‘QUASI-BARBARIANS’ AND ‘WANDERING JEWS’: THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
IN LIGHT OF WORLD EVENTS

By

MARYANNE AGNES RHETT

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of History

AUGUST 2008

© Copyright by MARYANNE AGNES RHETT, 2008
All Rights Reserved
To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation/thesis of MARYANNE AGNES RHETT find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

There are a number of people I feel a deep sense of gratitude toward in helping me get to the final stage of this process. Above all others, my sister Sarah has suffered through numerous run-on sentences, poor attempts at alliteration, and various Shiva-like ‘hands.’ As a result, Sarah knows more about the Balfour Declaration than anyone else should, poor thing. But, where Sarah’s help and support has been so has been my parents’. Their love and support in this experience cannot be overstated. Their patience as I endeavor through yet another degree, in a state still farther from home has been amazing. Mom and Dad have encouraged me with their keen interest and unwavering desire to see the whole picture. To Sarah, Mom, and Dad: I love you! Thank you, from the bottom of my heart.

Without my friends and colleagues, the Ph.D. process would have been disastrous. Amy Canfield, I mean, Dr. Amy Canfield, and I spent days on end struggling to get through the program, and the daily toils of graduate life. It seemed sometimes as if the illuminati would not prevail. Even from across the state she has helped remind me why I am doing this. Without her friendship (and sarcasm), it would have been a very different, and far less enjoyable, process. To Dr. Aditi Sen, too I am indebted for the coffee, the beer, the games, and the gossip. I am glad I had to opportunity to come to Vancouver. Similarly, Aaron Whelchel, Amitava Chowdhury, and Barbara Traver (of whom more than thanks for just being a friend should be said) have worked right alongside me in their own doctoral adventures. Knowing that I am not going through this alone has been an immeasurable help. And finally, Colin Meckel has been by my side in more
anxious moments at the end of this whole thing than almost anyone. He has let me have my moments of near insanity and is still there to help me relax and have fun, not forgetting that the dissertation is important, but reminding me that it is not the only thing in life. I look forward to reaping the benefits of all of this hard work with him and all my friends and family in the coming months and years!

My professors. In 1996, as a freshman in an international studies class at the University of South Carolina I first met Edwin Montagu, and it is Dr. Shahrough Akhavi I have to thank. Dr. Akhavi has been, and continues to be, a huge influence on my life. However, while he saw me through my most trying academic years, it was at Washington State University, under the guidance of Drs. Heather Streets and Robert Staab, that I ultimately developed my academic voice. Dr. Streets has been a dear friend and a dedicated professor. She has helped me improve my writing and my intellectual pursuits to a degree such that I really feel ready for my next academic challenge. Dr. Staab has been my Middle East confident. We were unique in our interest in the turmoil and turbulence of the Middle East, and to him I owe the deepest debt of gratitude for keeping me on track and focused. I could not have gotten here, or the places I have yet to go, without their help.

Finally, no historian does her (or his) work without those wonderful people who bring to us the documents upon which it solidly rests. I spent enormous amounts of time in England combing through a variety of manuscripts and governmental documents and never once did I have a negative experience in the archives. The Wren Library at Trinity College Cambridge, the Public Records Office at Kew, the British Library, the London Metropolitan Archives, and the House of Lords Archives at Parliament were all wonderful places to work. With friendly, patient, and helpful staff the research experience was made immensely easier. I look forward to returning
soon. What is more, without the generous financial support from the Gillis family, the Cooney family, and the Tauber Institute for the Study of European Jewry, none of those hours in the archives would have been possible. Thank you all.
On 2 November 1917, the British government formally issued the Balfour Declaration, one of the most important documents in defining the Middle East for the coming century. The Declaration laid the groundwork for the eventual creation of the state of Israel while at the same time problematizing the concept of ‘nation’ for the entire world.

This dissertation looks beyond the two traditional explanations for why the Declaration was created: British martial and imperial wartime need or the moral obligation felt by some influential politicians to the world’s Jewry. These accounts, while useful and necessary, only narrowly demonstrate the document’s significance, exclude factors which helped to create it, and prevent an examination of those global realities which developed as a result of its issuance. Instead, this work examines the Declaration in terms of the global context, broadening the scope of the document’s significance and creating a clearer picture of the global community as a composite of individual actors, regional pressures, and trans-regional realities. Crucial to this discussion is the impact ideals of race, gender, and nation had on policy-making structures and how events in Palestine, India, Kenya, Ireland and Europe influenced the Declaration’s formation, issuance, and outcomes.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER

1. AN INTRODUCTION .................................................................1
   A Historiographic Overview .................................................6

2. CONTEST FOR NATION ............................................................15
   Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Rhetoric .............................15
   Jewish Zionism ........................................................................19
      Traditional Zionism: Cultural, Economic, and Philanthropic ......20
      Political Zionism ................................................................26
   Christian Zionism .....................................................................32
      Christian Zionism as a Political Tool ...................................40
   Nationalism in the Muslim World ............................................44
      Nationalism in India ............................................................48
      Arab Nationalism ..................................................................57
   Conclusion ..............................................................................63

3. THE QUESTION OF RACE AND THE ‘RIGHT TO RULE’ .......................65
   Muscular Christianity and the Imperial Process ..........................67
   The Modammedan Question ......................................................73
      Islam’s Place in European Imagination ..................................75
   The Arab Case: Quasi-Barbarians and Very Old Children .............84
The Indian Colonialist and the Racial Politics of Empire.................................92
The Great Rebellion..........................................................................................93
The Ilbert Bill: Race and Gender Formalized in Policy ..................................95
Race and Indian Imperial Rights Overseas.....................................................98
The Jewish Case: The Re-Masculinization of Judaism.................................106
Muscular Judaism as an Extension of Muscular Christianity ....................123
Conclusion .......................................................................................................127

4. PERSONALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL .................................................129

The Power of the Pen: Writers and the Question of Zionism ....................130
The Journalist and Editors .............................................................................131
The Novelist ....................................................................................................139
The Murky World of Unofficial Politics..........................................................143
Individual Zionism as Policy Structure.........................................................144
Catholics and the Zionist Question .................................................................155
The Political Personality: Elected Officials and the Definition of Nation ....157
Propaganda as an Individual Actor .................................................................158
Official Stances and the Development of Nation in Political Circles..........164
Conclusion .......................................................................................................181

5. THE DECLARATION ..................................................................................182

Early Political Clamoring: 1915 and 1916.....................................................183
Political Expediency: 1917 .............................................................................185
The “Wolf Formula” and the Counter Preliminary Zionist Draft .............188
Asylum or Refuge? The Foreign Office Preliminary Draft .......................192
The Zionist and Balfour Drafts ................................................................. 193
Montagu and his ‘Anti-Semitism’ Draft .................................................. 195
Milner Draft ....................................................................................... 197
Montagu’s Second Suggestion ............................................................... 198
Milner-Amery Draft ........................................................................... 201
A Final Form: The Balfour Declaration ............................................... 205

6. GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS ..................................................................... 210
   A Broad Overview of Events Following the Release of the Balfour Declaration ... 210
   San Remo and the Obligations Regarding Palestine ............................... 212
   Palestine ............................................................................................. 220
   The Reemergence of the Racial Factor in International Politics ............ 226
   Familial Divisions in Post-War Palestinian Politics ............................... 228
   Palestinian Jewish Anti-Zionism .......................................................... 231
   London ................................................................................................ 234
   India .................................................................................................... 239
   Conclusion ......................................................................................... 245

7. EPILOGUE ......................................................................................... 246

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................... 251

APPENDIX
   A. DRAFTS OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION .................................... 271
   B. POPULATIONS & CIVIL POSITIONS IN PALESTINE, 1920 ............... 273
   C. RECRUITMENT POSTER - ENGLISH ............................................. 274
   D. RECRUITMENT POSTER - YIDDISH ............................................ 275
CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION

The repercussions of the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 are still visible in the world today. Even more importantly, the outcomes of the Balfour Declaration were not just important to the history of the future state of Israel and the Palestinian people, but to the entire global community both in the era of World War One and today. In February 2007, a *Guardian Unlimited* editorial, “No one has the Right to Speak for British Jews on Israel and Zionism,” examined the relationship between Jewish populations outside of Israel-Palestine, in this case in Great Britain, and those within the region. This article examined growing uneasiness non-Israeli Jewish communities had with the realities of the Israeli state. “No one has the Right…” and the numerous off-shoot editorials and letters that appeared in the *Guardian* throughout much of 2007, challenged the notion that anti-Zionism was synonymous with anti-Israel and, more insidiously, anti-Semitism. The author, Brian Klug, a senior research fellow at Oxford University, noted that

> As the situation in the Middle East deteriorates yearly, more and more Jews watch with dismay from afar. Dismay turns to anguish when innocent civilians - Palestinians and Israelis - suffer injury and death because of the continuing conflict. Anguish turns to outrage when the human rights of a population under occupation are repeatedly violated in the name of the Jewish people.¹

Despite the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, when speaking about the 2006 invasion of Lebanon, said “‘I believe that this is a war that is fought by all the Jews,’”² Klug goes on to


² Ibid.
insist that the world’s Jewry do not speak with one voice. Olmert’s assertion, Klug argues, is based on the widely accepted misconception “that Israel represents Jewry as a whole - in Britain included.” This fallacy, he continues, is “a dangerous one, since it tars all Jews with the same brush.” Finally, Klug notes that these assumptions, which lead to the belief that the British Jewry speak with a united, pro-Israeli voice, are problematic and even dangerous.

Klug’s assessment echoes the same chaotic and even schizophrenic concerns which plagued British Jewry nearly ninety years previous. But the truly incoherent nature of national definition created in the era of World War One and at the subsequent peace conferences had far reaching ramifications well beyond the Jewish community. Equally, the present socio-political situation in Great Britain, particularly as it relates to the culture clash between ‘native’ Anglo-Saxons and the members of the commonwealth and ex-empire who have moved to the metropolis, has brought to light the at best haphazard policies of the late eighteenth and early twentieth century imperial endeavour. This present-day outcome of early twentieth century imperial policy has pitted early immigrant communities against later immigrant communities, drawing frustration and violence into dialogue with political policy. The Islamic Human Rights Commission concluded in a report written in 2000 that “the law in the United Kingdom protects particular religious minorities (Jews and Sikhs) on the pretext that they can be defined as a race; [however] other religions are left to suffer harassment and discrimination.” The Islamic Human Rights Commission’s assessment is not only an outgrowth of decades of changing immigration

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 31.
laws resultant from decolonization and a fluctuating global economy, but is also the direct outgrowth of the religious, racial, and national definitions enacted and established via British colonial policy at the turn of the twentieth century, including those that shaped Israel, India, Pakistan, Kenya, and Ireland.

The structure of this dissertation draws its inspiration from an excerpt of Great Britain’s Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu’s 1917 *India Diary*. Shortly after the announcement of the Balfour Declaration’s release Montagu unwittingly offered an outline of the ways in which the Balfour Declaration impacted multiple *scales of historical inquiry* -- the individual, regional, supra-regional, and global levels of historical interaction. The passage reads:

> By the by, I see from Reuter’s telegram that Balfour has made the Zionist declaration against which I fought so hard. It seems strange to be a member of a Government which goes out of its way, as I think for no conceivable purpose that I can see, to deal this blow at a colleague that is doing his best to be loyal to them, despite his opposition. The Government has dealt an irreparable blow at Jewish Britons, and they have endeavoured to set up a people which does not exist; they have alarmed unnecessarily the Mohammedan world, and, in so far as they are successful, they will have a Germanized Palestine on the flank of Egypt. It seems useless to conquer it. Why we should intern Mahomet Ali in India for Pan-Mohammedism when we encourage Pan-Judaism I cannot for the life of me understand. It certainly puts the final date to my political activities.  

Firstly, at the individual level Montagu believed that the Balfour Declaration is a personal blow to himself, a Jewish member of the British government serving the Empire as a voice of the Indian constituency. Similarly, the Declaration calls into question the place of British Jews whose national identity, as Montagu points out, is torn between a Jewish ‘homeland’ and their native Great Britain. Secondly, at the local or national level Montagu’s question “Why we should intern Mahomet Ali in India for Pan-Mohammedism when we encourage Pan-Judaism” casts doubt on the role of the British government in arbitrarily defining nationhood. This argument in

---

particular has implications for how nation is defined in the Middle East, India and parts of Africa as well. Thirdly, at the supra-regional level, Montagu questions the reactions that will spring forth from the Muslim world when the news that a piece of land considered holy to Muslims (as well as Christians and Jews), populated by a Muslim majority, has been turned over to the control of a non-native, non-Muslim population. Finally, at the global level, Montagu’s concern for Palestine’s place in the military realities of World War One, that the Balfour Declaration will have “Germanized Palestine on the flank of Egypt,” enhances the total global nature of the war. According to Montagu’s logic, the power of supra-regional organizations like the World Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) to shape imperial policy and questions about the obligations the Empire has to its allies-- particularly with an ‘increased German influence-- placed the region in military jeopardy. This dissertation, therefore, examines the lead-up to, issuance of, and reaction to the Balfour Declaration on a global scale, via several historical dimensions, which intersect in the definition of nation, as informed by a combination of nationalist rhetoric, Enlightenment philosophy, religious ideology, racial theory, militarism, economic distinctions, and gender politics.

The history of Montagu’s role in the creation of the Balfour Declaration further aids our understanding of how and why the Declaration’s history is short on an examination of the global narrative. Because the linkages between the Declaration and the non-Middle Eastern parts of the world are typically ignored, Montagu’s part has been relegated to that of an overly anxious, emotional member of the Cabinet with only personal gripes against the Zionist endeavor. Much of this historical interpretation hinges on the place of the above passage in the historiography of the Balfour Declaration. Only Leonard Stein’s 1961 *The Balfour Declaration* references this passage in a nearly full form. The only liberty Stein takes with the passages is editing it by
changing ‘Mohammedan’ to ‘Moslem.’ Yet, even though Stein incorporates this passage, he does not offer any analysis of Montagu’s numerous arguments. For Stein, as for most historians of the Balfour Declaration, Montagu saw the Declaration’s release as a “personal injury wantonly inflicted upon him.”⁷ Scholars and contemporaries who focus on this emotional nature of Montagu perpetuate the feminized stereotype of ‘the Jew’ (see chapter three) and narrowly focus on only one of Montagu’s many contentions against Zionism. At best, Stein and scholars who only focus on the ‘personal’ arguments in Montagu’s words contend that Montagu is too emotional to be taken seriously. At worst, the narrative which this historical interpretation produces lacks the true depth which a more global and nuanced understanding of the events leading up to the document’s issuance and as a result of the document’s codification. What is more, the specific phrase: "they will have a Germanized Palestine on the flank of Egypt," is left out of almost all Declaration histories. Much of this is because the most often cited source for the passage is S. D. Waley’s 1964 biography of Montagu which has edited out the phrase. The omission of the phrase only further strengthens the argument that the non-Zionist and anti-Zionist positions vis à vis the Balfour Declaration has been largely neglected.

Simply put, the Declaration’s use of a vague concept of ‘a national home for the Jewish people’ left unclear what constituted a state or a nation. Coupled with the Anglo-Irish conflict and the growing demand for Home Rule, if not independence, in India, early twentieth century British imperial policy-makers found themselves changing what it meant to be a nation, according to a variety of internal and external influences. The failure to maintain control over Palestine, India, or Ireland was in part brought on by the internal division among the British

Empire’s ruling elite as to what the definition of nation was and, perhaps more importantly, how nations and imperial need were to be reconciled?

The simple paragraph that became the Balfour Declaration makes up the bulk of a letter sent to Lord Lionel Rothschild from Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour.

His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.\(^8\)

While the Jewish case is the most obvious connection to the narrative of the Balfour Declaration, widening the narrative’s historical scope reveals how the variants of Palestinian, Arab, Indian, Muslim, Kenyan, and even Irish nationalism were influenced by-- and played a role in forming-- the vague Declaration. Consciously aware of the pressures imperial obligations put on the creation of policy, British politicians juggled the demands of Irish Home Rulers, Indian Nationalists, Pan-Islamists, Indian imperialists, and regional ethnicities in their creation of the Balfour Declaration.

**A Historiographic Overview**

Because the Declaration was created during World War One, the historical narrative surrounding it has focused on two rationales for explaining its production: British imperial wartime needs and the moral obligation felt by some influential politicians to the world’s Jewry. These accounts, while important, explain only a part of the document’s significance. Indeed, they tend to exclude the role of anti-Zionists in the creation of the Declaration and, more importantly,

they rarely explore its importance outside the Middle East. As a result, historians have paid little attention to the ways the Declaration was received by the wider world in places as far afield as India, Kenya, and Ireland.

Charles Smith’s 2004 *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* is a typical, recent example of the first historiographical school, focusing on imperial wartime needs. He argues that the Balfour Declaration was a useful imperial tool in a time of war. According to Smith, “Lloyd George’s accession to the prime ministership .... Coincided with a reassessment of Britain’s war objectives.... British statesmen and generals began once more to look favorably upon a campaign in the East.”9 Other historians agree, and argue that increasing interest in the petroleum potential of the region was enough to motivate deeper interests in the Near East.10 Such narratives tend to privilege the place of pro-Zionist British politicians--in particular David Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, and Mark Sykes-- in the development of the Declaration. These men, historians of this school argue, created the Declaration because they saw imperial and military advantage in the establishment of a Jewish homeland/state at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Contending that such a state would be a strong ally; because the majority of Zionists were well-educated Europeans, they believed the state would benefit the “quasi-barbarian and backward Arabs” in showing them how to become ‘civilized.’11 British statesmen argued Palestine would become a cultured, Western center in the midst of the Arab Middle East.


The other main historiographical school in the exploration of the Balfour Declaration addresses three intertwined concepts: moral obligation, a *reaction to* anti-Semitism, and a *favorable policy of* anti-Semitism. While it first seems contradictory that proponents of and opponents to anti-Semitism would rally around the same cause, this is indeed what happened. Anti-Semitic events like those in Russia in 1881-82 spurred on the creation of an active political Zionist endeavor. Founders and proponents of the political Zionist movement knew that by using Christian Zionist and philo-Semitic rhetoric (playing to the sympathies of people keen to expedite the Second Coming) and encouraging the European anti-Semitic desire to rid Europe of Jews, their political ambitions for a national home could be more readily met.

This particular historical narrative places a great deal of emphasis on the role of individuals like Chaim Weizmann, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and Nahum Sokolow and, as a result, this historical school tends to romanticize figures like Weizmann and their role in the creation of the Balfour Declaration. Scholars Norman Rose and Ronald Sanders credit Weizmann, whose “seemingly unlikely rise [as] a humble provincial chemist,”¹² for being “responsible for the Balfour Declaration.”¹³ From this perspective, the Declaration would never have come into being without Weizmann.

Neither the ‘imperial gain’ narrative nor the ‘moral obligation’ narrative works in tandem with the other. The two narratives seek to underscore the Balfour Declaration only in terms of their particular perspectives, according to the agendas of area studies departments. Because these

---


two narratives represent different fields in the academy (i.e., ‘imperial gain’ typically taken up by political historians and ‘moral obligation’ by social historians), they have left out important and even critical information about the development and outcomes of the Balfour Declaration.

In terms of outcomes, the historiography of the Declaration is equally narrow. Indeed, this historiography tends to focus almost entirely on the impact of the Declaration on the rise of Arab--especially Palestinian--nationalist movements. Yet no narrative links the rhetoric of the Declaration to Indian or Kenyan nationalist movements and only a handful distantly draw parallels between Palestine and Ireland, despite, as will be discussed below, evidence which points in all these directions.

The historiography that deals with the outcomes of the Declaration contends that the heart of Palestinian nationalism rests in two powerful, elite families, the Nashashibis and the al-Husaynis. According to Glenn E. Robinson, “British policy contributed significantly to the maintenance of this power,” and this power in turn fostered Palestinian identity based on anti-Zionist rhetoric.\(^\text{14}\) Similarly, Brauch Kimmerling contends that “when Britain took the land from the Muslim Ottoman Empire and granted it, via the Balfour Declaration, to the Jews in order to create a Jewish ‘national home’ (namely a state) ... The Arab national institutions in Palestine were promptly formed.”\(^\text{15}\) According to this historiographic perspective, Palestinian nationalism is only reactionary to British imperial policy. Like the narratives that examine the Balfour Declaration’s issuance, this record leaves out critical components of the story, namely Palestinian agency in their own national definition.


Finally, even in terms of the history of the document itself, the record is patchy. There are ten drafts of the Declaration in addition to its final form; nowhere do the ten appear, outside the various archives in London, together. The work which most closely covers all of the Balfour Declaration’s incarnations is Ronald Sander’s 1983 *The High Walls of Jerusalem*, but it contains no discussion of two drafts: the ‘Wolf Formula’ and the ‘Foreign Office Preliminary Draft.’\(^{16}\) Leonard Stein’s work lists only five drafts, including the final text, and discusses the Foreign Office Preliminary Draft in the most detail. Stein’s short list of drafts has become the canonical assessment of the document’s history, appearing in other works like David Englander’s 1994 *A Documentary History of Jewish Immigrants in Britain 1840 – 1920* (which directly cites Stein) and Michael Prior’s 1991 work *Zionism and the State of Israel* (which actually cites Doreen Ingrams’ 1972 *Palestine Papers 1917 – 1922 Seeds of Conflict*, who in turn cites Stein). Still, not all histories of the Declaration offer even this limited selection of drafts.

James A. Malcolm’s 1944 *Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Weizmann’s Contribution* overlooks all drafts proposed except one, which he calls “Weizmann’s draft.” That draft, however, was actually the Milner-Amery Draft (see chapter five and Appendix A for further detail) with a few proposed changes. Malcolm’s assessment of the history of the Declaration, therefore, is not only problematic for what it leaves out, but for what conclusions it implies, namely that Weizmann single-handedly created the document (reinforcing Weizmann’s privileged place) and that Malcolm himself brought the word of Zionism to the British cabinet. Both conclusions are inaccurate. Malcolm states: “The original draft of the Declaration was prepared by Dr. Weizmann and his friends in London in the summer of 1917 at the instance of

\(^{16}\) See Appendix A: Drafts of the Balfour Declaration, and chapter five.
Sir Mark Sykes.”17 Only then does he, in brackets, go on to allude to the actual depth of the process, by saying “(after various amendments at the instance of the anti-Zionists).”18 Thus far, the record of the Declaration remains mired in a narrowly defined historical approach that ignores the actual nature and subtle word usage differentiating Zionists from anti-Zionists and underscoring the complexity of early twentieth century international politics.

While all of the above are important pieces to understanding the significance of the Balfour Declaration puzzle, they remain just that: pieces of a greater whole. There is ample evidence that the Balfour Declaration’s creation had far greater impact on the global community than these previous works would suggest. If, instead of narrowly focusing on the religious, ethnic, nationalist, regionalist, or imperial dimensions of the Declaration’s historical narrative the Declaration is viewed in terms of its place in the World War One/post-War era a more vibrant picture of its implications develops.

Beyond the area studies narratives which have been the main focal point for discussions of the Balfour Declaration, this dissertation seeks to enter the Declaration’s history into a much wider (and newer) field of research: world history. Despite being situated within the more ‘traditional field’ of Arab-Israeli history the theoretical base of this work emphasizes the scales of historical inquiry inspired by the work of Donald Wright, David Christian, and Mary Jane Maxwell.19 Wright’s work, The World and a Very Small Place in Africa, explores the


18 Ibid.

connections globalization has brought to the study of world history. By focusing on one small place in Africa, Wright is able to examine the interconnectedness of global history. Similarly, during a discussion of the ‘California School’ of world history at the 2006 World History Association Conference in Long Beach, California, Christian advocated historical evaluation on ‘Big,’ ‘regional,’ and ‘individual’ scales. Arguing that historical examination must not only be done within each of these strata, but between them as well he contended that history has been too narrowly focused on regional or micro-history and thus has ignored the great connections a world historical approach can offer. What is more, Christian’s discussion of the individual level in this approach to world history aligns well with Mary Jane Maxwell’s July 2006 guest editorial in the on-line journal, World History Connected. According to Maxwell, a great deal of world historical depth can still be gleaned from a study of individuals, not just ‘big questions.’ For the purposes of this dissertation then, the individual is not left out of the larger picture. Instead of focusing on the regional ramifications of the Balfour Declaration, personality plays just as vital a role in underscoring the historical narrative as does global ideology. Thus, this dissertation seeks, by way of levels of historical inquiry, to develop the global nature of the Balfour Declaration.

At the heart of Montagu’s arguments, echoed ninety years later by Brian Klug, is the question of what defines a community. Who has the right to speak for and by a people, and why? What justifications are required in order to prove oneself worthy as the voice of a population? To explore answers to these questions via the case study of the Balfour Declaration, this dissertation is broken into six chapters. The second chapter, “Contest for Nation,” examines how the ideology of nation, particularly in terms of its shifting nature at the turn of the twentieth century,

informed the rhetoric and policy decisions surrounding the Declaration’s creation and issuance.

Using the case studies of Zionism (Christian and Jewish), Arab nationalism, and Indian nationalism, this chapter looks at how events in the nineteenth century created the idea of the ‘nation,’ and how this idea in turn inspired anti-imperialism and new forms of self-identification.

While World War One marked the beginning of the end of Europe’s global Empires, it did not wholly destroy them. In fact, the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 reinforced these structures and set the stage for post-World War Two decolonization efforts. The ultimate conclusions this chapter draws are pertinent to the struggle for national legitimization. The British government, then the most powerful state in the world, and the great powers -- i.e., the United States and France -- decided the nature of national definition in their dealings with fledgling nationalist movements. Unless legitimized in their nationalist efforts on this international level, these peoples lacked the state structure necessary to allow them to fully build their new countries.

The third chapter examines how nineteenth century racial and gender ideologies, based largely on Enlightenment ideals of equality, notions of social Darwinism, and Victorian structures of ‘manliness’ shaped constructions of Jewish, Arab, and Indian identity and rhetoric at the fin de siècle. These constructions brought into particularly sharp relief the militaristic linkages between loyalty and nationhood and how the effort to legitimize a nationalist movement could be achieved via a masculinized ethos. The feminized anti-Zionist, Indian, and Arab images which racial policy and militant Zionist rhetoric inspired, stunted the development of self-governing institutions in the Middle East, India, and Africa while at the same time promoting Zionist aspirations for Palestine.
Chapter four takes the individual perspective into account by focusing on the correspondence and personal statements of Jewish and Christian Zionists, anti-Zionists, devoted Imperialists, and the body of disenfranchised imperial subjects like Annie Besant, Mahatma Gandhi, the Aga Khan, Eamon De Valera, and the Husayni and Nashashibi families. Despite the seemingly unconnected nature of these people, the linkages national struggles offered not only brought them into dialogue with one another, but this nation-based dialogue informed the formulation of the Balfour Declaration and other imperial policies between the 1880s and 1920s.

Chapter five looks at the physical structure and nature of the Balfour Declaration itself. Bringing the aforementioned areas of interest to the table, the British Cabinet found that in the summer of 1917 it had a monumental task before it in creating a statement which would galvanize Zionists while at the same time appease apprehensive anti-British and anti-Zionist sentiment. The construction of the Balfour Declaration took months, and the document underwent a variety of changes and structural amendments. Each change to the Zionist’s wishes was the direct result of some other constituency’s desires and demands.

The sixth chapter investigates the repercussions of the Balfour Declaration’s issuance in terms of Palestinian, Indian, and British imperial policy and legacies. By 1924, despite the attempts of individuals across the globe to define and understand the notion of a ‘national home,’ no one seemed able to do so.

The concluding chapter, the epilogue, returns the focus of the dissertation to the present, connecting the global nature of the declaration across both space and time. The impact of the Balfour Declaration did not cease in 1924 or even in 1948, when Israel declared independence. The Balfour Declaration, although obscured by more recent events, continues to inform international policy both directly and indirectly.
CHAPTER TWO
CONTEST FOR NATION

Expanding global empires, collapsing feudal systems, and bloody struggles of national identity distinguished the nineteenth century. In this period, the conflict to prove national status, encouraged by promises of sovereignty and national self-determination, became the battle cry for peoples claiming unity through ethnicity, political structure, language, religion, culture, or geography. Searching for active, participatory roles in emerging political structures and political bodies that ideally acted together for the good of the whole, people in historically allied communities found themselves pitted against one another. Into this chaotic world, on 2 November 1917, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration. As the first officially sanctioned effort to recognize the national character of the Jewish people, the framers of the Declaration profoundly affected the subsequent history of the Middle East, and simultaneously reshaped and reformulated the definition and concept of the nation. This chapter will examine how Jewish Europeans, English Christians, Egyptians, Levantines, and Indian Muslims received the Balfour Declaration in terms of nation building efforts. How were ideas about nation constructed over the course of the nineteenth century, and how did each of these groups use these ideas to define themselves, particularly in the years between 1880 and 1920?

Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Rhetoric

The concept of nation has a nebulous history and, as with many other terms used in the social sciences, the process of codifying and formalizing the definition of nation did not begin
until the nineteenth century. Before scientific measurement was applied to national definition, nations retained what Clifford Geertz eventually called primordial dimensions.\(^1\) Primordial nationalism focused on unity via ethnic features -- religious, cultural, or linguistic unity -- racial purity, or communal homogeneity and typically had a geographic component. In the wake of the Scientific Revolution, and more importantly the Enlightenment, traditional governmental structures were challenged and national unity manipulated to meet new, ‘modern,’ and progressive dimensions. Although, in practice, the term nation had undergone reinvention throughout the course of the nineteenth century, the French Revolution, Greek independence, and Italian and German unification all questioned what qualified as a nation. It was not until nearly the close of the century that Europeans began to think academically about the term.

The French scholar Ernest Renan (1823 - 1892) was one of the earliest and most well-known examiners of modern national definition. Renan’s work was so important to the field of nation studies that he was cited throughout the era of the First World War by politicians and nationalists alike. His engagement in questions of worldwide nationalist movements gave credence to nascent nationalist causes like those in Egypt or Europe’s Political Zionism. While Renan’s work has been taken to task for racialist overtones related to Arab and Muslim history, particularly in Edward Said’s Orientalism, Renan’s contribution to the field remains a foundation upon which the study of nation and nationalism rests.\(^2\)


\(^2\) Renan spent time in Syria doing research for his work on Jesus and that, coupled with the widely held racist beliefs of nineteenth century Europe, led him to consider Islam hostile to science and ‘civilization,’ and that since “Islam is the most complete negation of Europe” war should be waged upon it “until the last son of Ishmael shall have died of misery, or shall have been relegated by terror to the depths of the desert.” Francis Espinasse, The Life of Ernest Renan
Renan wrote several treatises on national definition and religious history, making him uniquely placed for a discussion of religious and political nationalist rhetoric. Aside from his work on the life of Jesus Christ, he took both an interest in the Jewish definition of nation and held an ongoing dialogue with noted Arab and Islamic nationalist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. The generally accepted starting point for modern nation and nationalism studies was Renan’s 1882 Sorbonne lecture, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (“What is a nation?”). In this lecture, Renan sought to dispel common misconceptions of the day and consequently laid the groundwork for future scholarly examination of the topic. It is apparent that much of Renan’s impetus for giving this particular lecture was due to current events, notably the consequences of politics in the French Third Republic, German and Italian unification, and the Franco-Prussian War.

Significantly, Renan noted that religion, ethnicity and, geography were no longer the defining features of national structure because society’s enlightenment had challenged and altered this.

---


4 The exchange of letters following Renan’s 29 March 1883 lecture at the Sorbonne entitled “Islam and Science” is contained in the 18 May 1883 Parisian Journal des Debats. Although al-Afghani disputed Renan for what he saw as a racist attack on the Arab-Islamic world, the two actually saw eye to eye on a number of issues, including the nature of religious clerical hierarchies in holding back scientific and technological progress. Indeed, Renan is noted as having said that al-Afghani was a fellow nationalist. For more see: Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, "'Exchange with Ernest Renan' in Journal Des Debats (Paris) 18 May 1883," in An Islamic Response to Imperialism, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 87.

Renan believed that two fundamentally flawed arguments misrepresented the true nature of nations. First, the basis for a national body did not lie in religious designation, linguistic determinants, or political confederations, e.g., Switzerland or the United States. Second, “a far graver mistake is made: race is confused with nation and a sovereignty analogous to that of really existing people is attributed to ethnographic or, rather, linguistic groups.”

Despite the practice of using ‘race’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably persisting well into the twentieth century, Renan’s separation of the two concepts was a monumental attempt to shift the discussion into a ‘modern’ framework. A nation is defined by its choice to live together, under a united political structure, a relatively new phenomenon. In Egypt and China, “They were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven. Neither in Egypt nor in China were there citizens as such.”

Although citizenship in the state, a critical distinction between modern and pre-modern state structures, was central to Renan’s definition of nation, he nonetheless asserted that it was not enough on its own to create the nation. In countries that Renan referred to as conglomerations, like Switzerland or the United States, although citizenship was a given, such an entity was not a nation. Unable to break fully with primordialist conceptions of nation, and perhaps not surprisingly, Renan contrarily noted that France is a nation. As he observed:

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principal. … One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.

---

6 Ibid., 42.
7 Ibid., 43.
8 Ibid., 46.
9 Ibid., 52.
France constitutes an example of a nation because, according to Renan, it is a body spiritually and politically united by choice.

While Renan’s work epitomized the great majority of nationalist scholarship between the 1880s and 1920s, and such definitions lay at the heart of some policy-makers decisions in the post World War One era, not everyone agreed with his assertions. Despite Renan’s arguments against religiously, geographically, or linguistically based national constructs, a tension remained between primordial and modern definitions. Race and nation continued to be conflated, and while nationalist agendas typically espoused a modern tone, they relied on the unity building symbols of religion, place, and language to achieve the goals of statehood, self-determination, and legitimization. The manipulation of modern, Renanian logic, in combination with cultural symbols and heritage defined the nationalist rhetoric of our case study communities. In each, pure modern nations do not exist except in their symbiotic relationship to the cultural or ethnic core principles, each being built in its own way upon an ancient cultural heritage. None of the nations, which were created or manipulated in the nineteenth century, were in fact wholly ‘modern,’ just as none were wholly ‘primordial.’ The most important outcome of this manipulated definition of nation, however, manifested in tensions and violent outcries when some groups’ national construction was given global legitimacy and others were not, drawing into question what was a legitimate national claim.

Jewish Zionism

At its core, the multifaceted belief structure of Zionism is nearly two thousand years old, but despite this age there is a disconnect between modern Political Zionism and traditional, Religious Zionism. In terms of its modern political usage for the Israeli state-building efforts of
the twentieth century, it is first modern and second rooted in nineteenth century European history, set against a backdrop of anti-Semitic violence, nationalist rhetoric, and social Darwinism. Religious Zionism, on the other hand, draws its heritage from the history of the Diaspora -- the casting out of the Jews from Israel by Roman conquest in the early centuries of the Common Era. Since the destruction of the Temple, Judaic ritual and custom have focused on a return to Israel at the moment of God’s choosing. For years, and still today in conservative and orthodox services and prayers, this factored into the spiritual life of the Jewish community as a philosophical underpinning of that community, unifying the scattered peoples in their common desire to return ‘home.’ The emphasis placed on Return in Religious Zionism was useful to the propaganda campaign of the Political Zionists. The popular imagination of large segments of the Jewish and Protestant Christian communities (see below) was well versed in Religious Zionism, accepting the politicization of Zionism with a great deal of ease.

*Traditional Zionism: Cultural, Economic, and Philanthropic*

Religious, or Cultural, Zionism is part of devout Judaism, and built on the understanding that God will restore the Jews to Israel with the coming of the Messiah and the redemption of the world’s people. Since messianic arrival is so inextricably linked to the restoration of the state of Israel, in Religious Zionist terms, it is worth noting that, as University of Montreal professor Yakov Rabkin points out, the Jewish community has long desired the coming of the Messiah, and at various times throughout history enthusiasm for the Messianic tradition has waxed and waned. From 1626 until 1676, for instance, such longing in Smyrna, Anatolia led to thousands of Jews following false hopes and prophecy. 10  

Ironically, it is this very centrality of Palestine as the

---

homeland of the Jewish people that split the Jewish community during the latter half of the
tenineteenth century.

Despite Religious Zionism’s focus on divinely inspired Return, which remains the
cultural center-piece of the Orthodox worldview, ‘returning’ to Palestine was actually put into
practice over the centuries by Jewish communities in the Diaspora, suffering from anti-Semitic
attacks and the unequal distribution of rights. The Zionism which developed out of these
circumstances --practical, cultural, or economic --was not particularly concerned with the
creation of a political state, but rather in protecting and continuing the Jewish community. Since
the expulsion from Israel, there has been a tendency toward violent and recurring anti-Semitic
attacks on communities throughout much of Europe. Seeking relief from these experiences,
Jewish communities sought refuge in more amiable regions. Not only did this tendency develop
the traditional European stereotype of the “Wandering Jew,” but it also set the stage for Political
Zionist desires to follow the tradition of European countries and Palestine at the end of the
nineteenth century. This move to colonize was actively advocated by Theodor Herzl (1860 -
1904) in his ground-breaking political Zionist work.

Broadly speaking, Jewish communities found a great deal of freedom, if not simply
safety, in the Ottoman Empire after the reconquest of Spain after 1492. These early communities
of Jews returning to the region of Palestine, while not seeking a political homeland, actively
maintained a spiritual center. Over the centuries, Jews immigrated from the far reaches of the
world to Palestine, typically motivated by economic, political, or cultural persecution in the lands
from which they came. While entire communities could not usually escape en masse, smaller

Sabbatai Tzevi, the false messiah turned Muslim, served as a cautionary tale of not being too
quick to act upon messianic aspirations from Jewish communities throughout Europe and the
Levant.
groups and individuals were able to break away. By the late 1800s, Jews immigrated in large numbers from Russia and Eastern Europe to North America, Western Europe, and the British dominions where religious tolerance was more widely practiced. But it was the smaller, yet significant, numbers of Jews continuing to migrate to Palestine, who began to break down the distinctions between divine and human agency and thus put into motion the more coordinated efforts of nineteenth century Political Zionist colonists. These waves of immigration to Palestine, known as *aliyah*, marked the beginning of a shift in focus from Cultural Zionism to Political Zionism. Earlier *aliyah* (1880s and 1890s) were less state-oriented in ambition, whereas later *aliyah* (1910s and 1920s) were more so.

As the numbers of Jews immigrating to Palestine grew, particularly toward the close of the nineteenth century, Palestine’s overall Jewish community found itself increasingly divided in two. The main cause of the difference was a conflicting agenda regarding Palestine’s governance. On the one hand, as will be discussed below, Political Zionist colonial efforts understood their movement to Palestine as the basis for the reestablishment of the *state* of Israel. On the other hand, a large portion of the immigrants were Orthodox Jews, who, while interested in preserving Jewish culture and heritage, found the idea of establishing a Jewish state without the aid of God, heretical. Although still practicing a form of Zionism, the Orthodox communities were vehemently opposed to Political Zionism and have thus, sometimes, been referred to as non-Zionists.

A 1919 British government report on the region of Palestine and Syria noted that the Jewish population in Jerusalem was largely Orthodox in character and few were Zionists.\(^{11}\) Most,

\(^{11}\) It is important to note that Jerusalem remained the focal point of Zionist efforts, despite the number of Jews living in other urban centers like Jaffa. Jerusalem, being the spiritual center of Judaism, Christianity, and in some ways Islam, was one of the biggest points of contention in
in fact, were quite opposed to the Political Zionist endeavor. This Orthodox community fell in step with the old *Yishuv*, the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, who traced their ancestry in the region back generations and even centuries. The old Yishuv was either devoted entirely to the religious life or dependent upon the religious devotees. This class of Jews produces no wealth, and depends on charity, being supported by contributions from Jews all over the world (the Halukah). It does not participate in the political life of the country or in the common work of organisation of the colonists.\(^\text{12}\)

This form of Zionism, a variation of Cultural or Practical Zionism, did not intend on superseding the divine will, but sought to protect Jewish Culture and ease the earthly lives of Jews in countries where they lacked equal rights. The true bridge connecting Religious, Cultural and Political Zionism was Economic Zionism which, although not concerned with the creation of a restructured Jewish State, was chiefly concerned with the need “to ameliorate the pitiable conditions of Jews living in such countries as Russia and Roumania, without rights of citizenship and subject to all manner of oppression.”\(^\text{13}\) As with Political Zionism, Economic Zionism cared little for the religious overtones of the Jewish culture, but focused on the survival of the community more generally.

Late in the 1800s, Political Zionism gained an ideological foothold among some of the world’s Jewry, particularly by using religious rhetoric for political purposes, but Orthodox Jews became increasingly uncomfortable with this new direction. Political Zionism advocated the creation of a Jewish state, contradicting divine prophecy, which dictated that a Jewish return to post-Balfour Palestine. What populations in Jerusalem believed or advocated carried far greater weight in policy making than did opinions from Jaffa, Haifa, or Hebron.


Palestine could not “be brought about through ordinary human agencies, -- not even through a Peace Conference, -- but by God Himself.” In the eyes of the Orthodox community, sidestepping the will of God was simply presumptuous, if not blasphemous.

Interestingly, it was not only the Orthodox community that found the Political Zionist agenda problematic. Unlike the Orthodox tradition, which saw no separation between religion and nation, the Jewish Reform community took the modern, non-religious, nationalism of Renanian logic to heart. In Pennsylvania in 1869 and again in 1885, Reform synagogue protests manifested in a claim that the Jewish people are

… no longer a nation, but a religious community; and we therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning a Jewish State.15

Similarly, there was strong denunciation from within Germany when in 1845 the Rabbis at Frankfurt (15-28 July) eliminated from their ritual: "the prayers for the return to the land of our forefathers and for the restoration of the Jewish state." According to a report compiled by the Board of Deputies of British Jews in about 1905, this sentiment also appeared in the weekly, Die Welt, in 1897 (repeated again in 1905).17 In this series of articles, the author G. Karpeles

14 Ibid., 3.


16 Ibid., p. 1.

17 Die Welt was founded in 1897 by Theodor Herzl as the organ for the Zionist movement. The modern day German newspaper Die Welt, began circulation in 1946. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, first known as the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews, was founded in 1760. It was concerned with issues of Jewish education, rights, and foreign matters. The C.F.C., one of the subcommittees of the Board, established in 1878, represented the interests of the Anglo-Jewish community to the British government on questions of foreign affairs. It was not until the 1800s that the organization was recognized by the British government as the representative body for British Jewry. Members of the Board were influential, well-educated, and typically well-to-do members of what Chaim Bermant has termed the
states that Judaism was not a religion, but a "set of moral values, world views, and historical facts" and that Political Zionism was a false set of promises and hopes that worked counter to modern momentum in nation-state formation.

Whilst assimilationist rhetoric advanced in states where Jews experienced relative equality and freedom, the nineteenth century was also marked by an era of renewed anti-Semitism that came forcefully into contact with Enlightenment ideals of equality and citizenship. This clash manifested partly in an internal schism within the Jewish community marked by notions such as those advocated at the December 1898 conference of Reform Rabbis in Virginia, where assimilated communities declared themselves in opposition to the Political Zionist movement. As one member stated: “America was the Jews' Jerusalem and Washington their Zion.” With the emancipated participation of Jews in countries like the United States, France, and Great Britain, patriotism, national affiliation, and political citizenship conflicted with older primordial definitions, which relied on rhetorical explanations based on religious ideology and ethnicity. Ironically, the same nationalist rhetoric used by groups like the Reform Rabbis also helped to usher in the creation of Greece, Belgium, Germany, and Italy during the 1800s. In turn, such national self-determination inspired Political Zionism to a call for the colonization of Palestine in the name of Jewish political unity and ethnic/cultural communalism.

‘Cousinhood’ (see page 116, footnote 121 and page 151, footnote 54). Neither the Board nor its various sub-committees was, strictly speaking, democratic. The Board’s election and selection process was a haphazard result of over a hundred years of appointments, volunteers, and internal community selections.

18 The document reads: “stittiche Weltanschauung und geschichtliche Thatsache” which appears to have several misspellings, but roughly translates as above.

19 "Reform Synagogue Protests, p. 3."
Political Zionism

The narrative of Political Zionism typically begins in the 1880s as waves of pogroms (riots/massacres, in this case driven by anti-Semitic fervor) swept across the Russian Pale of Settlement. In 1881 and 1882, Jewish towns witnessed the destruction of businesses and homes as fears of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy were fueled in large part by governmental instability and the anti-Semitic scapegoating of the Russian aristocracy. By 1905, this anti-Semitic rhetoric led to the publication of the fabricated The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, generally believed to have been the product of the Okhrana (the Tsarist secret police). The pogroms of the 1880s, coupled with similar anti-Semitic manifestations throughout France in the 1890s, Wales in 1910, and Leeds, England in early June 1917, initiated a series of events and organization-building efforts that created groups like the W.Z.O. and the Jewish Agency.

The use of Zionist rhetoric for political ends first appeared in the 1890s, when Viennese scholar Nathan Birnbaum (1864 - 1937) published Die Nationale Wiedergebung des Juedischen Volkes in seinem Lande als Mittel zur Losung der Judenfrage (“The National Rebirth of the Jewish People in its Homeland as a Means of Solving the Jewish Question”). Jewish nationalism, manifested in this new Political Zionist form, was the unique outgrowth of the events of the nineteenth century. Scholars have argued that Napoleon’s emancipation of the Jews reawakened aspirations for a return to Palestine, but this new version of return was couched in the rhetoric

---

20 "Correspondence Respecting the Outrages on Jews in Russia, 1881-1882," Collected Correspondence, Foreign Office, London. 16 May and 23 May 1881.

21 A great deal has been written on the topic of The Protocols, but it is perhaps the most easily accessible examination its history offered in Will Eisner’s 2005 graphic novel which best, and most concisely, depicts the development, publication, and subsequent outgrowth of the anti-Semitic propaganda piece. Will Eisner, The Plot: The Secret Story of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
that had aided Giuseppe Garibaldi in Italy and Lajos Kossuth in Hungary. This politically motivated idea of return was distinctly different from the form manifested in an Orthodox interpretation of Zionism. Unlike its spiritually defined counterpart, Political Zionism was earthly and less esoteric, and as such was greatly impacted by ideological shifts across Victorian Europe.

The development of nationalist rhetoric was one of the most important catalysts in promoting the emergence of Political Zionism. Prior to the development of Political Zionism, “The thought of Israel’s ultimate liberation was remote and found expression principally in prayer as a form of passive messianism.”\(^{22}\) In 1882, Leo Pinsker’s publication of *Auto-Emancipation* began a process of examining this traditional worldview by asserting a new, proactive perspective focused more on the temporal here and now and less on the spiritual, esoteric ever after. In it, “he diagnosed a hereditary and incurable ‘psychosis of anti Semitism’”\(^{23}\) and called for the creation of a Jewish homeland as the treatment.\(^{23}\) Basing much of his idea of nation on the contemporary rhetoric of Ernest Renan, Pinsker suggested that although the Jews were certainly a people, they were not yet a nation. To become “that particular sort of human grouping they needed both common residence in the same territory … and a determination to live together.”\(^{24}\) For Pinsker, the world’s Jewry was

> the shuttle-cock which the peoples tossed in turn to one another. The cruel game was equally amusing whether we were caught or thrown, and was enjoyed all the more as our national respect became more elastic and yielding in the hands of the peoples. Under such


\(^{24}\) Ibid.
circumstances, how could there be any question of national self-determination, of a free, active development of our national force or of our native genius?\textsuperscript{25} If the Jews could be granted a place of their own, “but a little strip of land like that of the Serbians and Romanians,” this would allow, he argued, the Jewish people the chance to regain their masculinity as a nation, thus challenging the non-Jewish world to “then prate about our lacking manly virtues!”\textsuperscript{26} To achieve this aim the Jews had to regain their lost political dimension.

