

A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-GROUP TENSIONS:
THE FATE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

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A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF INTER-GROUP TENSIONS:
THE FATE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Abstract

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The increasing importance of civil rights issues as a national policy priority during the 1950s and 1960s set in motion a series of events that ensured the transformation of the Democratic Party. The effect of inter-group tensions on the roll call voting decisions of members of the United States House of Representatives considering selected civil rights and unemployment policies between 1955 and 1980 are analyzed to determine the consequences of these pressures on the fate of the Democratic Party. Two alternatives to the development of the party are explored. One suggests that Democratic legislators responded to white majorities, becoming less likely to support national party agendas in areas with high levels of inter-group tensions. Responsiveness would transform the party by realigning ideologically divergent political coalitions. The second alternative suggests that Democrats did not respond to inter-group tensions, but rather adhered to party agendas and were displaced from office as a result of popular discontent. As a consequence of displacements the Democratic Party would become smaller but

more ideologically centralized allowing the possibility of a truly national Democratic Party.

Following Tilly's (2001) recommendations for the use of environmental variables a spatial unit of analysis is developed and employed to address the relationship between inter-group pressures and roll call voting decisions. Measuring inter-group tensions within spatial units provides an improvement over political or administrative units for estimating the areas of overlap of majority and minority group members, and provides a clearer estimate of the pressures potentially influencing legislative decisions. Patterns of Democratic gains and losses following the Civil Rights Movements and response to inter-group pressures indicate a move toward party nationalization. At the same time, one ideological divide remained intact. Northern and southern regions of the country remained divided on the extensions of political rights. This ideological divide, however, was confined to civil rights issues. Concerning unemployment policies, southern Democrats became more supportive, but northern Democrats responded to inter-group tensions—becoming less supportive. The results indicate a considerably more nationalized Democratic Party following the civil rights era, however, in a way that reduced the party's ability to pursue core policies.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“I am not a member of any organized political party. I am a Democrat.”
--Will Rogers

Two significant advances in social welfare were made during the twentieth century, workers’ protections and the extension of social and political rights to previously excluded populations (Katz 1996). Efforts to extend workers’ protections arose from New Deal era reforms; moving the United States from being a welfare laggard to a world leader in provision of social protections (Amenta 1998). These policies significantly predated efforts to extend rights to minority populations, and developed through a series of compromises inexorably tying workers’ rights to the exclusion of the minority group portion of the working-class for decades to follow. These compromises arose as a means to clear a key hurdle blocking the implementation of New Deal reforms—gaining approval from congressional committees controlled by southern Democrats hostile to any legislation that would grant cash directly to black workers. During the 1930s nearly eighty percent of African-Americans lived in the south and were employed almost exclusively as share-croppers, agricultural day laborers, or domestic servants. Compromises demanded by southern legislators excluded precisely these jobs from protections under New Deal programs, virtually eliminating welfare state protections for black workers (Quadagno 1994).

This pattern changed during the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than excluding minority populations, by 1980 both labor and social policies were largely geared toward reducing

intra-class inequality between majority and minority group workers. During the 1960s government commissions linked urban rioting with high unemployment and the disintegration of the African-American family structure (Quadagno 1994). In attempts to alleviate these problems government programs focused assistance on inner cities, and by the mid 1970s the average recipient of social assistance was younger and blacker than in the earlier era (Weir 1992).

It is well accepted that the shift in policy focus during the 1960s and 1970s was largely due to the efforts of civil rights organizations' demands for equal rights for minority populations (McAdam 1982). In efforts to win the White House the national Democratic Party became allied with civil rights groups during the 1950s and 1960s and began to champion the extension of civil rights. The implications of these extensions, however, had markedly different meanings in different regions of the country and set in motion events that would transform the Democratic Party.

Prior to the Civil Rights Movement the strength of the Democratic Party hinged on a weak coalition between its northern and southern wings (Mayhew 1986). The two wings of the party disagreed sharply on a number of issues and the suppression of civil rights was central to the maintenance of the party. The divide between the northern and southern regions of the country was centrally important to the fate of the Democratic Party. President Johnson understood that his support of civil rights extensions undermined the tenuous coalition between northern and southern Democrats, and that southern congressional seats long held by the Democratic Party would be lost. The Democratic Party that emerged from the aftermath of the fight for basic civil rights was

smaller to be sure, but this loss of congressional market share does not clearly translate to a weakening of the party itself. Indeed, this is one possibility—that as a consequence of pursuing social equality the Democratic Party’s political and institutional strength was undermined, effectively destroying the party itself. On the other hand, this destruction may have set the stage for higher levels of ideological alignment within the party, resulting in greater political and institutional strength and the development of a truly national Democratic Party.

This dissertation addresses civil rights and unemployment policies during the period when national policy priorities shifted from a format that excluded minorities, to one that gave priority to reducing intra-class racial disparities in access to social resources. The work addresses the impacts of social pressures on the decisions made by members of congress at a point in time when the priorities of legislators—especially Democrats—shifted from a white dominated labor protections approach to a civil rights approach, the 1960s and 1970s (Quadagno 1992). Democrats lost huge margins in the House of Representatives following the passage of civil rights legislation. These losses were initially much larger in the north than in the south. In subsequent elections, however, Democrats regained their lost margins in the north while support in the south continued to wane. It is argued that though this process the Democratic Party was transformed in a manner that allowed for a far higher level of central organization, but perhaps with a limited ability to pursue and accomplish a robust social policy agenda.

Historically, social policy development in the United States has been connected to both regional and political dynamics (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Amenta and Halfmann

2000; Amenta 1998). Amenta *et al.* draw on institutional (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1989) and state centered theories (Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988) in demonstrating that differences between areas of the country in institutional development and political capacities along with democratization and party priorities were influential in shaping policy outcomes during and after the New Deal. Their analysis demonstrates that differences between states' institutional strengths—particularly in the form of working-class organizations, state bureaucracies, and voting access were influential in shaping policy outcomes. Different areas of the country developed under different economic and political constraints resulting in considerable variation between regions in institutional and political structures. Race and issues of race equality were key (in their suppression) to the development of coalitions across spatially, politically, and institutionally disparate regions.

In the south Democrats had gained office under undemocratic conditions and held large margins in congress. Losses were inevitable in the south following civil rights extensions as these extensions undermined the bases of southern politics. In the north the situation was much more complex. Democrats held smaller margins, and maintained strength largely due to working-class support (Mayhew 1986). In many areas small changes in working-class support could shift an election. Across the north legislators had gained office under various political and institutional conditions, and the role and importance of race varied with these conditions. Civil rights extensions were centrally important to the national Democratic Party. John F. Kennedy's electoral strategy in the 1960 presidential election hinged on support for civil rights extensions. Working-class

margins of support for Kennedy's presidential bid were extremely narrow, and only through garnering support from northern non-white populations was Kennedy able to prevail in the election (Quadagno 1992). Kennedy's electoral strategy increased the national Democratic Party's alignment with civil rights extensions, but in doing so centralized racially based intra-class tensions on the political stage.

Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that racial dynamics were central to the anemic qualities of social protections in the United States. They argue that large distances between points of labor unrest have caused labor issues to remain regionally isolated, but racial tensions were an over-riding, national issue. Racial tensions varied across different areas in the north and any changes to civil rights policies meant potentially upsetting delicate racial balances. In some northern areas the extensions of civil rights held few implications for legislators, but in others legislative support of rights extensions threatened to undermine working-class support for Democrats, potentially throwing elections to the opposition. The Democratic Party faced a clear dilemma. Failure to pursue minority rights risked further minority protests, and undermined the viability of the national party. At the same time, pursuing a robust civil rights agenda both undermined the congressional coalition between northern and southern Democrats, and risked upsetting local racial balances in the north. By extending civil rights the Democratic Party risked not only losing congressional strength in the south, but in the north as well, as the extensions of civil rights would exacerbate northern racial tensions and undermined Democrat's narrow working-class majorities. Quadagno (1992) argues that these tensions within the Democratic Party ultimately transformed the party—

moving it from the “party of labor” to the “party of civil rights.” Other analyses are far less optimistic. Edsall and Edsall (1992) contend that Democrats’ efforts to extend civil rights undermined the party itself, and brought on an era of Republican Party ascendancy that nullified a broad range of social protections championed by Democrats.

RACIAL TENSIONS AND CONGRESS

The implications of local level racial tensions have been well investigated. Testing Blalock’s (1967) racial threat hypothesis, Tolbert and Grummel’s (2003) analysis of support for California’s proposition 209—eliminating civil rights protections—indicates that white voters who lived in census tracts with large minority populations were more likely to support eliminating civil rights protections. Other research supports these findings showing that policies benefiting minorities have often been blocked directly as ballot initiatives (Fording, Soss and Schram 2003; Tolbert and Steuernaget 2003), and opposed by the representatives of local populations in areas shared by majority and minority group members (Black 1976; Black 1978; Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Matthews and Prothro 1966; Wright 1977). Furthermore, Olzak *et al.* (Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003) show that majority group led race riots and resistance to minority rights are more common in areas with large non-white populations; and Jacobs *et al.* (1999; Jacobs and Carmichael 2003; Jacobs and Helms 2001) found that official reactions to minority group violence were harsher in the these areas.

Clausen (1973) maintains that the most important pressure shaping the decisions made by legislators is the maintenance of office. Prior to the 1960s civil rights issues

were not greatly influential in determining the decisions made by legislators.

Republicans were ambivalent concerning civil rights issues, and tensions between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party virtually paralyzed any civil rights leanings among Democrats. On the other hand, the exclusion of minority workers from labor protections allowed an alliance between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party when considering labor policies (Amenta 1998). This relationship, however, changed as civil rights gained additional importance for the national Democratic Party. The change led both to the disintegration of the alliance between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party and undermined white workers' support of Democrats (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Quadagno 1994).

As suggested by Clausen (1973), Democrats faced with high levels of inter-group tensions could respond to these pressures by backing away from the national party agenda in efforts to maintain office. In so doing the institutional fabric of the party would be compromised. While this strategy may have allowed Democrats to maintain more seats in congress, fractures in the party concerning policy agendas—particularly continued divisions concerning civil rights extensions—would leave the party less able to achieve central goals. Alternatively, party agendas may have prevailed. By remaining in line with national party agendas Democrats in areas with high levels of inter-group tensions would stand a greater chance of losing office, but the party itself would maintain its integrity potentially increasing the ability of the party to pursue a coherent policy agenda.

LOCATING SPATIAL PRESSURES

Previous research clearly demonstrates a connection between inter-group tensions and majority group resistance to the extensions of rights to minority populations. These studies have used states (Amenta 1998), congressional districts, or census tracts (Tolbert and Grummel's 2003) as their unit of analysis. These units of analysis are widely accepted and have the advantage that data is readily available. However, the units are constructed for administrative or political purposes and cut through neighborhoods and economies in some cases and include a number of distinct economies in others—effectively dividing and recombining the spatial contexts in which social life takes place. Bense (1987) found that legislators representing the same local economies tend to find common ground on issues that impact the areas they represent, even across party lines. Drawing on this observation the pressures shaping the decisions made by legislators are neither shaped entirely by the characteristics of the congressional districts they represent nor the administrative units where political divisions are defined. Rather, the pressures shaping congressional decisions arise from the realms of social interaction where populations share access to work, schools, and the broader economy—economic space.

To capture the impacts of popular pressures on congressional voting the empirical analysis is focused on congressional decisions within economic space. Following Tilly (2001), space is treated as an “environmental mechanism,” that is, “externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate—applied not to actors but their settings—suggest the sorts of cause-effect relations in question” (Tilly 2001: 24). Here spatial context not only has an impact

in its own right, but it influences the degree to which other relational mechanisms are dampened or amplified (Hooks and McQueen 2008). In their account of U.S. exceptionalism, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that the sheer size of the United States reduced the impact of labor unrest and the impact of the left on U.S. politics.¹ Here the focus is on racial characteristics along with local economic characteristics and political histories to determine what effect these factors have on the decisions made by the members of congress representing different localities. In so doing the goal is to determine whether the impacts of racial tensions weakened the institutional fabric of the Democratic Party or strengthen the party by reducing intra-party ideological disparities across space.

The spatial perspective is important to take into account as American political institutions developed across both time and space, and resulted in a number of unique economies and political structures (Mayhew 1986). The relationship between populations and spatially bound political institutions and economies varies greatly. Mayhew's (1986) analysis points to three distinct regions of political development: patronage systems in the northeastern industrial core, undemocratic institutions in states of the former Confederacy, and the more democratic frontier west. Drawing on this framework, Bense's (1987) analysis of American sectionalism found that the division between states of the former Confederacy and the rest of the country was particularly important when considering civil rights policies. Bense's finding is not particularly

¹ Whereas the distance between European capitals and industrial centers were often quite modest, the United States is much larger and its capital is distant from most production centers. Although the United States has a history of labor unrest that is comparable to many European nations, "America's great distances have made it difficult for strikers in industrial areas to impact Washington, D.C." (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, p. 126).

surprising, but illustrates the regional divide that gave rise to different social and political mechanisms, manifested in the battle for civil rights.

Space is particularly important when considering civil rights policies as the distribution of majority and minority group populations is not equal throughout the United States. At the beginning of the twentieth century over eighty percent of African-Americans lived in states of the former Confederacy (Chaison 2006). However, motivated by the mechanization of southern agriculture during the 1930s and the availability of military production jobs during the 1940s, large numbers of southern black workers moved to northern industrial centers. The migration of minority workers into northern industrial centers during the 1930s and 1940s changed the racial dynamics in the north. Prior to the migration of minority workers from the south, northern congressional districts were less racially diverse. Lieberman (1980) found that this shift activated latent racism in northern districts. Prior to the migration of black workers into the north, northern legislators were relatively unhindered by popular pressures when considering civil rights policies. In northern regions of the country significant portions of both the Democratic and Republican Parties supported the extension of rights to minorities; even to the extent that neither party was seen as more supportive of minority rights than the other. However, after the migration of large numbers of black workers into northern economies the manifestation of latent racism created higher levels of racial tensions and legislators in these areas faced greater resistance from white populations when considering policies extending rights to minorities (Edsall and Edsall 1992). It was the Democratic Party's adoption of civil rights as a party agenda under the leadership of John

F. Kennedy that set into motion the particular set of events that led ultimately to the transformation of the party.

POLICY TRENDS IN CONGRESS

The historical period is important to address as the shifts that occurred in congressional priorities were out of sync with the prevailing attitudes of the white working-class voters that provided the electoral base for the Democratic Party. The alignment of labor unions with the Democratic Party during and after the New Deal motivated large segments of the working-class to support Democratic legislators (Chaison 2006). However, the exclusion of minorities from the country's most politically influential labor unions reinforced a racial divide within the working-class. The Democratic Party's movement toward support of civil rights policies occurred while the white working-class was still largely aligned behind racially exclusionary ideals (Wolkinson 1973; Marshall and Vernon 1967).

During the civil rights movement Democratic priorities focused on the extension of civil and voting rights through two landmark pieces of legislation—the *Civil Rights Act* of 1964 and the *Voting Rights Act* of 1965. Following this peak the focus quickly turned to reducing disparities in access to jobs between primarily black populations living in deteriorating inner-cities and their white counterparts living in comparatively affluent suburbs (Weir 1992). During both periods significant intra-class tensions were evident. Race riots punctuated the former period, and during the latter white working-class political support shifted from Democrats—the traditional “party of labor”—to

Republicans, whose “race and taxes” approach had successfully aligned social protections with welfare, in the latter (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

To some extent the shifts in policy approaches between the mid 1960s and early 1970s were attributable to the evolution of the Democratic Party itself. John F. Kennedy’s need to win northern states to secure the presidency in 1960 and the importance of the northern black vote in winning these states quickly aligned the national Democratic Party and many northern Democrats behind civil rights issues (Quadagno 1992). This shift strained the weak coalition between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party and—through both the disaffection of southern Democratic legislators and successful Republican challenges in southern congressional districts—allowed Republicans and northern Democrats to usurp southern Democrats’ dominance in the congressional committee system for the first time in the twentieth century. With fewer southern Democrats controlling congressional committees a variety of legislation was able to gain congressional consideration that previously would have been killed, neutralized, or gutted in committee.

The intent of this work is not to determine why specific policies passed or failed in congress, but rather how members of congress responded to inter-group tensions. The collapse of the Southern monopoly on the congressional committee system during the 1960s and 1970s was the first time in the twentieth century that many policies were considered by the congress as a whole. Neither divisions in the working-class nor the divided Democratic Party were the only limitations to the extension of social protections. The Republican Party was hostile to the extension of labor policies and ambivalent

concerning civil rights policies throughout much of the twentieth century. As Democrats began to press for civil rights policy extensions Republicans used these efforts to align both civil rights and labor policy with welfare (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

The dilemma for Democrats was clear. Losing seats in congress would greatly compromise the ability of the party to accomplish its goals. However, the party's goals were compromised from the inside. Without adopting a civil rights agenda Democrats held little hope of gaining national office, but southern hostility to civil rights extensions undermined national party support of civil rights legislation (Bensel 1987). Adopting a civil rights agenda meant losing Democratic congressional seats in the south, but only by shedding these seats could southern Democrats' monopoly over the congressional committee system be broken, allowing civil rights legislation a chance to be seriously considered. Adopting a civil rights stance also threatened to upset delicate racial balances in the north, undermining narrow working-class majorities and leading to further losses for Democrats (Lieberman 2005).

Ultimately, the Democratic Party adopted a strong civil rights position, and suffered severe losses in both the north and south. Two questions remain. Were Democrats able to maintain seats by responding to inter-group pressures—retreating from civil rights support, or by an ideological coherence made possible with the collapse of the southern Democratic stronghold on congressional committees? Did the patterns of Democratic losses—in both the north and south—occur in such a way that greater ideological coherence and national party unity was a likely outcome as suggested by

Quadagno (1992), or was the party crippled by both loss of congressional majorities and lack of ideological coherence as suggested by Edsall and Edsall (1992)?

POLICY TRENDS IN SPACE

Democrats did not universally support social protections and Republicans did not universally oppose them. Political parties are important to understanding broad patterns in the decisions made by legislators, but to understand the decisions made by individual legislators from either party it is necessary to address the populations they represented. During the civil rights era there is little doubt that the awareness of civil rights issues impacted all congressional districts in the United States. However, the way that different populations reacted to the events of the 1960s varied significantly across areas of the country. In this regard Skowronek (1982) argues that American political parties developed not as national organizations but rather as an ideological hodge-podge of organizations that accumulated power to the point of being able to compete in national elections. It is, therefore, not surprising that patterns of support in many policy areas would be as strongly tied to region as to political parties. Lieberman (1980) found that racially homogeneous areas were more likely to oppose civil rights extensions than racially heterogeneous areas, and that stronger working-class alignments arose in racially homogeneous areas. It can be expected that in areas with low levels of popular opposition to civil rights extensions and higher levels of working-class alignment Democratic support of civil rights legislation would not result in significant popular political backlash.

To be sure legislators represent the constituents of their congressional districts, but the influences on individuals within these districts are broader than the districts in a number of ways. Individuals often work, shop, and attend school outside the districts where they vote, and it can therefore be expected that the influences that shape their voting choices reach beyond their home congressional districts as well. To capture these broader influences an approach based on Bensen's (1987) analysis of American sectionalism is adopted. Bensen found that on specific issues the decisions made by members of congress tend to converge, even across party lines, within the local economies where the districts were located. For this reason economic space—the Bureau of Economic Analysis economic area (BEA) (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977), rather than political space, is used for the unit of analysis in this work.

It is expected that the impact of inter-group tensions more strongly influenced members of the Democratic Party. But, because congressional voting tends to converge across party lines within local economies analysis is not confined to Democratic legislators but addresses congress as a whole. The policies addressed with this work are Democratic issues—that is, by the mid 1960s both labor and civil rights policies were strongly advocated by the national Democratic Party and opposed by Republicans. The impacts on congressional voting will necessarily be different for the two parties. Due to national party support for civil rights and labor policies, other things being equal, Democrats should be expected to support extensions. On the other hand, Republican Party ambivalence or hostility toward these policies suggests the impact on Republicans will be weaker and more dependent on local conditions.

CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Congressional consideration of the extension of civil rights during the twentieth century was concentrated almost entirely in the last half of the century. Between 1901 and 1980² the House of Representatives recorded sixty-six roll call votes considering civil rights, of those sixty-five were recorded between 1955 and 1980. The sole civil rights vote prior to this period was a bill to extend civil rights to minority group members of the armed forces who fought in World War I (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Perhaps more important to understanding the progression of civil rights than civil rights votes themselves is anti-lynching legislation. Anti-lynching legislation represents the most basic of civil rights, the right of freedom from the wrath of the mob, and while the House of Representatives voted twenty times concerning anti-lynching legislation between 1921 and 1940 the United States Congress was never able to successfully enact an anti-lynching law. Like civil rights efforts more generally the failure to pass lynching legislation arose from the resistance of southern legislators. Anti-lynching measures enjoyed widespread support in both the House and the Senate, but in each case filibusters by southern senators or southern control of key House committees were able to prevent passage (Pfeifer 2004).

Even among explicitly racist southern legislators resistance to the extension of civil rights was rarely characterized in terms of a white dominant society. Rather, “states rights” arguments prevailed. Southern resistance to the extension of civil rights and the imposition of anti-lynching legislation were characterized as attempts by the federal

² Roll call totals were derived using policy and keyword searches in Rosenthal and Poole’s *Voteview for Window* computer program (<http://www.princeton.edu/~voteview/>).

government to impose laws in areas that were explicitly reserved for state regulation (Katagiri 2001). As a consequence of the dominance of southern legislators in both houses of congress the majority of civil rights extensions prior to the mid 1960s were the result of either executive order or Supreme Court decisions (for instance Truman's integration of the armed forces in 1948 and the Supreme Court's 1954 *Brown verses the Board of Education of Topeka Kansas* decision). Congressional efforts to extend civil rights that did make it to the floor of congress were largely gutted in committee before consideration. For instance between 1956 and 1957 five roll call votes were recorded in the House of Representatives for the *Civil Rights Act* of 1957. The purpose of the bill was to increase minority voter participation and was ultimately enacted into law. However, arising from southern resistance and the Democratic Party leadership's fear that passage of the original law would tear the Democratic Party apart the bill was referred to the southern controlled House Judiciary Committee where its scope and enforcement mechanisms were gutted. As a consequence minority voter participation fell following the bill's passage (Nichols 2007).

