STATE-BUILDING AND NATION-MAKING IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS: TRANSFORMATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP, 1990-2005

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

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STATE-BUILDING AND NATION-MAKING IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS: TRANSFORMATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP, 1990-2005

Abstract

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Chair: Gregory Hooks

This dissertation is written in a three journal-length article format. I examine the external and internal factors that shaped nation-state building of new and young fifteen former Soviet republics, and determined what citizenship and naturalization legislation the republics adopted to construct a new nation, state and a polity since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

In manuscript-1 I synthesize two opposing theoretical perspectives-- World Society theory (addressing external pressures from the world culture) and Nationhood (addressing nationalism, ethno-demographic dynamics and the national identity). I divide fifteen post-Soviet republics into three theoretically distinct groups to examine the variation in the extent to which nationhood is incorporated and strengthened. I argue that in the post-World War II era the universally empowering nature of human rights scripts has provided new opportunities for states to do nation-building without defying world dominant political culture. To legitimize their actions, young states use not primordialism, but human rights
scripts to reinforce and strengthen the ethnic nation that the state is named after and represents. “Tamed” versions of nationhood are emerging, yet citizenship policies still reinforce the national identity of the nation that gave the name to the state.

Manuscript-2 is a methodological piece on migration—a variable that can be both a cause and an effect of citizenship regimes of the state. There is consensus among researchers that international migration data are undercounted in fifteen post-Soviet republics. I compare and investigate various methods of international migration estimation and argue that population censuses and household surveys provide superior quality of data on migration than the immigration-by-origin method.

Manuscript-3 focuses on conditions of diffusion of state practices and policies among social adopters. The manuscript explains the mechanism of diffusion of policies (globally and locally) that determined the citizenship regimes adopted by Baltic republics when the USSR collapsed in 1991. The manuscript suggests a synthesis materialist (coercive) and ideational (scripted and learned) explanations of diffusion-- to suggest a model where these competing mechanisms of diffusion intersect rather than occur in isolation or in opposition.
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I dedicate this dissertation to my mother and father. Without their support and encouragement I would have never achieved any of my goals.

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This dissertation was driven by my interest in nation-building and nationalism dynamics in nation-states. Coming from the former Soviet Union, I was most intrigued by how sharply nation-building was different among these republics. As I started exploring the ethnic dynamics, I realized that citizenship is the arena where nation-building agendas and nationalism collided with global pressure to not exclude minorities and immigrants. Thus, my journey to the understanding of the institutionalization and transformation of citizenship among new and young nation-states started. The larger and more general question posed is “what does it mean to start a new state?” More specifically, I explain how domestic and external forces shaped citizenship and nation-building of contemporary nation-states.

As I started exploring nation-building in the post-Soviet region, I realized that former Soviet republics represent three theoretically distinct groups of states: (a) those that before becoming part of the USSR had both previous statehood and nationhood, (b) those that had only nationhood, but were never recognized as nation-states internationally, and (c) those that neither had statehood nor nationhood (such as the republics in Central Asia). Thus, I decided to use this background in nationhood to investigate the variation in transformation of citizenship regimes in these young and new states since the collapse of
the USSR to 2005, when the empirical data collection ended. In future research I will expand the time span and the geographic scope of this dissertation.

The dissertation builds on the neo-institutionalist explanations, primarily the World Society Theory, on nation-states dynamics. However, I elaborate theoretical models where competing theoretical explanations are combined in a synthesized model to provide a more comprehensive understanding of dynamics of institutionalization of citizenship regimes among young states of the contemporary era.

The dissertation is written in a three journal-length article format. Manuscripts one and three directly relate to citizenship, whereas manuscript two explores one of the key variables that can be both a cause and also an effect of the citizenship regime the country adopts. Manuscript two discusses migration. It is a methodological article on estimating migration trends.

**Has the Nation Disappeared? Impacts of Nationhood and the World Society**

**Pressures on Nation-State Building**

The post-World War II era demarcates a specific context (Frank and Meyer 2002) in which fifteen former Soviet republics became independent sovereign states when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The World Society theory states that in the post World War II era the state is a society of individuals, and the nation-state building is influenced by human rights norms (Frank and Meyer 2002). The legitimacy of corporate collective identities, such as the primordial dominance of a nation, is “defeated” in the post-WWII era (Frank and Meyer 2002:87). In contrast, primordialism emphasizes the nationhood and defines the state as ethnically pure and homogeneous (Giddens 1987).
In this manuscript I examine the manner in which new and young states (of the former Soviet Union) build nations at a time when primordial conceptions of national identity and nationalism are condemned by the world society. I identify patterns of variation in nation-building given the statehood and nationhood past of young post-Soviet states. I argue that the universally empowering nature of human rights scripts has provided new opportunities for contemporary states to do nation-building without defying world dominant political culture.

Nationhood still drives state’s policies. However, in the postwar era this nationhood rhetoric is allocated into the world society culture: To legitimate their actions in the postwar era, young states use not primordialism, but human rights scripts to reinforce and strengthen the ethnic nation that the state is named after and represents. “Tamed” versions of nationhood are emerging. While world society pressures force states to standardize their agendas in conformity with the world acceptable models of nation and state building, the variation in the extent to which nationhood is incorporated and strengthened depends on the prior history of statehood and nationhood of the national ethnic group of the state. The empirical discussion of fifteen post-Soviet republics illustrates that citizenship is a closure mechanism to the nation and is open to those who are loyal to the nation of the state. Citizenship policies have emphasized nationhood over time-- to reinforce the national identity of the nation that gave the name to the state.

In 2008 this manuscript was awarded the James F. Short, Jr. Research Award for the Best Graduate Student Paper by the Sociology Department of Washington State University.
Estimation of International Migration in Post-Soviet Republics

There is consensus among researchers that international migration data are undercounted in the fifteen post-Soviet republics. This paper examines various methods of international migration estimation in this region. The paper is methodological. I investigate the statistical management systems on migration and comparatively analyze various (alternative) methodological approaches to measuring migration.

Migration data are difficult to obtain for post-soviet republics, and many republics do not even report migration statistics or report undercounted data. I compare and examine alternative methods of estimating migration dynamics. I discuss immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries, population censuses and nationwide household surveys on migration of post-Soviet republics. Throughout this discussion I illustrate and argue that population censuses and household surveys provide superior quality of data on migration than the immigration-by-origin method.

This manuscript is currently under review in “International Migration.”

Civilizing Nation-States: Scripted vs. Coercive Mechanism of Diffusion of World Political Culture into Post-Soviet Baltic State

This manuscript is co-authored with Gregory Hooks. The emphasis of the manuscript is on the mechanisms and dynamics of diffusion of policies and practices among social adopters. Economists and political scientists have emphasized the materialist origins of diffusion of policies and practices. These scholars have argued that it is the economic competition and or the change in the external material incentives that results in the diffusion of the policy or practice. In contrast, social learning theory and the neo-institutionalists argue that the
diffusion is a result of change in ideas. In this paper, we jointly examine these theoretical arguments to explain the conditions of diffusion of state practices and policies that determined the citizenship regimes adopted by Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union when the USSR collapsed in 1991.

We argue that the debates on whether the diffusion of the policy originated due to coercion or change in ideas have polarized the theoretical domain by posing a measurement rather than a theoretical debate. We suggest a synthesis of materialist and ideational arguments on diffusion to suggest a model where these competing mechanisms of diffusion intercept rather than occur in isolation or in opposition.