By the 1890s, Jewish communities throughout much of Europe were primed for the action and development needed to carry out the goal of establishing a modern Jewish state. In 1894, the opportunity for structuring this desire for action manifested itself in the trial of Alfred Dreyfus and the subsequent publication of \textit{The Jews’ \textbf{25} State}. The trial of Alfred Dreyfus, also known as the Dreyfus Affair, was a case of treason based on falsified evidence. Dreyfus, a Franco-Jewish Army Captain from the Alsace region, faced the accusation of treason because of his doubly problematic geographic and religious heritage. Because Alsace lay along the Franco-Prussian border, and thanks in large part to the tradition of anti-Semitism already present throughout the country, Dreyfus was an easy target for French patriots, whose definition of loyalty and nationality had been recently tested in the Franco-Prussian War and the uncertainty of French politics. Despite being well-known as a loyal member of the military, Dreyfus was convicted of the charge of treason and sent into exile.\textsuperscript{27} The outcomes related to the Dreyfus


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. (accessed).

\textsuperscript{27} Eventually Dreyfus was acquitted and he returned to serve his country once again in the capacity of a lieutenant colonel, during the First World War.
Affair were many. Not only did the Affair incite Emile Zola to publish the now famous article “J’accuse,” it also produced two distinct reactions among the Jewish populations of France, and Europe more generally. On the one hand, the case tested the limits of assimilation. For many British Jews, as an example, “the answer was still greater assimilation and patriotism.” 28 On the other hand, Political Zionists had even more impetus for intensifying their efforts to separate from what seemed to be an increasingly anti-Semitic Europe to re-establish themselves in communities of safety and cultural homogeneity. In either event, the Dreyfus Affair strained and reasserted many of the stereotypes of European Jews, forcing even those who had never questioned the policy of assimilation to reassess their individual definitions of Self. How religion played into the individual’s definition became an increasingly prominent component of daily European dialogue. Newspaper editorials, novels, and propaganda tested the limits of nation in terms of religious constraints. A growing uneasiness about the practicality of modern nationalism convinced many to rally around long held cultural and religious symbols.

Theodor Herzl, Jewish Austrian journalist, witnessed not only the mockery of justice evident in the French courtroom during Dreyfus’ trial, but also the backlash against France’s significant Jewish population. Newspapers ran anti-Semitic headlines and cartoons, while posters and other material propaganda insisted on boycotts of Jewish businesses and even violence against Jewish persons.

As a result, in 1896, Theodor Herzl published his work Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). Prompted by the work of Birnbaum and Pinsker, and the events in France, this monograph became the foundational treatise on the ‘Jewish Question’ and of Political Zionist ideology. In

the preface, Herzl argues that the idea of “the restoration of the Jewish State” is a very old one, but that recent outcries, political changes, and emerging ideologies “have awakened the slumbering idea.”

Proponents of Political Zionism made the claim that ever since the loss of the Temple, the world’s Jewry had begun to wither. As historian Alain Dieckhoff notes, having been “wiped out politically, they had continued to subsist through the mind and had become true living dead.”

A year after publishing The Jews’ State, Herzl began a process of rehabilitating this political lethargy by creating the W.Z.O. In 1897, the W.Z.O. met for the first time in Basel, Switzerland to confer on the plight of the world’s Jewry, and to discuss solutions to their problems. Herzl believed that in order to create a Jewish state, preferably in Palestine, which he prophetically declared would be achieved in the following fifty years, the W.Z.O. needed the assistance of one of the Great Powers.

Pragmatically, Herzl first looked to the Ottoman Empire, under which Palestine was then governed. He hoped to convince Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876 -- 1909) that the plight of the Jews in Europe was critical and that the Sultan could gain infinite glory if he allowed the Jews to immigrate to Palestine. Indeed, a great thread of loyalty to the Ottoman government existed within the Jewish community. During World War One, Menahem Mendel Ussishkin -- leader of the colonial organization Hoveve Zion (Lovers of Zion) -- argued against the creation of a Jewish Legion fighting alongside the Allies, because “Jewry owed a historic debt of gratitude to Turkey for having provided a haven of refuge for the Jewish exiles from Spain during the era of the

---


30 Dieckhoff, 24.
Spanish Inquisition.”\footnote{Gilner, 83.} That said, Herzl’s supplications did not ultimately convince the Sultan, and by 1902 it was evident that Abdul Hamid would offer no such aid.

There were several reasons for Abdul Hamid’s reluctance to aid the Zionists. The Sultan had become increasingly paranoid about the connections Jews had with Western states and how these connections could lead to his own political downfall. The Ottomans “did not want to increase the influence of the Great Powers over the affairs of the Empire” and a larger European-born Jewish population within the Empire’s borders would only seem to encourage this.\footnote{Mim Kemal Oke, “The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine,” \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 14, no. 3 (1982): 332.} Additionally, in 1896, when Herzl first requested the charter for Palestine from the sultan, Abdul Hamid advised him “not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have one this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood.”\footnote{Ibid.: 330.} This sentiment went a long way in underscoring the general fear the Ottoman ruling elite had toward growing nationalist agitation across the Empire. The Balkans and Eastern Anatolia were already clamoring for greater national independence: adding to this would make the task of maintaining Ottoman hegemony only more difficult.\footnote{Ibid.: 331.} Finally, as the 1919 report \textit{Syria and Palestine} noted, the late 1800s had proven to be a strain on the relationship between the Ottoman Porte and the Jewish population, stating:

\begin{quote}
The Alliance israélite universelle, of Paris, had introduced a first Hebrew colony to Palestine in 1870. British Jews followed suit in 1878. Four years later there was a veritable rush, as a result of pogroms in Russia and Rumania. With ten colonies already in existence, occupying some of the best land of the maritime lowlands, while Jerusalem,
\end{quote}

\footnote{31Gilner, 83.}


\footnote{33 Ibid.: 330.}

\footnote{34 Ibid.: 331.}
Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed had long had garrisons of fanatic Jews, the Porte put his foot down. In 1888 it informed the Powers that it would not admit another Hebrew colony into Palestine.\textsuperscript{35}

By the first decade of the 1900s, therefore, Zionists realized they had to find other supporters among the Great Powers.

Thus, Herzl turned his attentions elsewhere and began to focus on the other power he believed to have the most interest in the region, Great Britain. As is well documented, \textit{Fin de siècle} Europe existed in a tenuous balance of power and Herzl’s argument that the unstable Turkish power could have been aided by “loans from rich Jews”\textsuperscript{36} hinted at the ease with which that balance could shift. As a result, he surmised, “Zionist attention must be fastened on the Empire most concerned by, and most likely to benefit from, that break-up, the British.”\textsuperscript{37}

Political Zionism had found its goal, its adherents, and was now set to court its assistant.

\textbf{Christian Zionism}

The role Christian Zionism played in the production and issuance of the Balfour Declaration remains hotly contested. At a 2007 conference, \textit{Antisemitism and English Culture}, held at Birkbeck College in London, England, James Renton of King’s College London presented a paper entitled “Racial and colonial contexts: Britain and Zionism, 1917-1939.” While Renton acknowledged the place of Christian Zionist rhetoric in the history of the Balfour Declaration, he denied that it motivated Christian cabinet members in the cause of establishing a

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Syria and Palestine}, 44.

\textsuperscript{36} Frank Hardie and Irwin Herman, \textit{Britain and Zion: The Fateful Entanglement} (London: Billing & Sons, Ltd., 1980), 5.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
Jewish national home in Palestine. Rather, this remained an emotional and romantic notion that was only window dressing for the larger demands of ‘practical’ military and political concerns. Renton is not alone in relegating Christian Zionism to the realm of emotion and impracticality. Not surprisingly, given the difficulty in measuring the impact personal belief has on political outcomes, Christian Zionism is frequently overlooked, or at best footnoted, in the history of the Balfour Declaration. Yet, doing so neglects the fact that Jewish Zionists, anti-Zionists, and non-Christians throughout the British Empire were fully aware of the history of Christian rhetoric in the subjugation of the people and knew that Christian rhetoric, if used properly, could be a powerful motivating force in appealing to popular support for Zionism.

Christian Zionism is nearly as old as Jewish Zionism and is in many ways similar in scope. Instead of the Jewish belief that God will return the Jews to Palestine on the eve of Judgment, Christians argue that a Jewish return to Palestine will hasten the Second Coming of Christ. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that Great Britain was the power chosen to take the lead in creating a Jewish state. Britain had developed, over the centuries, an arrogance about its land, customs, culture, and place within Christianity which made it an ideal candidate for this particular task. British colonial history is littered with examples of manifest destiny and the role it was ‘destined’ to play as the guiding force in global structures. Britain’s specific relationship to Christianity derived from the belief that it had been asked, “to do for Christendom something which it appears, Christendom [could not] do for itself.”\(^{38}\) Indeed, early Christian Zionist rhetoric was much like Jewish Zionist rhetoric in that it did not carry overtly political tones, but rather focused on what Lucien Wolf (1857 - 1930), member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews,

called “eschatology rather than … practical politics.”

According to Wolf, the first Christian Zionist tract was published by the legal scholar Sir Henry Finch in London in 1621: *The World’s Great Restoration, or Calling of the Jewes*. Finch argued that the Bible clearly indicated that a great battle would take place between the Turkish ‘tyrants’ and the people of Judæ, and to the Jews would go a great victory. As the remainder of Finch’s title indicates, the Return of the Jews to Israel was not meant to be for the benefit of their own cultural rebirth or political gain, but for the coming of the world to Christianity: *The Worlds Great Restauration or the Calling of the Jewes and (with Them) of All the Nations and Kingdomes of the East, to the Faith of Christ*.

From the late sixteenth century to the twentieth century, England’s special place in Christianity acquired a great deal of attention from those in power. During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I (1533 --1603), the poet John Lyly described “the English as ‘His chosen and peculiar people. So tender hath He always had of that England, as of a new Israel.’” What is more, Palestine itself held a special place in the imagination of English Protestants. In order to carry out God’s work on Earth, they developed a unique understanding of Judaism, in which the role of the Jew was intrinsically linked to the general spiritual policies of Christianity.

---


40 Henry Finch, *The Worlds Great Restauration or the Calling of the Jewes and (with Them) of All the Nations and Kingdomes of the East, to the Faith of Christ* (London: Edward Griffin, 1621), 3. Although the Bible does not talk specifically about Turks, Finch reads ‘between the lines’ about “A marvellous conflict shall they have with Gog and Magog, that is to say, the Turke ….” Finch’s reinterpretation of the Bible to suit the modern issues at hand was certainly nothing new, nor the last time divining such insights has been attempted.

41 Ibid.

In 1290, Edward I had officially expelled Jews from England, and from that point until Cromwell’s restoration, England defined itself by its lack of a Jewish population. As a result, most historians only address Judeo-English history after 1655, when Oliver Cromwell took power and led the way for the restoration of Jews to England as a result of the Whitehall Conference (see below). This, however, is inaccurate. It is fairly clear from the historical and literary record that the country was by no means devoid of a Jewish population in the intervening years. A rabbi was even consulted, for instance, by Henry VIII in his divorce crisis. Officially, however, they were not a part of the state structure. By the time of Cromwell’s reign, a strong desire had arisen within England to see the official resettlement of the Jews to the country. England’s Puritan, Protestant reading of the Bible and its belief in the nature of the return of Christ, encouraged a sense of superiority about the country’s role in Christian doctrine. It was argued that its doctrine was closest, of all Christian doctrines, to Judaism. In 1655, at the Whitehall Conference, this sentiment was reinforced by the contention that before the Jews could return to Israel, they first had to be scattered to every corner of the globe. Thus, without Jews officially living in England, the coming of the Messiah --dependent upon a Jewish return to Palestine --would be delayed. As with Jewish Religious Zionism, Palestine and a Jewish restoration were linked to a messianic return and the restoration of the state of Israel. However, the role of human agency in Christian Zionism was much more akin to that of Political rather than Religious Zionism. Building on the foundations laid by the crusaders, Christians no longer saw themselves as solely the protectors of the Holy Places. Rather, they were now being

---

promised, in the same way as the Jews had been before them, rights and responsibilities toward Palestine.

In his 1833 work, *The Genius of Judaism*, Isaac Disraeli continued this legacy by stating:

In happier time, and with a nobler spirit, the Jewish controversy was saved out of profane hands of the sanguinary or the imbecile idolaters of the Roman church. The new church of the Reformed enlarged the sphere of religious inquiry; it had itself been too long a school of affliction not to sympathise with the afflicted. The first blessing on mankind by the Reformation was the establishment of that toleration which they had so long wanted. This step approximated Christianity towards Judaism; they ceased to be enemies; they were neighbours. The Hebrews were no longer hunted down as wild animals, but invited, like sheep straying without a shepherd, into the fold.44

Numerous examples of the belief that England had a special place in the Zionist endeavor appeared long before the Balfour Declaration. W. Young, the first British consul to Palestine (appointed in 1838), expounded upon the belief that Protestant Christianity was the saving grace of mankind:

Two groups would doubtless demand a strong voice in the future concerns of Palestine; the first were the Jews, to whom God had originally given ownership of this land; and the second were the Protestant Christians, their legitimate successors.45

Nevertheless, in 1916, a year before the Zionist debate came to a head in the British Cabinet, Edwin Montagu, a staunch anti-Zionist and Jewish member of government, declared that a pro-Zionist policy is “a rather presumptuous and almost blasphemous attempt to forestall Divine


45 Alexander Schölch, "Britain in Palestine, 1838 --1882: The Roots of the Balfour Policy" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 42. Meir Vereté tells us that a British Consulate was established in Palestine not because of early nineteenth century Zionist desires, nor at the behest of local missionaries, but “in the interests of British residents and travelers in Jerusalem, and of British policy, as well as on grounds of competition for status vis-à-vis the Turkish authorities and the Catholic powers, it was worthwhile appointing a Consular Agent of Great Britain in Jerusalem.” Meir Vereté, "Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?," *The English Historical Review* 85, no. 335 (1970): 320.
agency in the collection of the Jews which would be punished, if not by a new captivity in Babylon, by a new and unrivalled persecution of the Jews left behind.\textsuperscript{46} Not only did Montagu’s statement echo the arguments of Orthodox Judaism, it also questioned the presumption of British imperialism based on religious propaganda. Despite this, England --like all other European imperial powers --had long had a religious component to its colonial endeavor. England’s particular pride about its place in the Divine world had a long development.

English Protestantism’s particular interpretation of the nature of Zionism distinguished Great Britain from its Catholic counterparts in Europe in two ways, opening the door for its eventual role in the creation of the Balfour Declaration. First, when England broke with the Roman Church, as is noted by Disraeli above, the relationship between Judaism and Christianity’s two newest sects also changed. Some historians point out that England’s devout Christians no longer sought solace in the ceremony of the Church, but rather in the literal words of the Bible.\textsuperscript{47} The Bible was “for about two and a half centuries after the Reformation ...the only Book read by the majority of the British people.”\textsuperscript{48} As a result, even up until the middle of the nineteenth century, “the end of the world [seemed as though it] was imminent, and that the Jews were destined to play a major role in this final drama.”\textsuperscript{49} Given England’s special place in God’s eye, as Lyly described, the argument further insisted that once in contact with Puritan Protestantism, the Jews would no longer resist conversion; they would submit, return to


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{47}Angell, 79.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{48}Frankel, 1.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{49}David S. Katz, Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England 1603 --1655 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 90.}
Palestine, and thus the world would witness the Second Coming. It should be noted that in terms of the Protestant nature of Christian Zionism must be made, England was not alone. In the midst of World War One, particularly during 1917, there was a strongly held fear that the British government must act quickly in proclaiming a pro-Zionist policy as Germany looked poised to do so itself. This fear was fueled by the belief that the world’s Jewry would run to the side of whichever power first declared a pro-Zionist stance. This fear was further aided by the belief that Zionist support would equal physical and monetary support. Germany, largely Protestant, was no less likely to develop pro-Zionist sentiment than England.

Second, Catholic and Orthodox communities like those in France, Spain, and Russia had been the seat of some of the worst anti-Semitic discrimination and violence over the past several centuries. The works of contemporary Catholic traditionalists like Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton, it is argued, contained “a thread of thinly-veiled anti-semitism running through[out].”¹⁰ Even as late as January 1919, after the Balfour Declaration had been issued, Catholicism’s role in the establishment of the Jewish national home continued to be questioned. The English Catholic, Cardinal Francis Bourne, sent a letter to Lord Edmund Talbot stating that

The whole movement [Zionism] appears to me to be quite contrary to Christian sentiment and tradition. Let Jews live here by all means if they like and enjoy the same liberties as

50 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London: Abacus, 1998), 407. It should also be noted that Belloc and Chesterton were the same individuals who accused, via the weekly Eye Witness, Herbert Samuel, David Lloyd George, and Rufus Isaacs (two of whom were Jewish members of government) of ‘insider trading,’ the upshot of which directly led to the Marconi scandal of 1912 and a shaken confidence in the British Liberal Government. While accusations of anti-Semitism circulated, those accused were not all Jewish, (e.g., David Lloyd George) and the scandal had just as much to do with, if not more, party politics and ethics as it did with racism or anti-Semitism.
other people; but that they should ever again dominate and rule the country would be an outrage to Christianity and its Divine Founder.\textsuperscript{51}

Because Catholicism did not accept the Jewish role in the return of the messiah as did Protestantism, it is less surprising that England, and not France, led the way in the creation of a ‘resurrected’ Jewish national home.

We must be careful not to overstate religious tolerance in Protestant countries, however. John Foster Fraser’s 1915 claim that: “Nowhere does the Jew receive better treatment than in Great Britain. There is not a single disability. Anti-Semitism does not exist” was hardly a \textit{fait accompli}.\textsuperscript{52} Anti-Semitism remained a problem throughout Europe and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, but there certainly was a gradation of where that anti-Semitism developed and how virulent it was. The further West one travelled the more likely one was run into a Christian Zionism or Philo-Semitism (support of, friendship to, and intellectual pursuits in the study of Jewry). Anti-Semitism persisted in these areas, but was less bloody than in more Eastern European states.

The Christian Zionist cause fit well within the context of the nineteenth century imperial enterprise and, as such, the demand reached beyond philosophy to the ambition of establishing a physical British presence in Palestine so that they might become the protectors and converters of the world’s Jewish populations while at the same time securing crucial imperial interests in the region near Suez. Indeed, “English ‘Gentile Zionists’ of the nineteenth century [were] the


\textsuperscript{52} John Foster Fraser, \textit{The Conquering Jew} (New York: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1915), 114.
forerunners of non-Jewish supporters of Zionism” in the twentieth century. In order to establish such a presence in Palestine, however, British Christian Zionists had to both increase their number of supporters and create an institutional base within the region itself.

*Christian Zionism as a Political Tool*

The likelihood of Germany releasing a pro-Zionist document at nearly the same time as the British was historically bolstered by the roles Prussian and British Episcopalians played in nineteenth century Palestine. Although England’s emotional relationship with Palestine had been developing for centuries, its modern institutional relationship only began in 1841 with the establishment of an Anglo-Prussian Episcopal See in Jerusalem. The institution of the See was contingent upon an agreement finalized between the Anglican Church and the Prussians such that “the bishops would be appointed alternately by the English and Prussian crowns, but would always be ordained by the archbishop of Canterbury.” It was no accident that the first bishop chosen was a converted Jew, Michael Soloman Alexander. Baron von Bunsen, the German diplomat sent to carry out the negotiations with Lord Palmerstone to establish the Bishopric, noted of Alexander:

> he is by race an Israelite, - born in Prussian Breslau, - in confession belonging to the Church of England --ripened (by hard work) in Ireland --twenty years Professor of Hebrew and Arabic in England (in what is now King’s College). So the beginning is made, please God, for the restoration of Israel.

---

53 Schölch: 40.

54 Ibid.: 42.

55 As cited in: Wolf, 106.
Bishop Alexander’s chief task was to oversee the conversion of Palestine’s Jewish population. Needless to say, conversion was slow and resistance among the local Jews strong. As a result Bishop Alexander’s successor, Samuel Gobat (1849), set aside the task and focused on what he saw as more pressing and realistic endeavors, like the conversion of native Orthodox Christians to Protestantism and establishing a protective presence on behalf of Christendom. In fact, in the lead-up to the Crimean War (1853-1856) this question of who had to right to protect the Christian Holy Places was central to jingoistic propaganda. Taking on this particular shift in focus offers further evidence that the role Jews played was distinctly different in Orthodox and Protestant scriptural readings. Palestine’s native Christian inhabitants, who for the most part were Orthodox Christians, were much like their European counterparts in maintaining that Zionism held little appeal as it was primarily the result of Protestant Biblical understanding and culture.

While securing the region of Palestine began with the establishment of the Episcopal See, securing the minds of England’s masses was the unwitting endeavor of nineteenth century philo-Semitic literature and popular fiction. Briefly, philo-Semitism is the favor shown by non-Jewish academics, writers, or politicians toward Jewish heritage and culture. In English terms philo-Semitism manifested in a desire among some Christian’s to recognize the Judeo-Christian connections and convert Jews to Christianity in an effort to hasten the Second Coming. This type of philo-Semitic literature focused on romantic notions of salvation through love. By the second

56 Schölich: 42.

57 Indeed this held true right through the establishment of the state of Israel as some members of Palestinian Christian communities took up arms against the Israeli state, most notably in the form of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under the leadership of Christian Palestinian George Habash.
half of the nineteenth century, however, a new version of this genre began to emerge, which
focused on other nineteenth century themes as well, most notably nationalism. The most
important literary work of this genre was George Eliot’s 1876 Daniel Deronda. Designed to
inspire reflection on the issue of Jewish political aspirations, the novel became a cultural link
between the English masses and the Jewish Political Zionist enterprise. At the conclusion of the
novel the main character states:

The idea that I am possessed with is that of restoring a political existence to my people,
making them a nation again, giving them a national center, such as the English have,
though they too are scattered over the face of the globe.58

As proof of Deronda’s power in the imagination of the European public, on 22 November 1895,
Chief Rabbi Herman Marcus Adler remarked to Theodor Herzl that his scheme for Jewish
immigration and colonization of Palestine was the same idea as that of Daniel Deronda.59

Deronda’s idealized heroic Anglo-Christian, with a secret religious past, was not an uncommon
motif in mainstream nineteenth century literature. Literature meant to encourage Christian
conversion of Jews, in particular Jewesses, is apparent throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
century record. Even Sir Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe (1819), finds a thread of this philo-Semitism

58 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda (New York: Penguin, 1996), 803. Daniel Deronda was
first published in 1876.

59 Marvin Lowenthal, ed., The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York: Grosset and Dunlap
in arrangement with The Dial Press, Inc, 1962), 80. It is also interesting to note that Rabbi Adler
retained a thorough Britishness alongside his role as Britain’s Jewish spiritual leader. Of a dinner
enjoyed at the Rabbi’s house, Herzl said it was “everything English, with the old Jewish customs
peeping through,” and Rabbi Adler’s torn allegiances to Britain and the Jewish community, were
frequently strained when large numbers of foreign, pro-Political Zionist, Jews moved to the
country and found his assessment of Political Zionism as “an egregious blunder” problematic.
For more see: Elkan D. Levy, “The History of the Chief Rabbinate” www.chiefrabbi.org
(accessed: 30 September 2007).
running throughout in the character of Rebecca of York. But Deronda was more than Jewish nationalism romanticized. Indeed, as Eliot’s last novel, Deronda was a platform on which she denounced anti-Jewish sentiment and, ironically perhaps, anti-colonialism. Even with Deronda’s apparent forward thinking, Eliot’s desire to see national self-determination flourish worldwide was not necessarily clear. By way of example, when given the opportunity to help fund Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini’s work, she flatly refused, arguing that he did nothing more than promote conspiracy. Additionally, and more importantly for our own concerns, Deronda continued to reinforce another pertinent stereotype for the history of the Balfour Declaration, that of the heathen or barbarous Muslim and Arab. The only moment in the novel when Palestine’s native inhabitants, Arabs, are remotely alluded to comes in reference to Daniel’s adopted family’s Crusader legacy. In looking over the family tree, Eliot tells us “Daniel had never before cared about the family tree --only about that ancestor who had killed three Saracens in one encounter.” Saracen, non-Christian pagan or heathen, was a term widely applied to the Turks, and more generally Muslims, throughout English culture from the era of the Crusades to the twentieth century. As will be more fully developed in the next chapter, the labeling of Muslims, no matter their ethnic background, with broad and typically negative terms continued well into the twentieth century. Just as Eliot’s philo-Semitic discourse informed the policy making classes about the cause of Jewish nationalism so too was it vaguely anti-Ottoman.

---


62 Eliot, 143.
Both Christian Zionists and Jewish Political Zionists were, for the most part, pleased with the Balfour Declaration. Although the language of the Declaration was greatly modified by other interests, the premise that the world’s Jewry constituted a national identity was in step with Christian and Political Zionism’s definition of nation. Contrarily, anti-Zionist Jews, like the Reform synagogues of North America, the orthodox communities’ throughout Europe and the Middle East, and individuals like Edwin Montagu, contested this definition of nation. As Montagu observed shortly after the Declaration’s release, this legitimatization of the Political Zionist agenda drew into question a Jews’ membership and allegiances to any country outside of Palestine.63

Nationalism in the Muslim World

At roughly the same time as Jewish nationalism began to manifest in the organized literature of Political Zionism, the sub-continent’s Indo-Muslim populations began examining their own constructions of nationhood as well. Weary of the uneven relationship they had with London, nationalism was a unifying tool that countered the policies and practices of the British imperial administration. Similarly, Arab scholars like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani questioned the presupposed structure of nation in their calls for re-born Arab states. The nationalism that manifested across the Indian and Arab world was not homogeneous; even within smaller segments of these societies, the uniformity in the call of national self-determination and national rights varied widely. Universally, however, all manifestations of nationalism across this region tested the fledging notions of modern nations and the practice of self-identification. Much as was

the case with Jewish nationalism, the variation and forms of nationalism across the Islamic world (for our purposes between the western border of Egypt and the eastern border of India) compounded the problems in calls for unity while at the same time reevaluated communal dimensions. Despite the problems geographic distance caused, two great strains of national sentiment appeared: the first was religious, specifically Islamic in nature, and the second was more secular, more akin to the nationalism found in Europe.

Although there were sizable Christian and Hindu communities across the Islamic world, Christian nationalism in the Middle East did not manifest as religious nationalism, but instead Christians tended to align with ideologies of secular, modern nationalism (the second strain). Likewise, at least in the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century, Hindus did not tend to unify around religiously based nationalism; these movements only began to make political headway in 1923, with the publication of V. D. Savarkar’s *Hindutva (Who is a Hindu?)*. Thus, our first form of national ideology, one claiming unity through religion, focused on Islamic principles as alternatives to the European nation-state model. As with Political Zionism, Islamism or pan-Islamism drew on religious unity for communal cohesion, but integrated components of modern nationalist rhetoric to be viable alternatives to the European imperial endeavor.

Given that Islamism, thus did not speak to all members of the region (whether Muslim or not) several Arab and Indian nationalist movements used the principles of nineteenth century nation-state ideology to create a framework upon which local cultural and geographic features could work to unify large communities under one banner. The earliest stage of these nationalist movements was a period of supra-nationalism, which advocated ‘Arab’ or ‘Indian’ unity. In the case of Arab nationalism, this supra-structure was revisited and refined in the middle of the
twentieth century by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918 --1970) in his pan-Arab movement, but in the late nineteenth century this superstructure was vague and never all encompassing. This stage quickly gave way to smaller, more segmented regionally defined nationalist movements. Just as Zionism was sub-divided into Religious, Economic, and Political manifestations, Indian and Arab nationalism by the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century is best examined in terms of its smaller, more manageable, and localized movements.

One of the most significant features in the scaling down of nation from a supra-regional level to more localized experiences was the fracturing caused by the First World War. Instead of focus being given to pan-Arab unity, Egyptian, Palestinian, or Syrian sub-sets developed in response to changing regional dynamics, most notably the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the legitimization of Zionist endeavor. While Egyptian nationalism is not generally connected with ‘Arab’ nationalism until the 1950s and 1960s, when Nasser promoted his pan-Arab vision via the United Arab Republic, Egypt did play a significant role in ‘Arab’ nationalism of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, for two reasons. First, even though Arabic was not necessarily the only spoken or written language which could unify nationalist movements in this region, as most of the well-educated wrote and spoke in French, English, or German, Arabic was the underlying feature of nationalist rhetoric throughout the Egyptian-Levantine world. Secondly, there was a great deal of movement, particularly among the intelligentsia of the time, throughout Egypt and the Levant as well as the major cities of Europe. Thus, while Syrians, and for a while Palestinians, saw themselves as distinctly separate from Egyptians, and vice versa, all groups also saw themselves as distinctly separate from Europeans and found unity, if only in terms of cultural mores, with their Arabic speaking brethren. Similarly, in India, the variation across the subcontinent eventually led to the breaking away of Bengal and Pakistan, and to the
sub-divisions and tensions within India that have since contributed to language demonstrations, the Kashmir issue, and the religious divisions among Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. In late nineteenth century India, however, common anti-Imperial cause, in particular, created unity. Nationalism, as a result, was being tested and recast throughout the Arab and Indian world in the latter years of the 1800s through the 1920s, leaving unclear boundaries for where nations began and ended.

As this region fell almost entirely under a British sphere of influence (with notable exceptions to French and Russian interests), British imperialists anxiously watched the nationalist fracturing increasingly evident in the region. Pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism were in many ways easier for British policy-makers to deal with as the disenfranchised minorities could be used as imperial leverage, but with each minority or sub-set developing and unifying around a strong local, nationalist call, the British found themselves facing all too familiar a scenario. Frequent allusions to the Irish problem appear in the archival record and a fear that India or the Middle East would go through a process of ‘Ulsterfication’ helped define the ways in which policy was constructed as it regarded Indian self-government and Middle Eastern state formation.64

Fracturing nationalist causes were quite common across the Levant and India in the early part of the twentieth century and for this reason only the forms which nationalism most prominently manifested here will be the focus of discussion for this chapter. In part this is done to help simplify the narrative of the Balfour Declaration and at the same time to reinforce the

---

64 The term ‘Ulsterfication’ was used by a member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, but comments connecting Irish issues to what was happening in India appear throughout Cabinet meeting and official correspondence. More on this will be discussed in the final chapter when we examine the actual form of the Balfour Declaration.
interconnected qualities of national movements across the Middle East and South Asia. These
regions in particular are chosen as the focal point because they were both important hotbeds of
nationalist agitation in the Islamic world during this era and they were both profoundly impacted
by the production of the Balfour Declaration. Although it is specifically Palestinian nationalism
that comes most directly into contact with the efforts of Christian and Jewish Political Zionists,
Palestinian nationalism was nebulous in the late nineteenth century. For this reason, we must
take a wider view of the region around Palestine, incorporating Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian
nationalist rhetoric into the narrative. The roots of what became the Palestinian national cause
after World Wars One and Two began with the calls for total Arab unity and pan-Islamism in the
Eastern end of the Mediterranean and across the sub-continent at the fin de siècle.

*Nationalism in India*

The understanding of Indian history after 1857 is nearly impossible without discussing
the Great Rebellion of that year. Although the Rebellion had less to do with religion than with
political and cultural oppression, the Mughal emperor’s endorsement of the insurgent’s cause did
little, in the long run, to improve a Muslim’s status. The emperor Bahadur Shah II (1775-1862)
may have had little choice in his approval, but the upshot was a distinct change in attitude on the
part of British officials toward Indo-Muslims. As a result of the uprising, Muslims were thought
to possess a “corporate political character, which in British eyes Muslims had not previously
possessed.”65 The irony of this shifting Muslim imagery lay in the fact that as the Indo-Islamic
population became increasingly marginalized --politically --they were forced to look elsewhere,
to incorporate, in order to regain political advantage. One of the most obvious choices for

gaining such leverage was union with other Islamic populations. Coupled with the loss of the promise of eventual Indian self-government, which the East India Trading Company represented to many Indians, the British Crown’s direct control over the country meant that all native inhabitants found themselves fighting for national legitimization against the world’s largest imperial power. Broadly speaking, this contest for Indian national character manifested in a desire to be rid of British control. Within the Indo-Muslim community, several groups turned toward pan-Islamic unity while others joined their ethnic, if not religious, brothers in calls for united Indian independence.

In the late 1800s, the first signs of pan-Islamism began to appear in the rhetoric of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, the founder of Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarh, India. Khan questioned the role of the Caliph, the traditional titular spiritual leader of Sunni Muslims, in the lives of Indian Muslims. At that time the Caliph and the Ottoman Sultan were one in the same, but even though World War One was still several years away, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and as a result the realistic power the Caliph wielded opened the door to heavy criticism and concern. Khan, a prominent member of elite Indo-Muslim circles, questioned the legitimacy of the Caliph, and asked if in fact the seat of the caliphate should be relocated to a better protected and more powerful place like India. Khan’s direct criticism of the caliph’s power reinforced a growing tendency to question traditional power structures. According to Khan, “a ruler who could not in practice protect Muslims and


67 Aligarh Muslim University was founded in 1875 as the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College, the name was changed in 1920.
enforce the mandates of the *shari’a* could not be considered *khalifa*.” Thus, as Sultan Abdul Hamid II had no effective power in British India, he could not and should not be the caliph for Indian Muslims.

From this moment until the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the legitimacy and role of the Caliph became a real point of contention. In March 1920, a delegation from the Indian Khalifat movement met with Prime Minister David Lloyd George in London. Mahomed Ali (1878 --1931), who had been in jail on and off throughout the 1910s because of his activities with the Khalifat movement, described Islam as “a moral code and a social polity. It recognises no lacerating and devitalizing distinctions between things spiritual and things temporal, between Church and State.” Still, in order to function as a viable entity and drawing on the concerns raised by Khan in earlier decades, Ali went on to note that “For the defense of the Faith, the Commander of the Faithful must always retain adequate territories, naval and military forces, and financial resources, all of which can be summed up in the expression ‘temporal power.’” The Khalifat movement’s assertions about the nature of the Islamic populace and the Caliph himself were not without controversy.

Both within the Islamic *umma* (the worldwide Islamic community) and without, in the struggle to establish legitimate claims to national definitions, some British officials recognized the inherent contradiction which would arise from a legitimised Khalifat claim and their own obligations and desires as a world power. In a circa 1919 handbook on *The Rise of Islam and the

---

68 Hardy, 178.

69 "Minutes of Proceedings at a Deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister, at 10, Downing Street, 19 March, 1920," Minutes, Cambridge. See Chapter Three for further information on Mahomed Ali.

70 Ibid.
Caliphate published by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, the British government cited alternative Islamic sources that contradicted the Khalifat movement’s claims. In Haji Muhammad Ismail Khan’s 1906 A Short Note on the Khalifa, he is cited as saying, “several Muhammadan thinkers [believe] the true Caliphate came to an end with the death of Ali, the fourth successor of the Prophet.” What is more, contrary to the beliefs of pan-Islamists like Mohamed Ali, Sayyid Ahmed Khan argued “Indian Muslims [should] allow the British to define the terms and conditions of their political life,” noting their military and technological prowess would be useful in bettering their lives. Questioning native leadership in the Islamic community set in motion questions about outside leadership, e.g., British imperialists, as well. In the years leading up to World War One, the Indo-Muslim community was increasingly divided about the nature of governmental structure and national self. Khilafatists like Mohamed Ali, his brother Shaukat, and others like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, sought to strengthen Indian Muslim advantages and redefined the issue of the British in India in terms of outside versus internal control. Unlike Sayyid Ahmed Khan, these activists did not see the British imperial enterprise in benevolent terms, but as an obstacle to the self-definition. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, in his 1884 article “The Materialists in India,” derided Sayyid Ahmed Khan’s appeasement of British wishes and flagrant denunciation of Islam as bowing to oppressors, not learning to defeat them at their own game. The turn of the century Indo-Islamic nationalists like Mohamed Ali picked up

---


72 Hardy, 179.

where al-Afghani left off, using unity against British rule as a foundation on which to build national definitions.

Tensions persisted within the Indo-Islamic community and the larger umma more broadly, over what universally defined the nature of their community. As a result, debate among scholars as to what Islam’s role was among Indian nationalists exists. On the one hand, pan-Islamism and the Khilafat movement meant to inspire Muslims across the Islamic world seeking a supra-national structure. Alternatively, scholars like Gail Minault have maintained, the intention was not a supra-national movement, but simply an Indian nationalist movement. To view the movement as supra-nationalist “assumes a monolithic Indo-Muslim response to the fate of the caliphate.” This assumption, Minault contends, is “natural if one’s resources are restricted to the statements made by the Khilafat movement’s leaders, in English, to their British rulers,” but does not hold up in the actions undertaken by Hindu, Muslim, or other nationalist agitators during the era of World War One.

Beyond the crisis of definition which plagued those in the Islamic community, who advocated some form of pan-Islamism, others organized a campaign for Indian sovereignty around the philosophical underpinnings of modern nationalism. In 1918, just as the Great War came to an end, Annie Besant, Anglo-Indian advocate for the Indian national cause, argued for Home Rule using the terms of European Enlightenment philosophy, focusing on Natural Rights and noted that:

As the Tudors established their power over an England temporarily exhausted by the Wars of the Roses, so did the Company established its power over an India temporarily

---


75 Ibid.
exhausted by the struggle between the Mahrattas and the Mughals. Such temporary exhaustion occurs in every Nation, and causes weariness and desire for repose. Yet the fierce outbreak of the Sepoy Rebellion showed that a large part of the Indian People resented the subjugation of their ancient land.\textsuperscript{76}

Just as Besant placed Indian nationalism in the context of Victorian era nationalism, so she placed this movement in a primordial context as well. She stated that English literature had given the national sentiment a framework that made communication across the Empire one language, but at the same time

‘fundamental unity of India’ is rooted in her ancient religion, which recognised Bharatavarsha as one; the thousand years of Islamic habitation have enriched Indian culture, and its result is wrought into the fibre of the Indian Nation. The Musalman is not a foreigner, but is bone of India’s bone, flesh of her flesh.\textsuperscript{77}

The Indian nation was a cultural heterodoxy, but one well versed in prevailing international policy and the definition of nation.

Indian poet, philosopher, and politician Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877 --1939) is symbolic of the ever-changing nature of Indian nationalism. Although he began as an Indian nationalist, with modern definitions of an Indian nation-state, motivated by political independence and sub-continental unity, he eventually advocated Indo-Islamic nationalism, advocating a nation united through the same spiritual worldview. Much as Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim

\textsuperscript{76} Annie Besant, \textit{A Nation’s Rights}, New India Political Pamphlets (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1918), 6. The ‘Sepoy Rebellion’ also known as the ‘The Great Rebellion’ took place in May 1857 as a reaction to the East Indian Company’s growing cultural and economic insensitivity to native Indian populations. A series of military and civilian rebellions broke out mostly across northern India and challenged British power in the region. The direct result of the rebellion was the end of the East India Company’s rule in India and the crowning of Queen Victoria Empress of India. For further connections between the Rebellion and the history of the Balfour Declaration see chapter two.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 6-7.
Brotherhood, argued in Egypt in the 1920s, Iqbal believed that Islam offered alternative models to European concepts.

Although Indian nationalism long pre-dated the 1885 creation of the Indian National Congress (I.N.C.), the I.N.C. was the first truly viable, modern Indian nationalist organ. In time, splits emerged in the I.N.C., just as other nationalist movements refocused and shifted their goals to better represent their immediate constituencies. In the late 1800s and early years of the twentieth century the I.N.C. represented the majority of the sub-continent’s populace yearning for an independent, self-regulated state.

Finally, much like Zionism, or late nineteenth century German nationalism, an imperial expression existed which found a voice among some ardent Indian nationalists. Territorial expansion and colonization found an avenue of representation in many non-Western nationalist movements as well. In particular, Gopal Gokhale (1866 --1915) and the Aga Khan III (1877 --1957) were accused of having a ‘pet scheme’ to colonize East Africa with Indian settlers, suggesting that their notions of national strength must go hand in hand with imperial endeavors. In his work *India in Transition*, the Aga Khan argued that Indians should be considered the logical heirs to settlements in German East Africa, if not in fact being chosen to lead in British East African holdings as well. East Africa, the Aga Khan explained, was the “most appropriate field for Indian colonisation and settlement” because of Indian civilization, education, and economic interests.

---


79 Aga Khan, *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution* (Bombay: Bennett, Coleman, and Co., Ltd., 1918), 128. The entirety of chapter eight is spent laying out his arguments on this matter. More on this question of Indian imperialism in Africa will be discussed
Indian nationalism varied widely among its advocates, and as a result there was no one reaction to the Balfour Declaration, and how it related to Indian aspirations. For the Khilafatists, Jerusalem was the third most holy city and the first Ka’ba in Islam. As a result, it was argued that unquestioning leadership of the region should be granted to the Caliph, as the spiritual head of the Islamic (Sunni) world and that “The Arab States, namely Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Hejaz … may be constituted as independent States free from outside control.”80 Alternatively, Mahatma Gandhi once argued that “In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous terms.”81 With regard to Palestine specifically, and the promises of the Balfour Declaration, in a 23 March 1921, Young India article, Gandhi stated that “All I contend is that they [Zionists] cannot possess Palestine through a trick or moral breach. Palestine was not a stake in the war. The British Government could not dare have asked a single Muslim soldier to wrest control of Palestine from fellow-Muslims and give it to the Jews.”82 Even in non-Islamic Indian nationalist movements, the question of who has the right to control the land on which one lives played heavily into how the Balfour Declaration was interpreted.

in the next chapter as it relates to race and gender politics in the turn of the century community. What is important for the moment, however, is the intrinsic connections which were sustained in versions of nationalism between state formation and imperialism.


Aside from the religious concern felt by some Indo-Muslims, events in the Ottoman Empire were eagerly watched by most Indian nationalists as they signaled how Europeans might act with regard to their own country. During the years between 1911 and 1915 Mohamed Ali, and his newspaper *Comrade*, focused on the conditions of Muslims in India and across the British Empire. In particular Mohamed Ali was concerned with the fighting in Anatolia and the apparent clash of civilizations between the Greek represented Christian territory and the Islamic Turkish lands. After *Comrade* fell out of print, these same issues continued to concern Indian nationalists. Following the release of the Balfour Declaration, *The Times of India* declared “of all the absurd schemes which sprang from the turbid brains of British statesmen on the termination of the war, the ‘settlement’ of Palestine was the most grotesque.”

Although the nature of Jerusalem and its role in Islamic nationalism certainly played some part in the outcry against the Declaration, it was the vague quality with which the Declaration was written that was particularly vexing to the Indian populous.

If policy for such a small piece of land could be issued and acted on, what did this mean for India’s hopes of Home Rule and self government? Likewise, from the perspective of imperialists like the Aga Khan, Jewish movement to Palestine was certainly acceptable, but handing over political control to the minority --when strong, active, and intelligent nations already existed in the region, who could easily take governmental control --was unfathomable. Indeed, this concern lay at the heart of the racialist and bigoted policy pursued by some British politicians as regards issues throughout the Middle East and South Asia (which will be discussed further in the next chapter). While advocating Indian right to rule, and becoming an imperial force, Indian nationalist groups all had to face the reality that an international hierarchy of

---

83 "With Regards to Palestine," *The Times of India*, 6 December 1921.
civilization, as determined by the European powers, existed and played an important role in the
game of national legitimization. Race, gender, and political bigotry were profound rationales for
motivating Indians in the nationalist cause, no matter what ideological underpinnings they used.
Indians, like their Arab brethren, had the right to self-rule by virtue of their national definition,
but policies like the Balfour Declaration questioned and undercut this.

Arab Nationalism

Unlike Zionism, German nationalism, or Gokhale’s Indian nationalism, imperialism was
the antithesis of early twentieth century Arab nationalism. The principle concerns for all
nationalist movements in Egypt and the Levant rested on a desire to end occupation, be it British,
French, or later Zionist. Much as was the case with European Jews and Indians, however, no one
universal Arab nationalism emerged at the close of World War One. In part Arab nationalism
claims a heritage in the literature of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837 --1897), his disciple
Muhammad Abduh (1849 --1905), Abduh’s disciple Rashid Rida (1865 --1935) and Huda
Shaarawi (1879 --1947). These Islamic intellectuals each, in his or her own way, advocated new,
modern structures of Arab identity. Similarly, Arab nationalism was informed by the minority
groups of Christians living throughout Greater Syria who had their own internal loyalties and
external complaints.\(^{84}\) The narrative woven by all concerned with Arab nationalism at the turn of
the twentieth century is a depiction of nascent nationalism across the eastern end of the
Mediterranean.

\(^{84}\) I use the term Greater Syria here as a catch all for what have since become
Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. This geographical designation was a common one at the
end of the nineteenth century although a split in European thinking about whether Palestine was
in fact part of this region or was beginning to make head way.
At the very heart of al-Afghani and Abduh’s works was the desire to prove that it was not necessary to be a devout Muslim and simultaneously throw off modernity. The reconciliation between religious obedience and independent human reasoning was not so wholly different from the logical conclusions drawn by eighteenth century political theorists and philosophers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Paine. Indeed, al-Afghani used this argument to counter the xenophobic work of Renan and the attempts of Sayyid Ahmed Khan to disassociate religion from national definition. Nation was not a rigid set of structures that could be, or more importantly should be, transplanted across the globe, but the umbrella title of nation comprises a loosely linked confederation of concepts. Al-Afghani advocated a political revolution to bring modernism in line with Islam, creating a hybrid of European nationalism and traditional regional structures. His anti-Imperial (particularly anti-British) rhetoric not only led him to chastise those he believed were kowtowing, as he insisted Khan was, but it also influenced the rise of resistance movements particularly in Egypt and the Levant in the coming decades. Connections to al-Afghani’s philosophy can be drawn between events like the failed Urabi Revolt (1879 --1882) and Sa’d Zaghul’s 1919 attempts to speak on behalf of the Egyptian people before the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference.

The nationalism advocated by Egyptian activists was substantially different from that of Khilafatist Indians. Egyptian nationalists, even those who still sought to incorporate Islam into a modern state structure, did not, in the early years of the twentieth century, advocate a united umma. If Egyptian rhetoric was at all supra-regional it was pan-Arab, but even this is a stretch in the context of the late nineteenth century. The supra-regional nature of Egyptian ideals appears most notably in the framework it offered, which could be applied to other Arab nationalist
movements in their own quests for independent states. Rarely did Egyptians, until after World War Two, advocate pan-Arab unity in the form of one regional state.

