felt threatened to be fired. Furthermore, at the first moment, two officials were previously assigned to kill the labor union 's leader and they refused to do it, and none of them were fired from the army. For that reason, these aspects would be reviewed based on his personal characteristics in the following chapters.

## **PROFESSIONALIZATION**

Crimes that were perpetrated in order to eliminate the threat for the military regime showed a high level of organization in this agency. That is to say, to accomplish the mission, several agents were commanded to carry out a task. Even though these tasks

required breaking the law, they found it possible to do because they looked for the end goal of eliminating the threat.

In this mission, each agent had to accomplish his tasks well, because if someone did not it, the mission could be a failure. The degree of organization and the division of the tasks showed that this type of activities was not new for the agency. Furthermore, the way that the agents covered crimes showed a high degree of organization, and participant 1 argues that these crimes were perpetrated in a frame of professional work.

## **ISOLATION**

Despite the fact that participant 2 does not recognize that he perpetrated any crime or that he commanded a group to do so, it is possible to observe how effectively he was immersed in the army. His group referent was the army and its members, and his social life was around the military system. Even though he assumed positions in which he had close relations with the civilians, he perceived these in terms of military missions. He describes the role of the wife of an army official, and in this description it is able to perceive that the army system crosses the family ambit. It will be reviewed in the chapter of individual characteristics.

DIRECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF CARABINEERS

(DIRECCIÓN DE COMUNICACIONES DE CARABINEROS, DICOMCAR)

**Description of Participants**

**Participants 3:** The person interviewed belonged to the DICOMCAR, and he was also and still is a member of police (carabineers). Due to the fact that the police, like the army, do not expel members from the institution, in spite of their being condemned for felony crimes related with human rights violations. He is an official, and during his stay in the DICOMCAR, he was lieutenant and he retired with the rank of captain. Participant 3 worked also in CNI. In the DICOMCAR, he led a group of sub-officials and his mission was to investigate and exterminate the members of a specific guerrilla group.

Participant 3 was condemned to be in prison for the homicide of a teacher by cutting his throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same sentence) and he also murdered a civilian by police brutality. He tortured detainees and political prisoners, but he was not legal persecuted for these crimes.

**Participant 4:** belonged to the DICOMCAR, and he was also and still is a member of police (carabineers). He is an official, and during his stay in the DICOMCAR he was a major. He led a group of officials and sub-officials, and a civilian. He was in charge of a team that would investigate and exterminate the members of a specific guerrilla group.

Participant 4 was condemned to be in prison for giving the order to kill three civilians by cutting their throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same judicial file) and giving the order to kidnap and arrest ten people and broken private place without judicial order. He tortured detainees and political prisoners, but he was not legal persecuted for these crimes.

**Participant 5:** belonged to the DICOMCAR, and he was also a member of police (carabineers). He is sub-official, and during his stay in the DICOMCAR he was first sergeant. Participant 5 worked in the investigation and extermination of the members of a specific guerrilla group.

Participant 5 was condemned to be in prison for the homicide of a civilian by cutting his throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same judicial file); kidnapping and arresting ten people and broken private place without a judicial order; rob the detainees and broken places (*allanamiento*) and torture detainees and political prisoners, but he was not legal persecuted for the robberies and torture.

**Participant 6:** the person was a civilian, who before the coup belonged to the Communist Juvenile Party. Due to his training in the Soviet KGB, he was enrolled by the DIFA and later by the DICOMCAR.

Participant 6 was condemned to be in prison for the homicide of a civilian by cutting his throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same judicial file); kidnapping and arresting ten people and broken private place; torture, rape and sexual harassments of detainees. He was also not legal prosecuted for the torture, rape and sexual harassments of detainees.

### **Carabineers of Chile**

In the following section, the general features and the role of the Chilean Carabineers are described. This description allows one to understand the use of torture by the DICOMCAR's members. Then, the characteristics of the Dicomcar are studied.

The Police named Carabineers of Chile were created in 1927. The numerous municipal police were joined in a unique police organization called Carabineers of Chile.

The Decree law 8.352/27 defined that Carabineers of Chile as a military institution, which was and is responsible for keeping security and order in the national territory. Moreover, the Carabineers must supervise the accomplishment of the laws and general dispositions (which come from the authorities). Army generals led this institution during the first years of its foundation. Later, in 1932, Carabineers participated in severe political repression and at this time the military authorities gave the director of the institution the rank of general so that a policeman could assume the direction of the institution. The institution depended on the Interior Ministry. Later in 1974, during the military regime it depended on the Defense Ministry. Due to its military origins the ranks were and are based on the military system (web page).

From its beginnings until today, the Carabineers has been a militarized police. The structure of the command, the ranks and the internal structure are close to the military system. Indeed, they must submit to military courts. Even though they are closer to the citizenry than the military, their structure is more flexible than the military system, and their role is different than the military, the Carabineers have a strong military influence. Another characteristic is that Carabineers have a long practice in the use of torture. This aspect not only can be observed in the Report of the National Commissions, but also the interviewees refer to this aspect. The four interviewees who worked in the DICOMCAR tortured detainees. Moreover, participant 4 indicates that when he worked in a police station, it was a common practice to beat detainees (as he refers to the prostitutes) if they did not collaborate with the arrest of street delinquents. They used wet towels in order to avoid leaving visible scars.

Loveman and Lira (2002) argue that only in 1949 was the law derogated that allowed authorities to whip a criminal. And the concept of enemy of the state has permitted the use of violence to punish, educate, and interrogate the enemy in order to obtain information.

### **General Description of DICOMCAR**

The DICOMCAR was created in September 1983 after the dissolution of the DICAR. The DICOMCAR was endowed with more resources. The Carabineers sought to have a more significant role in intelligence work and counterinsurgency (Valech, et. al., 2004). Members of the DICAR were assigned to DICOMCAR and also other policemen from other units. The Commission of Political Prison and Torture (Valech, et. al., 2004) indicates that approximately one hundred and fifty agents were members of the DICOMCAR. The DICOMCAR also had a sort of custody of policemen who worked in CNI. This information was confirmed by participant 4, who says that he received information from policemen that worked there. The DICOMCAR also recalled information from CNI about the personal backgrounds of candidates, who applied to be enrolled in the Carabineers.

Civilian personnel were appointed to this direction, which had expertise in intelligence activities. The Director and Sub-director of the Carabineers were on the top of the DICOMCAR, both were Colonels. The functions of the DICOMCAR were to recall information, and emitted a weekly report to inform the General Director of Carabineers, who was a member of the military Junta. The DICOMCAR was also responsible for developing operational law enforcement activities. In the year 1984, the DICOMCAR participated in multiple arrests. At this time, DICOMCAR and CNI worked together in the

persecutions and arrests of leftists, although these agencies had conflicts between themselves

The DICOMCAR was divided into seven departments, and according to the judicial sentence, the Third Department was in charge of operative tasks. The interviewees worked on this department. The Third Department had the following functions and tasks:

1. Planning a strategy in order to identify people associated with political movements and members of labor unions, who were opponents of the military regime (p. 170).
2. Arresting the suspects without a judicial or administrative order.
3. Carrying out law submission to public or private places.
4. Spying and recording the suspects' pursuits.
5. Arresting the suspects in unknown places and torturing them in order to obtain information.
6. Implementing procedures that detected and neutralized any actions of espionage, subversion, infiltration and psychological attack against the institution. In the same way, the police cooperated and supported to others intelligence agencies and state divisions.

*Tasks:*

1. Planning the operatives to find information. To achieve this task they designed jurisdictional areas.
2. Keeping archives of the cases, operative actions and statistical reports.
3. Administrating financial funds to pay the agents' expenses, it also paid money to the informants.
4. Supplying information to Police Director and Sub-director.
5. Providing a team in order to record information of the prisoners.

6. Maintaining an available group of policemen to investigate any case that the authority ordered (p. 158).

As a result of these objectives some of the suspects were let free and others were assassinated. The deaths of the three members of Communist Party in 1985 led the dissolution of this direction and other important changes in the Carabineers, including the withdrawal of its General Director.

## **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES**

In this organizational framework, each region has a unit of intelligence, SICOMCAR, which depends on the DICOMCAR, but all of them dependent on the Director of Carabineers, who also was a member of the Junta. Hence, the order to investigate a case came from the Director of Carabineers (police) and/or the Director of the DICOMCAR. The Director of the DICOMCAR commanded the DICOMCAR's personnel and the SICOMCAR units throughout the entire country.

## Organizational Chart of DICOMCAR




Figure N° 1

## COMMUNICATIONAL SYSTEM AND DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND

The communicational system followed the organizational chart and the orders went up and down. The subordinates would report their activities and the accomplishment of the assigned tasks. Participant 3, who led a group of three to four people, says that even though the rank and the responsibilities of the chief were clearly established, they spend a lot of time together and the relationship between them became close and informal.

The Director of the Carabineers gave written orders by sending a memorandum F-L to the head of DICOMCAR, who passed on the order to investigate someone. Participant 4 argues that not all of the orders were written, they also could be verbal. He says that unfortunately when the DICOMCAR was questioned about the deaths of the members of the Communist Party, the archives were destroyed by fire by order of the DICOMCAR's Director.

## **POLITICAL INTERESTS**

Participants 3 and 4 explain that the objectives of the agency were based on the needs of the authorities to investigate the enemies. Participant 3 argues that at this time he never thought that he was fighting back against the political enemies, rather than he thought that he was combating terrorism, which affected the entire nation and specially the Carabineers. Today, he is able to see the manipulation of the Carabineers' and military authorities to achieve their political goals. Participants explain that effectively DICOMCAR emitted a report about matters of intelligence activities to the General Director of Carabineers and this information was used to make political decisions.

## **LEGAL IMPUNITY**

The carabineers interviewed never thought that they would be sentenced for crimes. Indeed, none of them was condemned for the perpetration of torture. The homicides, for which they have life sentence, were the result of a scale of violence that they became part of. The work setting allowed them to use torture as a mechanism to obtain information. Despite the law prohibiting this crime, the institution did not punish these "excesses," therefore those could not be a matter of judicial condemnation. Like the other agencies described here, the agents were removed from the DICOMCAR to avoid being identified in the judicial trial.

## **LINKAGES OF THE DICOMCAR WITH OTHER SECURITY SERVICES**

Two of participants had worked in other intelligence agencies and the chief of the team kept a permanent relationship with people from CNI. However, the level of loyalty was also questionable. In fact, CNI gave information to the authorities to denounce the DICOMCAR for the homicides.

Participant 4 explains that the intelligence agencies created a system to exchange reserved information about the political enemies of the military regime. Moreover, the members of a unit could be appointed to another one. The exchange of information between institutions allowed them to control the political adversaries.

The agencies also used counterintelligence. That is, the DICOMCAR or any intelligence agency appointed an agent in another agency in order to obtain secret information from the other agencies. Like participant 1, participants 3 and 4 explain that the loyalty between intelligence agencies was weak, because when a crime was in a judicial trial, each agency tried to shift responsibility to another. Indeed, participant 4 says that the DICOMCAR investigated the procedures of CNI.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE AND FACILITIES**

Participant 3 says “The departments of DICOMCAR had implemented a place to arrest the enemies and interrogated them by using torture. The place was known by the police members and the procedures of his team were known by the institutional authorities. The torture was an accepted method.” This place was an address in downtown Santiago.

## **BENEFITS AND MOTIVATIONS**

Participant 6 explains that the job in the DICOMCAR or DIFA gave him gratuities, and the people who worked there also received gratuities, such as: the possibility of power, job security, relationships with people who had power and personal influence, prestige (working in an agency give them prestige, especially DIFA) and they paid each agent over 30% of his/her regular salary.

Participant 6 believes that the benefits given by the agency were fixed with the individual motivations. That is to say, for him to work in an intelligence agency gave him

the possibility to be safe. He betrayed numerous members of his political party by denouncing, torturing and even killing them, so the political party looked for him. Moreover, he did not graduate from high school and he had received training in espionage. As a result, he could not find a well-paid job, and the intelligence agencies gave him a job and the possibility to develop his knowledge and skills.

According to participant 6, participant 4 was physically handicapped because he lost a hand by manipulating a bomb. The Carabineers did not make him retire; instead he was assigned to the DICOMCAR. This made him feel committed to the institution, and he would not question any order from the high command with the purpose of obtaining its approval and continuing his career in the police.

For participant 3, the agency gave him the possibility to take revenge for the killers of the carabineers at the hands of guerrillas. For others the agency gave the possibility to develop the concept of hero.

Participant 5 was able to buy three houses in circumstances that the regular sub-official's salary did not allow him to do.

Participant 4 was able to finance the physical rehabilitation of his arm. Even though he received the financial support of the institution, he was able to finance his treatment in Germany. He has several real estate properties and he says that those are the result of his job. Nevertheless, the costs of the real estate were not affordable on his salary. In effect, he registered all the real estate under the name of his wife in order to avoid paying the fines that the sentence commanded him to pay the victims' families.

Participant 3 was personally motivated to identify the murders of his workmates and make justice in his own way. In other words, the DICOMCAR gave him the possibility to

express his violent behavior in an institutional framework. In the next chapter these characteristics will be reviewed.

## **IDEOLOGY AND TRAINING**

Participant 6 at the age of 19 enrolled in an intelligence unit of the left party, and he received his training from the Soviet K.G.B. services in U.R.S.S. At that time, he was a member of a left party. The Soviet intelligence training offered the courses of interrogatory and infiltration of the military forces to make allies. He says that the Dicomcar's members received training from Brazilian and Taiwan military officials and from the Army School in Chile.

Participant 5 received training from the CNI's School in the "Tres Alamos." Participant 4 received training about guerrilla groups and terrorism in Bolivia and Colombia. They used the *Manual of Marijuela*, which gave instruction on how to reduce and fight against the guerilla groups.

Participant 3 says that received training outside of the country. Although he refused to indicate the places, he did acknowledge having training in interrogation (torture) and intelligence. However, in another interview participant 3 explains that the training was constant; they have to follow orders without questioning. In Chile, participant 3 also received training from the School of Intelligence of the Army. The DINA gave him training and he received training from Brazilian militaries, which were hired by the DINA. He has an internship in other arm forces, in order to learn other forms to obtain information, use of new arms, methods of espionage and breaking into homes.

Nevertheless, he says that the ways to conduct an interrogation could be unique, because each man could use his own technique to interrogate a prisoner, "it was able to be creative." Despite this argument, he thinks that nothing was new. In other words, during the

interrogation each individual felt free to do whatever he wanted in order to obtain information. Nobody questioned his methods. To the contrary, he had the support of the authorities and his subordinates. When he graduated from the Police Academy, he had to face up to cases of violent crimes as murders. This permanent exposure to violence made him gradually lose the horror of death.

Participants 3 and 4 did not and do not agree with Marxist ideology, they think that the Marxists are a threat to society, and their duty was to fight against them.

The perception of the enemy was the main reason to carry out the torture, and in the case of the carabiniers a criminal is synonymous with the enemy. Under this concept, they were able to repress a criminal with the same methods as an enemy of the state.

Nevertheless, this was not the case with participant 6; he says that he shared the military ideology and how the military drove the country. However, his behavior is better explained by the individual motivations.

## **OBEDIENCE CRIME**

Participant 6 observes that the training from the police made them follow orders in a natural way. Following an order is part of the daily routine since they were enrolled in the academy. Therefore, when a superior gave an order they only had to follow it.

Participant 3 says that orders were given and his duty was obey them. Nevertheless, he did not follow the orders because the authority gave them or because he was afraid of punishment. Instead, he followed the order because he had the strong conviction that the orders were correct. Those orders were according to the conditions that they fought against the enemy. He also argues that an official had the power to stay or not in the agency and commit torture. Hence, the people who worked in the intelligence agency had ideological conviction. If one person did not want to stay in the agency, they could ask for a position in

another police department. He thinks that it was voluntary to work in the agency. This perception is shared with participant 1, who worked like him in CNI.

Participant 3 thinks that an individual followed an order because s/he believed that the order had been previously made by the high command. The members of the high command were very respected and admired by the subordinates; therefore they felt proud to complete an order given by the high command. Indeed, one of the members of the high command expressed to them that he would assume all the responsibilities, something that did not occur during the judicial trial.

Participant 4 argues that the orders were usually verbal and ambiguous, but in some cases the orders were given to him directly from the chief of the DICOMCAR and the orders were also written using memorandum. In fact, after the homicides of the Communist Party's members, the high command gave the order to destroy the written documentation to hide information from the judicial trial and avoid responsibilities for the crimes.

Like the testimonies of CNI agent, the structure of the obedience in the institutional context does not work by itself. It is necessary to observe the presence of the other variables that motivated an individual to torture.

## **PROFESSIONALIZATION**

In the context of the carabineros, torture is a professional tool used to obtain confessions from the delinquents. In the case of the guerrilla group the torture was also related with obtaining information, identifying other members of the guerrillas and preventing a terrorist attack.

## **ISOLATION**

Even though the carabineers' institution is closer to the civil society than the military, DICOMCAR's members spent long periods of time with the workmates. The operations obligated them to spend many hours in cars watching the guerrillas' activities, and the job did not follow a regular schedule. These circumstances made them develop close relationships. In fact, they went out together and shared family activities. They believed that the characteristics of their job made them stay together and distant from the general society.

## **CRITERIA FOR ENROLLMENT**

Participant 3, 4 and 6 agree with the following features:

1. People who had previous experience in torturing
2. Anti-Marxist political ideology
3. Motivation in participating in risky activities
4. Capacity to keep in mind information
5. High level of commitment with the police institution

Indeed, participants 3, 4 and 6 were selected to enroll the DICOMCAR due to their studies in intelligence matters.

Participant 3 and 4 perceived that country was adopting a Marxist ideology, and to prevent the Marxist ideology it was necessary to destroy every thing that could be related to it. Both of them had participated in police activities that required them to participate in risky behaviors.

## **ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS**

The **organizational structure** of the intelligence agencies had very common characteristics. One of them was that they were organized following a head or leader, who had highest rank and more seniority than the subordinates. The structure defined who was responsible for giving orders and who had to follow them. The organizational structure defined a unique head, which was in command of a group of individuals and this pattern was common at different levels. This type of organization corresponded to a military system.

CNI and DICOMCAR had diverse agencies at the regional level, and these agencies were commanded and supervised at the central level. This organizational system allowed the central level to have control on the ground. The most powerful of this structure was how the communicational system worked, because in the organizational structure the information went up and down, and vice versa. The authorities gave orders to the subordinates, but at the same time they were commanded to inform their activities to the command. The information that the intelligence agencies gathered not only focused on the political adversaries of the military regime, but also it gathered information about the people who worked in their own agencies. This system kept the control of the agencies' members as well as the political opposition.

The **communicational system** allowed the information to be disseminated very fast and easily. An aspect in common between CNI and DICOMCAR was that the information handled by agents was partial. That is to say, the agencies compartmentalized the information to reduce the possibilities that an operation or mission could be jeopardized by the enemy. If people handled partial information, there was less risk than the information could be in the hands of the enemy. This system also permitted the

perpetration of crimes for a group of individuals while the rest of the agents did not know about it.

The daily reading used by the army was also utilized by the DINE. This system allowed each member to know the planning activities and there would be a report of the results of these activities. Even though the other intelligence agencies did not identify “the daily reading” as an activity implemented for them, they used a system very similar in order to inform the authorities about the activities developed for each agent in relation to the mission given.

In the communication system, the leader of each group and the intelligence agency were the most informed people, and they knew what type of activities was developed by the subordinates.

The intelligence agencies had to pursue the **political interest** of the military regime. The agencies persecuted and assassinated the political adversaries of the regime. The interviewees believe that they were manipulated for the political authorities to ensure the members of the Junta on the power.

Participants argue that they never ever thought that they could be judicially processed and condemned for crimes perpetrated by them. They always felt free of any judgment or sanction. To the contrary, they received rewards from the authorities.

The **legal impunity** was something already lived in the daily life of the criminals, due to the fact that the people who were called to condemn this type of crimes justified them. Moreover, the agents were removed from their positions and in some cases taken out country in order to avoid the judicial trial. Indeed, none of the interviewees were sentenced for torturing their victims.

The intelligence agencies were **linked to each other** with the intention of gathering information about the adversaries of the military regime. These linkages were absolutely functional; they did not have any loyalty between them. In contrast, the intelligence agencies gathered information about the criminal acts committed for other agencies to incriminate them in the judicial trial.

All the intelligence agencies had a detention-place, which were designed to arrest people (with or without a judicial order). The places had the **infrastructure and facilities** to torture people. The equipments required to conduct an operation (weapons, car, customers, and technological apparatus to track people) were financed by the police or army institutions.

Each interviewee received direct **benefits** for working in an intelligence agency. The benefits were economic as well as psychological. They refer to feels of gratification during their job in the agencies.

The **ideology** by itself did not motivate them to assassinate, instead it was the idea about whom they were killing. Even though it was discussed in the literature review that the military ideology is one of the factors that influence a soldier to torture and kill someone, here is evident that this factor is not determinant in this type of crime. In fact, carabineers received different training than the army soldiers; to them, antisocial behavior put an individual in the category of enemy. The subjects had the conviction that the person tortured represented a threat and deserved to be killed or tortured.

The military **ideology** or the police ideology about the concept of enemy (in general) is a facilitator that helps one to exterminate or torture the enemy, but the determining factor is the perception of the enemy. If the enemy represents the tremendous danger, s/he would be striped out from his/her humanity. It can be one of the explicative factors

that tell us why other people who did not have military training are able to perpetrate torture.

The **training** gave them information about what type of enemy they would fight and the methods that they should be use to defeat them. The conviction about the danger of the Marxist as enemy was given by the training and reinforced by the group.

The training for carabineers and army soldiers made them **follow orders** naturally.

Following an order is part of the daily routine since they were enrolled in the academy. Therefore, when a superior gave an order their duty was to obey it. Nevertheless, three of the interviewees did not follow the orders in response to authority or because they feared punishment. Instead, they followed the order because they had the strong conviction that the orders were correct. Those orders were responses to the conditions that they believed they were fighting against the enemy.

The structure of the obedience into the institutional context does not work by itself. Other variables are necessary to motivate the individual to perpetrate torture.

Torture is regarded as a tool that they needed to obtain information as quickly as possible. Therefore, torture was the method used to achieve this goal, but they also wanted to destroy the enemy physically and mentally, and the way to do it was also using torture. The degree of the organization and the divisions of tasks show that this type of activity was not new for the agencies. Furthermore, the way that the agents covered crimes showed a high degree of organization and these crimes were perpetrated in a frame of professional **work**.

The agents that worked in CNI and DICOMCAR admit that their job in these agencies made them spending a long time away from their homes and they stayed with other

agents most of the days. This meant that they were **isolated** from the civil world and established a close relationship between the agents of the same unit.

The institutional **criteria for enrolling** an agent were not very precise. However, most of the interviewees agree that one of the criteria was that the subject shared anti-Marxist ideology, assumed a risky behavior and were able to commit an illegal activity.