References


HAS THE NATION DISAPPEARED? IMPACTS OF NATIONHOOD AND THE WORLD SOCIETY PRESSURES ON NATION-STATE BUILDING
HAS THE NATION DISAPPEARED? IMPACTS OF NATIONHOOD AND THE WORLD SOCIETY PRESSURES ON NATION-STATE BUILDING

Abstract

The World Society theory states that in the post World War II era state is a society of individuals, and the nation-state building is influenced by human rights norms. In contrast, primordialism emphasizes the nationhood and defines the state as ethnically pure and homogeneous. I argue that universally empowering nature of human rights scripts has provided new opportunities for contemporary states to do nation-building without defying world dominant political culture. The theoretical discussion focuses on citizenship as a boundary to the nation and illustrates how glocalization takes place. Nationhood still drives state’s policies. However, in the postwar era this nationhood rhetoric is allocated into the world society culture: To legitimate their actions in the postwar era, young states use not primordialism, but human rights scripts to reinforce and strengthen the ethnic nation that the state is named after and represents. While world society pressures force states to standardize their agendas in conformity with the world acceptable models of nation and state building, the variation in the extent to which nationhood is incorporated and strengthened depends on the prior history of statehood and nationhood of the national ethnic group of the state. The empirical discussion of fifteen post-Soviet republics illustrates that citizenship is a closure mechanism to the nation and is open to those that are loyal to the nation of the state. Citizenship policies have more emphasized nationhood over time-- to reinforce the national identity of the nation that gave the name to the state.
HAS THE NATION DISAPPEARED? IMPACTS OF NATIONHOOD AND THE
WORLD SOCIETY PRESSURES ON NATION-STATE BUILDING

Historically, ethnicity has been regarded as primordial, that is a “given” feature of a society where the ethnic group or the nation is territorially rooted and the membership to it is defined by common biological connection, culture, language, customs and more (Geertz 1973: 259). As a principle of “natural” order and “natural political condition of humankind,” the state sovereignty was consolidated congruent with boundaries of the (homogeneous) national territory (Giddens 1987: 259). This logic prevailed throughout the twentieth century and “via a particular interpretation of sovereignty-citizenship-nationalism relation… [it] emphasized the importance of nationalism and associated regions of ‘cultural identity’ as the basis for the formation of nation-states….” (Giddens 1987: 259-260). Territorial membership in the state was defined by national belonging, and immigrants were expected to merge into the nation and its culture.

World War II and its aftermath shifted the emphasis from the primordial nation to the individual (Frank and Meyer 2002). This happened due to the defeat of fascism, decolonization and the expansion of nation-state system, and the codification of human rights that lead to the “stigmatization” and “defeat” in legitimacy of corporate collective identities, such as the primordial dominance of a nation (Frank and Meyer 2002:87). According to the World Society theory, in the post-WWII era the global expansion and the diffusion of human rights culture have provided models for state’s actions, policies and agendas (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). States that deviate from the dominant
world political-culture are confronted by challenges of legitimacy (Meyer et al. 1997).

The post-WWII era demarcates a specific context (Frank and Meyer 2002) in which fifteen former Soviet republics became independent sovereign states when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Throughout its seventy-year rule, the Soviet Union used a variety of demographic and assimilation policies to erase ethnic identities of peoples living in its territory. Soviet elites envisioned a political identity founded on the “Soviet man,” an identity that was supra-national rather than national in essence (Brubaker 1994:51). To accomplish this goal, the Soviet Union pursued policies that were designed to “merge ethnic nations” into a one nation-less society united by socialism and collective property, with ethnic identity a residual category (Goodman 1960).

Ironically, even though Soviet elites sought to “merge ethnic nations” (Goodman 1960), unintentionally their policies institutionalized nationhood and nationality of ethnic groups at the sub-state level (Brubaker 1994: 54). “Nation remaking and merging” during Soviet rule threatened to erase or deprive the titular ethnic group (i.e. the ethnic group after which the republic/state was named) from its national identity in its own republic. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, some republics sought to restore their “lost” nationhood; others started building a post-statehood national identity. Even as they faced domestic pressures to build a nation (i.e., an ethno-culturally coherent entity), these post-Soviet republics were also under great pressure to secure legitimacy in world society.

This paper examines the manner in which new and young states (of the former Soviet Union) build a nation when primordial conceptions of national identity and nationalism are condemned by world society. It also identifies patterns of variation in nation-building given the statehood and nationhood past of young states. The paper does
not focus on the organizational aspects of state-building; it focuses on the cultural
constitution of the political community—i.e. nation-building.

In this research I engage two theoretical traditions. Theories emphasizing
nationalism attribute nation-state building to such internal forces as ethno-demographic
factors (such as migration) and nationalistic conceptions of nationhood (Brubaker 1992a).
In contrast, theories emphasizing world society believe the nation-state building is molded
by “globally unified” post-WWII era world political-culture where human rights scripts
shape state’s actions (Thomas and Meyer, 1984). I offer a synthesis: world society human
rights scripts empower both the minority and dominant ethnic groups of the state. The
historical evidence presented here corroborates two complementary assertions that emerge
from this theoretical synthesis:

1. Since human rights scripts constrain exclusionist primordial claims of single-nation
state building (Frank and Meyer 2002), thus, to legitimate their actions in the world
political cultural system, states do not deploy primordial arguments. Instead, they
advance human rights rhetoric to reinforce and strengthen their ethnic identity and the
nation.

2. While world society pressures force states to conform to globally acceptable models of
nation and state building, nationhood remains a powerful source of identity. The
degree to which nationhood is incorporated and strengthened through state policies
depends on the prior history of statehood and nationhood.

The discussion is consistent with Robertson’s (1995) concept of “glocalization” – a
process in which the “global” (universalizing) forces and the “local” or “internal”
(particularizing) dynamics collide and dialectically implicate each other.
The theoretical and empirical focus of this research is citizenship, i.e. the naturalization of immigrants to membership in the political community. Citizenship embodies the nationhood and world society struggles: While conceptions of nationhood affect how immigrants and ethnic minorities are granted citizenship and integrated into the society (see Brubaker 1992a for France and Germany), with the expansion and diffusion of human rights culture citizenship is also largely regulated by human rights values (Soysal 1994). The empirical discussion of post-Soviet republics examines the dialectic struggle between world society and domestic nationalist pressures on citizenship regimes and nation-building of young states.

**Primordial Nations and World Society: A Synthesis**

Our understanding of nation-building has been hampered by one-sided conceptions that emphasize either internal or external forces at work. Brubaker (1992a) has examined the early nation-state building in France and Germany. He argues that the state is a state of and for people which represent a culturally and politically coherent entity—a nation. Nationalism, conceptions of national identity and nationhood shape the institutionalization of the state and the nation. This, in turn, molds citizenship policy -- i.e. whether and on what basis immigrants are incorporated into the state (Brubaker 1992a). Thus, membership in the state and the nation is bounded; the rules for acquiring citizenship define if and how an individual might cross this boundary (Brubaker 1992a). The citizenship policies adopted by a given state are influenced by the history of previous statehood (Brubaker 1992b), prior traditions of citizenship (Weil 2001), and the agenda of the governing party (Joppke 2003).
The World Society paradigm disagrees and argues that the decolonization, defeat of fascism, globalization and the expansion of human rights culture have changed the dynamics of state-making in the aftermath of the World War II (Frank and Meyer 2002, Meyer et al. 1997). Nationalism based on racial, religious or primordial dominance of certain groups has been replaced with new forms of “specialized” identities (Frank and Meyer 2002: 90). These identities are based on the choice of the individual rather than the natural order or the historical primordial dominance of a nation (Frank and Meyer 2002, Meyer and Jepperson 2000). The modern state does not govern a single (homogeneous) nation but governs a society of individuals. This more inclusive model of citizenship is reinforced by the transnational environment, not by local or national forces (Ramirez et al. 1997). Traditionally, citizenship status defines a person’s rights and opportunities within one state (Marsh 1965). Parameters of citizenship have been redefined in the contemporary world society: “…individual rights are human [rights], not citizen rights, and they amount to claims on the whole world society” (Frank and Meyer 2002:89). There is isomorphism of state models; state policies are “scripted” and derived from world models that “…define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states…” (Meyer et al. 1997:145, emphasis added). The once bounded citizenship (Brubaker 1992a) is now regulated by human rights values (Soysal 1994) or global networks (Urry 1999). Scholars working within this theoretical paradigm emphasize external dynamics that guide, shape and normatively standardize the nation-state building.

To restrict our focus to either internal or external forces results in incomplete theoretical explanations. Robertson redirects our attention and asserts that “[i]t is not a
question of either homogenization or heterogenization…”, but rather the “forms and ways” in which “glocalization” occurs, i.e., the process whereby the homogenizing (global) versus heterogenizing (local) trends coexist and mutually implicate each other (1995:27, emphasis original). With the diffusion of the global human rights culture, state-building and state policies (such as policies on immigrants) cannot be examined in isolation from normative trends and human rights values of the world.