Outside of Egypt, Arab, or pan-Arab, nationalism found a voice among Greater Syria’s elites. The history of Greater Syria’s nationalist enterprise is even more contentious than Egypt’s or India’s. Initially based around the Ottoman imperial framework, the millet system, the earliest Levantine national manifestations focused on the unity which the millet offered. An Ottoman millet was a confessional division of populations (non-Islamic). Largely allowed to retain their own customs, laws, rites, language, and cultural hierarchy, the millet fostered a communal sense of unity among groups like the Maronite Catholics or Greek Orthodox. Conventional wisdom asserts that from the 1870s through the outbreak of World War One Lebanese Christians (largely Maronites) turned to concepts of wide-spread Arab unity in their calls for national organization. This typical view of early Arab nationalism also asserts that these calls for organization were based on the already strong sense of communal cohesion brought on by millet structures. While it is generally accepted that nationalism did become more apparent in the region during this time the crux of the debate hinges on the question: ‘who brought nationalism to the Arabs?’ For decades it was widely asserted, and accepted, that nationalism came to these communities via Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and the subsequent European/American colonial educational structures established throughout the region. Given that the European/American educational pursuits were also themselves largely organized along confessional lines, this argument only helps to bolster the contention that it was the millet that founded the modern Arab national movement.

More recently, scholars have begun to emphasize that while in part this is true, it is not the whole story. C. Ernest Dawn remarks that “Among pre-1914 Syrian Arab nationalists,
persons educated in Ottoman state schools (63 percent) were far more numerous than persons educated in either traditional or Western schools (20 percent and 17 percent, respectively).\textsuperscript{85} What is more, Christian nationalists do not necessarily outnumber non-Christians; although given the respective ratios of Christians to Muslims, they did play a disproportionate role.

Laura Robson argues that in the Orthodox Christian communities of Palestine identity was structured by the history of Ottoman institutions, Christian religious and historical considerations, ethnic and cultural coherence, Western concepts of political rights and representation, and anti-Imperial sentiment.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally, Noah Haiduc-Dale asserts that the early mandatory administration of Palestine (early 1920s) was far more concerned with “dealing with issues relating to the Greek and Latin churches than with the nearly 90% Muslim majority.”\textsuperscript{87} The archival evidence both Robson and Haiduc-Dale rely on suggest the importance of Christians in the formation of Arab national identity, but also skew the historiographic record. A great deal of the emphasis placed on Christian concerns is the outgrowth of British imperial politics. Internal Palestinian matters were heavily focused on Christian constituencies not only because the Christian component of Palestine’s population was important to Palestine’s future,

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{86} Laura Robson, "Demanding a Voice: Christian Palestinians in the Greek Orthodox Church and the British Mandate " in \textit{Middle East Studies Association 2007 Annual Meeting} (Montreal, Canada: 2007), 1. Also see: Laura Robson, “From Communalism to Sectarianism: Arab Christian Political Identity in British Mandate Palestine, 1917-1948” (Yale, Forthcoming 2009).
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
but also because the British had to balance their activities in Palestine with the demand and concerns of the larger Christian world. As a result early twentieth century Levantine national sentiment appears to be almost entirely dominated by Christian Palestinians. Some of the most significant players in early Palestinian nationalism, i.e., Khalil Sakakini, Isa Bandak, Yacoub Farraj, Najib Nasser, Isa al-Isa, and perhaps most notably, George Antonius, all came from the active Greek Orthodox community in Palestine. What is more, the influence of the Christian community in shaping the course of Arab nationalism was aided by the fact that of the twenty five newspapers in Palestine in 1908, nineteen were Christian owned.

One of the historiographic problems facing researchers of Arab-Israeli history is, as Rashid Khalidi observes, the question of “When did a significant proportion of Arab inhabitants of Palestine begin to think of themselves as Palestinians?” We know that Arabs who spent time in Paris and London, like the Egyptian reformer Rifa’ah Rafi’ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873),

88 The 1922 Palestine census, which included the population of Trans-Jordan, found that Christians made up only 9.6% of the total population. "Report on Palestine Administration, 31 December, 1922," United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. Of that population, Robson asserts, the Greek Orthodox reached 45.7%, the largest sub-category. Robson, "Demanding a Voice: Christian Palestinians in the Greek Orthodox Church and the British Mandate ", 2.

89 Haiduc-Dale, "The Influence of Foreign Clergy on Palestinian Christian Political Participation During the British Mandate," 4. Khalil Sakakini (1878–1953), author and founder of the Dusturiyyah school; Isa Bandak and Isa al-Isa (1878–1950) were both journalists, al-Isa a co-founder of Filastin; Yacoub Farraj was Vice President of the Arab Executive (during the Mandate period); Najib Nasser was the publisher of al-Karmel; George Antonius (1891–1941), politician and author of The Arab Awakening — George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1946).

90 Robson, "Demanding a Voice: Christian Palestinians in the Greek Orthodox Church and the British Mandate ", 9.

manipulated the European national concepts, like the French *patrie* (homeland), in addition to Arabic terms like *watan* (similarly, nation or homeland), to create indigenous Arabic concepts of patriotism and national rhetoric.\(^92\) Glenn Robinson observes that in Syria ‘notable politics,’ elites running the local political scene, gave way to contentions centered on emerging concepts of more localized forms of nationalism, and that in Palestine specifically this nationalism was heavily focused on anti-Ottomanism, anti-Zionism, and by the 1930s anti-British, sentiment.\(^93\)

Mark Tessler adds that as early as 1904 groups like Palestinian born Nagib Azoury’s *La Ligue de la Patrie Arabe* had begun to advocate for pan-Arabism. In time, particularly in the Post-World War eras, calls for universal Arab unity waned, and Palestinians, faced with British occupation and Zionist desires, drew on the prior scholarship of Arab nationalism to find a single voice as *Palestinians*. Khalidi’s assertion that the formative years of Palestinian national identity coincided with the end of World War One and the establishment of the Mandate System is backed up by the on-the-ground realities as observed by the Arab Bureau’s Kinahan Cornwallis in 1918. According to his April dispatch to Edwin Montagu, “the Palestinians tend more and more to divorce themselves from the rest of Syria”\(^94\) a clear indication that they were, for political or cultural reasons, beginning to define themselves separately from their Greater Syrian brethren. As will be discussed further in chapter six, in part this was due the fact that Arab leaders with international power, like Prince Feisal (1883 --1933), were less concerned about specific Palestinian issues and more about creating a pan-Arab state. Still, the necessary unity to

\(^{92}\) Dawn, 4.


\(^{94}\) Kinahan Cornwallis, "Major Kinahan Cornwallis to Edwin Montagu, 10 April, 1918," Correspondence, India Office Records, London.
make a strong national stand was long in coming, and it only really formed after World War Two. Even then, Palestinian nationalism remained mired in the pulls and demands of social, economic, religious, and political differentiations.

Much like their Indian counterparts, but perhaps more keenly aware of the physical results, Arab nationalists were incensed by the creation of the Balfour Declaration. For Arabs living in Palestine, the Declaration created a tangible set of questions about their own nature as a people. In the wording of the Declaration they are only referred to as “non-Jewish communities,” negating their claim to definition by location or geographic heritage and questioning the legitimacy of leadership in the region by anyone not Jewish. Although the phrase “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” was purposefully added to the final draft of the Balfour Declaration to safeguard the rights of Palestinian Christians and Muslims, the phrase was intentionally vague. Not only were Palestine’s Christian and Muslim inhabitants denied definition as ‘Palestinians,’ the region’s native Jewish anti-Zionist inhabitants were unwillingly grouped with their religious, if not cultural, brethren.

Conclusion

Over the course of the nineteenth century, nationalism played an important role in how individuals, groups, and whole regions defined themselves in terms of who was part of the ingroup and who was not. Even within communities that first appear homogenous, like the European Jewish community, there was an internal fracturing which forced deeper consideration

---

about what is a nation. On the eve of the World War One our four case study groups, Jewish Europeans, English Christians, Egyptian and Indian Muslims, and Levantine Arabs, were brought to the brink of a political and material crisis as to the meaning of physical and ideological spaces. Christian Zionists clashed with Jewish anti-Zionists and non-Zionists. Indian pan-Islamists and Arab nationalist questioned the role of British imperial policy in the government of the lands they saw as their own, or lands which were traditionally in their sphere of influence. This conflict over the definition of nation accentuated the nature of the conflict that was sparked by the desires of Christian and Jewish Political Zionists to colonize and govern Palestine. The physical land became the testing ground for the power of national rhetoric and the legitimization of international policy structures.
CHAPTER THREE

THE QUESTION OF RACE AND THE ‘RIGHT TO RULE’

In 1920, two and a half years after the Balfour Declaration had been issued, Alfred Mond, Great Britain’s Minister of Health, asserted that

To place a highly civilized world people like the Jews under the sovereignty of the quasi-barbarian and backward Arabs is unthinkable! Nor from a British standpoint, as a question of policy, could such an enhancement of the insatiable lust of domination of Mahomedan Arabs be anything but disastrous.¹

The classification of ‘the Jews’ as civilized and ‘the Arabs’ as backward, quasi-barbarians was not simply a sweeping statement about two tremendously complex groups of people, but was itself a product of the nineteenth century imperial endeavor. Despite Ernest Renan’s advocacy of shifting communal definition away from primordial identifiers --ethnic features, racial purity, and communal homogeneity --such features remained important sources of knowledge and legitimization within the British imperial framework well into the twentieth century. Largely informed by the nineteenth century philosophy of degeneration and the ideals of muscular Christianity, British imperial policy was shaped by ideologies about both race and gender.

Mond’s statement reflects this relationship between empire and race, but also situates the British government in the position of arbitrator of claims to national legitimacy. Neither the Jews nor the Arabs, in Mond’s construction, had the agency to define themselves or to decide their own future. Mond’s assertion also highlights the ways that ideas about racial hierarchy and imperial hegemony were legitimized by representatives of imperial powers, who imposed racial

¹ Alfred Mond, ”Alfred Mond to David Lloyd George, 8 April, 1920,” David Lloyd George Papers, London.
(and gendered) constructs onto non-European and non-Christian communities. Just as the idea of a modern nation had been born in the political turmoil of late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, race was a category constructed in the scientific wake of nineteenth century Victorian Europe. Eventually race and gender were employed by non-European and non-Christian groups as cultural constructs of their own, but in the latter years of the 1800s they were largely ascribed to, not by, these communities.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the images employed by imperial powers to maintain the right to rule were increasingly co-opted by the subject groups. In the process of asserting a community’s own definition of self, as in the nationalist movements discussed in the first chapter, racial and gendered markers originally imposed on communities from the outside were either incorporated into the community’s self-definition or were used as a cultural foil.

This chapter examines how definitions of race and gender, first imposed and later self-ascribed, informed British imperial policy, legitimizing the issuance of documents like the Balfour Declaration and reinforcing the process of imperial patronage throughout the Empire. The chapter will first examine the ideals of muscular Christianity and how this ideal, in conjunction with Anglicization, informed late nineteenth and early twentieth century British imperial assumptions. Next, three examples will be used to address the relationship between race, gender, empire, and nation in asserting the argument that the Balfour Declaration was just as informed by racial ideals as it was by definitions of nationhood.

The first example addressed in this chapter will look at the argument put forward by early twentieth century British politicians that the Empire had, by World War One, become the largest Muslim Empire in the world. Given this, the relationship between Christianity and Islam becomes central to the history of the Balfour Declaration. The great majority of Palestine’s
population was Muslim in 1917, but the dichotomy established centuries before World War One of a morally superior Christian West and a degenerate Islamic East underscored a general sense of acceptability in pursuing the ‘best policy for Britain/Christendom’ in Palestine, rather than a best policy for Palestine. Moreover, the imagery employed by British imperialists, Arabists, and Zionists in discussing Palestinian Arabs was predisposed to a racialized view of Islam, which only underscored nuance lacking in racial politics. Palestinian Arabs included Muslims as well as Christians (and even Jews), but this distinction was only occasionally untangled. Painting all of Palestine’s inhabitants with one brush made the process of imperial domination easier, and in the eyes of imperial leaders, more justifiable.

A second example will explore the ways Indian racial politics during the Great Rebellion, Ilbert Bill crisis, and in British colonial Africa highlighted how imperial racism manifested on an institutional level. Just as Palestine acted as a litmus test for national legitimatization, the racial politics of India indicated the power of race-centered politics for informing imperial policy.

Finally, in returning to the militarization and masculinization efforts of muscular Christianity and Anglicization, the remasculization of Judaism in the late nineteenth century via a similar ideal of muscular Judaism and the subsequent creation of the Jewish legion, offers an avenue for explaining how racial politics could be co-opted and used in the reassertion of self-ascribed identities.

**Muscular Christianity and the Imperial Process**

By the end of the nineteenth century a scramble was underway among European powers to assert cultural superiority, solidify control of imperial possessions, and sustain the precarious balance of power in Europe. At the same time altered paradigms, shifting political ambitions, and
military setbacks overseas indicated a need to tighten cultural mores in metropolitan centers. In Great Britain, this tightening of ‘cultural sensibilities’ --cultural standards regarding morality and mores accepted by a society, although not defined by any one person --resulted in the development of Victorian era notions of manliness, militarism, and patriotism culminating in the ideals of muscular Christianity and Anglicization. According to Donald E. Hall, the “central, even defining, characteristic of muscular Christianity [is]: an association between physical strength, religious certainty, and the ability to shape and control the world around oneself.”

As a result of the process of reasserting physical and moral strength at home, Britons restructured imperial hierarchies and obligations abroad.

In the late nineteenth century upper-class Britons increasingly feared that their own ‘race’ was physically threatened by a decline in “the dynamic ‘racial energy’ that had carried the nation to pre-eminence.” The Anglo-Boer War of 1899 --1902 tested the boundaries of the British military, and by extension moral, power. Eugenicist Arnold White “was among the first to draw attention to the connection between physical deterioration and military failure in South Africa.”

The fear of physical degeneration was closely associated with a growing sense of decadence among the well-to-do and the decline of the moral stability of society. Such a decline, it was argued, could open the door for a British loss of hegemony, which was maintained via moral and physical superiority. This sentiment was expressed as late as 1921 when the question of racial

---


4 Ibid.
equality was broached on an international level. A confidential Foreign Office memorandum asserted that “Japan is the only non-white first-class Power … If she can enforce her claim she will become our superior; if she cannot enforce it she remains our inferior; but equal she can never be.”\(^5\) The perceived intrinsic connection between power and morality underscored the notion of Victorian sensibility and the God-given right to rule the British Empire enjoyed, but if the connection between power and moral superiority was severed or loosened, other powers could easily usurp Britain’s hegemonic position. As a result, social scientists grappled with ways of resurrecting British power by focusing largely on the physical nature of its people.

The policies of ‘Anglicization’ and the prevention of societal degeneration were much the same. In Victorian England, the Public Schools played a crucial role in developing the Empire’s leaders. These schools pursued a policy which focused on anti-intellectualism and games-dominated imperial ambition.\(^6\) The late Victorian era produced in Britain’s Public Schools the precarious fusion of Christian gentility and social Darwinism. Three sets of values became enmeshed: imperial Darwinism --the God-granted right of the white man to rule, civilise and baptise the inferior coloured races; institutional Darwinism --the cultivation of physical and psychological stamina at school in preparation for the rigours of imperial duty; the gentleman’s education --the nurture of leadership qualities for military conquest abroad and political dominance at home.\(^7\)


Not only did this refocusing of the standards of Britain’s elite alter the ways in which the right to rule was understood, but this process eventually filtered down to the lower classes as well. Social mobility was linked to a submission to the ideals of Anglicization. Accepting the regulations and structures laid out, first for the upper classes, but then co-opted by the lower classes, not only created a unity of nation in the definition of cultural self, but projected a unified image witnessed globally as well.

In conjunction with this shift in what constituted a gentleman and a leader, a second important change began to appear in what comprised racial identity among the European imperial powers. As Pamela Pattynama notes in her discussion of colonialism in the Dutch East Indies,

The colonial politics of modernity … coincided with an emerging fear of miscegenation in Europe. Invented as a term in the late nineteenth-century vocabulary of sexuality, miscegenation became associated with a set of discourses about degeneracy and eugenics. The object of European fear was less inter-racial sexuality per se than it was the decline of the white population that would be its inevitable result.  

Racial constructs took on the added element of miscegenation and environmental degeneration as Europeans increasingly feared physical and psychological decline “if they remained in the colonies for too long” or if “long-term exposure to native culture and its vile racial influences” resulted in individuals ‘going Native.’ As a result, the contradictory desires to ‘know the natives’ and not to be influenced by them only intensified stratification between the races. Flora Annie Steel, a late nineteenth century novelist and the wife of a member of the Indian Civil Service,

---


9 Ibid.
believed --like many other writers --that it was her duty to “explore what she perceived to be the dark and dangerous mind of India so that she could bring back intelligence of the bizarre and corrupt, the unintelligible and unthinkable.”\textsuperscript{10} Benita Parry observes that in order to do this Steel had to walk a fine line, “for when English delve into India, they meet with proclivities and customs so primeval that their personal equanimity will be disturbed and their confidence as masters shaken.”\textsuperscript{11} Knowledge gathering was not without its pitfalls.

Additionally, the physical nature of racial salvation in Victorian ‘sensibilities’ sought to emphasize what Max Weber termed the ‘Protestant Work Ethic.’ The process of Anglicization as outward signs of Christian devotion and the prevention of social degeneration were coupled with muscular Christianity to reinforce the need for physical morality as well. A Christian, in a constant relationship with God, fellow man, and him/herself, had an obligation not only to his/her spiritual and mental health, but physical health by way of regulating the animal within.\textsuperscript{12} As E. Knowlton notes in his 1869 article on the question of Muscular Christianity, “Constant devotion to spirit can never atone for continual neglect of the body; and lying lips are not more truly ‘an abomination to the Lord,’ than crooked spines, dyspeptic stomachs, and consumptive lungs.”\textsuperscript{13} Knowlton’s inclusion of these particular ailments symbolically discusses specific groups of people, some of which are central to our discussion.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} E. Knowlton, "Muscular Christianity," \textit{The Overland Monthly} II (1869): 530.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.: 533.
Knowlton’s ‘consumptive lungs’ (Tuberculosis) were representative of a whole variety of social phenomena, the two leading diagnoses of which were: Opium addiction and poorly ventilated living conditions. Both problems were closely linked with the lower classes. Alternatively, dyspeptic stomachs were frequently regarded as women’s issues. Women, thanks largely to the use of corsets under their clothing, commonly fell prey to internal ailments in their abdomens. Finally, the crooked spine, as with the other two ailments, carried several allusions, but in a discussion of race the connection that it drew to the supposed ‘Ghetto bend’ is particularly important. Louis Wirth’s 1928 work *The Ghetto*, states that the ghetto bend was created by an emaciated physique with flabby muscles and the inability to hold one’s spinal column erect. Although, as Wirth notes, ghetto bend was not an inheritable trait, it was a distinctive feature of Jewish communities, particularly those of immigrant populations or lower socio-economic status. The discernible and hidden (i.e., mental) traits about various strata of society helped in further justifying a subject race’s relationship to the paternalistic overseer. However, once ascribed these certain traits, based on ‘observable data,’ subject peoples could manipulate the perceptions they created and turn the traits into self-ascribed characteristics as well. Ultimately, the negative qualities which typically came along with these discernible traits were themselves manipulated and ascribed to sub-strata, creating additional hierarchies and complexity.

---


The Mohammedan Question

In the late nineteenth century, British imperial policy rarely distinguished race from religion, particularly outside Christian Europe. As a result, religious communities were ascribed the same physical traits, abilities, and morals by virtue of their common spiritual convictions.\textsuperscript{16} The Muslim world, which was generally looked upon unfavourably by Christian Europe in large part due to Crusader history, was seen as a unified whole. Encompassing features of backwardness, laziness, deterioration, despotic tyranny, and lustful insatiability, the Islamic world was conceived of as a place which could not be fully trusted and as a community in need of European leadership, patronage, and moral guidance.

During the years between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries, the tone and tenor with which the Islamic world was viewed by Christian Europe shifted. Initially cast as barbarians, infidels, and apostates --cultural bogeymen for Europeans --later images of Muslims emphasised erotic and exotic qualities alongside governments in decay. The literature, art, drama, and travel narratives depicting the Islamic world during these six hundred years informed Europe’s knowledge of and about the Eastern world, helping to distinguish what traits the Western world did not possess by extension.

One of the strongest features leaders of the Christian West emphasized in its relationship with non-Christian and non-Western cultures was the notion of ‘degeneracy.’ Degeneration “characterize[d] those whose nerves had been shattered by poisons like alcohol and opium, through inherited bodily malfunctions, but also by their social milieu and moral debility.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Even differences among sects were only rarely noted.

\textsuperscript{17} George L. Mosse, "Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew," \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 27, no. 4 (1992): 566. The term degeneration was first used in 1857.
People living in cultural peripheries, i.e., Ghettos or locations where itinerant populations congregated (i.e., wharfs), were seen as racially degenerate by virtue of the location and the moral reputation of their surroundings. Perception was a crucial part of the construction of racial degeneracy. If a community was *perceived* as being morally lax, this was enough observational material to justify classifying it as such. Culturally peripheral spaces, however, were not the only locations that incubated degenerate communities. The natural environment could lead to the degeneration of a person or community as well. While European climates were understood to aid in the development of creativity, hard work, and sanity, the regions closer to the equator were associated with opposite features.\(^{18}\) By this logic, societies living in tropical climates suffered from laziness and despotic systems of government.

Although more typically Jews, vagrants, criminals, the insane, or the permanently sick\(^ {19}\) were viewed as degenerate, Muslims were often portrayed this way as well. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, however, Muslims did not have the advantage of proximity to aid their status in juxtaposition to European Christians. Whereas Jews lived among European Christians, sometimes as equals in citizenship, Muslims were primarily foreigners, and lacked the familiarity of constant contact. As a result, while parallel in their status as second-class members of society, Jewish and Muslim communities were described as possessing distinctly different traits. Whereas the image of the Jew, as will be discussed later, was one developed in terms of servility and


\(^{19}\) Mosse: 566-7.
demonic femininity, they were still a part of European society. Muslims, on the other hand, retained characteristics that shifted and represented oppositional features to a smoothly functioning ideal European society. As a result, the Islamic world was deemed more dangerous in the construction of racial hierarchies. Additionally, environmental degeneration—the idea that peoples “could be rendered racially unfit” even if they were members of the ‘superior races’—only further supported this distance between the Muslim Middle East and Judeo-Christian Europe. 20

Islam’s Place in European Imagination

The earliest knowledge about the Islamic world spread throughout Medieval Europe via literature and drama. The Prophet Muhammad was frequently referred to as the anti-Christ, as in the ninth century Life of Mahomet. Here it was claimed that Muhammad had died in 666 AD, underscoring Islam’s supposed devilish qualities. 21 In the early fourteenth century, Dante wrote that Muhammad, and Shi’ism’s foundational leader Ali, were sent to the eighth circle of Hell, “where the Sowers of Scandal and Schism, perpetually circling, are wounded and --after each healing --wounded again by a demon with a sword.” 22 Allen Mandelbaum tells us that in Dante’s time Muhammad “was believed by some to be an apostate Christian. Whether or not Dante held this belief, he certainly thought of Mohammad as a ‘sower of dissention’.” 23 Similarly, Ali’s


23 Ibid., 384.
condemnation rested on the fact that the Shi'at Ali (The Party of Ali) was schismatic; he and his followers led to further disunity within the religion. Dante’s view of Islam is perhaps unsurprising in terms of his era. The 1300s were not long after the end of the Crusades, and Constantinople remained a precarious Christian outpost amid newly acquired Muslim lands. Islam represented a barbarian world of apostate hordes, the antithesis of righteous Christianity. That Islam professed a belief in the same God as the Judeo-Christian world, and followed the same prophets went unnoticed for centuries, further distancing the Islamic East from the Judeo-Christian West. As a result, by the middle of the fourteenth century Europe’s view of Islam was a complex blend of anxious coexistence and conflict, only further complicated by Europe’s own religious fractures.

In 1567-8, when Nicolas de Nicolay published *Les quatre premiers livres des navigations et pérégrinations orientales*, “certain *topoi* or clichés about the Ottoman Empire had entered the mainstream of western travel writing” which included the knowledge that “an open purse was the key to success in the Ottoman Empire.”24 A stronger relationship developed between the Ottoman Empire and France from the mid-1500s until the early years of the nineteenth century, not only explaining France’s political allegiances with Turkey (as in the case of the Crimean War 1853 --1856), but also the cultural history of Orientalist artwork and literature that became so prominent in France between Napoleon’s invasion and the turn of the twentieth century.

Similarly, England, and later all of Great Britain, developed its own tenuous relationship with the Ottoman Empire. England sent its share of forces to the Levant during the Crusades, but in 1581 it established economic ties with the Ottoman Empire through the auspices of the Levant

Company. Culturally, Islam continued to remain more obscure in the English imagination, but British literary interpretations of Muslims, according to Daniel J. Vitkus, were “not simply fantasies about fictional demons lurking at the edges of the civilized world.” Instead, English literature expressed “an anxious interest in Islamic power that is both complicated and overdetermined.” In Great Britain, Islam represented an image of Empire gone awry. The Islamic world provided a ‘morality’ tale for the British nation, poised, by the end of the eighteenth century, to colonize and control much of the globe.

The Renaissance, so often thought of as a truly European moment, owed a great deal to the Islamic world. Nancy Bisaha notes that Renaissance Humanists used secular examinations of Muslims to help them “shape new constructs of the ‘Western Self’” and by the early fifteenth century the image of Muslims incorporated new characteristics which would eventually support environmental degeneration philosophy:

The superiority of Europeans to Muslims is asserted in a verse contrasting the Germanic warrior spirit (literally *tedesco furor*) of the people who live in a land “that always lies in ice and frozen in the snows, all distant from the path of the sun” to the softness of Muslim peoples: “Turks, Arabs, and Chaldeans … a naked, cowardly, and lazy people who never grasp the steel but entrust all their blows to the wind.”

The Humanist influence on the Western world was a mixed legacy, promoting openness and greater understanding while at the same time a hostile interpretation of the Islamic identity flourished. This interpretation helped to “nurture incipient ideas of Western superiority to


26 Ibid.


28 Ibid., 51.
Eastern rivals.” By the sixteenth century and the era of the French Enlightenment, during which time negative qualities attributed to Muslims had become entrenched, there was the growing realization in Europe that the Ottoman Empire had a lot to offer, particularly in terms of trade. As a result, a more complex image of the Muslim world began to emerge.

Modern European ideas about Muslims were shaped by a variety of factors. In 1707 *The Thousand and One Nights* was translated into English and first published in Britain. The work provided “a provocative and imaginative vision of the East … that helped galvanize the image of the lascivious harem woman in the minds of European readers.” The image of an overly sexed Middle East persisted, even becoming an enduring image of Islam more generally. This perspective asserted that women ‘obeyed’ men’s sexual demands and desires and were themselves objects of community watchfulness as well as the external gaze. Such shifting Islamic stereotypes are also telling of a gendered shift in European imperial legitimization. The role of women as makers of cultural identity became a central theme in imperial policy constructions. What is more, men-- by virtue of their cultural relationship to women-- came under imperial reassessment. In post-colonial literature the ‘imperial gaze,’ developed over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, grew out of a desire to visually dominate, and at the same time be distant from a culture which the imperialist (or empire) was observing or seeking to control. This form of observation, necessary for the purposes of knowledge gathering, created a dynamic of visual power that “occurs time and again in Orientalist discourse, the

---

29 Ibid., 174.

30 Filiz Turhan, *The Other Empire: British Romantic Writings About the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 54.

31 Ibid.
The invulnerable position of the observer affirms the political order and the binary structure of power that made that position possible.\textsuperscript{32} In Islamic society perception and protection of a woman’s honor and virginity is intimately tied to communal morality. Thus, a community’s internal watchfulness -- visualizing the proper Islamic woman -- is central to a community’s identity formation. Women, who are considered central to the development of identity, become the focal point of internal and external knowledge production.

Although Orientalist images focused primarily on the sexual appetite of women, men remained parties to the imagery, if for no other reason than because they were too ‘weak’ not to give into the wonton lustfulness of the women. As “Western writers believed that the effect of the hot climate on an individual’s physiological development led to, in Arabs, an over-active imagination, an over-passionate nature, and a susceptibility to sexual arousal,”\textsuperscript{33} the distinction between the effects of a temperate climate (as in Great Britain) on controlling culture and the overly heated Mediterranean world continued to be reinforced. As will be discussed below, a similar dynamic appeared in other non-European and non-Christian communities as well. The place of women became an avenue through which the ‘morally superior’ imperial power could assert its right to rule either by protecting the women of the ‘morally inferior’ cultures or by virtue of a more dominant masculine ethos which was more suitable for leadership than the native population’s own males.

As a result, throughout the Islamic world both men and women were regarded as equally demonic and problematic. Sexuality became the defining feature of nineteenth century

\textsuperscript{32} Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., \textit{Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies} (London: Routledge, 2005), 187.

\textsuperscript{33} Hammerbeck: 11.
scholarship and artwork dealing with the Ottoman Empire. In British policy Muslims were noted for their ‘immoral’ conduct. On 7 August 1916, R. W. Graves of the Cairo Office commented on an attempt at wartime propaganda written by none other than Flora Annie Steel, “Germany as a Friend to Islam.” According to Graves, Steel was too kind in her view of “the pure Standard of Islam” as

the horror of the Moslem for the defilement of contagious disease seem almost ironical to any one acquainted with the conditions which prevail in Constantinople, Cairo, and the great cities of Syria and Irak, not to mention Mecca, which is notorious among Moslems as a sink of immorality.  

It is unlikely that any Muslim in the 1910s would have referred to Mecca as a sink of immorality, but Graves’ candid view of the Islamic moral code reveals how Muslims were imagined by many Britons.

Graves’ notions were built in part on the ‘knowledge’ gleaned from hundreds of years of Orientalist artwork, literature, and historiography. Not long before Napoleon invaded Egypt, European elites had begun to view the Middle East as an ideal location for imperial expansion. In his 1790 essay, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke made a comparison between the French monarchy and those of the Islamic world, specifically Persia and Turkey.

To hear some men speak of the late monarchy of France, you would imagine that they were talking of Persia bleeding under the ferocious sword of Tahmas Kouli Khan, or at least describing the barbarous anarchic despotism of Turkey, where the finest countries in the most genial climates in the world are wasted by peace more than any countries have been worried by war, where arts are unknown, where manufactures languish, where

---

34 R. W. Graves, "Note on 'Germany as a Friend to Islam', 1916," Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections: India Office Records, London. The documents referring to “Germany as a Friend to Islam” describe Steel as ‘an old lady’ who wanted to do her bit by writing propaganda for the British via the Times of India.
science is extinguished, where agriculture decays, where the human race itself melts away and perishes under the eye of the observer.\textsuperscript{35}

According to this view the Ottoman Empire --because of its barbarous despotic leadership --was doomed to languish and decay. According to this view there was a valuable lesson to be learned by empires contemplating global dominance, like Great Britain. An empire, by Burke’s calculation, needed manufactures, scientific advancements, agricultural advancements, and an artistic heritage in order to succeed. Although the Ottoman Empire had once had all of these components of imperial grandeur, by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they were either non-existent or in decline. The Ottoman structure had been both ideal and problematic for allowing ideas to move about. When leaders were educated and moved freely throughout Ottoman territories (as was the case up until the 1600s) there was an entrenched understanding of what was needed to maintain the power and prestige of the Empire. From the 1600s until World War One, the government fell into decay by caging its leadership in the Topkapi Palace.

According to Burke’s assessment of what essential elements of Empire were, the second phase of Ottoman history never saw the encouragement of modernization. Only by the end of the nineteenth century did an inkling of such changes begin to appear when it became clear that Europe had ‘suddenly’ surpassed the Ottoman’s in trading skill and military might.

Perhaps unwittingly, Burke asserted two of the most important lessons for the establishment of a successful Empire: great empires are not only won but also maintained, and a successful Empire must modernize while working closely with its peripheral regions. While few Europeans doubted Ottoman military prowess in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, by the start of the nineteenth century its power was waning. From the point of view of Europe, the

\textsuperscript{35} Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France"
Ottomans consciously chose to avoid modernization, forcing the culture and government to stagnate.

Orientalist literature pre-dates Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, but the field of Orientalism found its most vivid expression in the era following Napoleon’s retreat. As it happens, this period was also marked by the rise of Romanticism and Nationalism and, as a result, was “a watershed in colonial history, witnessing a move from a protectionist colonial system, based upon mercantilist economic principles to a free-trade empire with a political and moral agenda, proverbially described, after Kipling’s poem, as ‘the white man’s burden’.”36 The quickening pace of European imperialism sparked increased interest in the categorization of peoples into nations, races, and genders so as to formalize power dynamics.

Between 1876 and 1888 numerous events reinforced growing distinctions between the Islamic and Christian European frontiers. In particular, these events focused European interests on destabilizing Islamic leaders and gaining colonial footholds in Islamic lands. An uprising of Christian peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875, Serbia’s active involvement in destabilizing Ottoman control throughout the Balkans, and the outbreak of a second revolt in Bulgaria in 1876 continually pitted European Christians against Ottoman Muslims. These events led directly to Russia declaring war on Turkey and instigating the Russo-Turkish War (1877 -- 1878). By 1879, the Egyptian Khedive Ismail, who was a nominal vassal of the Ottoman Empire, was deposed by the Ottoman Sultan at the behest of Britain and France. Ismail’s fall from power was due largely to the growing debt his state owed European bankers and the British and French governments desire to protect their investors’ interests. In that same year, the Second Anglo-

Afghan War was ended with the Treaty of Gandamak. This prevented further British incursion into Afghanistan, although by then it was a foregone conclusion that Britain was the most significant power in the region. In 1881 France invaded Tunisia. In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt. Perhaps most importantly for British identity formation vis à vis the Islamic world, in 1885 General Charles George Gordon was killed in Khartoum.

The story of General Gordon is particularly important, not because of what he did, but because of what he became upon his death. John M. Mackenzie, in his 1992 work *Popular Imperialism and the Military*, asserts that Gordon, alongside Henry Havelock, David Livingstone, and T. E. Lawrence were perceived as popular ‘heroes of empire.’ These men “journeyed into other cultures, expanding the moral order through [the] defeat of ‘barbarism,’ the extension of Christendom, free trade and the rule of Western law.”37 These heroes, Mackenzie explains, “developed instrumental power because they served to explain and justify the rise of the imperial State, personified national greatness and offered examples of self-sacrificing service to a current generation.”38 Despite Britain being one of the most civilian driven empires in Europe, these heroes were primarily, and necessarily, militaristic.

The events of the last third of the nineteenth century, combined with the sense of superiority exhibited by the British imperial system --enhanced by gendered and racial considerations --shaped British perceptions of Britons and others well into the twentieth century. Claude Conder, of the Palestine Exploration Fund, wrote in the 1880s that the British nation “seems to abound in men specially fitted to govern Orientals by their tolerance, patience, good-

---


38 Ibid., 114.
humor, honesty, justice and firmness of character.” Conder goes on to note that “The Frenchman is often hated, and the German despised, where the Englishman succeeds in winning confidence and esteem and in imposing his will on all the Orientals he meets.” It was specifically a Briton, not just any European, who retained these requisite qualities.

The moral and sexual laxity Europeans saw in Muslims contrasted sharply with the view Britons had of themselves. While it was understood that working-class men and women could not control their sexual urges, elite men were taught to control themselves by repressing emotion, desire, and sexuality, and to favor sportsmanship and militarism as the highest forms of masculine existence. Britain’s leaders were thus ‘truly masculine’ and only the truly masculine could lead. The ideals of muscular Christianity reinforced a cultural aversion to, and distrust of, cultures perceived as careless in their own abilities to control such emotions. The militarism instilled in the British upper-classes defined the generations’ views of power and superiority, and any indication of weakness, whether emotionally, physically, or socio-politically was seen as dishonorable.

The Arab Case: Quasi-Barbarians and Very Old Children

It is nearly impossible to broach the subject of race and Arab history without making at least a passing reference to Edward Said’s Orientalism. To be sure, the book has faced criticism


40 Ibid.

for its limited scope (i.e., its exclusion of German or Italian Orientalist work), and because it places too great an emphasis on the diametrical world view of the West verses some sort of amalgamated Orient. Yet, some of Said’s basic assertions ring true about the character and nature of British policy-makers’ assumptions, or knowledge, about the Middle East and the Arab world. As Said notes, the separateness which defined the Orient in contrast to the West was built on a series of assumptions focused on the Orient’s “eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, [or] its supine malleability.” Additionally, the imagery which defined Islam in Great Britain was transferred, in large part, to the Arab world, whether or not the population was actually Muslim. The people of the Middle East were characterized as backward, degenerate, decadent, feminine, or, perhaps most universally, child-like. These categories aided the imperial endeavour and reinforced European hegemony by asserting European supremacy and ability to lead.

Mond’s 1920 supposition about the quasi-barbarian nature of Arabs (as quoted at the beginning of the chapter) was built on a long tradition of viewing the populations of the Middle East as dichotomously different from Europeans. Built on tenuous assertions about the physical, psychological, and cultural qualities of various communities, even Arabophiles noted ‘inherent’ differences between the two. For example, Arabist Gertrude Bell (1868--1926), a political officer for British Intelligence during World War One and later Oriental Secretary to the High Commissioner in Baghdad, noted:

The Oriental is like a very old child. He is unacquainted with many branches of knowledge which we have come to regard as of elementary necessity; frequently, but not

---

always, his mind is little preoccupied with the need of acquiring them, and he concerns himself scarcely at all with what we call practical utility.43

Racial theory and knowledge of the Arab world was based on two necessary assumptions. First, that the British Empire was at the top of a global moral, economic, political, and cultural hierarchy. Second, all other peoples fell somewhere below this mark.

In 1908, Lord Cromer (1841 --1917) -- recently retired from his position as Consul-General of Egypt -- published in *The Edinburgh Review* an article entitled “The Government of Subject Races.” According to Cromer, the ‘reasonable Imperialist’

will entertain not only a moral dislike, but also a political mistrust of that excessive earth-hunger, … He will have no fear of competition. He will believe that, in the treatment of subject races, the methods of government practised by England, though sometimes open to legitimate criticism, are superior, morally and economically, to those of any other foreign nation; and that, strong in the possession and maintenance of those methods, we shall be able to hold our own against all competitors.44

Cromer’s ‘reasonable Imperialist’ reinforced two important features of Britain’s right to rule. One, a reasonable Imperialist, in this case a Briton, had a moral duty to lead and was not out for material gain as was the ‘earth-hungry’ imperialist, like the Germans. Britain’s sense of ‘fair play,’ made vogue by the Anglicization and muscular Christianity of Britain’s Public Schools, required it to take on a caretaker role in global politics, to bring the ‘child-like’ races into order. Two, Britain claimed the most prominent role in the right to rule by virtue of its superiority to all other states, including other European states. A clear testimonial to the nature of Europe’s current political environment, Cromer’s views placed the British Empire above its European

---


counterparts, while simultaneously locating the ‘Subject Races’ well below all Europeans on the socio-political ladder.

The race and social hierarchy question, as it pertained to Palestinian Arabs, was complicated by the fact that multiple influences vied for the right to define Palestine Arabs. As we have already seen in the case of national definition, Palestinians were included and excluded from various Arab categories according to the whims of those forming the definition. Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Arabs were themselves grouped together and differentiated from one another in accordance with the needs of imperial powers like the British. Similarly, racial and social hierarchy was redefined by Zionists and other Arab communities who had vested interests in the region.

The differing visions of Palestinian Arabs depended greatly on the nature of the observer. Occasionally, for instance, Palestinian Arabs were thought of more highly than their neighbors. Former Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb (1897 --1986), in his biographical A Soldier with the Arabs, noted that “Jews and Arabs alike have fallen victims [sic] to unscientific modern theories of race.” An Arabophile, Glubb traced modern Levantine history back to the Biblical era, careful to draw a distinction between the Bible’s Israelites and modern Zionists. Glubb also distinguished ‘Arabs’ from ‘Egyptians,’ arguing that because the two are conflated, Middle Eastern history has been greatly misunderstood. Setting the stage for underscoring a militaristic, even European-like Palestinian society, Glubb argues that Egyptians, “are physically inclined to be lethargical, a quality doubtless to be attributed to their climate … They prefer to settle their

problems by intellectual means, rather than by physical action.” Alternatively, Palestine’s Arab inhabitants “always had more connection with Europe than with Iraq,” or other Arab communities. While Glubb is quick to note emotional traits (i.e., hot-headedness and fanaticism) and the out-dated education of Levantine Arabs, it becomes clear from his glowing depiction of Arab abilities and societies that he believed Levantine Arabs were more the heirs of Victorian era notions of masculinity and nationalism than Egyptians or Zionist Jews. Neither of these last two groups, in Glubb’s view, had the requisite ability to both learn and lead.

However, whereas Glubb had great deal of practical experience in the Middle East, London policy-makers rarely knew one Arab, let alone dozens. Such lack of personal contact forced them to rely on second-hand information and general assumptions in defining their own personal hierarchy of cultures and races. In his biography of Musa Alami, Palestine is my Country, Geoffrey Furlonge asserts that Zionists knowingly “played on the [British] ignorance of the Arabs of Palestine by representing them as a collection of illiterate and backward nomads and Zionism as a mission which would bring civilization.” Even a cursory glance through the archives indicates that there was a distinct division among British policy-makers and their knowledge of Arab history, culture, and abilities. As has already been discussed, Orientalist writing had been, throughout the nineteenth century, popular in all of Britain’s social classes, and

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Glubb’s discussion of the racial distinctions and military prowess of Arabs, Egyptians, and Jews is found between pgs 27 --37.

49 Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami (London: John Murray, 1969), 60. Alami was a Jerusalem native, whose family was “one of the most ancient and influential families in the community, commanding wide allegiances in both the city and the countryside.” (3)
while Said contends that this knowledge was overly rose-tinted, it nevertheless informed London politicians as well as local imperial officials on the ground. The British were certainly not ignorant of the Arabs, but the nature of their knowledge was principally dependent on the individual whims and biases of each person. Because of this, asserting the child-like nature of Arabs who, in turn, require British patronage became widely accepted as it facilitated imperial expansion and reward.

One of the best known Arabists of World War One was T. E. Lawrence (1888 --1935). In his work, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, Lawrence describes Arabic-speaking peoples as “a people of primary colours, or rather of black and white, who saw the world always in contour. They were a dogmatic people, despising doubt … They did not understand our metaphysical difficulties, our introspective questionings.”

Likewise, in his *Revolt in the Desert*, Lawrence states that “Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants.” Much as Bell had done, the entirety of the Arab world was simplified into a population either too simple-minded or, conversely, too pragmatic to be able to deal fully with the complex structures of European politics, culture, and society.

Beyond the official policy-makers and imperial leaders of the British Empire, the abilities of Palestinians were informed by other actors as well. Furlonge’s assertion that Zionists manipulated the knowledge British officials had to work with finds support in memoirs of Chaim Chissin. In January 1882, as a reaction to recent pogroms in Czarist Russia, the Bilu organization planned to immigrate to and settle in Palestine. Started in January 1882, Bilu was founded by

---


Israel Belkind and several friends who acquired the means for establishing Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine. This endeavor was intended as a part of a larger renaissance for the world’s Jewry. Chissin, a member of this organization, published an account of his experiences in Palestine between 1882 and 1887. Chissin’s description of the native inhabitants of Palestine -- Muslim, Christian, and Jewish -- is generally unflattering. Distinguishing the fellahin (sedentary peasants), the belledi (city dwellers), and the ‘Arabs’ from one another, Chissin adds further nuance to the socio-racial hierarchy of the region. According to Chissin, the fellahin generally walked barefoot, were less educated, and were members of the lowest economic class. Similarly, the immigrant Jewish population viewed the local Jews with a great deal of contempt. As the local Jews were so completely different in terms of culture, custom, and education, the immigrant Jews found it nearly impossible to communicate with them. Only one group appears to have stood out among the native population, the Christian Arabs. According to Chissin

The Christian Arabs, in general, constitute the most intelligent section of the population here. They don’t practice polygamy, their women enjoy almost complete freedom, and they educate their daughters just as well as their sons. In their dealings with other people they are much more honest and considerate than most of the Arabs and as a consequence their own lives are ennobled.

Reaction to the Palestinian Arab community, from outside sources, was influenced once again by discernible features, like education and social customs.

52 Chissin claims that only the nomadic Bedouin are known as Arabs.


54 Ibid., 93.

55 Ibid., 64.
As discussed in chapter two, the Christian Arab community in Palestine was at the forefront of Palestinian national identification and, as a result, played a disproportionately larger role in the historical record of Palestine than Muslim or Jewish Palestinian Arabs. Despite this, however, the average European was unaware of the true demographics of Palestine. Glubb notes that “Knowledge of Palestine was to a great extent limited to Bible study” among Europeans. Coupled with a vague sense of crusader history and the loss of Palestine to the Ottomans, it is perhaps not surprising that Glubb goes on to note that “I believe that many British people in 1917 imagined Palestine to be still the land of the Jews, and it never occurred to them to doubt that the vast majority of its people were not of that faith.” By this same token, Muslims in Palestine were attributed a foreigner status, much as was the case in India. Palestine remained either Muslim, or Jewish, in the imagination of Europeans up until the point when the first official census was taken in 1922. Despite the cosmopolitan and well-educated nature of Palestine’s upper classes (largely, but not universally, Christian) the predominant view of Palestinians from the late 1800s until after World War One remained that of uneducated, backward, and disjointed groups.

While Chissin may have found some members of the Arab Christian community well educated and friendly to European traditions and mores, Samuel Tolkowsky, in his 1917 Achievements and Prospects in Palestine, did not. Tolkowsky reinforced Furlonge’s assessment about how Zionists viewed and manipulated the status of native Palestinian inhabitants. According to Tolkowsky

56 Glubb, 29.

57 Ibid.
Public safety was only a word in Palestine at that time [the late 1800s]. Public hygiene did not receive the least attention from the authorities, and the result was that the most important inland towns, as well as the greatest part of the maritime plain, were infested with malaria-fever and different eye-diseases. There were no physicians, no chemists, no hospitals.  

What is more, “with their typical oriental lack of foresight,” and indistinct agricultural knowledge, the fellahin, Tolkowsky argued, “try to make their fields yield as much as they can with their very primitive methods.”  

Achievements and Prospects asserts that the only course of survival in Palestine was through Jewish Zionist control. To rid the region of ‘oriental lack of foresight’ or ‘quasi-barbarian’ tendencies meant installing new overlords who had a moral duty or obligation to the land and would be ‘reasonable Imperialists.’ By the 1910s Zionists were asserting their right to rule Palestine, using the perceptions of the Arab race to assert their own abilities as ‘reasonable Imperialists.’

The Indian Colonialist and the Racial Politics of Empire

India’s role in the narrative of the Balfour Declaration comes, in part, from the role it plays in defining race and gender within the greater British Empire. The largest of the British colonial possessions, India is a complicated example of how institutionalized racism impacted imperial policy decisions elsewhere. Additionally, by virtue of its large Muslim population, India was a unique governing experience for Christian Britain. Torn between religious and imperialist allegiances, Indo-Muslims inhabited a liminal state between the Ottoman and British Empires. What is more, despite the attempts to compartmentalize communities around the world into

---


59 Ibid., 2-3.
racial categories distinct from one another, when non-European peoples began to cast off these
designations and seek out their own form of group identity, India provides examples of how such
identities reached across what had seemed previously impermeable boundaries.