The institutional variables appear as factors that supported and favored the scenario to motive an individual to perpetrate torture. Nevertheless, it is also observed that the subjects were motivated to commit certain type of crimes independently of the institutional sponsor. These variables are examined in the next chapters.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **GROUP CHARACTERISTICS**

In this chapter, the perceptions of the interviewees about the group influences in the criminal behavior (torture) are examined. At this point it is important to establish whether or not the groups and the group dynamics favored or deterred the perpetration of torture, and the individuals' perceptions of these influences. The question of whether the individuals actually were forced by the group to perpetrate this type of crime is also considered.

#### **Perception of Enemy**

To participant 1, the world was divided into two groups, the good ones and the bad ones. He was unable to perceive other groups of people. Those who were against the military government were the bad guys and he had to eliminate them; if he did not, the enemy would kill him. He does not feel any remorse. Like other members of his group, he strongly believes in the destructive nature of the guerrillas and the Marxist groups. Moreover, he argues that he knows the characteristics of the enemy very well. He prepared himself over a long period of time (about ten years), studying the nature and *modus operandi* of the guerrilla in order to be able to persecute its members.

He also believed that the enemy wanted to corrupt the society and its values. The danger threatened the entire nation and the enemy became more dangerous since they were supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Today, he is able to understand that this perception was manipulated by the authorities. Even though he argues that the rebellion must be fought with violence and not with ideology, he stated that the use of excessive

violence was unnecessary. He did not torture to brainwash anyone because he believes that “if one subject was born mirista<sup>6</sup>, s/he will die mirista”.

On the other hand, the perception of the enemy of the state did not provoke many changes in the way that the carabineers tried the prisoners. Indeed, according to the Participants 6 and 4, Participant 6 was appointed to the DICOMCAR due to the agents not understanding very well the behavioral pattern of a guerrilla member. They learned from him how to fight back against the guerrilla. In addition, the attacks of the guerrilla against policemen generated in the agents the concept of the enemy as a real threat. Participant 6 says that he was convinced that “the enemy would do the same that he could do to him.”

Participant 6 argues that “the enemy is a subject, who uses violence to achieve his objectives, so I can achieve my objectives by using violence too.” To him, “it is impossible to perceive the enemy as a person because if I did think that way I could not attack him or her.” The enemy became intangible and a large numbers of myths and fantasies went around about him or her. Gradually, the enemy turned into a fabrication, and through this perception the person became an object. In fact, participant 6 refers to the enemy in terms of “the element.” This is a clear example of how the agents turned people into an object. The concept of element is also used by him to refer to other people such as other prisoners, teams of professionals or friends.

The police wanted to reduce the actions of the enemy; no matter the cost or implications for their futures or that of the institution. In the Participants 1, 3, 4, and 6, the perception of the enemy appears as the main trigger to torture them (coupled with their own motivations).

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<sup>6</sup> Mirista: member of the armed group opposites to the military government.

According to Participants 3 and 4, the enemy is not a political prisoner; instead he or she is a terrorist. They perceived that they were living in a war and the enemies were people from the left wing. They were and are perceived as terrorists; because they fought back with arms and military maneuvers. Participant 4 also argues that the enemy did not maintain a strong family relationship, so they could move from one home to another easily. This enemy was hidden in the civilian population and this made them difficult to find.

In the opinion of Participant 3, the terrorists received training from Lebanon, Cuba and East Germany. Therefore, they were experts in the use of arms and in war strategies. This participant says “I was trained to go a war, and if they send me a war I go to win.” Then, “if society does not like the methods used in war, then society should not send me to war...If I do not kill the enemy, he will kill me.”

In contrast with the other interviewees, Participant 5 says that he does not harbor any hate toward the political enemies or prisoners; instead, he perceived his role as a part of his job. When he looks back, he thinks that he committed atrocities, but he does not take responsibilities of his act; instead, he places the responsibility on the higher commanders. He alleges that he was obligated to perpetrate crimes and he did not see other alternatives at this time. These antecedents should be reviewed based on the personal characteristics of this participant, who presents very contradictory arguments.

### **Beliefs/values**

*What did you feel when you killed a man at the first time?*

The first time that Participant 1 killed people; he was assigned to the north of the country in an army barrack. He participated in the mass killing of civilians by shooting. He says: “I did not feel any thing when I killed them, because they were the enemy and a danger for the society. If I did not kill the enemy, the enemy could kill us.” He did not

question the way he killed the people he was assassinating and he did not manifest symptoms of posttraumatic stress.

In the School of Americas, he says he learned about the concept of the enemy of the state and the role of the Communist Party in the destruction of the society. This training gave him information about the dictatorship of the working class and the use of the arms to achieve power. Moreover, he learned how to fight against the enemy, using torture techniques. Later, he was in charge of teaching this to other soldiers. He explains his attitude in regard to the type of military indoctrination that he received which proclaimed as its main objective the protection of the country from people who threatened the national security.

The perception of the enemy became a belief, which was then expressed in their behavior. Participant 1 says that the army selected the best indoctrinated, those who did not question orders, who followed discipline, and those who believed in what the army said about the enemy. Participant 1 developed the conviction that he and his team were doing the right thing. The army's beliefs, the team's beliefs and his own became one. Under this umbrella, criminal behavior was absolutely acceptable for the group and for him.

The acceptance of the induced behavior is also observed in the carabineers, especially Participants 3 and 4. Both of them were absolutely convinced about the enemy's threat. They believed in the danger of Marxism and their beliefs merged with the notion of the enemy learned from their training and from Participant 6.

### Moral conviction

Participant 1 never thought that he would be charged and condemned for his crimes. He believed, however, in the notion of hero and the true love of country. Therefore, he was convinced that his acts were correct.

The police group had the strong conviction that they have the opportunity to retaliate any attacks against the police, and they can not fail the institution. They perceived it as a national duty. Indeed, participant 4 says “I would do it again, but I would take the precaution of not getting caught.”

Participant 6 compares the group dynamic between the military intelligence agency and DICOMCAR and he believes that the people who worked in the military agency were more mystical. They were strongly committed to the institutional mission and they were prepared to sacrifice their personal lives for the mission. The level of commitment crossed from the highest authorities to the lowest level. This aspect was not observed by him in the DICOMCAR, where only some individuals showed commitment at this level.

The police group maintained only one “absolute” truth. The enemy represented danger and they wanted to reduce the actions of the enemy; the cost that this might signify in the future for them or for the institution was not of concern. The perception of the enemy coupled with the identification with the institutional values and their direct group made very easy for them to identify the “in group members” and “out group members.” The out-groups were the enemy, but also included the civil society. The difference was that the society required their protection from the enemy. The military and policemen perceive the civil society in terms that the individuals do not confront the violence in the way that they do, because it is the intelligence agency’s job to confront violence. Since the civil society do not have weapon training and do not know the nature of the enemy, the society can not understand the methods used by intelligence agents to repress the enemy. The moral values sublimated their role. Four interviewees believed that they have a protagonist role in the protection of the society and their own institution. One of them says “I believed that I was playing an important role in social change.”

### Group support of beliefs for deviance and legitimization of the crimes

Participant 1 led a group of people in the CNI, and they agreed with the methods used to fight the guerrillas. The torture sessions were framed as part of the objective of obtaining information. Even though “excesses” were perpetrated by him and his team, no one was punished for these excesses. They needed to obtain information the fastest way possible, and torture was the method used to achieve this goal. But they also wanted to destroy the enemy physically and mentally and the way to do this as well was using torture. In the case of the carabineers, the institution provided the conditions to practice torture, but also allowed them to use of these methods. Since the main objective of torture was to obtain information, it was an absolutely legitimate act. The objective was not to kill people; instead they wanted to obtain information as quickly as possible.

Another objective was to produce fear in order to deter attacks by other guerrilla members, who went into clandestine lives, and for Participant 3 it was also a way to retaliate to the enemy using their own methods.

Participant 6 believes that the torture had the objective of obtaining information, but also breaking down the enemy and his/her family and his/her entire existence. Another feature of the legalization of a crime refers to the explanation that Participant 6 gives. He explains that the seriousness of the crimes is established during a certain period of time. If a crime was regularly perpetrated, such as the torture or illegal arrests, this crime produced equilibrium (homeostasis), in which each member accepted the perpetration of this crime. Nevertheless, when a more serious crime was committed, like homicide, this crime broke the equilibrium to establish a new one and then the homicide was accepted as normal act. Participant 6 makes differences between the police and military intelligence agencies,

believing that for the police to kill someone were beyond its duties, but for the military this was allowed.

#### Acceptance of induced behavior

Participant 1 was 14 years old when he enrolled the army and he incorporated the values of the army as his own. These values are led by the true love of his country, which encouraged him to protect his country from the enemy. He believed in the notion of the hero and perceived himself as a savior.

In the army, he learned to trust in the authorities, especially the leader (General). “I believed what the head of the army said.” He was unable to question Augusto Pinochet’s arguments and “if he said that the guerrilla could depose the military government, I just believed it.” And he was absolutely convinced that the military regime was the only option to govern the country and prevent the nation from the Communism.

He grew up in the army and his military formation gave him tools to defend the country from an enemy. The easy acceptance came from the army training; in the first stage, they taught him about the features of an enemy and the danger for the society and for his country. In the second stage, the specific training taught about the Marxists as enemies of the state. The mechanisms to defeat the enemy were outside the law, but he accepted the use of these mechanisms due to the nature of the enemy and the authorities shared these perceptions and encouraged belief in these concepts.

In the case of the carabineers or civil policemen, the institution gave them the concept of the criminal as an antisocial individual, who threatened society’s security. Mistreating a delinquent was a common practice in most police stations. Indeed, the Reports from the National Commissions established that the carabineers were the authorities who arrested the detainees and then started the ill-treatment to the victims. This

job practice was assumed by the police group and it was not perceived in terms of torture. The clear example was the beating of the prostitutes as a regular police practice. This example was reported by participant 4.

#### Group perception of threats and no choice

During the coup, Participant 1 and the soldiers were recruited into the army quarters and isolated from the society. Therefore, when Pinochet talked about “Plan Z,” which maintained that Cubans and leftist members would destroy the country by armed attack, all of the soldiers believed it. He said, at this time, any military members who had any idea contrary to the beliefs of Plan Z and the army were separated from the institution. Therefore, the military system did not allow one to oppose its ideology, which was Anti-Marxist. In his case, he agreed completely with army ideology. Participant 1 never felt threatened by the military institution. Therefore, he is unable to excuse himself in these terms. He felt free to leave the CNI to any time, and his subordinates had the same freedom. He worked in the CNI and did his job because he really thought that it was the way to combat the guerrilla army.

His participation in the intelligence unit (CNI) was absolutely voluntary. He argues that he never felt that his life or his family’s lives were threatened. He does not believe that a military member could be forced to enroll an intelligence unit. One of the persecuting lawyers agrees with this point. He explains that during his work as a human rights defense lawyer, he did not recall any case of a soldier being assassinated by the army due to a disagreement with military ideology. However, the army dissidents were removed from the army: being forced to retire or simply dismissed from the institution.

In the eyes of the policemen, the institution gave them the mission of stopping the attacks against the lives of the policemen and the participants engaged voluntarily in this

task. Belonging to an intelligence agency gave them prestige and they wanted to work in a team that protected its own institution. None of the interviewees said that was forced to work for this agency. In the case of Participant 6, who was a civilian, the rewards given for the institution were superior to the external threats. He betrayed his political party, and worked for the intelligence agencies, which persecuted the party's members. To him, the agencies protected him from the people that he betrayed, because, according to him, the political party authorities gave order to kill him (the traitor).

In the cases of both army soldier and carabineers, there was an acceptance of the use of torture as a way to fight against the enemy, even in the case of participant 5, who perceived this task as a part of his job. The authorities and the groups accepted and encouraged this conduct. The acceptance of the criminal behavior was a result of their individual beliefs, which are mostly based on the perception of the enemy.

Participant 6 explained that an agent avoided being associated with crimes and the way to do it, was to avoid being informed. That is to say, if an agent belonged to specific unit.<sup>7</sup> And another unit assassinated or tortured an enemy, he or any others not wanting to be linked tried to avoid being present when the events occurred. However, when his team conducted an operation it was impossible not be involved in, the perpetration of a crime occurred. Participant 6 says that this fact was contradictory, because on one hand the agent wanted everyone close to him in order to connect the others with the crimes, while on the other hand the other agents tried to avoid witnessing a crime in order to reduce their level of association. In other words, "if you committed a crime you need people around you in order to involve them with the crime. If you are not the direct perpetrator of the crime, you

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<sup>7</sup> Each unit has five or four members.

avoid being present at the scene of the crime in order that you not be involved with the crime.”

In this explanation, certain level of perversion of the group is observed, because it revealed that the individual, who perpetrated a crime, avoided being punished for this. And the way to prevent the punishment was indirectly involving the participation of other members in a crime, making them accomplice and forced them to keep the secret. This feature explains why in the judicial trial it was perfectly possible to establish the author of the crimes, especially homicides, and explains the distant attitude that the other agents, from the same intelligence agency, have with the prisoners, who were not sanctioned by the court (they do not visit them). Under this umbrella, the group closeness appears to be an instrumental type of relationship.

Contrary to the rest of the participants, Participant 6 felt the group’s influence in the sense that the group did not allow him to say no. He was unable to see other alternatives. When an order was given him it was not possible to debate it. This can be explained by his civilian status and his double standard that will be reviewed in the next chapter. However, Participant 5 also argues that if he refused to commit a crime his life and his family would be threatened. Therefore, he just followed orders and he made the authority responsible, but he also received benefits for participating in this type of crimes. However, Participant 3 argues that a policeman was not obligated to be a member of the DICOMCAR nor was their families threatened. “If someone did not manifest his agreement with the work team he was removed and reassigned to another unit...because this guy was not useful.”

In the judicial file, it was established that the homicides of the communist members were planned by the chief of the unit and the director of the DICOMCAR, and apparently

the people who perpetrated the homicides did not know the plan until the moment when the order was given by the chief of the unit.

Participant 6, who was very close to the chief of the unit, explains that the chief selected the group which would commit murders. Two of the policemen had committed a robbery during a break-in at a home, and it was a way to sanction them, and connect them with the crimes and with the group (participant 5 was one of them). The two others were loyal to him, but the last one had been recently assigned to the unit and it was necessary to compel him to unite with the team. The way to do this was to involve him in the perpetration of a crime. The commitment produces complicity with the chief of the unit and with the group.

The perception of choice or no choice depends on each participant: for some of them their participation was voluntary and they were absolutely committed to the job, others perceived the group pressures. The latter had lower rank than the rest of the interviewees (civilian and sub-official).

### **Identification with the institutional culture**

The identification with the institutional culture has two different levels: the institution and the intelligence agency.

1. In the identification with the institution such as the Army and Carabineros of Chile, the individuals developed a feeling of belonging and were in agreement with the institutional principles and values.

All of the interviewees, army soldiers and carabineros, were obligated to their institutions and they felt that they were part of a mission that they should accomplish. Even though three of them were disappointed with the institutional role during the

judicial trial, and perceived the manipulation of the authority, at that time they really shared the cultural values of the institution.

Participant 3 feels very tied to the institution saying “my heart is green” (the uniform of the police/carabineers is green). Despite the fact that the high command ordered his retirement and hid information about the procedures carried out by him, and the fact that the authorities did not take responsibility for giving the orders, he still feels close to the institutional values. This attitude is present in four interviewees, even though the institution, which was represented the authorities (Generals), did not take responsibility for giving the orders. The interviewees interpret the authorities’ attitude as a signal of cowardice, but the interviewees do not believe that this attitude represent the institution.

2. The other level is related to the identification with the intelligence agency’s culture. At this level the perpetration of torture was legitimate and the agency, through the institutions, provided the conditions necessary to perpetrate this type of crime. The individuals accepted the use of torture as a tool to fight the enemy, and they developed a group dynamic which encouraged this conduct and involved them in the crime. Nevertheless, they did not express emotional attachment to the intelligence agency.

#### Group cohesion and loyalty

Participant 1 thinks that a leader has to be fraternal and he has to go parties with other members and drink. The leader had to understand the needs of the subalterns and gave them the facilities that they needed such as authorization to be absent from the job.

The group cohesion was obtained by the daily activities together. In the CNI, like the other intelligence agencies, the agents spent long periods of time with the group members, the missions forced them to stay away from their homes or even out of the city.

Participant 3 says that they spent many hours into a car. This aspect motivated a shared informal relationship by the group.

Participant 3 explains that in the Police Academy training created groups of twenty students. Each group studied the same courses and lived in the same dorms. This closeness between students produced a strong cohesion among them. Indeed, if one of them committed an error, the entire group received the punishment. The individual features were accepted but the group characteristics took precedence over the individual. The bonds between the members of the group generated complicity between them.

Later, the same group dynamic was reproduced in the police station, but now with a connotation of masculinity. They shared places, nicknames, and friendship, which crossed into their personal lives. They became godfathers and close friends. About forty members belong to the DICOMCAR and they shared in the same dynamic. In the carabiniers, the group loyalty deterred a member from failing the group. They felt that their duty was to support the people in command.

Nevertheless, the cohesion and loyalty was functional. That is, when the participants were condemned to prison, visits from other agents were few. Today, none of them visit those in jail, only the family and the designed army officials make such visits.. The prison functionaries explained that for all the prisoners who had worked in an intelligence agency, they received visits from colleagues in the beginning, but today, the relatives are the only people who visit them. Sometimes a friend visits, but it is very uncommon. Participant 3 says “I feel like a prostitute, everyone is involved with her, but nobody admits it.”

### Isolation

Effectively, Participant 1 perceives himself as isolated from the general civilian world. Indeed, the close friends belonged to the CNI or the army. Even though the army did

not prohibit him from having relationships with civilians, Participant 1 felt close to the military people. The same happened to the policemen. The institutional training and the type of job demanded by the intelligence agency made them spend long hours at the job. Nobody wanted to be involved in criminal behavior, but at the same time the offender-agent wanted to involve the other agents in crime in order to increase the ties between the perpetrator-individuals. Moreover, their perception was that the civilians were unable to understand the nature of the enemy, and that consequently they could not understand the importance of torture as a mechanism to defeat the enemy and protect the society from this threat.

Secret-commitment:

Participant 1 understands the need for secrecy in espionage. However, he is not able to explain why the army keeps secrets. He thinks that it could be that people are cowardly and they are scared to lose their status and credibility with their family and society in general.

During the judicial trials, the Director of the DINE called all the officials and sub-officials who had participated indirectly or directly of the homicide of civilians, and asked them for a pact of silence. This meeting was mentioned in the judicial file and some soldiers confirmed the reason for this meeting. As Participant 1 says, the army members were absolutely able to perceive that the acts that they led were illegal and knew that these acts could imply a judicial punishment. However, they believed in their abilities to hide the information and people who were responsible or the crimes. Now the question is: why did these participants do the things they did? According to Participant 1 and the rest of the four interviewees, the following reasons were common among them.

- The first one was that they had the power to conduct actions outside the law and their experience had demonstrated that under the military regime they were not punished, but on the contrary they were positively rewarded. Indeed, the judicial sentences which punished them occurred during the return of the democratic government in 1990. At that time, the army was no any longer in power and the executive branch appointed judges in order to clarify the human rights violations during the military regime. Therefore, they perpetrated crimes under absolutely impunity.
- The second reason was that the military perceived that the civilians were unable to understand the nature of the enemy, and the agents should use nontraditional forms to combat their enemies – nontraditional means illegal. Under this concept, the agents put the members of the guerrilla group who effectively fought against the military regime using violence and the political leaders in the same “category.” For instance, recently a judicial trial is being conducted to investigate the suspected homicide of the ex-President of the Republic, Eduardo Frei Montalva and during the first days of July 2008 some DINA agents were condemned to prison for the homicide of General Prats who was minister during Allende’s government.
- The third reason was that they used power to eliminate the political adversaries, although these illegal methods are not approved for the general society. Therefore, they hid the information or any evidence of the illegal methods used by them. Secrecy also plays an instrumental role in the group; Participant 6 says if a subject committed more crimes, his o her units received still more pressure from the high command in order to involve the subject in other crimes and to keep the institutional secrets and loyalties. This fact could explain how the same individuals from different agencies are

involved in numerous judicial trials. One of the members of the Investigative Police, who led the police investigations of the cases of human rights violations, explains that the group of perpetrators is the same in most of the judicial trials.

Participant 5 highlights the fact that everyone in the institution knew what they were doing or did, but they pretended to be ignorant of it. Moreover, Participant 3 declares that the entire police knew the activities developed by the DICOMCAR and even the members of the Junta knew the intelligence agency's activities. Indeed, the police officers from any headquarter called intelligence agents when they arrested a suspect for crime related to political matters in order to collaborate with them in the interrogation of the detainee. This was a regular procedure; hence the members of the Carabineers could not say that they did not know what kind of activities the DICOMCAR accomplished. The detention location, the procedures and the forms of conducting an interrogation were part of the group secrecy and this type of group dynamic came from the Police Academy's training.

Although during the investigation and the judicial trial the carabineers' authorities denied knowing the activities that they carried out. They adopted the same attitude of the military authorities.

Participant 2 denies all the crimes and he argues that he was unaware of the crimes perpetrated by the DINE when he was a chief of a department. Even though it is evident that he lied, his behavior can be explained by his "inability" to speak of any secret. Despite the fact that he is in prison, he says "I keep strongly the loyalty with the army." To him, the loyalty means to keep the secrets.

Another more complex function of secrecy was observed in this research. That is to say, sharing a group secret generates complicity between group members, and this complicity fosters closeness within the group. If one member is left out the group secrecy,

he is indirectly excluded from the group. Thus, secrecy has the function of increasing the cohesion between its members, but it also has a double standard, which is to involve them with the crime.

The commitment is perceived negatively by the group members, because it forces them to be involved in the perpetration of a crime as an accomplice. At the same time, to be an accomplice forces the individual to share and maintain secrecy in order to avoid being accused of the crimes of others or to reveal his own crimes. This is the perverse function of secrecy.

### **Group structure**

The group structure was influenced by institutions such as the army or police, and then each group had a leader, who had a higher rank or more seniority than the subordinates. This criterion reduced conflicts between the groups, because they respected this institutional norm.

Participant 4 led several police groups and each team consisted of three or four men. He maintained regular meetings with the full group, but each group handled specific information with the purpose of maintaining compartmentalized information and in this manner did not risk the internal security of the institution.

He defines himself as an obedient and disciplined policeman. That means that he followed the rules of the institution very closely. This type of attitude was passed to him and then to his team. Control was a tool directing the subordinates, which was included not only in the professional career but also in the personal life. The institution had and has the power to investigate the family of the policemen as well as his social groups. The army possessed this same ability.