Led by the efforts of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson civil rights legislation with considerable scope and the potential for enforcement was finally passed in 1964 and 1965. From the beginning of his presidency Kennedy made efforts to pass legislation to make discrimination in employment, political participation, and access to public facilities illegal, however, like earlier attempts, this legislation was tied up in congressional committees and blocked by southern legislators until after Kennedy's assassination in

1963. Following the assassination incoming President Johnson made passage of the *Civil Rights Act* his top priority—finally securing its passage in 1964 (Matuso 1984).

The *Civil Rights Act* of 1964 reversed Jim Crow Laws established following the Civil War—prohibiting discrimination in housing, public facilities, public places, and employment. Enforcement mechanisms allowed for the elimination of federal funds to state level agencies that failed to comply with the policies provisions, and made way for the establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissions—enforcement bodies charged with bringing suit against businesses and public facilities who continued to engage in discriminatory practices (U.S. Committee on the Judiciary/House of Representatives 1981).

Reinforced by the passage of the *Civil Rights Act* a year earlier and motivated by continuing disenfranchisement of minorities, the *Voting Rights Act* was passed in 1965. The intent of the *Voting Rights Act* was to provide enforcement for the *Fourteenth Amendment* to the Constitution. Specifically, the legislation sought to remove barriers to minority voting participation such as literacy tests and poll taxes. Unlike the *Civil Rights Act*, the *Voting Rights Act* designated particular problem spots where state and local statutes and practices presented barriers to minority political participation, and southern states were disproportionately designated for enforcement. Of the eleven states of the former Confederacy only two, Arkansas and Tennessee, were not named in the law. On the other hand, only five of the thirty-seven contiguous northern states; Arizona, California, Michigan, New Hampshire, and New York; were named (U.S. Committee on the Judiciary/House of Representatives 1981). Because of the disproportionate focus on

southern states it would seem likely that southern legislators would be more opposed to the legislation. Southern legislators gained office under the exclusionary principles and stood to lose their positions under a more democratic system. However, it is also important to note that three of the five northern states; California, Michigan, and New York; were centers of black in migration during the twenty-five years prior to the passage of the bill (Quadagno 1994).

The *Civil Rights Act* and *Voting Rights Act* were definitive of civil rights progress in the United States and following their passage no further significant civil rights measures were passed (Weir 1992). Instead, continued civil rights progress was based on renewal and extension of these two pieces of legislation. During the fifteen years following the passage of the two acts legislation was considered in the House of Representatives to extend the enforcement period and scope of the *Voting Rights Act*, and for the applicability of the *Civil Rights Act* for school busing and housing (U.S. Committee on the Judiciary/House of Representatives 1981).

LABOR POLICY

The first attempts to extend aggressive national labor policies in the twentieth century were developed during the New Deal. In fact, labor protections were central to President Roosevelt's economic recovery plan during the Great Depression (Amenta 1998). Protections were extended to provide relief for the unemployed, jobs for the employable, and support for the unemployable—children and the elderly.³ The establishment of labor protections during the New Deal, however, was not guaranteed

³ Support for the unemployable itself was an effort to strengthen the position of workers by reducing the overall size of the labor market (Katz 1996).

and these measures passed only through a series of compromises (Amenta 1998). During the period only Democrats from western states that gained statehood following the Civil War were strongly aligned with New Deal programs. Patronage systems in eastern states, especially within the nation's industrial core, were at best ambivalent concerning labor protections, or hostile to them as their establishment would move patronage from local political machines to the national government and national political parties. Southern legislators were outwardly hostile to labor policies as the extension of labor protections to southern blacks threatened the racially based southern economy (Amenta and Halfmann 2000; Amenta 1998). Because of these challenges passage of labor legislation in the 1930s hinged on compromises designed to gain the support of southern Democrats, specifically the exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers from labor protections.

The exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from national labor protections was important for securing the support of southern legislators as the vast majority of black workers in southern states were employed in these jobs (Quadagno 1994). By excluding these employment sectors it was possible to extend labor protections to majority group workers, especially industrial employees, without undermining the racially based southern economic system. At the same time these exclusions coupled with labor organizing practices exemplified in the American Federation of Labor (AFL) that effectively excluded black workers from union participation promoted the development of a racially divided working-class (Stapan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003).

Unlike the AFL the second largest labor organizing body in the United States, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), was strongly partnered with civil rights organizations and centralized the elimination of workplace racial discrimination in its organizing efforts (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). The tensions between the organizing strategies of the two largest labor organizing bodies ensured that race remained a central issue in labor policy. For this reason, and the tensions between northern and southern Democrats, labor legislation, like civil rights legislation, was largely confined to congressional committee system between the beginning of World War II and the civil rights movement (Bensel 1987). Two labor bills were passed during the period. Only three roll call votes⁴ were recorded in the House of Representatives for the *Labor-Management Relations Act* before it was passed into law—the law effectively eliminated a number of labor organizing protections established during the New Deal. Similarly, the *Full Employment Act* was debated and gutted in committee—all enforcement mechanisms were removed and the bill was renamed the *Employment Act*—and passed into law without being subjected to the scrutiny of a single roll call vote in the House of Representatives (Weir 1992). Additionally, driven by the 1940s war mobilization effort that disproportionately focused funds in the western districts that were the most supportive of New Deal policies congressional support for federal employment programs was undermined and eliminated (Hooks and McQueen 2008).

Only four comprehensive labor bills were considered between the end of the Great Depression and 1980. Three of the four bills were passed into law. However, the

⁴ Roll call totals were derived using policy and keyword searches in Rosenthal and Poole's *Voteview for Window* computer program (<http://www.princeton.edu/~voteview/>).

effect of the passage of one, the *Labor-Management Relations Act* (mentioned above), was to reverse large portions of the labor protections extended during the earlier era, and the *Employment Act* (also mentioned above) was gutted and ineffective before it was passed. The two other bills were attempted during the 1970s. The *Labor Reform Act* was an attempt to restore a large portion of the New Deal labor protections eliminated by the *Labor-Management Relations Act*, but despite being the subject of more roll call votes in the House of Representatives than any of the other bills (six) it failed to pass. The final bill, the *Comprehensive Employment and Training Act* (CETA), was definitive of the shift in labor policy from white working-class protections to attempts to reduce racially based employment inequality (Weir 1992).

Unlike earlier omnibus labor policies CETA was not an attempt to impact national level support for workers. Instead, the act provided state and local level block grants for providing job training and public service employment in low income and high unemployment areas. Characterized as an extension of the New Deal era *Works Progress Administration*, CETA provided short term (12-24 month) public service jobs and youth employment programs in low income and high unemployment areas, and funded on-the-job and classroom based job training (Bullock 1981). By focusing grants on areas with the highest unemployment rates and lowest income levels the program had the advantage of placing assistance where it was needed the most and was a great improvement over earlier programs that focused on particular industries or job types (Weir 1992). However, at the time CETA was enacted America's working-class had already become racially segregated with minorities strongly concentrated in poor and deteriorating inner-cities

and their white counterparts in relatively affluent suburbs. As a consequence the program benefits were disproportionately focused on minority workers and deepened the divide in the already split working-class, allowing CETA to be easily aligned in the minds of white working-class voters with welfare (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Weir 1992).

Following World War II, attempts to regulate unemployment were much more common than comprehensive labor legislation (Weir 1992). During the relatively robust economy of the post-war period seven unemployment roll call votes were recorded in the House of Representatives. In a far less stable economy, between 1973 and 1980, forty-eight roll call votes were recorded concerning unemployment. The content of congressional consideration of unemployment changed little between the two periods. Votes considered efforts to extend or retract funding for unemployment, the types of employment eligible to collect unemployment payments, and the period of time for which the unemployed were eligible to collect benefits (Poole and Rosenthal 1996). However, after passage of the *Civil Rights Act* in 1964 the effect of these efforts changed. Because the act eliminated racial discrimination in access to public resources and unemployment was considerably higher among minority populations, efforts to extend unemployment benefits, by default, disproportionately benefitted black populations (Weir 1992).

THE STUDY

The study is designed to determine the impact of inter-group tensions on the outcomes of congressional decisions when considering civil rights and labor policies. The basis of the inquiry is that the existence of inter-group tensions impacted the decisions made by legislators in areas where these tensions were higher, and

subsequently led to the reorganization of the Democratic Party. Drawing on Olzak and others (Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003; Jacobs 1999) two factors, the prevalence of minority populations and working-class economic instability, are used as indicators of inter-group tensions. As majority group members far outnumber minority group members in all BEAs legislators in areas with high levels of racial tensions may have responded to popular demands by being less likely to support policies designed, or perceived to be designed, to reduce levels of inequality between black and white populations. The expected connection between inter-group tensions and civil rights policies is relatively straightforward. Civil rights policies sought to extend rights to minority populations that were previously reserved for majority group members. Legislators may have been less likely to support these policies in areas where the perceptions of majority group populations held that they had more to lose by their passage—areas where inter-group tensions were higher.

While labor and civil rights were connected throughout the twentieth century the connection between inter-group tensions and legislative decisions when considering labor issues is not as straightforward as the connection with civil rights policies. Prior to the civil rights era the connection between labor and race was largely a negative one—either through federal law or access to labor organizations minority populations were largely excluded from labor protections (Quadagno 1994). With the efforts of northern Democrats, and following the passage of the *Civil Rights Act*, the political debate over labor and race issues became much more similar. Labor policies themselves and the impact of unemployment policies both began to focus on intra-class inequality,

disproportionately benefiting minority populations (Weir 1992). It is expected that the relationship between inter-group tensions and congressional decisions when considering labor issues will follow the same pattern as the relationship between race relations and labor issues. Based on this line of reasoning, prior to the passage of the *Civil Rights Act* of 1964 there should be little or no relationship between inter-group tensions and legislative decisions concerning labor issues. After the *Civil Rights Act's* passage legislators may have been less likely to support labor policies in areas with higher levels of inter-group tensions because, unlike prior to the *Civil Rights Act's* passage, support of labor policies would disproportionately benefit minority populations.

Difference between the civil rights and post civil rights periods should impact not only legislative decisions concerning labor policies, but concerning civil rights policies as well. The shift in Democratic Party priorities during the 1960s and successful Republican Party efforts to align civil rights and labor policy with welfare resulted in many working-class voters shifting loyalties away from the Democratic Party. This work seeks to discover if the Democratic Party that emerged from the civil rights era did so with higher levels of political coherence—the emergence of a national party, or if both the basis and ideals of the party were undermined.

WHAT FOLLOWS

In the next chapter the theoretical basis for the study is considered in some detail. Competition theory, the Racial Threat Hypothesis, and previous studies that have applied these approaches to congressional decisions are addressed. The historical basis of the

work, the connection between labor and civil rights, and the political developments that aligned civil rights and labor with welfare are reviewed.

Chapter three lays out the methodology for the study. The use of economic areas as the basis for the measurement of congressional decisions is addressed. The development of dependent and independent variables is discussed, and the construction of regression models is outlined.

Chapter four addresses the transformation of the Democratic Party as a consequence of conflict between inter-group tensions and the party's adoption of a pro-civil rights agenda. Patterns of Democratic losses are addressed to determine if these losses occurred in a way that suggests a nationalization of the party.

Chapters five and six present the results for statistical analysis of the relationship between inter-group tensions and congressional voting patterns when considering civil rights policies and unemployment extensions respectively. The relationship between congressional decisions is addressed for the congress as a whole, northern legislators and southern legislators. Roll call voting decisions made by members of the Democratic Party in isolation from their Republican counterparts are then addressed for the congress as a whole, the north, and the south. Connections are made between these findings and patterns of Democratic losses in congress.

Chapter Seven offers conclusions and discussion. The results of the data analysis clearly suggest that inter-group tensions shape policy decisions, but suggest that these tensions were used by the Democratic Party to further their civil rights agenda rather than retreating from it. It is suggested that the ideological coherence of the Democratic Party

was left intact and the stage was set for the emergence of a national Democratic Party.

Many questions, however, remain unanswered. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research to shed additional light on the nationalization of the Democratic Party.

These suggestions include plans for analysis inside BEA, and use of a more refined approach for selecting policies for analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Quadagno (1994) contends that race relations in the United States have limited the extension of social protections. Springing from the history of slavery in states of the former Confederacy and the legacy of racist and undemocratic institutions that continued in the south through much of the twentieth century, the debate over civil rights has largely been seen as a debate between states of the former confederacy and the rest of the country (see Bense 1987). The importance of differences between northern and southern regions of the country are so strong that a great deal of research concerning policy development has elected to address the south independently of the rest of the country (see for instance Black 1976; Black 1978; Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Key 1949; Matthews and Prothro 1966; Wright 1977) based on the assumption that southern policy processes were distinct from those in the rest of the country. But, the migration of non-white populations from the south to a number of industrial centers in the north and west during and following World War II largely reshaped the demographic landscape of much of the country (Sugrue 1993). In many cases these population shifts were important in activating latent racism in many areas of the north (Lieberson 1980). These regional differences coupled with conservative political rhetoric aligning civil rights extensions with high taxes and government intervention pressed majority group populations across the country to turn against the extension of civil rights (Edsall and Edsall 1992), and successfully aligned a wide range

of social and labor protections with racial preferences (Alesina and Glaeser 2003; Quadagno 1992; Weir 1992).

Historically, southern politics have been quite different from those of the rest of the country. The undemocratic southern political system extending into the 1960s virtually ensured a Democratic lock on southern congressional seats. However, the southern branch of the Democratic Party operated quite independently of the national party to the extent that Mayhew's (1986) analysis of American political parties refers to an American three party system in the period between the end of the Civil War and the Middle of the Civil Rights era. Rather than a national Democratic and Republican Party, Mayhew contends that the Democratic Party was two parties, one controlling southern congressional seats and one competing with Republicans in the remainder of the country. While southern politics were defined by social conservatism, largely geared toward preserving the racist political economy, the south was not a bulwark of economic conservatism (Amenta 1998). On a variety of economic issues including labor and welfare issues, southern electorates were the most liberal group in the United States (Edsall and Edsall 1992). Furthermore, a number of popular movements demanding progressive social reforms, such as the Townsend Movement—a white working-class led movement demanding old age protections, originated in and drew much of their power from southern popular support.

The convergence of northern and southern legislators on economic issues allowed for the maintenance of a weak coalition between the two wings of the Democratic Party, and the party's majorities in congress were built on this coalition. Maintenance of the

link, however, was dependent on the exclusions of black workers from social protections ensuring that the party would remain ideologically divided—a coalition of two parties (Mayhew 1986). Any move of the national Democratic Party toward a more liberal civil rights stance threatened to undermine this coalition and crumble party majorities in congress. Civil rights issues gained importance in the late 1950s as Democrats' popular support was not sufficient to gain national office in the 1960 presidential election. Only by winning northern black votes, by the promise of extending civil rights, could Democrats hope to gain the presidency (Lawson 1976). The party was faced with a dilemma—restructure and risk losing congressional position, or maintain historical alliances and risk becoming politically untenable (Quadagno 1992).

Shedding southern seats was a necessary condition for the development of a national Democratic Party (Lieberman 2005). The ideological coherence necessary to maintain a national party could not develop as long as the party's strengths were based on an alliance between ideologically divergent groups. At the same time the challenge to the Democratic Party reached beyond the coalition between the party's northern and southern wings. Northern working-class majorities were built on alignments between Democrats and organized labor, and in many cases these relationships depended on the exclusion of minority populations built into labor protections (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). By pursuing a more liberal civil rights stance the Democratic Party risked upsetting these delicate racial balances in the north.

Ultimately, the national Democratic Party adopted a strong civil rights stance, championing the *Civil Rights Act* and the *Voting Rights Act*. This legislation nullified

earlier exclusions of minority populations from social protections, and ensured the unmaking of southern Democrats' monopoly on congressional seats and the congressional committee system (Lieberman 2005). With the adoption of a strong civil rights stance Democratic losses in the south were a foregone conclusion. Upon signing the *Civil Rights Act* in 1964 President Johnson stated that the south had been lost to Democrats for a generation to come. These losses, however, did not spell the doom of the party itself. Control of the congressional committee system by southern Democrats, hostile to civil rights extensions, stood as a major obstacle to civil rights extensions (Quadagno 1992). Only by breaking this monopoly and collapsing the loose coalition between ideologically conflicting northern and southern wings would it be possible for the Democratic Party to become an ideologically centralized national organization.

In many places northern Democrats' seats were won, and kept, by maintaining a balance between national policy goals and the demands of white working-class populations (Quadagno 1994). While labor policies excluded minority populations and southern Democrats controlled the congressional committee system Democrats were able to provide social protections for white worker, and there was little chance that these protections would be extended to minority populations. Under these conditions northern Democrats were able to maintain majorities in most northern congressional districts. This changed with Democrats' adoption of civil rights as a central aspect of their national policy platform. Passage of civil rights legislation threatened whites' privileged access to resources and in many places racial-tensions could crumble Democrats' popular support (Tolbert and Grummel 2003). Northern Democrats were faced with a choice—pursue

national civil rights extensions and risk losing large margins in congress or retreat from national party goals and risk collapsing the ideological integrity of the party.

Drawing on previous research suggesting that racial tensions have impacted social policy development, the proposition advanced by this work is straightforward: racial tensions presented real challenges to the Democratic Party. Upon adopting a civil rights agenda Democratic legislators faced with inter-group tensions had a choice: support the party's civil rights goals and risk losing office or retreat from party goals and weaken the ideological integrity of the party as a whole. The implications for the party are clear. By retreating from party agendas Democrats may be able to maintain larger cohorts in congress but the party itself would have less ideological integrity. Much like the alliance between its northern and southern wings, the Democratic Party would remain a loose alliance of organizations (Skowronek 1982), rather than a coherent ideological organization with clear goals. The ability to pursue goals would, therefore, be undermined.

The actual impact of inter-group tensions is less clear. Following the civil rights era did the Democratic Party continue as an amalgam of organizations that lacked central coherence, or did inter-group pressures lead to the development of the first truly national Democratic Party? Democrats lost large margins in congress, and success in accomplishing party goals was mixed. Great advances were made in the provision of civil rights, but many desired reforms were blocked (for instance school busing efforts failed and extension of voting rights was limited) (Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994). On the broader Democratic agenda success in extending unemployment benefits was also

mixed. A Democratic measure to provide jobs and training for disadvantaged populations (CETA) was enacted, but an attempt to extend workplace protections (the Labor Reform Act) was defeated (Weir 1992). Were these patterns the failures of a party crippled by a lack of ideological integrity, or success of a nationally centralized party limited by its numbers in congress?

INTER-GROUP TENSIONS

The theoretical basis for addressing racial tensions is drawn from Blalock's (1967) racial threat hypothesis (also see Liska 1987; Liska and Chamlin 1984). The racial threat hypothesis maintains that increases in the prevalence of black populations in localities influences majority group perceptions of inter-group economic and political competition and the threat of black-on white crime. Blalock found that the impact of minority populations as a proportion of localities was first decreased majority group discriminatory attitudes as increased exposure to minority group members reduced majority group ignorance of minorities. However, as minorities continue to increase majority group discriminatory tendencies increase until minority population size eclipses the dominant group. Increases in majority group discriminatory tendencies arise from increases in inter-group competition for social and economic resources. Factors regulating segregation such as local or state statutes, dual labor markets, and the overall availability of employment influence majority group perceptions of inter-group competition, and influence majority group discriminatory tendencies. In this regard, Jacobs (1999) and Olzak (1989) have associated higher levels of inter-group tensions with levels of working-class economic instability. Additionally, Olzak *et al* found that

white-led race riots are more frequent in areas with larger black populations and greater black-white interaction (Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003). In the face of increased racial threat dominant groups have attempted to use state apparatuses to maintain their dominant social positions (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Chamlin 1987; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Piven and Cloward 1971; Quinney 1977; Turk 1969).

Previous studies of the impact of inter-group tensions on congressional voting have focused almost entirely on Southern politics (Jacobs and Helm 2001 and Deckard 1976 are two exceptions). These studies relate the size of minority populations to legislative decisions, but come to widely divergent conclusions. Some have found that minority population size is positively related to legislator liberalism (Black 1978; Ehrenhalt 1987; Feagin 1972; Fleisher 1993; Gulati 1994). Others have found that legislator liberalism is inversely related to proportion minority population (Black 1976; Black 1978; Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Matthews and Prothro 1966; Wright 1977). Still others have concluded that there is no relationship (Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1984; Bullock 1985; Whitby 1985).

These earlier studies draw on a variety of measures of liberalism. For instance, Hood and Morris (1998) use the *Americans for Democratic Action* index of liberalism, Jacobs and Helm (2001) use tax progressivity, and Whitby and Gilliam (1991) use the *Leadership Conference on Civil Rights* index of liberalism. These measures offer considerable insight into general patterns of liberal or conservative voting patterns in congress, but offer little insight into policy specific voting. When considering popular

impacts, specific policies are important because individuals and groups are often conservative on some issues and liberal on others. For instance Edsall and Edsall (1992) point out that during the 1960s, southern whites tended to be far more conservative on civil rights issues than the rest of the American population. However, they were far more liberal than the rest of the nation in regard to economic issues such as labor protections or the availability of government transfer payments. Because populations tend to be liberal on some issues and conservative on others, aggregate measures of liberalism may mask effects that shed light on the relationship between inter-group tensions and congressional voting decisions.