*The Great Rebellion*

Fear of cultural stagnation pervaded Edmund Burke’s assessment of the Ottoman Empire
and informed how British imperialists viewed events in their own Empire. Following the 1857
Rebellion in India and the final consolidation of British power over the region, political
stagnation and the figure of the child-like Other came to be the most common image of Indo-
Muslims. On the one hand, the Rebellion allowed Britons to exhibit “greater confidence in race
as a marker of difference” which in turn fed the scientific racism and reinforced the principles of
muscular Christianity. The Rebellion and the establishment of the crown’s control over India
reasserted Britain’s right to rule and sense of moral superiority. On the other hand, Christian
militarism was curtailed in its proselytizing zeal, so as to disassociate it with the ‘fanaticism’
used to identify the Islamic world. It was upon this framework that British policy in India was
constructed after 1857.

It is generally accepted that the Great Rebellion drastically changed the ways in which
Britons defined Indians of all creeds, but a particularly notable shift occurred with regard to
Indo-Muslims. The Rebellion convinced the British, according to historian P. Hardy, to view


61 Ibid., 45, 106.

Muslims as having a “corporate political character, which in British eyes Muslims had not previously possessed.” The suspicions of potential Islamic unity, of longing to reassert Mughal power and to cast off British imperialism, this corporate character, encouraged Anglo-Indians to view Muslim Indians with suspicion and to avoid allowing too many of them into the Indian Civil Service.

Because British policy became more racialized and more anti-Muslim after 1857, some Indo-Muslim communities turned their allegiances toward their religious, instead of their political/imperial, community. A religio-cultural link with the umma (the global community of Muslims) established among some members of the Indo-Islamic community a pan-Islamist worldview. The subsequent growth of pan-Islamic sentiment strengthened the political hand of Indo-Muslim reformers while at the same time drawing deep concern from British politicians seeking to maintain imperial stability.

Frustration with British imperial oversight in India also manifested in a desire to reestablish the Mughal Empire or, at the very least, a native South Asian government. In 1889 Viceroy of India Lord Dufferin described the Muslims of British India as ‘a nation of 50 million, with their monotheism, their iconoclastic fanaticism, their animal sacrifices, their social equality and their remembrance of the days when, enthroned at Delhi, they reigned supreme from the Himalayas to Cape Cormorin.’

Reinforcing a view taken up by many nineteenth century Europeans, Dufferin’s statement discusses the perception of the Islamic world as having once been powerful, but now in state of decay. Because of the belief that the Mughals had been a foreign power and as a result Muslims

---

63 Ibid., 62.

64 Ibid., 1.
were not native to India, not unlike the British, Islamic claims of legitimate leadership roles were superseded by Hindu claims.

*The Ilbert Bill: Race and Gender Formalized in Policy*

The 1884 Ilbert Bill offers one of the clearest examples of how race, gender, and power were institutionalized in the imperial process. As a result of the controversy surrounding the Ilbert Bill the British colonial world redefined and reconsidered the place of European women as actors and definers of racial status, and the racial definitions of Indians and Africans. Indirectly, the Bill informed how other imperial policies, like the Balfour Declaration, should be constructed and implemented. At the heart of the debate surrounding the Bill was the question of whether the British government was seeking to educate Indians for eventual self-government, or whether Indian education was intended only to perpetuate the colonial administration and imperial oversight of Great Britain. Similarly, in Palestine after the Balfour Declaration, questions arose as to the role of the British government in administering the region. Was Palestine to become fully independent, a self-governing dominion, or a colonial procession --a part of the British government itself?

The Ilbert Bill, introduced in 1883, was intended to rectify a legal anomaly that Indian judges in the countryside were not allowed to preside over cases which involved European offenders. The Bill aroused vitriolic protest among the Anglo-Indian community and within the more conservative branches of the home government. A *New York Times* 1883 article examining the Ilbert Bill and the resentment to it expressed by Anglo-Indians asserted that “The Bill, by subjecting Englishmen who misbehave themselves in India to the same jurisdiction with natives of the same description, is simply a provision for the equality of all men in India before the
However, as the article goes on to note, Anglo-Indians believed, as Sir Bartle Frere is quoted as saying, that “this bill is calculated to ‘raise dangerous race hatred’ by inculcating the idea that justice which is good enough for natives is good enough for Europeans.” Implied in this sentiment, is the reverse: are natives good enough for European justice? Ultimately, what is clear is that the Anglo-Indians won few sympathizers back in London. The obstinacy with which they fought the Bill was noted and calculated into the consideration of future policy. Still, Edwin Hirschmann argues that the reaction to the racial questions which the Bill raised were not consistent throughout the Empire. Echoing Philip Curtin’s concept of “man-on-the-spotism,” Hirschmann argues that the bitterness which defined the debate in India had largely dissipated by the time the question reached London.

The Ilbert Bill took on a distinctly gender-oriented dimension when Anglo-Indian women became actively involved in the anti-Bill protests. Annette Ackroyd (Beveridge) offers one example of how vehemently Anglo-Indians protested the Bill’s passage. In The Englishman Ackroyd claimed:

I am not afraid to assert that I speak the feelings of all Englishwomen in India when I say that we regard the proposal to subject us to the jurisdiction of native Judges as an insult. It is not the pride of race which dictates this feeling, which is the outcome of something deeper --it is the pride of womanhood.

The proposal, as she goes on to note, “to subject civilized women to the jurisdiction of men who have done little or nothing to redeem the women of their own races and whose social ideals are

66 Ibid.
67 Annette Ackroyd (Beveridge), 1883, writing in The Englishman as cited in: Margaret Strobel, European Women and the Second British Empire (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 60.
still on the outer verge of civilization” strikes at the heart of racial and gendered dynamics in the late nineteenth century British Empire.

Mrinalini Sinha further notes that opponents of the Bill protested increased native power in the structures of the Civil Service, by equating the Civil Service with “sweet girl graduates from Griton.” Building on well-established stereotypes of an appropriate ‘woman’s sphere,’ the patriarchy of empire was reinforced through the process of effeminizing native civil servants. As Sinha observed, women were naturally ‘unfit’ for political roles, but effeminized natives were ‘unnaturally unfit.’ According the conventional wisdom, it was natural for a woman to lack attributes allowing her to be an active member of the political process, but it was unnatural for men to share these same characteristics. What is more, Sinha argues that “the Ilbert Bill controversy also witnessed an impressive and unprecedented mobilisation of white women in India.” As Ackroyd noted in her tirade against the Bill, British women had advanced along the lines of emancipation, but Indian women, in large part because Indian men had done little to speed the process, languished in servitude. According to Sinha, the “politics of colonial masculinity reconstituted Anglo-Indian racial privileges as the benevolent protect[ers] of native

68 Ibid.

69 Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century (New Delhi: Raj Press, 1995), 34. Griton, Cambridge was the first residential women’s college in Great Britain (established in 1869). While Griton was established to occupy for women the same place universities occupied for men coming from public schools women’s education in Victorian England was unequal to men’s. This quote reinforces the idea that while a woman may be highly educated, her education is not equal to that of a man’s, and thus Indians in the Civil Service are similarly ‘well’ educated.

70 Sinha’s discussion of this distinction comes from chapter one of Colonial Masculinity.

71 Sinha, 34.
and white women.‖ While the anti-Ilbert Bill group couched its opposition in terms of protecting native women, the perceived threat against white women which such reforms inspired, translated into perceived threat leveled at the entirety of the British race.

In relation to other imperial policies the controversy of the Ilbert Bill questioned the power of the imperial subjects to govern themselves. In time these concerns and arguments translated into questions of what rights imperial subjects had throughout the empire. Moreover, the ability of native populations to govern themselves or to need European assistance in their own governance was further explored in the questions raised by enfranchisement debates, international racial equality, and ultimately the Balfour Declaration.

Race and Indian Imperial Rights Overseas

While Muslims faced specific concerns with regard to the British Empire and the governance of India, all South Asians shared a common struggle for self-identification and equal rights. When Indians like the Aga Khan, in the 1910s and 1920s, expressed a desire for greater Indian control in East Africa such demands were not couched in religious terms, but in Indian terms. The connections between East Africa and India predate British imperialism in the region, and even predate Islamic influences in the region. For centuries traders throughout the Indian Ocean world connected South Asia and the Eastern coast of Africa. For the Aga Khan more specifically, these ties were enhanced by a united Ismaili community throughout the region. Nevertheless, despite these historic linkages European settlers in East Africa and Anglo-Indians spurned almost any attempt by any and all Indians at advancing along the racial hierarchy. The events of the Ilbert Bill crisis, and its subsequent passage, only made the two communities more

---

72 Ibid., 44.
vehement in their dislike of increased Indian rights. Of the strong parallels which developed between the enfranchisement of Indians in Africa in the 1920s and the questions raised by the Ilbert Bill, in particularly the connections between racial and gendered identity, by the 1920s an added Indian national identity was also emerging to further complicate the debate.

In 1884, Lord Dufferin (1826 --1902) replaced Lord Ripon as Viceroy of India. While Dufferin was willing to accept modest concessions to Indians in achieving peace in South Asia, particularly in the wake of the Ilbert Bill crisis, his 1888 *Minute on British Policy in India* only reinforced Britain’s role as India’s paternalistic overseer. Speaking of the newly formed Indian National Congress (1885) and the rights of the most highly educated in India about a future Indian self-government, Dufferin stated

> To hand over, therefore, the Government of India either partially or otherwise to such a body as this would simply be to place millions of men, dozens of nationalities, and hundreds of the most stupendous interests under the domination of a microscopic minority, possessing neither experience, administrative ability, nor any adequate conception of the nature of the tasks before them.

Dufferin did not doubt that Indians could be taught to govern themselves, but he did make it clear that they had not yet attained the ability to do so. Dufferin’s modest concessions in the wake of the Ilbert controversy only strengthened the dichotomous view of a Hindu-Muslim India.

---

73 The Ilbert Bill was finally accepted in 1884, but only with a compromise. Europeans having to be prosecuted by Indian judges could argue for at least half the jury being white.

74 Lord Dufferin, "Minute on British Policy in India by the Viceroy, 1888," Asia, Pacific and Africa, London. Dufferin’s listed this rationale during a speech he delivered to the St. Andrews dinner in Calcutta, 30 November 1888. Although Dufferin does not distinguish between Hindus and Muslims in this speech he does talk about the extremely small community of educated elite who would even have the potential for governmental leadership. Given the population ratios and the number of Islamic institutions verse Hindu ones, it can safely be assumed that Dufferin was speaking largely of Hindu leaders, although he must certainly have been considering the even smaller handful of Muslim leaders as well. Dufferin’s 30 November speech can be found in: Speech, by Lord Dufferin, Speech at St. Andrew's Dinner, Calcutta, 30 November 1888, John Murray. London.
--that Hindus were the native inhabitants and Muslims foreign elements. Dufferin added to the above, that “it looks as if the Mahomedans were rising in revolt against the ascendancy which they imagine a rival and less virile race is desirous of obtaining over them.” Speaking both of the rights of Hindus and of Britons to rule India (each in its due time) the perceived animosity Dufferin saw among Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim nationalists, while certainly valid in some circles, was nowhere near universal. The Aga Khan, by way of example, devoted a great deal of time to Islamic questions, but also discussed Indians as Indians, and more importantly here, as equals—politically, socially, culturally, economically—with Europeans.

In his 1918 work, *India in Transition*, the Aga Khan argued that political allegiance rather than race should set the standard for imperial inclusion and exclusion. Seeking to prove this point, he noted that because Austria and Germany had taken up arms against their European neighbors in World War One, “all and sundry have watched the humiliation of these fallen members of the white race” while at the same time “sepoys have fought hand to hand with the fairest inhabitants of Europe. [Thus] The long-maintained racial line of demarcation had been largely replaced by that of allegiance to Sovereign and flag.” Unlike the arguments put forward by racial theorists or Khilafatists, group inclusion thus remained a political matter, not a racial

75 Dufferin, “Minute on British Policy in India by the Viceroy.

76 Sultan Mahommed Shah, Aga Khan III (1877--1957), was the forty-eighth Imam of the Ismaili Shi’a sect. Believed to be the descendent of the Prophet Muhammad via his daughter Fatima and cousin/son-in-law Ali, the Aga Khan wielded a great deal of spiritual and political power in Islamic communities throughout the Indian Ocean world.


78 Khilafatists preached a pseudo-pan-Islamic doctrine, as will be discussed later. They were Indo-Muslims who sought to reestablish the power of the Caliph (the spiritual leader of the Sunni Muslim community). The Khalifat Movement reached an apex in India in 1919.
one. Despite this bold and well-reasoned attempt to publically shift imperial thinking from a
issues of race to those of patriotism and loyalty, British imperial policy continued to be defined
by race well into the 1920s.

Just as the Ilbert Bill controversy had ultimately upheld racial divisions, a case in the
1920s further proved that Indians, despite the contentions of leaders like the Aga Khan,
continued to be cast as unequal to Britons within the imperial framework. The first hint of this
came in 1921 when the question of Indian enfranchisement in South Africa came up for
discussion. Edwin Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, and members of the Indian
government lobbied hard for greater Indian involvement in the African colonies. Despite their
best efforts, however, Indians living in South Africa were denied enfranchisement. As a result of
the South Africa experience the pro-Indian lobby shifted its advocacy to Indian enfranchisement
elsewhere in Africa. In particular the focus fell on East Africa. Following World War One,
former German possessions (in what are the present-day locations of Burundi, Rwanda, and
Tanganyika) were divided between the French and British who already had sizable colonies in
the region. The Aga Khan pressed for greater Indian involvement in the colonial administration
of the British-granted colonies (and the colonies already controlled by Great Britain), in
particular noting the long historical connection between East Africa and India. As with the Ilbert
Bill and the South African, the events in Kenya again proved that racial hierarchies dominated
British policy. Indian leadership in East Africa was derided much as Indian leadership in India
had been in the 1880s.

The 1919--1923 correspondence between Edwin Montagu and Viceroy of India Lord
Reading (Rufus Isaacs, 1860--1935) reveals the administrative anxiety Indian enfranchisement
in East Africa produced. Montagu and Reading were particularly concerned with how the denial
of Indian rights overseas could adversely affect changes the government of India sought to make in reforming British control in India. Of particular importance to Montagu and Reading was the establishment of ‘responsible government’ in India and implementation of the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Additionally, delegations lobbied London politicians for Indian rights in East Africa. One of the most important features of this lobbying effort was that only educated Indians could be an equal footing with their European counterparts, not just any Indian living overseas.

Echoing the Ilbert Bill crisis, elevating Indians in Africa to equal status with European incensed Anglo-Africans and motivated the production of propaganda which recalled the gendered and racist tone of anti-Ilbert sentiment. In the summer of 1923, a pamphlet entitled “The Woman’s Point of View” was circulated among influential members of the British government. The pamphlet bluntly declares that the issue of Indian rights in Africa was of worldwide importance, as “There is no previous instance where a coloured race has aspired to share the rule of any country with the European.” As the pamphlet was intended to be from the perspective of a ‘concerned European woman,’ its greatest focus was on the potential

---

79 The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms sought to gradually introduce self-governing institutions to India, and by doing so pave the way for eventual Indian self-government. While Indian nationalists did not feel these reforms went far enough, imperialists feared they went too far. The argument that is important here, however, is the fact that if Indians could not be enfranchised in Africa how could they ever achieve self-government at home?

80 The copy of this, which can be accessed in the India Office Records at the British Library, was sent to the wife of Humphrey Leggett who passed it along to Sir Benjamin in a letter dated 1923.

enfranchisement had for placing “European women under Asiatic administration,” a similar argument to anti-Illbert Bill rhetoric.

The Kenya Indian Delegation, in a 1923 letter to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947), countered this anti-Asiatic sentiment by asserting that former Secretary of State for India Lord Salisbury, “emphasized the obligation of the Imperial Government to accord the Indian Subjects of His Majesty’s equality of treatment in the clearest terms.” In fact, what had been promised was the same treatment of Indians in India and abroad. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indians had continued to gain significant improvements to their rights in India. These improvements had led educated Indians, particularly those in the Civil Service, to consider themselves equal at least intellectual equals of Britons. The logical assumption was that these rights continued overseas. As has already been made clear, however, race continued to trump education and imperial policy was slow to change; particularly when it meant condensing the desires of diametrically opposed constituencies into one, functional, policy.

The overwhelming emphasis of the Kenya Women’s Committee pamphlet was on the degenerate nature of Indians in Africa. The propaganda boldly states “that any outbreak of plague invariably starts in the Indian quarters” and, as if this was not enough, the coeducation of Indian and English children would be disastrous. Indian children were, the pamphlet asserted, “trained and initiated into the mysteries of sex.” The theme of Indian hygiene, or lack thereof,

---


83 Kenya Women's Committee.
was nothing new in the assumptions British officials used in understanding South Asians. In an April 1917 letter to Montagu from Vaughan Nash (1861--1932), Secretary for Reconstruction in Asquith’s cabinet, Nash writes: “You mention sanitation and education, but the first of these, as you know, is a terrain vague to all Indians and I do not think that it will appeal to them.” After debasing the Indians’ skills as merchants, potential as agriculturalists, and status as loyal members of the military, not to mention their hygiene and children, the pamphlet changed tack, using the familiar rhetoric of Britain’s role as paternalistic overseer.

Noting the obvious predominance of native Kenyans over combined European and Indian populations, the author of the pamphlet contends that if the administration of Kenya is handed over to the Indians, “the progress of the Native will be put back 50 years.” Beyond this the pamphlet adds the battle cry of the Ilbert Bill crisis, noting that “On the whole, the Native has taken very kindly to the rule of the white woman --he looks to her as his friend.” While the Aga Khan had argued that Indian imperial overseers would act as good intermediaries between the ‘backward’ native African and the fully modern European, the pamphlet’s author fully disagrees. The Indian is portrayed as mischievous in this scenario and the African, child-like and need of protection. Just as the Indian judges were feared for their potential power over white subjects, the African Indians were castigated in this pamphlet for the lack of concern for what is ‘best’ for the native African.

---

84 Vaughan Nash, “Vaughan Nash to Edwin Montagu, 2 April, 1917,” Correspondence, Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.

85 Kenya Women's Committee.

86 Ibid.

87 Khan, 127.
On 27 January 1922, Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, delivered his ‘Kenya Dinner Address’ during which he made two significant points. First, Churchill asserted that “We consider we are pledged by undertakings given in the past to reserve the Highlands of East Africa exclusively for European settlers, and we do not intend to depart from that pledge. That must be taken as a matter which has been definitely settled in all future negotiations.”

Second, “all future immigration of Indians should be strictly limited.” Neither point made Montagu or the Indian delegations happy. As Montagu observed in a letter to Churchill on 31 January, “what distresses me is that you seem to think that the existing residents in the country can only mean the European residents. Under every rule of equal rights for all civilised men, the term must mean the residents in the country regardless of race.”

Racial division, particularly in the case of Indian subjects, was an increasingly difficult question to untangle.

As the Ilbert Bill was to the Kenyan question, so too was the Balfour Declaration to the achievement of Home Rule in India. Despite the Aga Khan’s basic assertion that Europeans turned on Europeans in World War One while Indians fought loyally alongside the British, policy did not reflect the belief that political allegiance could overcome racial allegiance. The events surrounding the Ilbert Bill, the enfranchisement issue, and as it turns out the Balfour Declaration, all reinforced the tradition of patronage, racial hierarchy, and perceptions of the gendered dynamics of races. During the mid-twentieth century, these dynamics turned on the

---


89 Ibid., p. 8.

90 Ibid., p. 10.
British Empire, in the form of the Mau Mau Rebellion and the Indian Independence movement. More broadly, the story of India’s struggle against racial division is telling of other post-World War One imperial concerns. Churchill’s loyalties to white settlers and Montagu’s anti-racial stance paralleled the issues of Palestine’s administration, hammered out as they were at the same time (see chapter six). The foundation for these events and the role racially determined policy would take, appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The Jewish Case: The Re-Masculinization of Judaism

Unlike the cases seen thus far, where ‘subject races’ largely failed in their struggles to combat imperial policy imbrued with racial theory, Jewish Zionists consciously altered the stereotypes to work in their favor toward to ultimate goal of state construction. At the close of the nineteenth century, European Jewish identity had evolved into two sets of impressions, which became central features in the debates surrounding the creation of the Balfour Declaration. On the one hand, a figure of a passive European Jew, noted as having submissive and feminine characteristics, permeated European cultural imagination. In time, the impression grew more distinct as a belief developed that such individuals were feeble intellectuals, unable to commit to the rigors of national service. This feeble persona, having largely been foisted upon the European Jewish population by their Christian neighbors, was internalized by the European Jewish community. Ultimately this led to a general cultural inferiority complex. On the other hand, a masculine, warrior past rooted in Biblical tradition underlay the subservient, submissive imagery which so pervaded Western culture. While Jewish communities intermittently thrived in Europe, their place during the eighteen hundred years between the destruction of the Temple and the First World War (the Diasporic years) was as wanderers. Because the image of ‘the Wandering Jew’
held a powerful place in the imagination of Western cultures, Jews were not fully incorporated into any European state until the nineteenth century, and only then incidentally.\textsuperscript{91}

Late in the nineteenth century political Zionists embarked on a project to remilitarize and remasculinize Jewish society, drawing on the underlying warrior history of the Bible. The choice to use the Biblical heritage, instead of forging a new, modern identity, was a conscious one that both aided the effort to legitimize the national endeavor and offered accepted cultural definitions of a masculine society. The early Biblical depiction of a militarized Jewish identity laid the groundwork for several political Zionist enterprises and although the philosophical underpinnings of the Bible are beyond the scope of this work, the historicity of the text is useful for its characterization of a Jewish military tradition. What is more, the tradition of militarism is central to national identity formation as nearly all states undergo a period of militarism during their formation.\textsuperscript{92} The process of war, conquest, loss, and re-conquest was rife in the Biblical Near East and into this volatile world Jews first appear in the written record as soldiers.\textsuperscript{93} The campaigns of Joshua and the wars of Judges depict a militaristic society. However, the Biblical Israelites were not only a warrior people, but “they had to wage war in order to play any part

\textsuperscript{91} Jewish emancipation was just as varied as the treatment of Jews. For instance, officially Jews were not emancipated in Great Britain until 1858 although they largely had equal rights since the late 1700s. In France and the United States, revolutions had emancipated Jews, as well as the lower classes, in the late 1700s, but Jews did not get equal rights in the German territories until the second half of the 1800s. Likewise, while Anglo-Jewry experienced a slow, but steady progression toward emancipation, Jews living in Eastern Europe, German speaking territories, etc. may have made progressive steps toward freedom under some leaders, but fell prey to regressive steps while liberalization was attacked by conservative societal elements.


whatever in history.”  

As Rabbi H. G. Enelow noted in his 1919 *The War and the Bible*, “the Bible views the training of Israel to warfare as one of the Divine tasks.” Not surprisingly, during the time between Moses’ life and the death of the Prophet Muhammad, there was a distinguished, continual history of military triumph in the Jewish record. Eventually this became the foundation for the twentieth century Zionist remilitarization effort.

Yet amid this militaristic society of Ancient Israel lay a pacifistic undercurrent, frequently derided as the antithesis of the military hero. Except for the discord that appeared between the pacifists and the militarists, military historian Sydney Gumpertz tells us, “the Jews might have withstood the [Roman] siege” of Jerusalem and the final destruction of the Temple. Enelow too discussed the concept of peace and the militaristic history of ancient Israel. To his mind, peace was the thing that Israel’s leaders strove for, but using Abraham as an example, Enelow asserts that by no means did Israel’s leaders stand for peace at any price. Writing in 1918, he drew parallels to contemporary events, noting that war is a necessary component of life so long as the “world is dominated by wickedness” as “There can be no peace in the world as long as righteousness does not rule.” In the time of the Roman siege, therefore, those who chose not to take up arms allowed ‘wickedness’ to rule. Similarly, militant Zionists like Vladimir Jabotinsky (see below) believed that Jews who did not take up arms in the name of a reestablished Israeli state prohibited the return of ‘righteousness.’

---


95 Ibid.

96 Gumpertz, 43.

97 Enelow, 109.
Although during the Biblical era Jewish pacifists were never overtly condemned for aiding in the creation of the Diaspora, some Zionists could not but help draw parallels between their role in bringing about the statelessness of their people and modern anti-Zionist Jews role in perpetuating it. Chaim Weizmann, for one, described anti-Zionists as ‘dark forces’ whose “only claim to Judaism is that they are working for its disappearance.”\(^\text{98}\) Just as the pacifists in Biblical Palestine allowed ‘wickedness’ to rule by virtue of their inaction against the Roman forces, Weizmann believed that modern anti-Zionists did not aid in the restoration of ‘righteousness’ by contravening Zionist efforts. Such a perceived internal cultural division was useful for Zionists aiming to remasculinize Judaism. Having an anti-Zionist foil equated with Biblical era pacifists meant that anti-Zionism lacked the warrior ethos central to a remasculinizing/remilitarizing effort.

While Judas Maccabeus is certainly the preeminent Jewish martial hero, “One of the greatest military figures of all time,”\(^\text{99}\) the Bible contains numerous other iconographic images of heroic, militarized Jews who fought bravely for ‘race’ and creed, both before and after the Maccabæan Revolts.\(^\text{100}\) Joshua, for example, led the Jews into Palestine to gain their first

---


\(^{99}\) Gumpertz, 20.

\(^{100}\) The Maccabæan Revolts took place roughly between 167-160 BCE. There remains a great deal of debate about how and why the Revolts took place, but the simplest version holds that they were initiated after Antiochus IV issued an edict demanding the Jews give up their ceremonies and tradition and participate in the community’s pagan rituals. That said, there remains strong skepticism among scholars that the Revolts represent a battle between Judaism and Hellenism. The significance of the Revolts, as is the case with many other events in Jewish military history, lies in the living memory of what the Revolts mean to the world’s Jewry. Today this is most notable in the celebration of Hanukah.
foothold on the land. As it was Joshua who began the conquest of Israel, the land promised by God to Moses, it is the book of Joshua which lay the groundwork for much of the political Zionists’ rhetoric. Joshua commanded his men to be vigilant against breaking their covenant with God; those who were disloyal to their people by breaking the covenant were to be put to death.

Eventually, Joshua’s forces conquered over thirty Canaanite city-states before his death. His son Gideon carried on the military tradition, developing a smaller, elite force of roughly 300 soldiers which was a fast, mobile fighting unit intended to raid and attack quickly. The role of the Covenant and of elite fighting forces is echoed in twentieth century Israeli military history. The promise made to Moses is at the heart of Zionist nationalism and the ethos of the modern Israeli military is imbrued with Biblical lore.

In the centuries after Joshua’s campaigns, several other military leaders appeared in the chronicles. King Saul and his son Jonathan, Judas Maccabeus, David, and Joab were all noted charismatic, military leaders. Only King Solomon the Wise “was not conspicuous for war as he

101 Holy Bible: New International Version, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 2001), Joshua 1:1-3, Joshua 1:6. Although a precise date is difficult to determine, Joshua’s campaigns into Palestine most likely occurred between 1407 - 1376 BCE. There is a detailed account of the mathematics involved in determining these dates in John Garstang, Joshua-Judges, The Foundations of Bible History (London: Constable & Co. Ltd, 1931), 51 --62. In the Herzog and Gichon book there are surprisingly few dates, but of those the years 1391 -- 1353 (the reign of Ikhanton in Egypt, page 30) correspond to Garstang’s assessment.


103 According to legend the tactics and location information from the Battle of Michmash (Samuel 13 and 14) fought between Saul and Jonathan against the Benjamites, was later used in World War One by Allenby’s British forces fighting Turkish troops. The story goes that Major Vivian Gilbert recognized the place name and looked it up in his Bible. The British forces used the tactics of Jonathan and Saul to route the Turks in the same way the Philistine/Benjamites had been defeated. Among other places, these linkages have been examined in popular history outlets like the History Channel as well as: http://www.endtime.org/library/articles/keller.html.
was essentially a peace-lover.” While Solomon’s intelligence stands out in Jewish memory, David embodied both intellect and military might; it was after all, David who vanquished Goliath.  

In modern Israeli and Zionist rhetoric, the Battle of Masada claims a prominent place in the military history of the Jews. The battle took place in 73 CE and was one of the last fortresses to hold out against the growing Roman power in the Levant. According to tradition, “Rather than accept surrender, they [the Jewish community in the fortress] cheated the blood thirst of their conquerors and wives and children were killed by their own men-folk, who then slew themselves. Such courage has never been surpassed.” In the years after World War Two, Masada became the symbol for the fledgling (second) Israeli state. The oath, “Masada shall never fall again,” is used today by the military and youth groups to identify with this militaristic and heroic past. Despite the fact that there remains widespread debate over the archaeological evidence at the site of Masada and the events that occurred there, the symbolic power of Masada in reinforcing Jewish unity and heroism links a modern narrative with an ancient one.

For early twentieth century Zionists, however, it was the Battle of Betar which was more symbolically important to their attempts at remilitarizing Jewish society. The Battle of Betar, which took place in the 130s CE, began when Hadrian’s reign over Rome led further subjugation

\[104\] Gumpertz, 29.

\[105\] It might be important to note that the most widely associated symbol with David, and the Jewish community more generally, the Star or Shield of David is probably least based on Biblical era military history. The generally accepted story is that the star represents David’s shield as used in battle, but there is little evidence to support this. The symbol, which becomes an increasingly important emblem in the twentieth century, especially in terms of Jewish military history, is really a rather late addition to the myth and lore.

\[106\] Gumpertz, 44.
of the Jewish population within the Empire. In 131 CE, Hadrian sent his military leader Julius Severus to subdue the Jews in Palestine who were resisting these attempts. Under the leadership of Bar Kochba, the Jews had retaken Jerusalem and around 1000 other towns and villages prior to Severus’ appearance. For four years, the two sides waged war, yet in 135-6 CE the fortress of Betar, the last Jewish stronghold, was defeated.107

From 136 CE until 1917, the historical narrative generally accepts that the Jewish community eschewed militaristic endeavors and existed under an ascribed intellectual, effeminate identity. Such a characterization developed out of the roles and rights Jewish communities were granted throughout Europe.108 During the Diasporic years a series of special laws were established and upheld (to differing degrees and at differing times across Europe) which forbade Jewish land ownership, participation in the state militaries, and otherwise full membership in a given society. For instance, it was not uncommon for Jewish land ownership to be prohibited in Medieval German kingdoms. What is more, until the political revolutions of the nineteenth century, landownership was a requirement to full citizenship and, occasionally, the right to participate in the military. Because European laws were typically restrictive of Jewish employment possibilities other avenues for income opened. These, however, were usually more

107 Roman Freulich, Soldiers in Judea; Stories and Vignettes of the Jewish Legion (New York: Herzl Press, 1965), 13. This number of 1000 town and villages seems particularly high for the region, but this what the sources indicate, although the number is perhaps closer to 100. The historian, Roman senator, and author of Historia Romana Dio Cassius is most often cited on this matter, arguing that perhaps as many as 580,000 Jews died during these wars, but again this is highly debatable. For further information see: Dio Cassius, "Historia Romana Lxix, 12-14: A Roman Account of the Bar Kokhba Revolt," in Texts and Traditions Ed., ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing Inc., 1998), 487.

108 Jewish communities were established throughout the world after the Battle of Betar, but for the purposes of this work we will be focusing on the European Jewish community (the Ashkenazi) who ultimately become the first to develop and instigate modern political Zionism.
‘intellectual,’ i.e., banking, rather than ‘physical,’ i.e., agriculture. Gumpertz, like other historians, notes that the “splendid military ardor [of the Jews] lay dormant during the Middle Ages in the absence of any incentive for active patriotic life.”

The European Jewish community defined this era as one “of oppression and martyrdom.” Theodor Herzl, in his 1896 work, *The Jewish State*, reinforces this worldview by noting that European Jewry was barred “from filling even moderately high positions, either in the army, or in any public or private capacity.”

As a result of the historical record being read this way, most historians argue that the Zion Mule Corps and the subsequent Jewish Legion, created during the First World War, were the first wholly Jewish military entities since Bar Kochba was defeated. The record, however, does not defend this position. Despite contentions that Jews put down their arms and took little part in military history during the Diasporic years, several prominent cases refute this claim. In Warsaw, in 1794, a Jewish regiment led by its own colonel, Berek “Berko” Joselewicz fought against invading Russian forces led by General Alexander Suwarov. Colonel Joselewicz, a merchant and army purveyor, organized a Jewish cavalry regiment and despite the regiment’s defeat at the storming of Praga, Joselewicz went on to have an illustrious military career. He joined Napoleon’s army, and after the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw returned to become a

---

109 Gumpertz, 64.

110 Freulich, 14.


112 Benis Frank, Elias Gilner, Vladimir Jabotinsky, Izhak Ben-Zvi, and Roman Freulich stand out as prominent examples of this position (see bibliography from further information on each author’s work).
squadron leader there. No account of Joselewicz denies his bravery and military skill.\footnote{A discussion of Colonel Joselewicz’s history and exploits can be found in: Gumpertz. Also in: Antony Polonsky, "Warsaw," in \textit{The Yivo Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).The Jewish Encyclopedia is the online version (in both PDF and text formats) of the 1901-06 twelve volume series.}

Evidence also suggests that Dutch Stadtholders maintained Jewish regiments in the late 1700s,\footnote{Passing reference to such regiments are made in several military histories, but most prominently in Isaac Disraeli, \textit{The Genius of Judaism} (London: Edward Moxon, 1833), 251.} and Jewish participants counted among the members of the rest of Europe’s armies, as members of armies in Islamic Spain (on all sides), throughout the sequence of internal European wars that marked the early modern era, and on both sides of the American Revolution.\footnote{\textit{The Jewish Encyclopedia} offers a detailed list of the involvement of Jews in the army from the Biblical era down to the encyclopedia’s publication. Furthermore, Gumpertz also offers a detailed synopsis of Jewish military involvement from the Biblical age down to the Second World War, although after 1776 his focus is solely on Jewish involvement in United States’ military endeavors.}

While the forces of Bar Kochba were united under a common Jewish flag, neither the Zion Mule Corps, the Jewish Legion, nor any other Jewish military effort during the Diasporic years could boast a similar triumph. Rather, like numerous cases which litter global history up to 1917, the Jewish Legion was simply a part of a larger state’s military structure; in this case, Great Britain. Despite the existence of a continuing, if muted, military tradition, the European Jewish community continued to be ascribed pacifist/intellectual characteristics by their Christian neighbors. What is more, by the end of the nineteenth century, even though many Jews were working to counter these images, they continued to dominate the ways in which Christian Europe defined Jewish Europe. Broadly based on stereotypes of the feminized, intellectual, wandering, and/or degenerate Ghetto Jews, Europe’s Jewish communities faced varying degrees of
incorporation or marginalization depending on the socio-political conditions of the communities surrounding them.

According to Daniel Boyarin, “The topos of the Jewish man as a sort of woman is a venerable one going back at least to the thirteenth century in Europe, where it was widely maintained that Jewish men menstruate.”116 This long history, Boyarin explains, was due in part to the traditional Jewish practice of circumcision, frequently interpreted as a feminizing ordeal. The curse of male menstruation, it was believed in Mediaeval Europe, could only be cured with the blood of Christian children, thus setting the stage for Blood Libel claims (see below) that would define a great deal of Jewish life in Europe for the Diasporic years, in particularly from the twelfth century forward.117

Blood Libel was an accusation leveled against European Jewish communities, first appearing in the Middle Ages. According to sociologist Jeffery Victor, the “‘blood libel’ involves allegations of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children and use of their blood in secret

116 Daniel Boyarin, Unheroic Conduct the Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man, Conversions; 8 (University of California Press, 1997), 210. As cited in Matthew Biberman, Masculinity, Anti-Semitism and Early Modern English Literature: From Satanic to the Effeminate Jew (London: Ashgate, 2004), 7. In short, Zionist remilitarization was in fact a figurative attempt to reclaim the testicles of the Jewish community’s men.

117 One discussion of male menstruation and the cure comes to us from 1648 and Yorkshire minister, Thomas Calvert’s retelling of the prophecy given to him by a recent Jewish convert to Christianity. See:

religious rites." Such fears only strengthened cases against Jewish members of European societies during and after the religious persecutions of the Inquisition and later. The records of the Board of Deputies of British Jews are littered with Blood Libel cases. The London Metropolitan Archives Board of Deputies of British Jews indicates that this remained a concern for European Jews up through the first half of the twentieth century.

Coupled with Blood Libel claims and the feminine characteristics attributed to Europe’s Jewish society was the particular backwardness associated with the Ghetto, further isolating much of the Jewish community from European socio-political life. Steven Aschheim points out that the Ghetto “symbolized the distinction between enlightenment and superstition, progress and reaction, even beauty and ugliness.” Aschheim’s cultural opposites were largely internalized not only by Christian Europe regarding Ghetto life, but by the well-to-do and assimilated classes of Jews in Western Europe, as well. According to David Lloyd George, Edwin Montagu once claimed: “I have been striving all my life to escape from the Ghetto.” Lloyd George’s remembrance of Montagu’s statement is an intriguing assertion, since Montagu had no actual practical or physical knowledge of life in a Ghetto. Much like the story of Masada, however,


121 Montagu was a member of a very prominent Anglo-Jewish family, part of what Chaim Bermant has dubbed ‘the cousinhood.’ Montagu’s eldest brother was, after all, Lord Swaythling.
the point is not whether Montagu actually made this claim, but that the perception (and thus power) of the ghetto remained strong in the identity construction of Jews, even among well-to-do, highly assimilated Jews as late as World War One.

Jewish communities were tolerated to varying degrees among the countries of Europe during the Diasporic years. In England and France, Jews typically fared better through the centuries than their brethren in Germany or Russia. A further outcome of this varied relationship with the European Christian world was still another Othering. Aside from the Othering Christians did of Jews, Aziza Khazzoom argues that Western Jews in turn Othered Eastern European Jews (as well as non-European Jews). This process, she contends, is known as ‘Orientalization.’ Khazzoom’s Orientalization is akin to Edward Said’s Other, in that Western European Jewish communities distanced themselves from Eastern European Jewish communities in much the same way as European empires Othered non-European peoples. A distinction noted in Chissin’s diaries from the late 1800s, differentiated the Sephardic community (Palestinian Jews) from the Ashkenazi (European Jews) like himself. According to Chissin ‘Jerusalem Jews’ carried the stigma of being parasitic and that they “have eyes, yet they don’t see; ears, but they don’t hear. Even facts cannot shake their prejudices.”\footnote{Chissin, 92-3.} Similarly, in the early 1900s Hungarian-born Max Nordau (see below) “projected upon the East European Jew of the Diaspora the physical and mental sickness which characterized … the stereotypes of the degenerate.”\footnote{Mosse: 567.} While

---

It should also be noted that assertions made by Lloyd George with regard to Montagu, in particular, need to be taken with a grain of salt. In his \textit{Memoirs of the Peace Conference}, from which S. D. Waley derived this quote, Lloyd George also claims that, after the release of the Balfour Declaration, Montagu actually came around to the idea of the scheme, and accepted it as a political necessity; a falsehood in the most extreme.

\footnote{Chissin, 92-3.}

\footnote{Mosse: 567.}
Nordau originally came from the Eastern European Jewish world, he had distanced himself from it through a process of education and rejecting ‘superstition.’ Like Said’s Orientalism, Khazzoom’s Orientalization increased in strength over the course of the nineteenth century.

According to Khazzoom, during the period between the 1700s and the 1900s Diaspora Jewish history in Europe and the Middle East can be conceptualized as a series of orientalizations. Through this history, Jews came to view Jewish traditions as oriental, developed intense commitments to westernization as a form of self improvement, and became threatened by elements of Jewish culture that represented the oriental past.  

One example reinforcing Khazzoom assessment and the variable nature of the ‘spectrum of orientalizations,’ is the case of Otto Weininger.  

Although Weininger was more interested in the dynamics between the opposites of ‘Jew’ and ‘German,’ his views were the result of centuries of Othering pursued by European culture, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. According to the argument articulated by Theodor Lessing in 1930, for some members of the Jewish community, like Weininger, “concerns with identity crystallized into a repugnance for their Jewish identity, a phenomenon described as ‘self-hatred.’” Thus, while Weininger is an example of a ‘self-hating’ Jew, he more accurately was a product of his time and place. The stereotypes and characteristics ascribed to European Jewish culture

---

124 Khazzoom: 482.

125 Otto Weininger’s 1903 work *Sex and Character (Geschlecht und Charakter)*, ultimately and fully articulates the internal perspective of a Jewish feminine identity construction. Weininger himself inhabits a particularly problematic place in Jewish history as his work is defined as particularly misogynistic and anti-Semitic. Although Weininger was himself Jewish, he claims to ‘prove’ the fusion of masculinity with Christianity, and conversely femininity with Judaism. What is more, shortly after the publication of *Sex and Character*, Weininger killed himself. He was only 23.

(feminine traits, Ghetto degeneration, and Orientalization) culminated acceptance and thus Jewish self-hatred, as articulated by Weininger, but in defiance, what Max Nordau called the ‘New Jew.’

The New Jew persona was intended to overturn centuries of negative traits ascribed to Jewish communities, and just as with early Zionist history, the events surrounding the 1894 ‘Dreyfus Affair’ influenced the development of the New Jew ideal. The specific case of Dreyfus’ show-trial polarized much of French society. The Affair questioned a Jewish man’s allegiance to any state beyond the Jewish nation and, in turn, his ability to be a military man. Christopher Forth argues that the trial was more than a simply anti-Semitism writ large, and historians who view it as such “have tended to ignore the complexity with which Dreyfus himself was viewed.”127 Because, in France, the intellectual and the Jew had become nearly indiscernible from one another, Dreyfus came to represent a new breed of officer criticized for being a functionary, rather than action oriented.128 Hence, ardent Zionists realized that removal of the stereotype of the intellectual as much as the money-lender or feminine man in his (re)militarization and nationalist cause was the only option for creating a New Jew.129

The New Jew underwent two distinct, but intertwined manifestations over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first of these, which is the main focus here, was a product of the Enlightenment and the Victorian eras. The first stage of the development of


128 Ibid.

129 It must be noted that the ‘New Jew’ is really only a masculine image. More than simply the (re)militarization of the Jewish man the creation of a New Jew was also a re-masculinization effort of Jewish society as well.
the New Jew manipulated the rhetoric of muscular Christianity to alter the perception of Jews as submissive and feminine into the definition of directed, heroic nationalists. The second phase took hold after the Balfour Declaration’s issuance, when colonization and land accumulation in Palestine became the internationally recognized object of political Zionists. Connecting the people to the earth through agricultural pursuits was a key feature of the post-Balfour state-building endeavor. This connection between state-building and agriculture was a close one and crucial for understanding post-World War Two Israeli nationalism, but comes as a distinctly second tier step after masculinization efforts.

George Mosse observes that “for many Jews, the Jewish anatomical structure [both figuratively and physically] was inherently different from the norm and it had to be reshaped if the Jews were to escape from their stereotype and recapture their dignity.”¹³⁰ According to Nordau, recapturing this dignity meant creating “deep-chested, powerfully built and keen-eyed men.”¹³¹ This New Jew served as the symbol of the regeneration of the Jewish people and was a masculinized Jew who fulfilled Nordau’s doctrine of *Muskeljudentum* --muscular Judaism. As “the victims of anti-Semitism [the Jews had] suffered from their own disease, a condition he called *Judendo*, or Jewish distress. Life in the dirty ghetto had afflicted the Jews with effeminacy and nervousness.”¹³² Modern Zionists “could show their worth as a fighting force,

¹³⁰ Mosse: 567.


deserving of their own nation and Jewish national honor.”¹³³ The Jew, Nordau ultimately believed, “must be transformed from one who shared many characteristics of the degenerates to an ideal of manhood which exemplified society’s standards of looks, comportment and behaviour.”¹³⁴ Not only was military heroism important, but defeating the feminizing effects of the ghetto was crucial as well.

Amid this discussion of masculinity and militarism, women appear to have played a limited role. There are two reasons for this. First, as discussed in chapter two, Jewish women were not as maligned as Jewish men in nineteenth century stereotypes. From the Christian Zionist’s perspective women could still be ‘saved’ (converted to Christianity), whereas the process of circumcision had irreversibly altered Jewish men. Second, if as a whole the Jewish people were to become ‘manly,’ shaking off centuries of effeminate characteristics, the ‘womanly,’ even among women, must necessarily be downplayed.

Michael Berkowitz briefly notes the roles of some Jewish women in World War One in his, Western Jewry and the Zionist Projects. Their role is limited to the traditional dynamics between prostitutes and virtuous women or those who had been corrupted by the assimilationist practices of the nineteenth century and ardent believers in the national cause. Zionist women, he observes, were “morally upright, well behaved, and display[ed] a keen sense of purpose.”¹³⁵


¹³⁴ Mosse: 568.

¹³⁵ Berkowitz, 14-5. This discussion of the woman’s role in the New Jew, like the masculine imagery, harkens back to the Biblical account of women as well. The juxtaposition of the virtuous women and prostitute women of the Bible help reinforce and re-inform the definitions of the Israeli nation.
These women “understand that nationalism is not a series of slogans, but rather a philosophy of life.”\textsuperscript{136}

Nordau, for one, remained conservative with regard to women’s roles in social and political leadership, although he did advocate their participation. In 1911, Sarah Thon, a Zionist working for the Zionist Central Office, wrote:

Woman, as we well know, plays a prominent part in the colonizing achievement of every people, but for our particular colonizing work she is of quite exceptional importance. For while other peoples have only the difficulties of climate and district to combat, we have in addition to wipe out years of subjugation and \textit{Golus}, with the ingrained lassitude and indolence they have produced, and to infuse vital energy into the people that for centuries has languished in Palestine in helplessness and lethargy. This task is a very difficult one; and if it is to be performed thoroughly, it must be tackled not only by men, but also by women, and through women.\textsuperscript{137}

Reliant upon the belief that culture is passed from mother to child, the role of women in the Zionist endeavor was a supporting one, focused on the dynamics of the private sphere.

As a trained physician in the nineteenth century, it was not unusual for Nordau to connect social ills and physical disease. As has already been discussed, the term ‘degeneration’ was widely used in the latter half of the 1800s and, as Robert Nye has noted, “There was wide medical and scientific agreement… about the threat of an inheritable and worsening biological degeneration” which was interpreted according the socio-political settings of various national communities.\textsuperscript{138} As a result, different populations appeared to be in greater danger, differing


\textsuperscript{137} Sarah Thon, "Women’s Work in Palestine," in \textit{Zionist Work in Palestine}, ed. Israel Cohen (London: T. Fisher Wilson, 1911), 99. \textit{Golus} in this passage refers to having been dispersed, that is having been a part of the Diaspora.

outcomes were predicted, and solutions reflected nationalist tendencies. The result of changing political structures in the middle of the 1800s, notably a growing demand for the empowerment of the lower classes, was that “Biology suddenly became useful for thinking about politics, and a medical model of diagnosis and cure became a fashionable way of analyzing problems of poverty, education and labour.” Of the biological models, that of degeneration quickly rose to the top.

Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880--1940) became the vehicle of Nordau’s activist approach, advocating the masculinization of Judaism and the militarization of the people via the creation of a Jewish legion. Jabotinsky recognized that in order to carry out the process of militarization, a new ideology to help reinforce muscular Judaism was necessary. For this model Jabotinsky turned to legend and lore of Biblical Israel and closely allied it with modern philosophical and ideological trends.