The chief's power was, however, limited. For example, he could not participate in the selection of the DICOMCAR members, although he could ask for the change of a few subordinates if they did not adhere to requirements of obedience and discipline. In his explanation, it does not appear that a policeman was forced to work in the DICOMCAR. To the contrary, if someone did not want to work in this agency, he could ask for another position in another institutional department.

The group structure permitted the leader to define certain standards like the above mentioned case of "discipline and obedience," but at the same time a subordinate was able to ask for another position in the institution if he did not agree with the leader's expectations. This characteristic was also manifested by the CNI's agent. The structure allows one to order others, and keeps control of the subordinate, but it was also relevant that the subordinate had to be convinced to be a committed member of this group.

#### Dominance and control and masculinity as a form of power

To Participant 1 and his team, a *macho man* is one who drinks more, has more women, does not show weakness during a torture session, and is aggressive. His job allowed him to lead a group of men and handle a lot of power, making decisions and creating different methods for investigating and interrogating the prisoners. Therefore, he was able to decide who could live or who had to be killed.

During torture Participant 3 says that he had to show the victims that he a lot of experience, therefore he had to be strong and his objective was to break the victim. Like Participant 1, he was in charge of a group of people, and he must not show weakness. The attitude of being in control gave them the opportunity to show their strengths to the group and to the intended victims. As well as the CNI's agents, the policemen went out and got drunk as a way to handle a violent success.

Participant 1 says that he had to be strong and did not show weaknesses under difficult situations. His subordinates had expectations of him, and if he showed any sign of doubt the group would question his authority; either way he would not trust in a subordinate who might have doubts about the tasks that he should accomplish. Even if they were not sure about perpetrating a crime, they could not show doubt. In other words, they also simulated having courage even when they might not actually feel it.

The group structure was designed as a pyramidal organization with a leader on the top. The leader perceived the group's pressures, which pushed him to show self-control on the violent episodes and during the torture sessions. Thus, the leader showed his dominance and demonstrated no manifestation of weaknesses, enduring the violent conduct and, by example, the subordinates were encouraged to emulate this attitude. Hence, the group structure favored the dynamic of torture, in which a torturer could not show doubts.

#### Status and prestige

Participant 6 says that crimes were defined so as to fit into a *legal framework*. A person who enjoyed high prestige and credibility among the groups was the appointed individual to present the legal framework. This prestige was achieved when an individual was expert in obtaining information and persecuting the enemy.

Participant 3 clarifies that the acts of violence were approved by the direct chief and the peer group. In the context of the group he had a position of authority (boss). Therefore, the teamwork would not allow him to show weakness or a doubtful attitude. He gave the orders, the subordinates could offer him some suggestions, but he made the final order or decision.

According to Participant 1 a leader must be trustworthy, and the subordinates had to do what the leader said. He had to be assertive in making decisions. He could not commit

errors. He learned about the Marxist ideology in order to know the beliefs of the enemy very well. This knowledge allowed him to obtain more information from his enemy by using torture and gave him social recognition from his subordinates. He says “when you have the power to arrest and kill people, you believe that you are superior to other people, you are more intelligent, and this excessive confidence in yourself motivates you to sometimes do stupid acts, and you think that others are so stupid that they are unable to see what you are doing.” The attitude of superiority was encouraged by the authority, the job group and friends, and this criminal conduct became a way to obtain recognition from the group and the authorities.

**Remorse and Regret:**

*How do you handle the violent episodes?*

The way to handle the violence was by getting drunk and going out with colleagues (other agents) in order to ignore what had occurred. The participant does not question why he did it, he just accepted the facts. This conduct was usual after an episode of violence.

He feels possible shame for the crimes that he committed, but only if his sons find out about them. At this moment, he believes that he is responsible for what he did it. He does not feel guilty for what he did, but sometimes he questions having tortured the relatives of the enemy, but it not a matter of suffering to him. The others participants do not express any remorse, but took the same way of acting that the CNI’s agent did after violent episodes: they went out and got drunk. None of the *carabineers* interviewed expressed remorse with regard to their criminal acts. Instead, most of them regretted being in jail and being distant from their families.

## Fear

Participants 1, 3, and 4 were not afraid of his team. The fear came from the enemy. However, Participant 6 says that in the group everyone is under suspicion and this fact made him feel unsafe. Nevertheless, in order to understand Participant 6's fear the individual characteristics and his role in the intelligence agencies had to be reviewed.

## Undermining External Control: Denial of responsibility

Denial is an attitude shown by all the interviewees although the level of denial is varies among them. Some, like Participants 1,3,4,5, and 6, recognized the perpetration of the crimes that condemned them to prison, and denied others crimes such as sexual assaults or robbery.

Participant 2 does not assume responsibility for any crime and he justifies his conviction and prison sentencing as a result of being a boss or group leader. According to him, the DINE never carried out illicit activities and he does not know of any illicit activity conducted by the CNI. He believes that these are simply stories told to discredit the institutions. However, in the judicial trial it appeared that he perpetrated torture and gave direct orders to kill civilians. In this case the denial responds to his necessity to project an image of an honorable person and he does not want to be judged by his family. Prison guards mention that the other soldiers who worked under the command of participant 2, remember him as a very despotic and cruel person.

The participation of Participant 1 in numerous crimes was direct and he knew very well that he was the directly responsible person. Other crimes were more diffuse like the armed confrontation between the guerrillas and intelligence agents. To him, the moral disengagement applies only relatively, because he is able to identify the crimes and assumes responsibility. Even so, he does not assume responsibility for crimes involving

sexual assaults or robbery. Similarly, he justifies his behavior by the fact that he followed an order, diffusing his responsibilities but also indicating that the victims represented a danger for the society.

The sexual assaults are crimes that they are unable to explain from the standpoint of a professed role of savior or protector of the society. The perpetrators perceived that they could act under absolutely impunity and they handled a level of power during the torture session, which allowed them to have free will. Clearly, a sexual assault reveals individual features, which motivated the individuals to perpetrate this type of crime.

Robbery was convenient. The absence of punishment and the access to the victims' properties gave them the ability to take any thing they desired. The victims were perceived as an enemy, with no rights. Like the sexual assaults, robbery is unjustified in their role of savior, and for this reason, the crimes of robbery and sexual assault are denied in order to avoid social sanctions, especially from their families.

## **ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: GROUP CHARACTERISTICS**

In both groups, the police and the army, the training made the individuals identify with the institution; and the type of job in the intelligence agencies made them spend long periods of time with the group. The agents worked together very closely and the representation of the enemy as an alien element encouraged the cohesion between the members of the group. The concept of the out-group was in terms of “them and us.” Not only was this separation held regarding the enemy, but also this differentiation applied to the rest of the society. Participant 3 refers to me (the interviewer) and the rest of the society who did not perpetrate crimes in terms of the “good ones.” However these “good people” condemn his crimes. “Society creates war and then the society condemns the soldiers who fought for them.”

The perception of the enemy as a group had certain characteristics that associated the enemy with extreme danger. The violent guerrilla attacks against military figures and policemen converted the threat into a real fact. Hence, the need for the destruction of the enemy was a belief shared by the institution, the group and the individual. In other words, it became in a social construction.

Once the individual conception regarding the enemy was acquired, torture then appeared as a legitimate act to deter and exterminate the threat. The group and the individual accepted the criminal acts as a way to eliminate the danger.

In the torture room, the agents could express violent conduct openly, without any control or sanction. The group supported this type of conduct and did not sanction the “excess.” This dynamic allowed the group to develop a level of complicity, which committed the perpetrators and the entire group and obligated the individual to keep secrecy. The secrecy itself also functioned as a way to increase the group cohesion.

Since one of the objectives of the use of torture was to destroy the enemy (mentally and physically), the uses of sexual abuse or sexual torture were totally allowable by the group. However, this type of crime was continues to remain secret and is denied. This conduct is recurrent in all the interviewees, not because they perpetrated those crimes, but again because it is an aspect or condition of group loyalty.

In this analysis, it is possible to observe two levels in the decisions taken. One came from the authorities, who used the closeness of their subordinates, their concept of hero, and the protector of the nation in order to manipulate them and keep power. The second level was that of the operative. The individuals who perpetrated the crimes really believed in their role of protector of the society, and they also received their rewards for their actions. Today, three of the interviewees are able to perceive that they were manipulated by authority.

In the mind of each participant, the torture followed an objective and its end was absolutely legitimate. It was not only the group that legitimized these acts, but also the authorities and the institution. Therefore, the group supported the beliefs for criminal conduct into the torture's objectives.

Like the findings reported by the study of the Brazilian police (Huggins, et. al. 2002), the job-socialization in the Carabineers accepted torture as a formula for obtaining the confession of regular criminals. Even though the police training did not teach them torture methods, in the police settings torture was routinely practiced and the institution favored this type of conduct as a method for interrogating detainees.

In this study, the group does not appear to be a factor that threatened its members in order to force them to commit torture or assassinations. The individuals did not fear the other members of the group; but indeed they were frightened by the enemy. Despite the

fact that some interviewees expressed a fear of the group, when the individual variables are examined it does not appear that fear of the group was a main factor explaining their behavior. On the contrary, the benefits received were among the main factors that motivated their participation in this type of crime. All but one of the interviewees clearly stated that their enrollment in the intelligence agencies was voluntary. The only exception was Participant 6. His participation is explained by other factors, which will be reviewed in the next chapter.

The interviewees did not perceive that the group to be what encouraged their behavior. They tended to explain their behavior as being due to their beliefs. However, when they have to assume the responsibilities for their criminal acts, they tended to make the institutional authorities responsible rather than their peer group.

The following figure identifies the group variables which are observed in this study and presents how the group variables interact in order to endorse the use of torture. In this figure, it appears to be evident that the group dynamic favors and encourage this crime:




Figure N° 2

To perpetrate torture, certain group conditions were necessary. The general scenario was mainly given by the police and military institutions. The military training and the type of socialization offered by the police favored the isolation of the individual from the general society. The isolation encouraged group cohesion and the sharing of common beliefs.

In the figure, the enemy perception represents one of the main variables to explain the criminal behavior. This perception not only is reinforced and shared by the group but also represents the beliefs of the individuals. Indeed, most of the interviewees enrolled the intelligence agencies in order to fight against the enemy. The individual beliefs were shared with the group, and the members of the group confirmed their

mutual beliefs and perceptions of the enemy. In this process, the subjects lost the real notion about their adversaries. That is to say, the humanity of the adversary was stripped away; s/he and their families were perceived as evil. The subjects gave the adversaries connotations of genuine threat for them and for the entire society. In the next chapter, the individual motivations of the agents, like being a hero, will be reviewed to explain how this encouraged their violent conduct.

The group beliefs converged with the institutional and agency culture, which not only agreed with the perception of the enemy, but also gave the physical facilities to torture them. As with the institutional variable, the agency offered the financial support and facilities to perpetrate torture. Into the institutional frame as well as in the group, the methods used to reduce or exterminate the enemy were positively reinforced by the group and the institutional authorities. If we put the individual into an isolated context in which his partners and the institution encouraged and approved his violent behavior, we can explain his conduct; moreover, the individual motivations were satisfied by the institution.

The beliefs were shared with the group and this aspect allowed them to increase the group cohesion. The figure of an external enemy as a threat helped them to focus on the extermination of the enemy and to reduce the differences or conflicts between members of the group. This type of the dynamic gave them a level of cohesion that was instrumental. That is, today they are rejected by their own group; indeed they are not visited in jail. It can be because the members of the group, who are not condemned, do not want to be related with the crimes that are deeply rejected by the general society, but also the level of loyalty between them was built up in order to keep them safe of keeping their crimes into a secret. Once on trial, they broke the secret in order to avoid

the judicial charges. Here, it was possible to observe that the subjects handled the group secret as a measure that committed them to a crime and to prevent each member from judicial and social punishment.

In the figure, group cohesion is linked with the secret as a way to commit the subject to commit crimes. This relationship between these three variables (group cohesion, secrecy and commitment) necessarily offered the appropriate scenario to commit torture, because, a member of a group wanted to be a part of the group, and the way to achieve it was sharing a secret. It is relevant to distinguish at this point that the group referred at this level of analysis it is the unit-group, and each unit had approximately three to four members. Here two group levels are observed. The first one refers to the unit-group and the other is the agency as a group. The secret/commitment dynamic was placed into the unit-group. In addition, the secret also was put on the agency-group, but here the secret had other objectives. That is, the agency-group avoided knowing in details what the unit-group did in order to prevent them to be engaged with crimes. However, they were accomplices of crimes whatever it was the level of their participation in those, and this fact also made them to keep secrets. If we focus on the individual beliefs we can see that the subject not only shared the group beliefs, but also he accepted the group dynamic that favored the perpetration of torture and also he accept the torture as a tool to defeat the enemy. Moreover, he ascribed the beliefs about the use of torture as his own.

Another path of influence drawn in the figure is the group structure influenced by the institution. The organization of the command left a subject on the top of the group (unit-group and agency-group). This subject received direct orders from a leader of the agency, and he replicated these orders to the subalterns. This system allowed the head

of the unit or the agency to have control on the subordinates and made the group very efficient in order to accomplish the objectives or the mission. The structure of dominance and control by a unique head was also replicated in the dynamic of torture.

The torturer perceived that his mission was to obtain information and defeat the enemy, so he had the absolute power given by the leader to achieve this goal. The torturer was able to dominate the victim and have absolute control on his or her life. In this situation, torturing a victim was completely viable and the torturer personal motivations were openly expressed in this room.

Another element that has to be considered it is the fact that the torturer wanted to be approved and recognized positively by the group. Hence, he was unable to show a doubtful conduct respect to whether or not torturing the victim. Even though he was not sure about torturing, if he wanted the group acceptance he had to do it.

Here it is observed that individual motivations were conditions necessary to perpetrate torture. In the next chapter, those variables are reviewed.

## CHAPTER VII

### INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

In this chapter, the individual features that motivated the participants to perpetrate torture are described. Each variable is examined in each case and the analyses of the results are presented for each case with respect to the exogenous factors that could trigger their conduct. At the end of this chapter, the characteristics of the individuals are compared in order to detect similarities or differences between the personal motivations of the subjects in the perpetration of torture.

In this research, the motivation is understood to be the psychological features that arouse the subject to act to achieve a desired goal and the reason for the action, which could give purpose and direction to the studied criminal conduct (torture).

The individual variables that will be measured here are the locus of control, self-esteem, child abuse history, and age. The **Locus of Control** deals with the notion that a person views himself in conjunction with the things that occur to him and the meaning that he makes of those interactions between himself and his experiences (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 29). The locus of control has two dimensions: internal and external. The internals tend to be less influenced by the group to take decision. On the contrary, the externals are highly influenced by other subjects. Goodstadt and Hjelle (1973) found that the internals were more persuasive and less coercive in their relations with others. Instead, the externals used significantly more coercion. Externals might resort to coercive or manipulative strategies when placed in a situation to obtain a goal. Internals utilized coercion of others only after trying to achieve control by acceptable means (Solar and Bruehl (1971). Therefore, the type of locus could indicate the level of influence of the subjects by other people as well as could explain the presence of cruelty in the studied conduct, torture.

The **Self-esteem** “is an affectively laden self-evaluation. It is, at heart, how a person feels about himself...*trait self-esteem* refers to how a person generally or most typically feels about him-or herself” (Leary and MacDonald, 2003, p. 401). Phares (1976) argues a chronically insecure person with a history of less than successful attempts at attaining rewards from his or her environment would yield to external pressure or become conforming. Hence, if a poor self esteem is coupled with external locus of control could influence the expression of the torture.

**Child abuse history** is any forms of violence lived for a child or adult person during his/her childhood – Physical, psychological, verbal, sexual, negligence and/or parental abandonment. The traumatic experiences have profound effects on multiple aspects of self and identity (Westen and Heim, 2003). Numerous studies have observed that the child’s abuse history associated with adult aggression (Eron et al., 1987; Farrington, 1989; Toch, 1992).

The **Age** is another variable that could influence the conducted study. Several studies of juvenile delinquency suggest that young people are less influenced by some threats of bad consequences than adults (Tittle, 1980; Tittle and Paternoster, 2000). They could assume a more risky behavior, and since they do not have conformed the personality could easily influence by peer group.

In the following section, the individual variables are reviewed in each interviewee:

## PARTICIPANT 1

### Criminal Behavior:

Type of crime perpetrated	Type of judicial sentence
Homicide of a labor union leader by three shots and cutting his throat.	The judicial sentences are consecutive life sentences.
Homicide of a worker by faking his suicide in order to implicate him in the labor union leader's death	
Homicide of a truck driver by the use unnecessary of force (torture)	Seven years imprison.
Homicide of numerous people by open gun fire ( <i>fucilamiento</i> )	No sentence, amnesty law is applied.
Torture of detainees and political prisoners	Not prosecuted.

Table N°4

### Family History

Participant 1 was the youngest brother of three siblings. He was born in 1951. His father encouraged him to enroll in military school. His father was unable to graduate from the navy school, therefore his was proud to have a son in the military forces. His mother was a Social Worker. He was the only son. His sisters are married to military officers.

His mother was in charge of the economic maintenance of the family. His father was a salesman (door to door) and most of the time his father did not have a job. His father was very affectionate and his mother was the one who punished them, but she did not abuse them. In 1982, his father died as a result of cancer. This fact touched him and the entire family.

### Actual Family

He was married two times. In his first marriage, he had three children; one of them died at the age of 6, and the loss provoked the marital divorce. During this time he was working in the CNI and he did not spend too much time with his family. His daughters are married and have their own families. They keep sporadic contact with him. Later, he

remarried and had a son, who is an undergraduate student. His wife and his son visit him regularly.

### **Personal background and career**

He enrolled in officer school at the age of 14. He was one of the best Sub Lieutenants at the age of 22, and this fact motivated the authorities to appoint him in the Sixth Division of Artillery. Later, he was assigned in the military quarter in the north of the country, Pisagua. In recognition of his performance in 1971, he went to the School of Americas in Panama. In this place he learned about the concept of the enemy of the state and the role of the Communist Party in the destruction of society.

In 1975, he took courses on military intelligence. He was motivated by the concept of spies. He recognizes that some fictional accounts of spies like James Bond, attracted him to the topic, and he also wanted to have an important role in changing society.

Between 1978 and 1985 he worked in CNI. He had to lead a group of soldiers and policemen charged with exterminating members of a guerrilla group. In 1985, he flew to Taiwan to receive training in political warfare. In the same year, he left CNI because he disagreed with the superiors about how they should fight back against the guerrilla group. It was not because he cared about the lives of the people or because the use of excessive violence was against his values.

### **Perception of historical moment**

He perceived that Chilean society was under a real threat and the Communist ideology would destroy the basic values of society. Later, he is able to understand that the leader's discourse changed depending on their personal interests, but this ambiguity did not

make him question his behavior. He always perceived that he was under permanent threat, because “the country was in war.”

### **Perception of Enemy**

To him the world was divided into two groups, the good one and the bad one. He was unable to identify other groups of people. Those who were against the military government were the bad guys and he had to eliminate them; if he did not kill the enemy, s/he killed him. He does not feel any remorse.

*What did you feel when you killed a man at the first time?*

The first time that he killed people, he was assigned to Pisagua’s army quarters. He participated in the mass killer of civilian by fusillade. He says that he did not feel anything when he killed people, because they were the enemy and a danger for the society. If they did not kill the enemy, the enemy could kill them. He does not question the manner in which he killed people, or who he was assassinating, and he did not manifest symptoms of posttraumatic stress.

### **Impunity**

He never thought that he would be charged and condemned for his crimes. At this time, any military members who had any idea contrary to the army were separated from the institution. Therefore, the military system did not allow opposition to its ideology and he was absolutely convinced that he was doing the right thing. He perceives his judicial sentence as a betrayal by the military authorities.

## **Personality Features**

He believed in the notion of the hero and the true love of country. Therefore, he was convinced that his acts were correct. He enjoyed the feeling of being in danger of war and feeling pride in fighting.

“When you have the power to arrest and kill people, you believe that you are superior to other people, you are more intelligent, and this excessive confidence in yourself motivates that you do stupid acts, and you thinks that others are so stupid that they are unable to see what you are doing.” This attitude of superiority is encouraged by the authority, the other on the job, and friends.

*Daily routine:* He rears birds and practices sports.

## **The Psychological Report**

### *1. Crime's consciousness*

The use of illegal methods to exterminate the enemy was absolutely acceptable for him. The use of “unconventional methods were irrelevant, because the moral values were irrelevant, the main point was to achieve the objective.”

To him the kidnappings of enemies’ children and their illegal adoption used by Argentinean military were a good strategy of war. Because “when the parents of the child died, the relatives would take care of the child, and the child would grow up into the Marxist ideology, so if the military’s families were in charge of the children, they saved them from the Marxist ideology.”

He feels ashamed of the crimes that he committed, but only if his sons know of them. At this moment, he believes that he is responsible for what he did it. He does not feel guilty for what he did; sometimes he questions having tortured the relatives of the enemy, but it not a matter of suffering to him.

Even though he refers to his crimes as a result of obedience, he is very imprecise. That is to say, he argues that he followed orders, but at the same time he says that he perpetrated the crimes because he had the serious conviction about the extermination of the enemy.

## *2. Consciousness of the injury caused*

Despite of the fact that he is able to perceive the concrete damages that he made, he does not manifest emotional attachment or empathy with the victims' pain or their families.

### *Psychological Description*

He is very polite during the interviews and he dresses very informally, has long hair and his physical appearance does not fit jay of an army official. He is very ambiguous with regard to his criminal acts, in some interviews he assumes complete responsibility for the crimes, but in other interview he places responsibility with the high command. It is very frequently observed that he is unable to answer some questions related to his criminal behavior or his life. It looks as though he has not analyzed deeply his failures in his personal life or in his military career.

### *Forensic Psychiatric Report:*

His behavior does not fit in the category of madness or dementia. Following orders does not belong to any defined pathological condition, and this behavior is conducted freely. He did not present any personality disorder and he was not affected by any psychopathology. The comprehension of values and education were classified within the limits of the comprehension of logical and normal empathy according to the definition of K. Jaspers (1977). He acted based on the cultural overvaluation of an idea such as "State Reason." This idea could strongly influence his conduct; nevertheless, he was able to understand the implications of this idea and consequences of his own behavior. Moreover,

he knew the complexity, structure and sequences of the actions in order to accomplish an objective.

The military indoctrination is based on numerous religious, legal and cultural values. Therefore, it is not possible to refer to this behavior as an illness. This criterion, military indoctrination, was used in the judicial process for other members of the guerrilla groups. The fear of being excluded from a group and the presence of external factors that transform the character are not enough in and of themselves to compel certain behaviors, allowing one to ignore the state of conscience of an individual.

### **Locus of control**

He takes responsibility for his actions, because he could have left CNI but he did not want to, believing that he was doing a good thing for the country. However, at the same time, he assigns responsibility to the high command of CNI. He never felt threatened by the military institution. Therefore, he is unable to excuse himself. He felt free to leave the CNI at any time, and his subordinates had the same freedom. He arrived at a point in which the image of the enemy derived from the training became his own perception.