Human rights culture empowers minority ethnic groups by forcing states to create more opportunities for minorities to integrate within the state. And yet, while the world society human rights norms empower minorities, they do not dis-empower or restrict the titular ethnic group from expressing and strengthening its ethnic identity. Every individual has a right to his/her ethnic identity. The redefinition of identities as rights has universally empowered both the dominant and the minority. It has also increased the salience of ethnic identities and created new opportunities for nations and ethnic groups to build a nation without defying human rights scripts.

New and peripheral states are more vulnerable to the pressures of the world society ideology (Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978, 1980), thus, they will be more prone to embrace human rights scripts to legitimate their actions in the world political system. Since primordial conceptions of a single-nation state building have been “stigmatized” and “defeated” in the post-war era (Frank and Meyer 2002:87), thus, to legitimate their actions in the world political cultural system, states do not deploy primordial arguments. Instead, they advance human rights rhetoric to reinforce and strengthen their ethnic identity and the nation. The nation can no longer assert its superiority, homogeneity and intolerance for ethnic outsiders. The state is no longer ethnically pure and homogenous.
To secure legitimacy in world society, the state must demonstrate its ability to govern an ethnically diverse society. Building a nation in the contemporary era requires that the conception of nationhood is “tamed.”¹ The conceptualization of the nation as “tolerant” and the state as “inclusive” neither contradicts, nor prevents nation-building agendas. Strengthening nationhood and the integration of immigrants have gone hand in hand in the contemporary era.

While world society pressures force states to conform to globally acceptable models of nation and state building, nationhood remains a powerful source of identity. The degree to which nationhood is incorporated and strengthened through state policies depends on the prior history of statehood and nationhood. Thus, while the world society pressures standardize agendas of states in conformity with the world normative frames of nation-state building, the variation in states’ policies results from the prior history of statehood and nationhood of the titular/national ethnic group. Diffusion of human rights culture creates more opportunities for minorities to mobilize on the local level to expand their resources and rights or to promote nationalist demands such as governance claims over homeland territories (Olzak 2006). This increases the competition over state resources (Olzak 2006). If the national/titular ethnic group of the state has had an articulated national identity (i.e. nationhood) in the past, then the mobilization around this national identity to counteract other ethnic groups that present a threat or undermine the position of the nation of the new state will be more successful. This perception of threat is even more likely where the titular ethnic group strives to direct state policy to restore the “lost” nation. Under these circumstances, the titular ethnic group may focus on marginalizing other

¹The concept of the “edited” or “tamed” nation was suggested by Professors John W. Meyer and Francisco Ramirez (personal correspondence).
ethnic groups or in the state. Hence, state’s policies on immigrants (and citizenship) will
be driven by the titular ethnic group’s conception of nationhood. In contrast, in those
states where the titular ethnic group does not have a shared conception of the national
identity, it is less likely that the titular ethnic group will mobilize around an identity that is
articulated vis-à-vis the ethnic “other.” In turn, state’s policies on immigrants will be more
inclusive and place less emphasis on institutionalizing the nationhood of the titular ethnic
group.

Nation-building versus pressures from the world society (to adopt inclusive policies
for minorities and migrants) are dialectically related. Those states emphasizing exclusion
and primordial conceptions of nations will feel pressures from world society and will be
forced to expand opportunities for immigrants to integrate. Even as titular ethnic groups
attempt to impose exclusionary (citizenship) regimes, they draw on human rights scripts of
ethnic entitlement and self-determination that universally empower ethnic groups to build
and reinforce a nation. Minority ethnic groups also deploy human rights scripts to
challenge exclusionary citizenship regimes and to justify expanded opportunities for them
within the state. Both nationhood driven state-building and world society pressures to
integrate minorities refer to the same human rights scripts, and they are a response to each
other. “Local” and “global” forces replicate and mutually implicate each other in what is
“glocal” (Robertson 1995). Contemporary states are nation-states—but they are molded
and reinforced by world society’s human rights scripts.
Methods

Among many states that emerged in the post-WWII era post-Soviet republics provide an ideal theoretical and empirical opportunity to understand the variable pressures emanating from world society and nationhood on citizenship policies (and consequently, on the nation-state building) of new and young states. The fifteen former Soviet republics may be divided into three groups of states with distinct nationhood and statehood pasts. But first, a note on definitions.

There are debates in the literature as to whether nations are primordial or modern and what constitutes nationhood. In reference to Western European states, scholars have defined nations as congruent with the territorial and cultural (largely homogenous) institutionalization of the political authority (see Anderson 2003 [1983], Gellner 1983, Mann 1991, 1993). Others have noted that this conception does not adequately capture the dynamics of nationhood in Central and Eastern Europe where “…political units were either much smaller…or much larger than cultural units” (Brubaker 1994: 56). Accordingly, this latter perspective conceives of nations as “neither conceptually, nor causally dependent on the political territory,” but as ethno-cultural (mostly linguistic) communities that could extend across many political units or be part of a larger political unit (Brubaker 1994:56). Drawing on this distinction, post-Soviet republics may be grouped as follows: (a) republics where before becoming part of the Soviet Union the titular ethnic group had both statehood and nationhood in the past (from now on referred in
the text as republics with prior statehood and nationhood), (b), republics where the titular ethnic group had only shared national or ethnic identity (i.e. nationhood), but the statehood prior to the Soviet era was never internationally recognized (hereafter referred to as republics with prior nationhood, but no statehood), and (c) republics where the titular ethnic group had neither statehood nor nationhood prior to being incorporated into the Soviet Union (referred to as republics with no prior statehood or nationhood).

Group (a) consists of Russia and three Baltic republics: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All four countries were recognized as members of the Westphalian system of states prior to becoming part of the Soviet Union (see Correlates of War project 2005). The Baltic republics were recognized as states in the interwar period. In 1941, the Baltic republics became part of the Soviet Union. International recognition of Russia as a state dates back to 1816 (Correlates of War project 2005). Each of these societies had historically been mobilized around an ethnic identity and shared an ethnic culture.

Group (b) consists of Armenia, Belarus\(^2\), Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine. These states had a short period of statehood (1918-1920) prior to the Soviet Union. But these states were not recognized as members of the Westphalian state system during this brief interlude (see Correlates of War project 2005). These republics had conceptions of national or ethnic identity prior to the Soviet era. Historically, their titular groups were able to develop linguistic, religious or some conception of an ethnic identity (see Christophe 2002 for Georgia; King\(^3\) 1994, 2004 for Moldova; Rawi 2002 for Ukraine,

\(^2\) Scholars would agree that perhaps the weakest national identity was present in Belarus which had historically struggled between Lithuanian, Polish and Russian identities (see Rawi 2002, Ioffe 2003). However, there is agreement that in the mid- to late 19th century, Belarusian-language books were published and the Belarusian identity started to evolve (Rawi 2002; Ioffe 2003).

\(^3\) Moldovan nationhood has evolved as a struggle between pan-Romanian and pro-Russian movements on identity building. Moldovan state emerged in the 14th century (King 2000:14). In the 19th century, under rule of the Russian Empire Moldovan boiars managed to obtain short-lived autonomous status for Moldovan
Smith 1991: 37-39 for Armenia). These nations had some expression of nationalism against the empires that ruled them. And yet, they were never able to achieve an internationally recognized statehood prior to absorption into the Soviet Union.