The connection of civil rights policies to inter-group tensions is straightforward—higher level of inter-group tensions would result in less support for civil rights extensions. But, if inter-group competition undermined the development of a national Democratic Party a broader range of Democratic Policies should be affected. “During the War on Poverty in the 1960s, labor market policies were definitively cast into the realm of social policy. In fact, by targeting poor urban African-Americans and setting up new ‘poverty institutions,’ labor market policies of the 1960s became strongly associated with welfare policy, the most despised segment of social policy in America” (Weir 1992; p. 10). Not only civil rights policies, but a broader range of Democratic issues were linked to tensions within the working-class. Measuring working-class support for the Democratic Party, Weakliem (1997) contends that racial composition impacted class-based voting between 1930 and 1980. He found that class-based voting among whites was lower in areas where blacks made up a larger proportion of the population.

Weakliem's conclusion points to a connection between inter-group tensions and popular support for legislators. Democrats responding to these pressures, by retreating from party goals, would provide evidence of a lack of ideological integrity within the party. On the other hand, lack of response or increased voting within party lines would point toward party nationalization.

RESPONSE OR NATIONALIZATION

Two variations of the consequences of inter-group tensions are addressed in this paper. The first, responsiveness, suggests that legislators responded to inter-group pressures in the areas they represented by voting in ways that conformed to local conditions and in so increased their chances of maintaining office. Conversely, the second, nationalization, suggests that legislators' voting decisions were driven by party pressures, rather than pressures arising from race-based competition for resources, and risked the displacement of legislators whose decisions failed to conform to the conditions within the areas they represented (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). The impact on the advancement of Democratic agendas is negative with both sets of consequences. In the former case policies are undermined as legislators conform to local pressures. In the latter case policy impacts arise as representatives are replaced by competitors more in line with local populations' demands, and perhaps allowing new legislators to nullify or reverse earlier decisions. In both cases extensions of the Democratic Party policy agenda would be dampened.

The most important implications arise for the Democratic Party itself. The collapse of southern Democrats' monopoly on the congressional committee system was a

necessary condition for the development of a national Democratic Party, but, given this condition, responsiveness of legislators to white working-class demands would place the party in a position little different than the alliance between the north and south.

Suppressing rights extensions required departure from the emerging national party agenda, and the party would again be an alliance between ideologically divergent groups. On the other hand, Democratic adherence to the party agenda would allow for the development of an ideologically coherent organization. As southern congressional incumbents were removed from office, or defected to other parties, the possibility arose that their replacements, if Democrats, would hold more closely to the goals of the national party. In addition to allowing ideological coherence within the party the collapse of the southern monopoly on congressional seats presented the possibility of a truly national Democratic Party.

Because of differences between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party the implications of party nationalization and responsiveness will be different in the two areas. In the south, racist cultural and political institutions gave rise to racially exclusionary predispositions. Support of civil rights legislation in the south, therefore, was the exception rather than the rule. That is, only under mitigating circumstances would southern legislators be expected to support civil rights legislation. In the north, on the other hand, the relationship is more complex. The association between organized labor and the national Democratic Party put in place pressures for party members to support the national party agenda. However, racially based institutional dynamics exerted pressures in the opposite direction—requiring northern

legislators to weigh the party agendas against popular pressures (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Weir 1992).

Democratic losses in the north immediately following passage of civil rights legislation were more severe than in the south. However, unlike the south, that continued to shed Democratic seats well into the 1990s, Democrats began to regain seats shortly after the initial losses. The development of a national Democratic Party suggests that Democrats who retained office were more likely to adhere to national party agendas. As southern Democrats continued to shed seats the divergence between southern Democratic voting patterns and the national Democratic agenda could be narrowed. On the other hand, southern Democrats who retained office may have done so by conforming to popular pressures. As legislators responded to inter-group pressures their voting decisions would not conform to the party's agenda and the ideological integrity of the party would be weakened, signaling the disintegration of the Democratic Party.

LOCATING INTER-GROUP TENSIONS

Previous studies addressing political party strength have concentrated on political and institutional processes (Mayhew 1986). Studies addressing political and institutional impacts select units of analysis most appropriate to the studies—those that draw the institutional and political variables into focus: congressional districts, counties, and states. This approach works well for demonstrating the importance of the given mechanisms, political and institutional pressures play out where political power is held. Previous studies concerning inter-group tensions have generally followed these other works, but inter-group tensions are played out within populations rather than centers of

political power. “What matters is the relevance of race for white voters, which could be affected by the racial composition of the neighborhood, the city, the state, or wider regions” (Weakliem 1997).

To more accurately capture the impacts of inter-group tensions it is necessary to address the orientation of populations in space. Following Tilly (2001) space is treated as an “environmental mechanism,” that is “externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life. [Such mechanisms apply] not to actors but their settings” (Tilly 2001, 24). The spatial context influences the degree to which other relational mechanisms are amplified or dampened. Variation in inter-group tensions across space implies spatial variation in the nature, degree, and timing of mobilizations associated with these tensions. Under particular conditions some areas may experience high levels of mobilization while others experience very little or none. Conditions may motivate the mobilization of different groups with competing claims on social resources across or within distinct areas, and may arise at different points in time. The consequences of mobilization may vary as well.

The importance of space in determining social policy outcomes is not a new idea. Mayhew (1986) points to differences in political and economic conditions across both time and space during continental development in the United States as consequential in giving rise to a number of distinct political systems. Drawing on Mayhew, Bense (1987) argues that distinct regional economies across the American geographic landscape have resulted in sectional pressures shaping a wide range of policies. In both cases the

co-development of regional economic and political structures impacted legislators' policy support.

From a different standpoint Alesina and Glaeser (2004) also found that space was central to differences between the development of social protections in the United States and other industrialized democracies. In their analysis space is important as the distances between points of working-class mobilization and centers of political power effectively mute the impact of working-class political efforts. By illustrating the importance of space in muting working-class political efforts Alesina and Glaeser implicitly established the existence of distinct and varying points of political mobilization. While these points are often separated from centers of political power (and from each other) they are not separated from legislators representing the localities where the mobilizations occurred.

Support for earlier findings concerning racial tensions on policy outcomes tends to cite the increased importance of the black vote to legislators' electoral viability—especially for the Democratic Party—in studies concluding increased legislator liberalism (Black 1978; Ehrenhalt 1987; Feagin 1972; Fleisher 1993; Gulati 1994), and inter-group tensions in the case of reduced liberalism (Black 1976; Black 1978; Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Matthews and Prothro 1966; Wright 1977). Because these studies use congressional districts as their unit of analysis both offer viable explanations. In congressional districts where newly enfranchised minority group members make up a large enough proportion of the population, they may become a political force. In these cases the evidence indicates that official negative responses to minority well-being drop off dramatically (Blalock 1967). Particularly in districts faced

with viable opposing party (Republican) candidates, marginal black votes may provide Democratic candidates with the electoral edge. However, as minority populations grow large enough to affect electoral outcomes, competition theorists have found that majority-group-led social unrest and inter-ethnic violence increase (Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003). In the same way majority group members may align behind anti-civil rights candidates.

Competition theory and the racial threat hypothesis are extended here in an attempt to account for differences in the decisions made by legislators representing areas experiencing varying levels of inter-group tensions. Earlier studies have relied upon states or congressional districts as their unit of analysis. In contrast, this effort draws on Bense's (1987) analysis of American sectionalism to more fully address the social and economic pressures shaping political structures. Bense's analysis indicates that legislators representing the same local economies tend to cross party lines and vote in the same direction on a number of important issues. The patterns he detects predict that regularity in congressional voting are defined by shared economic space rather than shared political space. By using a spatial unit of analysis that more accurately estimates economic spaces, a more realistic picture of the pressures that inter-group competition impose on political outcomes (the fate of the Democratic Party) is developed.

MEASURING INTER-GROUP TENSIONS

For the Democratic Party to develop as an ideological centralized national organization Democrats in congress would need to become centralized in their agendas rather than connected to regional political economies. In this situation Democrats would

vote more in line with the party's national agenda, not respond to the dynamics of the populations they represent. Given the development of a national Democratic Party, legislators would respond less to inter-group tensions. The lack of something is difficult to measure, so the analysis is focused on the more pessimistic scenario—the disintegration of the party into regionally bound alliances. A disintegrating Democratic Party would be marked by party members' decisions being tied more closely to regional dynamics than central policy agendas. In this situation a higher level of responsiveness to regional pressures would be expected. Responsiveness to inter-group pressures is tested on two civil rights policies, the *Civil Rights Act* of 1964 and the *Voting Rights Act* of 1965, and support for unemployment extensions.

Connecting inter-group tensions to party nationalization is more difficult, but patterns of Democratic Party loss may offer some insight. Democrats lost roundly in both the north and south following the passage of civil rights legislation. Party nationalization suggests that those legislators who were left would be more likely to support the party position. But, Democratic losses were a net loss and not wholesale replacements with opposing party candidates. In both the north and the south Democrats won some seat from Republicans. Reduction of responsiveness linked to successful Democratic challenges provides stronger evidence of party nationalization. Patterns of Democratic Party losses are analyzed to address this possibility.

CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

The *Civil Rights Act* of 1964 and the *Voting Rights Act* of 1965 were selected as the civil rights policies for the analysis, and were allowed to define the scope of the

study. The policies provided a good basis for the research as they were definitive of twentieth century civil rights progress (Upchurch 2008). While both acts were passed during the most active years of the Civil Rights Movement they were controversial; both passage of the bills, and maintenance of the laws were the subject of considerable congressional attention. Four roll call votes were recorded in the House of Representatives on passage of the Civil Rights Act and eight votes on the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Between their passage and 1980 each law was the subject of fourteen more roll call votes in the House concerning enforcement, funding, extension, and the laws' application to other concerns, such as access to housing and busing to decrease racial segregation in public schools (Poole and Rosenthal 1996).

Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was originally introduced for consideration by President Kennedy, but was bottled up in committee by Southern legislators until after Kennedy's assassination in 1963 (Lieberman 2005). The intent of the bill was to outlaw segregation in business and public places and to ban discriminatory employment practices. The vote for final passage of the bill in the House of Representatives revealed both party line voting and the expected north/south divide. While the vast majority of Republicans and northern Democrats supported the measure, a narrow majority of southern Democrats opposed it. Some legislators within both the northern wing of the Democratic Party (4) and the Republican Party (34), however, voted against final passage.⁵ While examination of these patterns offers some insight, they may

⁵ Party voting data were drawn from *Voteview for Windows* (<http://www.princeton.edu/~voteview/>).

not be the best measure of congressional leanings as the vote occurs after a great deal of parliamentary negotiation aimed at reducing resistance to its passage.

While northern Democrats were the single most supportive congressional group of the Civil Rights Act itself, subsequent votes on the act's provisions and extent found them less supportive. Nearly a third of northern Democrats opposed amending the act to include a ban on housing discrimination (1966). They also opposed amendments to include or extend public school busing provisions (1968 and 1972). Voting patterns among southern Democrats and Republicans underwent similar changes. Strong opposition remained within both groups. However, the majority positions shifted from one group to the other, with the bare majority of Republicans tending to oppose extensions and the bare majority of southern Democrats supporting them.

Voting Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was geared specifically toward recalcitrant areas of the country where the provisions of the 15th Amendment to the Constitution had failed to thwart the disenfranchisement of minorities (Upchurch 2008). Because the act was aimed at particular regions of the country, and disproportionately at the south, it is expected that the north/south divide in congressional voting would be quite pronounced. This is largely borne out by preliminary analysis of roll call votes. Northern Democrats almost universally supported the roll call vote on passage of the Voting Rights Act—only one voted in opposition. Republicans were somewhat more opposed with approximately 20% voting against. Two thirds of Southern Democrats opposed the bill.

Amendments to the Voting Rights Act over the next several years included votes to extend the act and provisions to address “at large” districting (a practice that diluted minority voting impacts), gerrymandering, extension to Latino and other minority populations, and the provision of multiple language ballots (U.S. Committee on the Judiciary/House of Representatives 1981). While the voting groups (northern Democratic, southern Democrats, and Republicans) remained more cohesive than with the Civil Rights Act, some changes were apparent with as many as twenty northern Democrats opposing some extensions. At the same time, Republicans and southern Democrats showed more support for many of these provisions than they did for the law itself.

LABOR LEGISLATION

Labor policies are included in the analysis in order to determine whether the effect of inter-group tensions extend beyond civil rights issues. The availability of data, however, strongly limited the range of labor policies available for analysis. As pointed out by Weir (1992), the United States congress has only rarely considered comprehensive labor legislation, and instead prefers to consider unemployment regulations and measures. This finding is largely borne out by the availability of congressional roll call votes considering labor legislation. Between the end of World War II and the end of the Civil Rights Movement, only two major labor bills were considered in congress: the Full Employment Act in 1946 and the Labor-Management Relations Act in 1947 (Van Horn and Schaffner 2003). Their passage was motivated by fears of severe economic downturn and a return to depression era economic conditions. These bills were subjected

to very little roll call scrutiny. Only three roll call votes were recorded for the Labor-Management Relations Act (two on passage in 1947 and one movement to amend in 1951) during the period, and no roll call votes were recorded for the Full Employment Act, despite the fact that the act was gutted and renamed the Employment Act before passage (Weir 1992). In comparison, seventy-one unemployment roll call votes were recorded in the House of Representatives between 1955 and 1980, seven between 1955 and 1964, and forty-nine between 1973 and 1980.

Labor legislation, including comprehensive labor policy, was exposed to considerably more roll call scrutiny following the civil rights era than before it. To maximize comparability between the pre- and post civil rights periods, the decision was made to follow the trend in congress and perform analysis on House of Representatives roll call consideration of unemployment measures. Roll call votes were selected from two time periods: 1955-1964 and 1973-1980. The earlier period was selected to address congressional response prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ranging from the merger of the American Federation of Labor with the Congress of Industrial Organization and extending to what Edsall and Edsall (1992) found to be a watershed year in the reorganization of political alignments around civil rights issues. The latter period addresses legislation following civil rights extensions. This period is marked by what many have characterized as a cynical attempt by President Nixon to use civil rights to undermine white working-class support for the Democratic Party by attempting to nationalize the Philadelphia Plan (Graham 1989; Lipset 1992), a law requiring racial

parity in access to union employment, and the successful entrenchment of social policy as welfare marked by Ronald Reagan's election as president (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

DEMOCRATIC PARTY TRANSFORMATION

The 1950s and 1960s brought about social pressures that stood to transform the Democratic Party. Changes in the party were inevitable, and the direction of those changes is of some interest. Two potential responses to inter-group tensions were central to future of the Democratic Party. Legislators could respond to inter-group pressures and in so doing sacrifice the national integrity of the party. This approach would leave the party little different than before the movement, a loose coalition between ideologically disparate groups. On the other hand, the realignment of the party due to the loss and gain of seats may have left a party that was far more centrally organized—a truly national Democratic Party. This work addresses congressional responses to inter-group tensions to shed light on the fate of the Democratic Party.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA AND METHODS

The basis of this work is to measure the influences of inter-group tensions on the transformation of the Democratic Party. The intersection of rising public discontent due to civil rights concerns with the increased importance of northern minority votes to win the White House centralized civil rights issues for the Democratic Party. Major changes in the party were inevitable, but the direction of these changes was less clear. Did Democratic losses following the passage of civil rights legislation, hearkening the demise of the party, or lead to ideological centralization resulting in the development of a truly nationalized party?

This chapter addresses the methodological approach used to measure the impact of inter-group tensions on the decisions made by members of congress. A number of obstacles were encountered in measuring inter-group tensions—not the least of which was determining the location of inter-group tensions. Previous research measuring inter-group tensions have selected units of analysis based on convenience or necessity. Improving on earlier studies, this research utilizes a unit developed to estimate the basis of these tensions—the relevance of race for white voters (Weakliem 1997). The development of the unit of analysis is addressed below. Next the measurement strategy is addressed followed by the development of the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. Finally, the construction of models for the analysis is addressed.

UNIT OF ANALYSIS

To measure the impacts of inter-group tensions on the voting behavior of members of congress it was first necessary to settle on a unit of analysis. In doing this, Richard Bensei's approach is followed. In *Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880-1980*, Bensei (1984) demonstrates that regardless of partisan differences, legislators from an economic region tended to vote similarly on many issues. Clearly, members of the Democratic and Republican Party disagree sharply. Nevertheless, across party lines, legislators from a given region find common ground on a host of issues related to the economic activities concentrated there. Consider this example from the contemporary period. Over the past several decades, the United States has closed hundreds of military bases. It is quite common for Republicans and Democrats to provide a united front in efforts to prevent the closure of a military base. In fact, no instances were found in which Democrats and Republicans from a given region disagreed on this topic, i.e., legislators from one party favoring closure of a local base and legislators from the other party fighting alone to keep a base open (see for example, Cable News Network 2005). Following Bensei's reasoning, it is likely that both Democratic and Republican legislators' voting decisions will be impacted in areas where attempts to extend civil and economic rights to minorities threatened to upset embedded patterns of access to social and economic resources.

Several units of analysis were considered. Given the focus on congressional voting outcomes, the congressional district might seem to be an ideal choice. But congressional districts change over time (they are redrawn after each decennial census),

making it impossible to find detailed demographic, economic, and social data specific to congressional districts over time. Moreover, congressional districts are defined according to political and demographic criteria – they are not defined on the basis of a distinct regional economy. Both states and counties are administrative units; for this reason, data are available continuously over time. However, neither unit conforms to economic regions. Counties are typically much smaller than the regional economy, e.g., many residents commute across county lines to shop and work; many businesses serve and recruit workers from a multi-county region. Nor do states conform to economic regions. Some states are large (e.g., Texas and California) and contain several economic regions; others are small and economic processes are influenced by structures and processes outside the state (e.g., much of Delaware is oriented toward the Philadelphia economy). More often, states are oriented toward and dependent on several regional economies. For example, portions of New Jersey are integrated into the New York City region, much of southern New Jersey is tied to Philadelphia.

For these reasons, and consistent with themes developed by Bensen, the unit of analysis for this study is the multi-county Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) economic area. BEA economic areas encompass "the place-of-work and place-of-residence of its labor force" (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977, p. 1). That is, based on commuting and trade patterns the Department of Commerce identified the metropolitan counties and surrounding hinterland of economic regions throughout the United States. One hundred eighty one economic areas in the contiguous U.S. states have been defined. Consistent

with central place theory, each BEA is named after its largest city, which is assumed to be the area's economic center (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977).

Because the unit of analysis—i.e., the BEA economic area—does not coincide with congressional districts, an index was developed to assign congressional districts to BEA economic areas:

- If the congressional district is wholly located within one BEA economic area, a score of one (1) is assigned to the BEA economic area in which the district is located.
- If the congressional district contains all or most of the principal population center(s) of the BEA economic area, a score of 0.75 is assigned to the BEA economic area containing this population center.
- If the congressional district contains outlying areas of one or more economic area, a score of 0.25 is assigned to *each* BEA economic area.

Consider the New York City economic area. This economic area encompassed 28 counties concentrated in New York and New Jersey; this economic area also includes one county in Connecticut and one in Pennsylvania. A number of congressional districts were completely contained in the highly urbanized counties of New York City (assigned a value of 1). In addition, portions of several congressional districts in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut were located in counties included in the New York City economic area (assigned a value of 0.75 or 0.25 depending on the degree to which the New York economic area contained a large share of the congressional district's population). Conversely, in sparsely populated regions, an economic area might *not* contain an entire

congressional district. For instance, the entire state of Montana was represented by one legislator. But counties of Montana are included in several BEA economic areas (including Missoula and Great Falls as well as economic areas that are anchored in adjacent states [Wyoming and South Dakota]).

MEASUREMENT

As the congressional body most influenced by local pressures (Bensel 1987; Mayhew 1986) the analysis focuses on votes cast in the United States House of Representatives. A panel design is used to examine differences in House of Representatives roll call voting support for the *Voting Rights Act*, the *Civil Rights Act*, and unemployment legislation during time periods contemporary with and following major civil rights efforts in the United States congress. All dependent and independent variables in the analysis were expressed as proportions or as indexes based on proportions—thus avoiding data effects arising from differences between BEA sizes and populations. Following previous research concerning the impacts of inter-group tensions the proportional size of the non-white population and the level of unemployment are the independent variables (Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003). Variables were included in the analyses to control for population size, population density, median family income, and percent manufacturing employment. To control for fixed effects arising from state level dynamics a unit effects approach was used.

Roll call votes for each issue were considered within two time periods. Time periods were selected to determine whether the congressional voting patterns were

different between the civil rights and post civil rights periods. For civil rights votes the periods selected for analysis were the civil rights congresses—the 88th and 89th congresses (1963-1966), and the post civil rights period—the 90th through the 96th congresses (1967-1980). The former period encompasses the congresses when both the landmark Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts were considered and passed in congress. The latter period ranges from the beginning of reduced civil rights tensions in congress (Bensel 1987) to the successful conservative recasting of civil rights policies as “social welfare” marked by Ronald Reagan’s election as president of the United States (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

Slightly different periods were selected for the analysis of congressional support of unemployment. The 84th to 88th congresses (1955-1964) were selected as the civil rights period when considering unemployment.⁶ The beginning of this period was selected to coincide with the merger of the two major labor organizing bodies, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), an event that effectively muted the CIOs three decades of success in reducing both workplace racial inequality and unemployment (Zeitlin and Weyher 2001). The end of the period marks the end of high levels of civil rights tensions within congress (Bensel 1987). The post-civil rights period selected ranges from the 93rd to the 96th congress (1973-1980). This period ranges from the beginning of the alignment of unemployment with civil rights and welfare policy (Weir 1992) and ends with this relationship’s

⁶ The period initially selected for analysis extended through the 89th congress, however, only one roll call vote considering unemployment was considered in the 89th congress. The vote was nearly unanimous and did not add significantly to the models and was therefore dropped.

established entrenchment as an aspect of the understanding of public policy (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

The issues addressed are Democratic issues. That is, the Democratic Party was strongly aligned with organized labor and dependent on the working-class vote during much of the twentieth century. Likewise, beginning in the 1950s the Democratic Party increasingly aligned behind civil rights issues, and by the end of that decade civil rights extensions, as well as, labor protections were associated with Democratic efforts (Edsall and Edsall 1992). Two complete sets of models are constructed for the analysis. The central concern of the analysis is impacts on the Democratic Party, but Bense's (1987) observations suggest that pressures within localities may lead to convergence in voting patterns across party lines. Models considering the House of Representatives as a whole (both Democratic and Republican legislators) provide a baseline of the impact of inter-group pressures on congressional voting. The other set of models considers the Democratic legislators alone. The goal in considering both the House as a whole and Democrats alone was to determine if the impact of inter-group tensions had broad congressional implications or if the Democratic Party, because of its orientation to these issues, was more strongly impacted.