### **Self esteem**

He took courses on intelligence in the military dependences and was concerned about spies. He recognizes that some fictional stories about spies, like James Bond, attracted him to the topic and he also wanted to have an important role in the change of society.

The disagreements that participant 1 had with his superiors were not because he cared about the lives of people or because the use of excessive violence was against his values. It was because the authorities did not recognize his level of knowledge about the

enemy and he was not able to have someone question his job, despite the fact that they were his superiors.

He could handle power, for instance, being out on the street using special authorization to use weapons, and car siren (alarm).

### **Denial**

He denied perpetrating other crimes like robbery, sexual assault, or drug consumption. Even though it was not possible to determine his participation in these types of crime, the prison's functionaries reported finding cocaine and female underwear in his dorm. His wife provides him both materials.

### **Daily routine in prison**

He spends long part of the day writing in the computer and e takers care birds.

### **Prison's Medical physician**

He has cancer; it is prescribed medicines for depression and anxiety. He has psychiatric and medical treatment.

### **Prison's functionary**

Gendarmerie personnel report that he has nightmares and a permanent state of anxiety. In the last interview he recognized these conditions. However, the reason of his anguish is because he remains in prison and he could not see his son and daughters grow up. His daughter had marital conflicts and he could not help her. In other words, the reason for his emotional pain is because of his personal and situation not for the crimes that he committed.

He had a long history of cocaine use, but he did not recognize this during the interviews.

He had sexual relations with another prisoner, who belonged to the leftist party.

During the interview, he refers favorably to this prisoner, and he argues that he has learned that the leftists are human beings. Today, both perceive themselves as victims of the state system.

The prison's functionaries recognize that he and the other prisoners are different from regular criminals, because they are more educated and belong to middle-high social class. In contradiction to their crimes, which perpetrated severe human rights violations, they are very demanding about their rights. Frequently, the gendarmerie personnel are accused of some "abuses," which are not recognized by the judicial court or by the institutional authorities.

### **Benefits**

The CNI's members had a salary 30% higher than that of a regular soldier at the same rank.

He received the following benefits:

1. Loan of CORFO.
2. Loan from CNI, the money was not paid back.
3. A farm house.
4. 15.000 dollars from a total of 100.000.
5. Financial support and false passport to stay in Uruguay during the judicial investigation.
6. Airplane tickets for him and his family.
7. Payment of the legal expenses.
8. Notation of merit.

## Dynamic of motivation in the perpetration of torture




Figure N°3

### Analysis of results participant 1:

- This participant was absolutely convinced about the danger of the enemy and the methods used to fight back against the enemy. He does not question his behavior because it was encouraged and supported by the institution. One of most relevant aspects that are evident in this interviewee is his level of conviction about his beliefs and what he did as a result of his beliefs.
- Indeed, he feels betrayed by the army; because he acted according to what the institution asked of him in service of the country. However, he was absolutely convinced that the violence was the way to do it.

- Another aspect is that he never questioned the violent methods he used to accomplish his objectives. To him it was absolutely legitimate to torture the prisoners and his/her family members. When he refers to the method used by Argentinean military, who kidnapped children of the leftists and let their own military officers adopt them, to him it was the best method to exterminate an ideology. If the military families raise the children of the enemy, the enemy's ideology would not be reproduced by their children. The moral values are adapted to accomplish the objective. Hence, the methods used to achieve them are irrelevant.
- Like the other interviewees, he regrets being in prison but he does not feel remorse for his crimes. However, his stay in prison has made him question his behavior but not in relation with the magnitude of the damage caused, but its relation to the consequences of imprisonment, particularly not seeing his children grow up.
- The self-esteem is very difficult to evaluate, due to the fact that today he is rejected by other army soldiers and officials. His peer group avoids having contact with him, and the general society perceives him as a criminal. Only, his family from the second marriage keeps contact with him. His self-esteem has been affected by the actual conditions of life. Therefore, the way to interpret his self-confidence is reviewing his perception and his emotional contents during his job in CNI.

One of the aspects that appear in this interviewee (as well as other interviewees) is the image of "James Bond." This personage represents to him power, seduction, and social admiration. Clearly, these elements affected positively his self-esteem.

Moreover, the authorities encouraged his behavior, gave him all the facilities to perpetrate the crimes, and guaranteed him that he would not have a judicial

persecution for his acts. Nevertheless, it does not mean that he did not and does not have plenty consciousness about his crimes.

His role in the intelligence agency gave him absolute power to control the lives of others, and he went into a spiral of power acquisition. That is to say, he recognizes that he felt superior to the rest of the people; he believed that he was more intelligent and the others were very stupid in that he could cheat them without them realizing it. This level of self-confidence made him lose his perception of reality and do stupid things leaving evidence of his crimes.

At this time his self-esteem was permanently and positively confirmed by the authorities and the peer group. This is evidently a strong need for him and it appears that the benefits he received were both emotional and material.

- The ambiguity of his statements appears in the context of the judicial trial and prison stay. He develops an extensive essay in which he justifies his crimes into the context of following orders. However, the arguments are not supported during the interviews, because he never felt threatened to leave the intelligence agency. On the contrary, he voluntarily stayed in the agency, because he had the absolutely conviction that he was doing the right thing.

The ambiguity appears as a justification of his behavior and as a way to avoid social condemnation. The logical argument pushes him to accept responsibility for some crimes, but the having to visualize the magnitude of the damages he did puts him in a position which he could not handle emotionally.

- He does not report a history of child abuse during his early age. The only fact that appears to be associated with his tolerance of violence his age during military training. He enrolled the army when he was 14 years old. However, this fact does not

by itself explain his participation in torture. At this time, most members of the military enrolled in the army at the same age, but they did not perpetrate torture and they were not motivated to enroll in an intelligence agency.

- Today, his locus of control tends to be internal. His role as the chief of a unit made him make decisions with or without the group approval. The decisions were taken by him and he says that he determined his own life.
- The prison's professional team and forensic psychiatric report assert that he is not affected by any psychiatric illnesses associated to personality disorders or antisocial behavior.

## PARTICIPANT 2

### Criminal Behavior:

Type of crime perpetrated	Type of judicial sentence
Giving the order and the institutional facilities to perpetrate homicide of a labor union's leader.	Eight years imprison.
Giving the order to kill ten members of the guerrilla group.	Ten years imprison.
Torture of detainees and political prisoners	Not prosecuted.
Bribery	Not prosecuted.

TableNº5

### Family History

He was 7 years old when his father died and he was the oldest of three siblings. He was born in 1938. His mother was a school teacher and he grew up protected by his mother and his aunts and uncles. He did not feel the absence of a family despite the fact that he enrolled the army at very early age.

His father and his grandfather were military officials. He belonged to a family with a long military tradition. Therefore, at the age of 10, he knew that he would be a soldier. His father was assigned to several places outside the country.

### Actual Family

He got married and he has three daughters and one son, all of them have a college degree. His son enrolled in the Navy, but he left it.

His wife does not have college degree, and since he is in prison, she is the owner of a gasoline station and she manages it. He argues that the money that he has is from stocks. He denied committing theft or any illegal acts during the military regime.

## **Personal background and career**

At the age of 10, he was interned in a private school with his brother. Later, he enlisted the military academy at the age of 14. He was assigned to the Infantry in Santiago; he denied having participated in any activities fighting the subversives. This was impossible given the place where he was assigned where numerous deaths and disappearances by the military were reported.

At this time, he entered the War Academy in order to be a part of the high command. One of his expertise was intelligence matters. Later, he was assigned to Infantry School and he became one of the trusted men of General Pinochet, and he was appointed in the highest administrative position of the region (equivalent to state governor, *intendente*).

Between 1981 and 1982, when he was out of the War Academy, he was appointed in the DINE as a chief of a unit. He says that he never tortured or killed anyone. However, in the judicial process it appeared that he participated in these types of crimes. In 1990, he was appointed to the Chilean Embassy in Ecuador as a military representative. During this time, the judicial investigation of the death of a labor union leader pointed to the DINE as responsible for the crime. He was directly implicated in this murder. Once the judicial trial ended in 1992, the army asked him to go into retirement,

## ***The official's wife***

To him the military career trumps the personal life. For instance, he refers to the role of the official's wife, which is to help and support the military career of her husband. She had to participate in beneficial institutions and did not have any family conflicts. Because he wanted to follow his military career with a diplomatic career and live outside of the country, his wife should behave according to the diplomatic standards.

He argues that a good chief should be able to make decision in his home, because “a man who can not be in charge of his home cannot command an army.”

### **Perception of historical moment**

He declares that he does not have any political position; nevertheless, during the interviews his right-wing tendency and very conservative views were clear. He argues that he is a professional soldier.

He argued that in 1973, armed groups of people supported Salvador Allende’s government. These groups were from inside and outside of the country and they provoked a subversive war. According to him, “due to the fact that the army is trained to fight back against the enemy, the barbarism and atrocities are always manifested in a war.”

The socioeconomic and political crisis arose during the Frei Montalva<sup>8</sup> government. The Allende’s state administration wanted to divide the country and the army by social class. Indeed, before the Allende government, the army did not have discord between the officers and their subordinates, Allende generated social resentment among the lower class.

The Pinochet’s government gave opportunities and helped the wealthy class so that they profited and the excess of these profits would indirectly benefit the poorer classes, they called trickle down (*ley del chorreo*).

### **Perception of Enemy**

He perceives the enemy in terms of social class. The Allende government and ideology provoked the breakdown of the social order, since the lower class blamed the upper class for their level of poverty. He declares that he is a man of arms, therefore he perceived the enemy as a threat to the country, because he believed that Chile was in war.

*Why do you participate in torture?*

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<sup>8</sup> Eduardo Frei Montalva was a President of Chile between 1964 and 1970. He belonged to the Christian Democracy, which at this time was a political party close to the right.

“I did not kill nobody nor ordered kill no one.” He does not admit to having committed any crime. According to him, he is in prison because he had to assume the responsibilities for the homicides perpetrated by personnel under his command. When the killings occurred, he was outside of the country in another military mission. He was in charge of the group, which killed a labor union leader.

### *Impunity*

He never thought that he would be charged and condemned for his crimes.

### **Personality features**

He is very conservative. The military standards are conservative and this influenced his job and family habits. He explains that military sons and daughters keep relationships with other military children and families.

He was a member of a very elitist social group, the Lyon’s Club. He is very proud of his family, because his son and daughter are professionals and they married prominent professionals, who give them a good economic and social position.

He argues that no crime was perpetrated. However, when the time came for authorities to assume responsibility, he did so. In the interviews, he constantly tried to show an image of a very respectable and honorable person, who belongs to the upper social class. He adulates the interviewer for her intelligence and physical beauty and he tried to inquire about her personal life and asks the same questions that he did in previous interviews. He reacts with a lot frustration and impotence to his imprisonment and does not believe he is part of the perpetration of crimes, because criminal conduct is incompatible with the image of a respectable person. He does not want his family knows details of his conduct and makes them believing that he is in prison due to his responsibilities as a commander.

## **The Psychological Report**

The psychological report states that he has self-confidence, and an adequate level of a comprehension of language, which facilitates communication.

He establishes a relationship with others in which he informs them about what he thinks or believes, and he is inclined to be very formal and polite, but with an authoritarian tendency.

The intellectual level is normal, and he has a critical judgment in evaluation of the consequences of his actions. He is able to develop abstract thoughts and does not have damage to his cognitive capacities. He is an extrovert and dominant and accepts his actual condition (being in prison) stoically.

He has high level of self-esteem.

### *1. Crime's consciousness*

He does not express any conscience about the crimes. In fact, he denies being involved in any illicit act. He does not perceive the gifts that the people gave him as bribery. He says that "I am unable to kill an animal, so it is impossible that I kill a person." The reason why he is in prison is due to the authority's responsibilities.

### *2. Consciousness of the injury caused*

Since he does not assume any responsibility, the perception of the injury caused is relative in that he is able to perceive the importance of the value of life, but only at the rational level, and he denies that he perpetrated the criminal acts probed in the judicial trial.

## **Denial**

He avoids being involved with the homicides despite the fact that he was a chief in charge of the intelligence unit which directed and covered up the perpetration of the crimes. In the interviews, he is very contradictory in his narratives. On one hand, he argues that the army is an extremely structured institution and for this reason no one is able to take a

decision on his own. On the other hand, he denies knowing what the people under his command did.

In the judicial file, he suggests that he did not approve that CNI appoint its agents to the DINE in order to perpetrate the crimes. The homicide would have been committed under absolutely secrecy by the army people, due to the fact that in CNI people from other military fields could leak information. Contradictorily, he does not show discontent with General Gordon, who was the head of CNI, and he is unable to explain why the DINE conducted this operation instead of CNI.

### **Locus of control**

The level of internal locus of control is high.

### **Self esteem**

The evaluation of the prison psychologist reported high self-esteem, which does not appear to have been damaged by the time of imprisonment.

### **Daily routine in prison**

He is spent the time in prison playing tennis, painting and reading.

### **Prison's Medical physician**

He has anxiety, and problems sleeping and the medical physician prescribed sleeping medication.. He had a vascular accident and he presents a face deformation, he had an angioplasty. He is affected by high blood pressure and prostate problems.

### **Prison's functionary**

They report that the participant 2 tries to keep his military rank in prison, as a way to put himself above the other inmates and the prison's functionaries. He does not acknowledge the perpetration of any crime. One of the gendarmerie officials explains that

other prisoners, who were under his command during the military regime, refer to him as a very despotic person who was very cruel with the detainees.

### **Benefits**

This type of job gave him the ability to have the power of a state governor and a diplomatic position, and to be surrounded by people that belonged to the upper social class. Moreover, he was a trusted man of Pinochet; hence he enjoyed a high command position, which gave him prestige and economic rewards. He received gifts when he was governor, for him these presents were the way that the authorities eulogized him, asked him for a favor, or thanked him. He did not perceive this to be bribery.

## Dynamic of motivation in the perpetration of torture




Figure N°4

### Analysis of results participant 2:

- He believes that the Chilean crisis in 1973 and the military coup were the result of a social class conflict. He believes that the lower social class should exist to keep the social order, and the Allende's government broken the social equilibrium when he gave power to people from the poor economic sectors. From this point of view, he explains the armed conflict and the persecution of General Pinochet's opponents. His moral values are fixed into the frame of social classes' order; therefore, each subject has a role depending on his social position. He argues that he is a son of a military officer who belonged to the upper social class and he has made great efforts throughout his life to maintain his social status.

- The army gave him the possibility to have governmental positions such as gubernator and diplomatic positions that represented power and prestige. This fact committed him to ascribe to “the Pinochet politics,” indeed, he became in one of the trusted men of Pinochet’s circle.
- In his framework of beliefs it is absolutely plausible that there would be the perpetration of atrocities and brutal crimes in a war, due to the nature of war. Therefore, to him it was not stressful to know about the perpetration of a crime or simply to perpetrate crimes. Nevertheless, he always tried to maintain his social position and distance, and if he did not perpetrate the crimes himself. Instead, he ordered subordinates to do it.
- The high social class position not only gave him a good economic income, but also gave him the authority to establish high social values, which were and are very conservative. The social values that he ascribed and ascribes to are incompatible with the perpetrated crimes, so he is unable to recognize the perpetration of his crimes.
- Like the other participants, his social world was limited to the army world. This isolated him from the civilian society, despite the fact that he assumed public positions. This extended to his personal life, his family also was involved in the military world and his wife assumed a role that allowed him to develop his military career. His achievements and the rewards reduced the possibilities that he left the army.
- His primary motivation for staying in the army was the benefits that he received, and the important losses that he would face if he left it. To him, the unique decision was to stay and be part of the military regime. The contradictions that came up during the judicial trial demonstrated that his behavior did not fit with the moral values that he proclaimed. Under this scenario, he denies all the charges.

- The impunity is not exclusively related with the army protection, it also was related to his social position. The judicial prosecution was not possible since he did not personally commit the crimes and because, in his view, it was not possible that someone from his social position could be punished.
- He does not report a history of child abuse, but at an early age (ten years old) he was separated from his original family to enroll in a school with an internship system. Later at the 14, he enrolled the army. He grew up in the institutional system. He does not report feeling abandoned by his family.
- This aspect could be a factor in understanding the loyalty that he shows towards the army. Despite facing imprisonment, he does not disclose army secrets and does not condemn the army for his personal situation. He subscribes to the army values and sublimates his role in the institution as a member of a unique family (the army). Since he grew up in an institutional system his early identity group was the army so attacking the army means attacking himself.
- The psychological evaluation reports that he has a high self-esteem and the reclusion has not affected it. The locus of control tends to be internal. The denial appears as an attitude of self-defense with respect to his conduct.
- Like participant 1, he does not regret the crimes perpetrated by him; instead in this case he denies the crimes. The court ruling made him feel ashamed with respect to his family and he saw his self-image damaged with respect to his social world. This was a cause of suffering for him, it was the fact that his wife had to assume the role of the family head, and she had to manage the family business (gasoline station). He does not have any sorrow for the victims or their families.

- During, the writing of this thesis, he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for the murders of other opponents of the military regime. This was another judicial trial. The psychologist that worked in the prison explained to me that this last time he recognized the crime perpetrated. However, this admission came up under the scenario of the new sentence and his expectation to receive prison benefits. He does not express any remorse and regret about his crimes.

## PARTICIPANT 3

### Criminal Behavior:

Type of crime perpetrated	Type of judicial sentence
Homicide of a teacher by cutting his throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same judicial file)	Fifteen years and a day, plus two imprison sentences of 541 days.
Homicide of a civilian by police brutality	Three years imprison.
Torture detainees and political prisoners	Not prosecuted.

Table N°6

### Family History

His father was very *authoritarian*. He was unable to disagree with his father. If his father made a decision he would not regret it. He was the youngest of three brothers. He was born in 1953. He studied in a male public school. His brothers were popular in the high school, because they always fought and won. He, on the other hand, was more reserved and attractive to the girls. Therefore, he was popular too in the high school but by using other strategies. The friends always looked for him, because he was popular among the girls. He remembers his childhood and adolescence very positively.

He argues that his mother did not teach him to torture, “break fingers.” Despite the fact that his father was authoritarian he does not report that he suffered child abuse.

Since he was a child, he wanted to belong to the armed forces. He was 14 years old when applied for the first time to the Navy. His father rejected his enrollment. Even though his original family did not participate in a political party, his father was scared that Chile would become a Communist country like Cuba. His mother just accepted what his father said. His father worked in the Senate as a civil servant, and his mother stayed at home and raised the children. He belonged to a middle class family.

## **Actual Family**

He is married to a police officer, who is retired. They have two daughters. One of them is a single mother, and both are studying in college. His wife is the head of the family since he is in prison since 1991 (16 years). His family visits him regularly.

## **Personal background and career**

He went to the college and studied one year, but because of his bad academic performance he was expelled from the university. Due to his failure, he had to work and his father found him a job in the Senate as a typist. After two years he applied to the Police Academic School for Officials (Carabineers). He was 22 years old when enrolled the police and 30 when he joined DICOMCAR.

When he graduated from the Police Academy, he received the rank of lieutenant. This rank put him in charge of group of policemen who were sub-officials. He was appointed in the Police station in charge of nineteen men, and later in the Transit Department, he was in charge of eighty men. He was able to command a group of people easily. Indeed, when he enrolled in the Special Forces, he had to work under a great deal of pressure, because during the military regime he was in charge of a team whose mission was to repress public riots. Under these circumstances he was always fearful, but he focused on the task rather than the fear, in such a way that he concentrated in giving clear instructions to the subordinates and supervised the accomplishment of the orders. He says “I must focus on the task and my thoughts should focus on the accomplishment of the objectives.” At this time, he was in charge of twenty men, even though each one was responsible for his own function, he felt responsible for making good decisions, which did not risk the lives of his people. He learned to take pressures under his control from his mother. He explains that during the earthquakes his mother directed the entire family and gave them instructions to

reduce risks and save each family member. He was enrolled in CNI before joined DICOMCAR, but he does not give details about his time in CNI. The other agents did not know that he worked in CNI.

### **Job gratification**

He chose to work in the Transit Department in the police motorcycle patrol, because this projected a masculine image and allowed him to date various women. “I loved to work in this department because it made me feel brave and attractive for women.” To him it was important to be successful with the women. Indeed, during the interview, he tries to show the interviewer that he was a seducer, and he had dates with several women.

Later, he joined the Special Forces in order to face risky activities, “I enjoyed feeling the adrenaline.” In this position, he had to lead a group of policemen during the riots and handled street disorders. During this time, he had to face the death of several carabineers as a result of guerrilla’s attacks. This experience along with his attraction to risky activities motivated him to enroll in DICOMCAR.

The type of work that he did made him progressively more tolerant of violence. In fact, he was two sentenced for two different cases of homicide and, in the interviews with other workmate, he was said to have been involved in other crimes involving the use excessive of force. Participant 3 is unable to recognize that he abused his victims. To the contrary, he still believes that the subjects were dangerous and he was risking his life.

### **Perception of historical moment**

He acquired an anti-Marxist ideology, which he still believes in. He perceives that Marxism is a real threat for the country. His position against this ideology was shared by

the police institution and his group of friends. Moreover, he agreed with the idea that a military regime governed the country and kept the nation safe from this type of enemy.

These personal conceptions became more powerful after he had to face the murders of various policemen. Due to his job in the Special Forces, he confronted people in public protests and riots, and according to him he could perceive the danger.

The murders of the policemen were mainly perpetrated by guerrilla members. This fact provoked in him a sense of revenge, because his duty was to defend his people. He recalls feeling a lot frustration when he had to face the death of young carabineers and the conditions under which they were assassinated (under surprise and in public places). This information is found in the Reports of the National Commissions (Valech, et. al., 2004; Rettig, et al., 1991).

He perceived that the military authority did have the real intention to protect the members of the police, then the police by itself was responsible for its safety and its duty was to arrest and persecute the murders.

### **Perception of the Enemy**

He perceives that the guerrillas were a tremendous danger for the Chilean society. To him, the guerrilla members are individuals who did not respect the value of life and they used violent methods to achieve their objectives. The most risky attitude of these groups was that they staged surprise attacks against defenseless people or policemen.

To him, the enemy was not a political prisoner instead he or she was a terrorist. He perceived that they were at war and the enemies were people from the left. They were perceived as terrorists because they had military training. This enemy was hidden in the civilian population, this aspect made it difficult to them. The way that the enemy was

organized obligated him and his team to change tactics and used unconventional measures to arrest them. He says “If I did not kill him, he would kill me.”