And finally, group (c) consists of Azerbaijan and the five republics in the Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These six republics are theoretically quite unique given that they never had either statehood or nationhood. The peoples of the Central Asian republics lived in the territory of the Russian Empire under clan leadership as tribes or nomads (see Akcali 2003: 414 for Central Asian republics). Tribal names were based on genealogical descent, and the territorial affiliation was defined by the membership to the tribe (Haugen 2004). The names, such as “Tajik” or “Uzbek” were assigned by the conquerors and the nomadic Turks of the Central Asia in the sixteenth century (Haugen 2004). Not only linguistic boundaries were unclear, but these designations also encompassed boundaries “….that were not relevant … to what was to be considered a ‘nation’ or a ‘people’ (Haugen 2004:31). Besides being Muslim, the tribal identity was more “… significant than being ‘Uzbek’ or ‘Tajik’” (Haugen 2004: 40). And while based on genealogical descent each tribe had a myth of “fictive” origin, one could barely distinguish Turkmen culture from Kazakh or Kyrgyz (Haugen 2004: 44-45). After the Soviet Union was organized, Soviet authorities created five Central Asian republics principality (known as Bessarabia) where the Moldovan language was used alongside Russian, and works in Moldovan were being published (King 2000:21-22). Ethnographic works identified Moldovans and Romanians as part of the same nation (King 2004: 27). In the early 20th century, pan-Romanian nationalism emerged in the Principality of Moldova; Society of Moldovan National Culture was established and was later transformed into a Moldovan National Political Party (King 2000: 29-30). During Soviet rule, Soviet policies aimed at erasing Romanian past and articulating and consolidating a non-Romanian –i.e. “Moldovan” identity in a territory most of which belonged to Romania prior to 1940. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldovan anti-Soviet nationalism emphasized the joint Moldo-Romanian (linguistic) identity and called for the unification of Moldova and Romania as one nation (King 1994: 350-351). Only in recent years, have Moldovans tried to distance their ethnic identity from the Romanian identity. Even this contested history of nationhood sets Moldova apart from republics in group (c) where the Muslim identity in the pre-Soviet era has been more salient than any national or ethnic conception of the identity.
with a central goal in mind—to draw the territorial boundaries and allocate ethnic groups in Central Asia such that no ethnic group would be able to mobilize around an ethnic identity in future (Akcali 2003; Kurzman 1999). Thus, the nationhood in these republics started to develop only after the statehood was achieved when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. Azeries in Azerbaijan did not have a distinct identity either: While only since the 20th century the Azerbaijani elite started to shift from Pan-Islamism to Turkism to Azerbaijanism, by the time Azerbaijan was incorporated into the Soviet Union the masses still possessed the religious --“umma” (i.e. believers) consciousness and nationalism was neither understood, nor perceived favorably by the Azeri masses (Swietochowski 1985: 193). Scholars agree that the Azeri national identity started to develop after Azerbaijan was created as a Soviet republic by the Soviet authorities (Mehdiyeva 2003; Suny, Stork 1988).

Groups (a) and (b) represent predominantly Christian countries, whereas in group (c) all republics represent predominantly Muslim countries.

The statehood-nationhood background of post-Soviet republics is ideal for examining: (1) the variable impact of the world society and nationhood on state-building of young states in the post-war era, and (2) the impact that past histories of nationhood and statehood have on shaping citizenship policies (and nation-state making) of new/young states as states become more embedded into the world society. (3) This paper examines the manner in which new and young states (of the former Soviet Union) build a nation when primordial conceptions of national identity and nationalism are condemned by world society. While the articulation of citizenship (as a boundary to the nation) contributes to the further nation-building of the state (Brubaker 1992a), the prior nationhood and
statehood of states (or lack it) determine the conception of citizenship that the young state will adopt (Brubaker 1992b). Thus, as in one instance the conception of citizenship regime of a state is a cause, in the latter instance it is a dependent variable. Therefore, reverse causality issues arise. And hence, it would be insufficient to examine nation-building and the institutionalization and transformation of citizenship regimes in newly independent post-Soviet republics without controlling for their nationhood and statehood past.

This paper is based on historical comparative analysis of various documents, historical accounts, news reports available from the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) series “Report on the USSR.” This collection includes Communist media, underground publications, and RFE/RL broadcasts. In 1995, the Soros Foundation became custodian for this collection and has tried to build an archive that is readily accessible for scholarly research.

In addition, drawing on an array of government documents, I have reviewed and coded information from citizenship laws, amendments and documents related to the naturalization of immigrants for all former Soviet republics. This article examines requirements for naturalization that an immigrant must fulfill in order to qualify for citizenship. These prerequisites include (a) knowledge of language and/or history, and (b) length of residency established as a pre-condition for naturalization to citizenship. These requirements are directly linked to nationhood. In Eastern and Central Europe language has historically been a “rallying point” for emerging national movements, especially if the group could not use statehood as a platform for its nationalism (Kamusella 2001:239). Knowledge of history is directly linked to nationhood by selectively emphasizing historical events, heroes, and symbols around which national identity develops (Smith 1991).
Finally, the longer that immigrants are required to reside in the country to qualify for naturalization, the more they will be exposed to the culture of the nation which, on its turn, increases the likelihood that immigrants have been assimilated into the national culture. Longer periods of residency also demonstrate the commitment of the immigrant and the desire to become part of the state and its community. This paper explores how the world society and nationalism pressures have influenced these components of citizenship and naturalization policies over time.

Soviet Statehood and Nationhood: A Remedy or for Post-Soviet Republics?

In the post-Soviet period the nation-state building of former Soviet republics largely evolved around the consequences of Soviet demographic and assimilation policies. Language of the national ethnic group became one of the focal points around which nationhood, state-building and citizenship debates collided. Before discussing post-Soviet dynamics of nation-state building, I elaborate some of the pre-conditions that shaped the nation-state building in the post-Soviet era.

The Soviet Union was designed as a nation-less society. Stalin, one of the designers of the Soviet state, believed that the collective property would erase national categories, and socialism would expand and unite people in one international multicultural state where nations would eventually lose their ethnic identities (Goodman 1960). In the 1960-1970s the Soviet elites sought to develop an all-Soviet identity of a “Soviet man” as a “new historical community” (Brubaker 1994:51). But this identity was supra-national, rather
than national, and was distinguished from sub-state ethnic nationalities and identities (see Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990 cited in Brubaker 1994:51).

The vision of an international inclusive state was reflected in the Soviet citizenship regime. No requirements had to be fulfilled by immigrants to qualify for naturalization to Soviet citizenship (Verkhovnii Sovet SSSR 1975; 1986). If a foreign citizen was a permanent resident in a particular republic of the Soviet Union, to acquire Soviet citizenship s/he was only required to fill out an application and renounce the other country’s citizenship (Sbornik Zakonov SSSR 1975; 1986). Each of the Soviet republics had its own citizenship law that was almost identical to the main Soviet citizenship law both in format and in naturalization procedure.

Despite Soviet intentions to build a nation/less state, Soviet authorities did encourage the articulation of national sentiments and cultures hoping that one day voluntary merging of national cultures into one would happen (Goodman 1960)\(^4\).

However, while ethnic identities were being elaborated and developed, underneath, this was a process guided and supervised by the Soviet state. Ideologies and agendas were designed to erase and re-construct national identities. Whenever there was a possibility that national cultures could mobilize in future into a distinct ethnic identity, Soviet authorities tried to re-direct the development of the national identity into a “new” identity. For example, to eliminate the possibility of ethnic or religious mobilization, Soviet authorities drew territorial boundaries in the Central Asia such that Muslim peoples of various backgrounds were redistributed among five republics in the Central Asia (Akcali 2003;

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\(^4\) As an unintended consequence, the policies of the “internationalist, supra-nationalist and anti-nationalist Soviet state” even led to the institutionalization in form of the ethnic nationalities and nationhood (Brubaker 1994:54).
Kurzman 1999). This would make sure that there would be no prospects for any group to
mobilize around an ethnic identity in future (Akcali 2003; Kurzman 1999). In this manner
Soviet authorities created five (predominantly Muslim) republics that fall into the group
(c)—i.e. republics with no statehood or nationhood prior to the Soviet era.

The re-making of national identities went as far as designing new alphabets for
linguistic assimilation. Among the republics with no prior statehood or nationhood Soviet
authorities switched Arabic alphabets to Latin to erase cultural ties with Turkic, Arabic, or
pan-Islamic cultures (see Table 1). In less than 20 years Soviet authorities made another
switch – this time from Latin to Cyrillic alphabet (Cyrillic was also used for the Russian
language). Literature classics and textbooks were translated again —now to Cyrillic. All
the official communication at work, in schools, by the media had to now be done using the
new alphabet. Elders and adults had to learn a new alphabet for the third time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Before the USSR</th>
<th>During the USSR</th>
<th>After the USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Latin, then Cyrillic</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Latin, then Cyrillic</td>
<td>Cyrillic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Latin, then Cyrillic</td>
<td>Cyrillic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Latin, then Cyrillic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Latin, then Cyrillic</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Latin, then Cyrillic</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>Cyrillic</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In 2006 Kazakhstan suggested switching to Latin alphabet, while maintaining Cyrillic alphabet until transition is complete (RFE/RL 2006b)

A similar agenda was also set in Moldova-- a republic with prior nationhood but no
statehood. To erase the Romanian identity among Moldovans, Soviet authorities replaced
Moldova’s Latin alphabet with the Cyrillic alphabet (Singurel 1989). Communist party
members, scholars, artists and writers were given an agenda to elaborate an ideology that
Moldovan and Romanian were different languages. As the Soviet Union collapsed, post-Soviet republics made another linguistic switch—this time switching back to Arabic or Latin alphabets (see Table 1).