Northern Democrats were strongly influenced by organized labor during much of the twentieth century, and beginning with John F. Kennedy's bid for the presidency the national Democratic Party became quickly aligned behind civil rights issues (Ladd 1975). The Democratic Party, however, was split between northern and southern wings. The southern wing of the party actively opposed civil rights extensions but was much more

liberal concerning economic issues including unemployment protections (Edsall and Edsall 1992). Because of the difference between the two regions the implications of Democratic Party transformation are different for the north and south. Due to this unique relationship, for both of the policy areas considered in the analysis models were constructed considering the 181 BEAs making up the contiguous United States and separate models for the 119 northern BEAs and 62 southern BEAs.

Dependent variables: Congressional support for civil rights and unemployment policies. The dependent variables were constructed as indexes of mean proportional support for each issue during each time period being considered. Tables 3.1a and 3.1b summarize the dependent variable used in this analysis. Roll Call votes were selected for analysis using Rosenthal and Poole's *Voteview for Windows*⁷ computer program. *Voteview for Windows* provides a searchable database of all roll call votes cast in the United States congress. Votes were initially selected for analysis if they appeared under searches for the appropriate policy periods using the search terms "civil rights act" or "voting rights act" for the two civil rights policies, or "unemployment" for the unemployment votes. Descriptions of each selected roll call vote were then used to determine if the votes addressed the appropriate act or policy. If they did the pro-extension direction of the vote—whether a "yea" or "nay" vote supported extending civil rights or unemployment access or benefits—was determined (Appendix A summarizes all roll call votes used in the analyses).⁸ Following selection of votes, indexes were

⁷ <http://www.princeton.edu/~voteview/>

⁸ In many cases roll call votes were cast to limit the scope of policy funding or access. In these cases the "nay" position was selected as the pro position.

TABLE 3.1a. Descriptive statistics dependent variables all congressional members.

Measure	Mean and Standard Deviation*		
	Contiguous United States (181 BEAs)	Northern BEAs (119)	Southern BEAs (62)
Support for Civil Rights Act	0.44	0.54	0.25
Votes, Civil Rights Congresses 1963-1966	0.22	0.18	0.14
Support for Voting Rights Act	0.53	0.65	0.31
Votes, Civil Rights Congresses 1963-1966	0.25	0.16	0.23
Support for Unemployment	0.71	0.71	0.71
Votes, Civil Rights Congresses 1955-1964	0.16	0.17	0.15
Support for Civil Rights Act	0.63	0.70	0.47
Votes, Post Civil Rights Congresses 1967-1980	0.19	0.17	0.14
Support for Voting Rights Act	0.57	0.68	0.37
Votes, Post Civil Rights Congresses 1967-1980	0.22	0.16	0.18
Support for Unemployment	0.59	0.61	0.54
Votes, Post Civil Rights Congresses 1973-1980	0.14	0.15	0.10

* All measures of support are expressed as proportions.

TABLE 3.1b. Descriptive statistics dependent variables congressional Democrats only.

Measure	Mean and Standard Deviation*		
	Contiguous United States (181 BEAs)	Northern BEAs (119)	Southern BEAs (62)
Support for Civil Rights Act Votes, Civil Rights Congresses 1963-1966	0.44	0.54	0.27
	0.32	0.34	0.14
Support for Voting Rights Act Votes, Civil Rights Congresses 1963-1966	0.58	0.73	0.31
	0.35	0.31	0.24
Support for Unemployment Votes, Civil Rights Congresses 1955-1964	0.61	0.61	0.62
	0.32	0.38	0.16
Support for Civil Rights Act Votes, Post Civil Rights Congresses 1967-1980	0.54	0.57	0.48
	0.26	0.29	0.18
Support for Voting Rights Act Votes, Post Civil Rights Congresses 1967-1980	0.58	0.68	0.40
	0.30	0.30	0.21
Support for Unemployment Votes, Post Civil Rights Congresses 1973-1980	0.62	0.65	0.58
	0.23	0.26	0.15

* All measures of support are expressed as proportions.

constructed by dividing the number of roll call votes cast supporting the pro-civil rights or pro-unemployment position for each vote by the total number of votes available in each BEA. The arithmetic mean was then calculated for each BEA by adding the percent support for all roll call votes selected and dividing by the total number of roll call votes considered—the resulting indexes was used as the dependent variables for the analyses. Dependent variables for models considering the Democratic Party alone were constructed in the same way as those for the House of Representatives as a whole. However, the proportion support for each roll call vote was calculated by dividing the number of Democrats voting in the pro-civil rights or pro-unemployment extension direction for that roll call by the total number of Democratic legislators (rather than all legislators) in the BEA (see Table 3.1b).

To test the viability of the indexes separate regression models were constructed for each roll call vote used in the indexes. The results of the models testing individual roll call votes were largely consistent with the results for the indexes, but the indexes provided two distinct advantages and were used for the final analyses. First, the indexed mean variables have the advantage of reducing the impact of extreme results for any single roll call vote (Kim and Rabjohn 1980). Due to a variety of parliamentary maneuvers and other pressures present in the House of Representatives, which are beyond the scope of this study, the decisions made by legislators on any single vote may differ considerably from the overall voting pattern for that legislator or within a particular BEA. Using the indexed means, therefore, provides a much better estimation of overall voting patterns.

Second, the index models provided more concise, and therefore, more interpretable results.

Independent variables: Democratic Party representation, northern/southern BEA, proportion non-white population, and proportion unemployment. All independent variable for the analysis were expressed in as proportions. Table 3.2a and 3.2b summarize all independent and control variables used in these analyses.

Democratic Party Representation. The proportion of legislators in each BEA from the Democratic Party is used as the primary measure of inter-group tensions on congressional decisions⁹. All other things being equal legislators are expected to support the position of their party on any particular issue. Democratic Party legislators were placed in BEAs using the index described above. Once placed in BEAs the total number of Democratic legislators was divided by the total number of congressional seats in the BEA. For all models that considered multiple congresses the arithmetic mean proportion Democratic Party support across all the congresses in the analyses was used for the models.¹⁰

Northern/Southern BEA. To measure the impact of the historical divide in political culture between states of the former Confederacy and the remainder of the

⁹ Republican Party representation is the inverse of Democratic Party representation. It was therefore not necessary to control for the effects of both parties.

¹⁰ Alternative measures of proportion Democratic Party representation for models spanning multiple congresses including maximum and minimum proportion were examined, but these alternatives did not significantly impact the models so the decision was made to use the arithmetic mean.

country a dichotomous variable for southern BEAs was included. BEAs do not coincide with state boundaries, but each BEA contains a population center thought to be the

TABLE 3.2a. Descriptive statistics independent and control variables civil rights congresses.

Measure	Mean and Standard Deviation		
	Contiguous United States (181 BEAs)	Northern BEAs (119)	Southern BEAs (62)
Population (natural log of count)	13.30 0.89	13.32 0.99	13.25 0.65
Democratic Party representation Civil Right models (proportion)	0.62 0.33	0.47 0.30	0.89 0.19
Democratic Party representation Voting Rights models (proportion)	0.66 0.33	0.55 0.32	0.88 0.24
Democratic Party representation Unemployment models (proportion)	0.81 0.35	0.71 0.40	1 0
Non-white population (proportion)	0.10 0.12	0.04 0.04	0.22 0.14
Unemployment (proportion)	0.05 0.02	0.05 0.02	0.05 0.01
Median family income (dollars)	4309.96 1074.93	4818.61 846.51	3333.67 741.56
Population density (natural log of ratio)	6.24 1.17	6.23 1.36	6.28 0.68
Manufacturing employment (proportion)	0.21 0.10	0.22 0.11	0.19 (0.09)

TABLE 3.2b. Descriptive statistics independent and control variables post civil rights congresses.

Measure	Mean and Standard Deviation		
	Contiguous United States (181 BEAs)	Northern BEAs (119)	Southern BEAs (62)
Population (natural log of count)	13.39 0.93	13.41 1.03	13.35 0.70
Democratic Party representation Civil Right models (proportion)	0.58 0.30	0.48 0.27	0.79 0.23
Democratic Party representation Voting Rights models (proportion)	0.58 0.31	0.48 0.28	0.78 0.24
Democratic Party representation Unemployment models (proportion)	0.89 0.27	0.84 0.30	0.98 0.13
Non-white population (proportion)	0.10 0.11	0.05 0.05	0.20 0.12
Unemployment (proportion)	0.05 0.01	0.04 0.02	0.04 0.01
Median family income (dollars)	7630.10 1458.76	8298.66 1241.32	6346.90 867.76
Population density (natural log of ratio)	6.33 1.19	6.31 1.38	6.38 0.74
Manufacturing employment (proportion)	0.16 0.08	0.16 0.08	0.17 0.09

economic hub of that area. The variable was set equal to one if the economic center of a BEA was within a state of the former confederacy and zero otherwise.

Proportion Non-white Population. Following earlier studies concerning the impacts of inter-group tensions the central independent variable used in these analyses was percent non-white population. It is expected that inter-group tensions will be higher in BEAs where the non-white population is larger in proportion to the population as a whole—thus creating majority group perceptions of increased competition for jobs and other social resources. Due to the impacts of increased inter-group tensions on mobilization and the tendency of majority group populations to mobilize in opposition to minority group access in these situations congressional support for civil rights and unemployment policy is expected to be lower in BEAs where a larger proportion of the population is non-white. Proportion non-white population was calculated as a simple proportion by dividing the total non-white population by the total population for each BEA as estimated from county level census data for the census nearest the time period being considered.¹¹

Unemployment. Organized labor's political efforts, during much of the post World War II period, focused on supporting legislation to ensure employment stability (Weir 1992). The link between organized labor and the Democratic Party suggests that employment stability was central to the party's labor policy efforts. Olzak (1992) and Jacobs (1999) use unemployment as a measure of working-class economic instability.

¹¹ Data for percent non-white population and other independent variables were generated from county level census data drawn from the *County City Data Archive*. Population estimates were made by selecting the census period closest to the years that the votes for that policy were cast and are, therefore, estimates. Because these estimates were made from decennial figures it was not necessary to make adjustments for models considering multiple congresses.

For this work unemployment is adopted as a measure of working-class economic instability and it is expected that congressional support for civil rights policies will be lower in areas with higher levels of unemployment. Similar to the measure for non-white population a simple proportion is used to measure unemployment. The variable was calculated by dividing total unemployment by the total workforce in each BEA. Values for total unemployment and total workforce were estimated using census figures for the census nearest the congressional periods being addressed.

Control Variables. Population, Population Density, Manufacturing Employment, Median Family Income, and Fixed Effects. BEAs have the advantage of encompassing areas of social overlap between diverse populations within the United States, however, they vary across a number of other dimensions. Variables were included in all models to control for the effects of differences in population, population density, and the size of the manufacturing economy. Additionally, dichotomous variables for each state (with one omitted), were included to control for fixed effects arising from state level dynamics.

Population. The overall population of BEAs is important to take into account as a measure of the overall size of the economies in question. Areas with smaller overall populations may be characterized by larger rural or homogeneous populations where lower levels of inter-group tensions would be expected, or where majority group discriminatory tendencies arise from ignorance rather than inter-group tensions (Blalock 1967; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). The measure initially used for population was a simple count taken from the decennial census nearest the congressional period being addressed. However, extreme population values for some areas distorted model

outcomes. The natural logarithm of population was used as the control for BEA population.

Population Density. Population Density influences the probability that majority group member will encounter minority group members (Massey and Denton 1988). In areas with low population density larger non-white populations may have less impact on majority group discriminatory attitudes simply because majority group members do not encounter minority group members on a regular basis. Population density for BEAs was calculated by dividing the population by the total square miles of each BEA. As with the measure for population a natural logarithm transformation was used to reduce the impact of extreme values.

Manufacturing Employment. Prior to the 1980s labor organization was largely concentrated on the manufacturing sector of the economy (Weir 1992). The Democratic Party's ties to organized labor suggests that party members holding office in areas with large manufacturing sectors would be impacted differently than their counterparts in areas with economies supported by other sectors. These differences could arise as the attachment of Democrats to organized labor provided more stability in office, allowing greater latitude in civil rights decisions, or as racial exclusionary practices attached to particular labor organizing strategies exacerbated inter-group tensions. The size of the manufacturing employment sector for each BEA was calculated as the proportion of the labor force employed in the manufacturing sector. The variables were calculated by dividing the total number of manufacturing employees for each BEA by the total workforce for that BEA.

Fixed Effects. Not only the economic context but also effects arising from state level processes may impact the decisions made by legislators. Lobao and Hooks' (2003) lead is followed in controlling for the effects of state level processes. All models include dichotomous variables for each state in the contiguous forty-eight omitting one (Kansas for models including all BEAs in the contiguous U.S. and northern BEA models, Arkansas for models concerning the south alone). Each state's dichotomous variable was set to one if the economic center of the BEA fell within that state and zero otherwise.

MODELING

Leicht and Jenkins (2007) caution concerning political sociologists' tendency to overlook spatial context was taken seriously in developing the research questions for this work. However, the correlation of variables across spatial units presents a challenge for statistical modeling. Two steps were taken to ensure that problems arising from spatial effects did not distort the models. First, state dummy variables were included in all models. By including state level dichotomous variables it was possible to control for impacts on the data arising from state level relationships. To save space the regression coefficients for the state level dichotomous variables are not included in the tables presented in subsequent chapters. Second, all models in the analysis were constructed using both ordinary least squares regression and spatially weighted maximum likelihood models using GeoDa¹²—a software package designed to detect and control for the effects of spatial autocorrelation. GeoDa constructs weighting schemas based on the orientation of each area in a dataset to all other areas in that dataset and dynamically controls for the

¹² <https://www.geoda.uiuc.edu/>

effects of areas on each other based on the weighting schema selected. For this analysis a first-order queen's contiguity weighting schema was used.¹³ First order queen's contiguity weighting controls for the effects of spatial autocorrelation arising from all immediately contiguous areas. While the effects of spatial autocorrelation did not greatly impact the models, in many cases the spatially weighted models fit the data better than the OLS estimates. For this reason OLS and spatially weighted maximum likelihood results are reported in all models in subsequent chapters. In addition to the spatial effect Breusch and Pagan (1979) tests indicated the existence of heteroscedasticity. A third set of models was, therefore, constructed using robust regression techniques to determine if heteroscedasticity significantly impacted the model outcomes. Results for the robust regression models did not differ notably from the other two sets of models and were therefore not reported.

The impacts of spatial autocorrelation arise from two distinct causes: correlations between variables in one area and variables in surrounding areas or correlations between variables in one area and the error terms from surrounding areas. In any given model spatial lag (correlation between variables across spatial units), spatial error, or both types of spatial autocorrelation effects may be present. GeoDa constructs separate models to control for spatial lag and spatial error effects, and runs LaGrange multiplier tests to determine the significance of each type of spatial autocorrelation. Non-significant LaGrange multipliers indicate that spatial auto correlation does not significantly impact the model; likewise, significant LaGrange multipliers for either or both of the lag or error

¹³ Second and third order queen's contiguity weighting schemas were also tested but did not add significantly to the models.

models suggest model distortions caused by spatial effects. The significance of the LaGrange multipliers was used to determine which models to present in the analyses. In models where the LaGrange multiplier was not significant for either set of models lag models are presented by default. Following Anselin (1988) only when the coefficients for the error models were significant, or the LaGrange multipliers for both lag and error models were significant and the error model coefficient was larger, were error models presented in the analyses.

Due to the differences in political culture between northern and southern states, and the general hostility of southern congressional members to civil rights policies, the effects of inter-group tensions was expected to be dependent on an interaction between the dependent variables and the region of the country. Initially, to control for these effects a series of models were constructed using slope dummy variables (see Hamilton 1992; Jorgenson 2006) for each of the dependent variables. The results for the slope dummy models confirmed the existence of interaction effects, however, the variance inflation factor increased significantly, distorting the models. Fortunately, the number of BEAs in both northern (119) and southern (62) regions of the country allowed separate models to be constructed for each region.

The inter-group sharing of economic space is by no means equal. Demographic indicators leave little doubt that black populations are far more likely to live in urban centers than in suburban or rural areas (Wilson 1987). It is areas where these two groups intersect within localities that previous research has discovered high levels of inter-group tension (Blalock 1967; Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak

and Shanahan 2003). In economies where this area of overlap is larger, marked by a larger proportion black population, it is expected that more legislators will be negatively impacted by majority-group perceptions of inter-racial competition, effectively nullifying pro-civil rights votes in the same economies arising from political party, legislators' preferences, or intra-district pro-civil rights pressures (for instance majority black congressional districts). While some districts within an economic area and the legislators representing them may strongly support civil rights extensions, because these districts share economic space with numerous other congressional districts, and the vast majority of these districts are white dominant, it is expected that the net within-economic area support for civil rights issues will fall as minority group members reach numerical parity with majority group members (Blalock 1967). Faced with these conditions legislators may respond to popular pressures or be displaced from office. In other words, by addressing the problem from within economic space rather than political space a clearer picture of what "political strategists [have termed] 'white nooses' around black cities" (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 103) may be gained.

Although legislators representing majority black congressional districts can be expected to favor extending civil rights legislation, such districts are extremely rare and are typically embedded in majority white economies. Prior to the 89th congress (1965-1966) there were only four majority black congressional districts and all were in southern BEAs (Alder 2003). Of these, minorities held only a bare majority in three (less than 55%), and all were rural—usually split between two or more economic areas. After 1966 the number of majority black congressional districts expanded slightly and moved

northward. There were seven majority black congressional districts during the 90th congress, and by 1979 the number had expanded to thirteen with twelve in northern urban centers and only one remaining in the rural south. The orientation of majority black districts to other congressional districts ensured that black districts remained dominated. In the rural south the slight black majorities in a few districts coupled with widespread minority disenfranchisement does not clearly translate to any kind of real political power. In the urban north, black majority congressional districts were by far outnumbered by white majority congressional districts in the same economies. Take for instance the New York City BEA. This economic area had three majority black districts—more than any other economic area—but it shares an economy with thirty-nine majority white congressional districts. The racial threat hypothesis draws into question whether inter-racial sharing of economic space leads white voters in this BEA to align disproportionately behind anti-civil rights organizations and candidates, effectively nullifying the civil rights efforts of the majority black districts.

The net effect of inter-group tensions was the transformation of the Democratic Party. The displacement of legislators and the collapse of southern Democrats' monopoly on the congressional committee system virtually guaranteed that the Democratic Party emerging from the civil rights era would be fundamentally different from the party prior to the era. The impact of inter-group pressures on congressional voting is addressed to shed light on the nature of that transformation. The transformation of the Democratic Party hinged both on the impacts of inter-group tensions and the realignment of congressional members across congressional districts as legislators lost

seats in some areas and gained seats in others. In the next chapter Democratic losses in congress are addressed to determine if the patterns of these losses are consistent with party centralization or disintegration. The following two chapters address the impacts of inter-group tensions on these transformations.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEMOCRATIC LOSSES

Historical accounts place some emphasis on the Democratic Party's support for civil rights policies in shaping the future of the party. President Johnson understood the implications of the party's civil rights efforts: stating upon signing the Civil Rights Act into law that the south was lost to the Democratic Party for a generation to come. Johnson's fears were well founded. Between 1966 and 1980 Democrats lost twenty-five percent of their southern congressional seats. Southern Democrats' woes following the passage of civil rights legislation are widely attributed to perceptions of majority group priority in the region. Extending this reasoning nationwide, legislators in all regions of the country who failed to conform to popular pressures may well have faced electoral defeat in subsequent elections. Unfortunately, the structure of the data used in this analysis does not allow for consideration of legislators' subsequent electoral successes based on prior individual voting records. The aggregation of data across BEAs allows for the analysis of differences in policy support based on characteristics within economic areas, but less can be determined concerning the fate of particular legislators impacted by similar popular conditions. Still, some insights can be gained into the fate of the Democratic Party by addressing the general patterns of Democratic Party losses and gains.

Over the fifteen years following the passage of the Voting Rights Act Democratic losses in the south were significant while losses in the remainder of the country were less

so. The evidence commonly used to demonstrate the impact of southern defection from the Democratic Party is clear. Between the 89th and the 97th congresses Democrats lost nearly twenty-five percent of their congressional seats in the south while only losing fifteen percent in the remainder of the country. However, by observing the more immediate aftermath of the passage of civil rights policies a different picture emerges. Table 4.1 summarizes Democratic Party representation in congress between the 88th and 97th congresses (1966-1982). The congressional election of 1966—the first election following the passage of the Voting Rights Act—saw Democratic losses in both the north and south. In the election of 1966 Democrats lost 8 seats in the south (9% of all southern Democrats). During the same election the party lost 42 seats in the north (19.5% of all northern democrats). Democratic losses in the south during the period are frequently associated with the racist southern institutions, and rightly so. Democratic electoral losses coupled with the defection of democratic incumbents from the party—such as the formation of Strom Thurmond’s Dixiecrat Party—makes southern hostility to civil rights extensions apparent. The same connection has rarely been made in the north even though Democratic losses in the north were much more severe than in the south.