Due to the fact that the enemies had special training in military matters and they joined a terrorist movement, this enemy used its own modus operandi. That is, each member belonged to a small group or cell, and each cell had a leader who knew each member and he gave orders to them. When an attack against the police was conducted, a member of one cell had to meet with another member from another cell in a predetermined place or point. The members who had to meet did not know each other and the information that they handled was partial, they did not know the complete operation. The main idea was to create a chain of information because if one member did not meet at the planned place the order or the plan was changed, because they assumed that a member was arrested. Moreover, if one of them was captured by police, the subject could only give incomplete information. Therefore, it was important for the police to arrest one guerrilla member and interrogate him about the meeting point in order to arrest the other guerrilla member as soon as possible. If the police did not have the information on time the other guerilla member aborted the mission and the police were unable to arrest him or her. Under this scenario, torture was the most expeditious method to obtain information.

The most relevant aspect is that participant 3 had the conviction that he was fighting a war. He says “I was trained to go a war, and if they sent me a war I go to win...If the society does not like the methods used in war, then the society should not send me to war.” This perception does not coincide with the role of a policeman. Even though in Chile the police or Carabineros have a strong military influence, they were not trained in matters of fighting a war. Hence, this perception responds to his expectation and the intelligence agency. The concept of war was formulated by the authorities of the military regime. The

use of the state of siege created an unreal situation that made the armed forces and the police react as though they were in a scenario of war. In addition, the attacks against the carabineers' lives were real in such a way that the perception of war was encouraged by these violent attacks.

### **Profile of the agent's recruitment**

According to participant 3, a good agent had to be smart to obtain information, analyze data, and organize an operation based on good information and good analysis. He should be in adequate physical shape, and have good health. The agent should not follow the rules and stay separated from the rule manual because in this type of job it was necessary to improvise, be creative and have initiative. Risky behavior was also necessary.

Based on this requirement, it is observed that DICOMCAR gave him a lot freedom to operate, and the absence of control offered him vast possibilities to exceed the police standards and perpetrate crimes.

### *Why do you participate in torture?*

“Because it was my job and I want to identify the murders and make justice by my own and revenge the murders...” and today after the prison stay he is able to say that “I was in the wrong place and at the wrong moment.”

Like the other interviewees, he did not question his violent behavior until he was condemned to prison. Today, he is not able to perceive the damages caused in the victims and their families. Indeed, he was sentenced for the perpetration of homicides not for the perpetration of torture. Therefore, he diminishes his conduct.

## **Impunity**

He never received sanctions for his violent conduct. The aggressions against prisoners or against civilians in the riots were not sanctioned by the authorities; instead, his role was rewarded.

## **Personality features**

He is very distrustful person. After several interviews, he could openly give information. During the first interviews, he does not want to talk about his personal life, later he spontaneously refers to it, but always hides some information. He spends a long time reading the news and analyzes the information and recalls newspaper news to evaluate the government's policy. He constantly examines the information in order to detect conspiracies.

He gave me some newspaper clippings; because he wants me to perceive the actual risk of the Marxist threat today. Today, he is absolutely convinced that what he did was correct. Nevertheless, he is able to perceive manipulation by General Pinochet to create the image of the enemy. He disagrees with another interviewee, who perceives Pinochet as a correct person.

## **The Psychological Report**

The Psychological Report informs us that he has an adequate perception temporal-special, that is he has plenty perception of the reality. He perceives the substantive aspects of the context. He interacts with others showing a dominant and extroverted attitude. He does not report problems in controlling aggressiveness.

He is conscious of the crime and accepts the judicial sentence, but he does not recognize his participation in the crimes and he reduces the magnitude of crimes.

The psychological evaluation consigns three levels of consciousness respect to the crime and caused injury:

### *1. Crime's consciousness*

He presents during the prison stay an evolution related to this aspect:

1º Stage: he does not assume responsibility in the perpetration of crimes. Moreover, he denied committing crimes.

2º Stage: relative, he assumes his participation in terms of ingenuity. He ignored the consequence of his acts.

3º Stage: He changes his arguments, arguing that he had to follow orders.

In the three stages, he does not assume responsibility for the crimes.

### *2. Consciousness of the injury caused*

He minimizes his behavior and he justifies it by blaming the political moment and context. The conscience of the injury caused is relative, he recognizes the damages that he provoked in the victims, but he also visualizes himself as a victim of the political context.

His major conflict revolves around his imprisonment; it is not related to remorse as a result of the damages provoked to the victims.

In spite of his permanent denial, he is able to see the objectives of the intelligence agency and this work. However, he did not perceive the manipulation of the authorities when he worked for the agency. Indeed, he argues that he would never accept that one of his sons or daughters would enroll in the army or police forces.

### **Locus of control**

He blames the institution for his behavior, due to the fact that the institution allowed him to perpetrate the crimes. He assumed what the group or the institution says about the enemies is correct and he just accepted the facts. Despite the fact that he perceives himself

to be more intelligent than the rest of the participants, he did not question the procedures used to repress and attack the enemy, because he agreed with them. At this time, he was unable to perceive the political interests that the authorities looked for.

According to the locus of control test, he presents a high tendency to express external locus of control.

### **Self esteem**

DICOMCAR gave him the opportunity to respond to his frustration about the deaths of his workmates, and the intelligence agency did not put restrictions on the expression of the violence. Here it is observed that his need for vengeance and the expression of violence are coupled with the institutional needs to repress the political adversaries, ignoring the methods utilized.

The job in this type of agency also gave him the opportunity to have power and control the victims, and his procedures were supported by his group of workmates. He became a policeman who gets revenge for the other policemen.

During those days and today, it is very important to him being successful with women, despite the fact that he is married, and this type of job allowed him to have other relationships outside the marriage which positively and reinforced his self-image. To him, the marital infidelity did not cause emotional conflicts.

Self-esteem does not appear damaged; to the contrary the institution and his peer group reinforced positively his behavior.

### **Daily routine in prison**

Physical training, writing in computer. He spends long time reading newspapers in order to evaluate the government's policy. He constantly examines the information in order to detect any conspiracy.

### **Prison's Medical physician**

He does not follow any mental treatment and does not receive any medical prescriptions for any mental or physical illness.

### **Prison's Functionary**

He spends all the morning sleeping and does not develop any activity. Sometime, he runs.

### **Benefits**

Unlike the other interviewees, the rewards received by him were mainly psychological, such as the afore mentioned extramarital relationships, rather than economic. He had a salary 30% higher than that of the regular policemen.

He was able to perceive the consequences of his behavior, but he was 30 years old and decided to follow the moment and receive some rewards such as achieving the rank of captain.

## Dynamic of motivation in the perpetration of torture




Figure N°5

### Analysis of results participant 3:

- One of the aspects that stand out the most in this participant is the hate that he felt for the enemies. It was evident in the way that he stripped away the humanity of the victims. He was able to cut the throat of a victim, and the victim was not a guerrilla member or a participant in violent attacks. The same attitude it was observed in the murder of a civilian, who in a confused incident on street was attacked and beaten to death by the police. Participant 3 was the mainly responsible for his death.
- He assumes that one of the reasons why he enrolled DICOMCAR was to participate in actions that demanded high risks and a permanent state of alert; he says he could “feel the adrenaline.” The level of excitement not only caused him to lose perception of reality but also gave him a room to express violence without limits.

- In the crimes perpetrated by him, it is evident that he was unable to perceive the victims as human beings. Even though he explains his violent behavior as a way to exterminate the enemy (who was perceived for him as evil), the hate pushed him to lose the perception of reality. When asked why he obeyed the order to kill the victim (cut his throat), he responded that he was killing a dangerous guerrilla member, therefore it was the right thing for him to do. If this answer is compared with participant 1, it is very similar in that both interviewees are unable to question these acts, and do not express any emotion for the victims and for the violent acts they committed.
- In his scale of values and beliefs, retaliation is legitimate and the methods used to revenge the death of policemen are absolutely acceptable. He perceives the revenge in terms of a positive attitude and feelings that motivated him to avenge the dead of his colleagues. If he did not do something to take revenge for the police deaths, he felt that he was betraying his own people. At this point, it is clearly observable that the personal motivations and the institutional conditions favored the expression of violence.
- The group identity is a feature observed in participant 3. He says that he had a very close relationship with the members of his unit. The dynamic was learned in the Police School, in which the complicity and loyalty between the group's members were defined by the type of relationship between them and which also established who was outside or inside the group. He explains that this type of relationship was expressed in the station police and in the intelligence agency. If he belonged to the group, he felt very committed to be loyal to the group. Those feelings were coupled with his beliefs about the nature and danger of the enemy.
- He is a subject very susceptible to being influenced by the peer group (unit and police in general) and the authorities. In spite of his intellectual capabilities that permitted him

to understand and explain certain behaviors, he joined the group beliefs and acted according to what his boss said. The group dynamic played an important role in his behavior, because he looked for the group approval and the authorities' approval.

- Like other murders that he perpetrated, he was not alone. In one of the murders, two other agency's members at the same time and the same place killed the other two victims by the similar method, by cutting the throat. Here it appears that during tense moments he responded very violently. Although he argues that during the street riots, he was able to command the police team and handle the tension very well, at certain point he tended to lose the self-control and scaled into extreme violent behavior. Once the acts of violence were committed, he justified them based on the fact that the victims, who were attacked by him, were extremely dangerous and they would kill one of his colleges, despite the fact that he did not have any evidence that this should be the case.
- Before enrolling DICOMCAR, he was a CNI member. This aspect is an element that indicates that he was absolutely convinced about the dangerous and social damage caused by the Marxist ideology. His stay in CNI made him confirm his beliefs about the evil nature of the enemies, and he joined DICOMCAR in order to continue his job initiated in CNI. Today, he maintains his distrustful perception about the people that surround him, and he is very suspicious about the governmental authorities. During his stay in prison, every day he read the newspapers and cuts new articles to analyze information and detect any conspiracy from the Communist and Marxist movements.
- This feature could be interpreted as a paranoid symptom; nevertheless, the prison's psychological evaluations do not report any mental disorder.

- In this case, it is observed that his personal motivations, the group beliefs coupled with his own, and the institutional support are conditions necessary to perpetrate torture and even kill someone, whether or not if the victim was an “enemy.” The group perception about the danger of a subject identifies him or her as an evil subject who threatened them.
- He does not report a history of child abuse, but his father was very authoritarian, and did not give his son room to disagree with him. His father’s vision divided the world between white and black and he was very rigid. As in the case of participant 1, the absence of empathy and tolerance towards other visions are also observed in participant 1.
- He does not express any remorse for the perpetrated crimes. Like participant 1, he was convinced that he was acting correctly. The prison sentence made him question his participation in the crimes, but not in terms of the damage caused to the victims. Instead, he said that others committed the crimes, not him, and they should be in prison. This difference is relevant, because he does not regret perpetrating the crimes, he regrets the punishment.
- Participant 3 enrolled in the police at the age of 22; later at the age of 30 he joined DICOMCAR. The early age of training does not appear in this case. The age of the subject indicates that he was legally plenty responsible for his conduct and at the age of 22 he should have defined patterns patron of personality.
- He used his position of power that the intelligence agency gave him to reinforce his self-esteem. He appears to be a person very centered in his needs, and most of his needs looked for the group approval or for women’s approval. He has high self-esteem.

- The locus of control tends to be strongly external. In the interviews, he is unable to accept responsibility for the criminal acts perpetrated by him. He attributes his violent behavior to external factors (enemy, authorities, and political context) and feels that he was a part of a system and he could not perceive the manipulation from the authorities. This attitude is not only in regard with assuming responsibilities in his acts, but also this attitude is in regard to take life decisions.

## PARTICIPANT 4

### Criminal Behavior:

Type of crime perpetrated	Type of judicial sentence
Giving the order to kill three civilians by cutting their throats, kidnapping three people and illicit association (same judicial file)	The judicial sentences are accumulated: life sentence and two sentences of five years and one day each.
Giving the order to kidnap and arrest ten people and broke into a private place without judicial order.	
Torture detainees and political prisoners	Not prosecuted.

Table N°7

### Family History

He grew up in a middle class and conservative family. He was born in 1946. His parents had a large amount of land managed by themselves and they lived in a town in the south of the country. He does not refer to a history of child abuse. In contrast, his family supported him studying and enrolling in the police.

### Actual Family

He was father of two daughters and two sons. One of his daughters was killed by her fiancé when she refused to get married with him. Her fiancé was a military official. He does not show emotional pain when refers to this loss. This same attitude shows during the interview when he mentions that one of his sons who died from an illness. Both, daughter and son died suddenly at the age of twenty. Only when he refers to his family (wife, daughter and son) does he demonstrate emotion. His family believes that he is innocent and that the judicial charges are false and the judicial sentence is political rather than criminal.

## **Personal background and career**

He was 18 years old when he was enrolled in college. However, he dropped the career because he disagreed with the professors' ideology. The professors ascribed to Marxist thoughts. He wanted to enroll the Air Force or Police; he trained very hard to be accepted in the Police Academy for Officials.

Later, he asked the police authorities to be appointed to Santiago city, because he got married and he wanted that his wife to have the opportunity to conclude her degree in Architecture. Shortly afterward, he was appointed to a police unit to create the GOPE (Police Group of Special Operations).

During his stay in the GOPE, he suffered an accident deactivating a bomb. The accident caused the loss of his right arm, and the police authorities, rather than forcing him to retire, reassigned him to DICOMCAR, due to his good performance. He was offered retirement three times, but he refused to be separated from the police.

The authorities offered him another position in another police department different from DICOMCAR; he also refused to leave DICOMCAR. Only when the murders of three teachers were investigated, was he removed from DICOMCAR and appointed as chief of the Arms Department, where he was the instructor in the use of weapons. Later, the police authorities made him to retire due to the judicial trial.

In DICOMCAR, he led several teams and each team had three or four men. He maintained regular meeting with the full group, but each team handled specific information with the purpose of keeping information compartmentalized and did not risk the internal security of the institution.

He defines himself as an obedient and disciplined policeman. That is to say, he followed the rule of the institution very closely. This type of attitude was passed from him

to his team. This control was a tool that he used to direct the subordinates. The police had and have the power to investigate the family of the policemen and their social groups. This authority allowed and allows the police chiefs to control the personal and professional lives of the subordinates.

Even though he could not recruit the members of the team led by him, as a chief of the police department, he could ask for the change a few subordinates if they did not comply with the requirements he demanded, obedience and discipline.

### **Perception of historical moment**

He had a positive impression on the President of the Republic Salvador Allende. Nevertheless, he thinks that the president was not concerned about the economic problems that the citizenry suffered during his mandate. Therefore, the president must pay for his irresponsibility.

According to him, during 1984 to 1985, twelve to eighteen policemen were assassinated by the members of the paramilitary group. This paramilitary group paid \$800.000 pesos to kill a one policeman.

In 1985, the Communist Party reorganized the guerrilla group to fight back against the military persecution. The political party organized the paramilitary group. This group met 1,500 members (men and women) which were divided into group of four or five people. During the military regime, the police represented the governmental authorities, and they supported the military regime. The terrorist group targeted the police, because the police was the visible face of the military regime.

He prepared for the interviews bringing up newspaper articles, which refer to the terrorism. Most the articles were published by the newspaper "*El Mercurio*," which has an

editorial tendency toward the rightwing party. Some of the articles present a deep stand against Communism.

His ideology was backed by the institution and by the authorities. Indeed, the institution provided the entire equipment to investigate any subject, and provided the arms, cars, and arresting places. During the judicial trial, the police authorities denied these facts giving all the responsibilities of the crimes to the interviewee as a chief of the team, which murdered the Communist members.

### **Perception of the enemy**

The enemies were terrorists and to fight back against terrorists it was necessary to use the same methods used by them. The terrorist groups received paramilitary training from the Lebanon, Cuba, Lybia, and East Germany making them more dangerous.

Contradictorily, he expresses in the interviews that he does not want to call them “enemies,” because they are people who have a different ideology as results of unequal economic distribution. This argument is very contradictory with other statements that he does in other interviewees, in which he refers to the evil nature of the enemy.

#### *Why do you participate in torture?*

The institution provided the conditions for torture, but he also allowed the use of these methods. Even though he does not recognize that he killed or tortured any detainee, he admits that he gave the orders to accomplish these crimes. He believes that the torture was a legitimate form to obtain information. The objective was to obtain information the fast possible, not to kill people.

To him, torture is not the best mechanism to obtain information; instead it is the way under which the interrogator persuades the enemy in order to obtain information. Torture is an absolutely legitimate act. In one of his argument, he explains this point

mentioning an example: at the beginning of his career, he was assigned to the police station in a city area to reduce street crime. He and the team that he led usually beat the prostitutes, who objected to the arrest or did not want to denounce criminals. They used wet towels to avoid visible scars. Therefore, the use of violence was not an exclusive procedure utilized by the intelligence agents; instead it was a practice of the regular police. To him, an enemy or a delinquent were similar, both were a threat for the security of the citizenry.

### **Impunity**

He never thought that could be judicially charged for the crimes he perpetrated, because he had and has the conviction that he did what he should have done due to the characteristics of the enemy and the sociopolitical context of the country. His duty was to protect the citizenry and the police institution, and he just did it. Indeed, he perceives the sentence he is serving as payment for the all human rights violations perpetrated for the police. He says that “during the military regime 502 people died at the hand of the police, I believe that the society through the judicial trial tries to make me responsible for all these crimes.”

He has the absolute conviction that he is innocent, because all the crimes that he led or did were authorized by the institution. Therefore, they could not be illegal.

In one of the sentences, he was condemned for illicit association, which means that he and the group that he led acted by their own initiative. According to him this is impossible, due to the fact that the institution provided all the necessary resources and the equipment to accomplish the detentions, tortures and homicides. Moreover, the high command gave the order to investigate and eliminate the “terrorists.” He always informed the high command about the activities that he did and planned to do, hence the high command authorized the perpetration of crimes. He does not question his participation in

the crimes; he questions why the authority does not accept their responsibilities for the crimes.

During the third interview, he is able to say that “when I received an order to kill someone, I never questioned it, because the victim had killed a policeman. ... I never killed someone but I gave the orders to do it.” It is relevant to highlight this argument, because during the first interviews, he was unable to recognize any attitude, which associates him with a crime. Later, he is able to indicate that he gave the orders because he was absolutely convinced that he was doing the right thing.

### **The Psychological Report**

He expresses very contradictory arguments regarding how he perceives the way other people live. On one hand, he thinks that the human beings have to be free and on the other hand he believes that it is important to sacrifice people to achieve certain goals; he disagrees with unequal distribution of wealth, but he does not support the government policies to redistribute wealth. He enjoys the idea of having a protagonist role in national history, of being the hero and having the power to lead people.

The psychological report adds that he lacks of empathy, has a dominant character, and high tolerance of frustration. He accepts the responsibility since he was in charge of a group of policemen, but he does not acknowledge the perpetration of crimes. When he speaks, he tries to inform the other rather than to interact with him or her.

The psychological evaluation reports high level of **self-esteem**.

#### *1. Crime's consciousness*

He partially accepts responsibility for the criminal acts, but he tends to minimize his behavior. He refers to be overwhelmed by the context.

The intellectual level is normal and he has critical thinking, which allows him to evaluate the consequences of his acts. He does not have damage to his cognitive capacities.

## *2. Consciousness of the injury caused*

He is unable to perceive the damage caused to the victims or their families. He registered all the real state in the name of his wife in order to avoid the payments that the sentence requires him to pay to the families of the victims. He legitimizes his acts based on the damage caused by the enemy to the entire society.

### **Locus of control**

He attributes responsibility for the crimes to the police authorities because they ordered him to commit the crimes. He believed what the authority said about the enemies and he agreed with them. He was unable to question the procedures used to repress and attack the enemy, because he shared them.

The test reports an internal locus. The argument to follow order is regularly used to justify his behavior, rather than to assume the responsibilities of his acts.

### **Self-esteem**

According to the psychological evaluation conducted by the prison's psychologists, he reports high self-esteem.

### **Daily routine in prison**

He spends time growing vegetables and fruit trees and reading newspapers. Prison's Medical physician

He presents health problem such as high blood pressure and overweight, and he had problem sleeping and was prescribed sleeping medication.

### **Prison's functionary**

He still keeps the relationship with other inmates using the hierarchical rank in order to keep distance between him and the rest of the ex-policemen. When he talks about the police, he includes himself as a part of the institution.

### **Benefits**

He was able to finance the physical rehabilitation of his arm in Germany. Even though he received the financial support of the institution, he was able to finance his treatment in Germany.

He has several real state properties and he says that those are the product of his job. Nevertheless, the costs of numerous real state properties were not possible to afford with his salary, because his wife did not work. Belonging to DICOMCAR gave him prestige and the opportunity to stay active in the police, because his physical handicap limited him to continue in the police.

## Dynamic of motivation in the perpetration of torture




Figure N°7

### Analysis of results participant 4:

- Participant 4 expresses openly his hate against the enemy. He has the absolutely conviction that he had to fight against this threat. His political ideology made him believe that people opposed to the military regime put at high risk the general society.
- His beliefs were reinforced by the job-work group. Moreover, he received the advice of participant 6, who was a civilian member of the Communist Party that collaborated with the intelligence agencies. This man had a lot influences on his perception of the enemy, because according to participant 4 only an ex-member of the Communist Party, who received training from KGB, could know the characteristics of the enemy very well.
- The process of dehumanization of the victims was encouraged by the guerrilla attacks against the policemen. This aspect reinforced the perception of the enemy as evil, and made him generalize this perception to any individuals who were opposed to the

military regime. From this scenario, it is possible to explain why he authorized and led the torture and murders of the three teachers.

- The level of desensitization about the victims began in the job-working scenario. This process commenced with the mistreatment of the detainees. To him, a subject who behaves illegally should be punished without a legal process. Therefore, he had the power to use physical reprimands against the detainees, and this mistreatment was also applied to the opponents of the military regime. The police institution gave him the facilities to perpetrate torture. In the case of “the state enemies,” the institution favored and supported this conduct.
- He justifies and explains his conduct based on his beliefs. He thinks that the unconventional methods should be used to fight against the enemy. The methods were irrelevant if the final objective, exterminating the threat, was achieved. To him, this ultimate goal was to protect the people who worked for the institution and the society. Therefore, the notion of hero was present in his narrative in that he had to intervene and not allow impunity for the criminals.
- His work was positively recognized by police authorities and military regime’s leaders. The hero notion was positively reinforced by them and by his workmates.
- The acceptance of torture as a legitimate method of interrogation was an institutional belief that he acquired and accepted as one of his tasks in his job. To him, the torture methods are unquestionable and they are not matters for regret. Then, the illegal methods are irrelevant; the final results were and are the most important thing.
- Unlike the other interviewees, he is unable to perceive the manipulation of the political authorities. He is and was absolutely convinced that he did the right thing. Indeed, he

says that “I would do it again, but without being detected,” in order to avoid judicial punishment.