Due to administrative purposes, the Russian language gradually became more dominant and widely used by the Soviet public. In the mid-1930s, despite the nation/less intentions of Soviet authorities, the Russian language compulsory in schools throughout the Soviet Union. In all but the Transcaucasian republics—Armenia, Georgia (with prior nationhood, no statehood) and Azerbaijan (no statehood, no nationhood), Russian was the state language and the language of communication in business, administrative and managerial positions. Moreover, Russian was used for day-to-day communication in homes across the Soviet Union. Conversely, the native ethnic language started to disappear.

Under Gorbachev (1985-1991) the Soviet Union allowed a greater range of political organization and freedom of expression. These freedoms increased the salience of ethnic identities, fueled nationalist sentiments and contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Some republics sought to restore the “lost” nationhood; others started building a post-statehood national identity.

The Nationhood Revival

The independence movements of former Soviet republics condemned Soviet assimilation and “nation-merging” policies. Once the Soviet Union disintegrated, every republic made an effort to institutionalize a state of a titular ethnic group (i.e. the ethnic group after which the republic was named, such as Latvians for Latvia). The nation was emphasized not in
civic terms, but in ethnic terms. Even those republics that did not have prior nationhood or statehood (before becoming part of the Soviet Union) made claims about past nationhood in order to use it as a platform for the new nation-state. National language became one of the elements around which ethnic boundaries were drawn against “ethnic others”.

During 1989-1990, to reverse the linguistic assimilation to the Russian language, republics adopted legislation that restored the language of the titular ethnic group (not Russian) as the state language. As a result, employees were required to consider fluency of the titular language when making hiring decisions. Timelines were defined for the transition to reverse the linguistic assimilation to Russian.

The control over national language signified that the titular nation had become “…masters of [its] own land;” it conveyed “…a vigorous step towards … sovereignty” (cited in RFE/RL 1989). By referencing the ethnic past, key aspects of ethnic identity and language, in particular, were identified. To ensure that the post-Soviet Latvian state is built around the Latvian ethno-cultural identity, Latvia’s Chairman of Supreme Council was cited saying in 1992 (a year after the Soviet Union collapsed):

[S]pecial measures are necessary so that the Latvian nation can preserve itself and its national identity, that it will not disappear from the world’s ethnic map, and that the Latvian language will not be eliminated. It is a language in which one-and-a-half million folk-songs have been written –as many folk-songs as there are Latvians in the world…. (5th Saeima of Republic of Latvia Standing Commission on Human Rights, cited in Pabriks 1999:150)

Similar sentiments were observed also in the republics that had only nationhood but no statehood in the past. In Moldova, for example, the rhetoric focused on the ‘sameness’ of
Moldovan and Romanian languages (President of Moldavia at the time cited in Radio Bucharest in Socor 1991). The similarity of Moldovan and Romanian was used to claim *uninterrupted* continuity of Moldovan nationhood.

Language was linked to the national identity even in the republics that had no prior history of nationhood or statehood. Despite several alphabet changes during Soviet rule, these republics made claims to revive the supposedly “lost” linguistic identity and reverse the Cyrillic alphabet to Arabic or Latin. Ironically, these claims went so far that even the authorities and elites suggested that their titular nations had nationhood prior to Soviet era. For example, the Head of Kazakh Writers’ Union argued that people did not know about Kazakhs’ history simply because “…the history of Kazakhs [had] not yet been written”, whereas scholars and historians had *initiated* to write Russian, Mongol and other histories (an interview to the newspaper *Qazaq edebietti* on Jan 1, 1989 cited in Bohr and Kocaoglu 1989, emphasis added). Since the lack of prior nationhood made the articulation of national identity difficult, the republics with no prior nationhood even used religion—Islam, to claim nationhood. Even atheists embraced the script when in Turkmenistan the deputy director of the House of Scientific Atheism suggested that:

> It [was] possible that it was precisely the arrival of Islam in [the Central Asia] that facilitated the appearance of a new ethnic group from among the Central Asian nomads that later came to form the Turkmen Nation…. It is desirable to begin the *restoration* of the history of our people with the study of the history of Islam in Central Asia (Turkmenskaya Iskra Dec. 30, 1988 cited in Bohr and Kocaoglu, 1989, emphasis added).

Cities that had names of Soviet leaders were renamed to represent national heroes. Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and other Muslim countries were sending multiple copies of Koran and Islamic literature to Muslim republics of the Soviet Union, Arabic language newspapers were printed.

Despite the desire to revive the “lost” nationhood and reverse Soviet assimilation, new and young post-soviet republics referred to the world society authorized scripts to legitimate their nation-building agendas. Since the global political-cultural system “stigmatizes” primordial nationhood scripts (Frank and Meyer 2002:87), then Soviet republics called upon human rights of ethnic self-determination to legitimate their claims for ethnic autonomy and state sovereignty. Not only the unique and chosen nation, but also every ethnic group in the territory of the new state was entitled to have its own language, culture and ethnic identity preserved. Not only the titular nation had to be rescued from Soviet assimilation agenda, but all ethnic cultures in the territory of the republic had to be empowered. With no exception, every republic that restored the status of titular language as the official state language, also called for the preservation of ethnic languages of ethnic minorities: Sovereignty movements and independence declarations stated that the newly independent republic would ensure the rights of other languages other nationalities within its territory. As republics opened Arabic, Moldovan and many other schools to teach the national language of their nation, so were opened minority language classes, schools, centers to teach Hebrew, Yiddish, Gypsy, German and more.

Citizenship: Strengthening Nationhood Guided by World Society Pressures

The all-inclusive human rights rhetoric-- to preserve and develop the culture of ethnic minorities and immigrants of the republic-- was abandoned when post-Soviet states
pursued their citizenship policies. Debates over how immigrants can acquire citizenship (and membership in the political community of the nation-state) illustrate that citizenship remains central to state sovereignty and is a vital mechanism used by states to draw a boundary between members and those “outside” the nation. Citizenship policies are used to strengthen the nationhood and the ethnic base of the state (for examples on recent studies that have examined citizenship policies in European post-Soviet republics see Brubaker 1992b; Barrington 1995; Budryte 2005).

Within only four years after the Soviet Union collapsed, fourteen of fifteen post-Soviet republics had already adopted new citizenship laws. The last republic to adopt a post-Soviet citizenship law (in 1998) was Azerbaijan -- one of the republics with no prior statehood or nationhood.

The unanimous adoption of citizenship laws by post-Soviet republics asserts that the citizenship policy of the state is an inseparable part of the state sovereignty package. Every new state adopts a citizenship law to constitute its sovereignty among other states. States still need citizenship to exercise control over populations in their territories. Even the pressures from the world society convey that citizenship is an important component of the state model and a mechanism that can potentially affect opportunities of minorities within the state. In fact, Latvia was denied membership in the Council of Europe until it passed an acceptable citizenship law (Parliamentary Assembly of COE 1994). Thus, the “post-national citizenship” (Soysal 1994) does not replace state citizenship, nor is “world citizenship” (Urry 1996) a taken-for-granted cultural environment for contemporary states. Rather, the state citizenship is still a contested sphere where human rights norms may clash with state’s policies that marginalize minorities and immigrants within the state. The
discussion that follows sheds light on the tension between the world society driven versus nation-driven policy agendas of states.