Muscular Judaism as an Extension of Muscular Christianity

Parallels that exist between what Max Nordau sought for the Jewish community and what European Christians were seeking are significant for our study. The policy of ‘Anglicization’ and the prevention of societal degeneration were driven by the same impulses that inspired the creation of the New Jew. While Anglicization was closely associated with an Anglican Christian viewpoint, it nevertheless shaped the identity construction of all Jews, Catholics, and other Christian denominations, especially those of the upper class. Among the Anglo-Jewish elite, identity construction manifested itself not only in sending their sons to the same schools as their

---

139 Ibid.: 688.
140 Ibid.
Christian counterparts, but in establishing parallel Jewish organizations, like the Anglicized Boy Scouts, for immigrant Jewish boys and girls.

Just as muscular Christianity was a means for inculcating the Christian youth of Britain into a militarized physical identity; British Judaism underwent a revitalization of its own militaristic past with the development of paramilitary organizations like scouting groups. The Jewish Lads’ Brigade, the most prominent example of these groups, was founded in Great Britain in 1895. Largely subsidized by the Maccabæans, “a society of English Jewish intellectuals and professional men who supported Jewish culture,” the Brigade sought to instill in “a rising generation, from its earliest youth, habits of orderliness, cleanliness, and honour, so that in learning to respect themselves they would do credit to their community and country.” 141 The Brigade was a distinct effort on the part of the Anglo-Jewish elite to reform and “help ‘Anglicize’ and assimilate into English society those recent Jewish immigrant boys from eastern Europe,” who, as Khazzoom would argue, represented the oriental branch of the Jewish family. 142 The distinction between Eastern European Jews and Western European Jews was so well understood that in his “Dissertation on the Eastern Question” the Aga Khan stated that “the eastern Jews, whom we may encourage to flock to that unfortunate country [Palestine], need careful watching, for they are terrible human blood-suckers in economic questions [and] we must

141 Richard A. Voeltz, "...A Good Jew and a Good Englishman: The Jewish Lads' Brigade, 1894 - 1922," Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 119. We should note that not all attempts at Anglicization in Jewish communities sought to further Zionist ambitions, frequently the process of Muscular Judaism simply sought to create loyal citizens of the home state, Great Britain, as in our examination. In a 1907 edition of The Jewish World Lady Sassoon (born Aline Caroline de Rothschild), when speaking at the Butler Street Girls club deprecated “the spread of the Zionist movement among the younger generations, remarking that 'we need not chafe for the freedom of tomorrow while we are enjoying the freedom of today.'” Unknown, "A Brief for Girls," The Jewish World, 1 March 1907.

142 Voeltz: 120.
in no way mistake them for the excellent, cultivated Jews of Great Britain or France.”\textsuperscript{143} The Brigade drew several of its members from the Jews’ Free School Cadet Corps, which had access to a rifle range (opened in 1908) and practiced drilling, marching, and gymnastics for the “fulfillment of physical vigor.”\textsuperscript{144} The school consciously used Anglicization to teach “the pupils to adapt to English usages in speech, in manner, in mental attitude, and in principles, in such a way as to enable them to integrate successfully into the wider community.”\textsuperscript{145} Thus the Anglo-Jewish community actively sought to alter the process of Orientalization.

The Brigade received a great deal of press at the turn of the century, a time marked not only by the development of the Aliens Question but also by “growing anxiety over physical deterioration and increasing militarism”\textsuperscript{146} throughout British society. The \textit{Jewish Chronicle} in

\textsuperscript{143} Aga Khan, "Dissertation on the Eastern Question, Undated," Correspondence & Memorandum, p. 7, Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.

\textsuperscript{144} Severin Adam Hochberg, “The Jewish Community and the Aliens Question in Great Britain 1881 --1917” (Dissertation, New York University, 1989), 216. The Jews’ Free School had been founded in 1817.


\textsuperscript{146} Hochberg, 227. The Alien’s Question dominated British politics in large part between 1888 and 1905. During these years, increased immigration from Eastern Europe raised questions among the British populous, in particular the elite, about the moral, physical, and economic effects unrestricted immigration had on the nature of the British nation. Up until 1880 there were about 60,000 Jews living in Great Britain, nearly 40,000 of whom lived in London and as a result of the 1881 --82 pogroms, another 30,000 Eastern European Jews settled in London’s East End, nearly doubling the city’s Jewish population. Already an easily scapegoated community, the Eastern European Jewish immigrants, who settled largely in London’s East End, became a focal point of concern. The Board of Deputies of British Jews aggressively campaigned against prohibitions placed on Jewish, specific, immigration. One avenue for counter-acting the apparent ‘evils’ of the large influx of Eastern European Jews, therefore, was the establishment and furthering of the educational structures such as the Jews’ Free School. Although not universally aimed at the immigrant children, these educational structures actively pursued a policy of assimilation. The ultimate outcome was an attempt to mitigate the effects of increased immigration and create a smooth transition for immigrant communities into British life.
particular observed with delight how the “ghetto-bend” was being “ironed out, and the keen bright faces seemed remarkably free from most of the outlines and curves which are conventionally considered Jewish.” The ghetto bend’s association with social degeneration encouraged Jewish leaders to focus on treating its existence.

Although the Jewish Lads’ Brigade was only intended to make ‘good Britons’ out of the boys, and not to extend the Zionist agenda, the component of militarism it introduced to immigrant communities was ultimately important to Zionist aspirations. Loyalty, mental and moral improvement, and national pride were all the indicators of true patriotism which, it was believed, nations should have in order to be legitimate claimants of national definition. Given that the capacity of Jewish patriotism had already been in doubt among large segments of Europe’s population, focusing attention on patriotic tendencies were crucial features of Zionist goals. In the years after the creation of the Jewish Legion and the Balfour Declaration, activist youth Zionist organizations, like BETAR, increasingly sought to instill the patriotism the Brigade found so important. When coupled with a political and cultural agenda, the Zionist youth organizations became not only an echo of British cultural inculcation, but of the Zionist desire to remilitarize the Jewish community more universally.

---

147 Unknown, Jewish Chronicle, 24 January 1902. as cited in Hochberg.

148 BETAR, a Latvian student’s organization, established in 1923 is significant particularly for its title’s double meaning. On the one hand Betar refers to the last stronghold against the Roman forces in the 130s CE. On the other, it is the Hebrew acronym for ‘Alliance of Josef Trumpeldor.’ Josef Trumpeldor was a former Russian army officer who was killed by Arab attackers while defending a Jewish settlement (Tel Hai) in 1920 and like Jabotinsky one of the strongest proponents of Jewish legion during World War One. See: Alain Dieckhoff, The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), 198.
The actual events surrounding the final issuance of the Balfour Declaration indicated that Zionism achieved a masculine vision of the Jewish people and by extension, their future. Just after the British Cabinet met and decided on the final wording of the Declaration (as will be discussed in chapter five) Sir Mark Sykes came out of the room and congratulated Chaim Weizmann, declaring “It’s a boy!” That the success of the Zionist enterprise could easily be exchanged with the events surrounding the birth of a boy are not hard to understand in the context of Zionist leaders’ conscious effort to masculinize Judaism via the political Zionist agenda. One wonders if the birth of a girl would have harkened the failure of political Zionism and the triumph of Montagu’s anti-Zionism?

**Conclusion**

There was no clear or universal definition of race by the end of the nineteenth century, and yet it was clear from the statements and actions of British policy-makers that race factored into how policy was constructed. British statesmen allowed race to factor into the definitions of subject groups and usually did so with specific, typically narrow, agendas in mind. Race, and the occasionally related gender dynamics, bolstered imperial designs and created useful Others in the imperial periphery. These others often became counterpoints to the ‘ideal imperialists’ who represented the intentions of the core. As will be discussed further below, race played directly into the construction of the Balfour Declaration, giving weight to arguments for reasonable imperialism in Palestine. In turn, Zionist aspirations built upon Anglicization and muscular Christian extrapolations, and used racial hierarchies to distance their endeavors from anti-Zionists as well as Palestinians after the Balfour Declaration’s release (see chapter six). Arabs and Indians continued to confront racial stereotypes that reinforced their child-like status and the
necessity of the British government to continue to teach them how to govern. Ultimately, in addition to the necessities of economics, politics, and war, race played a fundamental role in shaping the knowledge with which imperialists governed and in the ways in which ‘subject races’ responded to imperial policy.
CHAPTER FOUR
PERSONALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Personality can affect the course of history just as much as events and ideologies. Shifting the focus from thematic, regional level perspectives to the individual level, this chapter examines the significance of individual participants normally obscured or omitted from the conventional narrative of the Balfour Declaration. Acting as the crucial linkages between otherwise disparate groups, individuals reinforced the global nature of the Balfour Declaration’s history by directly and indirectly promoting and discouraging the policies of the imperial government. This chapter shifts the place of these agents in the development, creation, and outcome of the Balfour Declaration to a more central position as important actors in the Declaration’s history.

In order to explore these individual contributions to the formation of the Balfour Declaration, this chapter will be broken into three parts: writers (fiction and non-fiction), un-official actors (members of the W.Z.O. or religious leaders), and official political actors (i.e., members of the British government, military, and propagandists). These divisions are not necessarily discreet. While a clear line may be drawn linking the latter two, editorializing in the popular media was a common avenue pursued by official and un-official political actors alike. The use of the editorial pages was a common practice in garnering support for their particular positions. Thus, while individuals will be discussed in terms of their main employment (as authors, editors, members of Parliament, etc.), some overlap is inevitable.
The Power of the Pen: Writers and the Question of Zionism

The power of individual authors to shape the development of the Zionist endeavor, define a national identity, or contribute to the war effort is a profoundly important feature of the story of the Balfour Declaration and national identification. Fiction and non-fiction equally informed both government officials as well as the general public in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Novelists like Mary Anne Evans (George Eliot, 1819--1880), Flora Annie Steel (1847--1929), and Israel Zangwill (1864 --1926), in particular manipulated traditional stereotypes of Muslims and Jews throughout their works. Eliot and Zangwill, specifically, used Jewish characters and Zionist-centric story lines to advocate for pro-Zionist (broadly defined) political agendas. Eliot’s Daniel Deronda unwittingly became a part of the remasculinization of Judaism by emphasizing a new vision of Jewish manliness and culture. Steel, as discussed in chapter three, wrote fiction which sought to educate Europeans about the Indian world. Like Eliot, Zangwill used his novels as a platform for social commentary on the dynamic qualities of European Jewish life. Unlike Eliot or Steel, however, Zangwill straddled the worlds of literature and journalism, disseminating his social commentary in the non-fiction prose of journals and newspapers.

Journals and editorialists like Zangwill, Charles Prestwich Scott (C. P. Scott, 1846 – 1932), Maulana Mohamed Ali (1878 – 1931), and Mahatma Gandhi (1869 – 1948) offered their points of view in newspapers which acted as platforms for public advocacy. Full time journalists like Scott and Mohamed Ali found not only that the newspaper industry was the most effective means of mass communication at the turn of the twentieth century, but also that being journalists advanced them into political (official and un-official) circles and positions of influence.
Similarly, un-official political leaders like Gandhi and Zangwill found newspapers a central vehicle for advocating change to the status quo.

*The Journalists and Editors*

Perhaps no other English journalist had a larger impact on shaping British policy than *Manchester Guardian* editor Charles Prestwich Scott (C. P. Scott). His diaries are a litany of communications and conversations with British politicians, political activists, and important businessmen. Trevor Wilson, in commenting on Scott’s life, states that there was a strong connection between the political fortunes of David Lloyd George and Scott, so much so, that a reading of Scott’s diaries and letters may suggest that the chief interest of a volume dedicated to Scott’s life “lies in the insights [they provide] into the career and character of David Lloyd George.”¹ Wilson is cautious to note, however, that Scott’s career and personal documents tell more than just the story of David Lloyd George. They also offer a glimpse into early twentieth century policy and how knowledge was produced.

Scott was solidly liberal and his opinions expressed to Lloyd George reflected this state of mind. Contrary to Scott’s firm political views, Lloyd George generally vacillated between liberal and conservative perspectives, a fact Scott was not certain of until 1918. However, on the question of Palestine Lloyd George stayed stubbornly concrete in his vision. Scott’s strong convictions on liberty and personal freedom surfaced at several points during his friendship with Lloyd George. In early April 1917, Scott raised the question of conscientious objectors with Lloyd George, arguing that “those that were left had now given ample proof of their

genuineness, there could be no object in further penalising them.”² For Lloyd George, however, there was “no sympathy with men who when their fellow countrymen were in danger of starvation would not work the land to help save them.”³ Again, in the wake of the Russian Revolution as the “coldness with which this tremendous movement of political and spiritual emancipation was received by a great portion of [the British] press and society … seems to show how far [Britons] have drifted from the tradition of liberty.”⁴ This idealism for political liberty influenced Scott’s views on the questions of Ireland and Palestine as well. It was here, however, that Scott may have begun to see the eventual division between himself and Lloyd George.

In terms of national definition, on the one hand Lloyd George viewed the Zionist scheme for Palestine as “the one really interesting part of the war.”⁵ On the other hand, regarding the Irish case, Scott noted that Lloyd George’s proposals were “a bare makeshift to tide over the immediate difficulty and spare us the shame of a revolted Ireland at the moment of the Peace Conference.”⁶ Whereas Scott saw the two ideas in much the same light, Lloyd George retained the capacity to separate Zionism from other forms of nationalist outcry. Zionism for Lloyd George and the more actively pro-Zionist leadership was an exceptional case, as will be discussed further later.

The differences between Scott’s and Lloyd George’s vision came out in a meeting Scott had with Edwin Montagu in September 1917. Montagu was concerned that Lloyd George had

² Ibid., 274.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., 272.
⁵ Ibid., 273-4.
⁶ Ibid.
the capability of overturning the liberal agenda and argued that Lloyd George “was coming more and more under the influence of the Tories.” Scott suggested that the recent appointment of Montagu and Churchill to the Cabinet countered these fears, but by the late fall of 1918 it was clear Montagu had been right to fear Lloyd George’s vacillations. According to Wilson, “the two men [Scott and Lloyd George] had nothing further to say on the matter. Lloyd George made his choice: to fight side by side with the Conservatives taking a section of Liberals with him but treating the Liberal Party as such, and the Labour Party, as enemies.” During the moment in 1917 when the future of Palestine was most undefined, however, Scott and Lloyd George worked with one goal.

A close confidant and political advisor to Chaim Weizmann, Scott acted as an intermediary between the Government and the W.Z.O. on several occasions. Scott, Herbert Samuel, Weizmann, and Lloyd George frequently spoke on the matter of Zionism and the future of Palestine, throughout the war years. On the many other points where Scott remained constant, however, Lloyd George did not. Scott’s ambitions for Ireland and Palestine both -- seeking fair political solutions and securing liberty for all -- reflected a coherent, structured idea about the nature of nation and of personal freedom, but whereas he was able to impact policy for Palestine he made little headway on the future of Ireland.

Elsewhere in the Empire, Indian journalist and ardent nationalist Mohamed Ali noted the significance Irish and Indian Home Rule as well as the question of Zionism, in advocating for Indian freedoms and the recognition of pan-Islamic rights. Early in his career, Mohamed Ali had

7 Ibid., 307.

8 Ibid., 361.

been an advocate of British imperialism and tutelage in India, taking a page out Sayyid Ahmed Khan’s (1817 --1898) view that Britain was good for the future of India.¹⁰ Unlike Khan, however, Mohamed Ali developed an antipathy toward the Empire during a visit to England in 1913. While there, he found himself better situated for understanding the complex relationship the Christian West had with the Islamic East -- especially with the Ottoman Empire. As Mushirul Hasan observes, Mohamed Ali began to understand that outside forces, remolded “the destiny of the Ottoman Empire.”¹¹ Mohamed Ali left England with the belief that “the British were insensitive to Muslim feelings over the Khilafat, and their ignorance of conditions back home was ‘driving them fast to the brink of the precipice.’”¹² This, and the fact that he found it frustratingly difficult to meet with anyone from the India House while in London, encouraged Mohamed Ali to take up a new position in his fight for Indian and Islamic rights.

In 1911, Mohamed Ali and his brother Shaukat Ali began publishing the English language newspaper, Comrade, as a vehicle for their nationalist rhetoric. Historians have observed that Comrade was indispensable for helping to stir up support for pan-Islamic sentiment and that, although “The future of Turkey and of the Khilafat had been a matter of

¹⁰ Khan wrote a great deal on the question the Caliphate and British imperialism during his life. In addition to questioning the legitimacy of the Ottoman leader, “a ruler who could not in practice protect Muslims and enforce the mandates of the shari’a [Islamic law] could not be the khalifa [leader of the Islamic community],” (P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 178.) Khan also maintained that, in light of Great Britain’s technical and organizational prowess, “it was necessary for Indian Muslims to allow the British to define the terms and conditions of their political life” (Hardy, 179.). Khan’s rhetoric has been widely acknowledged as being a basis upon which the 1919 Khilafat Movement was built.


¹² Ibid.
concern to Indian Muslims since the last quarter of the nineteenth century … pan-Islamism did not have much popularity till Mohamed Ali took up the cause in 1911 – 12.”

Contrary to the arguments of scholars who deemphasize the supra-territoriality of Khilafatist sentiment, Mohamed Ali argued that “pan-Islamism is nothing more nor less than Islam itself, the supernational Sangathan of Muslims in five continents.” Between 1911 and 1915 Mohamed Ali, through Comrade, extolled the virtues of this theme of universal Islamic brotherhood, making his co-religionists aware of the conditions of Muslims in India and throughout the British Empire.

Indian Muslims were struck by three political blows between the fall of 1911 and the summer of 1912: the annulment of the partition of Bengal, the rejection of the right of Aligarh University to affiliate colleges all over India, and, most importantly in terms of global history, the British non-involvement in Italy’s invasion of Tripoli. These events, Mohamed Ali argued, should have taught the Indian Muslim community that “it was futile to rely on anything else but their own God and the strength that He may chose to grant them.” From 1913 onward, “Mohamed Ali published accounts of alleged atrocities committed by the Balkan troops and their

---


14 Ibid. According to G. R. Thursby “Sangathan meant the acquisition of strength through consolidation of communal resources” (158) and in this sense a logical corollary to the Islamic umma. However, Thursby goes on to note that with the emergence of the 1920s Sangathan Movement “the word became the foremost rallying-cry of those Hindus who believed themselves to be lagging behind Muslims in mobilizing and militancy” (158). G. R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict, and Communal Movements in Northern India 1923-1928 (Leiden: J. Brill, 1975).

15 Basu, 113-114.

16 Ibid., 114.
followers in the war with Turkey.”\textsuperscript{17} Despite his anti-British sentiment, Mohamed Ali was not ecstatic about the Turkish government either. Where he found a leader of the Muslim community in the Caliph, he found a despotic Turkish national in the Sultan. In a January 1911 issue of \textit{Comrade}, Ali indicated that his dislike for the leaders of the Ottoman Empire hinged on their abandonment of Ottoman Imperial identity in favor of Turkish Imperial identity, which came at the expense of all nations within the imperial borders who were not Turks.\textsuperscript{18} He further noted that this meant constitutional equality among Greeks, Jews, and Arabs was slipping away rapidly.\textsuperscript{19} This fear, about the loss of constitutional equality in the Ottoman Empire, indicated a sophisticated understanding of national identity and national rights. Whereas Mohamed Ali was advocating Islamic unity, he was also advocating Indian independence.

By 1914, however, under internment and growing political pressure (not to mention financial constraints) circulation of the \textit{Comrade} ultimately ceased.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, neither Mohamed Ali nor Shaukat Ali diminished their advocacy of Islamic and Indian rights. Mohamed Ali, who was interned regularly throughout World War One, became an important figure to the question of national definition in India, so much so that in November 1917, Montagu questioned the internment of “Mahomet Ali in India for Pan-Mohammedism when we encourage Pan-

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 116.


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} In 1911 the two also began publishing an Urdu weekly, \textit{Hamdard}. The two newspapers had a combined circulation of well over 10,000 not long after they began. \textit{Comrade} was revived for a short while in the 1920s, but it never regained its once prominent position.
Judaism.”21 Informed, in part by the journalism of local Indians, Montagu and other leaders in India drew parallels between pan-Islamism and British imperial policy. The correspondence between Montagu, Viscount Chelmsford (Frederic John Napier Thesiger, First Viscount Chelmsford, 1868 --1933), and Lord Ronaldshay (Laurence John Lumley Dundas, Second Marquess of Zetland, 1876 --1971) indicate a great familiarity with local journalism. One outcome of this familiarity was a growing belief that the policies of the British Empire have a disruptive impact on the relationship between it and the people of India.

British policy-makers who feared the repercussions of a unified Islamic front against continued British imperial policy took note of the linkages which Mohamed Ali overtly created in the Comrade. While in Egypt, en route to India, for example, Montagu stated, with trepidation, the realities that may befall the United Kingdom if it chose not to retain a friendly relationship with the Muslim world. Egypt’s ruling elite he observed was

intimately connected with Turkey, particularly on the female side, and it is one of the greatest misfortunes that ever befell a Mahommendan Power like England to have fallen foul of the Turk. What a lot we have to pay for bad diplomacy.22

As the Aga Khan noted in a letter to Montagu in 1919, the future of the Ottoman Empire, by then the ‘Turkish Question’ was “indissolubly bound up with the Indian question.”23 Stanley Reed (1872 --1969), editor of The Times of India, similarly wrote to Lord Lytton (Victor Alexander George Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, 1876 – 1947) in 1921 that


22 Ibid., p. 21-22.

For the last two and a half years I have been preaching, in India and in London, the doctrine that the real Indian issue is the question of the Khilafate. For the same period the Foreign Office has been pursuing a policy which not only exacerbates the Indian Moslem beyond bearing, but which is so unspeakably futile that it is a source of as much derision to the world.  

For journalists and statesmen alike, the futures of the Islamic Middle East and South Asia were intrinsically interconnected.

Mohamed Ali was not the only Indian nationalist to draw these inter-imperial connections, however. As Annie Besant (1847 --1933) had argued in 1918, the complexity of Indian nationalism required India to obtain a place in the global national structure. Conversely, to separate events in the Ottoman Empire, Ireland, or elsewhere from the ideologies and underpinnings of Indian nationalism indicated a myopic policy on the part of the British Government. In March 1921, not long after the Treaty of Sèvres had been finalized, Mahatma Gandhi asserted in The Bombay Chronicle that

No canon, however, of ethics or war can possibly justify the gift by the Allies of Palestine to Jews. It would be a breach of implied faith with Indian Mussulmans in particular and the whole of India in general. Not an Indian soldier would have gone, if Britain on the eve of war had declared even the possibility of any such usurpation, and it is becoming clearer every day that if India is to remain a free partner in a future British Commonwealth, as distinguished from the Empire, the terms of the Khilafat have to be settled more in consultation with the spiritual leaders of Mussulmans than with the political leaders of Turkey.

---

24 Stanley Reed, "Stanley Reed to Lord Lytton, 9 December, 1921," Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.

25 See chapter one for further information on Annie Besant.

By December 1921, a *Times of India* article concerned with the Zionist scheme for Palestine made it clear that the Balfour Declaration was widely perceived of as a fool-hardy policy that, if fulfilled, would only hurt British power in the Middle East and India.

A correspondent draws out attention to the fact that in outlining the broad principles of a statement of Middle Eastern affairs which would secure that great desideratum, peace with and within Turkey, we took no account of the future Palestine. That omission was deliberate, because the future of Palestine is not worth considering; of all the absurd schemes which sprang from the turbid brains of British statesmen on the termination of the war, the “settlement” of Palestine was the most grotesque. Our position there as the Mandatory Power arises from what is called the “Balfour Declaration” of 1917. … Many people, in the fit of cold reason which has followed the glamour of victory are asking what that Declaration means. None has been able to suggest an answer. Least of all, we are convinced, could Mr. Balfour himself furnish an intelligible explanation of the logical application of the policy here outlined.27

Although each individual journalist and author had his/her own agenda the reach of literature and newspapers complicated the political questions which defined World War One and the post-War years.

*The Novelist*

Almost all histories about the Balfour Declaration incorporate at least a minimal discussion of George Eliot’s 1876 work *Daniel Deronda*. Despite this, the effect the book actually had on policy is largely ignored. Eliot’s work was not written as a platform for Weizmann’s Jewish Zionism, having appeared nearly forty years before the Declaration was issued, but it was imbued with a great deal of Christian Zionist rhetoric and it is here that the power of *Daniel Deronda* is best understood.

English professor Barry Qualls argues that Eliot focused on the “anti-Semitism of her world, [and] she reminded her readers that ‘a people owing the triple name of Hebrew, Israelite, and Jew’ created, and kept alive, religious traditions that constituted ‘the birthplace of common

---

27 Stanley Reed, *Times of India*, 6 December 1921.
memories and habits of mind." In *Daniel Deronda* Eliot purposefully reverses the place of Christians and Jews in an effort to underscore her own Zionist vision. Qualls notes “George Eliot’s Christians are the heathens, and they need the Jews for liberation.” Offering a highly stylized and romanticized vision of Jerusalem and a Jewish ‘return’ to Palestine, Eliot’s protagonist goes “off to rescue Palestine for his people” in such a way as to square with the Protestant vision of Zionism advocated by Christian Zionists like Arthur Balfour and David Lloyd George. Because of Eliot’s popularity as a novelist and the well-studied character of her authorship, *Daniel Deronda* allowed Christian Zionists to believe a Jewish Return to Palestine was not only possible, but actually desirable to Europe’s Jews. As with race, the perception created by such fiction informed the knowledge policy-makers chose to use in substantiating their claims for the Declaration’s issuance.

This tenuous relationship between the information fictional work offered and how it was used by the politically powerful was not limited to the Jewish question. As has been discussed, Flora Annie Steel sought to educate Englishmen in England, protecting them from having to learn for themselves what South Asia was actually like. Similarly, Rudyard Kipling’s notable patriotic work informed how both imperial leaders and the public viewed the Empire. As H. L. Valey notes, between 1890 and 1900 Kipling and jingoistic imperialism were synonymous in the public mind. Such a desire to inform the public, not to mention statesmen, was not unusual for


29 Ibid., 131.

30 Ibid.

fictional works. Benjamin Disraeli’s *Sybil* examined the rights of Catholics in nineteenth century Great Britain and Upton Sinclair’s *The Jungle* shed light on the atrocious working conditions caused by the Industrial Revolution. Fiction, as has been argued by many scholars, was, and continues to be, used to inform the opinions of those in positions of power as well as the general public.

Like Eliot, Zangwill’s fictional, and non-fiction work, are accounted for in the Balfour Declaration’s history. While his fictional work certainly tackled many of the same concerns his non-fiction essays broached, it is his non-fiction work which is more fully recognized. Because Zangwill was actually a member and advocate of Jewish Zionist endeavor his historical significance is more overt than Eliot’s, and typically receives a great deal more attention. Zangwill’s 1889 article “English Judaism: A Criticism and Classification,” appeared in the new journal, the *Jewish Quarterly Review*. The essay established Zangwill’s philosophical stance on Judaism, and the nebulous place of English Jews in the wider realm of global Jewry. According to V. D. Lipman, Zangwill was critical of late nineteenth century Jewish theology, but remained sympathetic to the “age-long faith of the simple pious Jews” who vested their faith in God’s promise to re-establish Israel. While securing a position as a respected commentator on Jewish matters, this article also established his tenuous relationship with the Political Zionist cause. According to Zangwill, Jewish nationalism “seems to consist in keeping up some Jewish observances and customs which are connected with the historical life of Israel; and in keeping down any inconvenient self-questionings as to its own rationality. It is ‘auld lang syne’ raised to


a religion.” As he understood it, Jewish nationalists (Political Zionists) were “best classified, despite its pretensions, as an ‘intensive [sic] form’ of ‘Racially sympathetic Jews not professing Judaism.’” At the heart of Zangwill’s work was a division of British Jewry in two large categories, each containing numerous subcategories: ‘Professing Judaism’ and ‘Not professing Judaism.’ These distinctions in the Anglo-Jewish population would have been a good study for the Political Zionists like Weizmann in the 1910s, as they articulate the divisions so prevalent in the community and the divisions which made the Zionist endeavor so difficult in 1917. While fault can be found with Zangwill’s categories, the assumptions which underlie his work were the same as those policy-makers struggled within the 1910s. Namely, what is the nature of nation? As in the 1890s, no one seemed to have a clear answer.

An early follower of Herzl, Zangwill left the W.Z.O. in 1905 and founded the Jewish Territorial Organization (I.T.O., after its Yiddish initials) which sought any land upon which a Jewish community could be built free of discrimination. The I.T.O. purposefully encouraged the colonization efforts of Jews not wishing to remain in the lands where they now lived, but put no special emphasis on Palestine. Paramount in his argument for this was the impracticality of political Zionism’s focus on Palestine and how the upheaval of the native populations there would be disastrous for the efforts of creating a peaceful Jewish community home. This distinction, forced upon the W.Z.O. and the English Zionist Federation (E.Z.F.) in 1917, indicated Zangwill’s ability to discern the various natures of the divisions in Judaism that

---

34 Israel Zangwill, "English Judaism: A Criticism and a Classification," The Jewish Quarterly Review 1, no. 4 (1889): 394.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.: 393.
Weizmann never seemed able, or willing, to accept. This flexible understanding of what was needed for Judaism eventually led Zangwill, while speaking at Carnegie Hall in New York City in 1923, to declare political Zionism dead.

While policy was created by politicians, ‘average’ members of the Empire had opinions that could be openly expressed in community forums, like literature and the newspapers. This, coupled with the dynamics of special interest groups, only made the questions relating to Palestine equally global and personal.

**The Murky World of Unofficial Politics**

Influential men and women who maintained considerable political power, despite their status in non-political entities, led the W.Z.O., the E.Z.F., the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and religious groups like the Ismailis and the Roman Catholic Church. For our purposes, the distinction here between official and un-official parties relates to the state apparatus. Official persons, like Members of Parliament, are elected to office by citizens/subjects of a state or are appointed to their office by state leaders (i.e., military leaders or Cabinet ministers). Although there sometimes is an electoral or appointment process for unofficial leadership, membership in these communities is limited by religion, political affiliation, or some other membership criteria beyond country of residence or birth. Un-official leaders represent exclusive communities that are limited in membership and goals, whereas official leaders represent more inclusive communities limited by the legislative apparatuses of states.
**Individual Zionism as Zionist Policy Structure**

Histories of the Balfour Declaration place a great deal of emphasis on the personalities of World Zionist leaders Chaim Weizmann (1874 - 1952), Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880 --1940), and Nahum Sokolow (1859 --1936). Weizmann, in particular, is attributed a special status and an overly romanticized role in the creation of the Declaration. Scholars Norman Rose and Ronald Sanders credit Weizmann, whose “seemingly unlikely rise [as] a humble provincial chemist” had the effect, “more than any other Zionist leader,” of his being, “responsible for the Balfour Declaration.” Yet, while Weizmann is certainly important to the overall story, his rise was not at all ‘unlikely,’ and neither was he the only figure to alter and manipulate the Declaration’s wording.

Weizmann’s beginnings were humble. Born in Motol, Russia (now Belarus) his home village was fortunate enough to escape the physical violence of the 1881-2 pogroms because of its remoteness and size. Like other Jewish children in Eastern Europe, Weizmann’s early education focused on the Talmud and Biblical history, but also included, as he described it, more “enlightened” instruction in the natural and physical sciences. The traditional Jewish belief that the world’s Jewry would one day return to Palestine, guided by God, was widely held in Motol, but the tenets of political Zionism, which were beginning to appear in other parts of the Russian Pale remained distant to the city and its inhabitants.

---


In 1885, Weizmann’s official introduction to Chemistry (his career path) and Zionism (his ideological path) began at the Real Gymnasium in Pinsk. Although Zionism in Pinsk was largely philanthropic in nature, the ideas first introduced by Leo Pinsker and later popularized by Theodor Herzl had begun to stir as well. In the late 1800s, however, Zionism was not “tolerated as a political movement by the czarist regime,” but as a form of charity, it was able to survive and help individuals and families move out of the repressive state structure of Imperial Russia. These efforts were not necessarily intended to create the groundwork for a Jewish state, but rather to help members of the community escape the hardships of their Russian lives.

Not all Zionists believed this charitable/philanthropic form of Zionism was useful or helpful in truly changing the fortunes of the world’s Jewry. Weizmann was a member of a more politicized camp of Zionists who believed the only solution to the woes of the Jewish community was a fully formed Jewish state. The distinctions between philanthropic and political Zionists were a point of frustration for Weizmann in the 1910s and 1920s, particularly when Zionist ambitions were finally making international political headway. While at the Real Gymnasium, and with a tone of cynicism, Weizmann pointed out that the very well-to-do families were “bitterly anti-Zionist” while the middle and poorer classes created the bulk of Zionist support. This cynicism and indeed this socio-economic division plagued Weizmann’s efforts. The antipathy he had for well-to-do Jews influenced his relationship with Jewish organizations like the Board of Deputies of British Jews in Great Britain and indicated that the question of Zionism was equally a regional, global, and individual issue as well.

---

40 Ibid., 24.

41 Ibid.
After completing his studies in Pinsk, Weizmann traveled west to do graduate work in Germany. There he came to the realization that his understanding of Judaism and nationalism was not universal, even within the Jewish community. Unlike Jewish-Gentile relations in Russia, German society was as alien to him as the language. German Jews considered themselves German first and Jewish only in religion. One professor Weizmann met argued that “if the Germans would only have their eyes opened to the excellent qualities of Jews,” the anti-Semitism that was beginning to pick up steam across the country would simply dissipate.\(^42\) Weizmann did not see it this way and only responded that “if a man has a piece of mud in his eye, he doesn’t want to know whether it’s a piece of mud or a piece of gold. He just wants to get it out!”\(^43\) Echoing Theodor Herzl’s belief that anti-Semitism would eventually help the Zionist cause, Weizmann believed that assimilation, as was advocated in Germany and Western Europe, was neither possible nor desirable.\(^44\)

During Weizmann’s tenure in Berlin, Herzl’s *The Jewish State* was published (1896). Although the ideas contained in Herzl’s work were no different than those Weizmann and his friends had been discussing in Berlin coffeehouses, the general reaction in the Jewish community was revolutionary. The subsequent W.Z.O. helped to gather this energy and motivated European Jews to think about the creation of their own state, in particular, in Palestine.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 32.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Herzl declares, in his diaries, that he believed anti-Semites would do no harm to the Zionist endeavor, but may in fact become some of its most significant allies. Marvin Lowenthal, ed., *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap in arrangement with The Dial Press, Inc, 1962), 10. This is also noted in Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2000), 40. Here Segev declares that Herzl actually said: “The anti-Semites will become our most loyal friends; the anti-Semitic nations will become our allies.”
Amid Weizmann’s intellectual pursuits he met and married Vera Chatzman. Although Vera Weizmann did not initially share her husband’s passion and determination for the Zionist cause, the passage of time allowed her to develop her own zeal for the subject. Eventually she became as significant a player as her husband in the Zionist endeavor, despite the fact that she is portrayed as a passive actor in the history.

Like her husband, Vera was well-educated; having received medical training in Geneva she practiced as a pediatrician until 1916 when she gave up her practice to work more closely with Chaim in his discussions with British politicians and prominent Jewish leaders. Although the record is brief on her role in shaping the Zionist cause, the letters and papers of Chaim clearly indicate that she was fully aware of all important events, personages, and ambitions of the Zionist organizations.

Scholars who have acknowledged Vera’s commitment and contribution to the Zionist endeavor are few. Only Ronald Sanders’ The High Walls of Jerusalem gives her an index entry. Even there however, her role is described as a passive player in the history of Zionism -- recipient of Chaim’s letters. It is clear in reading Chaim’s letters, however, that Vera was active in the development of the Zionist endeavor. In December 1914, while Chaim traveled throughout Europe drumming up support for the Zionist enterprise, he wrote to Vera that “You will remember that what we are building, we are building together.”

45 In this section, for the sake of clarity the more informal use of the first names of Vera and Chaim will be used. Elsewhere in this work the word ‘Weizmann’ will be used to refer to Chaim Weizmann. Whereas traditional histories of Zionism use the phrase ‘Mrs. Weizmann’ to refer to Vera this is consciously not done here so as to reinforce the argument that Vera was herself an active agent in the history of the Zionist endeavor, not only Chaim Weizmann’s wife.

from Manchester, Vera served as the un-official interim head of the Zionist organization there. Only a few days later, on 24 December, Chaim’s letter indicates that Vera had already met with British businessman Israel Sieff (later Baron Sieff) and was soon to receive scholar and writer Leon Simon, both of whom were crucial members of the Weizmanns’ inner Zionist circle.

By the early 1900s it had been made clear to political Zionists that the only logical source for political help was Great Britain. Ties linking Eastern European Zionists to Great Britain, first formalized in 1900, at the Fourth Zionist Congress in London, were strengthened at the Sixth Zionist Congress (1903), when it was announced that the British Government was willing to offer territory in British East Africa as an alternate location for Jewish settlement. Uneasy about taking steps to further destabilize the already weak Ottoman Empire, the British government offered the land in present-day Uganda for the purposes of the Jewish settlement.47 This scheme, the ‘Uganda Proposal,’ appealed to Zionists like Israel Zangwill who believed any land was a step in the right direction, particularly in light of the worsening situation in Russia. However, the great majority of political Zionists would not consider anything short of Palestine, and the plan was ultimately rejected. Chaim Weizmann, for one, voted against it.

For Political Zionists like Weizmann, Palestine was a non-negotiable point. In response to the Uganda Proposal, Weizmann stated:

We knew that Palestine could not be obtained in short order, and that is why we do not despair if this or that particular fails. ... If the British Government and people are what I think they are, they will make us a better offer.48

---

47 While the W.Z.O. did send out a commission to investigate this offer, Palestine remained, largely because of its cultural significance, the focus of the W.Z.O. The proposal to encourage immigration to East Africa, at least as a temporary fix for the communities hardest hit by Eastern European anti-Semitism, was put before the W.Z.O.’s Sixth Annual congress in 1903, but was defeated by a 295-178 vote.

Shortly after the defeat of the Uganda Proposal, in July 1904, Herzl died, opening the door for Weizmann to become a more central figure in the Zionist cause. Herzl’s death also signaled a shift of Zionist focus from the Eurocentric W.Z.O. to Great Britain and the possibilities Britain offered in obtaining Palestine. While a great number of Zionists continued, even during World War One, to advocate for a German statement favorable to Zionism, the camp that was ultimately successful turned its attentions to London. Logically, this shift could only be carried out with a stronger base in Britain. It was as a result of the Weizmanns’ move to Manchester, where Chaim worked in the chemistry department at the University, that the inner circle of devoted political Zionists was created.49

Despite Weizmann’s successes in science and in the Zionist cause while at Manchester, he still had little affinity for the wider Anglo-Jewish population “who were still concentrating, for the larger part, on the possibilities of Uganda.”50 The Board of Deputies of British Jews, in particular Lucien Wolf (1857--1930), did not even share this vision of a Zionist enterprise focusing more on assimilationist policies, and dissention scarred the relationship among members of the Anglo-Jewish community and the newly immigrated political Zionists throughout the War. In a collection of notes from the Board of Deputies of British Jews archives, entitled “Difficulties of Political Zionism,” the centrality of Palestine itself came under fire. The “Difficulties…,” which was probably written in 1916, asserts:

49 During his time in Manchester, Weizmann made himself an invaluable and tangible asset to the war effort as well. His chemical work on the production of acetone, an important ingredient in the munitions industry, led to his being appointed Honorary Technical Adviser on acetone supplies for the Admiralty on 1 September 1915. See: Leonard Stein, ed., The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. VII (Jerusalem Israeli University Press, 1975).

We do not know precisely, or even approximately, what Palestine is. If it is the Biblical country, it is too large for Jews to claim; if it is the land settled and owned by the pre-exilic Hebrews, it is too small for any practical political purpose of the modern Jews. That is an area of 3,800 square miles, or little more than one sixth the size of England.51 Palestine, aside from the role it played in the historical definition of the Jewish nation, did not seem a practical solution for any viable state undertaking.

Beyond the potential impracticality of Palestine, fundamental philosophical differences split the Jewish community in England, represented on the one hand by ‘Weizmann Zionists’ and on the other hand by ‘Wolf Zionists.’ In April 1915, the Wolf-led Conjoint Foreign Committee (C.F.C.) met with the political Zionists, including Weizmann. This meeting did not end in an entente. As it stood in the spring of 1915, the C.F.C. could not justify working with Weizmann’s Zionists, who the C.F.C. believed were too focused on the universality of the Jewish nation. Political Zionists, the Committee argued, only spoke for one segment of the Jewish community, rather than to all Jews.52 In 1916, this argument continued to be put forward by Wolf and scholar Claude Montefoire (1858 --1938):

We [the Conjoint Committee] would go hand in hand with the Zionists in every stage of their work, within these limits, but we stipulate that that work should not be based on any overt or official assumption of the existence of a Jewish Nationality for the Jews all over the World and that it should not comprise any demand for privileges or preferences in Palestine in which the non-Jewish population would not equally share. 53

51 Unknown, "Difficulties of Political Zionism, c. 1915," Notes/Brainstorming Outline, p. 1, The Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. These notes although not indicated as such, are most likely written by Lucien Wolf as they a strikingly similar to his later published works. Many of the same ideas presented here appear later in his other identifiable, published works.

52 Ibid. These notes although not indicated as such, are most likely written by Lucien Wolf as they a strikingly similar to his later published works.

53 Lucien Wolf, "Conjoint Foreign Committee Negotiations with Zionists, 22 October, 1916," Memorandum, The Board of Deputies of British Jews: London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), London. Montefiore was a prominent member of the Anglo-Jewish community and an active participant in the development of Liberal Judaism in Britain. It is also significant that
Despite sharing the same desire to alleviate the suffering of Jews in states where they lacked basic rights and freedoms, how and why this could be done was a distinctly individual concern.

Eventually, and much to the relief of Weizmann, the E.Z.F. began to realize the impracticability of the Uganda scheme. The large and growing immigrant Jewish population in Manchester helped to shift the E.Z.F.’s focus from such plans to those centered solely on Palestine, which had the added benefit of cultural heritage to aid and inspire supporters. Like Weizmann, many of the most politically active Jews in Manchester were recent immigrants or the children of recent immigrants. Conversely, those who continued to pursue the Uganda Proposal were, largely, members of the Cousinhood, -- wealthy, titled Jews --supporters of Wolf-Zionism, or members of Zangwill’s I.T.O.

In 1906, through friendships at Manchester University, Weizmann met Arthur Balfour (Arthur James Balfour, 1st Earl of Balfour, 1848 --1930). The Balfour Declaration’s conventional narrative rightly emphasizes initial contact between these two individuals because, as some authors observe, it was during this meeting that Weizmann’s hopes and intuitions about the mentality of the “British mind” were formulated. Understanding the way an Englishman thought, according to Norman Angell, was crucial to how Weizmann interacted with Balfour, David Lloyd George, and Viscount Grey (Edward Grey, First Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 1863 -1933). Angell argues that Weizmann was “able to speak to the English in their own language, which means not merely in the words they use, but in the tone and temper that they habitually

Montefiore’s involvement (in the 1910s) with the development of Liberal Judaism brought him into a working relationship with Lily Montagu, Edwin Montagu’s sister.

54 The cousinhood is actually a phrase used by Chaim Bermant, The Cousinhood (New York: Macmillan, 1972). In the work Bermant more fully discusses the development and legacy of Britain’s Jewish elite classes.
adapt to each other.”\textsuperscript{55} Having become a British citizen in 1910, Weizmann eventually became the president of the E.Z.F., a counter-organization to the Board of Deputies of British Jews.\textsuperscript{56} Angell’s assessment seems more than logical when one considers the role muscular Judaism played in Zionist ideology. There was a conscious effort to equate Jewish nationalism and the Jewish right to statehood with British structures of masculinity, race, and militarism, thus making it easier to speak with ‘the English in tone and temper.’

Looking back on this first meeting with Balfour, Weizmann claimed that he learned two valuable things:

\begin{quote}
The first was that, in spite of the years of Zionist propaganda in England, both in the press and by word of mouth, a leading British statesman … had only the most naïve and rudimentary notion of the movement. The second was that if someone had been found to present the case of Palestine to the British authorities, it would not have been difficult to enlist their sympathies.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

Whether or not Weizmann’s assumptions about the nature of the British mind --or more specifically Balfour’s mind--were accurate, the fact of the matter remained that between 1906 and 1917 British politics and global demands had changed dramatically. With a war ravaging much of the world, Weizmann was painfully aware of the fact that there were, as he termed it, “dark forces” poised to dismantle any attempts he and his associates made in the name of the Zionist effort. Despite the outward political gains that Weizmann made within the E.Z.F., his authority continued to be questioned and challenged. During the debate over the creation of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Weizmann, \textit{Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann} 116. Weizmann became president of the E.Z.F. on 11 February 1917.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 111.
\end{itemize}
Jewish Legion the spring of 1917, for example, Weizmann was made painfully aware that he did not, in all instances, speak for the political Zionist cause.

Weizmann favored the creation of a Jewish Legion, having supported the young and driven publicist Vladimir Jabotinsky’s campaign for a militarized Jewish body, but many other Zionists -- from inside and outside his own camp -- argued that

Placing Jews in a separate category would imply that their contribution to the war effort until now had been negligible; unlike Catholics or Methodists, they had to be bribed into making the supreme effort.

Cultural Zionist Ahad Ha’am disagreed with the concept of a Jewish Legion, stating that

Although it is hardly advisable to have Jewish soldiers at the Palestine front, they should be in British (or if possible American) units and not in a separate Jewish regiment. I consider the latter to be an empty demonstration, the result of which may prove disastrous both to Palestinians and, generally, Turkish Jewry and to our future work in Palestine, if after all, it is not occupied.

The result of Ha’am’s rebuke was Weizmann’s resignation from all Zionist offices on 17 August 1917. While this resignation ultimately proved an empty threat (it was retracted shortly thereafter) the support Weizmann previously enjoyed was brought into question. Even among close friends, murmurs could be heard that he had “outlived his usefulness as a Zionist leader.”

What is more, while divisions among pro- and anti-Zionist factions may have been inevitable, factions within political Zionist circles further frustrated Weizmann’s efforts. Vying for a central role in the Political Zionist establishment, agronomist and intelligence agent Aaron Aaronsohn (1876 --1919) was another thorn in Weizmann’s side. With a great deal of experience

58 Rose, 178.

59 Ibid., 179.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., 180.
on the ground in Palestine and connections inside the British government, Aaronsohn had the political leverage Weizmann lacked. However, as Aaronsohn’s biographer Patricia Goldstone notes, “Chaim Weizmann, who emerged from the Paris Peace Conference as leader of the world Zionist movement … possessed these qualities [patience and cunning] in abundance, … [and], he was unwearied by battle. Aaron was bruised and exhausted.”62 While the British government in 1917 placed a great deal of weight on Aaronsohn’s assessments, as will be discussed further in chapter five, even when they contradicted Weizmann’s, it was ultimately Weizmann who had the political staying power.

One particular shift in Weizmann’s favor happened just as the troubles with the E.Z.F. erupted. In June and July of 1917, a ‘vote of no confidence’ in the Board of Deputies for British Jews was held. The vote, which sought the removal of the C.F.C.’s officers, came as a result of -- and backlash to -- the Committee’s May 1917 open letter to The Times. The May letter dissented from the Weizmann Zionist platform and advocated Wolf’s Zionist agenda, putting the Committee under frequent attack. The backlash and vote of no confidence were dramatic changes in the structure of Anglo-Jewish representation. After the vote, the Board’s character took on a distinctly pro-Weizmann Zionist stance. As a result, while Weizmann lost the support and confidence of members of the E.Z.F., he gained new inroads into the Board and the C.F.C. This in-fighting, while ultimately not detrimental to the creation and release of the pro-Zionist statement by the British Government, certainly underscored the divisions within the Jewish community and the unclear definition of nation as well as foreshadowed future debates in Anglo-Jewish politics.