Immediately following the civil rights congresses Democrats lost more severely in the north than in the south. Over the next seven congresses Democratic fortunes in the north shifted, and they began to regain seats. Northern Democrats eclipsed their high water mark of the civil rights period in the congressional election of 1974—an election marked by the Watergate Scandal—and then fell precipitously again in the 1980 election. By contrast Democrats in the south continued their decline losing an additional twenty-

Table 4.1—Political party representation in the House of Representative 88th-97th congress

Congress	Northern Democrat	Southern Democrats	Republicans
88th Congress 1963-1964	163	95	177
89th Congress 1965-1966	205	91	140
90th Congress 1967-1968	163	83	188
91st Congress 1969-1970	163	79	193
92nd Congress 1971-1972	172	78	178
93rd Congress 1973-1974	168	74	192
94th Congress 1975-1976	211	82	142
95th Congress 1977-1978	211	81	143
96th Congress 1979-1980	201	77	160
97th Congress 1981-1982	174	69	193

two seats. Only during the controversial Watergate years did Democrats make modest gains in the south, but these gains were quickly reversed in subsequent elections.

When changes in Democratic Party representation are placed into BEAs it becomes apparent that Democratic Party losses immediately following the civil rights congresses were not absolute. While the Democratic Party as a whole lost ground in the House of Representatives a more complex pattern emerges within BEAs. In both the north and the south Democrats gained seats in some BEAs while losing ground in others. The fact that Democratic losses were uneven across, and even within, economies reinforces the tie with differing levels of inter-group tensions across areas. When the distribution of minority populations within space is considered some indication of this pattern emerges.

The relationship between the prevalence of minority populations and Democratic losses within BEAs differs dramatically between north and south. Contrary to expectations, in the 1966 congressional election Democrats experienced stronger losses in northern BEAs than in southern BEAs, and stronger gains in Southern BEAs than in the north. Democrats lost ground in all five of the northern BEAs with the largest minority populations. By contrast, in the five southern BEAs with the largest minority population Democrats lost ground in only one. In the other four Democrats gained ground in three, and representation remained the same in the other.

By contrast, in the most racially homogeneous northern BEAs little change was seen in Democratic Party representation. Prior to the civil rights congresses Democrats held seats in only two of the five most racially homogeneous northern BEAs and did not

gain ground in either of these areas. Of the other three Democrats gained a seat in one BEA, lost ground in the second and remained the same in the third. By contrast Democrats lost strongly in three of the five most homogeneous southern BEAs and representation remained the same in the other two.

Democrats lost in northern BEAs and gained in Southern BEAs where inter-group tensions are strongest. Changes in the north follow expectations and supply evidence of the formation of a unified national party. Gains in the south may also suggest party nationalization. The widespread enfranchisement of minority populations brought on by passage of the *Voting Rights Act* coupled with Democratic Party policy moves demonstrating that Republicans could no longer claim to be the “Party of Lincoln” in regard to race issues may have motivated these shifts within congressional districts more in line with the emerging policy agenda of Democrats. Verifying this would require looking inside BEAs, but reduced responsiveness of southern legislators to inter-group tensions following the civil rights period would provide further support for the party nationalization argument.

As with the earlier period, placing Democratic gains and losses following the civil rights period into BEAs yields additional information. Like the earlier period changes in Democratic Party representation were not absolute in either the north or the south. Democrats gained ground in some areas and lost ground in others. The relationship between the location of minority populations and Democratic gains and losses, however, contrasts starkly with the earlier period. Democratic gains between the 90th and 97th congresses were more likely in northern BEAs with larger minority populations, while

Democratic losses in southern BEAs were more likely in areas with large black populations.

While not conclusive, the relationship between changes in Democratic Party fortunes within BEAs and the dominance of minority populations suggests that racial tensions impacted Democratic Party success. The fact that the relationship between the two variables is reversed between northern and southern BEAs suggests a difference in the institutional and political dynamics between the two regions. Democratic losses in northern BEAs with large black populations immediately following the civil rights congresses indicates that inter-group tensions negatively impacted the success of Democrats in northern BEAs. The fact that Democrats also regained seats in northern BEAs with large non-white populations may simply indicate that Democrats were voted back into seats that were previously lost. At the same time, the possibility arises that Democrats lost ground in congressional districts within these BEAs with dominant white populations immediately following the passage of civil rights legislations and gained ground in the same BEAs, but in congressional districts with lower racial tensions or majority black populations.

In similar fashion the movement of Democrats in Southern BEAs may have been the result of Democratic retention in black populations centers during the immediate aftermath of civil rights extensions—a political reorganization that afforded minority populations significantly more electoral power. The possibility arises that the continued Democratic losses in the south during the next fifteen years was the resignation of white dominated areas to Republicans. The patterns together suggest a process that truly

resulted in “white nooses around black cities,” but gave rise to the possibility that surviving Democrats voted more in line with the national party.

Prior to the civil rights movement the Democratic Party was, for all intents and purposes, a coalition between two parties, regionally divided between northern and southern regions of the country (Mayhew 1986; Poole and Rosenthal 1996). Analysis of Democratic Party gains and losses following the civil rights congresses displaying distinctive patterns, and these changes concentrate in the most racially heterogeneous BEAs. The timing of Democratic gains and losses within racially heterogeneous BEAs suggest the development of a party that, while smaller, was more centrally organized and focused on social policy extensions. The changes in the Democratic Party that resulted in this realignment occurred within, rather than between, BEAs and therefore cannot be completely analyzed with the data used for this study, and must be reserved for future research. Addressing the reactions of congressional members to inter-group tensions will offer further support and is taken up in the next two chapters. Chapter five addresses the impact of inter-group pressures on support for civil rights. Chapter six takes up these issues with regard to unemployment policies.

CHAPTER FIVE

CIVIL RIGHTS RESULTS

The reaction of legislators to inter-group tension was central to the fate of the Democratic Party. By reacting to local pressures the post-civil rights Democratic Party would be different from the early period only by the regional alignment of coalitions. Following party agendas, on the other hand, would suggest the development of an ideologically coherent organization. The path taken by Democrats following the civil rights era however is unclear. Bense's (1987) analysis of American congressional voting behavior provides strong evidence that sectional pressures played a fundamental role in the development of the federal policy landscape in the United States. His findings indicate that on a host of issues popular pressures, economic characteristics, and political histories influenced the decisions made by members of congress on a variety of issues. On the other hand, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) found that politicians had a tendency to vary from party lines only during times of extraordinary popular mobilization. The civil rights period was a time of extraordinary mobilization, but the question remains if Democrats responded to popular or party pressures.

Drawing on a total of thirty-three civil rights measures Bense demonstrates the importance of the coalition between northern and southern legislators before and during the Civil Rights Movement, but notes that following the civil rights period this coalition began to break down. This divide between the north and south was certainly important, but it was not definitive of American race tensions. While of a different character,

minority group members faced obstacles in the north equally as daunting as those faced in the south (Quadagno 1994; 1992). During the tumultuous years of the civil rights era the Democratic Party was faced with imminent transformation. Due to the existence of inter-group pressures in the north the possibility exists that the Democratic Party was only transformed in the geographic character of the pro and anti-civil rights organizations that made it up. On the other hand, the party may have been strengthened as Democratic legislators less in line with the party's agenda were purged from congress; allowing the party itself to gain ideological coherence. Evidence in the last chapter indicates a geographic realignment of the Democratic Party. This chapter addresses the role of inter-group tensions on civil rights policies to determine the changes to the ideological coherence of the Democratic Party.

To gain a broader understanding of the impact of inter-group tensions previous research was referenced to (Jacobs 1999; Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003) develop measures of popular pressures on congressional support for social policies. These works address the impact of majority group perceptions of inter-group competition on popular mobilization. Their findings indicate that areas shared by majority and minority group members tend to experience higher levels of majority group mobilization and inter-group violence, and that these effects are stronger in areas where high unemployment rates exacerbate working-class economic instability. By responding to such inter-group pressures support for extending social and political rights to minority populations would be lower in areas where inter-group tensions were higher. Given situations where legislators are more responsive to

popular demands it can be expected that their responses followed majority pressures rather than ideological or party pressures—in the case of civil rights decisions lower support for extension. These findings are expected as majority group members far outnumber minority group members within economic spaces allowing their demands to overwhelm minority group efforts to gain access to political and economic rights.

Measuring the impacts of inter-group tensions on the outcomes of legislative voting behavior suggests a two-fold effect: first that the sharing of space by minority and majority group members gives rise to inter-group tensions, and that, when these tensions are substantial enough, they will impact the decisions made by members of congress. Olzak *et al.* (Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003) provide strong evidence for the first point, showing that inter-group violence is more prevalent in areas with higher proportion minority group membership and areas where working-class economic stability is lower. Evidence of the second point has been less clear. A number of studies have connected legislative decisions with indicators of inter-group tensions, however the studies have addressed a wide range of policies and the outcomes have been somewhat inconsistent (See Hood and Morris 1998 for a review of these findings).

FINDINGS

Following Deckard (1976) the roll call votes selected for the analysis reflect the preferred position of the national Democratic Party, but Bense's (1987) lessons concerning sectionalism are taken seriously. While Democrats would be expected to vote in line with party preferences, other things being equal, sectional pressures may lead to some variation between regions. To control for this models concerning all legislators

Table 5.1. Regression results for Congressional support of civil rights policies—both political parties. N=181

	Civil rights Congresses (1964-1966)				Post Civil Rights Congresses (1967-1980)			
	Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act		Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.003 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Democratic Legislators	0.12* (0.05)	0.12** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.04)
Non-white Population	0.02 (0.20)	0.02 (0.17)	-0.70*** (0.17)	-0.66*** (0.15)	0.13 (0.17)	0.13 (0.14)	-0.79*** (0.18)	-0.77*** (0.16)
Unemployment	2.44* (1.08)	2.46** (0.91)	2.32** (0.93)	2.33** (0.79)	1.23 (1.10)	1.22 (0.93)	2.49* (1.19)	2.45** (1.00)
Median Family Income	0.27 (0.25)	0.28 (0.21)	0.29 (0.21)	0.27 (0.17)	-0.34** (0.14)	-0.34** (0.11)	0.15 (0.15)	0.15 (0.12)
Population Density	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04^ (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Manufacturing Employment	-0.03 (0.23)	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.16)	0.56** (0.21)	0.56** (0.18)	-0.38^ (0.22)	-0.38* (0.19)
Southern BEA	-0.31* (0.14)	-0.32** (0.12)	-0.21^ (0.12)	-0.20* (0.10)	-0.41*** (0.11)	-0.41*** (0.10)	-0.24* (0.12)	-0.23* (0.10)
Constant	0.02 (0.24)	0.04 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.18)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.77*** (0.18)	0.33 (0.22)	0.32^ (0.19)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.04 (0.11)	_____	0.07 (0.09)	_____	0.02 (0.10)	_____	0.03 (0.09)
Adjusted R²	0.70	0.70	0.83	0.83	0.77	0.77	0.79	0.79

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher.

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher.

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher.

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher.

(Democrats and Republicans) are included as a baseline estimate of sectional influences. Differences in the influence of popular pressures between the models provide an estimate of the impact of those pressures on Democrats compared to all members of congress.

Table 5.1 displays the results of the regression analyses for the contiguous United States considering all members of congress, and offer considerable evidence that inter-group tensions influenced legislative decisions when considering the *Civil Rights* and *Voting Rights Acts*. As expected the relationship between support for the *Voting Rights Act* and percent non-white population was negative and significant. This relationship was significant for the *Voting Rights Act* and not the *Civil Rights Act*, suggesting that legislators were more responsive to popular pressures when considering legislation attempting to extend political rights than when considering legislation attempting to extend social and economic rights.

The strongest and most surprising findings in the models were the strong positive relationships between percent unemployment and civil rights legislation. This relationship held in three of the four models, only for the Civil Rights Act during the post civil rights congress was this variable not significant. Because inter-group tensions are higher in areas with higher unemployment rates the relationship found in the models clearly refutes the hypothesis that increased inter-group tensions would decrease support for civil rights policies.

The models in this study do not include direct measures for the influence of organized labor on legislative decisions¹⁴, but the positive relationship between support for civil rights legislation and unemployment rates suggests that the principles used by organized labor influenced these decisions. The strong relationship clearly indicates that legislators representing areas with higher levels of unemployment were motivated to vote in the same way when considering civil rights policies, but the direction of the relationship clearly shows that this response was not an attempt to pander to the racially motivated demands of mobilized populations, but rather a thoughtful response to a genuine social problem.

The fact that when faced with comparatively high levels of working-class economic instability legislators were more likely to support extending civil rights suggests a response that is anything but cynical. The evidence indicates that legislators certainly responded to the conditions within the economic areas where their districts were, but not by folding to majority group pressures in a racially charged atmosphere. Instead, the response of legislators appears to derive from other factors. Considering that during the three decades prior to the civil rights era Congress of Industrial Organization efforts to reduce racial inequality resulted in lower unemployment inequality and lower unemployment rates in general (Zeitlin and Weyher 2001) congressional decisions when

¹⁴ Union membership in the United States is only measured at the state level, providing at best a rough measure of union membership within BEAs. However, following Zeitlin and Weyher (2001) models were constructed using dichotomous variable for the 15 most highly unionized states and the five strongest CIO states. The variables were not significant in either set of models and did not add significantly to the analysis and were therefore not reported. Considering the fact that Zeitlin and Weyher's findings indicate that CIO civil rights efforts were successful in lowering unemployment rates this finding is not surprising.

considering civil rights policies appear to suggest a response driven by past successes in lowering unemployment rather than by racial tensions.

Two other variables in the models for the contiguous states merit some discussion. First, the significant negative relationship between congressional support for these policies and the dichotomous variable for southern BEAs indicates that southern legislators were less likely than their northern counterparts to support civil rights policies. Second, percent Democratic Party Representation was significant in three of the four models. Neither finding was surprising in and of itself, but both suggested the need to further investigate the particular relationships. Models considering northern and southern BEAs independently and Democratic Party legislators in isolation from their Republican counterparts are considered below.

NORTH AND SOUTH RESULTS

The significant negative coefficients for the dichotomous variable measuring the influence of economic areas centered in states of the former confederacy indicates that support for civil rights was lower in southern regions than in the rest of the country. Table 5.2 confirms the strong difference between the two regions. Legislators were far more likely to support civil rights legislation in northern BEAs than in southern BEAs.

TABLE 5.2. Mean values for dependent variables—all members of congress.

	Civil Rights Era		Post Civil Rights Era	
	Civil Rights Act	Voting Rights Act	Civil Rights Act	Voting Rights Act
All	0.44	0.54	0.63	0.57
North	0.54	0.65	0.70	0.68
South	0.25	0.31	0.47	0.37

If the influences shaping legislative decisions were the same between northern and southern areas there would be little difference between the coefficients for other variables in the models when the two regions of the country were considered separately. This, however, was not the case. Dramatic differences between the independent variables validated the need to address the two regions separately.

Interestingly, the effect of percent non-white population on support for the *Civil Rights Act* is negative and significant for northern BEAs for civil rights congresses (Table 5.3), but not significant for southern BEAs or when the contiguous states were considered together. While this effect is mild it verifies that, at least at the peak of racial tensions during the civil rights era, inter-group tensions influenced the decisions made by legislators in northern regions of the country.

In southern BEAs it is relatively unclear whether inter-racial tensions or southern political culture shaped legislative decisions. In southern BEAs percent non-white population is significant during both the civil rights and post civil rights periods but only for the *Voting Rights Act*. The monopoly on political power that the southern wing of the Democratic Party enjoyed during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century was based largely on the disenfranchisement of the African-American population. It can therefore be expected that southern legislators would be resistant to extending political rights to minority populations. However, legislators in all areas of the south, not just in those areas where the minority population was disproportionately large, stood to lose political power by the extension of political rights to black populations. It would,

Table 5.3. Regression results for Congressional support of civil rights policies northern BEAs—both political parties. N=119

	Civil Rights Congresses (1964-1966)				Post Civil Rights Congresses (1967-1980)			
	Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act		Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 [^] (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Democratic Legislators	0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.35*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.04)
Non-white Population	-1.13* (0.71)	-1.13* (0.57)	-0.25 (0.43)	-0.23 (0.35)	-0.21 (0.56)	-0.19 (0.45)	-0.19 (0.49)	-0.19 (0.39)
Unemployment	4.26** (1.39)	4.25*** (1.12)	2.29** (0.84)	2.26*** (0.68)	2.07 (1.57)	2.09 [^] (1.27)	2.82* (1.30)	2.85** (1.05)
Median Family Income	0.70 [^] (0.37)	0.69* (0.30)	0.06 (0.23)	0.07 (0.18)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.14)
Population Density	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 [^] (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)
Manufacturing Employment	-0.33 (0.34)	-0.33 (0.27)	-0.01 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.17)	0.61 (0.40)	0.62 [^] (0.33)	0.24 (0.35)	0.26 (0.28)
Constant	-0.45 (0.36)	-0.46 (0.30)	0.17 (0.22)	0.23 (0.19)	0.61 [^] (0.32)	0.69** (0.27)	0.52 [^] (0.29)	0.57** (0.22)
Spatial Weight	_____	0.02 (0.12)	_____	-0.09 (0.11)	_____	-0.09 (0.11)	_____	-0.08 (0.11)
Adjusted R²	0.59	0.59	0.81	0.81	0.71	0.71	0.75	0.75

[^] Significant at the 0.10 level or higher.

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher.

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher.

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher.

Table 5.4. Regression results for Congressional support of civil rights policies southern BEAs—both political parties. N=62.

	Civil Rights Congresses (1964-1966)				Post Civil Rights Congresses (1967-1980)			
	Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act		Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.01 (0.04)	0.003 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.04)
Democratic Legislators	0.26* (0.11)	0.28** (0.09)	0.10 (0.13)	0.10 (0.11)	0.07 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	0.16 (0.10)	0.16^ (0.09)
Non-white Population	-0.07 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.68** (0.27)	-0.66** (0.25)	0.15 (0.17)	0.16 (0.15)	-0.80*** (0.23)	-0.76*** (0.20)
Unemployment	0.30 (1.98)	0.73 (1.63)	1.03 (2.38)	1.00 (2.01)	-1.13 (1.89)	-1.17 (1.59)	-1.53 (2.55)	-1.71 (2.15)
Median Family Income	-0.03 (0.38)	0.10 (0.32)	0.32 (0.47)	0.32 (0.39)	-0.54* (0.21)	-0.51** (0.18)	-0.11 (0.29)	0.08 (0.24)
Population Density	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06^ (0.06)	0.05^ (0.03)	0.004 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Manufacturing Employment	0.13 (0.33)	0.14 (0.27)	-0.46 (0.39)	-0.45 (0.33)	0.44^ (0.25)	0.44* (0.21)	-0.66^ (0.33)	-0.64* (0.28)
Constant	-0.18 (0.44)	0.10 (0.37)	-0.21 (0.54)	-0.22 (0.46)	0.10 (0.35)	0.09 (0.30)	0.66 (0.48)	0.64 (0.41)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.30 (0.19)	_____	0.03 (0.17)	_____	0.08 (0.16)	_____	0.07 (0.16)
Adjusted R²	0.33	0.36	0.62	0.62	0.58	0.58	0.55	0.55

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher.

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher.

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher.

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher.

therefore, be expected that congressional support for extending political rights would be low in the region as a whole. If this were the case support for the *Voting Rights Act* should not be dependent on the size of the non-white population. A statement by Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender to president Lyndon Johnson adds support to the idea that popular inter-group tensions influenced congressional support for the Voting Rights Act: “In some counties in the state of Mississippi, the ratio of Negroes to white is 3 to 1. I am frank to say that in many instances the reason why the voting rights were not encouraged is that the white people in those counties are in the minority, are afraid they would be outvoted. Let us be frank about it.”¹⁵

The results of the regression analyses for northern and southern regions independently also clarify the relationship between support for civil rights legislation and unemployment. This relationship is exclusive to the north, and is strengthened when northern BEAs are addressed independently of the south. Additionally, the coefficient for percent unemployment gains marginal significance (above the 0.10 level) for the Civil Rights Act during the post civil rights period—the only model for which this variable was not significant in models considering the contiguous United States. Zeitlin and Weyher (2001) found that the relationship between Congress of Industrial Organizations civil rights efforts and lower rates of unemployment were exclusive to northern regions of the United States. Assuming that northern legislators understood this relationship and responded to higher levels of unemployment with attempts to extend civil rights—an approach that had previously reduced unemployment—this finding is less surprising.

¹⁵ Cited from <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk:80/USAcivil64.htm>

In addition to the Congress of Industrial Organization's greater strength in northern regions of the United States—allowing them greater success in efforts to extend civil rights and thus impact unemployment rates in the region—a strong relationship existed between organized labor more generally and the Democratic Party, often referred to as the liberal-labor coalition. Assuming that organized labor's influence was stronger within the Democratic Party the relationship between unemployment and support for civil rights extensions should be stronger when the Democratic Party is considered alone. This relationship is explored below.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESULTS

All regression analyses presented for the Democratic Party were mirrored by models for the Republican Party. None of the independent variables were significant for any of the votes considered in the models isolating the Republican Party. It can, therefore, be concluded that the impact of inter-group tensions on support for civil rights policies arose largely from differences in support within the Democratic Party. The models considering the Democratic Party alone offer confirmation, while some differences are evident the results for the Democratic Party models largely reflect the models for the congress considered as a whole. Two differences, however, were of note. First, as expected, the coefficients for unemployment were larger in models considering northern Democrats than for models considering all northern legislators. This relationship suggests some level of ideological coherence among northern Democrats. Second, during the post civil rights period southern Democrats were strongly more likely to oppose extension of the *Voting Rights Act* than were all southern legislators. Opposite

the prior finding, this relationship indicates retrenchment of southern Democrats within racially exclusionary ideal—an indication of party disintegration rather than nationalization.