- The police high command was not charged with any crime. Indeed, this participant was the only policeman with the highest rank to receive the imprisonment-punishment. He perceives this as an act of revenge by society, and that he and his team have to pay for all the murdered and disappeared victims of the military regime. He mentions the President Aylwin’s words, which refers to the judicial cases in terms of “applying justice as far as possible.” Into this frame, he was one of the people who received this punishment, under unfair circumstances due to the fact that he did what he had to do and what the authorities told him.
- He refers to the high command, which gave him the orders and the approval to use torture and arrest people outside the law, as cowards. However, he does not generalize this perception to the police institution. He is very specific to refer to the authorities involved in these crimes.
- Because he was absolutely convinced about what he did, he had no reason to believe that he could receive any legal or institutional sanction for his criminal behavior. The impunity for the crimes was an element that he could not even distinguish, because the detainees’ mistreatment was a regular practice in his job, and he was never questioned by the institution for using torture. From this perspective the impunity was a necessary condition to perpetrate the crimes.
- Contrary, to his perception of the enemy and the justification that he was right, his family believes that he was sentenced for his high position in the institution and that he should assume some responsibility for what his subordinates did. This fact is incongruous with his notion of the hero, and the way that he explains this contradiction

is saying that the civil society does not know the characteristics of the enemy and does not understand the nature of danger that the guerrilla members posed.

- Like the other participants, the economic and emotional rewards were present. He was able to afford real state that his regular salary could not allow him to obtain. In this case, the need for recognition and the tangible benefits are strongly associated. In particular, he needed recognition and approval from the institutional authorities, because the loss of his hand could have resulted in mandatory retirement from the institution.
- In this case, the personal rewards associated with the personal beliefs appear as relevant variables which can explain his criminal conduct.

## PARTICIPANT 5

### Criminal Behavior

Type of crime perpetrated	Type of judicial sentence
Homicide of a civilian by cutting his throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same judicial file)	The judicial sentences are accumulated: life sentence in prison.
Kidnapping and arresting ten people and broken private place without judicial order.	
Robbery the detainees and broken places ( <i>allanamiento</i> )	Not prosecuted.
Torture detainees and political prisoners	Not prosecuted.

Table N°8

### Family History

He was a child of a farmer and he suffered poverty during his childhood. He was born in 1951. His family received economic help from the Catholic Church. He grew up in the rural area in the south of the country. His father was a president of the Communist Party in his town.

### Actual Family

He got married in 1974. He wanted to have a family, because a single sub-official would spend most of the time in the police station and the married policemen were able to spend more time with their families.

His wife got her graduate degree during the time when they were together. She is a business engineer. He had two children. The son is a college student and his daughter became a single mother and stay with his wife.

He is divorced and this happened once he was charged in the death of the Communist members. His family did not know his activities inside the police, but at the time of the judicial trial they knew.

His family does not keep contact with him. Instead, he has a new relationship with a woman, who met him during his stay in prison. She is one of the volunteers who gives religious services to the prisoners, which is an evangelic religion called “The Jehovah’s Witnesses.”

Prison personnel refer to her as a person who tries to take advantage of him, because she administers his real state. Furthermore, several times the prison personnel have realized that she lies about her job activities. Indeed, she told the prison functionaries that she was a member of the police, and this was not true.

### **Personal background and career**

He enrolled the Sub-official School for Carabineers in 1972. His reasons for enrolling in the police were based on the economic improvement that this job meant for him, and his family was very proud of this. Due to the fact that he belonged to the lower socioeconomic class, joining the Carabineers it meant to him economic and social recognition and improvement. He was the first student of his class and he chose his specialization in the intelligence area. At this time he never thought that he would torture someone.

In 1980, he moved to Santiago, and he received training from CNI in the “*Tres Alamos*,” which was a prison administrated by CNI for political prisoners. Due to his studies in intelligence matters, the authorities appointed him in DICOMCAR.

### **Perception of the enemy**

He does not hate the political enemies or prisoners; instead, he perceives his role as a part of his job. When he looks back, he thinks that he committed atrocities, but he does

not accept responsibility for his acts; instead, he blames the high command. He argues that he was obligated to perpetrate crimes and he did not see other alternatives at this time.

## **Impunity**

Like the other interviewees, he never thought that would receive any punishment for his crimes, because he was following orders and the authorities should be responsible for these orders.

## **The Psychological Report**

### *1. Crime's consciousness*

In contrast to the other interviewees, he recognizes openly the criminal acts that he perpetrated (torture and homicides). However, he blames authority. He argues that if he refused to commit a crime his life and his family were threatened. Therefore, he just followed orders. He does not recognize that he committed robberies during the break-in of homes or the arrest of the victims. Like the other interviewees he acknowledges perpetrating some crimes, but he denies others, particularly those that are very difficult to justify in the context of their missions. However, the robberies perpetrated by him were consigned in the judicial file and other workmates verified this.

### *2. Consciousness of the injury caused*

He is the unique prisoner who paid the victims' family the monetary fines ordered by the criminal court. This attitude shows that he is able to perceive the damage committed to the victims and their families.

### *Psychological Description*

He actively resists the prison's system. He has permanent problems with prison functionaries, with the professional team and with other inmates. He does not follow the medical prescriptions and indications. Almost daily he presents complaints or requests.

He shows aggressive behavior. In fact, he was the only inmate who had physical fights with other prisoners.

In the first interview he was very cooperative and very excited about participating in the study. He gave two interviews and agreed to participate in the study. Nevertheless, later he did not continue with the interviews and does not give any explanation. To gendarmerie functionaries, this attitude is his common behavior.

Even though he does not have any psychological evaluation, because he refuses to receive treatment from a specialist, the psychologist and the medical physician believe that he presents poor mental health. In fact, they were surprised that this prisoner participated in this study.

In the judicial trial, the psychiatric evaluation did not report psychopathic personality and he had full conscience about the crimes committed. Hence, the apparent deteriorated mental health should appear during his stay in prison since 1991.

### **Locus of control and Self-esteem**

External Locus of control and Self esteem. Those aspects were not possible to evaluate since he did not continue participating in the study.

### **Daily routine in prison**

He does not develop any activity in the prison. He wakes up in the middle of the day and tries to pass the days. He does not attend courses or practice a sport. Sometimes, he runs.

### **Prison's Medical physician**

He is a very conflict-prone prisoner. He has constant conflicts with other prisoners and gendarmerie officials. He has diabetes, obesity and blood high pressure, but he does not follow a diet and drug treatment. He does not follow the medical indications.

### **Prison's functionary**

The prison functionaries say that the prisoner is one of the most conflictive inmates. He always complains about jail conditions without a real reason. Indeed, the court had ignored his complaints because they are unsubstantiated. His family does not visit him nor do any other relative or friends. The only person that visits him is the women that he met in prison.

### **Benefits**

He was able to buy three houses, despite the fact that his salary did not allow him to afford them. This real state belongs to him, not his wife. He was able to rob the victims without institutional sanction.

## Dynamic of motivation in the perpetration of torture




Figure N°9

### Analysis of results participant 5:

- In spite of the fact that this participant presents a certain type of mental deterioration, it is possible to observe in the judicial and prison files some characteristics which explain the motivation to participate in torture. Based on these elements the analysis is conducted.
- Like other participants in the judicial trial, he denied any participation in the crimes. Later, he blames the police authorities for the crimes he perpetrated, arguing that he followed orders.
- His enrollment in the police was not in response to a need to serve the community. Instead, the enrollment responded to his personal needs (economic and social recognition). This attitude is also observed in his personal life, in that he got married in order to get some institutional benefits.
- He was involved in illegal activities outside of the institutional framework, such as robbery. He denies this fact. The forensic psychiatric evaluations did not report any

personality disorder. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that he establishes relationship with others in terms of an instrumental relations for his personal gain.

However, this fact by itself is not enough to explain his attitude.

- Participant 5 is the only prisoner who paid the court fines to the victims' families. This demonstrates a contradiction between his claims that he merely followed orders and what he really did. He is able to perceive that he caused damage and that he is direct participation in the crimes, but he does not express verbally this last point.
- From the beginning of his prison sentence to today, he is described by the other inmates and the prison's personnel as a very conflict-prone person. This characteristic could have been aggravated by the time spent in prison. However, the bad relationships appear to also be associated with his family, because unlike the other prisoners' families, his family abandoned him once they knew his participation in the crimes.
- Like participant 1, 3 and 6, he received training in intelligence matters in the formal academic career. In this particular case, he was trained by the military and intelligence agency.
- He received important economic benefits, which allowed him to afford real estate and enjoy a good living standard, a lot better than a regular sub-official policeman.
- Due to the fact that today he presents mental deterioration it is not possible to evaluate the locus of control and self-esteem.

## PARTICIPANT 6

### Criminal Behavior

Type of crime perpetrated	Type of judicial sentence
Homicide of a civilian by cutting his throat, kidnappings three people and illicit association (same judicial file).	The judicial sentences are accumulated: life sentences, five years and day and 541 days.
Rape and sexual harassments of detainees.	Not prosecuted.
Torture detainees and political prisoners	Not prosecuted.
He has another ongoing judicial charge	Ongoing judicial process.

Table N°9

### Family History

He is the oldest brother of three siblings. He was born in 1952. His parents broke up when he was fifteen, because his mother initiated a new relationship. His father assumed the maternal role and he had to cooperate with him. He says that he felt that his mother abandoned him and his brother and sister.

His father belonged to the Socialist Party and was a psychiatrist and director of a public mental health hospital. At the time of the coup, his father was exiled and later his brother and sister left the country to live in exile with his father. The interviewee was the only member of his family who decided not to go into exile. He explains this by saying that the DIFA would kill him and his family if he did not cooperate with them.

He did not keep in touch with his original family due to the fact that his brother and sister are still members of the Communist Party and did not accept his betrayal against the members of the political party. It is important to highlight that participant 6 participated in the denunciation, arrest, torture, and murder of Communists. His mother died in 2006, but he did not keep touch with her since she got divorce from his father, when he was 15 years old. She lived in home for the elderly.

## **Actual Family**

He was married to a college student, who today is a social worker. He has one daughter and two sons; the younger one is affected by autism. When the judicial trial was initiated in 1985, he moved to live in Paraguay to avoid the judicial charges. Today, he is divorced and his wife lives in Paraguay with both sons. The daughter is living in Chile, and she has sporadic contact with him. He lost all contact with other family members. He does not have any contact with his ex-wife. In fact, she left him when he was arrested. He argues that he received a lot pressure from his wife to go back to Chile for the judicial trial. His wife did not know about his activities, and only she realized what he had done when they had to move to Paraguay to avoid the judicial trial. She worked for Paraguayan military veterans and she could lose her job due to the charges of human rights violations against him. She pressured him to be extradited and later she divorced him.

He perceived that his marriage and family were the best things that happened to him. In spite of the fact that the older son is affected by autism, and initially this fact was perceived as a tragedy, he and his wife were able to handle it.

He lived in Paraguay for five years, from 1987 to 1992. During his stay in Paraguay, he managed his own farm and founded the Autism Foundation. He gained a lot respect from the community, but at this time he used a false identity and nobody knew about his activities in Chile.

In the first interview, he argues that he got divorce to protect his wife from the judicial trial. She has a career in Paraguay and the community has a lot respect for her. His participation in the crimes caused the community and close friends to disapprove of him.

## **Personal background and career**

At the age of 19, he joined an intelligence unit of the Communist Party and he received his training from the K.G.B. services. The type of instruction that the K.G.B. gave him was military. The training offered the course of interrogation and infiltration of military forces to make allies.

When he came back to the country he was appointed by the Communist Party to a political movement. The movement was in charge of promoting political propaganda by painting walls in public areas. Later, he enrolled in the armed group, which belonged to the Communist Party (before the coup). At this time, he participated in numerous armed fights against rightwing groups. The Communist Party provided him the weapons to fight; meanwhile the Cuban government gave Chile military training and supplied arms to the Communist Party.

In 1975, DIFA (Intelligence Direction of the Air Force) was created. This unit has the mission to obtain information and advise the Generals, members of the Junta. DIFA investigated the enemies of the Generals, which could be inside his own division or in the Junta. After four months of arrest in DIFA, because he was a member of the Communist Party, he enrolled in DIFA in 1975; the objective was that he helped them in the persecution of members of the Communist Party.

In 1985, he was assigned to DICOMCAR to advise the team in the arrest and persecution of guerrilla group. This new assignment was mainly due to the fact that the DIFA was judicially investigated for the crimes perpetrated by the *Comando Conjunto*, and he could be involved in these crimes. The other task was counterintelligence. That is, he obtained information from DICOMCAR and gave DIFA this information.

He was considered by DIFA to be a good agent. His level of expertise in intelligence matters would help DICOMCAR, which did not handle information about the guerrilla groups and how to stop the attacks against police. The chief of DICOMCAR's team gave him a lot of support and credibility.

Even though handling information it was necessary to ensure his safety in the intelligence agencies, he did not have access to all information. Some information was restricted to certain group of people, if he asked too much the group did not trust in him. He perceived very clearly the limits of the information "when to ask for some information or when do not it."

*Why did you become a traitor?*

According to him, during the military coup, the Communist Party and its intelligence leaders did not alert its members about the military persecution. Instead, the party told them not to put up armed resistance. He felt completely abandoned, because the intelligence leaders asked for refuge outside the country and did not inform the followers what was happening. He was arrested and tortured, as were his friends and his family (brother and sister). When he was released, he had to live clandestinely under very poor conditions and later the Communist Party called him traitor, because Communist leaders were arrested and attributed responsibility to him.

When he was tortured, he denounced several Communist Party members. Then, the political party determined that he was responsible for the deaths and detentions of other party members, and targeted him as an enemy. Under these conditions, he felt very unsafe, his family was in exile, and they were threatened by DIFA's agents.

After the coup, he continued participating in the Communist Party and he made big effort to be involved with the party, but he did not perceive the same level of loyalty from the leaders.

In 1975 he enrolled DIFA, belonging to an intelligence agency gave him the power to handle information and have control on other military fields or police. DIFA enrolled people from the air forces (official and sub-officials) and civilians, who belonged to rightwing parties or rightwing movements, and people who belonged to leftwing parties. This was the case with this interviewee, who was arrested and tortured by the air force members. Nevertheless, he argues that he felt betrayed by the Communist Party and was not able to live clandestinely and he was trained to be an intelligence agent, therefore, he saw the possibility to work for DIFA and he did it.

### **Perception of historical moment**

At time of the military coup (1973), he was a member of the Communist Party. He enrolled in this political party at the age of 16. His family, as well as relatives and his group of friends, shared the same political ideology, some of them until today. Hence, being a Communist was the expected decision for his peer group. He says that “at this time a person must define the side which he or she wanted to belong, simply right or left without another alternative.” Moreover, if he could take the rightist position, he would have been isolated from his group of friends and family.

The Communist Party encouraged him to become the students’ president of the high school committee with the intention of leading the student movement against the rightwing parties and the capitalist model, and recruiting other students to the political party. Later, he was selected by the Communist Party to study in Soviet Union a course of intelligence. He

describes himself as an adolescent who was very idealistic and committed to the political party. He did not graduate from high school; he could graduate during his stay in prison.

He explains that the Communist Party was not an inoffensive political adversary; in reality, it had defined strategies to infiltrate the army before the coup. These included:

1. Listing conscripts in the Communist Party, who were enrolled in the army or recruiting them to the communist ideology.
2. The Communist Party asked the students of Army Academy and Police Academy (Carabineers and Investigations) to be loyal to the political party. Moreover, the Communist Party supported the enrollment of its members to these academies.
3. The Communist Party detected the army officials who sympathized with its party and used their sons or daughters to infiltrate them.

The objective of infiltrating the army was to cause discord within the army and to generate allies in the army. By 1974 the Communist Party was almost destroyed. The leaders were exiled and in 1975 to 1976, the political party organized and gave economical support to the military movement of the guerrilla organization FPMR.

In 1978, the Return Operation (*Operación Retorno*) began. The communist party decided that the leaders should be in the country. A group of important leaders came back clandestinely and reorganized the Communist Party and the FPMR was created.

In 1982, the Communist Party led and organized riots on the streets, public complaints, and propaganda against the military regime. Most of the arguments explained by the interviewee are presented in the first chapter. The facts are close to his interpretations of the historical actions. However, he uses this information to justify why he betrayed his political party. At this point, it is relevant to clarify that in the judicial trial it was proven that he denounced, tortured and killed members of the Communist Party. One

of his victims said that he raped her, and the forensic report described one of the assassinated men as presenting injuries in the rectum. He does not acknowledge these last crimes.

He perceives that the history is manipulated for those who have power. To him, today the leftist party has power; therefore, their members are those who wrote the national history and nobody knows about the historical actions that he refers to. The leftist party's discourse relates to the political persecution that its members suffered and they are presented in terms of victims of human rights violations. The leftist party does not mention the scenario previous to the coup, when it planned to take the power by force. He says "the civil war was imminent."

### **Perception of the enemy**

"The enemy is a subject, who uses the violence to achieve his objectives, so I can achieve my objectives by using the violence too." To him, it is impossible to perceive the enemy as a person because then he could not attack him or her, and he dehumanizes the enemy.

The enemy became intangible and a large numbers of myths and fantasies went around about him or her. Gradually, the enemy turned into a fabrication. Into this perception the person became an object (*cosification*). He refers to the enemy and other people in terms of element. He is unable to establish close relationships and tends to perceive people around him as an object, element This aspect was highlighted by prison's professionals, who had to evaluate him for prison benefits, and also it is observed during the interviews. He does not manifest any emotional attachment to his narrative. In 1985 the FPMR began a campaign against the police (Carabineers), which had as objective to kill policemen on street or attack police stations. They called *Placera Operative*. His group

believed in one absolute truth, that “the enemy would do the same that he could do him.” The enemy represented danger. The police wanted to stop the actions of the enemy. It did not matter what the cost would be in the future for them or for the institution.

*What did you feel when you killed a man at the first time?*

“I was scared, because I felt that I stepped up to a level that I could never back. It is a feeling that I crossed the line and I broke the highest human values. This act could happen again.”

He is able to recognize certain type of crimes, he explains that “every one perpetrates torture and assassination in order to compromise each other with the crime and avoid being denounced.” In his explanations, he does not appear to have any remorse or regret for the injuries caused to the victims. Moreover, it looks that if circumstances put him in the same situation again he would do the same things.

## **Impunity**

He never thought that he would be charged and condemned for his crimes. Moreover, he does not show any guilty feelings.

## **The Psychological Report**

### *1. Crime's consciousness*

He constantly maintains that he is a victim of circumstance. He says that he never felt that he was in charge of his life. He made the wrong decision but it was not his fault it was the circumstances, fate.

### *2. Consciousness of the injury caused*

Due to the enemy’s nature, to him the injury caused is irrelevant. Despite of the fact that he was tortured and taken prisoner, he is unable to be empathetic with the victims.

### *Psychological Description*

He received training in an early age. Since he was young he had the experience to be abandoned by his mother, and later he felt abandoned by the political party. He does not compromise emotionally with others. In fact, in the interviews he refers spontaneously to the other agents and does not show loyalty to them. Nevertheless, the forensic evaluation did not classify his personality as psychopathic or as a sociopath.

He says that his family is not affected by domestic violence. He recognizes that he does not have a normal relationship with his daughter, she visits him sporadically and he does not know where she lives. In prison, he is not visited for anyone. His family does not visit him, only sporadically his daughter visits him. According to the prison guard, during his daughter's visits, he has sexual relations with his daughter. Despite this fact the psychiatric evaluation does not report any antisocial personality, and the prison's professional team does not handle this information.

In the interviews, he is very rational in response to the questions and is very cooperative and calm. When I asked certain question about his criminal acts, he avoids the question or simply says "I do not know why I did it." He uses the mechanism of rationalization permanently in order to avoid emotional contact with his history. In all the interviews, he was extremely polite and gentle.

### **Locus of control**

He argues that he could not have control of his life. The only time he perceives himself to have been in control of making decisions it was when he decided to study in Soviet Union and when he lived in Paraguay. He believes that his life always was controlled by others and he does accept responsibility for the crimes, because, he explains, if he did not betray the friends he would have become a disappeared victim. However, he

does not explain how he became a part of the repressive apparatus and how he is able to perpetrate the crimes that he denied.

### **Self- esteem**

Despite of the fact that he is in prison and he is not visited by relatives, only sporadically for his daughter, his self-esteem does not appear damaged. It is important highlight that despite of this assessment of his self-esteem, a more exhaustive evaluation should be conducted because that this interviewee presents certain type of personality features which prevent him from expressing empathy for others and make him avoid establishing emotional attachment to other people. He refers to other people around him as “element.”

### *Sexual assaults and denial*

As was mentioned before, during the judicial trial one of the victims, who were kidnapped and sexually abused, identified him as her sexual offender, but he does not recognize the accusations and argues that other policemen harassed her. The charges were not investigated. He also denied perpetrating torture related to sexual abuses, and does not acknowledge having sexual relations with his daughter. These types of crimes reveal that his moral values are very ambiguous, and he is able to distinguish between the socially acceptable behavior and unacceptable behavior. He perceives the social and legal sanctions that he could receive, and so he opts to deny the unacceptable behavior. He has life sentence and the punishment do not modify his conduct, they only restrict his actions. The psychological and the psychiatric evaluations did not detect psychopathic characteristics in his personality. Nevertheless, the absence of guilt for his behavior and the way that he refers to his crimes show that he does not keep emotional contact with his narrative. He rationalizes his acts, and he never has emotional contact with his statements, and when

during the interview it is mentioned that he is absolutely alone, he does not establish emotional contact with this fact.

### **Daily routine in prison**

He reads the news papers and analyzes the news. He practices sports and organizes soccer competitions into the prison between inmates. He reads books.

He grows roses and Rose Marry (Romero), practices sports and organizes soccer games in the prison.

### **Prison's Medical physician**

He has very good health.

### **Prison's functionary**

He is a conflict-prone prisoner. He always presents requests for protection in the court or in prison. He complains about any routine activities in which he feels that other prisoners have more privileges than he. Officials of gendarmerie perceive him as a dishonest and astute person. He does not have visit or visitors in prison; therefore gendarmerie has to provide him the cloths and personal stuff.

### **Benefits**

His position gave him power and job stability. Because his level of education was low (he did not graduate from high school) and his training was in intelligence matters it was unlikely that he could find a job with a good salary.

The type of job he had allowed him to have relationships with people who had power and influence. He never felt part of the intelligence agency, but he believed that the institution gave him some protection from the leftist parties (people that he betrayed). Due

to the fact that he was a civilian, he could never enjoy a prestige inside the agency and he could not feel absolutely safe. The intelligence agency gave him financial support and a false passport to live in Paraguay during the judicial investigation.

## Dynamic of motivation in the perpetration of torture




Figure N°10

### Analysis of results participant 6:

- Participant 6's life history reports abandonment by his mother during his adolescence. The affective losses are present throughout his life. His father, sister and brother had to go exile, and later his wife divorced him after the judicial sentence. She does not keep contact with him nor do his brother and sister, who also condemn his behavior. Even though the forensic evaluation does not report any sociopath tendency, it is possible to see that he is unable to establish emotional attachment with other people.
- He is able to acknowledge the crimes for which he was judicially condemned but only in the context of the historical moment and the role of an intelligence agent. Nevertheless, he denies committing sexual crimes or any criminal conduct that could not be justified by the agent's role. The prison's psychologists do not detect any sociopath feature; however, they have not applied any specific evaluation to detect

those. He has a life sentence and he does not have any prison benefits. Therefore, the psychologists have not required any specific evaluation.