______________________________
Catholics and the Zionist Question

Catholicism’s role in the Zionist enterprise is one that has only been peripheral in most historical accounts. Despite this, however, two major Catholic countries, France and Italy, were not only Britain’s allies in World War One, but claimed vested interests in the future of Palestine, especially Jerusalem. Aside from this, because Catholics represented a large voting bloc throughout Europe, even in England, the opinion of Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy became a valuable asset for both pro- and anti-Zionist factions.

Catholics, taken as a whole, seem to have little actual power in the Zionist question. However, at the individual level the opinion of Catholics were widely considered in the production of policy. As has already been discussed, in January 1919, Cardinal Francis Bourne took it upon himself to speak on behalf of the Catholic world in his letter to Lord Edmund Talbot. Not only did Bourne declare that to the Catholic world Jewish control over Palestine was unacceptable, he also asserted that the Zionist claim to have “obtained the approval of the Holy See and thereby [gain] the support of some Catholic Bishops in the United States and England” was baseless.63

The Zionist claim to have obtained approval from the Pope may be rooted in the events of May 1917, when, on 10 May, Rennell Rodd, of the British Embassy in Rome, wrote to Balfour that

there was a representative of the Zionists [sic] in Rom, a M. Sokolow, and he had asked for an interview. This he was not disposed to grant as he did not wish to treat the matter in any way officially. But from what he had heard of M. Sokolow’s ideas he was inclined

to view them with sympathy, and he was inclined to the proposal to found Jewish colonies in Palestine.\textsuperscript{64}

Like the motivations behind the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, the spoils of war played heavily into political and religio-political ambitions of both Protestant and Catholic communities alike.

In January 1918, Monsignor Arthur S. Barnes wrote to Sir Eric Drummond with his own version of how Palestine should really be handled. Barnes proposed that

\begin{quote}
If only the Government have vision enough to understand, they have a magnificent chance. It need mean almost nothing --practically --to name the Holy Father, Protector of the Holy Places, he is so more or less already since they are mostly Catholic property, --but the sentimental value would be enormous. Give the Jews the political rights if they want them. Give the Holy Father the Holy Places at once, reserving the existing rights of the Easterns so as not offend Russia and keep the Mahometans at the Mosque of Omar and at Hebron.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

The significant point in Barnes’ proposal was that “the psychological effect would be great. It would show the whole world that the Irish and French-Canadian assertion that the British Government is anti-Catholic is untrue.”\textsuperscript{66} Fostering a vision among these regions that the British government was not anti-Catholic carried valuable political cache. Moreover, as will be discussed in chapter six, the role of France in Palestine, even after the Sykes-Picot Agreement had been reached, continued to burden the British Cabinet.

Amid World War One and its aftermath, Ireland and Quebec, both predominantly Catholic regions, proved to be continued nuisances to London. 1916 witnessed the Easter Rising in Dublin. Similarly, French-Canadians joined the Canadian army at much lower rates than

\textsuperscript{64}Rennell Rodd, "Rennell Rodd to Arthur Balfour, 10 May, 1917," David Lloyd George Papers, London.


\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
English-speaking Canadians at the outbreak of World War One. By 1917, the question of conscription was being raised in the Canadian government and as a result, for the first time, Quebec’s parliament debated the idea of secession. In March 1918 anti-Conscription demonstrations turned into riots and the lack of initiative on the part of French-Canadian police to get involved in quelling the riots only further reinforced the rift which was growing between the French, largely Catholic, and English, largely Protestant, sectors of Canadian society. Once again, therefore, balancing the demands of different contingencies in creating a statement on Palestine meant that the British government had to take into account more than its own interests, the interests of Zionist, or the interests of Palestinians.

Ultimately, although Barnes’ proposal was rejected, the future of the Holy Places and the potential of Catholic administration continued to play into Palestinian politics well into the 1930s. Commenting on the proposals of the Peel Commission, Ireland’s minister to the Vatican, William Macaulay, stated in 1937 that “the abandonment of some of the of the Holy Places, common as they are to all Christians, is considered at the Vatican as most deplorable.”Adding further weight to anti-Zionist sentiment, the Catholic component complicated the Zionist question.

**The Political Personality: Elected Officials and the Zionist Question**

In 1918, British war propaganda (which was a fairly new enterprise) produced several recruitment posters for use in Canada. One stands out as particularly unique in regards the story

---

of Zionism and nationalism.\textsuperscript{68} Issued in both Yiddish and English, the poster was purposefully aimed at Quebec’s Jewish population and featured the images of three prominent Anglo-Jews, Herbert Samuel, Lord Reading (Rufus Isaacs), and Edwin Montagu across the top. Below this Union Jack festooned header was an illustrated image of a British soldier undoing the bonds of a Jewish man. While overtly pro-Balfour Declaration in intent, the choice of the three prominent Jews is also representative of the variation Jewish nationalism throughout the Anglo-Jewish community. Herbert Samuel, the most ardent Zionist of the three, and Edwin Montagu, the anti-Zionist, flank a more centrist Lord Reading. It cannot be known what the intention of the poster-maker was in choosing the placement of these three men, the juxtaposition of the illustrated center, and why specifically, aside from their common heritage, they were chosen. Nor can it be determined whether Montagu, Reading, or Samuel was aware of the use of their images in this specific way. What is certain, however, is that each man represented a crucial component of official perspectives on the questions of nation and the Zionist enterprise and that propaganda was one of the most important vehicles for expressing these viewpoints.

\textit{Propaganda as an Individual Actor}

By the time World War Two began, war propaganda production was a well-conditioned, smoothly running system, but at the outbreak of World War One it was almost universally a new factor in the changing landscape of war. In September 1914, as a response to the profusion of German propaganda, Great Britain established the War Propaganda Board, more commonly known as Wellington House. Focused largely on the production of pamphlets, and later graphics and film, Wellington House was largely kept a secret from members of Parliament and the

\textsuperscript{68} See Appendices C and D.
As a result, British war propaganda fell into two broad categories: overt government productions and covert materials. Recruitment posters, like those discussed above, were overt products of the government, intended for public consumption. Wellington House’s materials, on the other hand, were covertly produced and disseminated, often via private outlets like newspapers. The rationale for this secretive production was to lend legitimacy to the materials being disseminated. Working under the belief that the populations targeted by Wellington House would not trust overt governmental materials, journalists and authors were hired to write believable articles and stories that could be used in mainstream media and would thus carry the weight of legitimacy. Among others, historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1889 --1975) and journalist Lewis Namier (1888 --1960) contributed to the Wellington House efforts. Toynbee, although largely responsible for propaganda in the United States, wrote several essays and pamphlets about the Armenian genocide, including the 1915, “Armenian Atrocities: the murder of a Nation.” Ultimately, these two forms of propaganda --overt and covert --worked in combination to restructure global perceptions in accordance with British policy regarding the war and the way British officials envisioned the post-war world.

M. L. Sanders argues that British propaganda was “specially directed towards influencing the United States of America” and encouraging the world “to take a right view of the actions of

---

69 Of the 203 employees at the London office (Wellington House, by the end of the War had offices scattered across the Empire) only 47 were men. This disparity in the female to male ratio is in part due to the fact that men were encouraged to in more ‘front line’ positions, but is also representative of the continued disparity between managerial and staff positions held by women and men in World War One. None of the 156 women employed at Wellington House held decision making positions. See: "Activities of Wellington House During the Great War 1914 - 18”, Department of Information: INF 4/1B, London.

the British government since the commencement of the war.”\textsuperscript{71} While the largest focus of Wellington House’s activities remained centered on convincing the U.S. to enter the War on the side of the British, this was far from the only concern pertinent to its work. During the course of the War policy-makers came to the realization that propaganda distribution in neutral countries was just as vital as in allied and enemy states. The Islamic world in particular became an important front in the propaganda wars, particularly after 1916.

Of particular importance in the war of propaganda which Wellington House waged, a document found during General Jan Christiaan Smuts’ East Africa campaigns, in the town of Moshi (now in Tanzania), proved useful to the propaganda efforts. By June 1917, Wellington House began using this document, generally known as the “Moshi Letter” in its Islamic world propaganda. According to the Wellington House records, this document condemned “Mohammedan worship amongst East African natives” and “orders [were] given to encourage them to keep pigs - unclean animals.”\textsuperscript{72} The Moshi Letter was translated into Chinese and combined with photographs of Dr. Heinrich Schnee (German Imperial Governor of the region), who had signed the order. Fifty thousand posters with this letter and photograph “were printed for the benefit of the Chinese Moslems who live mostly in the provinces of Kansu, Hsin Shiang, Chihli, and Yunnan.”\textsuperscript{73} While it is not known for sure how many Muslims lived in China during World War One, current estimates run near 30 million. If the Muslim population of China in the 1910s was only a fraction of that, the power of persuasion would still have been an important

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.: 119 - 120.


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. See Appendix E.
consideration for British propagandists. Producing propaganda for use throughout the Islamic world, even in areas not predominantly Muslim, indicated the British government’s knowledge that undermining the stability of the Ottoman Empire could be done in terms of religious division as well as military campaigns. Similarly, Wellington House made great use of the Sherif Husayn of Mecca’s ‘Declaration of Independence.’ Issued in June 1916, this Declaration initiated the Arab Revolt. Tens of thousands of posters and pamphlets extolling the Arab alliance with the Entente powers were produced. Like the Moshi poster, these were distributed throughout China as well as across the Islamic world.

Propagandists worked diligently in the Islamic world, largely for two reasons: to counteract anti-Islamic rhetoric wittingly or unwittingly issued by the British government’s officials, and because war with the Ottoman Empire meant war with the Sultan and Caliph. British officials had not always been careful in their choice of words regarding war with the Ottoman Empire. In October 1914, for instance, Lord Crewe (Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1858 – 1945) suggested to David Lloyd George that he, Lloyd George, should speak with the Aga Khan about the Queen’s Hall speech on the subject of “International Honour” (given 19 September 1914). During the speech, Lloyd George derided the Kaiser’s warmongering. Quoting from the prior week’s British Weekly, Lloyd George went on, noting that the Kaiser proclaimed:

> Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On me, on me as German Emperor, the Spirit of God has descended. I am His weapon, His sword, and His vizard! Woe to the disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!

After noting the Kaiser’s vehemence, Lloyd George went on to state: “There has been nothing like it since the days of Mahomet. Lunacy is always distressing, but sometimes it is

---

dangerous.” Not only did comparing Islam’s prophet Mohammed to the Kaiser touch a nerve among Muslim subjects of the British Empire, but that both the Kaiser and Mohammed were equal ‘lunatics in their leadership’ was not a flattering image to create for an Empire which controlled the largest Muslim population in the world. Crewe suggested that Lloyd George try to explain that “no offense to their religion was intended,” but noted too that any public statement would draw attention to the original words and would imply “that the general impression of the Prophet in the West is that he was a Blasphemous impostor, which is not conciliatory when one comes to think of it!” Paralleling Allenby’s triumphs with that of the Crusades suggested that the war in the Near East was being fought against Islam, not the political entity of the Ottoman Empire.

Lloyd George did not seem to learn from this mistake, however. In early 1918, he dubbed “Allenby’s conquest of Jerusalem ‘the last and most triumphant of the crusades.’” While it was not, as we have already seen, uncommon for anti-Islamic rhetoric to appear in letters and statements of British policy-makers, the Islamic world was increasingly important to sustaining British war efforts. Alliances with the Islamic world needed to be strengthened and maintained.

75 Ibid.


77 Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 52. Nor was this the first time Lloyd George had made such claims. At the outbreak of the war, Robert Graves remembers that when Lloyd George, a Welshman and devout Protestant, “became Minister of Munitions, and persuaded the chapels that the War was a Crusade, we had a sudden tremendous influx of Welshmen from North Wales.” Robert Graves, Good-Bye to All That (New York: Anchor Books, 1998), 80.
Since the British government was engaged in a war against the Ottoman government, at the head of which sat the Sultan/Caliph, the doctrinal and political debates over the nature of the Caliphate prevalent in the 1910s became a major focus of British propaganda. In particular, the British government attempted to sever the belief that the Caliph was the ultimate leader of all Muslims, and should therefore be the leader of a rejuvenated pan-Islamic state. According to the Foreign Office Handbook, “The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate -- The Pan-Islamic Movement,” the office of the Caliph had ceased to exist thirty years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin Ali. The pamphlet states that many Muslim thinkers, believed that the “rulers who followed were kings and sultans and had no right to be called khalifahs at all.” Moreover, there continued to be great dispute among Muslims as to who the rightful Caliph was, given that, at the time the pamphlet was written, aside from claims which may be asserted by the Sherif Husayn of Mecca, the “Shairf of Morocco, the Sultan of Djokarkarta, the Sultans of Koetei, Pasir, and Sambiliung (in Borneo), and the Sultan of Tidore (in the Molucca Islands)” also could make similar claims of Caliph status. To all of this was added the assertion of many British officials, including Edwin Montagu, that the British Empire was the world’s largest Muslim power.

Pieces of propaganda -- posters, pamphlets, and speeches -- were as vital to the war effort as any military operation or political bill. Propaganda campaigns need to be understood both as general efforts and discreet objects. The Moshi Letter, the Jewish recruitment posters, and the anti-Caliphate materials each informed communities about the nature of Britain’s war

---


79 Ibid., p. 46.
effort and, conversely, the faults of the enemy powers. However, as discreet portions of the larger questions, propaganda only reinforced the haphazard policies of the British Empire. While winning the war and recruiting for the war effort are consistent themes, the promises made or implied in each piece was just as contradictory as the official documents and statements of policy. For instance, the anti-Caliphate rhetoric of “The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate --The Pan-Islamic Movement” denied the global nature of the Islamic umma, while the Jewish recruitment posters reinforced the implied assumption that all Jews wanted communal independence.

Official Stances and the Development of Nation in Political Circles

Although Edwin Montagu had no real interest in politics from boyhood, this changed when he became a student at Cambridge. First at Cambridge and later as a Member of Parliament, Montagu engaged with the changing nature of India’s political fortunes. Subsequently this interest, alongside his religious heritage, encouraged him to consider thoroughly the construction of national identity. Naomi Levine correctly notes that Montagu “is almost totally forgotten --bypassed by historians, he earns only a brief line or footnote in most biographies,”^{80} except as the lone voice speaking out against the Zionist cause. Despite this outsider quality attributed to the historical memory of Montagu, he was very much a political and cultural insider. His antipathy for the Zionist endeavor was, as we have already seen, not unique, and brought him in line with many in the Anglo-Jewish community, particularly the well-to-do.

---

Between 1910 and 1916, Montagu held various governmental posts, including Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India (1910) and Financial Secretary to the Treasury (1914). Had war not broken out Montagu would most likely have secured a cabinet position due to his service in the Treasury, but in 1916, the effects of a worsening war helped prompt the downfall of Prime Minister Asquith, a close friend and political ally of Montagu’s. Because of their relationship, Montagu did not initially seek to join the new government. Ultimately, however, Montagu’s desire to be a part of changing political structures eventually led him to a position in that government. While his position in Lloyd George’s cabinet strained his friendship with devoted Liberals, not to mention his personal relationship with Asquith, his acceptance of the Secretaryship did not make him particularly unique from other politicians of the time.

Montagu’s desire to be involved in every facet of imperial politics only made him more like his fellow politicians, not less. Asking for details on Irish issues, even as the Secretary of State for India, Montagu was actively engaged in the structure and continuation of the Empire. Unlike many of his cohort, however, he openly recognized the interconnectedness of British imperial holdings and areas outside of imperial control. Egotistically, most members of the British Cabinet during World War One possessed a belief that without his own input and personal touch the whole system would come crashing down. In the case of Montagu, this is particularly noticeable, as he was not only a central feature in the Zionist debate, but was actively involved in

---


82 Care must be taken in observing that Montagu, as Secretary of State for India, was a member of the Cabinet, but not of the War Cabinet. During the summer of 1917 Montagu takes part in many War Cabinet meetings, but this is by special invitation as the meetings directly pertain to his own position’s concerns, e.g., India, Islam, or Zionism.
Irish, Kenyan, American, and Indian affairs as well. It is, in fact, Montagu’s desire to be vital in all sectors of the British Empire that lends the story of the Balfour Declaration its global nature.

In his diaries and correspondence, a conflicted Montagu emerged in the days following Asquith’s fall. The Battle of the Somme (July --November 1916), the fall of Bucharest (December 1916), and the fighting between Allied and Greek Royalist troops in Athens (Fall 1916) indicated that Asquith’s patience with the War Committee was affecting his abilities to govern.\(^8^3\) Not wishing to be disloyal to a friend and mentor, Montagu supposedly joined several other Liberals in vowing never to join Lloyd George’s cabinet, but this pledge was no match for Montagu’s overwhelming sense of national duty and desire to be involved. For a politician, the overwhelming desire to do ‘his bit’ rested in his abilities to be an active part of the governmental structure.

In 1949, a personal account written by Montagu of the days just after the fall of the Asquith government surfaced. Dated 9 December 1916, the seventeen page personal memorandum was his description of the events leading up to the change in government and his intentions for the future. Among the details surrounding Asquith’s removal, Montagu asserted that “I find no common cause with my colleagues for refusing to join George’s Government. They do not believe in him. I do.”\(^8^4\) According to Lady Violet Bonham-Carter (daughter of Asquith) Montagu’s eventual acceptance of a position in the Lloyd George Government was best described by Winston Churchill:


I have no right to be squeamish about changes from front --but this --it is as if one’s own lap-dog turned around and bit one.\textsuperscript{85} Montagu was certainly no lap-dog, but such imagery accurately portrays perceptions about him.

Although Montagu never defined himself by his religion, this was exactly how some believed he should be defined. After his appointment to the India Office (summer 1917) some concern was raised that his religion would be a handicap to him in India. Lord Derby (Edward G. V. Stanley, 1865-1948) declared that “The appointment of Montagu, a Jew, to the India Office has made, as far as I can judge, an uneasy feeling both in India and here.”\textsuperscript{86} This sentiment was reiterated by Balfour on 18 July 1917, in a letter to Lloyd George. According to Balfour, while Montagu would almost certainly be very popular with the native Indians he would, by way of contrast, be unpopular with the Anglo-Indians who would dislike him for his ease with the Indians and in part because he was a Jew.\textsuperscript{87} Montagu’s ease with the Indians had nothing to do with his religion, but much to do with his record as a liberal interested in seeing progressive changes to the Government of India.

What is more, it was not clear that Anglo-Indians would not work with Montagu. On 19 July 1917, historian and President of the Board of Education H. A. L. Fisher (1865 --1940) wrote

\begin{flushright}
Ibid. This statement was made to Lady Bonham-Carter in the summer of 1917, shortly after Montagu accepted the Secretary-ship for India and was then written in a cover letter preceding and in reaction to Montagu’s memorandum from 1949. It should also be noted that another entanglement connected Montagu more closely with Asquith than other Liberals. In 1915 Montagu married Venetia Stanley, a socialite and confident of Asquith. It is generally accepted that Asquith was deeply in love with Stanley and that his increasingly frequent attentions were the reason for her accepting Montagu’s proposal of marriage (which she had initially declined in 1913). Loosing Stanley to Montagu does seem to have strained the friendship some, only to further strain it after Asquith’s loss of the Prime Ministership.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
Waley, 130.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
to Lloyd George advocating Montagu’s appointment, stating that “He is already very popular with Indians” and “When he was in India he was very welcomed by the Anglo-Indian Community.”\(^{88}\) Still, while Judaism may have played a part in the way in which some of the Empire saw Montagu, it was his politics and uncanny ability to be a part of all that was politically important that most drew fire from those with dissenting opinions.

Montagu was at the center of three of the most important issues to face the British government in the summer of 1917: the colonial unrest in India and Ireland, the Jewish Legion, and Zionism. Irish troubles flared up in 1916 when the Easter Rising proved to British politicians that controlling even their oldest possessions was not going to be a smooth undertaking. Similarly, dissatisfaction within India further destabilized the entire imperial structure and made it clear that imperial policy needed to change. Concurrently, ardent Political Zionists like Vladimir Jabotinsky intensified their call for the creation of a Jewish Legion, which was inextricably linked to Political Zionist ambitions. Montagu, and other politicians who chose to view the global interconnectedness of imperial politics, could not help but see how the call for a Jewish national home was linked philosophically and practically to the unrest in India and Ireland, in particular because of debates about the definition of nation.

At stake in both Ireland and Palestine were complex questions of nationality and right to rule. In March 1917, Weizmann indicated that in “negotiations with the Arabs the Jewish interests in Palestine are not well defined” and that in order to secure post-War goals for Palestine, since it was clear that at least two populations were vying for control of the region, the

---

\(^{88}\) H. A. L. Fisher, "H. A. L. Fisher to David Lloyd George, 17 July, 1917," David Lloyd George Papers, London. Montagu, as Under-Secretary of State for India (1910 --1914) had undertaken a tour of India, which was almost as unique as his tour in 1917 after being appointed Secretary. Few, if any, such tours had been taken. His decision to do so was generally seen as a positive step toward bridging the divide between London and Calcutta.
Zionists had to be more proactive in the pursuit of their ambitions. Similarly, the Easter Rising of 1916 had forced an increased effort to define the power dynamic between London, Irish Republicans, and Irish Loyalists.

Miriam Kingsberg rightly asserts that “At the outset of the twentieth century, Catholic Nationalists identified with the Zionists because they perceived certain similarities between the two self-determination movements.” Arguably, Irish nationalism took on a more religious tone at roughly the same time Zionists sought official support for a nation defined by Judaism. This is not merely coincidental. Nationalism among peoples either under colonial occupation (i.e., the Irish) or seeking to establish an independent state (i.e., the Jews) purposefully used the rhetoric of modern nationalism (Renanian nationalism) and the symbols of primordial nations (i.e., religion and language) in creating their own definitions of nation. That Catholicism and Judaism began to play significant roles in early twentieth century nationalist movements is further testament to the power of a hybrid modern-primordial nationalist sentiment.

The 1916 Easter Rising marked a turning point in Irish nationalism, triggering a renaissance of myths, memories, and symbols which “spoke to an Irish national perception of the preceding Anglo-Irish and Protestant-Catholic relationships.” Much as other nationalist movements focused on ‘golden age’ imagery, post-Easter Rising Irish nationalism emphasized

---

89 Wilson, 271.


the restoration of a “mythical ‘pre-English’ golden age.”\textsuperscript{92} This restoration was endowed, as was Jewish nationalism, with an overtly religious tone. Republicanism became intrinsically linked to Catholicism.

Over time, the religious character of Irish nationalism developed a series of new rhetorical devices that emphasized a Celtic tradition as well as a ‘chosen people’ quality. Building on a long held “belief that the Irish and Jewish peoples shared a common ancestry,”\textsuperscript{93} twentieth century Irish nationalists were keenly aware of how London interpreted Zionist rhetoric. Throughout the War and well into the 1920s, a pragmatic Montagu advocated a “simpler and shorter” statement seeking an end to the violence in Ireland without “a recapitulation of history, [as] the addition of qualifications are as dangerous as they are unnecessary.”\textsuperscript{94} Much as with his arguments about India and Palestine, Montagu believed eliminating romanticized historicity from nationalist discourse would be the most useful in moving the Empire, as a whole, in a more modern and open direction.

In a parallel turn of events, in 1915 Herbert Samuel (First Viscount Samuel, 1870 -- 1963), then President of the Local Government Board, began actively advocating Zionism within the Government’s inner circles. In March of that year, Samuel openly advanced a Zionist scheme for Palestine which induced his first cousin, Montagu, to react in a tirade of anti-Zionist

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} Kingsberg, 18.

\textsuperscript{94} Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to David Lloyd George, 4 April, 1921," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.
rhetoric. In March 1915, Samuel offered his services to Lloyd George, observing that at the present moment the Local Government Board had very little going on. Working under the assumption that Samuel was wooing Lloyd George to the Zionist cause, Montagu attacked him for wasting the government’s time and stated, in a handwritten note atop a letter from Samuel to Lloyd George: “It seems to me the Chancellor has enough sponge holders as it is.” Despite his earnest, and occasionally bitter, attempts, Montagu never gained the support that Samuel enjoyed among the pro-Zionist members of the government.

Samuel’s Zionism, however, was a peculiar kind unique to the Cousinhood and elite American Jews. Unlike the cases of Weizmann or Jabotinsky, there was no physical or psychological threat to an Anglo-Jew’s political, social, or economic status if Zionism did not prevail. Instead, Anglo-Zionists retained a deep-seated desire to do good for ‘their people.’ Similar in many ways to guilt ridden Christian Zionism, this sentiment was idealist, but not necessarily fully conceived in pragmatic ways. Bernard Wasserstein notes that Samuel is remembered by Zionists as the instrument through which the Balfour Declaration was diluted, and by Arab nationalists as the representative of oppressive British imperialism in the Levant. In truth, as Wasserstein goes on to argue, neither offer a fully accurate account of what motivated

---


96 David Lloyd George was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. Edwin Montagu, "Herbert Samuel to David Lloyd George, 18 March 1915," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.

Samuel nor of Samuel’s true intentions for Palestine,\textsuperscript{98} but both do indicate the fact that his ideas about Zionism did not fully align with practical considerations.

Still, while Irish nationalists and Political Zionists actively advocated national definitions with religious overtones, others, like Montagu, deemphasized the religious nature of nationalism, and looked on Irish, Jewish, Indian, and Arab national movements as essentially political. Montagu, who had no real connections to Irish politics, took every opportunity he could to offer his opinion on how things should be run. For instance, in 1921, when talks between the British Government and the Irish nationalists (including Eamon De Valera) reached a critical juncture, Montagu asserted that “Mr. De Valera ought to take the position of spokesman for all Ireland, both North and South.”\textsuperscript{99} While some Irish nationalist may have made distinctions between Northern and Southern Irishmen based religious divisions, Montagu only once again proved that he did not see the need to solidify politically such divisions. For Montagu, and to a lesser extent other politicians in the Government of India, parallels between the Irish case and other nationalist movements across the Empire were abundantly clear. For example, in December 1920, B. U. Basu, of the India Office, wrote to Lloyd George encouraging him to appoint Lord Reading to the post of Viceroy of India. Basu noted that “Encouraged by the examples of Egypt and Ireland, Indian extremists are seeking to explore the path of separation from the Empire.”\textsuperscript{100} Similarly, Ireland and Palestine were not easily disentangled. Into the 1930s, de Valera was

\textsuperscript{98} Samuel, who becomes the first High Commissioner for Palestine, will be revisited in chapter five during the discussion of the post-Declaration era.

\textsuperscript{99} Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to David Lloyd George, 30 June, 1921," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.

\textsuperscript{100} B. U. Basu, "B. U. Basu to David Lloyd George, 3 December, 1920," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.
keenly aware of what transpired in the Middle East, having appointed Joseph Walshe, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs in the Middle East, to keep him informed on conditions in the Levant and Egypt.\(^{101}\) Despite the desires of politicians like Lloyd George and Balfour to keep the Palestinian, Irish, and Indian cases separate all nationalist movements learned from the successes and failures of other nationalist movements throughout the British Empire.

Lloyd George and Balfour, however, refused to view nationalist movements as essentially the same. In two particular documents this is most clearly evident. On the one hand, the pro-Zionist Balfour Declaration certainly asserted a Jewish national identity based on the rhetoric of Weizmann’s Zionism. On the other hand, Balfour’s 1913 *Nationality and Home Rule* denied a parallel sentiment among the Irish. According to Balfour, “we have not here to do with the ordinary case familiar enough in history of a down-trodden nationality. Ireland is neither robbed nor oppressed. It is not exploited in the interests of British financiers or of British taxpayers.”\(^{102}\) While Irish nationalists certainly disagreed with this argument, Balfour, in attempting to break Irish national sentiment of its desire for independence from the United Kingdom, asserted that patriotic sentiment

may be found in a real or supposed community of race, of language, of religion, of institutions, of culture. It may be due to geographical conditions; or it may be the offspring of common memories, or of common hopes, or of common interests. Only of this we may be sure, that whatever its real origin or justification, it will endeavour to draw nourishment from all sources, and will be especially apt to justify its existence by a version of history which at the best is one-sided, at the worst is purely mythical.\(^{103}\)

\(^{101}\) Kennedy, 7-8.


\(^{103}\) Ibid., 11.
Thus, Balfour argued that national affiliation, in the Irish case, could only be created via multiple angles. Drawn, as he suggests, from the well of patriotic sentiment, Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom’s common community. Ireland, by virtue of its geographic proximity and long connections with England, Scotland, and Wales, is not a separate nation drawing on a ‘one-sided’ history, but a member of the united community of the British Isles. Clearly, Balfour did not see all nationalist causes in the same light. If he had, this cosmopolitan view of what defined members of the United Kingdom would detract from the more simplistic national definition put forward by political Zionists, and vice versa. ¹⁰⁴

In the case of India, Montagu’s observations on Ireland gave him fodder for challenging the “too wooden, too iron, too inelastic, too anti-diluvian” and “too rigid character of the statute-ridden Government of India.”¹⁰⁵ During the period after Asquith had left the government and before Montagu was appointed to the India Office, Montagu retained his seat in Parliament and strongly voiced opposition and concern on matters of Imperial import. Late in March 1917, he submitted his views on India to the War Cabinet. He remarked that India “had been very loyal, indeed surprisingly loyal, in the war and would expect to be rewarded.”¹⁰⁶ Contending that the policy of ignoring Home Rule demands in Ireland was having disastrous outcomes, Montagu further asserted:

¹⁰⁴ It is also interesting to note, but of only peripheral importance here, that one argument put forward by Balfour is that if Ireland were to be allowed to become independent, with or without Ulster, not only would this enrage Australia and Canada, but that such a severing of part of the Kingdom, would be as if the American South had gained its cession from the United States in the 1860s.

¹⁰⁵ Waley, 127.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 118.
that any attempt to buy off demands for political reform in India by economic concessions is doomed to certain and irretrievable failure. The history of Ireland ought to tell us that. However lavish you may be in the distribution of seed potatoes, the Irishman still wants Home Rule.\footnote{Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to Maurice Hankey, 31 March, 1917," Correspondence, p. 4, Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.}

Montagu’s views were not revolutionary. Increased nationalist agitation in India had already made it abundantly clear that India was not going to remain loyal or content as a second-class member of the British Empire.

Despite knowing that policy toward India must change, Montagu was not interested in obtaining an Indian Cabinet position. In the same review of events leading to Asquith’s downfall, Montagu noted that “as Bonar Law insisted on the Exchequer, I was to go to the India Office. I should not have cared to do this, because it has no connection with the War.”\footnote{Montagu, "Personal Memorandum/Diary, 9 December, p. 14.} Further reinforcing the societal norms in an atmosphere of national patriotism which heavily emphasized all members of society ‘doing his/her bit,’ Montagu continued to feel the need to be connected to the most intricate matters of the War effort.

Two and a half months after Montagu submitted his views to the War Cabinet, on 26 June, the Mesopotamian Committee issued a report censuring the Government of India for failing to adequately aid General John Nixon’s army in its attack on Baghdad in 1916, citing the “inefficiency of the Indian government’s direction of the mideastern operation.”\footnote{Ida S. Heuer, “Edwin Samuel Montagu: Liberal Statesman in the Era of the First World War” (Dissertation, New York University, 1989), 56.} On 12 July, Montagu argued that the Government of India lacked “any use for the modern purposes we have
in view."\textsuperscript{110} In the way of a solution, Montagu proposed a structural reform for India, “not one
great Home Rule country, but a series of self-governing Provinces and Principalities federated by
one Central Government.”\textsuperscript{111} Lloyd George called his bluff, and Montagu was offered the
Secretary of India position.

Montagu was appalled by the fact that so many political officials did not see how events
in one part of the Empire directly impacted other imperial holdings. In 1918, in his
correspondence with Viceroy of India Lord Chelmsford, Montagu stressed how events in the
Middle East and India were closely intertwined. He noted that “The Government of India was
everously lowered in the eyes of people at home by the Mesopotamia Committee Report.”\textsuperscript{112}
Why, he asked, should the Indian taxpayer foot the bill for the administration of his/her country
when it was becoming increasingly evident that that administration was too weak to provide for
the people of India.\textsuperscript{113}

Whereas Montagu’s religion did not ultimately play a role in his position as Secretary of
State for India, it did impact his opinions on and vehemence against Zionism. Despite his best
ttempts to sever the connections between religion and nationality, the creation of the Jewish
Legion and Zionist ambitions in Palestine thrust Montagu into the heart of the debate over
national definition. While not all Zionists believed the Jewish Legion and the endeavor to create
a Jewish national home in Palestine were necessarily linked, both Jabotinsky and Montagu, at

\textsuperscript{110} Waley, 127.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to Lord Chelmsford, 10 April, 1918," Montagu
Papers, Cambridge.

\textsuperscript{113} Heuer, 58.
opposite ends of the spectrum, argued that they were. Montagu declared that the creation of a Jewish Legion made “the position of Jews in other regiments more difficult and forces a nationality upon a people who have nothing in common.” For Jabotinsky the nationality of the Jewish people was the given, and the creation of a Jewish military apparatus was a necessary step in creating a Jewish national home. From Montagu’s perspective, however, identifying the Jews as a single group via acts like creating a ‘Jewish Legion,’ meant that Jews who opposed being viewed as members of this single group were denied equal representation. As was the case with Indians not being allowed enfranchisement in Kenya, identifying Jews as a homogenous nation gave power to the identifiers (in this case the British Empire and the Zionist leadership) and took power from the dissenters (anti-Zionists).

Certainly the issue of the Jewish Legion was not the first time Jewish nationality was raised among well-to-do British Jews or British officials. As Lord Reading noted in a 1916 letter to Montagu:

The moment one considers the Jewish question one realises that its aspects differ so … according to the country of which Jews are subjects that it is impossible to define as a nation. In England, for example, the Jew is an Englishman with the religious belief of a Jew, but I doubt whether it is so with a Russian Jew.

At stake was not only a question of citizenship, but more subtly a question of who qualified as a loyal member of a community: in this case, who was a ‘good Jew.’ According to Montagu’s interpretation of the Zionist agenda, political Zionism threw into doubt his own (and by

---


extension any Jewish Englishman’s) place in the structure of the British Empire. Upon hearing of
the release of the Declaration, Montagu wrote in his diary:

Balfour has made the Zionist declaration against which I fought so hard. It seems strange
to be a member of a Government which goes out of its way, as I think for no conceivable
purpose that I can see, to deal this blow at a colleague that is doing his best to be loyal to
them, despite his opposition. The Government has dealt an irreparable blow at Jewish
Britons, and they have endeavoured to set up a people which does not exist … I cannot
for the life of me understand. It certainly puts the final date to my political activities.116

This question of patriotic loyalty was at the very center of Montagu’s assault on the anti-Semitic
nature of the Zionist endeavor. In 1916 Montagu argued:

one of the commonest criticisms of those Jews who have been most successful in
European life is not that they [have] Jewish sentiment but that they are lacking altogether
in national sentiment and are cosmopolitan. I believe personally that this criticism, if
justified at all, is only justified in those countries where Anti-Semitism has prevented the
Jewish inhabitants from identifying themselves fully in spirit with the country of their
adoption.117

Anti-Zionists like Montagu defined Political Zionist aspirations as inherently anti-Semitic, not to
mention strategically dangerous. There was some fear that advocating a Zionist policy would
allow German anti-British sentiment to gain a foothold close to the Suez, in particular because so
many leading Zionists were of German origin. Furthermore, as becomes clear when Ireland and
India are brought into the picture, pro-Zionist policy appeared schizophrenic in its incongruous
definition of nation with those being worked out elsewhere in the Empire. Whereas Indo-
Muslims or Irish Catholics were denied the right to national definition by virtue of their religion,
Jews were encouraged to pursue a Jewish national identity. The policy was an uneasy one to
accept for individuals who viewed the whole Empire, not to mention the whole world, in one

116 Montagu, "India Diary. 87.

117 Edwin Montagu, "Untitled, 17 March, 1916," Draft Memorandum, Asia, Pacific, and
analytical assessment. Zionism, Montagu argued, questioned Jewish Britons’ loyalties and their abilities to continue on as faithful British subjects. Zionism, he argued, had always seemed to him, a mischievous political creed, untenable by any patriotic citizen of the United Kingdom. … [Moreover, he continued] If a Jewish Englishman sets his eyes on the Mount of Olives and long for the day when he will shake British soil from his shoes and go back to agricultural pursuits in Palestine, he has always seemed to me to have acknowledged aims inconsistent with British citizenship and to have admitted that he is unfit for a share in public life in Great Britain, or to be treated as an Englishman. 118

From the perspective of the anti-Zionist, Zionism was a dangerous anti-Semitic dream predicated on the stereotype of the wandering Jew. Pandering to Christian revivalism Zionist aims, Montagu argued, would only lead to the ghettoization of the world’s Jewry in Palestine. Ironically, Montagu’s fears about the nature of anti-Semitism and Zionism were extolled by Theodor Herzl in his belief that anti-Semites would become significant allies of the Zionist enterprise. 119

Montagu was only half right in his assertion that the Government’s policy was anti-Semitic. The Balfour Declaration, and subsequent pro-Zionist policy, was profoundly influenced by actual Zionist desires. Zionists, as was the case with Herzl, recognized that anti-Semitism was useful for obtaining their ultimate goals. The wording and actions which ‘weakened,’ as Weizmann saw it, the Balfour Declaration and the creation of the Jewish Legion were expressions of Jewish, anti-Zionist sentiment. To be more accurate, Montagu should have said that the anti-Semitic policy was in fact the policy of Zionism. Only once the Government had accepted a pro-Zionist policy it too was treading on official anti-Semitic territory. It is the great

118 Montagu, "The Anti-Semitism...".

119 Lowenthal, ed., 10. This is also noted in Segev, 40. Here Segev declares that Herzl actually said: “The anti-Semites will become our most loyal friends; the anti-Semitic nations will become our allies.”
Irony of Zionist history that the anti-Semitic policy of the British Government during the First World War was in fact the policy Jewish nationalists, themselves, asked for.

In the months and years which followed the release of the Balfour Declaration, Montagu’s abhorrence of Zionism became nearly lost in this history. Lloyd George incorrectly remembered that “urgent diplomatic and military reasons at last ensured complete unanimity on the subject [of Zionism]. Even Mr. Montagu surrendered his opposition, and accepted the declaration as a military expedient.”120 Montagu never surrendered his dislike for Zionism, nor is there really any reason to believe that the Balfour Declaration truly held significance for military reasons. Diplomatically, one may argue that the release of the Balfour Declaration secured Zionist support in the face of a possible German declaration, but Germany was in no way capable of carrying out a pro-Zionist scheme in Palestine as the power in the region rested firmly in the hands of Arab and British forces, particularly by December 1917. Once the Balfour Declaration was released, British attentions shifted back to more pressing issues -- the Western front, the loss of their Russian allies, etc. However, Lloyd George’s faulty remembrance of Montagu’s shifting perception may not be so out of focus if what in fact he remembered was the shifting mentality of the larger Anglo-Jewish community. As will be discussed in chapter six, the Anglo-Jewish community largely changed gears after 1917, and accepted the British policy in Palestine as part of their allegiance to the state.

Conclusion

The example of Edwin Montagu most clearly proves that individual actors linked such seemingly disconnected concepts as Irish and Indian nationalism with Zionist ambitions or the religious politics of the Catholic world. He was, however, not alone in acting as an agent of imperial confluence. Propaganda produced for consumption in China used the anti-German material found in East Africa, and Catholics concerned with the rights of their co-religionists in Quebec and Dublin questioned pro-Zionist British policy, while at the same time Indian Home Rulers connected their ideas of future independence to Irish calls for separation from the United Kingdom. To understand how these seemingly disparate set of factors worked together in the 1910s and 1920s to influence British imperial policy, one must look at the individual agents who moved among the regional and global themes of nationalism, imperialism, racism, and religion in affecting change across the Empire. Whereas thematic examination of nation or race offers a sense of how large groups defined themselves and are in turn defined by others, conversely, examining the individual illustrates how one person can influence entire communities at the regional or global level. This pared down view of a global moment will carry over into the next chapter, where a single document --the Balfour Declaration --will become the focus of assessment. Like the individuals and pieces of propaganda focused on in this chapter, the Declaration itself became an active participant in its own history as it evolved to incorporate the global demands focused on thus far. Like authors, political officials, or the leaders of nationalist movements, the documents created in the 1910s and 1920s profoundly shaped the nature of future policy across the British Empire. Similarly, like the propaganda Wellington House produced, the impact of documents like the Balfour Declaration reached across political boundaries to inform an emerging global definition of nation and the right to self-determination.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE DECLARATION

Late in November 2007, the United States revived a ninety year old issue in a series of talks in Annapolis, Maryland. On the table was a discussion of what was to be done about the plight of a stateless people, the Palestinians, and the security of the Israeli government. The *Columbus Dispatch* reported:

Months of behind-the-scenes wrangling and a final marathon round of talks that had lasted until 3 a.m. and resumed at 5 a.m. still hadn't yielded an agreement…*The parties were still stuck on the wording of one key paragraph.*

The hope at Annapolis was that this newest round of negotiations would result in an end to the bloody conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, a conflict started by the events which took place in London ninety years previously. Echoed in the words of the *Dispatch* article, November 1917 witnessed the broaching of the questions of Zionism and of Palestinian interests, and how all of this would impact the British Empire. Then, like today, concerns over divisions of land, policies of governance, and the political rights of populations were central to the ‘Palestine Question.’ Instead of discussing how Israelis and Palestinians could work toward the creation of a two-state solution, however, the commotion of November 1917 focused on how the British government could advance Zionist aims and simultaneously protect Palestinian rights and British Imperial interests in the Ottoman owned territory of Palestine. The final outcome of these

---

questions, too, was worded in one key paragraph. The repercussions of the affairs of 1917 and the creation of the Balfour Declaration still resonate in global politics.

**Early Political Clamoring: 1915 and 1916**

Zionist aspirations had been well-known long before 1915, but it was not until that year that the efforts of the Zionist lobby began to be seriously considered among top British officials like Herbert Samuel and Lord Edward Grey. Samuel, then President of the Local Government Board (February 1914 to May 1915) put before the Cabinet a memorandum on the subject of Zionism, which was subsequently attacked by Edwin Montagu (then Chancellor of Lancaster).

On 16 March 1915, Montagu assailed Samuel’s cautious support for Zionist ambitions, stating:

> I believe that the Jewish hopes of once again finding themselves in Palestine are based on their interpretation of divine prophecy in the Old Testament; but the return of the Jews to the Promised Land was predicted in that book of divine agency and by miracle, and I think it would require nothing short of a miracle to produce a Jewish State in Palestine.

Montagu concluded his memorandum by stating that “If only our peoples would cease to ask for special favours, if they would take their place as non-conformists, Zionism would obviously die and Jews might find their way to esteem.” While Montagu was forced to acknowledge that age old prejudices against Jewish peoples continued to plague global politics, he did not believe that these misperceptions could be altered by recreating a Jewish state. For Montagu, such an undertaking was neither desirable nor practical.

---


4 Ibid., p. 4.
The British Government was slow to take up the Zionist cause, but the Board of Deputies of the British Jews --the self-proclaimed voice of the British Jews--was not. Lucien Wolf, the head of the C.F.C., had spent several years grappling with the desires of the less fortunate Jewish populations throughout Europe, in an effort to promote the establishment of a stable living arrangement for their people and culture. He had done so by playing to the loyalties and sympathies of Jews living more comfortable lives in Great Britain, the United States, and several Western European countries. By 1915, brainstorming notes from the Board of Deputies in what appear to be Wolf’s hand suggest that the issue of political Zionism was problematic in its potential to split the Jewish community. These notes from the archives of the Board of Deputies of the British Jews suggest a great deal of debate on the questions which political Zionism engendered. The gist of these discussions indicate three particular points of concern with the question of Political Zionism:

1. We know precisely, or even approximately, what Palestine is. If it is the Bible country, it is too large for Jews to claim; if it is the land settled and owned by the pre-exilic Hebrews, it is too small for any practical political purpose of the modern Jews. That is an area of 3,800 square miles, or a little more than one sixth of the size of England.

2. We are in the habit of regarding Palestine as essentially and indisputably Jewish. There is, however, much to be said on the other side. Palestine is not in chief measure Jewish to-day. [Thus] The idea of expropriating the native population of Palestine, in order to make way for Jewish would work disastrous results.

3. Happily Charter policy is impossible. … It means handing over Government of [the] country to a minority or to an artificially created influx of alien immigrants. Powers could not propose this without condoning Russification of Finland, Prussification of Prussian Poland and Ulsterification of Ireland. Democratic sentiment of the world would not tolerate it. Mohammedan sentiment all over the world would rebel against it. The Bedouins would fight and the Bedouins would perhaps be right.⁵

Following the change from the Asquith to Lloyd George government in late 1916, these main concerns continued to be the focal point of debate as statesmen attempted to create an announcement sympathetic to the Zionist cause.

**Political Expediency: 1917**

Until late in 1916, the British government considered the Zionist enterprise impractical and unnecessary. While individuals like Lloyd George and Samuel continued to advocate for a statement favorable to the Zionist endeavor, the Asquith government consistently tabled the subject as unimportant in comparison to the events at the Somme, in Ireland, or the efforts of the Arab Revolt. The December 1916 change of government dramatically shifted the conventional wisdom. With Asquith out of office, Chaim Weizmann and the Political Zionists found a more sympathetic ear in Prime Minister Lloyd George. Still, even with this change in government not all British officials were agreeable to, or convinced of the necessity for, the Zionist scheme.

As of June 1917, the War Cabinet largely viewed Zionism in terms of how the Allied cause could benefit from promoting a pro-Zionist statement. The War demanded that only those things beneficial to the effort should be considered. On 13 June, Weizmann wrote to Sir Ronald Graham, the Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary, that “it appears desirable from every point of view that the British Government should give expression to its sympathy and support of the Zionist claims on Palestine.”6 That same day, Graham pointed out to members of the Cabinet that there should be an effort on the part of the Allies to secure all the political advantages we can out of our connection with Zionism[,] and there is no doubt that that advantage will be considerable, especially in Russia where the

---

only means of reaching the Jewish proletariat is through Zionism to which the vast majority of Jews in the country adhere.\(^7\)

The propaganda qualities Zionism offered aided in garnering support among officials who might not have been swayed by purely ideological considerations.

Despite the momentum Zionists achieved in the war cabinet as a result of Christian Zionism and the potential of Zionism as a tool for propaganda, several obstacles remained which deterred swift movement on the issue. First, the Turks were not yet defeated, and issues pertaining to Allied control following such a defeat, grounded in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, were not altogether supported by British officials. Military setbacks like those at Gallipoli (1915) and Iraq (Baghdad was not captured until 1917) made officials leery of dividing “up the skin of the bear before they had killed it.”\(^8\) Nonetheless, the Sykes-Picot Agreement did just this, dividing the Arab territory of the Ottoman Empire between the French and British. Even though the British gained substantially by this agreement, it was not universally welcomed throughout the government, and at best remained a source of contention for the remainder of the War and during the post-War peace efforts. Brigadier-General Macdonogh (Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office), Sir Arthur Hirtzel (of the India Office), and Cabinet Minister Lord George Curzon (1859 – 1925), for example, opposed the Agreement. One concern stemmed from the deep distrust British officials had for their French counterparts.\(^9\) In February 1917,

---


\(^8\) George Macdonogh, "Brigadier-General Macdonogh to Sir A. Nicolson (Received January 7), c. 1917," Foreign Office Records, London.