TABLE 5.5. Mean values for dependent variables—Democratic Party members only.

	Civil Rights Era		Post Civil Rights Era	
	Civil Rights Act	Voting Rights Act	Civil Rights Act	Voting Rights Act
All	0.45	0.59	0.54	0.58
North	0.54	0.73	0.57	0.68
South	0.27	0.31	0.48	0.40

Addressing support for civil rights policies by Democratic legislators in isolation from their Republican counterparts provided some ability to determine the influence of political parties, particularly the Democratic Party, in shaping support for these acts. By comparing differences in support within the Democratic Party across the two time periods it is possible to further determine the party's path of transformation. Table 5.5 displays mean values for Democrats' civil rights support for both the civil rights and post civil rights periods, for the contiguous United States as a whole, and for the northern and southern regions of the country independently. Differences between the two time periods suggest very little change when considering all Democrats and northern Democrats. Support for *Civil Rights Act* extensions was slightly higher than for the passage of the act itself, but overall very little change is observed. On the other hand, southern Democrats overall were considerably more likely to support extensions of both the *Civil Rights Act* and the *Voting Rights Act* than they were to support the acts' passage. This finding is strongly in line with nationalization of the Democratic Party.

Table 5.6¹⁶ displays the results of the models regressing Democratic Party support for the *Civil Rights* and *Voting Rights Acts* on indicators of inter-group tensions for both the civil rights and post civil rights congresses. These models confirm that inter-group tensions played a central role in shaping Democratic support for civil rights extensions, but these influences were notably different for the two regions of the country.

As observed earlier northern Democrats' reaction to inter-group pressures appears to strongly support the thesis of party nationalization. Democrats more strongly supported the extension of civil rights policies in areas with higher levels of unemployment during both the civil rights and post-civil rights periods, but this support was markedly stronger in the post civil rights period. Additionally, northern Democrats were more like to support extension of the *Civil Rights Act* than they were to support its passage. Both of these findings suggest increasing levels of ideological coherence within the party. The development of a truly national Democratic Party, however, is not as clear.

¹⁶ The models addressing Democratic legislators alone displayed in this chapter include percent Democratic legislators as a control variable. This variable adds very little additional information to the models, suggesting only that more Democratic legislators in a BEA results in more Democratic support for the votes being considered. A second set of models (not shown) were constructed excluding the control for percent Democratic Party. Important differences between the two sets of models—notably stronger relationships between percent unemployment and the dependent variables—indicated that including the variable provided more accurate results. Percent Democratic Legislators was therefore left in the final models.

Table 5.6. Regression results for Congressional support of civil rights policies—Democratic Party members only. N=181

	Civil rights Congresses (1964-1966)				Post Civil Rights Congresses (1967-1980)			
	Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act		Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.05 [^] (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 [^] (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08** (0.02)
Democratic Legislators	0.37*** (0.08)	0.46*** (0.07)	0.43*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.09)	0.38*** (0.07)
Non-white Population	-0.001 (0.27)	-0.38 (0.25)	-0.69* (0.30)	-0.66*** (0.25)	-0.01 (0.27)	0.004 (0.22)	-1.03*** (0.31)	-0.94*** (0.26)
Unemployment	3.80* (1.76)	3.60** (1.34)	2.25 (1.62)	2.25 [^] (1.36)	3.80** (1.79)	3.82** (1.47)	5.27** (2.00)	5.18** (1.68)
Median Family Income	0.28 (0.39)	0.34 (0.30)	0.34 (0.37)	0.32 (0.31)	-0.22 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.18)	0.04 (0.25)	0.04 (0.21)
Population Density	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Manufacturing Employment	0.47 (0.33)	0.46 [^] (0.28)	0.29 (0.34)	0.30 (0.29)	0.97** (0.33)	1.02*** (0.28)	-0.19 (0.39)	-0.20 (0.32)
Southern BEA	-0.26 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.17)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.30 [^] (0.17)	-0.32 [^] (0.18)	-0.33* (0.15)	-0.21 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.17)
Constant	-1.02** (0.35)	-0.99** (0.30)	-0.41 (0.36)	-0.43 (0.31)	0.80** (0.32)	-0.71** (0.28)	-1.06*** (0.38)	-1.11*** (0.32)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.12 (0.10)	_____	0.05 (0.10)	_____	-0.16 (0.10)	_____	0.13 (0.10)
Adjusted R²	0.70	0.70	0.74	0.74	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.68

[^] Significant at the 0.10 level or higher.

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher.

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher.

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher.

Table 5.7. Regression results for Congressional support of civil rights policies, northern BEAs—Democratic Party members only. N=119

	Civil Rights Congresses (1964-1966)				Post Civil Rights Congresses (1967-1980)			
	Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act		Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06^ (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07^ (0.04)
Democratic Legislators	0.53*** (0.11)	0.52*** (0.09)	0.51*** (0.10)	0.51*** (0.08)	0.49*** (0.12)	0.49*** (0.09)	0.46*** (0.11)	0.45*** (0.09)
Non-white Population	-2.02^ (1.17)	-1.98* (0.94)	0.13 (1.14)	0.12 (0.92)	0.64 (0.93)	0.66 (0.74)	0.86 (1.03)	0.87 (0.83)
Unemployment	4.15^ (2.31)	4.41* (1.87)	1.57 (2.22)	1.57 (1.80)	3.47 (2.61)	3.48^ (2.09)	6.14** (2.74)	6.19** (2.21)
Median Family Income	0.26 (0.61)	0.36 (0.49)	-0.06 (0.59)	-0.06 (0.48)	-0.07 (0.32)	-0.08 (0.26)	-0.33 (0.36)	-0.35 (0.29)
Population Density	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.002 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.002 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
Manufacturing Employment	0.59 (0.56)	0.56 (0.45)	0.92^ (0.55)	0.93* (0.44)	1.47* (0.67)	1.52** (0.53)	0.33 (0.73)	0.27 (0.59)
Constant	-1.67** (0.59)	-1.63*** (0.48)	-0.10 (0.57)	-0.10 (0.47)	-0.83 (0.53)	-0.72^ (0.44)	-0.82 (0.58)	-0.87^ (0.47)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.13 (0.12)	_____	0.01 (0.12)	_____	-0.18 (0.11)	_____	0.12 (0.11)
Adjusted R²	0.70	0.70	0.64	0.64	0.72	0.72	0.68	0.68

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher.

* Significant at the 0.05 level or higher.

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher.

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher.

Table 5.8. Regression results for Congressional support of civil rights policies, southern BEAs—Democratic Party members only. N=62

	Civil Rights Congresses (1964-1966)				Post Civil Rights Congresses (1967-1980)			
	Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act		Civil Rights Act		Voting Rights Act	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.02 (0.04)	0.002 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.003 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
Democratic Legislators	0.13 (0.13)	0.12 (0.11)	0.03 (0.14)	0.04 (0.12)	0.15 (0.10)	0.16^ (0.09)	0.10 (0.12)	0.10 (0.10)
Non-white Population	-0.08 (0.23)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.66* (0.28)	-0.61* (0.26)	0.06 (0.23)	0.05 (0.19)	-1.13*** (0.28)	-1.11*** (0.26)
Unemployment	1.04 (2.11)	1.40 (1.73)	0.58 (2.55)	0.46 (2.12)	-2.12 (2.50)	-2.27 (2.06)	-1.92 (3.08)	-1.97 (2.56)
Median Family Income	0.37 (0.40)	0.33 (0.33)	0.35 (0.48)	0.38 (0.40)	-0.57^ (0.29)	-0.65** (0.25)	-0.28 (0.36)	-0.26 (0.30)
Population Density	0.002 (0.05)	-0.001 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Manufacturing Employment	0.12 (0.33)	0.12 (0.27)	-0.50 (0.40)	-0.46 (0.33)	0.62^ (0.32)	0.69** (0.27)	-0.34 (0.40)	-0.34 (0.32)
Constant	-0.36 (0.47)	-0.25 (0.39)	-0.39 (0.56)	-0.42 (0.47)	-0.26 (0.49)	-0.20 (0.40)	0.68 (0.60)	0.67 (0.51)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.26 (0.19)	_____	0.07 (0.16)	_____	-0.18 (0.16)	_____	0.02 (0.17)
Adjusted R²	0.35	0.38	0.65	0.62	0.57	0.58	0.55	0.55

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher.

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher.

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher.

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher.

The only significant independent variable for southern BEAs in models considering Democrats alone (Table 5.8) was a negative relationship between percent non-white population and support for the *Voting Rights Act* and its extension. This negative relationship is much stronger in the post civil rights period than it was during the civil rights congresses. The finding suggests that southern Democrats were more likely to respond to popular pressures when considering extension of political rights after the civil rights movement than they were during it, a finding that suggests ideological disparity and the disintegration of the Democratic Party. This finding is somewhat tempered by the fact that southern Democrats in general were more likely to support civil rights extensions after the civil rights movement than during it (Table 5.5). When faced with inter-group tension southern Democrats responded quite strongly in attempts to protect white privileged access to the ballot box, but when not faced with these pressures they fell more in line with the national party agenda, providing evidence of the nationalization of the Democratic Party.

CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the data concerning civil rights extensions revealed that the divide between northern and southern regions of the country remained important following the civil rights era, and that the ideological divide between the two regions may have been strengthened. At the same time, northern Democrats appear to have gained considerably more ideological coherence following the Civil Rights Movement than before it. While the impact of inter-group tensions is supported, the influence of these tensions on congressional voting behavior was quite surprising. The evidence suggests that inter-

group tension increased northern Democrats adherence to the party agenda of supporting civil rights legislation while southern Democrats became more opposed.

Analysis of congressional support for civil rights measures revealed that inter-group tensions were influential in shaping the decisions made by members of the House of Representatives. These influences, however, did not conform clearly to the patterns expected by analysis of racial threat. Instead, evidence of a more complex pattern is suggested as a result of a relationship between political and institutional factors. The observed relationship between voting decisions and unemployment, and the fact that this relationship was characteristic of Democratic Legislators, suggests a high level of party control, within the north this control appears to have been stronger after the Civil Rights Movement. This stands as strong evidence of the ideological alignment of the party. On the other hand, southern Democrats in areas with high levels of inter-group tensions were more resistant to the extensions of voting rights after the civil rights era than they were during it, suggesting a gloomier future for Democrats. At the same time Democratic support for civil rights policy extensions in the south were, in general, stronger following the Civil Rights Movement providing some evidence that in the absence of mitigating factors Democrats were becoming more unified nationwide. In the next chapter congressional decisions concerning unemployment are addressed directly.

CHAPTER SIX

UNEMPLOYMENT RESULTS

Labor and civil rights issues have been politically connected since the beginning of American congressional efforts to extend protections to members of the working-class (Weir 1992). The passage of New Deal reforms to extend working-class protections however hinged on the *de jure* exclusion of black workers.¹⁷ In addition to political impediments to workplace racial equality racist practices within the labor movement itself largely excluded minority workers from union protections (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). Together political and institutional processes promoted the development of a divided working-class, and left ample room for both intra-class tensions and the basis for political divisions.

Led by the efforts of Roosevelt's New Deal reformers the northern wing of the Democratic Party became closely aligned with organized labor and the extension of labor protections. The relationship between organized labor and Democrats resulted in the development of a liberal-labor coalition through much of the post-war period. The Democratic Party itself, however, was not a cohesive whole, but rather a weak coalition between northern and southern wings of the party. Through an undemocratic system southern Democrats were able to gain seniority in congress, and control most key congressional committees. Through control of the committee system southern Democrats

¹⁷ At the time of the passage of New Deal labor policies over 85% of African-Americans lived in southern states and the majority worked as either domestic or farm labor. New Deal labor policies explicitly excluded domestic and farm labor (Quadagno 1994).

were able to maintain the coherence of the Democratic Party by ensuring that issues on which the two wings of the party disagreed did not make it to the floor of congress (Bensel 1987). With the exception of adjustments to the provision of unemployment protections labor issues were among those that rarely made it out of the committee system, ensuring that robust labor policies with the ability to unite the working-class were never seriously considered (Weir 1992).

The collapse of the Democrats' monopoly on southern congressional districts and the demise of southern Democrats' dominant positions in the committee system during the 1960s allowed a shift in Democratic Party control and unemployment programs largely turned to reducing racial inequality in the workplace—chiefly employment disparities between inner-city black populations and their white suburban counterparts (Quadagno 1992; Weir 1992). While this strategy had the advantage of focusing on both racial inequalities and the geographic areas with the worst unemployment problems it also allowed opponents of employment policies the opportunity to turn disaffected white working-class voters against these programs by aligning them with “welfare” (Weir 1992; Edsall and Edsall 1992). While weakened by losses in congress the Democratic Party was still able to get significant portions of its labor agenda enacted into law, something it failed to do prior to the civil rights period. Using the same procedure employed in the previous chapter, this chapter measures the extent to which support for unemployment extensions were influenced by inter-group pressure and party alignment to further determine the direction of the development of the Democratic Party.

Two aspects of labor policy development resulted in changes in the way these policies were considered and implemented by congress, and due to these changes a shift is expected in the impact of inter-group tensions on these policies. Prior to the civil rights period the de facto exclusion of minority populations, and a large segment of the Democratic Party aligned with organized labor, allowed for the development of labor policies that focused benefits on white working-class members. However, following the extension of civil rights during the 1960s barriers to minority access to labor protections were lowered and the extension of civil rights protections gained increased importance for the Democratic Party. As a result of these changes a strengthening of the impacts of inter-group tensions on support for labor policies can be expected. Prior to the civil rights period the exclusion of minority populations, and Democratic Party efforts, united the white portions of the working-class and left little reason for inter-group tensions to influence policy direction. During the post-civil rights period the focus of labor policy efforts on the reduction of racially based intra-class disparities, and the weakened Democratic Party link to the majority group section of the working-class, may have left more room for inter-group tensions to impact congressional policy decisions. In this regard impacts of inter-group tensions on Democratic Party centralization or disintegration should be strongest when considering labor protects—an area of social protection once reserved for whites.

FINDINGS

TABLE 6.1. Mean support for unemployment policies within BEAs.

	Civil Rights Congresses	Post Civil Rights Congresses
All Legislators	0.71	0.59
All Northern Legislators	0.71	0.61
All Southern Legislators	0.71	0.54
Democrats	0.61	0.63
Northern Democrats	0.61	0.65
Southern Democrats	0.62	0.58

Table 6.1 summarizes mean congressional support for unemployment during the civil rights and post civil rights periods. Two findings are of note from this table. First, unlike civil rights votes there is very little difference between northern and southern support. Prior to the passage of civil rights legislation southern legislators were as likely as their northern counterparts to support unemployment legislation and, notably, the data suggest that southern legislators may have been slightly more likely to support these measures. Second, during the civil rights period all members of congress considered together were significantly more likely to support unemployment measures on average than Democrats considered alone. In the post civil rights period both of these relationships were markedly changed. During the post civil rights period Democrats in general were more likely to support unemployment policies than their Republican counterparts. Furthermore, during the latter period southern Democrats were less likely than northern Democrats to support unemployment policies—a disparity that was not evident in the earlier period.

At some level the fact that southern legislators were not less likely to support unemployment than northern legislators is not surprising. On many economic issues

including unemployment protections southern populations tended to be more liberal than the country as a whole (Weir 1992). Prior to the passage of civil rights legislation pressures from a population strongly supportive of unemployment extensions apparently influenced the decisions made by southern legislators when considering unemployment extensions. This relationship shifted following passage of civil rights legislation. During the 1970s southern Democrats were less likely to support unemployment policies. The evidence demonstrates that the extension of rights providing employment equality for minorities, coupled with labor policy trends focused on reducing intra-class inequalities, undermined economic liberalism in the south. In terms of the centralization or disintegration of the Democratic Party, lower levels of support for unemployment policies indicate a movement toward less centralization, and support the disintegration thesis.

The finding that, prior to the Civil Rights Movement, all legislators together were more supportive of unemployment issues than Democrats alone was somewhat more surprising. Regression models considering Republican legislators alone (not shown) did not reveal that inter-group tensions significantly impact Republican decisions. This, however, does not rule out the impact of sectional pressures making Republican legislators more likely to follow their Democratic Party counterparts increasing the overall level of support for unemployment policies in congress without significantly impacting the pattern of Republican voting itself. This sort of relationship would indicate a high level of centralized control within the Democratic Party, but, as similar relationships were not observed when considering civil rights policy, this would be very

issue specific. Instead of party centralization a strong point in the coalition between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party is suggested—a condition suggesting political strength on some issue without ideological coherence or national centralization.

The regression analyses reveal patterns similar to the findings for civil rights support (Table 6.2). There was a positive relationship between support for unemployment and the local prevalence of joblessness—working-class economic instability—within BEAs when the contiguous states were considered as a whole, but only for the post-civil rights congresses. In the case of support for unemployment policies this finding does not seem that surprising. However, it does provide reinforcement for earlier findings (chapter 5) indicating that unemployment was more influential than inter-group tensions in shaping congressional decisions, and supports the centralization of the Democratic Party. The only other independent variable that was significant for models considering the contiguous states as a whole was the measure for percent Democratic Party support. Coupled with the finding that all members of congress considered together were more supportive of unemployment policies than Democrats alone suggests a sectional influence on congressional decisions when considering unemployment policies. That is, Democrats were motivated to support unemployment policies based on party agendas. Republicans on the other hand supported (or opposed) unemployment policies based on the conditions in the areas they represented—including sharing those areas with Democratic legislators.

TABLE 6.2. Regression Models Unemployment Votes—both political parties. N=181

	Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)		Post Civil Rights Congresses (1973-1980)	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Democratic Legislators	0.17** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.03)
Non-white Population	0.03 (0.19)	0.03 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.10)
Unemployment	1.56 (1.03)	1.57^ (0.87)	2.28** (0.78)	2.24*** (0.66)
Median Family Income	-0.12 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.09)	09.09 (0.08)
Population Density	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Manufacturing Employment	0.13 (0.22)	0.13 (0.18)	0.19 (0.15)	0.18 (0.13)
Southern BEA	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.17* (0.07)
Constant	0.55* (0.22)	0.55** (0.20)	0.10 (0.14)	0.08 (0.13)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.01 (0.10)	_____	0.05 (0.09)
Adjusted R²	0.52	0.52	0.77	0.77

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher

Findings for models considering southern legislators alone (Table 6.3) reveal that the only independent variable that impacted legislative decisions to support unemployment policies was the dominance of the Democratic Party.

TABLE 6.3. Regression Models Unemployment votes Southern BEAs—both political parties. N=62

	Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)		Post Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)	
	OLS	Spatial ML ^a	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Democratic Legislators	0.21 (0.14)	0.22* (0.11)	0.22** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.06)
Non-white Population	0.16 (0.24)	0.14 (0.22)	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.12)
Unemployment	1.50 (2.17)	0.08 (1.71)	2.16 (1.60)	2.06 (1.33)
Median Family Income	0.15 (0.43)	0.32 (0.37)	-0.16 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.15)
Population Density	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)
Manufacturing Employment	0.34 (0.36)	0.47 (0.42)	0.12 (0.21)	0.10 (0.17)
Constant	0.74 (0.50)	0.84* (0.39)	0.02 (0.30)	-0.06 (0.26)
Spatial Weight	_____	0.38* (0.15)	_____	0.18 (0.16)
Adjusted R²	0.25	0.30	0.46	0.48

^a Error models were reported when the spatial weight coefficient was significant

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher

This finding suggests that in the south a single issue—Democratic Party control—shaped support for unemployment extensions. During the civil rights period black workers were still largely excluded from the extension of unemployment protections and southern support of these extensions would reinforce southern Democrats' weak coalition with their labor aligned northern counterparts. In the post civil rights period the finding is a bit more surprising, and suggests an increased level of Democratic Party control, indicating southern Democrats were being drawn into a nationally centralized party. Racial tensions were still of concern during this period, and perhaps even more significant because the working-class unemployment policy had changed significantly—to focus on the reduction of racially based unemployment inequality. As with civil rights votes the lack of significance of other factors may have resulted from a high universal level of opposition in the south to policies extending rights to minorities. The significant positive relationship between support for unemployment policies and the size of the Democratic Party presence within southern BEAs indicates a particularly strong impact of Democratic Party control.

Findings for northern BEAs were much more revealing (Table 6.4). Most notably the impact of percent non-white population on congressional support for unemployment policies shifted from negative to positive between the civil rights and post civil rights periods (although the finding for the civil rights period was weak, [i.e. significant at the 0.10 level]). During the civil rights period a negative relationship

TABLE 6.4. Regression Models Unemployment Votes Northern BEAs—both political parties. N=119

	Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)		Post Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)	
	OLS	Spatial ML ^a	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Democratic Legislators	0.17** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.42*** (0.04)
Non-white Population	-0.72 (0.62)	-0.80^ (0.48)	0.62^ (0.34)	0.65* (0.28)
Unemployment	2.25^ (1.23)	1.60^ (0.94)	0.97 (0.97)	0.99 (0.77)
Median Family Income	-0.21 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.20* (0.10)
Population Density	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)
Manufacturing Employment	-0.05 (0.30)	-0.16 (0.21)	0.45^ (0.24)	0.50** (0.20)
Constant	0.32 (0.31)	0.54* (0.23)	0.47* (0.19)	0.54*** (0.16)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.87*** (0.12)	_____	-0.12 (0.09)
Adjusted R²	0.64	0.74	0.85	0.86

^a Error models

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher

between percent non-white population and support for unemployment votes appears to confirm the impact of inter-group tensions on policy decisions. However, during the post civil rights period a much stronger positive relationship indicates that legislators in areas with a large non-white population tended to support measures to reduce unemployment, indicating that inter-group tensions increased adherence to party agendas.