Researchers have indicated that the previous tradition of citizenship largely determines the nature of a future citizenship law that the state will adopt (Weil 2001). However, without any exception, each post-Soviet republic deviated from the Soviet Union’s all-inclusive citizenship tradition. New citizenship laws made naturalization of immigrants to citizenship more demanding. Certain requirements were specified that had to be fulfilled to qualify for naturalization. Those republics (Latvia and Lithuania) with statehood prior to becoming part of the Soviet Union adopted a more demanding naturalization procedure for immigrants compared to their interwar citizenship laws (Flournoy and Hudson 1929). Republics that experienced severe assimilation to the Russian culture initiated policies to control immigration and limit the access of other ethnicities to citizenship. Citizenship was a mechanism of closure to the nation (Brubaker 1992a). The legislation on citizenship became one of the most controversial issues where nationhood and the world pressures collided to shape policies towards immigrants.

Republics where the titular ethnic group had both prior nationhood and statehood were most exclusionary in their rhetoric towards immigrants. Soviet assimilation policies and the high volumes of immigration of other ethnicities had raised fears that the “[n]ation [would] disappear” (Kionka 1991b). The history of prior nationhood and statehood gave these republics a larger repertoire to articulate the “threats” to nationhood, define who the “outsiders” are and draw a boundary around the nation. Ethnic minorities and immigrants were perceived as “outsiders” and a threat to the
statehood and nationhood. Nationhood was clearly reflected in the first citizenship laws of these young post-Soviet states.

All republics in this group (except Russia) declared that immigrants need to have at least some basic knowledge of the national language necessary for the communication (see Table 2, in this article I will continuously make reference to Table 2). In two republics—Latvia and Estonia, the titular ethnic group perceived that its existence as a nation is undermined. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, in both republics the proportion of ethnic minorities had increased, and the titular ethnic group barely made up the majority of the republic’s population. Immigration and naturalization quotas were specified to monitor the demographic dynamics in the republic (Budryte 2005). In Latvia the approved draft version of the citizenship law stated that the purpose of annual naturalization quotas was "... to ensure the development of Latvia as a single-nation state" (article 9 of the Citizenship draft law approved on November 25, 1993, cited in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] 1993, emphasis added). In Estonia the state’s position on citizenship asserted that the ethnic Estonian population was too small (less than one million) to keep the Estonian culture and identity alive if citizenship was automatically granted to non-Estonians born in Estonia (Minister of Interethnic Relations of Estonia cited in the European Center for Minority Issues 1999). Hence, only persons of Estonian descent could obtain Estonian citizenship automatically (upon the birth).
In this context the state was defined as a state of the titular nation. Citizenship was used as a closure mechanism for the nation (Brubaker 1992a). “Post-national” properties of citizenship (Soysal 1994) were also challenged. In Latvia, for example, immigrants were deprived of rights to ownership and were not allowed to establish joint-stock companies (if they had lived in Latvia for fewer than 21 years); even certain apartment rent and loan conditions were defined less favorably for immigrants (League of Stateless Persons cited in Parliamentary Assembly of the COE 1994a). In Estonia the candidates for parliamentary elections “…had to undergo preliminary testing of the [Estonian] language” to be eligible to post their candidacy for parliamentary elections (Parliamentary Assembly of the COE 1994a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Statehood and Nationhood</th>
<th>IN THE FIRST VERSION</th>
<th>THE VERSION AS OF 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge of Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Understanding at the Minimum Communication Level Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Prior Statehood or Nationhood</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Nationhood, but no Statehood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Prior Statehood and Nationhood</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this context the state was defined as a state of the titular nation. Citizenship was used as a closure mechanism for the nation (Brubaker 1992a). “Post-national” properties of citizenship (Soysal 1994) were also challenged. In Latvia, for example, immigrants were deprived of rights to ownership and were not allowed to establish joint-stock companies (if they had lived in Latvia for fewer than 21 years); even certain apartment rent and loan conditions were defined less favorably for immigrants (League of Stateless Persons cited in Parliamentary Assembly of the COE 1994a). In Estonia the candidates for parliamentary elections “…had to undergo preliminary testing of the [Estonian] language” to be eligible to post their candidacy for parliamentary elections (Parliamentary Assembly of the COE 1994a).
The nationhood driven state-building extended further: immigrants who wanted to naturalize were required to demonstrate proficiency of the titular state language in speaking, writing and reading. For example, the first citizenship law of Latvia stated that the immigrant acquiring citizenship should:

- completely understands information of an everyday and official nature; can freely talk, carry on a conversation and answer questions on topics of an everyday nature;
- can read freely and understand any texts of an everyday nature, laws and other normative acts and other instructions of an everyday nature; can write a brief summary on a topic from everyday life (Citizenship law of Latvia, Article 20, adopted and came into force in 1994).

Similar wording of language proficiency as a precondition for naturalization was specified for the Estonian citizenship law. For the reader to compare, the Nationality Law of the United States also specifies knowledge of language (i.e. English) as a pre-condition for naturalization of immigrants. However, the level of proficiency is quite basic and only requires comprehension of such simple words and phrases for everyday-life English as “My car does not work” or “You cook very well;” or for the civics/history test such simple statements as “People in America have the right to freedom” (US Citizenship and Immigration Services [USCIS] 2007:62). However, the proficiency of language specified in citizenship laws of these post-Soviet republics extends much further. For example, the Estonian citizenship law demands a mastery of (1) listening comprehension of news, and descriptions of events; (2) speech (narration and conversation, expressing opinions): (3) reading comprehension of journalistic articles, reports, minutes; and (4) writing applications, letters of explanation, and do forth (Article 8, Citizenship Law of Estonia,
1995). Formal testing of these was mandated.

The initial citizenship policies of post-Soviet republics with prior nationhood and statehood defined the state in ethnic terms. Citizenship was a means to draw the boundary to the primordial nation (Brubaker 1992a). However, primordial conceptions of national dominance are not acceptable in the post-WWII political-cultural system (Frank and Meyer 2002). Binding pressures from world society demanded equal treatment of immigrants regardless of ethnic origin. For example, the CSCE urged that language proficiency be set at 1500 words as a sufficient minimum to make oneself understood (a letter from the CSCE Higher Commissioner on National Minorities to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, April 6, 1993). More importantly, communicating the logics of state-making in the world society, the CSCE declared the primordial single-nation state building philosophy incompatible in letter and spirit with the modern state obligations (CSCE 1993:3). Yet, while the primordial conception of nationhood was rejected, the nationhood of the state was not. The world political-cultural system is inclusive: every nation has a right to strengthen and preserve its nationhood. No nation is denied the right to its identity and culture. And meanwhile “…the majority nation wants to create a State in its own image… this does not have to be at the exclusion of persons of other ethnicities” (OSCE 2001:3). The contemporary state is not a primordial state. Yet, even as a diverse nation-state, the state is still seen as a state of a titular nation. Thus, while the world society forces condemned the primordial nation-state model, young states were also advised to take measures that would facilitate the integration of non-titular ethnicities into the new state without making it “…incompatible with the wish of the [titular ethnic group] to ensure and strengthen [its] political, cultural and linguistic identity” (CSCE 1993:3).
Nationhood is still an essential element of the state in the contemporary era. The state represents the nation it is named after; it is the state of that nation. Young states embrace this rhetoric. The elements around which the nation is preserved are not compromised even in an era where diversity is the main feature of a democratic state. While multiculturalism is supported, the integration of minorities into the state is tied to, if not contingent upon, the loyalty to the nation that the state is named after. This loyalty is reinforced when immigrants (that apply for citizenship) are required to possess those elements that represent the nationhood and the national identity of the ethnic group that gave the name to the state.