\(^9\) One indication of this comes from a meeting with Weizmann, Frenchman, Professor Bache, discussed France’s desire to complete a separate peace with the Ottomans. Bache stated “We shall not continue to fight for England's absurd ideas of conquest in Mesopotamia or
Manchester Guardian editor C. P. Scott observed the fear British officials had regarding France gaining too much power in Palestine or taking control of lands too near Jerusalem. In a letter to Lloyd George, Scott noted,

I hope you will be able to see Weizmann about the Palestine question. He and James Rothschild and Lord Rothschild and two or three others are to meet [Sir] Mark Sykes on Wednesday morning to discuss the matter and a good deal may hang on that interview. I dread the matter being handled in the spirit of compromise by the F. O. [Foreign Office] I gather that the whole drift of the F. O. policy is towards some sort of dual control --name of ill omens --with France and M. Picot, the representative of the French F. O. has been over here, seeing Sykes and pressing the French claim. … there is evidently a strong drift in that direction and very soon we may be as far committed in the negotiations that it will be difficult to take a … stand. When Turkey breaks up let France have Syria and if necessary Damascus and the policing perhaps of the Holy Places, but to give her a position of control in Palestine, even of limited control, side by side with us would inevitably lead to a quarrel as it did in Egypt, and fatally weaken our whole position.\footnote{C. P. Scott, "C. P. Scott to David Lloyd George, 5 February, 1917," David Lloyd George Papers, London.}

As will be discussed in chapter six, these concerns about French control made the post-War settlements tricky to negotiate.

A second obstacle was that even some of the more ardent Zionists did not support the creation of a British Protectorate in Palestine. Graham, for instance, only a few days after pointing out the political advantages of Zionism, stated that he “never meant to suggest that the question of ‘protection’ should be raised at all.”\footnote{Brazilay-Yegar: 253.} His understanding was that the Zionists only asked for public support of their scheme, not the actual means, e.g., a Protectorate, by which such a state could be developed. A great many British politicians, feeling the strain of Indian and Irish nationalist agitation argued that adding another country under the guardianship of the 

---

\footnote{Ronald Graham, "Minute by Sir R. Graham, 23 June, 1917," David Lloyd George Papers, London.}
British Empire would only harm the empire, and they wanted instead to fix the issues already a part of the system.

A third obstacle Political Zionists faced were the claims to legitimacy for speaking on behalf of the Jewish people. In Great Britain the Anglo-Jewish community continued to be represented by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, although the 1910s marked an era of growing frustrations on the part of the Anglo-Jewish community with the Board’s opaque structure. The demand for greater administrative transparency culminated in a split between Zionist and anti-Zionist factions among the Anglo-Jewish communities. This split was marked most notably by the C.F.C.’s attempts to edge out the E.Z.F.’s (the English affiliate of the World Zionist Organization) direct access to the British government, which was trying to act as the voice of the Anglo-Jewish community. The problem with this political hierarchy was that Lucien Wolf was largely against Political Zionism and the E.Z.F. knew this. Thus, given that the E.Z.F. wanted greater control over the matter of presenting political Zionism to the British government it found it had to circumvent the Board and its subcommittees.

The “Wolf Formula” and the Counter Preliminary Zionist Draft

On the question of Palestine, the C.F.C. proposed a “Suggested Palestine Formula” (the Wolf Formula), which was written 1 December 1916 and then submitted to His Majesty’s Government 3 March 1916.

In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and
colonisation, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown necessary.\textsuperscript{12}

The Wolf Formula contained many of the same elements which were included in the final form of the Balfour Declaration, but clearly maintained a Cultural Zionist outlook. In particular, the notion that “equal political rights with the rest of the population” would be secured, suggested that even a large immigrant Jewish population to Palestine would remain smaller than the native Palestinian population. The delineation between this form of Cultural Zionism (Wolf Zionism) and Political Zionism (Weizmann Zionism) was further articulated in a November 1916 letter from Wolf to Israel Zangwill. According to Wolf

Through the Board of Deputies, the Conjoint Committee concerned itself with Palestine over a hundred years before Zionism was dreamt of. In conjunction with the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Alliance Israelite, and the Ica, it has much larger interests in Palestine in the shape of schools, colonies, and other institutions, than the Zionists have.\textsuperscript{13}

The infighting between the Board of Deputies and the E.Z.F. should have signaled problems to come. If the Jewish community in Great Britain could not agree on what Zionism should and should not seek to accomplish, how what a pro-Zionist imperial policy supposed to be implemented?


\textsuperscript{13} Lucien Wolf, ”Lucien Wolf to Israel Zangwill, 10 November, 1916,” Correspondence, The Board of Deputies of British Jews: Conjoint Foreign Committee, London. ICA is the name by which the Jewish Colonization Association was known. According to Albert Hyamson “the institution [was] formed and endowed by Baron Maurice de Hirsch with his millions, and devoted to the assistance of Jewish emigration from the East of Europe, and to the establishment in the first instance of Jewish agricultural colonies in North and South America.”(116) Alternatively the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Alliance Israelite “confine their work in Palestine entirely to education” the former being based in British funding and structures the latter in French (219). Albert M. Hyamson, Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1917).
For Political Zionists, while a public display of support was important and the securing of “civil and religious liberty” crucial, the ultimate goals of the W.Z.O. and the E.Z.F. were nothing less than establishing an independent Jewish state in Palestine. The problem, however, was that a ‘state’ was more difficult to convince the British government of, particularly as Palestine was still part of the Ottoman Empire. It is not until well after the Balfour Declaration’s final release that ‘state’ became common usage in reference to the Jewish program in Palestine, and even then, as will be discussed in chapter six, only vaguely. In an effort to explain and elaborate on the goals of the political Zionists, without treading too closely to the question of a Jewish state, Nahum Sokolow (1859 --1936, the Zionist diplomatic agent in London) issued the Preliminary Zionist Draft (PZD) on 12 July 1917. The wording of the PZD was such that that, if issued by the British government, it would be faithful and favorable to the essential principles of the political Zionist endeavor.  

His Majesty’s Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build its national life at the conclusion of peace following upon the successful issue of the War.

His Majesty’s Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country.

The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a Charter for the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation should, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organization.  

A ‘national home’ became the euphemism employed by political Zionists, like Weizmann, for a Jewish state. The use of the term ‘state,’ however, was never publically accepted before and only

14 Sokolow was assisted by Sir Mark Sykes, then a conservative Member of Parliament, and Sir Harold Nicolson, a member of Britain’s Foreign Office.

occasionally, immediately following the Declaration’s release. It is important to note that the PZD purposefully eliminated the Board of Deputies of British Jews by asserting that the Government will meet with “representatives of the Zionist Organization.” The same letter between Wolf and Zangwill illuminated just how determined the Weizmann Zionists were in side-stepping the Board of Deputies. Wolf notes that

They [Political Zionists] have had the opportunity of coming to terms with us [Conjoint Foreign Committee]. I may tell you that, at the very commencement of the negotiations, I had a letter from one of the representatives of the Zionists, threatening me that, if we did not accept all the Zionist proposals - I quote the exact words --‘we shall do what within us lies to destroy any authority they (the Conjoint Committee) may claim in Jewry, or beyond Jewry, to speak for the Jewish people; we know we have the power to do it.’ They have been as good - or rather as bad - to their word. This threat was made formally on behalf of the Zionist leaders.16

Weizmann Zionists made it clear early on that unless the voice of the Anglo-Jewry was wholeheartedly behind their version of Zionism, the Board of Deputies and its committees would be cut out of the decision making process. From the perspective of Wolf this was inconceivable. Wolf argued that not only were Political Zionist organizations, “largely composed of enemy aliens,” but the Board was defined by its Britishness and as such should have a direct say in British policy.17 By extension, giving Political Zionists direct access to the British Government, particularly if they were largely foreign in birth, Zionism was necessarily a global matter, not simply an imperial matter.

Instead of recognizing the “historic interests” of the Jewish peoples, as the Wolf Formula suggested, the PZD sought the recognition of “Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people.” The definition of a “National Home” was purposely left open to interpretation. From

16 Wolf, "Lucien Wolf to Israel Zangwill, 10 November.

17 Ibid.
the Political Zionist standpoint there was little doubt that the ultimate goal was an independent Jewish political state. Given that neither Ireland nor India had yet earned for itself a similar right, however, the Jewish National Home was a convenient alternative to an outright declaration of statehood. To achieve statehood, the Zionists recognized that more than political maneuvering was necessary; proof of the Zionist’s abilities to ‘govern responsibly’ had to be offered. Thus, Zionism had to embody the principles of modern nationalism and this was done via the creation of a New Jew. As a result, Zionists distinguished their version of nationalism from that of the Irish and Indian cases. This logic maintained that Ireland and India retained too many of the ‘primordial’ qualities that made them unsuitable candidates for immediate statehood. Therefore, while Graham had argued that “all they [the Zionists] ask for is a formal repetition, if possible in writing, of the general assurances of sympathy which they have already received from members of H.M. Government verbally,”¹⁸ it is clear from the PZD that the Zionists themselves had much more in mind. Not only did they seek “protection to be established at the conclusion of peace,” but they also wished that the protecting nation would grant the principle of “internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine.”¹⁹ In other words, they wanted a state.

Asylum or Refuge? The Foreign Office Preliminary Draft

Sometime in late June or early July 1917, the Foreign Office submitted its own text on the question of Palestine, known as the Foreign Office Preliminary Draft (FOPD). This text however, no longer exists or has not yet been rediscovered. What information does exist about the FOPD comes from Leonard Stein’s work The Balfour Declaration. According to Stein, in a

---

¹⁸ Brazilay-Yegar: 253.

¹⁹ Sanders, 558.
private conversation with Sir Harold Nicolson, the key words in the FOPD were *asylum* and *refuge*. Stein asserts that the “British Government was to declare itself in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a sanctuary for Jewish victims of persecution.”\(^{20}\) For political Zionists, however, this was largely seen as distasteful, although the intention might have been kind. Nahum Sokolow expressed dislike for this wording and pushed harder for the phrase ‘a national home for the Jewish people’ instead. In 1952, Nicolson remembers that the sense among his colleagues working on this draft was that “we were founding a refuge for the disabled and did not foresee that it would become a nest of hornets.”\(^{21}\) If Nicolson’s memory serves, there is ample evidence that the intentions of the British government, at least in June or July of 1917 did not line up with the exact desires of Jewish Political Zionists.

*The Zionist and Balfour Drafts*

The PZD, and perhaps even the FOPD as well, were reviewed by Sykes, Graham, and Lord Lionel Rothschild, a prominent British banker. Deemed too specific on the sensitive topic of the future governance of Palestine, these first drafts were set aside. On 18 July, Lord Rothschild sent a letter to Arthur Balfour reiterating the Zionist desire to ‘re-constitute’ the national home for the Jewish people. That same day, a second official draft --the Zionist Draft (ZD) --was circulated among the Cabinet. This draft reflected the two most essential components of a possible resolution, as seen through the eyes of the Zionist Political Committee: (1) The recognition of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people, (2) the recognition of the


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 468, footnote 24.
Zionist Organization. In the wake of the disagreements and changing political structure of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, this second component began to carry a great deal of significance for the pro-Zionist factions. Balfour’s response to this draft was received by the middle of August and a nearly exact copy of the ZD was brought before the War Cabinet. This draft, the Balfour Draft, only made a slight change in the second clause:

His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people.
His Majesty’s Government will use their best endeavors to secure the achievement of this object and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before them.

The most significant distinction between what Rothschild advocated and what Balfour purported came in the last clause. Rothschild’s suggestion advocated that the Government “discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization” to achieve these ends, whereas Balfour stated that the Government would be “ready to consider any suggestions on the subject, which the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before them.”

The distinction between discussion and consideration is one of power. British statesmen like Balfour, despite being ardent Zionists, were careful not to give too much power to the Zionist Committee. Instead of making the Zionists equal partners and discussing with them the future of Palestine, the British government retained the right to consider ideas set forth by the Zionists. Given that non-Jewish Zionists still had not come to equate a national Jewish home with a Jewish state, a divide

---


continued to exist between what the British government offered and what the Zionists aimed to achieve.

*Montagu and his ‘Anti-Semitism’ Draft*

On 17 July 1917, Edwin Montagu took his position in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for India. Although this position did not entitle him to regular participation in the War Cabinet, he was nevertheless granted occasional access. As a result, anti-Zionism gained a foothold in the Cabinet, while at the same time the Cabinet was missing one its strongest behind-the-scenes Zionist supporters. Chaim Weizmann had been sent, on behalf of the British government, to stop American diplomat Henry Morgenthau from continuing on his mission to discuss a separate peace with the Turks.\(^{25}\) As a result of this changing dynamic, it did not take long for the first major clash between the ideals of the Zionists and those of the anti-Zionists to appear in governmental records. On 23 August, Montagu issued his memorandum, “The Anti-Semitism of the Present Government,” only a few days after the Balfour Draft had appeared.

Based largely on the same arguments Montagu had used in 1915 and 1916, “The Anti-Semitism” memorandum focused on his belief that a “national home for the Jewish people” created in Palestine would have two distressing consequences. First, Montagu understood this phrase to mean “that Mohammedans and Christians are to make way for the Jews, and the Jews should be put in all positions of preference.”\(^{26}\) Then, more at the heart of Montagu’s fear, was his belief that as a result of such actions, “the Jews should be...peculiarly associated with Palestine

\(^{25}\) Not only was Morgenthau’s mission disliked by the Government because of what it might do to the war effort, but it looked as though it might cause a serious setback to the Zionist endeavor as well, by effecting the chances of Great Britain securing control over Palestine and thus aiding Zionist ambitions for the region.

in the same way England is with the English or France with the French.” Muslims and Christians in Palestine, he argued, “will be regarded as foreigners, just in the same way as Jews will hereafter be treated as foreigners in every country but Palestine.” Instead of proposing to support a Jewish national state, Montagu suggested:

that the Government will be prepared to do everything in their power to obtain for Jews in Palestine complete liberty of settlement and life on an equality with the inhabitants of that country who profess other religious beliefs.

Montagu’s suggestion is far more diplomatic than may be assessed from the histories written about him, or the Declaration more generally. While it is true that Montagu’s version comes nowhere close to the Zionist vision, it is also evident that he is not indifferent to the suffering of those living in less desirable situations than his own. At the same time, one must be particularly careful in reading this passage, because the slightest difference in emphasis can result in several completely different interpretations. On the one hand, Montagu appears to refer solely to Jews already in residence in Palestine. On the other hand he could be discussing both Jews who are already residents in Palestine and those who wish to become residents. Because Montagu does not use any punctuation to direct the reader, his meaning on this point is not entirely clear. Although empathy can be implied in the fact that he offers “complete liberty of settlement,” his stance is tempered with concern for the other inhabitants of the region and a general sense of rhetorical vagueness.

---

27 Ibid. Ironically, in 1919, at the Paris Peace conference Weizmann reiterated this same contention hoping that this would indeed be the way in which Israel would be seen. In 1922, the issue was revisited in the Churchill White Paper. This time, however, Palestine was not intended to become a wholly Jewish region, that it should not therefore be as Jewish as England is English.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.
Milner Draft

Sometime in late August 1917, shortly after Montagu released his memorandum, the War Cabinet met to discuss the declaration on Palestine. Lord Alfred Milner, a member of the War Cabinet, “evidently had concluded that the Balfour draft declaration...was a bit too strongly Zionist,” and as a result proposed a new declaration that maintained the same appearance as Balfour’s, but changed the language.

His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine, and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist organisation may desire to lay before them.31

Where Montagu wished to gain equality for Jews, Milner, Balfour, and Sokolow remained focused on the specific task of acquiring a specific place in Palestine.

After Weizmann returned from his meeting with Morgenthau, his attentions began to focus more than ever on the actions of the War Cabinet. In a letter to C. P. Scott on 13 September 1917, Weizmann voiced concern that Montagu posed a threat to the Zionist endeavor and argued that he might have a profoundly negative effect on the procurement of a pro-Zionist declaration. Weizmann already blamed Montagu for weakening the effectiveness the Jewish regiment32 and feared Montagu would do this, or worse to the more important objective,

30 Sanders, 575.


Palestine. Whether Montagu did have such an effect is uncertain. What is clear is that such a view ignored the fact that several members of the Zionist camp had not been in favor of the regiment either. Nonetheless, the set-backs faced by the Jewish regiment were seen as a win for anti-Zionism by Political Zionists.

**Montagu’s Second Suggestion**

Montagu’s apparent dislike of the Zionist endeavor prompted Lord Milner and Lord Robert Cecil to raise objections to Montagu’s memorandum on the grounds that his views were those of the minority. Whereas Political Zionists sought to change policy, Montagu appeared to be speaking for the minority opinion because his was that of maintaining the status quo. Typically, anti-Zionists and non-Zionists felt little need to actively lobby against Zionism, believing that political inertia would be enough to undo the ambitions of Political Zionists. However, while it is not clear whether Zionists or anti-Zionists spoke for the majority, it is clear that Montagu was by no means alone in his opinions. Significant numbers of the Anglo-Jewish community vehemently opposed the Political Zionist endeavor, as has already been shown. In an attempt to disprove his ‘lone voice’ image, on 14 September, Montagu sent a letter to Lord Cecil further explaining his position. The letter used indirect evidence that Zionism was not an ideology held by the majority of England’s Jews and as a result Montagu once again offered suggestions for the wording of a possible resolution.

His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment in Palestine for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they live at present, will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which any Jewish or Zionist organisations may desire to lay before it.\(^{33}\)

---

Perhaps realizing that his first suggestion was too mild for even the moderates in the Cabinet, Montagu took up some of the language used in Milner’s draft and went so far as to state that His Majesty’s Government was “ready to consider any suggestions on the subject” from both Jewish and Zionist organizations. This distinction is, of course, important in light of Montagu’s belief that the Jewish community was not united behind the Political Zionist cause. Yet, Montagu’s new proposal offered the Zionists one of the two main principles for which they had been fighting.

In July 1917, when the Zionist Political Committee had defined the two main goals it felt should be reflected in a British pro-Zionist declaration, the simple recognition of the Zionist Organization ranked only behind the recognition of Palestine as the national homeland of the Jews. To this end, Montagu’s suggestion that His Majesty’s Government be prepared to “consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist organisation may desire,” was clearly in line with the very terms set out by the Zionists themselves. This new draft represented a tremendous concession on the part of such an ardent anti-Zionist as Montagu. Moreover, his second proposal clarifies which Jews Montagu was concerning himself with, all of those in residence and wishing to be in residence in Palestine.

Despite this rather significant concession, Montagu did not win friends in Weizmann’s circles. On 16 September Weizmann, writing to Philip Kerr, argued that despite “three years of hard work, after having enlisted the sympathies practically of everyone who matters in England,” the possible declaration then being considered in the War Cabinet, was “hung up owing to opposition of a few Jews, whose only claim to Judaism is that they are working for its
disappearance.”\textsuperscript{34} The fact that the people who mattered in the British Government happened to also be in favor of Zionism (as a result, it seems, of Weizmann’s group’s lobbying efforts) is also significant. While Lord Curzon, for example, certainly ranked among the most influential members of the British Government, he did not like the Zionist endeavor and one wonders if he was one of the rank among the people Weizmann believed did not matter in British politics?

Two days later Weizmann reiterated his dislike for Montagu’s involvement in the issue. In a letter to Harry Sacher, Weizmann wrote

Our enemies have displayed lately a very considerable amount of activity and Sir Edwin Montagu has become their instrument. He has used and is using his position as a British Cabinet Minister to hurt Zionism.\textsuperscript{35}

For all of the supposed minority status rhetoric Montagu was accused of espousing, the fear of his influence and power in the British government clearly unsettled Zionist leaders who continued to be unsure of their political footing.

\textit{Milner-Amery Draft}

On 4 October 1917, Lord Milner and Leopold Amery (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office) issued what appeared to be an appeasement draft. The Milner-Amery Draft went into greater detail than had any draft since the PZD:

His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish Race and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which


\textsuperscript{35} Chaim Weizmann, "To Harry Sacher, 18 September 1917, Doc. 505," in \textit{The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann}, ed. Leonard Stein (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 514. A footnote in this text correctly observes that Montagu had not yet been knighted, and as such Weizmann’s use of “Sir” was purely a sarcastic dig against his opponent.
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship.  

The language between the Milner Draft and the Milner-Amery Draft was markedly different. Instead of simply accepting the idea that a home of the Jewish people should be created in Palestine, His Majesty’s Government was suddenly fully in favor of the establishment of a national home not for the Jewish people, but for the Jewish race. This last term in particular raised a series of questions itself. Weizmann believed race was the better of the two terms, but other Zionists, notably American Justice Louis Brandeis, argued that the word people, was less aggressive and therefore more practical. That same day, at the War Cabinet meeting, Montagu continued to raise objections to the Zionist endeavor, noting that most English-born Jews were opposed to Zionism, while it was supported by foreign-born Jews, such as Dr. Gaster and Dr. Herz, the two Grand Rabbis, who had been born in Roumania and Austria respectively, and Dr. Weizmann, President of the English Zionist Federation, who was born in Russia. 

While the Milner-Amery Draft took steps to secure the rights of Jews who chose not to live in Palestine, Montagu readdressed his objections to Zionism five days later, 9 October, in a memorandum entitled “Zionism.” This memorandum, a reiteration of the 4 October minutes, made it clear that this was still not enough. For Montagu the two ideas, that Jews should have a national home in one place as well as protected rights in another, were in opposition to one another. 

This early October attempt to derail the Zionist endeavor was a constructed, if passionate, plea for the Government to reconsider its position regarding a Jewish national home in Palestine.

---


37 Ibid.
To further prove his contentions, and to counter the argument that he represented a rogue minority, Montagu included a list of prominent anti-Zionists as well as series of quotes from foreign born and foreign citizen Zionists, who in Montagu’s mind, represented the alien essence of the ideology. He then went on to argue that “whatever safeguarding words might be used in the formula, the civil rights of Jews as nationals in the country in which they were born might be endangered.”

Lord Curzon also voiced opposition at this point, stating: “from his recollection of Palestine, that the country was, for the most part barren and desolate,” thus how was the world’s Jewry not only supposed to thrive in the region, but deal with the large numbers of native Arab inhabitants as well? Curzon’s concerns spoke directly to points raised by Montagu in his “On the Anti-Semitism of the Present Government” and suggestions for possible declarations, but only Curzon’s comments were noted as being “strong objections upon practical grounds.” Montagu, despite his numerous and thoughtful contentions against the Zionist scheme, continued to be depicted as too emotionally attached to the opposition to be taken seriously on ‘practical’ grounds.

With regard to the Milner-Amery Draft, Weizmann submitted three suggestions for alterations in a letter to Sir Maurice Hankey. The first was that “instead of ‘establishment’ would it not be more desirable to use the word ‘re-establishment’?” Weizmann, consistent in his arguments, pointed out that re-establishment would indicate the historical connection of the Jews

---

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

to Palestine.\textsuperscript{42} What is more, in direct opposition to the safeguarding words meant to appease anti-Zionists like Montagu, Weizmann suggested that the phrase “the rights and political status enjoyed in any other countries by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship,” should be replaced with “the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country of which they are loyal citizens.”\textsuperscript{43} Had this wording been accepted later problems between the questions of a sovereign states’ rights and the loyalty of its citizens would have been brought into serious question. As it was, although the wording did eventually change, the sentiment that one could be both a citizen of one and a loyal member of another country was beginning to be established. Such questions arose later, when the Israeli state established the Law of Return.

The 5 July 1950 Israeli ‘Law of Return’ allowed Jews to obtain dual citizenship in Israel and other states (one can be both a Israeli and an American, for instance). This was, in part, a conscious effort to allow members of the world’s Jewry to be both Jewish and members of a variety of other states. In so doing, nationality and statehood became officially recognized as distinct concepts in Israeli rhetoric. In 1917, Weizmann’s removal of ‘nationality’ was consciously done so that Zionist national identity could only be defined by Judaism. Looking toward the creation of a Jewish state there is logic in doing this. If Zionism is the ideological underpinning of the state’s structure, then it logically follows that Judaism is the defining feature of national affiliation. Additionally, Weizmann argued that the original wording might suggest that to be loyal citizens of the nation in which they lived they would have to “totally dissociate themselves from the Jewish national home, showing no interest in or sympathy with, its

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
successful development.”\textsuperscript{44} This draft in particular had gone through the hands of Justice Louis Brandeis (1856 – 1941) who, on the request of President Woodrow Wilson, worked to redraft it “in slightly stronger and cleaner language, substituting ‘the Jewish people’ for ‘the Jewish race.’”\textsuperscript{45} Although Weizmann typically preferred using the term ‘race,’ as had Herzl before him, the switch muted the “vexing question of who’s-a-Jew” when coupled with the final clause protecting the rights of Jews choosing to stay outside of Palestine.\textsuperscript{46}

It seems evident from the type of language used in successive documents that the Zionists felt much more pressure to act quickly than did the anti-Zionists. Whereas Montagu sought moderation and further discussion on the issues pertaining to Palestine and Jewish nationalism, by the middle of September Weizmann believed that “these dissensions are most harmful at this critical moment”\textsuperscript{47} and thus sought to achieve a declaration as quickly as possible. Growing unease with the War, fears that the Germans might release a pro-Zionist declaration before the British, and Montagu’s continued anti-Zionist activities in the War Cabinet drew anxiety among Weizmann’s cohort.\textsuperscript{48} Clearly, Weizmann put much stock in the notion that Montagu was

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{46} Neff, 81.

\textsuperscript{47} Weizmann, "To Harry Sacher, 18 September 1917, Doc. 505," 514.

\textsuperscript{48} Rumors had begun to circulate in London that the Germans were also considering the propaganda advantages in issuing a pro-Zionist statement during 1917. A great deal of work has been done connecting these rumors to the hurried pace of the Zionist work in London after 1917, including an attempt by some scholars to add the Zimmerman Telegram into the mix. While scholarship with regards to German Zionist ambitions is largely outside the scope of this particular work, and does not \textit{directly} impact the British Cabinet’s final decisions it should be noted and considered in further examinations of the subject. (For further information see: John
capable of defeating any proposed declaration and, as a result, harbored a great deal of resentment toward him.

As October came to a close, the issue was once again discussed in the War Cabinet. To the great relief of Zionists Montagu was not present, having left for duties in India. On the other hand, despite Weizmann’s deeply held belief that he would be offered a chance to speak before the Cabinet, he too was unable to attend.

A Final Form: The Balfour Declaration

On 31 October 1917, Balfour began discussion on the issue of Palestine by suggesting that all seemed to be agreed, and that “from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made.” However, not to ignore the numerous contentions of Montagu and other anti-Zionists, Balfour thought that two outstanding problems needed to be addressed. First, the adequacy of Palestine for forming a home for either the Jewish or any other people. Second, the difficulty felt with regard to the future position of Jews in Western countries. Balfour’s first point anticipated the issues that arose subsequent to the establishment of the state of Israel: that the region of Palestine was inadequate for the Jewish Zionist community in combination with the communities already there. Curzon was not alone in raising concern about the productivity and capacity of Palestinian land or the matter of the population already present in the region. The


50 Ibid.
potential of scientific advancement largely negated these concerns, however. According to the minutes from 31 October, Balfour reiterated the beliefs coming from scientists on the ground, saying that “if Palestine were scientifically developed, a very much larger population could be sustained than had existed during the period of Turkish misrule.” In particular it was the work of intelligence agent and agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn which supported the contention that with scientific analysis and development, the region of Palestine could certainly sustain the agricultural pursuits of a Jewish and Palestinian state. By the latter half of the twentieth century, these scientific pursuits brought their own environmental pitfalls, including soil depletion and the country’s heavily reliance on petro-chemicals to sustain a self-supporting agriculture. For the conditions of 1917, however, the possibilities that science held were enough to allow the question to be dismissed. Never, however, was the other part of this question, regarding the roughly 600,000 native inhabitants of the region, ever fully discussed or concluded.

The second concern, while certainly a main focus of anti-Zionist rhetoric, misjudged the breadth and scope of the nationalism question. Accepting the Zionist enterprise and protecting

51 Ibid.

52 Patricia Goldstone, Aaronsohn's Maps: The Untold Story of the Man Who Might Have Created Peace in the Middle East (Orlando: Harcourt, 2007). Aaronsohn’s work was predicated on the idea of an independent Palestine, not necessarily an independent Jewish Palestine.

53 During the environmental revolution of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s several scholars examined the idealized Israeli kibbutz system and the state’s general agricultural program. In 1979 Peter Bunyard asserted that not only was the Negev “threatened as never before” but that agriculture itself was “a major source of pollution in Israel Oil, rich in sulphur, is used for heating greenhouses and the application of pesticides and herbicides is among the highest in the world.” Peter Bunyard, "The Promised Land: Is It Still So Promising?," The New Ecologist 1979, 41-42. For an examination of the intersection of environmentalism and history in Palestine also see: Larry Lohmann, "Green Orientalism," The Ecologist 1993; Nigel Pollard, "The Kibbutz - an Ideal Society?,” The Ecologist 1982.
the rights of Jews in Western countries were, as Montagu and the anti-Zionists had argued, two distinctly separate issues. The definition of nation which underlay the Zionist movement begged a clear answer to the question of whether Judaism constituted a nation or only a religion. Conversely, the Zionist New Jew rhetoric argued that Jewish nationalism is “not meant for those people who have cut themselves adrift from Jewry, it is meant for those masses who have a will to live a life of their own.”54 From the Zionist perspective, if one accepts Judaism, how does one simultaneously deny Zionism? The Cabinet’s succinct interpretation of the problems which faced a potential Declaration simply ignored the question of national identity. As will be discussed in the next chapter, not having a clear idea of what a nation is, and what rights a nation has, eventually harmed the British effort in Palestine.

The question of nationality, as we have already seen, had much broader implications for global politics as well. The reassessment of the obstacles to a Declaration singled out the future of Western Jews and although the eventual Declaration made no distinction on the question of Western, Eastern, or Asiatic Jewry, the mention here of only the future and rights of Western Jewry simply reinforced the racialist overtones of imperial hierarchy and unclear definitions of national identity. There remained hundreds of thousands of Jews outside Europe and North America, but their opinions as to national identity were neither consulted nor considered in the pursuit of a Zionist Palestine. From a political point of view, Montagu in particular argued that if nationality is defined by religion, otherwise well established nationalities like the English and French must be reexamined and reconsidered as a result.

In an attempt to define the language presented in the proposed declaration, Balfour stated that he understood a “national home” to be

Some form of British, American or other protectorate, under which full facilities would be given to the Jews to work out their own salvation and the build up, by means of education, agriculture, and industry, a real centre of national culture and focus of national life. It did not necessarily involve the early establishment of an independent Jewish State, which was a matter for gradual development in accordance with the ordinary laws of political evolution. \(^{55}\)

As had been the case with Graham in the preceding months, whether Balfour’s understanding of Zionist aims was accurate or not remained unclear. What was clear was that Curzon believed a declaration would only complicate British goals for the eastern end of the Mediterranean and that the more important ambitions for Palestine should relate to maintaining peaceful relations with the Arab communities. Curzon attached a great deal of importance to the necessity of retaining the Christian and Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and, if this were to be effectively done, he did not see how the Jewish people could have a political capital in Palestine. \(^{56}\)

While Curzon eventually acquiesced to the scheme, he did so only with the strictest interpretation in mind. A year after the Declaration’s final release in a letter to Balfour, Curzon raised objections to the creation of a Jewish state. Noting Weizmann’s call for “the ‘whole administration of Palestine’ being so constituted as to make a Jewish Commonwealth under British trusteeship,” Curzon went on to argue that “a Commonwealth as defined in every dictionary is a ‘body politic,’ a ‘state.’” \(^{57}\) Curzon continued in his letter to Balfour: “I feel tolerably sure therefore that Weizmann may say one thing to you or while you may mean one

\(^{55}\) (PRO), “Cabinet 245, Minute 18: The Zionist Movement, 4 October.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.

thing by a National Home, he is out for something quite different. He contemplates a Jewish State. For Curzon, there should be no Jewish ‘state,’ only a Jewish entity within the larger British imperial framework.

The outcome of the 31 October meeting was the authorization of what has since become known as the Balfour Declaration:

His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.59

The wording of the one key paragraph created a worldwide wake.

58 Ibid.

59 (PRO), "Cabinet 245, Minute 18: The Zionist Movement, 4 October."
CHAPTER SIX
THE GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS

In 1906 Theodor Herzl suggested to the British government a Jewish colonial effort in the Sinai Peninsula. The British countered with an offer for the establishment of Jewish colonies in East Africa. For the next eleven years there was an impasse between what the British Government was willing to do in the name of Zionism and what the W.Z.O. wanted. In 1917, Zionists finally received a favorable, albeit vague, statement from the British which amounted to much more than the Sinai, although no one seemed to know exactly what the offer really meant. The historical narrative of the Balfour Declaration typically ends there. The reality, however, is that once issued the Declaration went on to have profound effects not just in Palestine, but across the world. This chapter will examine how, by April 1918, only five months after the release of the pro-Zionist statement, uncertainty about the nature of Zionist intentions and the future of Palestine began to have a destabilizing effect on British imperial politics --both in the Middle East and beyond. The focus of this chapter will rest on the years between 1917 and 1924.

A Broad Overview of Events Following the Release of the Balfour Declaration

In December 1917, General Edmund Allenby’s (1861 --1936) forces entered Jerusalem, but progress northward was slow as the Germans increased troops to the region.\(^1\) It took until September 1918 for Allenby and the British forces under his command to break through and capture Damascus. The New York Times reported on 2 October 1918 that Damascus was

\(^1\) Allenby provisionally led the administration of Palestine until the conclusion of the War.
occupied by “British forces and a portion of the Arab Army of King Hussein … After its surrender, with the exception of necessary guards, all the allied troops were withdrawn … local authorities remain responsible for its administration.”2 For the Arabs this was an enormous victory. As the article goes on to note, “allied Governments have decided formally to recognize the belligerent status of the Arab forces fighting as auxiliaries with the Allies against the common enemy in Palestine and Syria.”3 Once the war had come to an end this should have meant that the Arabs had significant enough bargaining power at the peace conference to ensure the political goals of the Arab peoples. The reality, however, was considerably different.

War officially came to an end on 11 November 1918, and in January 1919, the Paris Peace Conference began. Many historians, including Margret MacMillan author of Paris 1919, argue that the initial six months of the conference were the most crucial. Technically, however, the Conference continued into 1920 when, in August, the Treaty of Sèvres finally dealt with the division of Ottoman lands. The treaty abolished the Ottoman Empire, obligated the Turks to renounce control over regions of the Arab Middle East and North Africa which had been controlled by the Ottoman Empire at the outbreak of the war, and perhaps most notably, Thrace and Smyrna were to be ceded to Greek control.4 Eventually, the Treaty of Sèvres led to a Turkish nationalist uprising and most of the obligations outlined in it were abrogated, i.e., the

2 "Damascus Taken, with 7,000 Turks," The New York Times 1918.

3 Ibid.

establishment of a Kurdish state, an Armenian state, and the secession of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece.

The Treaty of Sèvres, the San Remo Conference (of which more will be said later), the discussion of race which was raised by the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, and the bargaining prompted by the Husyan-McMahon Correspondence (1915), Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), and the Balfour Declaration (1917) drew together the fortunes of Palestine and India, of Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and questioned the principles of self-determination and colonial stewardship. The time between the Balfour Declaration’s issuance and 1924 was confused by a host of treaties, differing demands made at the international and local levels, and a clear understanding that no power had an agenda for the future of the now highly fractured, highly nationalist Middle East and South Asia.

San Remo and the Obligations Regarding Palestine

In April 1920, the Allied prime ministers met in San Remo, Italy to discuss the political future of the Levant. The key to the disputes discussed there, however, had little to do with Arab or Zionist interests and plenty to do with French and British concerns. By the time Allenby’s troops had entered Jerusalem the French had become “very touchy” regarding Palestine, fearful that the British were maneuvering themselves “to oust them from their traditional guardianship of Near Eastern Christianity.” In December 1918, T. E. Lawrence reported to Lord Robert Cecil upon returning from France, that Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) had come over “with a Middle East policy fully worked out which if Lawrence is rightly informed would

mean the whole sale destruction of all Arabian and Jewish interests and incidentally our own.”6

The growing uncertainty and distrust between the French and British about each other’s intentions in the Levant led to a further statement about the future of the region, the 1918 Anglo-French Declaration. This Declaration stated that

France and Great Britain are agreed in the desire to encourage and assist in the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia … To ensure equal and impartial justice for all, to aid the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to facilitate the spread of education, to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy --such is the rôle which the two Governments proclaim in the liberated territories.7

Still, the layers of promises, agreements, and treaties did little to mollify the growing frustrations Palestine engendered. French claims to Syria, based on historic connections to the Maronite community there, as well as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and British claims to Palestine, came into direct conflict with the promises made to Arabs in the Husayn-McMahon letters and the implications of the acknowledgement of Arabs as auxiliaries to the Allies in the war. Lord Cecil raised this last point again in February 1919, in a letter to Lloyd George. According to Cecil, being obliged to protect the rights of Arabs, insofar as not forcing upon them a government they do not want, the British government has done several things to indicate

the intention to allow them to occupy Damascus in full sovereignty. We hoisted the Arab flag there when we arrived; we have insisted on Feisal being treated as a belligerent --and

6 Lord Robert Cecil, "Robert Cecil to David Lloyd George, 18 December, 1918," David Lloyd George Papers, London.

77 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, two vols., vol. II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939), 672. According to Lloyd George with the signing of the Armistice with Turkey on 30 October 1918, the Allied governments sought to allay Arab fears about their political futures (having been allied against the Ottomans with the Entente Powers). On 7 November France and Great Britain issued this ‘Anglo-French Delegation’ sent from the Foreign Office to then High Commissioner in Egypt Reginald Wingate (1861 --1953). The full text appears here in Lloyd George’s Memoirs.
quite rightly; and we know that he has constantly asserted that without Damascus it is impossible to carry on any Arab Government.⁸

To all of this Cecil concluded that while the British might not be “guilty of an actual breach of faith” if they do not fulfill their commitments to Feisal, assisting him may also cause the French to further intrigue against the British. The French, having a fully secured base in Lebanon, could from there undermine British efforts in Palestine. The French, he concluded, “will also be exceedingly unpleasant neighbors to us in Palestine.”⁹ What is more, there were machinations on the part of ultra-Catholics in particular to assert French dominion over all of Greater Syria, which would have also included Palestine.

Still uncertain about the British government’s own policies for Palestine and the Catholic world’s desires for the region, Lloyd George, in a moment of clarity, wrote to Philip Kerr that

If the Zionist claim that the Jews are to have domination of the Holy Land under a British Protectorate, then they are certainly putting their claims too high … I have heard from other sources that the Arabs are very disturbed about the Zionist claims and that they are under the impression that they are to make room for Jews. We certainly must not have a combination of Catholics and Mohammedans against us. It would be a bad start to our government of Palestine.¹⁰

This only further proved that following World War One the British government seemed to have little, if any, recognizable goal or agenda for Palestine, establishing a Jewish homeland, and protecting the rights of its Empire’s Muslim subjects. France and Great Britain did not have similar objectives in international policy matters related to the future of Palestine.

---


⁹ Ibid.

In the end, despite all of the various treaties, correspondence, and agreements, Balfour asserted that it was Sykes-Picot which was the trump card of international agreements; this in the face of Lord Curzon’s assertion that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was in fact “a millstone round our necks.”\footnote{David Gilmour, “The Unregarded Prophet: Lord Curzon and the Palestine Question,” \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies} 25, no. 3 (1996): 62.} In a 1919 memorandum Balfour affirmed that “The fundamental conception underlying the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be maintained … [but it should] be brought into closer harmony with the Covenant [of the League of Nations].”\footnote{Arthur James Balfour, "Respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, 1919," Memorandum, p. 5, India Office Records, London.} The concerns raised by the disparate treaties and agreements, coupled with a concerted pro-Catholic lobby ultimately (as was discussed in chapter three) made the decision to give France power of Syria the only seemingly logical conclusion.

In Palestine proper, untangling the obligations, declarations, treaties, and rights of various groups became increasingly complicated as well. The task of unraveling this political rat’s nest fell into the hands of various administrators for Palestine. By August 1919, Major-General Harry D. Watson (1866--1945) took the Chief Administrator’s role from Sir Arthur Money (1866--1951) who had been appointed to the position in 1915. In a letter from Watts Taylor (dates unknown), Watson’s memorandum about the conditions in Palestine were transmitted, as well as Taylor’s own impressions. The most important of these was Taylor’s plea to the government in London:

Before you publish your mandate for Palestine with its conditions, for God’s sake let us know, not your policy, but your method of putting it into effect, if the British Administration is to be trusted to work it out on its own lines, with the assistance of
broad-minded Jewish Nationalists, not Jewish Politicians or Diplomats, all may yet be well, but if we are to proceed with energy, then send us more troops.\textsuperscript{13}

Additionally, Taylor notes that while Watson remained “sympathetic to the Zionist cause,” it was only “as long as ‘it is not carried out at the expense of the rightful inhabitants and owners of the land.’”\textsuperscript{14} Taylor’s fears that the British government would not explain its methods for implementing its policies turned out to be well-founded, but the task of managing the chaos that was brewing in Palestine did not fall into the hands of further military leaders, but to Sir Herbert Samuel who, in July 1920, was appointed the first British High Commissioner for Palestine.

Despite his personal pro-Zionist leanings, Samuel soon found that on-the-ground realities made the future of the Zionist program difficult to ensure. In a symbolic attempt to overcome the growing dissention within the region, in December 1920 Samuel proposed a flag for Palestine which would incorporate all of its constituent parts. The flag, he suggested, “should not be the badge of any one creed, not is it desirable that it should attempt a combination of the Cross, the Crescent, and the Shield of David.”\textsuperscript{15} Samuel’s flag is symbolic of not only his attempt to bring together the ideology of Zionism and the realities of Palestinian history, but of the ultimate failure of the British Government to do so, as well.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Herbert Samuel, Lord Curzon, and Arthur Hirtzel, “Proposed Palestine Flag, 1920-21,” Letters, Notes, and Minutes, Asia, Pacific, and African Collection: India Office Records, London: British Library. Samuel actually proposes “the head of a torch, with an upright flame of conventional patter, enclosed in a circle. The torch the symbol of enlightenment and spiritual endeavour.” To this Arthur Hirtzel noted, “Sir H. Samuel does not mention among the recommendations of a torch the fact that it suggests oil.”
Riots on 1 May 1921 encouraged Samuel to temporarily halt Jewish immigration, and in June he was forced to acknowledge that the reestablishment of immigration could only take place “in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country, to advantage of all the inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{16} From 1917 on, Palestinian Arabs had become increasingly vocal in their dislike of the Zionist endeavor and the British confusion over administration of the region. In August 1921, a committee of Christian and Muslim Arabs, including mayor of Jerusalem Musa al-Husayni (1850--1934), took their grievances to London. Both diplomatic protests like these, and the May Day riots, finally led to two important attempts at administering Palestine: the creation of a proportional representative council and, on 24 July 1922, the issuance of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine.

In early 1922, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill suggested the formation of a legislative council to work in tandem with the British Mandatory government. The council was to be “composed of the high commissioner, ten appointed British officials, and fifteen elected local representatives. Of the latter, nine were to be Muslim, three Christian, and three Jewish.”\textsuperscript{17} Churchill’s suggestion was a distinct improvement of proportional representation Samuel’s October 1920 Advisory Council maintained—a ratio of 4:3:3 (Muslims, Christians, and Jews respectively). A “Statement giving Proportion of British and Palestinian Officials” from even early in 1920 reveals that of the 285 governmental and civil posts filled in Palestine, and of which 132 were British held positions, only about 37\% of them were in the hands of Muslims. Although estimates vary, Muslims made up at least 74\% of the total population of Palestine and


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
taken together, Muslims and Christians totaled just over 88% of the population. This combined total comprised nearly 85% of the positions in the administration, but it was Christians who held a disproportionate number of the seats with respect to their population --only about 15% of the total population. While this combined total certainly balanced out the numbers, the overwhelming percentage of Palestinians continued to be Muslim and still they remained severely outnumbered, proportionally, as a result.\(^\text{18}\)

Eventually, when the British government accepted a constitution for the Mandate in August 1922, the ratio settled on was 8:2:2.\(^\text{19}\) Nevertheless, despite these attempts at defining representative bodies, Palestinians continued to question by what rights their country was being governed by outside parties. Moreover, Palestinian nationalists increasingly refused to participate in any of the Mandate’s administrative bodies. Zionists, on the other hand, largely ignored the confused and confusing policies issued by the administration, choosing instead to focus attention on building up settlements and other Jewish-only structures. In 1919, Vladimir Jabotinsky alluded to this separate status felt by Zionist leaders, stating that the British should handle the Arabs, letting the Zionists deal with their own issues independently of the administration. The

\(^{18}\) Figures come from: Herbert Samuel, "Herbert Samuel to Lord Curzon, 10 January, 1920," Asia, Pacific, and African Collections: India Office Records, London: British Archives. There is a further note on this letter that reads: “Certain Jews who are in actual fact recruited locally, but who are British, have been included under the heading ‘British’” and thus in the 132 ‘British’ positions in the administration. Additional figures are listed in: *Syria and Palestine*, (London: British Library/Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections: India Office Records, 1919), 15, Handbook. According to this account, there were closer to 90,000 Jews in Palestine in 1919, although a footnote here cites still another estimate which argues: “475,000 Mohmmedans, 150,000 Jews” and 75,000 various Christian groups. This last set of numbers, however, seems to offer a much higher figure for the Jewish population than almost any other source, and for this reason the numbers used above reflect modest and generally accepted figures. For further information, see table in Appendix B.

\(^{19}\) Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Fifth ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004), 110.
Arabs, Jabotinsky argued, are “just the same old ‘natives’ whom the Englishman has ruled and led for centuries, nothing new, no problems.”

In the end, the Mandatory administration’s task was much like herding cats; none of these councils got any real political traction.

Notwithstanding al-Husayni’s protests in London, Palestinian Arabs typically had little influence or active voice in the political machinations of the Paris Peace Conference, the San Remo Conference, or the creation of the Mandate. In Paris they were largely represented by Prince Feisal (1883 --1933) whose goals and ambitions for the future of the Arab Middle East did not usually take into account the nationalist sentiment of Palestinians, who increasingly saw themselves as independent from other Arab communities. The other notable advocates, T. E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, tended to fall in step with Feisal. Only Lord Curzon and Edwin Montagu seemed even remotely interested in what the Palestinian Arabs, not simply all Arabs, thought. If, however, the Palestinians believed that clarity and some assurances of increased involvement in their own political fortunes would come with the League of Nations Mandate and the establishment of a legislative body, they continued to be sorely mistaken. Aside from securing British hegemony over the region, the Mandate only reinforced --without clarifying --

the Balfour Declaration. The Mandate’s Preamble states:

… the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish

---

people with Palestine and to the grounds *for reconstituting their national home* in that country...²¹

Safeguards continued to be issued for Jewish contingents in the region, despite the fact that records indicate only 28,765 Jews living in Palestine in 1920 were entitled to vote.²² Political and symbolic representation in the administration of the region did not reflect *all* of the peoples in Palestine.