Models considering the Democratic Party in all BEAs showed little difference from models considering all legislators (Table 6.5). Reviewing the similarity between mean support for unemployment when all legislators were considered and when Democrats were considered alone this finding is not surprising. On the other hand, during the post civil rights period the relationship between percent non-white population and support for unemployment policies was dramatically different when northern Democrats were considered in isolation from their Republican counterparts (Table 6.6). When northern Democrats were considered alone a negative relationship with support for unemployment policies was observed during the post civil rights period. This finding is even more dramatic in the fact that it is exclusive to Democratic legislators. When the House of Representatives was considered as a whole the relationship between percent non-white population and support for unemployment policies was positive. The fact that this relationship reversed for Democrats alone suggests that Democratic legislators responded to inter-group pressures in areas with high levels of inter-group tensions, suggesting party disintegration.

Table 6.5. Regression Models Unemployment votes Democratic Legislators only. N=181

	Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)		Post Civil Rights Congresses (1973-1980)	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 [^] (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)
Democratic Legislators	0.50*** (0.10)	0.50*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.06)
Non-white Population	-0.22 (0.34)	-0.22 (0.29)	-0.25 (0.24)	-0.26 (0.20)
Unemployment	4.52* (1.87)	4.47** (1.57)	3.07* (1.58)	3.09* (1.33)
Median Family Income	0.14 (0.42)	0.14 (0.35)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.16)
Population Density	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Manufacturing Employment	-0.08 (0.39)	-0.07 (0.32)	0.31 (0.30)	0.34 (0.25)
Southern BEA	0.29 (0.24)	0.28 (0.20)	-0.33* (0.16)	-0.33** (0.13)
Constant	-0.83* (0.41)	-0.84* (0.35)	-0.49 [^] (0.29)	-0.46 [^] (0.25)
Spatial Weight	_____	0.04 (0.10)	_____	-0.06 (0.10)
Adjusted R²	0.61	0.61	0.67	0.67

[^] Significant at the 0.10 level or higher

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher

Table 6.6. Regression Models Unemployment votes Northern BEAs—Democratic legislators only. N=119

	Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)		Post Civil Rights Congresses (1973-1980)	
	OLS	Spatial ML ^a	OLS	Spatial ML ^a
Population	0.09 (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)
Democratic Legislators	0.62*** (0.13)	0.63*** (0.10)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.06)
Non-white Population	0.38 (1.33)	0.23 (1.06)	-0.25 (0.24)	-0.37* (0.18)
Unemployment	3.70 (2.63)	4.31* (2.10)	3.07* (1.58)	3.23** (1.32)
Median Family Income	-0.06 (0.69)	0.25 (0.53)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.15)
Population Density	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Manufacturing Employment	-0.46 (0.64)	-1.20** (0.49)	0.31 (0.30)	0.39^ (0.24)
Constant	-1.00 (0.67)	-1.36** (0.52)	-0.49^ (0.29)	-0.62** (0.25)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.68*** (0.14)	_____	-0.36** (0.12)
Adjusted R²	0.68	0.73	0.67	0.68

^a Error models were reported when the spatial weight coefficient was significant

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher

Table 6.7. Regression Models Unemployment votes Southern BEAs—Democratic legislators only. N=62

	Civil Rights Congresses (1955-1964)		Post Civil Rights Congresses (1973-1980)	
	OLS	Spatial ML	OLS	Spatial ML
Population	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07^ (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Democratic Legislators	0.06 (0.14)	0.06 (0.12)	0.18^ (0.10)	0.18* (0.09)
Non-white Population	0.02 (0.25)	0.01 (0.21)	-0.31 (0.23)	-0.28 (0.19)
Unemployment	2.18 (2.25)	2.26 (1.86)	1.49 (2.48)	1.45 (2.08)
Median Family Income	0.21 (0.45)	0.19 (0.38)	-0.26 (0.28)	-0.19 (0.24)
Population Density	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Manufacturing Employment	0.44 (0.37)	0.44 (0.31)	0.27 (0.32)	0.22 (0.27)
Constant	1.24* (0.51)	1.28** (0.45)	-0.15 (0.46)	-0.24 (0.40)
Spatial Weight	_____	-0.07 (0.18)	_____	0.13 (0.16)
Adjusted R²	0.33	0.33	0.37	0.37

^ Significant at the 0.10 level or higher

*Significant at the 0.05 level or higher

** Significant at the 0.01 level or higher

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or higher

The negative relationship between Democratic support for unemployment policies and the relative size of the non-white populations within BEAs is not reflected in the models considering southern economic areas alone (Table 6.7). In fact, in both models considering all legislators and those considering Democrats alone the only factor that influenced southern support for unemployment extensions was the relative size of the Democratic Party itself. Due to high levels of economic liberalism in the south support for unemployment extension is not surprising in and of itself. It is more interesting that this support was connected to the size of the Democratic Party within BEAs and was stronger following the passage of civil rights legislation. Unlike with civil rights legislation no other factors influence southern Democratic support for labor issues. This finding suggests centralization of the party.

The dependence of southern support of unemployment legislation on the relative size of the Democratic Party within BEAs suggests that discipline within the Democratic Party rather than other factors were central in shaping support in the region. Prior to the passage of civil rights legislation the virtual exclusion of minorities from access to labor protections resulted in a situation where southern legislators had little to lose by supporting unemployment extensions and much to gain in maintaining the weak coalition with their northern counterparts. Minority access to labor protects were strongly reinforced by the passage of civil rights legislation and the Democratic monopoly on southern congressional seats collapsed. For the first time southern populations were faced with obstacles to white dominance—legislation guaranteeing racial equality, and the Democratic Party was faced with serious challenges to its dominance in the national

legislature. It is under these conditions that it might be expected that inter-group tensions would be strongest as Democrats struggled to maintain their positions in the south and Republicans worked toward completing their southern coup. This however, was not the case. Instead the evidence suggests a retrenchment of the Democratic Party, a movement toward a smaller but more politically coherent party. In the next chapter implications for this reshaping of the Democratic Party are explored.

CONCLUSIONS

In the last two chapters evidence has been presented concerning the impacts of inter-group tension on two competing claims—disintegration or centralization of the Democratic Party. As with civil rights issues, the evidence presented in this chapter was mixed. Some indicators suggest the centralization of the party while others suggest disintegration. In contrast to the findings for civil rights policies, models considering unemployment extensions suggest that southern Democrats were drawn closer to the party agenda on unemployment issues following the civil rights period while northern Democrats became more responsive to inter-group tensions. These contrasting findings suggest that inter-group tensions weakened ideological consolidation under some circumstances and promoted it in others. The consequences for the Democratic Party have become considerably clearer. While the displacement of Democratic legislators following the Civil Rights Movement did promote moves toward a nationalized party these changes may have undermined the party's overall capacity to pursue and enact legislation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this dissertation was to demonstrate the importance of racial pressures on congressional voting decisions concerning the extension of social rights. It was recognized at the outset that inter-group pressures were not the only factors impacting congressional decisions. Instead it was necessary to consider a second line of analysis, namely that members of congress did not respond to popular pressures arising as a consequence of racial tensions within space but were displaced in subsequent elections by those more likely to support the racial status quo. In reality, the consequences of attempts to extend rights to previously excluded populations in a racially charged atmosphere were some combination of both factors. With certainty, candidates run for office, and legislators make decisions, with some awareness of the populations they represent, and the dynamics and pressures shaping the opinions of those populations. Furthermore, in order to maintain office, once elected legislators have a vested interest in maintaining the circumstances under which they were elected (Clausen 1973). At the same time, the pressures motivating candidates to run for office, and shaping their decisions once in office, do not arise entirely from within the areas they represent (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), and may be contradictory to prevailing popular sentiments (Hooks and McQueen 2008). Because pressures shaping the decisions of legislators arise both internally, from population dynamics in the areas they represent, and externally, from political and institutional sources, it was necessary to consider both in the analysis.

The issues considered in the analysis were Democratic Party issues. That is, while tensions existed within the party concerning both civil rights and unemployment extensions all issues considered were championed by the national Democratic Party during the entire period under consideration—either responding to popular demands or displacement of legislators in subsequent elections would therefore concentrate impacts on the Democratic Party. The ultimate results of the two paths, however, have markedly different implications for the party itself. In the case of responsiveness the party would have diminished abilities to pursue core goals as population pressures pressed legislators to reduce support for controversial social policy extensions. As with responsiveness, displacement would diminish the ability of the party to obtain passage of policies important to the party—not due to an erosion of the party’s core goals but due to fewer votes in congress. Unlike with responsiveness, the displacement of legislators could potentially result in a more centrally coherent party as legislators were displaced from some areas where local dynamics were an obstacle to support for party goals and congressional seats were gained in areas where social policy extensions were seen as beneficial. Analysis of the data indicates the importance of spatial factors in influencing legislators decisions, however, the results suggest that legislator displacement was the dominant factor shaping the fate of the Democratic Party, and responsiveness played a less important role.

The empirical analysis offered strong support for the importance of racial issues in influencing congressional decisions; however the interaction of race and other factors were more complex than initially expected. Political parties played a much stronger role

than expected. Regional differences between northern and southern areas of the country persisted on some issues, but the realignment of political parties resulted in more party cohesion and partially undermined the importance of inter-group tensions in shaping congressional voting decisions. Inter-group tensions remained important in shaping congressional voting; however, not exclusively as a cynical response to popular pressures. Some responsiveness to popular pressures was evident. In southern BEAs legislators were far less likely to support the extensions of political rights in areas with larger non-white populations. Legislators in northern BEAs also responded to pressures arising from within the areas they represented. Some evidence suggested that legislators in the north were less likely to support civil rights policies in areas with large non-white populations, however these effects appeared only at the peak of civil rights tensions. In the north, instead of cynically responding to popular pressures, the impact of spatial pressures appeared as a retrenchment within the party's core goals.

The dominant response of congressional voting in northern BEAs was not to inter-group tensions but to working-class economic instability—high unemployment rates. In areas with high levels of unemployment northern legislators tended to strongly support extension of civil rights. Olzak *et al.* (Olzak 1990; Olzak 1992; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Olzak and Shanahan 2003) found that inter-group tensions were higher in areas with higher-levels of working-class economic instability. The fact that legislators were more likely to support the passage of civil rights policies under these conditions indicates that congressional response to inter-group tensions was anything but cynical. Rather than attempting to reinforce majority group political and economic

dominance the response of congress to these pressures was in opposite direction—efforts to extend rights to the minority populations at the center of those inter-group tensions. This finding indicates that while population dynamics shaped legislators' decisions it was not racial tensions themselves that determined the decisions. Instead, the evidence indicates that broader based political and institutional pressures were instrumental in determining legislative decisions. The fact that this pattern was stronger for northern Democrats suggests that inter-group tensions worked to shape adherence to party principles rather than responsiveness to popular demands—a condition likely to result in the displacement of legislators as local electorates chose candidates in subsequent elections more likely to adhere to the conditions within their localities, but perhaps result in a more centralized party.

The importance of race in shaping political decisions is undeniable. However, prior to World War II party dynamics largely prevented the extension of rights to minorities from becoming a central policy issue. Before the war nearly all African-Americans resided in states of the former Confederacy—states controlled by institutionalized conservative Democrats strongly opposed to the extension of rights to minorities. Through the twentieth century party alignment behind the extension of race rights shifted progressively from the Republican to the Democratic Party. The Republican Party—the Party of Lincoln—was largely responsible for the abolition of slavery, however the alignment of Republicans with business interests undermined efforts to extend rights to the working-class populations during the twentieth century—including extending rights to minorities (Weir 1992). The ambivalence of the Republican Party

toward the extension of civil rights was slowly overcome by increasing efforts by northern Democrats' concerned with racial equality, and by the early 1960s neither Democrats nor Republicans were seen as more supportive of civil rights issues.

Two factors undermined the efforts of northern Democrats to extend rights to minorities. First, and most importantly, the Democratic Party was divided between a labor aligned northern wing and a conservative, undemocratic southern wing. The southern wing of the party was strongly opposed to the extension of civil rights and due to undemocratic processes by which they attained office they were able to gain party seniority—controlling both the Democratic Party agenda and key congressional committees. In addition to southern control of the Democratic Party and congressional committees preventing serious consideration of civil rights issues the alignment of northern Democrats with organized labor also limited civil rights efforts. Organized labor itself was divided between pro-civil rights and anti-civil rights organizations complicating northern Democratic efforts to extend civil rights.

Despite the obstacles to civil rights extensions faced by the pro-civil rights contingent of the northern wing of the Democratic Party extraordinary efforts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations forced consideration of civil rights policies. In addition to bringing civil rights issues to the forefront these efforts helped bring about a vast sectional realignment within the United States. Upon signing the *Civil Rights Act* into law in 1964 President Johnson understood the implication of his decision to some degree, stating that the south had been lost to the Democratic Party for a generation to come. To some extent Johnson was correct in his concerns as more than twenty percent

of southern Democrats lost their congressional seats following the passage of the *Civil Rights Act*, but, on most issues, the southern Democrats that maintained office voted much more closely with the national party than they did prior to the act's passage.

On some issues race remained an important factor dividing the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party. Particularly, southern legislators in economic areas with large non-white populations maintained strong opposition to the extension of political rights to minorities. Both during and after the civil rights period southern legislators in areas with the most dominant non-white populations were more likely to oppose the passage and extension to the *Voting Rights Act*. Southern districts were disproportionately listed for enforcement under the *Voting Rights Act*, so it is not that surprising that legislators were more opposed in the south than other areas of the country to the passage of the act. However, a number of indicators suggest that racial tensions were definitive in shaping southern opposition. First, the strength of southern opposition to the act's passage followed the proportional size of the non-white population within economies rather than areas named in the act for enforcement. Second, areas in the northern region of the country listed for enforcement were not more likely to oppose passage of the *Voting Rights Act* than other areas. Both indicators suggest that racial tensions played a role in the development of congressional resistance to the *Voting Rights Act*. The opposition was confined to the southern region of the country suggesting either that racial tension were higher in those areas, or that the undemocratic processes by which southern legislators gained office made them more resistant to supporting legislation that would disrupt the southern political economy that allowed them to gain

power. Extensions of the *Voting Rights Act* during the 1970s included extensions of enforcement periods, increased the minority populations protected under the act, and provided provisions for multiple language ballots. Despite the fact that the undemocratic processes previously outlined were largely mitigated by the time extensions were introduced, resistance to civil rights extensions followed largely the same lines during both voting period—southern economic areas with proportionally large non-white populations were less likely to support the extensions, suggesting that inter-group tensions played a role in shaping congressional decisions.

The direct impact of inter-group tensions accounted for only a small part of the impact of racial politics on congressional voting decisions—party dynamics played a much more decisive role. Following the civil rights period the realignment of the Democratic Party resulted in a nominally smaller Democratic Party, as Republicans had made significant inroads into the southern stronghold, but the party itself was more cohesive. After the civil rights movement southern Democrats were much more likely to vote with their northern counterparts on both votes concerning the Civil Rights Act and unemployment extensions than they were before or during the civil rights period. In northern regions of the country party membership was particularly influential—no other factor was more influential in determining support for civil rights extensions in northern districts than membership in the Democratic Party.

By the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement both labor and civil rights issues were clearly defined as Democratic issues, and drawing on Democrats' attempts to extend rights the Republican Party took full advantage of existing popular tensions in

attempts to gain congressional seats and political power. The Democratic Party push to extend civil rights during the 1960s allowed Republicans to break Democrats monopoly on southern congressional districts and southern Democrats control of congressional committees. Following this initial victory further Republican Party efforts aligned unemployment and other social protections with racial preferences and increasing tax burdens (Edsall and Edsall 1992). Disproportionate unemployment and economic hardship among inner-city black populations coupled with programs geared toward reducing economic disparities in the working-class provided tacit evidence of Republican claims and white working-class populations began to abandon the Democratic Party to support Republicans. The movement of working-class voters to the Republican Party, however, was not unilateral. While Democrats lost ground in some areas they gained seats in others.

Analysis of patterns of Democratic gains and losses in the House of Representatives following the passage of civil rights legislation offers preliminary support for the hypothesis that racial tensions resulted in the displacement of legislators, particularly Democrats, resulting in a smaller but more unified Democratic Party. Immediately following the passage of civil rights legislation Democrats lost seats precipitously nationwide, however, losses were concentrated in BEAs with the largest proportion non-white populations. Furthermore, Democrats gained seats in a number of BEAs where the non-white population was smaller compared to the size of the overall population. This general pattern suggests Democrats lost ground in areas where inter-group tensions were higher. The pattern changed somewhat in the fifteen years following

the civil rights period. After initial losses Democrats began to gain seats in the same northern BEAs where they were previously lost—those with large non-white population. At the same time, Democrats continued to lose seats in the south.

This pattern does not undermine the importance of inter-group tensions, but rather presents the question of the location of parties within BEAs. Through the 1970s the distribution of non-white populations in the United States shifted; transforming the historical pattern of minority concentration for the south to the north. Furthermore, as this happened the number of northern Congressional districts where the majority of the residents were non-white increased. The possibility arises that Democrats gained seats in these areas, resulting in an alignment between Democratic and Republican legislators within BEAs that reflected the manifestation of inter-group tensions.

Democrats occupied nearly all southern congressional seats prior to the civil rights era, and, as in the north, began to lose seats following the passage of civil rights legislation. However, unlike in the north, Democrats continued to lose seats in Southern BEAs. This too suggests a concentration and transformation of the Democratic Party as the only Democratic legislators left in the south were in congressional districts most aligned with Democratic Party social policy agendas. These patterns of Democratic Party changes are only preliminary in this analysis and require investigation of congressional gains and losses within BEAs. This work must, therefore, be reserved for future research.

Sociologists have provided considerable evidence that organizational and institutional dynamics have been central to shaping social policy outcomes and the results of this research provide some confirmation of these findings. Support for both civil

rights and unemployment policies aligned along political party lines and institutionalized regional political economies. These studies, however, have focused far less on pressures arising from population dynamics. Addressing the decisions made by legislators from a spatial perspective provided evidence that population dynamics have not only been important to shaping the decisions made by members of congress, but have also played a role in shaping political parties.

Civil rights efforts led by Northern Democrats during the 1960s broke the weak coalition between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party. Republican Party candidates running for office in southern districts, in many districts for the first time in history, were successful in unseating a number of southern Democrats. Those seats that remained Democrat, however, voted much more closely with the national Democratic agenda concerning the extension of social protections after the civil rights movement than before it. The Democratic Party's move toward a civil rights agenda left the party's presence in congress nominally smaller, but the party itself became stronger as the party became more unified around a national agenda.

President Johnson's prediction that the south had been lost to the Democratic Party for a generation was only partially prophetic. The Democratic Party lost a significant number of southern congressional seats in the years following the passage of the *Civil Rights* and *Voting Rights Acts*, but Republican inroads into the south did not peak until nearly a generation after the passage of these two landmark pieces of legislation. Democrats lost over twenty percent of their seats in southern districts, but this transformation was not yet complete in the 1980s. By this time the alignment of the

Democratic Party behind programs such as the *Comprehensive Employment and Training Act*—a program that sought to reduce intra-class economic disparities—was nearly universal, and the Republic Party’s “race and taxes” (Edsall and Edsall 1992) approach to gaining popular support was political doctrine. The transformation of the once polarized Democratic Party was nearly complete, and in its place a regime arose that was no less dependent on inter-group tensions arising from the racialized history of the United States.

The purpose of this work was to demonstrate the importance of racial dynamics in determining the outcomes of congressional voting decisions, and show the consequences of these pressures on the realignment of the Democratic Party. The results of the empirical analysis offered evidence that both racial pressures and economically based sectional pressures influenced the decisions made by members of the House of Representatives. The pressures however did not arise entirely from within economic space, in fact the effects of some of these pressures allowed Democrats greater latitude in extending rights to minorities. On the other hand, the combination of racially based pressures resulted in the realignment of political parties, transforming the historical divide between institutionalized northern and southern political economies to a nationalized party system dependent on racial-tensions to maintain congressional balances.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

At the conclusion of the paper is the overwhelming sense that the work is incomplete. The research answered a number of questions concerning the impacts of inter-group tensions on congressional voting decisions and developments in the

Democratic Party. At the same time, even more questions have arisen. This research, therefore, stands as a starting point to a broader research agenda. Limitations of the data used in the analysis prevented many of these questions from being answered. At the same time, the research confirmed the importance of taking inter-group factors into account. Two distinct lines of future research are suggested—the first concerning issue specificity, the second concerning the spatial analysis itself.

The focus of this research on specific policies presented an improvement over previous research using indexes of liberalism as their measure of congressional decision-making. At the same time the breadth of extensions to both the *Civil Rights Act* and *Voting Rights Act* indicate the need for more detailed analysis. During the post civil rights period, in addition to extensions to the act itself, amendments to the *Voting Rights Act* included provisions to extend the act to minorities other than African-Americans and to supply multiple language ballots. Amendments to the *Civil Rights Act* included the applicability of the act for reducing housing inequality, and busing to reduce inequality in access to education. Both acts were effective in reducing inequality, and the extension to include a broader range of issues is not surprising, but amendments to the act to include a broader range of issues reduces specificity for the purpose of data analysis. The distribution of different ethnic groups, multiple languages, housing inequality, and education inequality are all distinct issues that potentially impacted different areas of the country in different ways. The location of Latino and Asian populations—most commonly the focus of multiple language ballots—were far different from the location of African-American populations. Additionally, school busing and housing concerns

focused on particular areas of the country with high levels of education and housing inequality. While these areas had large non-white populations they only partially coincided with the largest non-white population in the country. It may, therefore, be fruitful to address the impacts of inter-group tensions on these issues individually, bringing more precise measurement to the pressures shaping the ideological direction of the Democratic Party.