The integration of minorities and the strengthening of nationhood of the titular nation are parallel processes that simultaneously co-exist and reinforce each other in the contemporary political-cultural system. While local forces within the young states try to reinforce the nation to resist the dominance of ethnic minorities and immigrants within the state, their rhetoric has been promoted from the “above” on a “trans” or “super-local” basis as “generalized recipes of locality” (Robertson 1995: 26). Nation-building versus pressures from the world society (to adopt inclusive policies for minorities and migrants) are dialectically related in societies where the threat to nationhood is salient. The world society is characterized by multiculturalism and diversity; it is dominated by human rights values and norms. In the meantime, the recognition of the young state depends on how well the state conforms to world norms (Meyer et al. 1997)—i.e. how well ethnic minorities and immigrants are integrated into the national society. Since human rights scripts are universal, these scripts empower both minorities and the dominant ethnic group of the state. Thus, the more the world society culture pushes states to adopt inclusive
policies towards minorities and immigrants, the more is the drive from domestic forces to strengthen nationhood and the national identity of the titular nation (who the state is named after). Both forces refer to the same human rights scripts, and both forces are a response to each other. These forces reflect what has been referred to as “glocal” (see Robertson 1995:134)

By 2007, only seventeen years after the Soviet Union collapse, each republic with prior statehood and nationhood required fluency in the national language (to be examined with formal testing procedure). Even Russia amended its citizenship law in 2002 to establish proficiency of writing and reading comprehension of the Russian language (with formal testing procedure) as a pre-requisite for naturalization to citizenship (Decree of the President of Russia on the Procedure of Implementation of the Citizenship Law of Russian Federation 2002, point 10). In Russia’s first (1991) citizenship law, language was not mentioned: an immigrant had to only reside in post-Soviet Russia for 3-5 years to obtain country’s citizenship (article 19, point 2). In recent years it has become more difficult to obtain Russian citizenship despite that the naturalization policy of Russia has been relaxed to increase the flow of immigrants from the former Soviet region. As Russia has grown stronger, it has tried to restore not only its economic, but also its cultural dominance. The knowledge of the Russian language as a pre-condition for naturalization is mainly targeted towards immigrants from the non-Soviet region (since the immigrants from the former Soviet region can easily fulfill this requirement). In fact, Russia declared that 2007 was the year of Russian Language Year. In his address to Russia’s Federal Assembly, President Putin even stressed that “[Russians] will be able to achieve [their] goals only if [Russians] maintain respect for [their] native language, for [their] unique cultural values, for the
memory of [their] forebears and for each page of [their] country’s history” (April 26, 2007 Annual Address of the President of Russia to the Federal Assembly).

Clearly, nationhood has been guiding naturalization policies of young post-Soviet states that had prior statehood and nationhood before they became Soviet republics. In Central and Eastern Europe nations evolved not necessarily as a function of territorial and cultural institutionalization of a state, but were defined as ethno-cultural (mostly linguistic) communities that could extend across many political units or be part of a larger political unit (Brubaker 1994:56). Because the titular nations of post-Soviet republics evolved as cultural rather than political communities, then scholars have suggested that the cultural identity was the main locus of collective identity in these societies (Pabriks 1999).

Therefore, upon achieving post-Soviet statehood these titular nations primarily aimed at securing their ethno-cultural identity that had been threatened due to Soviet “nation-merging” policies (see Pabriks 1999: 150 for Latvia). In this mission, citizenship served was a closure mechanism for the nation. In fact, according to a very recent amendment that Latvia made to its citizenship law in 2006, if an applicant fails Latvian language proficiency three times, s/he will not be eligible to apply for citizenship in the future (BBC News 2006). Estonia too toughened the Estonian language requirements. Under the new 2007 amendment, the mastery of the knowledge of Estonian language will be tested repeatedly in organizations and enterprises (Parliamentary Assembly 2007). Language certificates (required for employment) will be void for those who fail language tests three times (ibid).

Nationhood dynamics evolved somewhat differently among the republics that had prior nationhood, but no statehood. These republics required immigrants to only
demonstrate basic communication knowledge of the national language. Extensive proficiency of speaking, writing, reading and listening comprehension of the language was not required. The threat from ethnic outsiders was not salient in every republic in this group: Armenia was quite homogeneous, with an emigrating rather than immigrating population (Shevtsova 1992). During Soviet rule, in Armenia and Georgia the official state languages were the Armenian and Georgian accordingly. Both Armenia and Georgia became more homogeneous during Soviet rule (as per census data of 1926 and 1989). Thus, the threat from immigrants was not salient when the Soviet Union collapsed.

In contrast, among the Slavic republics – the Ukraine and Belarus, the linguistic assimilation to the Russian was quite severe. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, ethnic minorities comprised 22-25% of the population in the Ukraine and Belarus (Anderson and Silver 1989). Yet, most importantly, the titular ethnic group was highly assimilated to the Russian language; not only ethnic minorities spoke Russian at home and at work, but so did ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Belarussians. In the Ukraine, it was estimated that one third of ethnic Ukrainians spoke Russian at home (Arel and Khmelko 1995 cited in Arel 2002). In Belarus, even in 1999 (eight years after the Soviet Union collapsed and Belarus acquired an independent statehood), about 56% of ethnic Belarussians spoke Russian at home (Arel 2002). During the collapse of the Soviet Union, titular ethnic groups in these republics demanded cultural autonomy and national sovereignty. However, the linguistic assimilation of the titular ethnic group hindered the articulation of the linguistic national identity to the extent that nationhood could be incorporated into the new state’s policy to limit the access of immigrants to the state. Thus, these republics required only basic knowledge of the national language without specifying
extensive reading, writing, speech and listening comprehension with a formal testing procedure (as was the case in the republics with prior statehood and nationhood).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the Ukraine (and less so Belarus), has been working vigorously to expand the use of the Ukrainian language and unite its Ukrainian and Russian-speaking populations into one nation. Annually, in November, a National Language Day is celebrated in the Ukraine. To promote the use of the Ukrainian language, a nationwide dictation contest is held that is called “Dictation of National Unity” (RFE/RL 2006a, emphasis added). The dictation is broadcast on the radio. Listeners send their dictation transcriptions to the radio-station to win prizes selected on the basis of fewest spelling and grammatical mistakes.

Among the republics with prior nationhood but no statehood, the salience of national identity was strongest in Moldova. Soviet authorities had changed Moldova’s Latin alphabet to Cyrillic alphabet (see Table 1) to erase the salience of the Romanian ethnic identity among Moldovans. In addition, the proportion of non-Moldovans was also increasing: Just two years before the Soviet Union collapsed, ethnic minorities comprised one third of Moldova’s population (Anderson and Silver 1989). When the Soviet Union disintegrated, Moldovan government immediately specified immigration quotas to limit the access of future immigrants to the state. However, in the early years of statehood, Moldovans’ priority was to reverse the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet in order to claim nationhood continuity and united national identity with Romanians. Few ethnic Moldovans used the Latin alphabet. Moldova’s first post-Soviet citizenship law stated that immigrants demonstrate only minimum knowledge of the Moldovan language to qualify for naturalization. Moldovans were not able to use the language to restrict the access of
immigrants to the young state.

In recent years Moldova’s nationhood rhetoric has become more explicit. Despite strong similarities between Romanian and Moldovan languages, Moldova has placed greater emphasis on its national ‘*uniqueness*'. The goal is to institutionalize a Moldovan (rather than a Romanian) *nation*-state. Despite little, if any, differences between Moldovan and Romanian languages, the Moldovan state asserts that the native language of Moldovans is Moldovan and not Romanian. Moldova even held a referendum to decide whether the state language should be called Moldovan or Romanian (RFE/RL 2008). In his recent speech, President Voronin of Moldova said:

The Moldovan state will celebrate its 650th anniversary next year, while the Romanian state is only 170 years old. So what came first: the chicken or the egg? The Moldovan Republic's Constitution says that the country's national language is Moldovan, not Romanian. Yes, they are identical. But historically it's called Moldovan, and it's going to stay that way (cited in RFE/RL 2008).

Moldova was not recognized as a member of the Westphalian state-system until 1991, after the Soviet Union collapsed (Correlates of War project 2005). Clearly, the statement by the President of Moldova refers to Moldovan nationhood rather than statehood. Importantly, the President’s statement also confirms the trend that has been taking place in Moldova’s citizenship legislation; as language has become a symbol of Moldovan nationhood, language has also been used to define who is “outside” the Moldovan nation. By 2007, Moldova had amended its citizenship law to place higher demands on language proficiency. Moldova’s current citizenship law requires that the immigrant who wishes to become a citizen:
sufficiently understands conversational language and official information; discusses and answers questions of social life; *is able to read and sufficiently understand any written text of social nature, laws and other regulations; is able to write an exposition on a social topic*” (Article 18, Citizenship Law of Moldova 2000, emphasis added).

This level of language proficiency is quite similar to the language requirements specified in citizenship laws of republics with prior statehood and nationhood—such as Latvia or Estonia.