As Margaret MacMillan notes “There were two realities in the world of 1919, and they did not always mesh. One was in Paris and the other was on the ground, where people were making their own decisions and fighting their own battles.”²³ Just as was the case before the Balfour Declaration was released, the story of how it affected change must be viewed from several vantage points. The events in Paris were ultimately only a backdrop to how the Declaration was manipulated on the ground in Palestine, London, and India.

**Palestine**

Prior to the arrival of the Zionist Commission (also known as the Jewish Colonies Commission) to Palestine in 1918, a general sense of uncertainty and fear pervaded Palestine’s native population. The Zionist Commission’s aims in Palestine were to survey conditions and lay plans for the future based on its reading of the Declaration. According to historian Walter Laqueur, Chaim Weizmann and Allenby did not agree on the future of the region and Zionists

---


²³ MacMillan, xxx.
frequently complained about the military administration’s insensitivity, even anti-Semitism. Weizmann wrote that the “messianic hopes which we had read into the Balfour Declaration suffered a perceptible diminution when we came into contact with the hard realities of G. H. Q.” Laqueur notes that while Allenby and Weizmann ultimately got along reasonably well, “the commander-in-chief probably never changed his basic view that there was no future for the Jews in Palestine.” The cool relations indicated by the two were emblematic of the general relationship between British officials and Zionists --from then until the British handover of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947.

In April 1918, Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of the Arab Bureau, noted that prior to Weizmann’s meeting with Syrian and Palestinian officials a general sense of dread permeated society; “fear that the Jews not only intended to assume the reins of Government in Palestine but also to expropriate or buy up during the war large tracts of land owned by Moslems and others, and gradually to force them from the country” had an unsettling effect on Britain’s native allies. Cornwallis further observed that “Everything possible was done by British Officers to allay these fears but here again an ignorance of the exact programme of the Zionists made this

---

24 This attitude is noted by several authors dealing with Palestine at the end of the World War One, including but not limited to Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972); MacMillan; Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Smith; Tessler. Additionally both Chaim Weizmann and Vladimir Jabotinsky note the relationship between the military administration and the Zionists working in Palestine.


26 Laqueur, 449.

27 Kinahan Cornwallis, "Major Kinahan Cornwallis to Edwin Montagu, 10 April, 1918," Correspondence, India Office Records, London.
The Balfour Declaration left too much room for interpretation and this, coupled with continued war efforts, made defending the policy increasingly frustrating. During the meeting between Arab and Zionist officials, Cornwallis reported, Weizmann declared “that a Jewish Government would be fatal to his plans,” but a cynic may ask why, if this was the case, did British officials find it so difficult to explain what was to happen in post-Declaration Palestine?

Historian A. J. Sherman argues that policy-makers dealing with Palestine assumed an ideal was achievable. Namely, Palestine would be improved by “an industrious, educated Jewish population grateful for British protection” and the improved economic “well-being of the region would reconcile its Muslim and Christian communities to Zionist aspirations.” This naïve idealism, Sherman goes on, was perpetuated by the belief that the ‘natural authority’ of British imperial structures would allow Palestine to “somehow fit into the large-scale Pax Britannica that was to be established throughout the Middle East and on into India.” The early confusion over the actual meaning of the Declaration, Arab frustrations and fears, and the impatience of Zionists eroded this sentiment, at least on the ground in Palestine, while London officials continued to chant a mantra of ‘stay the course.’

In 1919, Major J. N. Camp, Assistant Political Officer in Palestine, noted that the promises made to the Arabs, and the Arabs to the Zionists, during the meetings between

\[\text{\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 15.}\]
Weizmann and Prince Feisal (1883 --1933) --codified in the 1919 Feisal-Weizmann Agreement --were less than practical. Camp observed that

practically all Moslems and Christians of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionists, and bitterly so. They openly or secretly support or sympathize with the societies in their anti-Zionist and anti-immigration talk and plans for action. In other words, if we mean to carry out any sort of Zionist policy we must do so with military force.\(^32\)

The growing unrest Camp witnessed, he felt, led to two interconnected problems. First, the promises and vague plans for the future of Palestine were certain to spark turmoil throughout the Muslim world, and in turn the Government must prepare itself “for the propaganda that is certain to be made with regard to Jews taking possession of the Holy Places and the Holy Land.”\(^33\)

Second, Weizmann’s agreement with Feisal was “not worth the paper it is written on or the energy wasted in the conversation to make it.”\(^34\) Not only did Camp believe that the Zionists were being less than upfront about their intentions, but that Feisal did not represent the wishes of the Palestinian locals and was not a useful negotiator on their behalf. To make matters more difficult, “the majority of British officials posted there [Palestine between 1918 and 1948] had no great sympathy for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, even if they could


\(^33\) Ibid.

\(^34\) Ibid. As it turns out Camp’s assessment was correct. Weizmann ultimately backed out of the agreement, as Psychologist Baylis Thomas notes, this was done because Feisal wanted to ally with the Zionists against the French who sought control over Syria. Since Weizmann was not interested in alienating British backing at the expense of a French Syria, the Agreement fell through within months. See: Baylis Thomas, How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lanham, MD Lexington Books, 1999), 14.
have explained what was meant by the phrase.”\textsuperscript{35} The frustration engendered by the vagueness of the Declaration even began to cause problems for pro-Zionist British officials in Palestine.

In May 1922, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel visited London to urge politicians to “offer an official interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, preferably one that would clarify British policy toward Jewish immigration in a manner acceptable to mainstream Arab opinion.”\textsuperscript{36} Samuel, who had been one of the staunchest advocates of the Zionist platform represents, to some degree, what Sir Michael Hogan (1908 --1986) believed happened to most officials sent to Palestine: “everyone who came to Palestine came there to a certain degree pro-Jew, but after a time became essentially pro-Arab, and generally ended pro-British.”\textsuperscript{37} Notably, the fact that Samuel found he had to have the Balfour Declaration clarified further proved that a ‘national home’ was too vague and new a concept for the practical implementation of policy.

This sentiment, however, was nothing new. In 1920 Humphrey Bowman (1879-1965), Director of Education and a member of the Advisory Council for Palestine, expressed the general sense of frustrated obligation felt by British officials in Palestine:

It is indeed difficult to see how we can keep our promises to the Jews by making the country a ‘National Home,’ without inflicting injury on 9/10ths of the population. … we have now got the onus of it on our shoulders, & have incurred odium from the Moslems & Christians, who are not appeased by vague promises that their interests will not be affected.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35} Sherman, 27.

\textsuperscript{36} Tessler, 173.

\textsuperscript{37} Sir Michael Hogan was the Chief Magistrate for Palestine in 1936. Sherman, 30.

\textsuperscript{38} Humphrey Bowman, "Diary, 1920," Humphrey Bowman Collection, Oxford. As cited in: Sherman, 54.
Bowman was correct in his assessment of the Muslim-Christian sentiment. As was discussed in chapter one, before 1917 Palestinian Arabs were generally disorganized in their nationalist rhetoric, largely asserting Greater Syrian nationalism. After 1917, however, Palestinians began to distinguish themselves from other Arab community, essentially for two reasons. First, the Arab leaders, like Feisal, who spoke on behalf of the Arabs, did so more in pan-Arab rather than Palestinian terms. Feisal was clearly more concerned with the fate of Damascus than he was Palestinian fellahin (peasants). Palestinian nationalists saw Feisal’s agreements with Weizmann and diplomatic intrigues in Paris as a performance of their own region’s sacrifice. Palestine, they believed, was sacrificed to secure Feisal’s state in Damascus. Second, after 1917, and it becoming clear that Palestinians needed to fend for themselves, Zionist colonization increased, providing a convenient rallying point for the general desire for Palestinian self-determination. Palestinian Arabs, however, were hampered in their efforts by two further issues. First, racially driven British imperial policies continued to dictate what Arab abilities were and were not. Second, internal fracturing made achieving independence, in particular Palestinian independence, increasingly difficult.

A further point of aggravation which Bowman forgot to include was the active anti-Zionist Jewish population in Palestine, which also fought to prevent the establishment of any Jewish state. This population, albeit small, only further complicated the politics of Palestine and further frustrated officials attempting to stabilize the region. Thus, within months of the Declaration’s release the divisions, -- ethnic, religious, political -- which still plague Palestinian-Israeli politics today, were clearly emerging.
The Reemergence of the Racial Factor in International Politics

In 1919, Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden (1854--1937) stated that “there were ‘only three major powers left in the world: the United States, Britain, and Japan.'”39 This belief and the increased anti-immigration legislation in places like the United States encouraged Japan to advocate for the addition of a “racial equality clause” to the Covenant of the League of Nations (created at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919). On 13 February, Baron Nobuaki Makino (1861--1949) of the Japanese delegation read his amendment to the ‘religious liberty’ clause:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.41

Unfortunately for Japan, as well as all other Asian and non-European countries, the mystique of white hegemony continued to pervade international politics.42 Lord Cecil, in response to the


40 The ‘religious liberty clause’ promised to discriminate against any of the League and its jurisdiction on the basis of creed, religion, or belief.

41 MacMillan, 318.

42 It is interesting to note that during the course of World War One several discussions took place in which the use of Chinese and Japanese forces to complement, and in some cases supplement, British forces were considered. In November 1917, Montagu, in a letter to Lord Chelmsford expressed his sincere dislike for this scheme stating: “As regards Japan, at home I took very strong objection to the employment of Chinese either in Mesopotamia or in Aden or in Egypt. I felt that they had doubtful military value, if any, and that it would lower our prestige enormously to appear to depend upon foreign mercenaries to protect British processions. The Japanese present another question. They are of undoubted military value. We are getting very short of men. At home I stated the strong objections felt by the India Office to Japanese cooperation in Mesopotamia, based not so much on prestige but on the notorious attitude of the Japanese, their Germanic system of civilisation, and the prize they would be likely to ask.” Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to Lord Chelmsford, 1917,” Correspondence, p. 2, Montagu Papers, Cambridge.
proposed amendment “said that, alas, this was a highly controversial matter. It was already causing problems within the British empire delegation.”\textsuperscript{43} For the British delegation the clearest problem a racial equality clause raised was reconciling it with the continuation of current colonial policy.

By 1923 the discrepancies between white rights and the rights of non-whites throughout the Empire had grown into a monumental imperial dilemma. Representatives of India, in a letter to Minister of Parliament Stanley Baldwin (1867 --1947), stated that the “principle of equality in Imperial citizenship has been openly violated by some of the self-governing Dominions” and “is already a cause of grave discontent in India.”\textsuperscript{44} The seeds of this discontent began to make a clear entrance into imperial and international politics as a result of Japan’s attempted amendment, but much like the states-rights issues that dominated United States’ politics, the question of whether international Charters could supersede a country’s immigration laws became a central hurdle. The proposed amendment was in direct opposition to British policy regarding non-white, inter-imperial immigration and enfranchisement (as were discussed in chapter two).

According to a confidential memorandum written by the Foreign Office in 1921

The ‘racial equality’ question in its present stage primarily concerns the following countries: Japan, China, British India, United States of America (especially California and the Pacific States), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa. The first three countries demand the right of free immigration and freedom from discriminatory disabilities for their nationals in the territories of the last five countries. The question can be regarded from an economic or from a political point of view, but in its essence it is a racial one. … The white and coloured races cannot and will not amalgamate. One or the

\textsuperscript{43} MacMillan, 318.

other must be the ruling caste… only one of the aggrieved races has acquired sufficient material strength to demand a hearing, and that is Japan. … In every respect, except the racial one, Japan stands on par with the great governing nations of the world. But, however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will never be able to admit her equality.\textsuperscript{45}

Just as the Aga Khan had attempted to prove by asserting Indian equality with Britons, the Japanese attempted to prove in the ‘racial equality clause’ the necessity to change racial political thinking on a global scale. The problem, however, was that the European ruling powers were not yet ready to allow significant losses to their status as ‘racial superiors.’ British imperial policy continued to be dominated by this racial hierarchy in the years following World War One.

In Palestine the racial tensions after World War One continued much as they had in the years leading up to the war. British officials held negative stereotypes of both Jews and Arabs and these informed policy construction and practice from 1917 onward. The most difficult obstacle facing Palestine, on the ground, was the growing division within the population. On the one hand, European political Zionists continued to migrate to the region, engendering dissatisfaction among the native populations (Jewish, Muslim, and Christian alike), but on the other hand, Palestinians struggled to find a voice and a leadership which represented their own wishes for the future of the region.

\textit{Familial Divisions in Post-War Palestinian Politics}

The two most significant families in post-World War One Palestinian politics were the Nashashibis and al-Husaynis. In 1914, the two families represented Palestine in the most recent round of Ottoman parliamentary elections. Raghib al-Nashashibi (1881 --1951) and Said al-

Husayni (dates unknown) ran on anti-Zionist platforms. Nashashibi stated that “If I am elected as representative I shall devote all my strength, day and night, to doing away with the threat of the Zionists and Zionism.”46 Similarly, Said al-Husayni promised to stop the increased land sales to Jewish Zionists.47 Still, despite the rhetorical unity the two families shared, the al-Husaynis and Nashashibis split a great deal of the energy of anti-Zionist sentiment and the British used this rivalry to their advantage, as best they could, during the post-war years.

J. N. Camp’s 1919 report on the political situation in Palestine examined several nationalist organizations, dissecting them for their ties to one of these two main families. Al Mutada al Adabi (The Literary Club), for instance, was largely comprised of Nashashibi members and appeared to have ties to the ‘Black Hand,’ the Al Nadi el Arabi (the Arab Club) was generally Husayni, and Al Fedaiyah (a society “of persons ready to sacrifice themselves”) were “ruffians who swear to do what they are told; that is, to start a revolt or assassinate anybody.”48 The distance between the al-Husayni and Nashashibi families is noted by Camp’s informant who states that the Al Nadi el Arabi and Mutada al Adabi “are not on good terms” with one another, although they are united in their mutual opposition to “Zionism and Jewish

46 Tessler, 132.

47 Ibid.

48 Camp. The ‘Black Hand’ noted here should not be confused with the Serbian Black Hand. This organization, which was founded by Syrian Izz al-Din al-Qassam ( - 1935), was an early anti-Zionist and anti-British imperialist terrorist organization. While the Black Hand as an organization died with Qassam in 1935, it left an enduring mark on future movements, in particular with the two-pronged approach to dealing with both the British and the Zionists at the same time.
Immigration.” 49 Finally, Camp notes the existence of a fourth group, the Moslem-Christian Society.

The Moslem-Christian Society was an attempt to represent a cross-section of Palestinian society. This group was composed of older Palestinians, who represented a diverse set of political goals and leanings. According to Camp, “The Latins [Roman Catholics, etc.] in it are pro-French; the Greek Orthodox are nearly all pro-British; the Moslems are out for independence.” 50 Camp further discussed the activities of these communities including the “Arming of members with small arms; preparation of lists of prominent Jews and pro-Zionists among non-Jews, … various forms of pro-Arab, anti-Zionist propaganda, … raids on Zionist settlements, encouraging Bedouin raiders, teaching pro-Arab curriculum, etc.” 51 Thus, by 1919 it was abundantly clear that the significant political actors in Christian and Muslim Palestinian politics were all anti-Zionist.

In 1920, British officials accused Amin al-Husayni (1895 --1974) of inciting anti-British disturbances. Despite the fact that Amin al-Husayni would eventually become one of the leading spokesmen for the Palestinian people during the inter-war years, and appointed by the British, this moment offered the British an opportunity for further fracturing the Husayni-Nashashibi base. The British supported Raghib al-Nashashibi to replace the recently dismissed mayor of Jerusalem, another Husayni, Musa al-Husayni. As historian and political scientist Mark Tessler points out, this meant that

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
while the Husaynis became bitter opponents of the British, the Nashashibis now allied themselves with Great Britain. The two most important consequences of these events were a deepening of the rivalry … and the [Husayni’s] emergence as the leading faction of an increasingly militant Palestine national movement.\textsuperscript{52}

The divisions between pro-British, pro-nationalist, and anti-Zionist Palestinian factions only deepened during the 1920s and 1930s, and persisted well beyond the establishment of the state of Israel. Conversely, other divisions like the Jewish anti-Zionist Old Yishuv\textsuperscript{53}, while vehemently anti-Zionist in the 1920s and 1930s, slipped into the woodwork after Israeli statehood.

\textit{Palestinian Jewish Anti-Zionism}

Much of this dissertation has focused on Edwin Montagu as an example of anti-Zionist Jewish sentiment, but his was certainly not the only case. As has already been discussed, Orthodox Jews also found political Zionism problematic, albeit for different reasons. The great majority of the Jews living in Palestine before the \textit{alyiah} were Orthodox and the anti-Zionism they advocated was a combination of distrust of Zionists (who were largely from Europe) and the secularization that political Zionism brought. As noted in the 1919 \textit{Syria and Palestine} handbook, “the older inhabitants [of Palestine] … the great majority of them, particularly in Jerusalem, are fanatical in religion and opposed to modern Zionism.”\textsuperscript{54} What was worse still was the combination of the two -- using religious ideas and ideals to advocate for a secular, non-religious outcome. One of the most prominent Anti-Zionist Jewish organizations -- the Agudat \textit{Israel}, or the Israelite Union--comprised in part by native Palestinian Jews, opposed the political

\textsuperscript{52} Tessler, 222.

\textsuperscript{53} Old Yishuv by 1920 Old Yishuv typically referred to Palestinian Jews (Jews who had been living in Palestine before alyiah of the late 1800s), but also the ultra-orthodox and orthodox Jewish community which did not agree with the political Zionist agenda.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Syria and Palestine}, 60.
Zionist scheme. Although after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, when the Agudat Israel accepted the existence of the state, its advocacy for religious conservatism continued. Cultural and religious laws, i.e., dietary constraints and laws pertaining to work on the Sabbath, are among the many outcomes of the Agudat Israel’s involvement in modern Israeli politics. In the 1920s, however, the Agudat Israel, and in particular some of its members, vocally denounced political Zionism and worked to derail the Zionist program for Palestine.

In 1919, Dutch-born Dr. Ya’acov Israel De Hahn moved to Jerusalem, initially guided by Zionist ideology. De Hahn’s history before Palestine suggests the ideal candidate for the Zionist endeavor. He had been born to an Orthodox family, but parted with religion while studying medicine in Amsterdam. He traveled to Russia and experienced a reconversion to Judaism, which it seems, encouraged him to move to Palestine. Historian Nachman Ben-Yehuda writes that “While De Hahn obviously moved to Palestine out of a Zionist ideology, he very quickly became disillusioned with the local Zionist political and social leadership. He drifted very slowly into the circles of the most extreme anti-Zionist Jewish orthodox groups in Jerusalem.” Historian Yakov M. Rabkin argues that one reason De Hahn became disillusioned with political Zionism was because of its ‘aggressive nature,’ in particular the proto-fascism Vladimir Jabotinsky and his followers seemed to advocate.

Rabkin contends that “his [De Hahn’s] acquaintance with Jabotinsky and other leaders of the future Israeli right wing, which was fascinated by the growing fascist movements of Europe, alerted De Haan to the threat that Zionism’s violent side represented.” In a concerted effort to


distance himself from this, and to encourage the Old Yishuv to take an active role in the future of Palestine, De Hahn joined with Rabbi Joseph Chaim Sonnefield, the leader of the Agudat Israel, in advocating a more cultural Zionist stance. Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht note the Agudat Israel was quite willing “to sacrifice the establishment of a Jewish state if they could be sure that Jews could come and live in the land of Israel without harm.”\(^{57}\) De Hahn and Sonnefield even conducted negotiations with King Abdullah (King of Jordan, 1882–1951) to secure Jewish immigration and settlement without the establishment of a Jewish state.\(^{58}\) Despite this diplomatic attempt to stall the development of a Jewish state, De Hahn’s rhetoric, expressed in Dutch, English, and local newspapers became increasingly bombastic in the early 1920s. Several articles appearing in Holland and England were highly critical of the Zionist program in Palestine and the Zionist elite. This criticism did little to engender favor among local political Zionists. By 1922 “Local newspapers (secular and religious) even published pieces calling to revenge De Hahn for his activity.”\(^{59}\) In June 1924, this is exactly what happened. On Monday, 30 June, De Hahn was assassinated. A great deal of controversy remains over the question of who ordered his assassination, but it is generally accepted that the assassin was someone closely connected to the discussion of fascist connections Rabkin cites: Marius Schattner, *Histoire De La Droite Israélienne* (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1991), 297. There does not seem to be any consistency in how to spell De Hahn’s name. In addition to ‘De Hahn’ is also appears as ‘De Haan’ and ‘De Han.’


\(^{58}\) Ibid.

\(^{59}\) Ben-Yehuda, 138.
De Hahn “became a hero who had died like a medieval martyr for the greater glory of God” in Palestine’s orthodox community.61

The small anti-Zionist orthodox Jewish Palestinian community continued to distance itself from the efforts of the political Zionists. Sonnefield “habitually referred to Zionists as ‘evil men and ruffians;’ hell had entered Eretz Israel with Herzl.”62 Still, the two communities remained difficult to distinguish from one another. British officials saw only Jews, anti- or pro-Zionist. Arab Christians and Muslims too, it seemed, found it increasingly hard to tell the two factions from one another. In 1975, Rabbi Katzenelbogen remembered that “The Arabs do not know how to distinguish us and the Zionists. We suffer in all these wars while we have no part in creating them.”63 The anti-Zionist faction of Palestinian Jews, while advocating the same thing as the Muslim-Christian Palestinian community, was never able to work closely with their Palestinian brethren, only further adding to the complexity of varying desires for the future of Palestine.

London

Coming to Palestine “to a certain degree pro-Jew,” as Hogan noted, was not surprising given the views held by the majority of Britons who lived and worked outside of Palestine. In essence the British Government was pro-Zionist, or at least indifferent to Zionism. As has been

60 Ibid. The Haganah was the underground (para)military organization of the Zionist community in Palestine from the early 1920s until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

61 Laqueur, 410.

62 Ibid.

shown, this philosophy was informed largely by Christian Zionism (and the moral guilt which was associated with it), coupled with the belief that Zionism would aid the war effort. Rarely was this perception held, or at least maintained, by British officials on the ground in Palestine or who had significant experience in the region. As both Bowman and Sherman argued, an imperial stubbornness prevented significant alterations to the policy indicated by the Balfour Declaration. Simply put, no one had a clear vision for how Palestine administration should be constructed and no one seemed willing to lay down a framework for the future of the region.

Even before the end of the war, reluctance to have the British government embark upon still another imperial adventure was felt worldwide. On 14 October 1918, Viscount Northcliffe (Sir Alfred C. W. Harmsworth, 1865 --1922) received a telegram from an agent in Washington D.C. which observed that President Woodrow Wilson (1856 --1924) did not want to see negotiations at the end of the war needlessly protracted and was “opposed to a British Protectorate over Palestine and Mesopotamia.”64 While ultimately Wilson did support a British Mandate over Palestine, even the rumor of his hesitancy was sign enough that Palestine was going to cause serious international policy concerns. From within the British Government there was additional dismay at the prospect of a British protectorate for Palestine. Lloyd George’s private secretary, Philip Kerr, offered several views on the future of Palestine and the nature of mandatory governments. In 1918 he wrote to Lloyd George:

May I suggest as a possible solution of the Middle Eastern problem that the U.S.A. should be invited to assume a tutelage over: Constantinople, Asia Minor, Armenia, Syria,

---

64 Henderson, "Telegram from Henderson to Northcliffe, 1918," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.
[and] Palestine. If she did this [it] would be a great Mohammedan power and I should not be afraid of possible intrigues.\textsuperscript{65}

In January 1919, Kerr wrote that he did not “believe the mandatory system will really work at all. It is either a sham, or it means perpetual irresponsible interference or dual control with clearly defined responsibility for government nowhere.”\textsuperscript{66} How to administer Palestine continued to plague British efforts therein. On 16 January 1919, Lord Curzon wrote to Balfour that the general opinion of Money, then Administrator of Palestine, and Allenby was that the government should “go slow about Zionist aspirations and the Zionist State. Otherwise we might jeopardise all that we have won. A Jewish \textbf{Government} in any form would mean an Arab rising, and the nine-tenths of the population who are not Jews would make short shrift with the Hebrews.”\textsuperscript{67} Curzon also reiterated his own belief that a pro-Zionist effort in Palestine was problematic, noting

As you may know, I share the views, and have for long felt that the pretensions of Weizmann & Company are extravagant and out to be check. The statement that they asked our leave to make, but which I think was held up by you, would in my judgement do great harm, and I certainly could not assume the responsibility of authorising it.\textsuperscript{68}

Only days later Balfour asserted that as far as he knew, Weizmann had never “put forward a claim for the Jewish \textbf{Government} of Palestine. Such a claim is in my opinion certainly inadmissible and personally I do not think we should go further than the original declaration

\textsuperscript{65} Philip Kerr, "Philip Kerr to David Lloyd George, 1918," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
which I made to Lord Rothschild.”69 The problem was, however, that it continued to remain unclear what Balfour thought the Declaration promised.

In a February 1919, letter to Lloyd George, Balfour notes that

the weak point of our position … is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and lightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance, and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can be given without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants.70

The anxiety which drove pro-Zionists in the British Government to focus more heavily on the future of Palestine appeared clearly in Sir Alfred Mond’s 13 October 1919 letter to Lloyd George. This nearly frantic appeal stated:

I notice with some concern an article in the Jewish Chronicle as to an interview which Amir Feisal had given regarding his views on Palestine. He put forward the idea that Palestine should be part of an Arab Kingdom in which the Jews will be welcome but will in fact be governed by Arabs. This is so entirely contrary to the expressed policy of the British Government, that I so hope you will impress on him the intention of the Governments of the Allies regarding the Jews and their national home. It is of the very most importance that there should be no weakening on this question, which is causing me a great deal of anxiety.”71

Balfour did finally elucidate some of his thinking as regards Palestine in an August 1919 memorandum. Balfour began by focusing on the recent political past. The story, he contended, is

69 Arthur James Balfour, "Arthur Balfour to Lord Curzon, 20 January, 1919," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London. It has been argued that in fact in 1922 Balfour and Lloyd George at a meeting with Weizmann and Winston Churchill actually admitted that the Balfour Declaration “had always meant a Jewish State,” but at least publically this was not acknowledged. Gilmour: 65.


71 Alfred Mond, "Sir Alfred Mond to David Lloyd George, 13 October, 1919," Correspondence, David Lloyd George Papers, London.
affected by five documents, beginning with our promise to the ruler of the Hedjaz in 1915; going on to the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France of September 1916; [the Balfour Declaration of 1917]; followed by the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918; and concluding with the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919.72

Humbly, Balfour goes on to accept that

These documents are not consistent with each other; they represent no clear-cut policy; the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is not really the policy of the Allied and Associated Power; and yet, so far as I can see, none of them have wholly lost their validity or can be treated in all respects as of merely historic interest.73

One of the most fundamental points of contention, in Balfour’s mind, was the difficulty of reconciling these treaties and agreements with post-war realities, in particular the newly vogue notion of national self-determination, and the conflicting desires of various interested parties. On the one hand, the belief “enshrined in the Covenant” that “if we supply an aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and religion,” protect them and nurture democracy among them, they will “establish ‘a national government,’ and enjoy, ‘an administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population.’”74 On the other hand, racial prejudice continued to affect Balfour’s assessment of Middle Eastern populations as he asserted that believing Arabs, once freed from “Turkish tyranny … will desire to use their new-found freedom to set up representative institutions, with secret voting, responsible government, and national frontiers, I fear we are in error.”75 What Balfour made clear was that not only were the Arabs not ready for self-government, but Zionist aspirations, just as Mond had argued, needed to be paramount in the minds of policy-makers

72 Balfour, "Respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, p. 3.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
whether the rationale behind the Declaration was sound or not. Balfour’s memorandum argued that

The contradiction of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the “independent nation” of Palestine than in that of the “independent nation” of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.

In my opinion that is right.  

As if the British Government was the world’s general practitioner and the Arabs, in this case, were petulant children who did not want to take their medicine, Balfour concluded that “I do not think that Zionism will hurt the Arabs; but they will never say they want it.”  

Even before the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine had been established, it was clear that Zionism was vehemently disliked by Palestine’s native population, the British government was unclear on how the administration of Palestine would develop, and that despite all of these seemingly important obstacles to the establishment of a peaceful, stable region no one was going to stop the process which the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration had put into motion.

India

More globally, the questions of what to do with Palestine were part of a larger dialogue about the Ottoman Empire and future of the world’s Muslims and Muslim lands. The British Empire found itself in a delicate situation at the end of the war, attempting to balance the need to

76 Ibid., p. 4.

77 Ibid., p. 5.
exact punishment on the Ottoman Empire while at the same time seeking to protect its relationship with the substantial Islamic population within the Empire and among its allies.

Two things were of particular concern to Indian Muslims as regards the future of Ottoman territories. First, Indo-Muslims understood the future of Palestine to represent not only the future of all nationalist causes in the Middle East and South Asia, but as a symbolic statement on the place of Islam in the minds of Western policy-makers. Similarly, and secondly, Indo-Muslims took a keen interest in the potential for Ottoman state dismemberment, in particular the fate of Istanbul and the Sultan/Caliph.

Early in September 1918, a series of Muslim disturbances took place in Calcutta, which Lord Ronaldshay believed

The root cause of the trouble, however, is not a local one. It is deep seated and widespread; and so far as I can judge the present display of feeling in Bengal is merely a symptom of the disturbed state of the whole Moslem body politic. … namely, the fact that the individual is daily confronted with the formidable and distracting task of reconciling the claims of loyalty to a Christian Power as a citizen of the British Empire, with those of sympathy with Turkey as the centre and fountain-head of his religion.78

In November, Montagu reinforced Ronaldshay’s belief that the interconnectedness of Indian and Turkish politics had a profound impact on the administration of India. In a letter from 8 November, Montagu contended that “There is no doubt that people do not realise how delicate the position of out Mohammedan fellow-subjects in India has been during the war with Turkey.”79 In particular, a letter which had recently appeared in The Times “suggesting that the opportunity had now come to the Allies to transfer the Mosque of St. Sophia at Constantinople from its present use to that of a church” only further frustrated the political agenda Montagu had

78 {Dundas, 1918 #1694}

for creating a responsible government in India. What is more, the lack of press coverage Indian forces received for their part in the Near Eastern campaigns further proved to Montagu that there was a distinct disconnect between what London perceived and the sacrifices made by the Empire’s subjects. Much as declaring the Arab forces in the Levant belligerents, Montagu believed that “the part [Indian troops] played in the early days in France and later in Mesopotamia and Palestine, entitles India to claim that she has done her bit in achieving the success which has at last dawned.” Like the Arabs and even the Japanese, however, the Indians continued to be subjected to the racially dictated policies of the British Empire, and the battle over Palestine proved to be only one point of contention.

In a memorandum submitted on 9 November 1918, the Aga Khan argued that “The British nation, in particular, more than any other in the world will and ought to have a logical, reasonable, and if not altruistic, at least not immoral, policy towards Islam as a whole.” Additionally, the Aga Khan continued, this was in large measure due to the fact that the ‘British Empire is now the greatest Muslim power in the world.’ This assertion did not sit well with all members of the British government. In a 6 December response to the Aga Khan, a reviewer stated

The British Empire is a Christian Power which happens to have a larger number of Moslem subjects than any other; and the true inference is rather the opposite. … The lesson of experience is that no Christian Power with a large number of Moslem subjects can afford to allow them to establish intimate relations with their co-religionists in other

---

80 Ibid.


countries; and the larger the number of its Moslem subjects. [sic] the less it can afford to do so.\textsuperscript{83}

Coming to grips with the changing make-up of the Empire’s population, and how that population viewed itself\textit{vis à vis} the political structure of the Empire, created only future trouble for organizing a peaceful conclusion to the war.

In January 1919, Montagu once again reiterated his desire to see the Indian people rightly compensated for their sacrifices and contributions to the war effort. In his \textit{The Future of Constantinople}, Montagu took aim at talk which circulated at the Paris Peace Conference to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, depose the Sultan/Caliph and ‘return’ to European states (i.e., Greece) various Ottoman possessions. Montagu argued that

\begin{quote}
Indian Mohammedan opinion is entitled to greater consideration … it would surely be an act of ingratitude and of cynicism to say to them; ‘Because you were so loyal, because you did not show more excitement, because you have helped us in our war, because you have actually provided soldiers to fight against the Turkish arms, we are going to not expel your fellow Mohammedans from Europe.’\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

Two years later, these same concerns were raised again when a deputation of Indian Muslims met with the Prime Minister at the House of Commons.

Agitation at what was perceived to be injustice against Muslims, the greater number of which had been allied with the British, continued to spark anxiety among officials throughout the Middle East and South Asia. In Taylor Watts’ letter from 1919 this sentiment was expressed as he noted that “The feeling here [Palestine] is very acute and it seems to me madness, with affairs as they are in the Indian frontier … to risk an Islamic rising here with a repercussion in India and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
Egypt; poor us we shall certainly be in the tactical middle.”\textsuperscript{85} As already discussed, the fear that rising pro-Caliph, anti-European sentiment was going to destabilize the region led many British officials on the ground to take seriously the frustrations of Muslim leaders like the Aga Khan and Mohamed Ali.

On 24 March 1921, the Indian deputation in London laid out five main concerns of Indian Muslims, which included the futures of Constantinople, Thrace, Smyrna, Arab States (including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the Hejaz), and the Caliph’s religious suzerainty. Regarding the Arab states, the deputation asked that they “be constituted as independent States and freed from outside control.”\textsuperscript{86} To this, the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, responded that

\begin{quote}
I do not think however that any responsible Arab Chiefs would like to try the experiment of being absolutely without the support of a Great Western Power in Mesopotamia or Syria. They are people who have not for hundreds of years had control of those states. They are not a coherent people, \textit{they are tribal}.
\end{quote}

As for Palestine, Lloyd George continued to tout its exceptionalism, noting that it contained a very mixed population, it is of course traditionally a great Jewish country, and although the Arabs are undoubtedly in the majority and should have their voice in the Government of that country, I think in view of the great international place which Palestine holds … it is in a very different position either to Mesopotamia or Constantinople.\textsuperscript{88}

The deputation noted that it was not the \textit{place} that concerned them, as the \textit{people}, and they sought justice for those people. When asked, however, what form of Government the region would finally receive, Lloyd George again indicated the uncertainty that pervaded Palestine

\textsuperscript{85} Taylor.

\textsuperscript{86} "Report of Deputation to the Prime Minister from Representatives of the Mohammedans of India," House of Commons (London: Parliamentary Archives/House of Lords Records, David Lloyd George Papers, 24 March 1921), 2.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 10. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
policy even in 1921. The government, he said, had not been finally decided on, “but it will be a very different thing from Mesopotamia; that will be purely Arab and we will leave the Arab to govern himself there with as little interference as we possibly can, but Palestine is a different thing.” The superior attitude with which Lloyd George spoke, whether wittingly or not, did little to encourage favor from the Muslim population of the Empire.

In May 1923 the Aga Khan did not hide his dislike of Lloyd George’s government and how anti-Islamic it seemed. In a letter to the newly elected Prime Minister Bonar Law (1858 -- 1923), the Aga Khan wrote that he looked forward to working with the new government and how getting rid of the “notoriously pro-Hellenic” leadership of the Lloyd George government would “change the spirit in Near Eastern” (Middle Eastern) policy. Indeed, several historians argue that Lloyd George’s “rabidly anti-Turk, pro-Greek” policy contributed greatly to his downfall. According to Christopher Catherwood, signing the Treaty of Sèvres inflamed Turkish opinions (and thus in turn worldwide Muslim opinion). What is more, Catherwood goes on to argue, “The humiliation of the treaty --which went far beyond anything imposed on Germany by Versailles -- now encouraged” Turkish nationalists under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal (1881 --1938) “to launch a war that would within just a few years bring Turkish victory and destroy the British government.” Furthermore, Kemal’s rise also insured the end of the office of Caliph, which was finally abolished in March 1924.

---

89 Ibid., 19.
91 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 79. The role of Lloyd George’s pro-Greek policies are also touched on in: Inbal A. Rose, Conservatism and Foreign Policy During the Lloyd George Coalition, 1918 - 1922 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1999), 241.
Conclusion

Well after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, two things were certain. First, no one had a clear idea what a ‘national home’ was and how it was to be created (at least no one admitted publically to knowing). Second, Muslims across the British Empire (and eventually across the world) shared intrinsically linked fortunes; the fate of one segment of the community came to symbolize the fate of the whole community. Well into the 1920s, politicians and nationalists grappled with the meaning of the Declaration, never knowing exactly what it called for, but nevertheless referring to it as the most monumental of all of the era’s documents.

Ultimately, the Balfour Declaration was never actually defined, at least not in terms of workable policy. Cheered as the first step in establishing a restored Jewish state, and condemned as a political slap in the face of the faithful Arab--and Muslim--allies during World War One, the Balfour Declaration, much like its wording, remains a controversial document.
The story of the Balfour Declaration did not begin with the outbreak of World War One, nor did it end with the signing of peace treaties in the 1920s. By 1947, the confusion it created led the British government to hand over the Palestine Mandate to the newly created United Nations, and by the following year, the state of Israel came into being (14 May 1948). Today, few historians can claim with any certainty what the document actually called for. What is certain is that the repercussions of its issuance rippled out to incorporate the entire global community, although these ripples were, and continue to be, largely overlooked.

This dissertation has shown that the Balfour Declaration, the debates which led to its issuance, and the political turmoil which erupted after its release all profoundly questioned the role of national identity in the construction of a community. As Brian Klug noted in the summer of 2007, distinguishing the Zionism from Judaism has become increasingly difficult since 1917. In Palestine in after the Declaration’s release, the distinctions between Arab, Palestinian, Christian, and Muslim were blurred and altered such that British statesmen could forge structures compatible with imperial policy. For India the questions raised in London and Palestine vis à vis the Declaration further complicated national definition in terms of religion and race, of patriotism to the Empire, and of loyalty to one’s community. The Declaration came into direct contact again and again with traditional definitions of nation and the modern struggle for nation-states.
What is more, the ideological and ethical crisis the Declaration’s issuance set into motion continues to play out on an international stage, not just within the boundaries of Israel-Palestine. Stephen Glain’s 2005 *Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants* examined this global nature of the repercussions of imperial policy like the Balfour Declaration. According to a mufti (Islamic scholar and leader) from Aleppo “What is happening in Palestine is being done by Zionists, not Jews.”¹ This sentiment too, he went on, is also true of Muslim extremists, like those who perpetrated the 11 September 2001 attacks, in their co-opting Islam. Zionists the mufti explained “are changing the holy concepts to serve Zionism at the expense of their own faith” and that “Muslims were not behind the events of September 11.”² Again, the mufti concluded, the question comes down to national definition, that Muslims are not fighting a civilizational battle against the West, as authors like Samuel Huntington may argue, but that their struggle is for legitimacy and to cast off oppression.³

The questions that defined 1917, about what a pro-Zionist statement should look like, if issued at all, are the same questions which continue to appear at almost all international diplomatic talks which seek to deal with newly emerging nation-states. The relationship between ethnicity, examined in this dissertation under the guise of race and gender, and nationality continues to be a crucial component of international politics. In the 1990s, as the former Yugoslavia broke apart and ethnic fighting in Rwanda created a new term for the international lexicon, *Balkanization*, the same concerns once again surfaced. What is a nation? Who has the


² Ibid.

³ See: Samuel P. Huntington, ”The Clash of Civilizations?,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).
right to define a nation? Is a nation the most effective and appropriate means of creating a state? The politics, theory, and ideology which ushered in the twentieth century helped to show it out -- nationality, an outgrowth of the nineteenth century, continued to plague the twentieth. That ethnically defined nations have the right to self-determination was the international refrain throughout most of the 1900s. Even in the midst of the Cold War, when international policy was thought to be simply divided between two spheres of influence -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- decolonization in Africa and Asia proved that the reality was not as straightforward. Nationalism and the struggle for national self-determination continued to be multidimensional and could not be simply swept up in dichotomous global politics. Nationalist movements that defined the latter half of the twentieth century, just as those defining the first half had done, were more than exertions of diplomatic desires or the concerns of two ‘great powers.’ In the case of the Balfour Declaration, the future of Palestine was not solely determined by the imperial struggles of France and Great Britain, any more than it was by the divisions appearing among Zionists, anti-Zionists, and non-Zionists. Likewise, events which sparked decolonization in Africa, when examined more closely, were not solely the result of the Cold War dynamic, nor were they driven by the divisions between white settlers and native Africans. Instead, decolonization, like the era of World War One, was a moment of confluence. Multiple layers of historic and presentist needs and demands came together to create a chaotic and confusion set of new structures and outcomes. Like the Balfour Declaration, the whole picture of how a nation goes about defining itself and claiming legitimacy, and how in turn that legitimacy is recognized and codified, is not fully appreciated or understood, until the individual, the regional, and the global is accounted for.
The repercussions of the Balfour Declaration are just as seemingly disparate today as the influences which formed it ninety years ago. Today, Muslims throughout the British Commonwealth continue to vie for a voice in British politics, just as Muslims in the 1910s and 1920s struggled to speak for themselves regarding the future of their homelands and their place in the larger political structure of empire. In 2006 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw unwittingly raised the same questions about Muslim abilities and rights as had been raised in the late nineteenth century. In asking female constituents to remove face veils when they came to meet with him, Straw simply reinvented the idea that British policy is the superior political policy and it is by that standard the tone for statecraft should be set.

On the ground, in what is now Israel, the realities of the issuance of the Balfour Declaration have created a split between the Jewish Israeli state and the stateless Palestinians. Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, like those living in the state of Israel, their struggle for legitimizing a Palestinian national identity continues. Until the late in the twentieth century, the official stance of the state of Israel was that the Palestinians were “a ‘community of individuals’ consisting of ‘Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.'” Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir who claimed there was no such thing as a Palestinian people most notably upheld this position. Palestinian Arabs -- Muslims and Christians -- by virtue of their being “non-Jewish peoples,” in the language Balfour Declaration, continued to resist this belief.

The work begun in 1917 continues on. In 1919, Louis Jean Bols (1867 – 1930), in a letter to General Edmund Allenby, expressed the sentiment that in as little as ten years Palestine could

---

become the land of ‘milk and honey.’ Sixty years after the founding of Israel this desire has yet to be fulfilled. In a series of articles examining Israel on the eve of its sixtieth anniversary, an Ethiopian Jew -- one of the region’s newest immigrant communities -- notes that “We thought Israel was the land of honey and milk. …But you have to work for that honey and milk.” The Balfour Declaration was extolled by many as a first step in securing the rights of all nations in the process of self-determination. Since its issuance, however, many others have condemned the Declaration for only establishing an ‘exceptional case.’ Today, as then, few who actively work with the Declaration, historians and statesmen alike, can claim with any certainty what the document really sought. The implications of what it could and can mean, however, continue to confound international politics and at the same time celebrate the confluence of modern and primordial nationalism.

---


6 Paul Adams, "Journey through Israel," BBC News 2008
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources (Government Documents)

United Kingdom: Foreign Office

Correspondence Respecting the Outrages on Jews in Russia. National Archives. London 1881 - 1882.


United Kingdom: Cabinet Minutes


United Kingdom: Department of Information

“Activities of Wellington House During the Great War 1914 - 18.” INF 4/1B, National Archives. London.

United Kingdom: Hearings


Primary Sources (Papers from the Board of Deputies of British Jews)


Primary Sources (Personal Correspondence and Memoranda)


______. "Speech at St. Andrew's Dinner, Calcutta, 30 November 1888." In Speeches Delivered in India, 1884-8, By the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 229 - 248. London: John Murray, 1890.


George, David Lloyd. Queen's Hall Speech, 'International Honour;' 19 September 1914, Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914. ed. by Leslie L. Brooke.


Minutes of Proceedings at a Deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister, at 10, Downing Street, 19 March 1920. Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.


______. Edwin Montagu, to Lord Chelmsford, 10 April 1918. Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.


Reed, Stanley. Stanley Reed, to Lord Lytton, 9 December 1921. Trinity College Library: Montagu, Cambridge.


Primary Sources (Treaties and League of Nations Documents)


Primary Sources (Memoirs, Diaries, and Political Essays)


Bowman, Humphrey. Diary, Humphrey Bowman Collection, St. Antony’s College, Oxford.


**Primary Sources (Propaganda)**


Primary Sources (Fiction)


Primary Sources (Sacred Texts)


Primary Sources (Newspaper Articles)


"Damascus Taken, with 7,000 Turks." The New York Times 1918.

Gandhi, M. K. "The Khilafat." Young India, 23 March 1921.


Reed, Stanley. Times of India, 6 December 1921.


"With Regards to Palestine." The Times of India, 6 December 1921.

Secondary Sources


Fetzer, Joel S., and J. Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005


Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).


Landow, George P. , "A Critical View of British Public Schools"  


APPENDIX A
DRAFTS OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

1. Conjoint Foreign Committee Suggestion - ‘Wolf Formula’ (3 March 1916)
   In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonisation, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown necessary.

2. The Foreign Office Preliminary Draft (June/July, 1917)
   The text of this does not exist (or has not yet been found) but instead of referring to a ‘national home’ for the Jews, Sir Harold Nicolson is supposed to have said that the phrase “asylum for the Jews” was being used.

3. The Preliminary Zionist Draft (12 July 1917)
   His Majesty’s Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build its national life at the conclusion of peace following upon the successful issue of the War.
   His Majesty’s Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country.
   The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a Charter for the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation should, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organization.

4. Zionist Draft (18 July 1917)
   1. His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people.
   2. His Majesty’s Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization.

5. Balfour Draft (The middle of August 1917)
   His Majesty’s Government accept the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people.
   His Majesty’s Government will use their best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before them.
6. Montagu’s First (23 August 1917)

…that the Government will be prepared to do everything in their power to obtain for Jews in Palestine complete liberty of settlement and life on an equality with the inhabitants of that country who profess other religious beliefs.

7. Milner Draft (August 1917)

His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist organisation may desire to lay before them.

8. Montagu’s Second (14 September 1917)

His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment in Palestine for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they live at present, will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which any Jewish or Zionist organisations may desire to lay before it.

9. Milner-Amery (4 October 1917)

His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish Race and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship.

10. The ‘Weizmann Draft’ (As cited by James A. Malcolm)

His Majesty’s Government views with favour the re-establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country of which they are loyal citizens.

11. The Balfour Declaration (31 October 1917, publically 2 November 1917)

His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.
APPENDIX B

POPULATIONS & CIVIL POSITIONS IN PALESTINE, 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate of Population</th>
<th>Of Total Population</th>
<th>Positions held in Palestine Administration</th>
<th>Of Admin. Positions to Population Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>73.53%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>14.71%</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>48.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C
Recruitment Poster -- English

THE JEWS THE WORLD OVER LOVE LIBERTY
HAVE FOUGHT FOR IT & WILL FIGHT FOR IT.

BRITAIN EXPECTS EVERY SON OF ISRAEL
TO DO HIS DUTY

ENLIST WITH THE INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS
FOR OVERSEAS

Under the Command of
Capt, FREEDMAN

Headquarters
786 ST. LAWRENCE BOULEVARD.
MONTREAL.
APPENDIX D
Recruitment Poster – Yiddish
APPENDIX E
Moshi Letter Poster