Results of the spatial analysis confirm the importance of taking spatial factors into account in addressing political dynamics, but the aggregation of data across BEAs limits the ability to address changes within BEAs themselves. While BEAs provide a good starting point for addressing differences in racial distributions across space, the distribution of groups within BEAs varies too. As indicated by the analysis of Democratic Party gains and losses within BEAs the displacement of legislators within economic areas may be the basis of what Edsall and Edsall (1992) refer to as “white nooses around black cities.” Further addressing these issues may shed considerable light onto these dynamics.

The use of spatial techniques in addressing these issues offers considerable options for further analysis. Functionality using Geographic Information Systems software, GeoDa, and collection techniques placing data within geographic context offers the ability to engage in geographic analysis of political dynamics. With the availability of data the use of Geographic Information Systems software allows for the placement of population dynamics within space. With use of these techniques it may be possible to not only determine the pressures reshaping the Democratic Party, but also to address the

arrangement of groups within space and the pressures impacting them with much greater specificity.

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APPENDIX A

DEPENDENT VARIABLE ROLL CALL VOTES

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Congress	Vote	Pro-civil rights Position	Description ¹⁸
89	82	Yes	TO AGREE TO H. RES. 440, A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF, AND 10 HOURS OF DEBATE ON H.R. 6400, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965.
89	83	No	TO AMEND H.R. 6400, THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT, BY PROVIDING CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION ON VOTING ELIGIBILITY STATUS.
89	84	No	TO AMEND H.R. 6400, THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT, RESPECTING JUDICIAL REVIEW.
89	85	Yes	TO AMEND H.R. 6400, THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT, BY ALLOWING PEOPLE ILLITERATE IN ENGLISH TO VOTE IF THEY HAVE COMPLETED THE SIXTH GRADE IN SPANISH-LANGUAGE SCHOOLS.
89	86	No	TO RECOMMIT H.R. 6400, THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBSTITUTE THE TEXT OF H.R. 7896 PROHIBITING THE DENIAL TO ANY PERSON OF THE RIGHT TO REGISTER OR TO VOTE BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO PAY A POLL TAX OR ANY OTHER SUCH TAX, FOR THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT.
89	87	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 6400, THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT.
89	106	No	TO RECOMMIT S. 1564, THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DELETE THE BOGGS-LONG AMENDMENT.
89	107	Yes	TO AGREE TO CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 1564,

¹⁸ All vote numbers and roll call descriptions were quoted from *Voteview for Windows*.
<http://www.princeton.edu/~voteview/>

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT.

91	150	No	TO AMEND H.R. 4249 A BILL TO EXTEND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 WITH RESPECT TO DISCRIMINATING USE OF TESTS AND DEVICES.
91	151	No	TO PASS H.R. 4249, TO EXTEND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 WITH RESPECT TO DESCRIMINATING USE OF TESTS AND DEVICES.
91	273	Yes	TO ORDER THE PREVIOUS QUESTION ON H. RES. 914, PROVIDING FOR AGREEING TO THE AMENDMENTS OF THE SENATE TO H.R. 424., A BILL TO EXTEND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965.
91	274	Yes	TO AGREE TO H.RES. 914, PROVIDING FOR AGREEING TO THE AMENDMENTS OF THE SENATE TO H.R. 4249.
94	182	No	TO AGREE TO AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 6219, A BILL EXTENDING AND AMENDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965. THE WIGGINS SUBSTITUTE WOULD "TRIGGER" THE FEDERAL PRESENCE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS WHEN LESS THAN 50% OF SPANISH OR BLACK CITIZENS HAVE VOTED IN THE PREVIOUS FEDERAL ELECTION, IN DISTRICTS IN WHICH 5% OF THE POPULATION IS BLACK OR SPANISH (INSTEAD OF IN ANY DISTRICT WHERE 50% OF VOTING AGE POPULATION DOES NOT VOTE) AND WOULD REQUIRE THE FEDERAL PRESENCE FOR 10 YEARS AFTER SUCH ELECTION, INSTEAD OF UNTIL THE NEXT ELECTION IN WHICH 50% OF SUCH MINORITIES VOTE.
94	183	No	TO AMEND H.R. 6219 BY MAKING IT EASIER FOR STATES TO "BAIL OUT" OF COVERAGE OF THE ACT.
94	184	No	TO AMEND H.R. 6219 BY ADDING A SECTION REPEALING THE PRECLEARANCE (OF VOTING LAW CHANGES INCLUDING REDISTRICTING) PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN SECTION 5 OF THE

ACT.

94	186	No	TO AMEND H.R. 6219 BY STRIKING TITLE II WHICH PROVIDES THAT ANY STATE WHICH HAS 5% OF A LANGUAGE MINORITY GROUP, LESS THAN 50% TURNOUT, AND BALLOTS PRINTED ONLY IN ENGLISH WOULD COME UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT.
94	190	Yes	TO AMEND H.R. 6219 BY INSERTING "CITIZENS" IN LIEU OF "PERSONS" IN LANGUAGE OUTLINING CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO TRIGGER COVERAGE UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT.
94	192	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 6219.
94	328	Yes	TO AGREE TO H.RES. 640, PROVIDING TO AGREE TO SENATE AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 6219, A BILL AMENDING AND EXTENDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

88	127	Yes	H.R. 7152. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. ALBERT MOTION THAT THE HOUSE ADJOURN UNTIL MONDAY, FEB. 10, RATHER THAN MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO CONSIDERATION OF FINAL TITLES OF THE BILL AND A VOTE ON PASSAGE.
88	128	Yes	H.R. 7152. PASSAGE.
88	182	Yes	H.R. 7152. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION (H. RES. 789) PROVIDING FOR HOUSE APPROVAL OF THE BILL AS AMENDED BY THE SENATE.
88	227	Yes	H.R. 12633. PROVIDE \$998645 ,874 IM SUPPLEMENTAL FISCAL 1965 APPROPRIATIONS FOR NEW OR EXPANDED PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED IN 1964, INCLUDING ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ECONOMIC OPPERTUNITY ACT, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND NDEA. PASSAGE.

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| 89 | 361 | No | TO AMEND H.R. 13161, THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1966, BY REQUIRING THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 REGARDING WITHHOLDING FUNDS. |
| 90 | 459 | Yes | THAT HOUSE RECEDE FROM DISAGREEMENT TO SENATE AMENDMENT NO. 64 TO H.R. 18037, AND CONCUR THEREIN. THE SENATE AMENDMENT IS TO STRIKE OUT SECTION 410, PROVIDING THAT NO PART OF FEDERAL FUNDS CONTAINED IN THIS ACT SHALL BE USED TO FORCE BUSING OF STUDENTS, OR THE ATTENDANCE OF STUDENTS AT A PARTICULAR SCHOOL AS A CONDITION FOR RECEIVING FEDERAL FUNDS AND INSERT A NEW SECTION 410, ADDING "IN ORDER TO OVERCOME RACIAL EMBALANCE," AND A NEW PARAGRAPH IN SECTION 410 PROVIDING INVESTIGATION INTO COMPLIANCE OF NON-SOUTHERN STATES TO TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1964, AND FURTHER PROVIDING THAT MONEY FOR SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAMS OR MEDICAL PROGRAMS OR MONEY RECEIVED FROM THE SALE OF PUBLIC LAND MAY NOT BE RECOMMENDED FOR WITHHOLDING. |
| 92 | 560 | No | TO AMEND THE GREEN (D, OREG) AMENDMENT TO H.R. 13915 BY STRIKING OUT LANGUAGE THAT AUTHORIZES BUSING, OTHER THAN BUSING TO THE SCHOOL NEAREST TO THE STUDENT'S RESIDENCE. THE GREEN AMENDMENT:1.) FORBIDS BUSING AND 2.) WOULD ALLOW COURT ORDERS AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS ALREADY IN EFFECT UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO BE REOPENED AND MODIFIED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS BILL. |
| 96 | 895 | Yes | TO AGREE TO H. RES. 656, THE RULE PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5200, REVISING THE PROCEDURES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF FAIR HOUSING UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.
(MOTION PASSED) |

96	952	Yes	TO RESOLVE INTO THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE TO CONSIDER H.R. 5200, A BILL AMENDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968 TO REVISE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF FAIR HOUSING. (MOTION PASSED)
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UNEMPLOYMENT

85	18	No	HR 6287. FISCAL 1958 APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEPARTMANTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE. AMENDMENT TO CUT FUNDS FOR GRANTS TO STATES FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. ACCEPTED. NAY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT'S POSITION.
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85	19	No	HR 6287. FISCAL 1958 APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE. AMENDMENT TO CUT FUNDS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. ACCEPTED. NAY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT'S POSITION.
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85	129	No	HR 12065. TEMPORARY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 1958. AMEND TO SUBSTITUTE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR COMMITTEE BILL SUPPORTED BY DEMOCRATIC LEADERS. AGREED TO. YEA SUPPORTS PRESIDENT'S POSITION.
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85	130	Yes	HR 12065. PROVIDE FEDERAL LOANS TO STATES TO EXTEND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO PERSONS WHO HAVE EXHAUSTED STATE BENEFITS. PASSED. YEA SUPPORTS PRESIDENT'S POSITION.
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87	4	Yes	H.R. 4806. TEMPORARY EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 1961. AUTHORIZE FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES WHERE WORKERS HAVE EXHAUSTED REGULAR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. PASSED. YEA SUPPORTS PRESIDENT'S POSITION.
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87	11	Yes	H.R. 4806. TEMPORARY EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 1961. AUTHORIZE FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES TO EXTEND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION UP TO 13 WEEKS TO WORKERS WHO HAVE EXHAUSTED NORMAL BENEFITS. CONFERENCE REPORT AGREED TO. YEA SUPPORTS PRESIDENT'S POSITION.
88	79	Yes	H.R. 8821. EXTEND THE NUMBER OF YEARS DURING WHICH EMPLOYERS IN 16 STATES MAY MAKE REPAYMENTS TO THE TREASURY FOR AMOUNTS ADVANCED TO THEM UNDER THE TEMPORARY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 1958, AND UNDER TITLE XII OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT FOR PAYMENT OF BENEFITS TO JOBLESS WORKERS. PASSAGE.
93	62	Yes	TO ORDER THE PREVIOUS QUESTION ON H. RES. 360, A RULE PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4204, A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR FUNDING THE EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1971 FOR TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS.
93	63	No	TO ORDER THE PREVIOUS QUESTION ON AN AMENDMENT ESTABLISHING RULES FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2404, A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR FUNDING OF THE EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1971 FOR TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS.
93	64	No	TO TABLE THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE VOTE ON H. RES. 360, RULE PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4204.
93	225	Yes	TO RECEDE FROM ITS DISAGREEMENT TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 8410, A BILL TO CONTINUE THE EXISTING TEMPORARY INCREASE IN THE PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT THROUGH NOV. 30, 1973, AND CONCUR THERIN WITH AN AMENDMENT. THE HOUSE AMENDMENT ACCEPTS CERTAIN OF THE SENATE PROVISIONS IN THE "CONGLOMERATE" AMENDMENT

RELATING TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
CONTRIBUTION TAX CHECK-OFF AND TO
EXTENDED FEDERAL-STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS.

93	499	Yes	TO AMEND THE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 11450 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES FOR THOSE WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED AS THE RESULT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BILL.
93	502	Yes	TO AMEND THE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT TO H. R. 11450 BY PROVIDING THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR MAY RESTRICT EXPORTS OF COAL AND PETROCHEMICAL FEEDSTOCKS IF SUCH EXPORTS WILL RESULT IN UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
93	837	No	TO DELETE FROM THE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 82, A BILL RELATING TO DUTY-FREE SHIP REPAIRS, A NONGERMANE SENATE AMENDMENT EXTENDING UNTIL APRIL 30, 1975 AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM SCHEDULED TO EXPIRE JULY 31, 1974.
93	1041	Yes	TO SUSPEND THE RULES AND PASS H.R. 17597, PROVIDING A PROGRAM OF EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.
94	176	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 6900, THE EMERGENCY COMPENSATION AND SPECIAL UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE ACT.
94	316	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 8714, A BILL TO AMEND THE RAILROAD UNEMPLOYMENT ACT TO INCREASE UNEMPLOYMENT AND SICKNESS BENEFITS.
94	646	Yes	TO AGREE TO H. RES. 1025 THE RULE TO CONSIDER H.R. 11453, THE EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT PROJECTS AMENDMENT PROVIDING FURTHER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS.
94	648	No	TO AMEND H.R. 11453 BY REVISING THE

FORMULA FOR ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR
EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT PROJECTS AMONG
PRIME SPONSORS OF INDIAN TRIBES.

94	649	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 11453.
94	812	Yes	TO AGREE TO H. RES. 1183, PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H. R. 10210, THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS OF 1975.
94	999	Yes	TO AGREE TO H. RES. 1259, THE RULE TO CONSIDER H.R. 10210.
94	1008	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 10210.
94	1259	Yes	TO AGREE TO H. RES. 1552, THE RULE TO CONSIDER H.R. 14970, TO EXTEND UNTIL DEC. 31, 1977 THE SPECIAL UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SUA) AND TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR WORKERS PRESENTLY NOT COVERED BY REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.
94	1260	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 14970, TO EXTEND UNTIL DEC. 31, 1977 THE SPECIAL UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SUA) AND TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR CERTAIN WORKERS PRESENTLY NOT COVERED BY REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.
95	22	Yes	TO AGREE TO A SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT FOR THE SHUSTER AMENDMENT (SEE RC 29) TO H.R. 11. THE EDGAR AMENDMENT WOULD ALLOCATE 65% OF THE FUNDS TO ALL STATES BASED ON AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED, AND 35% TO STATES WHOSE AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS 6.5%+.
95	72	Yes	TO ORDER THE PREVIOUS QUESTION ON H. RES. 411, THE RULE TO CONSIDER H.R. 4800, A BILL EXTENDING THE EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 1974 THROUGH MAR. 1978 AND REVISING ITS TRIGGER PROVISIONS.

95	73	Yes	TO ADOPT H. RES. 411, THE RULE TO CONSIDER H.R. 4800.
95	74	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 4800.
95	104	Yes	TO AGREE TO THE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4800, EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION EXTENSION ACT OF 1977.
95	211	No	TO AMEND H.R. 6810 BY CHANGING THE FORMULA FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE APPROPRIATED FUNDS TO A FORMULA BASED ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX EFFORT INSTEAD OF ON STATE AND LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT.
95	521	No	TO AMEND THE THOMPSON SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT TO THE COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE BILL FOR H.R. 4544. THIS ERLBORN AMENDMENT WOULD DELETE LANGUAGE THAT ALLOWS FOR REDUCTIONS IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OR WORKERS' COMPENSATION OF A PERSON RECEIVING BLACK LUNG DISABILITY PAYMENTS IF THE OTHER COMPENSATION PAYMENTS ARE RECEIVED FOR REASONS RELATED TO THE SAME DISEASE.
95	829	No	TO MODIFY THE BAUCUS SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENTS (SEE RC 153) FOR THE ORIGINAL ASHBROOK AMENDMENTS (SEE RC 153) TO H.R. 50. THE MODIFYING ASHBROOK AMENDMENTS STATE THAT ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT SHALL BE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNEMPLOYMENT GOALS SET FORTH IN THE BILL, AND THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH A POLICY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A FULLY BALANCED BUDGET BY 1983.
95	830	Yes	TO AGREE TO SEVERAL AMENDMENTS OFFERED IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ASHBROOK AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 50. THE BAUCUS AMENDMENTS AFFIRM THAT ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT SHALL BE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCED BUDGET THAT IS

CONSISTENT WITH THE UNEMPLOYMENT GOALS SET FORTH ELSEWHERE IN THE BILL. THE ORIGINAL ASHBROOK AMENDMENTS STATE THAT ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT SHALL BE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET BY 1983.

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| 95 | 835 | No | TO AMEND H.R. 50 BY PROVIDING THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS USED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT SHALL NOT INCLUDE PERSONS UNEMPLOYED BECAUSE OF STRIKES, PERSONS SEEKING PART-TIME WORK, PERSONS WHO VOLUNTARILY LEFT THEIR OLD JOBS OR ARE WITHOLDING FROM ACCEPTING AN AWAITING JOB, AND PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN UNEMPLOYED FOR LESS THAN FOUR WEEKS. |
| 95 | 840 | No | TO AGREE TO AN AMENDMENT OFFERED IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 50. THE QUIE SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT SETS NATIONAL GOALS OF 4% UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICANS AGE 16 TO 19, OF 3% UNEMPLOYEMNT AMONG AMERICANS AGE 20 AND OVER, AND OF NO MORE THAN 3% ANNUAL INCREASE IN INFLATION. |
| 95 | 1183 | Yes | TO SUSPEND THE RULES AND PASS H.R. 12232, THE BILL AUTHORIZING CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE PAYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND IN THE DATES FOR THE SUBMISSION OF THEIR REPORTS. |
| 95 | 1184 | Yes | TO SUSPEND THE RULES AND PASS H.R. 12380, THE BILL IMPOSING A TWO-YEAR LIMITATION ON THE TIME DURING WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL CAN RECEIVE ANY BENEFITS TO WHICH HE OR SHE IS ENTITLED UNDER THE FEDERAL-STATE EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM. |
| 95 | 1296 | No | TO MODIFY THE ERLNBORN AMENDMENT (SEE RC 673) TO H.R. 12452. THE GOODLING AMENDMENT MAKES THE PAYMENT OF |

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS BY PRIME SPONSORS FOR PERSONS IN PUBLIC SERVICE JOBS OPTIONAL RATHER THAN MANDATORY.

95	1300	No	TO AMEND H.R. 12452 BY PUTTING A \$3.2 BILLION CEILING ON PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT SPENDING EXCEPT DURING PERIODS OF CRITICALLY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT. THE JEFFORDS AMENDMENT ALSO SHIFTS AUTHORIZATIONS FROM PUBLIC SERVICE FUNDS TO YOUTH PROGRAMS AND PROGRAMS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED.
96	352	No	TO AMEND H.R. 3920, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION, BY STRIKING LANGUAGE EXTENDING UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1982 THE EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIEN FARM WORKERS FROM FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAX. (MOTION FAILED)
96	563	Yes	TO ADOPT H. RES. 363, THE RULE PERMITTING FLOOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4007, (SEE RC 631). (MOTION PASSED)
96	564	Yes	TO PASS H.R. 4007, PROVIDING THAT THE PROVISIONS WHICH INCREASE THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX IN STATES WHICH HAVE OUTSTANDING LOANS WILL NOT APPLY IF THE STATE MAKES CERTAIN REPAYMENTS. (MOTION PASSED)
96	589	No	TO RECOMMIT H.R. 2063, PUBLIC WORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ADD AN AMENDMENT STRIKING THE \$2 BILLION AUTHORIZATION FOR A STANDBY LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM WHEN THE NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AVERAGES AT LEAST 6.5% FOR THE MOST RECENT CALENDAR QUARTER. (MOTION FAILED)
96	653	Yes	TO AMEND H.R. 5980, ANTI RECESSION FISCAL ASSISTANCE, BY USING AS THE BASIS FOR

DETERMINING THE EXCESS UNEMPLOYMENT FACTOR FOR TITLE V CALENDAR YEARS 1975 1978 RATHER THAN FISCAL YEARS 1976 1979. (MOTION PASSED)

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| 96 | 684 | No | TO AMEND THE RODINO AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5980 BY SETTING THE UNEMPLOYMENT TRIGGER AT 7.5%. (SEE RC 16) (MOTION FAILED) |
| 96 | 685 | Yes | TO AMEND H.R. 5980 BY INCREASING THE TARGETED FISCAL ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION FROM \$150 MILLION TO \$200 MILLION IF THE NATIONAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF A FISCAL YEAR EXCEEDS 5%. (MOTION PASSED) |
| 96 | 697 | Yes | TO AGREE TO H. RES. 544, THE RULE PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5507, AMENDING THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE TO ELIMINATE THE REQUIREMENT THAT STATES REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PAYABLE FOR ANY WEEK BY THE AMOUNT OF CERTAIN RETIREMENT BENEFITS. (MOTION PASSED) |
| 96 | 699 | No | TO RECOMMIT H.R. 5507, REDUCTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, TO COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ADD AN AMENDMENT CHANGING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FEDERAL REQUIREMENT FROM JAN. 1, 1982 TO JULY 1, 1981. (MOTION FAILED) |
| 96 | 700 | Yes | TO PASS H.R. 5507, REDUCTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BY RETIREMENT BENEFITS. (MOTION PASSED) |
| 96 | 1199 | Yes | TO ORDER THE PREVIOUS QUESTION TO END FURTHER DEBATE ON H. RES. 798, TO PROVIDE CONSIDERATION FOR H.R. 8146, PROVIDING FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. (MOTION PASSED) |
| 96 | 1200 | Yes | TO AGREE TO H. RES.798, PROVIDING FOR FLOOR |

CONSIDERATION FOR H.R. 8146, PROVIDING
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION. (MOTION PASSED)

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| 96 | 1201 | No | TO RECOMMIT H.R. 8146, FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM, TO THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT THE BILL BACK CONTAINING AN AMENDMENT TO REQUIRE STATES TO QUALIFY FOR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION BENEFITS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS, RATHER THAN NATIONAL AVERAGE. (MOTION FAILED) |
| 96 | 1202 | Yes | TO PASS H.R. 8146, FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM. (MOTION PASSED) |