- He is a kind of person who looks out for his own convenience regardless the consequences for others. When he perceived that Communist party did not support him and he did not have a good level of education, which allowed him to keep his good standard of living, he saw the opportunity to work for the intelligence agencies as a way to develop his abilities and keep his economic standard.
- To him, it did not matter what side he joined, the relevant aspect was what side provided him the conditions to develop his abilities as an intelligence agent. Due to this, he was able to move from one side (Communist) to other (military anticomunist). He was able to demonize the enemy depending on what side he ascribed to. In his narrative, it is possible to see the justification for his behavior depending on position that he had. To the intelligence agencies, he was an important contribution for the persecution of the Communist members, due to the fact that he knew the members, the political party structure and the way that they operated. Therefore, he participated in the identification, torture and murder of the Communist members.
- His description of the historical moment is very close to the facts that effectively happened. In the chapter 3, the Chilean socioeconomic crisis and political violence in 1973 and the different moments of the military repression were reviewed. If this discussion is compared to his depiction of the historical events, they coincide. Therefore, under this scenario, it is possible to conclude that he enrolled on the side from which he could obtain gains and safety. In the interviews, it is observed that he was absolutely convinced that the intelligence agencies, independently of their tendencies, were necessary in order to fight against any threat and he uses these

instances to achieve their own purposes. Therefore, the threat came up depending on the side where one was placed, and he was able to move from one to another.

- He handles very well the way one can create the enemy perception and the mechanisms used to demonize the enemy to fight against them and strip them of any humanity. Even though he is able to identify these mechanisms, he used those to achieve the purposes of the intelligence agencies. He explains “that if you see the person that you have front on you in the torture room, you are unable to torture him or her.”
- Clearly, he presents deviant conduct, and the torture dynamic allowed him to perpetrate sexual abuse, and no one condemned this conduct. To the contrary, the intelligence agency’s members used his knowledge and abilities to persecute Communist members and provided him a salary, which allowed him maintain a good lifestyle. The absence of punishment was an important element, which permitted him to perpetrate the crimes. Indeed, when he was prosecuted for the murders of the teachers, the intelligence agency provided him a false identity and moved him and his family to live in Paraguay.
- In the interview, he was asked why he preferred to betray his own people and work for the “enemy” instead of going into exile. Even though the answer is implicit and mentioned above, he justifies his election based on the fact that his brother and sister would be assassinated. In spite of the fact they were safe in the exile, he insists on this answer.
- He received training at the early age from the KGB. This experience gave him the opportunity to find his vocational interests and encouraged his fantasy of “James Bond” as an intelligence agent. The training also gave tools for fighting against an enemy using intelligence strategies. In the process, he was systematically desensitized to the violence, and he learned that the use of torture was a legitimate method of interrogation

and achieved the intelligence purposes. The illegal methods were irrelevant and what was most important was the final result.

- When he enrolled in DIFA, he was not the only civilian who worked for this intelligence agency. Others intelligence members who belonged to extreme rightwing groups joined this agency voluntarily. At this time, he met one of the civilian agents, and they became very close friends (later, his friend was killed by a guerrilla group). He felt very close to him due to the fact that they did not feel completely integrated with the other military agents because they were civilians. This situation made them feel, in a certain way, excluded them from the military. He says “we would never achieve at the high position, nevertheless we could relate with them and have power.” The military did not trust them because they are not military.
- He also shared with this friend his fear about the personal consequences if he left the agency, and the friend discouraged any initiative to leave it. Instead, he made him see the terrible consequences that he would pay if he or they abandoned the agency, because the Communists would look for him and he would not have the support of the agency.
- This friendship permanently reinforced his enrollment in the intelligence agency and also supported his criminal behavior. The peer group also encouraged him in the perpetration of torture. Hence, his job was positively recognized by the authorities, peers and his friend.
- In the tests, he presents a pronounced external locus of control and his self esteem does not appear damaged. The external locus of control can be explained by the fact that he blames the context for his own decisions. He does not recognize explicitly the benefits

that he obtained during his job in the agencies. Instead, he explains his participation in the crimes based on the contextual circumstances.

- The benefits obtained are evident. He enjoyed his job as an agent and he perceives himself with personal abilities to detect and reduce the adversaries. Moreover, the institution gave him the possibility to express violence and sexual deviance, and gave him economic rewards to keep a good lifestyle.

## ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

In the following table, the characteristics of the individuals are compared to define the similarities and differences between the personal motivations of the subjects in the perpetration of torture.

VARIABLES	PARTICIPANTS					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Common Crimes	Drug consume	Bribery	Police brutality	Police brutality	Robbery Police brutality	Rape Sexual harassment
Deny common crimes	√	√	√	√	√	√
Acknowledge the perpetration of torture	√	X	√	√	√	√
Perception of torture as a illegal act	√	√	√	√	√	√
Economic Benefits	√	√	√	√	√	√
Psychological Benefits	√	√	√	√	√	√
Job gratification	√	√	√	√	√	√
Torture training	√	X	√	X	√	√
Work socialization accepts torture	√	√	√	√	√	√
Intelligence training	√	√	√	√	√	√
Enemy's evil perception	√	√	√	√	√	√
Anticommunist beliefs	√	√	√	√	√	√
Perception of historical moment	√	√	√	√	√	√
Moral values accept torture	√	√	√	√	√	√

Systematic desensitization toward violence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Perception of impunity	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Locus of control	Internal	Internal	External	Internal	---	External
Self Esteem	High	High	High	High	---	High
Antisocial personally	X	X	X	X	X	?
Child history abuse	X	X	X	X	X	Emotional abandonment
Institutional enrollment's age	14	14	22	20	21	23
Training's age in intelligence agency	20	40	28	30 aprox.	29	19
No remorse	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Table N° 10: Individual Variables**

- The interviewees refer exclusively to the crimes that they were condemned for (homicides) and deny being responsible for common crimes such as robbery or sexual attacks. None of them were judicially persecuted for the perpetration of torture acts.

Even though all of them have perfectly clear knowledge that they behaved outside the law, they explain this conduct based on the historical moment and the features of the enemy.

In fact, they perpetrated other crimes that they are unable to explain in the context of “war,” and they simply deny these acts. The denial appears to be a constant variable in the interviewees. This allows them to avoid social condemnation and save their self-perception and self-esteem.

- In the table, it is observed that all of them perpetrated common crimes; nevertheless, a few of them are able to perceive those crimes in these terms. That is to say, participant 2 carried out bribery, but he was never legally persecuted and he diminishes these acts and puts them as normal matters. The same aspect is observed in the policemen (participants 3, 4, 5), who refer to the police brutality as regular acts. Indeed, none of them try to hide this information. To the contrary, they mention them in the context of their routine tasks, despite of the fact they were also condemned for the use of unnecessary violence. The same feature is observed when they refer to the torture.
- During the research, it was very important to review the judicial sentence files because they tended to lie with respect to the facts. The lies come up to hide other crimes and justify their criminal conduct and they also tried to blame the crimes on other people. Therefore, the researcher had to be very careful to distinguish between true and false information. This dynamic makes reality confusing and it was necessary to distinguished between fantasy, and how these fantasies relate to the truth.
- The “espionage world” made them building up certain interpretation of facts which were not necessarily real, and once they established certain facts as true, they went to a scale of unreal perceptions to confirm their beliefs. The violent attacks of the guerrilla groups confirmed their fantasies or, indeed, the real facts made them increase the perception of the enemy in terms of imminent danger and evilness.
- They have beliefs and values, which provide them with a logical framework for perpetrating crimes. Therefore, to them it is very difficult to question their behavior, because they are rigid in their thinking, which prevents them from doubting their conduct and beliefs. In the following figure, the manner in which they establish their

beliefs, making it very difficult to change the way they think about their criminal acts, is described.




Figure N°11

- The circular form of thought prevents them from remorse. Sometimes, they are ambiguous and vary from acknowledging their participation in their crimes to blaming the context or the institution. This ambiguity is stabilized using the argument of following orders. That is, when the interviewer asked them about their career, the feeling of autonomy, the notion of the hero and superiority appears in each case. However, this perception of autonomy makes them directly responsible for the crimes and the way to avoid this responsibility and keep their safe-image safe is by explaining their behavior by saying that they followed orders.
- None of them acknowledge feeling satisfaction by torturing a person, but they felt gratified by their jobs. This aspect shows us the individual features that motivated each of them to enroll an intelligence agency. In fact, all of them, with only the exception of participants 5 and 6 (which are not very clear) recall being voluntarily enrolled in the intelligence agency.

All of them, with no exception, received economic and psychological rewards and they feel that those benefits were absolutely deserved.

PARTICIPANTS	BENEFITS
1	Loan of CORFO. Loan from CNI, the money was not paying back. A farm house. 15.000 dollars from a total of 100.000. Financial support and false passport to stay in Uruguay during the judicial investigation. Airplane tickets for him and his family. Payment of the expensive and salary of the lawyers. Notation of merit.
2	Handle power as a state gubernator, and be surrounded by people that belonged to high social class. Joining high command position, which gave him prestige and economic rewards. Expensive gifts. Following a diplomatic career.
3	Mainly psychological such as afore extramarital relationships. Express violent behavior. 30% income over a regular policemen salary. Achieving Capitan rank.
4	Financing the physical rehabilitation of his arm in Germany. Buying several real states. Belonging to DICOMCAR gave him prestige and the opportunity to stay active in the police, because his physical handicap limited him to continue in the police.
5	Buying three houses. Perpetrating robberies without institutional sanction.
6	Handling power. Job stability and achieve a good salary. Keeping relationships with people who had power and influences. The intelligence agencies gave him protection from the leftist parties (people that he betrayed). Financial support and false passport to live he and his family in Paraguay during the judicial investigation.

**Table Nº 11**

- In this list, it is clear that each of them have their own motivations to enroll in the intelligence agency. The motivations are individual and respond to their personal needs. The economic rewards had an important impact on their conduct, because it not only gratified them economically but also was an institutional signal that they did a very good job. All of them were able to develop a successful career and achieve high ranks. In Chile, having a good economic standard of living gives people prestige and power, and they were able to achieve those.

If the motivations are observed in detail, they are not very different from one to another, because they looked for economic gains, prestige and power and the intelligence agencies gave them. The differences raise questions regarding the meanings of these motivations. That is to say, each interviewee defines that had an important role defending the country from the enemy. Participant 4 expresses the notion of the hero, and participants 1, 3, and 6 refer to being an agent like "James Bond," who was involved in intelligence matters and works for the benefits of the nation. Participants 2, 5 and 6 perceive that the institutions (Army and Carabineers, respectively) gave them the opportunity to develop a better social and economic status and the intelligence agencies (DINE and DICOMCAR) were a way to achieve them.

- One of the hypotheses is that the type of training used by the army makes the soldier, making him more tolerant toward the use of violence. If this variable is observed separately from others, it does not explain why some military soldiers or policemen do not perpetrate torture and others do. When this variable is associated with the individuals' characteristics it explains why the participants were more easily convinced carry out torture than others. Here it is important distinguish between the personal motivation mentioned previously, their beliefs, and the type of training that each participant had.
- Their personal motivations were coupled with the Anti-Marxist ideology and the perception of the enemy. Moreover, the group to which they belonged became close and their members reinforced the concept of enemy in terms of evil and dangerous threat. At this point two elements became fundamental: what they expected for their own life and what the institution offered them to achieve these expectations. Both elements were supported by the Anti-Marxist beliefs and the perception of the enemy.

Into this frame, torture was a method to achieve their purposes: destroying the enemy, saving the country and receiving the honors and recognition for doing it.

- The type of training of each participant made them more tolerant toward the violence.

Here is necessary to distinguish between the type of training received, and one has to be very specific about it. That is, all the participants had intelligence training and this specific preparation gave them tools to interrogate the enemy. This training is not offered by the military or police academics, this is given by specific intelligence agencies which could belong to the national army, foreign army or some particular intelligence agencies such as CNI. In chapter four was mentioned that the training also gave them the conviction about the danger of the Marxist as enemy and how to reduce this threat using torture.

- In addition, the police had the regular practice of mistreating the detainees. Hence, the policemen were able to implement the torture methods in their regular procedures. This preparation was not offered by the police academies' training, instead it was learned into the informal daily job socialization.
- Once of the most powerful impacts of the training on the conduct studied was the progressive desensitization of the subject with respect to the torture. The training gave them the possibility to strip the victims of any humanity and also favored the fact that they progressively and systematically endure toward violence. Therefore, if one of them witnessed some of their colleagues or subordinates rape a victim did not cause any reason for commotion, in spite of the fact that this crime was not justified by the context of national security policy. In fact, one of the victims assassinated by the policemen had evidence of suffering sexual aggressions.

- The criterion for selection for enrolling in an intelligence agency was not very clear. However, it is observed that each interviewee had intelligence training, which was obtained previous to enrolling in the intelligence agency; all of them shared the anti-Marxist ideology, assumed a risky behavior and were able to commit an illegal activity.
- The prison sentence is the factor that makes the prisoners question their acts, but the questioning was not about the damages caused to the victims, instead, it was concern about their own personal situation, such as being separated from their family. Despite the fact that anyone would think that they have sociopath personality in the forensic evaluation, none of them reports it.
- The perception of impunity of each interviewee was strong. The absence of a sanction not only did not point out what conduct was allowed by the institution, but also did not put limits in their behavior. Despite the fact that the interviewees knew very well that they behaved outside the law, the torture dynamic gave them the possibility to exceed normal conduct and perpetrate acts which are unjustified in the frame of “war.” Here is relevant to mention that the structure and goals of the intelligence agencies sheltered any individual who participated in deviant conduct. Therefore, this aspect has also to be considered among the individual motivations, a subject might have had in enrolling this type of agency.
- Goodstart and Hjelle (1973) argue that an individual with external locus of control might resort to coercive or manipulative strategies when placed in a situation to obtain a goal. Meanwhile, the subjects with internal locus of control utilized coercion of others only after trying to achieve control by acceptable means. Here it is evident that the type of locus did not have a role in carrying out torture. In addition, it can be established that a subject with an external locus can be more influenced by the peer group in the

criminal conduct than an individual with internal locus. Nevertheless, the interviewees present in distinctly different types of locus which could not have an impact on their conduct.

- Self-esteem does not appear damaged even by the prison sentence. Indeed, the interviewees present high self-esteem and in fact they used their job as a way to reinforced positively their self-concept. Their over-sized self-perception made them underestimate other people and committed stupid acts, which left their crimes exposed.
- The child abuse history appears in only one interviewee, participant 6. This variable does not come out as a pattern that could influence this type of crime, torture.
- In Chile, the age to be persecuted as an adult criminal was 21 years old. In 1989, the law reduced the age to 18 years old. The change of the law was based on the idea that citizens are able to understand the consequences of their acts at this age. Indeed, the law 20.084, which refers to juvenile criminal law, published in 2006, confirms this concept. Here, two important differences are expressed: one is the age when the soldiers enrolled in the army and the second was the age when the person enrolled in the intelligence training. The enrollment age in the army was 14 for participants 1 and 2. The enrollment age in the intelligence agency was 20 and 40 respectively. The age of enrollment in the police academy was very similar 22, 20 and 21. However, the policemen joined the intelligence training at the age close to 30 years old (28, 30 and 29). Looking at the age of institutional enrollment, it is quite early in the case of the enrollment in the military (14), but for the policemen not really early, around 20. The level of mature between adolescence and young adulthood marks important differences between both age groups and those differences do not appear to have impact on the criminal conduct. Here it appears that the military or police training gave them the

chance to learn how to follow orders without questioning the intuition. However, it does not explain why other military soldiers or policemen, who were enrolled the institution at the same age, did not join an intelligence agency and perpetrate torture. Indeed, the ages of enrollment in an intelligence agency were advanced, making it possible that the subjects made voluntarily decisions to enter this type of agency. In conclusion the age of training is not a variable determinant in the perpetration of this type of crime.

- It would be interesting to interview their families in order to know how they behave in the intimate group. Most the family members knew about the criminal acts during the judicial trial. Unfortunately, it was not possible due to the limits imposed by the prison authorities to conduct this study.

## **CHAPTER VIII**

### **FINAL CONCLUSIONS**

The results of this study show that the perpetration of torture is a complex crime, which requires of the presence of numerous variables in order to be expressed. Three groups or level of variables are observed. Their presences are indirectly or directly necessary for the manifestation of this crime. Those are the institutional level, group level and individual level. The following figure describes these three levels:




Figure N° 12

Each level of analysis reflects the level of direct or indirect incidence on the studied conduct, torture. The institutional level gathers the variables that the military or police institution provided to generate the general scenario to perpetration of this crime. These variables are not by themselves the trigger of this conduct. However, they favored and encouraged the manifestation of studied conduct.

## Institutional Level

The following figure shows the variables that are expressed at the institutional level:




Figure N°13

The findings show that the Chilean military and police invested a bureaucratic authoritarianism that defined a hierarchical structure. This structure determined the organizational structure, the distribution of command, and established the communicational system. Since the military and police founded the intelligence agencies and their own men were who organized these agencies, they followed this institutional system and organizational order. The intelligence agencies had diverse agencies at the regional level, and these agencies were commanded and supervised at the central level. This organizational system allowed the central level to have control on the ground. The most powerful of this structure was how the communicational system worked, because in the organizational structure the information went up and down, and vice versa and also allowed the information to be disseminated very fast and easily. The authorities gave orders the

subordinates, but at the same time the subordinates were commanded to inform their activities to the command.

The obedience theory's concepts do not observed clearly. On once side, the some interviewees claim that they followed order, but at the same time they recognized to feel gratified by their job and that they joined voluntarily the intelligence agencies. When they are asked whether or not they were able to refuse an order they claim that they could refuse to perpetrate a crime and they did what they did because they were absolutely convinced that they did the right thing. The concepts of obedience theory are utilized for the lawyers of the accused in the judicial trial as a way to reduce their responsibilities in the crimes. Moreover, the victims' lawyers used the obedience's concepts to make responsible people from the high command and the institution. In spite of the purposes of the lawyers, h re is observed that the institutional structure and the way that is spread out the orders favored the perpetration of this crime. Nevertheless, it was necessary to have individuals able to torture.

The institutional values joined anti-Marxist ideology and did not give chance to anyone to dissent from the institution or its authorities. The ideology by itself did not motivate them to torture; instead it was the idea about whom they should torture. Being a Marxist meant to be the state enemy. The institutions did not give their own people the chance of disagreeing. This means that those who did not share anti-Marxist ideology were expelled from the institution. The interviewees and the defense lawyers interviewed did not perceive that ideological disagreement with institutions' ideology and with the "procedures" of the intelligence agency was synonymous of being murder. Instead, this means that the dissidents were not appointed on high positions or did not develop a successful career. One of the defense lawyers explains that could be possible that during the first time of the military regime, the dissenting military soldiers or policemen could be

separated from the institution or murdered, and this fact created a myth about what happened with the military dissidents of the regime. However, in the praxis this fact did not occur at least during the eighties and end of seventies.

The difference between an intelligence agency and a military or police institution must point out. The military or police institution provided the infrastructure, personnel, facilities and the organizational system to implement the intelligence agency, which depended on each institution. Then, the intelligence agencies were those that carried out torture.

The institutions also gave rewards and benefits to the agents, who worked on the intelligence agencies, and also provided the conditions to avoid any punishment, judicial or not, for the perpetration of torture or other type of common crime. In this case, the institution as well the intelligence agency, accepted the torture as a way to fight back the enemy.

It has to be differenced the type of training given by the military and police institutions from the training given by the intelligence agencies. The intelligence training gave them information about what type of enemy they should fight and the methods that they should be use to defeat them. The conviction about the danger of the Marxist as enemy was given by the intelligence training and reinforced by the group. Instead, the institutional training for carabineers and army soldiers made them follow orders naturally. Following an order was part of the daily routine since they were enrolled in the academy. Therefore, when a superior gave an order their duty was to obey it. Both types of training are coupled to perpetrate torture. From one side the institution gave them the feeling of identity and socialized them about the hierarchical organizational structure and the institutional discipline. On the other hand, the intelligence training gave them the

conviction about the danger and evil nature of the enemy, and the way how they had to defeat this threat.

Another feature of the institutions is that the military are trained to fight back against an enemy. The training to fight back the enemy was coupled with the attributes given to enemy. It was no matter if the enemy's attributes were truth or false, the point was that the enemy was a threat that put in risk the society and the lives of those who fight against them (military or policemen). In the case of the police occurred something similar. That is, the police fight back against the criminals, and the criminals were the enemy. Therefore, the institutions had the structure and ideology to fight back with someone. Therefore, it was not difficult to introduce them an image of enemy, in this case left party members or guerrilla members. One of the policemen interviewed explains that he was trained to fight a war and then he does not understand why civilians complain about the procedures used by him, because he was trained to do it.

One of the variables which were not expected to find, it was the role of the authorities' political interest in order to destroy the political adversaries of the military regime. Today, several interviewees are able to perceive the manipulation of the political authorities to defeat their political adversaries.

The agents that worked in CNI and DICOMCAR admit that their job in these agencies made them spending a long time away from their homes and they stayed with other agents most of the days. This meant that they were isolated from the civil world and established a close relationship between the agents of the same unit. The isolation limited their possibilities to relate to other social group, which could give them another point of view about their conduct.

The institutional criteria for enrolling an agent were not very precise. However, most of the interviewees agree that one of the criteria was that the subject shared anti-Marxist ideology, assumed a risky behavior and were able to commit an illegal activity. The institutional variables appear as factors that supported and favored the scenario to motive an individual to perpetrate torture.

### **Group Level**

It is also observed that the subjects were motivated to commit certain type of crimes independently of the institutional sponsor. Some of these variables are present at the group level, which are presented in the next figure:





Figure N°14

Here is possible to observe that institutional and individual variables (moral values and beliefs) are expressed at the group level. This occurs due to the fact that the variables are coupled each other for the occurrence of torture.

As it was mentioned in the chapter group characteristics, the group generated a dynamic that supported, encourage and triggered directly the perpetration of torture. However, this dynamic is not into a vacuum. Instead, the group dynamic was set up on the institutional framework.



**Figure N°2**

In the group dynamic, the presence of individual variables appears as a condition necessary to the perpetration of torture; these variables are crucial to determine the participation of the interviewees in this type of crime. The individual variables were merged with the group.

Berkowitz (1989) argues that to express an aggressive behavior, the presence of rewards is necessary, and the rewards could come from the peer group. In this study, it is founded that the impact of group influences and the reinforcement given by the military or police institutions through rewards encouraged the perpetration of torture.

In these findings the variable group necessity (Matza, 1984; Tittle & Paternoster, 2000) appears in terms of the intelligence organized groups taught how to carry out torture. The group provided social support and a body of supporting beliefs for torture. Like the findings showed by Huggins et al. (2003) with the Brazilian police, the informal daily socialization in the police organization gave informally the policing techniques and attitudes to mistreat and torture the detainees.

According to Tittle and Paternoster (2000) a person who has many groups that meet a particular need, such as companionship, is less dependent on any given one and is, therefore, less likely to fear rejection and less subject to group pressure. Here is evident the level of isolation of the intelligence agency's members, which could have impact in the studied conduct. However, several interviewees do not recognize the group pressure to explain their participation in torture. Instead, they refer to their beliefs and the role that they played to save the society and people from their own institution. Nevertheless, it can not be ignored that the group certainly gave them status and prestige and had the ability to grant recognition.

The role of the group to promote masculinity as a form of power, which emphasizes competition, dominance and control is also evidenced. Indeed, most of the interviewees express that in the torture session did not have room to doubt or show any signal of questioning. Participant 1 and 4, who led groups of men, coincided that they have to show confidence and guide with assurance "their men."

The characterization of a structural model of the processes of social influence presented by Kelman (1961, 1964) describes three variables: compliance, identification and internalization. The results of this research evidence the presence of the internalization in terms that the participants declare that their beliefs were congruent with the group values

and those values reinforced their beliefs. Nevertheless, it has to be established that most participants invested an anti-Marxist ideology previously to join the intelligence agency. Some of them ascribed the anti-Marxist ideology previous to enroll the police.

Warr and Stafford (1991) and Elliot and Scott (1996) argue that misbehaving people select friends and associates who also misbehave. Effectively, here the individual motivations coupled with the group to drive the perpetration of torture.

Deindividuation is not observed in this study, the secret and commitment dynamic did not allow it, since the subject was identified in the perpetration of the crime in order to commit him in a crime. The group dynamic is very particular in this study and played a fundamental role to generate the conditions to the occurrence of the torture.

The enemy perception represents one of the main variables to explain the criminal behavior. This perception not only is reinforced and shared by the group but also represents the beliefs of the individuals. When the individuals' beliefs were coupled with group beliefs those beliefs became a truth and they accepted the torture as a tool to defeat the enemy.

The secret encouraged the group cohesion and also was a tool to commitment the group members with the crimes. They were accomplices of crimes whatever it was the level of their participation in those, and this fact made them to keep secrets.

Sykes and Matza (1957) and Minor (1980) point out that the technique of neutralization is a cognitive mechanism that has the function of releasing from constraints. The techniques include denial of responsibility, denial of the victim, denial of the injury, higher loyalty (I had to defend the fatherland), metaphor of the ledger (look at good things we have done) and condemning the condemners. These techniques were evidenced in each interviewee, particularly, the denial. In fact, the interviewees refer exclusively to the crimes that they were judicially condemned (homicides) and deny being responsible for common

crimes such as robbery or sexual attacks. None of them were judicially persecuted for the perpetration of torture acts. Even though all of them have perfectly clear that they behaved outside the law, they explain this conduct based on the historical moment and the features of the enemy. The denial allows them to avoid social condemnations and save their self-perception and self-esteem.

### **Individual Level**

They have beliefs and values, which permitted them into a logical frame to perpetrate crimes. Therefore, to them it is very difficult to question their behavior, because they structure rigid thoughts, which prevent them to doubt about their conduct and beliefs.

The circular form of thoughts prevents them from remorse. Sometimes, they are ambiguous and vary from assuming their participation in their crimes to make responsible the context or the institution. This ambiguity is stabilized using the argument of following orders. That is, when the interviewer asked them about their career, the feeling of autonomy, the notion of hero and superiority appears in them, in each case in particular. However, this perception of autonomy made them directly responsible for the crimes and the way to avoid this responsibility and keep safe their self-image is explaining their behavior saying that they followed orders.

The following figure shows the individual variables that appear recurrently in the interviewees:




Figure N° 15

The motivations to join an intelligence agency were very common between the interviewees, and these motivations were strongly linked with the benefits. They looked for economic gains, prestige and power and the intelligence agencies gave them. The differences rise regarding the meanings of these motivations. Each interviewee defines that had an important role defending the country from the enemy. One of them expresses the notion of the hero, others refer being an agent like "James Bond," who was involved in intelligence matters and works for the benefits of the nation, and others recognizes that they had the opportunity to develop a better social and economic status and the intelligence agencies were a way to achieve them.

The individual and group beliefs were merged and the institution offered them rewards and concrete benefits (psychological, material or economic) which encouraged their beliefs and their behavior. Indeed, none of them or their families had a bad economic standard of living. The only exception is the participant 6 who was abandoned by his family.

One of the common characteristics of the interviewees was that all of them have committed regular crimes. This feature shows that their moral values are inconsistent and they adopt those according to their own gain. They are absolutely consciousness about what conducts break the law, but they felt free to do it, because they had the absolute certain that they will never be persecute for these crimes – indeed, they are not. Today, they simply deny those regular crimes, because these crimes are not justified into the frame of war and the fight against the enemy, and they seek to project a respectable image.

Here two aspects are observed. One is that some of the interviewees looked for an institution to express their deviant conduct, and others perceived that the expression of deviant conduct were not punished or restricted by the group or the institution. Therefore, under this scenario both groups of subjects could express their delictual conduct. The systematic desensitization with respect to violence simply made them become tolerant and endured them.

The perception of the historical moment helped them to build up the enemy perception and the real violent attacks against the military and police members supported their perceptions and amplify the power of the threat. The military regime's authorities reinforced the evil perception of the enemy and supported the use of torture to retaliate them.

The results do not demonstrate that low self-esteem or external locus of control have some incident in this type of crime. Moreover, the child history abuse does not appear as a condition in the interviewees. The sociopath personality also is not manifested. Nevertheless, the researcher has several doubts about one of the participants, but the forensic evaluation did not report any psychopathic features.

The next figure shows how the three groups of variables are coupled.




Figure N°16

These finding could prompt one that anyone could became in a torture, however, I strongly disagree with these hypothesis due to the fact that the results show that the individuals who perpetrate torture have their own motivations to do it and they embraced anti-Marxist ideology and they way to defeat it.

Effectively, we can say that anyone can be a criminal but at the same time we can say that anyone could be not a criminal. Human beings have the possibility to choose and here is observed that the interviewees chose to perpetrate torture, and they were not under perceived constrains.

The psychological characteristics and personality features of this type of criminals should be studied in depth. To determine specific personality aspects of a subject to perpetrate torture it is required the application of numerous instruments, which could not be administrated in this study such as MMPI 3. The exhaustive study of the subject could help us to determine specific personality features that help us to prevent this crime. Nevertheless, the presence of the institutional variables and group variables are evidenced and those allow one to prevent this crime.

After the military government, in Chile several measures had been adopted by the democratic authorities. One of them has been structural changes of the administration of justice. Today, the inquisitorial judicial system has been changed for an accusatorial judicial system in which people are considered innocent until it is proved the contrary. Two new institutions were created: Defensoría (Defense Counsel) and Fiscalía (Prosecutors).

The police have gradually adapted to the new form to investigate crime. Human rights issues have been incorporated to the curriculum of military and police training. The progress has been slow but important.

Unfortunately, the governmental authorities and as well as human rights defense lawyers do not perceive the importance to punish torture. None of the interviewees were judicially punished for this crime. This aspect illustrates the absence of interest to deter this type of crime.

If I have to say what I have learned from this study, I would say that the hate makes you become in one of them, because people give to the enemy the evil features and turn them into a true threat. When this occurs, people make horrible things to fight back the enemy. These things makes them became evil. The evil is not outside.

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## APPENDIX

### **Summary of Interior Ministry's Decrees Before the Military Coup 1973**

Describe situation	Decisions taken	Date
Strike of Mining company in the north, Antofagasta	Orders to end the strike	1566, October 1972
Change of Ministers. The Index of Costumer prices (IPC) during 1972 increased 164% and between January and March of 1973 it was increased 30%	Asks to resignation of ministers	399, March 1973
Strike of State companies of buses	Orders to end the strike	436, April 1973
Strike of operative personnel of the Casa de la Moneda	Orders to end the strike. Appoints an Army Colonel to reinitate activities and to fire people.	623, May 1793
A huge storm affected the south of the country two cities were isolated and import material losses were reported	Declare area of catastrophe the south of the country	822, June 1973
Strike of Mining company of Teniente	Orders to end the strike State Mining Association (El Teniente) went to strike due to the fact that the workers rejected the implementation a law. The government decreed that the province was under emergency. This allowed the military intervention in the strike.	901, july1973
Strike of State companies of buses	Orders to end the strike. Appoints Air Force personnel to reinitate activities. Applies State National Security Law 12.927	1109, august 1973
Strike of Trucks companies	Orders to end the strike. Appoints army generals to Apply State National	1116, august 1973

	Security Law 12927, art. 72-2	
Appoint ministers	Accepts the resignation of ministers and assigns two ministers	1134, august 1973
The Trucks strike did not desist	New military personnel was assigned	1135, August 1973
Appoint ministers	Accept the resignation of ministers and assign two other ministers	1160 and 1161, august 1973
Strike	The National Confederation of the Owners of Buses and Taxis went to strike. The government declared illegal the strike and appointed an Army General to intervene in the conflict and he could designate to soldiers to get involved in the conflict. The Contraloría refused authorize this decree (638). The Contraloría is a state institution, which is in charge that the other state institutions work according to the law.	637 Supreme Decree

### **After the Military Coup 1973**

Describe situation	Decision taken	Date
Appoint ministers	Assigns new ministers, they belonged to the armed forces and two of them were civilians	1215/73 , 1217/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Appoint a military official	Appoints a military officials in the superintendence of electricity, gas and telecommunications	1218/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Assign an intendente: Intendente is a charge equivalent to the mayor but at the level of state. The intendentes were active officials of police and military forces.	Appoints army general intendente of Santiago Regional uper intendent	1219/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September, 1333/73, October
Assign new director of the national office of plan	Air force captain	1220/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Assign new director of the news paper “La Nación”	Army general	1221/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Appoint National Director of Mail Office	Army general	1222/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Ask to retire the high command of Carabineros	Ask to retire the high command of Carabineros	1225/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Appoint National Director of Television	Army Captain	1244/73, 12 <sup>th</sup> September
Fire people	People from state agencies were fire	1362/73, 1367/73, October
Expel foreign people	Expel from the country to foreign people who belong to the left parties	1608/73, November 1675/73, November 1848/73 to 1852/73, 1907/73 December 1973
Create the Carabineros headquarter of Special Services	The Special Services had two sections: Police bodyguards of the military junta and Service of intelligence of carabineros. The National Direction Carabineros were in charge of these services. The personnel hah the right to receive special bonus and	1528/73, November

	<p>extra pays based on the Decree 1606, 22nd October 1970.</p> <p>Service of intelligence of carabineers had the task of knowing the social conflicts, public meetings, identifying elements which are against the regime...investigating confidential matters of the institution, conducting intelligence activities to identify movements which are against the social order and the national institutions.</p>		
Appoint Director in Investigation Police	Appoints an army general in the charge of General Director of Investigations Police	560/74, March	
Appoint members in the professional association	Appoint members of National Association of Public Administrators, Veterinarians, Nurses, Dentists, Medical Physicians, Civil Engineers,	41/74, 43/74, 61/74, 80/74, 90/74, 91/74, 1841/74, 1852/74	
Closing social organizations	Centers of Mothers	1908/74	
Closing social organizations	Neighbors association,	82/77	
Closing social organizations	Social Clubs	1159/74, 1160/74, 1139/74, 1481/74, 1482/74, 1626/74, 1627/74, 1628/74, 2160/74, 2161/74	
<b>Exempt Decree</b>			
Prohibit the sale of possessions	Prohibits the sale of possessions, which belongs to members of left parties	92/74, 93/74, 94/74, 150/74, 162/74, 163/74, 164/74, 185/74, 188/74, 189/74, 201/74, 202/74, 203/74, 207/74, 213/74, 217/74, 218/74, 224/74, 229/74, 309/74, 312/74, 334/74, 38/75, 40/75, 41/75, 81/75, 196/76	

		323/76, 437/76, 506/76, 679/76, 1114/76
Break up social organizations	Breaks up social clubs and organizations integrated by members of left parties	99/74, 127/74, 103/74 to 113/74, 123/74, 124/74, 294/77
Expel from the country	The DINA disposes the exile of people.	1/75, 2/75, 19/75, 20/75, 21/75, 67/75, 75/75, 85/75, 98/75, 148/75, 149/75, 150/75, 155/75, 175/75, 233/75, 341/75, 342/75, 343/75, 373/75, 412/75, 458/75, 459/75, 460/75, 461/75, 462/75, 502/75, 528/75, 529/75, 555/75, 613/75, 614/75, 629/75, 630/75, 631/75, 632/75, 637/75 (65), 650/75 (50), 653/75, 654/75, 682/75, 683/75, 693/75, 722/75, 729/75, 730/75, 731/75, 752/75, 780/75, 781/75, 782/75, 964/75, 955/75, 956/75, 975/75, 987/75, 1004/75, 1005/75
Appoint 1973	Mayor in cities and towns	1421, October 1973 1591 to 1604/73 1750, 1751, 1752/73 December 1973
Designs place of detentions	Due to the state of siege (which authorizes the arrest of any suspect) it is necessary to establish a places and quarters to detain people. The Exempt Decree refers to the Law Decree N° 527/74, and the Supreme Decree N° 187/76. The Exempt Decree mentions three places of detentions Tres Alamos, Cuatro Alamos and Puchuncavi.	146, February 10 <sup>th</sup> , 1976
Requisition	Requisition of real states which belong to the members of Communist , Socialist and Radical	141/74, 148/74, 153/74, 154/74, 224/74, 229/74, 243/74, 244/74, 272/74, 279/74, 485/74, 492/74,

	Parties	689/74, 1158/74, 1161/74, 1162/74, 1240/74, 1241/74, 1244/74, 1250/74, 1251/74, 2163/74, 1330/74, 1429/74, 1483/74, 1628/74, 1735/74 1976: 13/76, 225/76, 264/76
Requisition	Requisition of <b>real states</b> which belong to the members of Communist , Socialist and Radical Parties	Decree Exempt: 326/76, 327/76, 338/76, 578/76, 578/76, 752/76, 1070/76, 1099/76, 127/77, 497/77, 535/77, 685/77, 764/77, 890/77, 915/77, 1096/77, 1200/77, 121/78, 305/78
Requisition	Requisition of vehicles which belong to the members of Communist, Radical or Socialist Parties	1973: 145, 279, 295 1976: 226, 263 224/74, 342/77, 531/78, 524/74 2162/74, 683/74, 684/74, 1253/74, 1331/74, 1332/74, 1333/74, 2105/74, 2107/74 Exempt: 293/76, 394/76, 395/74, 396/76, 609/76, 397/76, 619/76, 75/76, 1098/76, 1249/76, 10/77, 16/77, 17/77, 18/77, 146/77, 391/77, 444/77, 462/77, 534/77, 577/77, 652/77, 1138/77, 1284/77, 1285/77, 484/78, 270/78,
Requisition	Requisition of Journal Company “EL Clarín,” which belong to the members of the opposition	276/74 Later in 1975, 1984 and 1985 this place was used for the CNI as a place of detentions and torture (Valech, p. 534, 535) 730/ News Latinoamericana CIA.
Requisition	Requisition of printing - house which belong to the members of the opposition	294/74 615/74, 1243/74
Requisition	Requisition of real state which belong to the national labor union administrated by Communist Party	137/1976
Requisition	Requisition of radio	251/77

	Station Pulmahue which belong to the member opposition	
Requisition	Requisition of radio Stations which belong to the member opposition	Exempt: 261/74, 562/74, 614/74, 682/74, 690/74, 691/74, 692/74, 1242/74, 1629/74, 1540/74, 2011/74
Change names of public places	Change the names of public places such as neighborhood, streets, towns which had names of left leaders.	1066/74

Law Decree		
Military authorities and police could arrest people	Authorizes the entry of military authorities and police to review private and public places and arrest people. The Interior Minister had the faculty to authorize it.	Law Decree 81, 1973
Prohibit political participation	Declares the cessation of all political parties, political movements and political associations.	Law Decree 78, 1frt October 1973
Appoint 1974	Mayor in cities and towns	1135, 1372, 1374, 1378 October 1973: 1442 to 1461 seventy-two people were appointed; ten of them belonged to the army or police forces. 1866/73, 318/74 1817, 1818, 1911 December 1973 183 January 1974
Appoint	The Regional Gubernators (intendentes) were active officials of police and military forces in charge of the region (equivalent to state)	1178, 1197, 1198, 1200, 1201 1711 (November 1973): two intendents and two gubernator 1711 66/74, 91/74, 225/74, 313/74 50/75, 55/75 62/74, 152/74, 184/74, 198/74, 186/74, 214/74, 367/74 278/74, 280, 349 to 354/74, 391/74, 423/74 1941/73
Appoint	Gubernator of the province	1196, 1197, 1596, 1869/73 66/74, 85/74, 91/74, 110/74, 313/74 50/75, 61/75
Appoint	Minister of Defense	1305, 1395/73
Appoint	Delegate to a members of police force to be the representative of the junta	1420/73

	in the Cooper Corporation (CODELCO)	
Appoint	Chief of police station that belong to the Investigation Police	1434, October 1973
Appoint	Director of electoral register	1478, October 1973
Appoint	The members of the commission to elaborate the state administrative reform. The five members belong to the military forces and the police force	
Appoint	Minister of Mining	253/74
Appoint	Three policemen were designed to interrogate people in the National Executive Secretary of Detain People	644/74
Expulsion out the country	Expulsion of foreign and no foreign people due to their Marxist ideology	1974: 1173/74 190/74, 364, 467, 824, 845, 895, 896, 905, 1031, 1071, 1083, 1084, 1676, 190, 364, 467, 824, 845, 895, 896, 905, 1031, 1071, 1083, 1084, 159, 1151 159/76, 1151/76
Confiscate	Nineteen cars, which were assigned by the President Allende to his two daughters, wife and personal secretary. Seventeen cars, which belonged to the members of Communist Party	203/76
Firing	Sixteen people were fired from the general secretary of government	1482/73(October)
Call active service	Ask for reenroll eighty-nine reserve soldiers to be active in the army	Supreme Decree 563, 544 to 551, 605 to 615 (August 1973)
Appoint	A General Brigadier was appointed in the charge of President of National Central Bank	Supreme Decree 644, September 12 <sup>th</sup> , 1973

Appoint	A General Brigadier was appointed in the charge of Vice President of National Corporation of Growing (CORFO)	Supreme Decree 645, September 12 <sup>th</sup> , 1973
Prohibit	Prohibit the sold of real estates which belongs to the member of Radical Party	140/74
Medal	Gives medals to 10 policemen who died the day of the coup.	761/74
Medal	Give medals to 43 policemen to serve the President	733/74
Medal	Give honors to civilians who collaborated with the regimen	Law Decree 1/74, 128/74 527/74 1628/76

### **Others Decrees**

Decree N° 545 May 5<sup>th</sup> 1976 in the 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph says “that the Supreme Government knows very well that when it assumed the patriotic task of restoring in the country the validity of the values of the Chilean country. This task was achieved by banishing the Marxist-Leninist foreign ideology, whose elements displaced<sup>9</sup> of the before regimen and the country’s enemies, built up the most furious and disloyal reaction against of the current regimen.

4<sup>th</sup> paragraph: Despite of the facts mentioned it previously, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between what is an attitude political against the actual government, that is legitimate or illegitimate, and what is an action that attacks ideologically and materially the Government. These attempt the State’s essential interests and provoke a severe damage to the entire nation.

The withdrew ambassador of Mexico, Hugo Vigonera, had promoted from Mexico a violent and public campaign against the Government of the Republic in order to drop down it and replace it for a Marxist regime. To achieve these objectives he does not doubt and uses the press and publics acts to slander the Junta of the Government. Moreover, he says that the country has ovens used to burn people that the Armed Forces and Order killed in order to erase any evidence.

That behavior causes severe damage to the Chilean society in general, and shows clearly that the author not only is far from few feeling of love or solidarity that any individual has for his country, but also he became in a palpable enemy of Chile.

The decree removes the Chilean nationality to Hugo Vigonera and is signed by the Army General and President of the republic and the ministers.

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<sup>9</sup> The elements displaced are the people who supported the President Allende’s Government

Decree N°1308 December 27<sup>th</sup> 1977 answers the United Nations' denounces of human rights violations perpetrated for the military regime. The decree points out that... "The United Nations uses the human rights violations to describe a supposed Chilean situation, which is far away from the reality. These accusations exceeds any falseness and unjust, and slanders our nation and hurts deeply the sovereignty and national dignity... The United Nations' resolution revels clearly that our country is persecuted by an international conspiracy, which is leaded by the big nations... The United Nations' resolutions is a clear expression of the moral decadency that today predominates in the humanity."

Decree N°1337 December 30<sup>th</sup> 1977 presents the Governmental Program for the next year 1978. The decree reaffirms the principles that supported the military coup. Moreover, in this decree the attitude of ignoring the international monitions was explicit, because the decree orders that the Defense Ministry continues developing its tasks of interior security through the supervision and control of weapons and explosives, and the detentions of subversives.

### **Supreme Decree of Defense Ministry (1970 to 1978)**

Military Intelligence Course, auxiliary intelligence, three moths of duration.

Intelligence of combat

Legislations and regulations

Counterintelligence

Exempt Decree 146, February 10<sup>th</sup>, 1976. Due to the state of siege (which authorizes the arrest of any suspect) it is necessary to establish a places and quarters to detain people. The Exempt Decree refers to the Law Decree N° 527/74, and the Supreme Decree N° 187/76. The Exempt Decree mentions three places of detentions Tres Alamos, Cuatro Alamos and Puchuncavi. The Report of the National Commission on Political Prison and Torture identifies the three places as a center of torture (p.522, 533).

Supreme Decree 441, July 18<sup>th</sup> 1973 Designation of military official to School of the Americas

Supreme Decree 491, July 31<sup>st</sup> 1973 Designation of military official to West Point  
Decree 139 Interior Ministry commissioning four police officials to assist to course of Intelligence Analysis offered by the Brazilian government.

Decree N° 1183, July 19<sup>th</sup> of 1974 informs about the decease of a policemen of Investigations Police. He dies when fall from the 13<sup>th</sup> floor.

DINA

Law Decree of Interior Minister N° 521 defines the National Direction of Intelligence in terms of "a military and professional institution, which depends on the Junta of Government. Its mission is joining all national information that comes from the different action fields in order to provide intelligence to make policies, plans and take decisions in regards to the National Security and the development of the country."

Decree 672, November 2<sup>nd</sup> 1971, Appoint teachers to the National Direction of Intelligence (DINA).