And finally, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union the salience of the national identity was the weakest among the (predominantly Muslim) republics with neither prior nationhood nor statehood. Since these republics did not have prior statehood or nationhood before becoming part of the Soviet Union, then these peoples were most affected by Soviet assimilation policies. Among all the republics, here, there was little, if any, articulation of a national identity. Linguistic assimilation to the Russian was also the strongest: Soviet authorities had changed alphabets twice to erase ethnic and linguistic identities; and the Russian was the day-to-day language in these republics.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, all anti-Soviet independence movements were directed against Soviet assimilation policies. However, while the republics with prior nationhood and/or statehood were able to quickly articulate nationhood rhetoric for their movements, this was not the case for the republics that had neither prior nationhood nor prior statehood. Thus, groups of activists traveled to Baltic republics (i.e. the republics with prior statehood and nationhood) to borrow and replicate their popular front models, action programs; they also learned how to develop informal organizations (see Crow 1990
for Tajikistan, or Bohr et al. 1989 for Turkmenistan). Since the national language was among the hot issues debated at the time, the republics without prior statehood and nationhood adopted language laws too, following the example of republics with prior statehood and nationhood. Titular languages were assigned the status of the official state language status, but with one nuance— the Russian was declared the language of interethnic communication.

The republics with no prior nationhood and statehood faced a big challenge: their populations barely spoke the titular language, and the Russian language was more widely used than Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Azeri or Uzbek. There were debates over the status of the Russian language and the timelines within which the managerial and state apparatus employees would be required to master the titular language (see Fierman 1998 for Kazakhstan; Kurzman 1999 for Uzbekistan; Akcalı 2003 for the general discussion). Thus, it should come to surprise that half of the republics with no prior nationhood or statehood did not require immigrants to have proficiency in the national language to qualify for naturalization to citizenship (Table 2).

Nationhood was so weakly reflected in the initial citizenship laws of these republics that a foreigner could become a citizen of Tajikistan by simply adopting a child that was a Tajik citizen (Article 23(b) Citizenship law of 1995); or in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan all the requirements of naturalization would be waived for a person that married a Kazakh or Tajik citizen (Article 23 (b) Citizenship law of Tajikistan 1995; Article 16 of the Citizenship Law of Kazakhstan 1991).

Table 2 conveys an important trend. Nationhood is still part of the state model in the contemporary era, and language (reinforced through citizenship) is one of the means by
which states maintain and draw the boundary of the nation vis-à-vis immigrants. The stronger the articulation and the resonance of the national identity in the society, the more the national identity is reflected in the policies of the state vis-à-vis its immigrants. The trend depicted in Table 2 clearly shows that citizenship and naturalization laws of young states have become more nationhood-defined. This trend is based only on data from 15 states. Yet one cannot ignore the direction of the over-time-change: naturalization of immigrants to citizenship has become more demanding over time. Immigrants are required to demonstrate higher proficiency of the language of the titular ethnic group of the young nation-state. The language here plays more than a mere integrative function. It is the language of the nation, language of those who have committed loyalty to the nation and have put an effort to learn the language of the nation that the state represents. It is the access key of those who deserve to be members of the young nation-state. The postwar world political culture is hostile to “primordial” nationhood (Frank and Meyer 2002), yet the “nation” is still reinforced with the emphasis on the immigrants’ loyalty to the nation that the state is named after and represents.

Among the post-Soviet republics with neither prior nationhood nor statehood, some did not make any language proficiency a pre-condition for naturalization to citizenship. These are the republics where the Russian language was more popular than the language of the titular nation. If language served a mere integrative function for the young state, then immigrants would have been required to demonstrate knowledge of the Russian language that was most widely used in the society. Yet, these republics never mentioned the knowledge of the Russian as a pre-requisite for naturalization. The language of the non-titular group could not serve as a filter to the titular nation. Thus, citizenship laws in these
republics did not specify any language requirement at all.

Among the republics with no prior statehood or nationhood, only Azerbaijan in its first citizenship law required some certification of the knowledge of the national language. However, this confirms and does not contradict the trend depicted in Table 2: Azerbaijan was the last republic to adopt a citizenship law in 1998. Most republics adopted their laws during 1991-1993 and by 1998 had already amended that to raise linguistic demands. By 1998, the demographic and socio-political dynamics in Azerbaijan compelled the young state to articulate in state policy its linguistic identity. Azerbaijan was the second most homogeneous republic of the Soviet Union with the titular ethnic group—Azeries, comprising 83% of the population (Anderson and Silver 1989). During Soviet rule, the state language in Azerbaijan was not Russian, but Azeri. And yet, the population largely spoke Russian at homes and everyday communication, not Azeri (Aslan and Fuller 1989). Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan switched from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin. The linguistic similarity with Turkish and close post-Soviet cultural ties with Turkey, as well as the ethnic homogeneity of the population enabled Azerbaijan to emphasize language in its post-statehood nation-building. Thus, in its first citizenship law, immigrants were required to pass a language exam. Citizenship policy was used to establish barriers for the ethnic “other”.

What has been the reaction from the world society to the nationalist demands in citizenship laws of these republics? Despite that young states have made the naturalization to citizenship more demanding for immigrants, and have made explicit reference to the

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6 In its 1998 citizenship law Azerbaijan required that immigrants pass an exam on the national language before applying for citizenship (article 14). However from the law it is not clear whether the mastery of the language is limited to only listening comprehension or whether it also extends to reading and writing proficiency.
nationhood and the national identity of the titular group in citizenship laws (even to the extent of identifying the “ethnic other” or “threats” to nationhood), the world society pressures have not restricted states from embracing and strengthening their nationhood. A good example of this is Latvia (a republic with prior statehood and nationhood). Besides extensive language testing, in Latvia immigrants are also required to pass a national history test to qualify for naturalization to citizenship. The knowledge of the Latvian language test includes topics of Latvian history. The history exam consists of both oral and written sections (all conducted in Latvian language). The history test clearly identifies the “ethnic other” and the “threats” to nationhood. In Latvia the anti-Soviet sovereignty movement developed against the dominance of Russians in the republic. During Soviet rule the proportion of Latvians in the republic sharply decreased, and by the end of the Soviet era, Russians and other ethnic minorities roughly comprised the half of Latvia’s population (Parming 1986; Anderson and Silver 1989). These ethno-demographic dynamics resulted in increased hostility towards Russians and Russian-speakers in the society. Below are some of the sample questions of the history test for citizenship. In parentheses (in italics) I provided the correct answers to the questions and draw attention to the issues of nationhood. These questions clearly identify the “ethnic outsider” and the threats to Latvian nationhood:

- How did the rate of Latvians among the inhabitants of Latvia change during the years of the Soviet power? *(refers to the increase in the proportion of Russian population and decrease of Latvian ethnic population)*;
- What is the approximate number of population of Latvia? *(2.4 million by Population Census data of 2000)*;
• Which are the largest national minorities in Latvia? *(Russians are the largest ethnic minority comprising roughly 30% of the population of Latvia, Belarussians (4%), Ukrainians (2.7%) and Poles (2.5%) as per 2000 Population census data);*

• What exerts essential influence upon decreasing of the population in Latvia at present? *(refers to the low birth rate, high mortality and emigration rate of Latvians)(Naturalization Board of Republic of Latvia 1999, 2000).*

Are Latvians being nationalistic, or is nationhood still a necessary part of a modern state? The world human rights scripts do not deprive states from expressing their nationhood vis-à-vis immigrants and “outsiders”, no matter how strongly the ethnic identity of the titular nation is emphasized. World society does not reject expressions of nationhood. By not restricting states from incorporating nationhood into policy-making (to strengthen the nation), global pressures have indirectly facilitated the nation-making in young states. Human rights scripts empower *all* groups in the society. Ethnic groups (including the titular ethnic group in the state) have been successful in utilizing these scripts to maintain their status, rights and opportunities. This rhetoric of human rights has been embraced by new states where strengthening the titular nation and the integration of immigrants have gone hand in hand. Here is an example from Latvia again. This republic had demanding linguistic requirements for naturalization of immigrants to citizenship. The national programme “Integration of Society in Latvia” addresses the nationalist opposition that is against the integration of ethnic minorities in Latvia by stating:

The opposition to integration is typically related to a fear of losing ethnic identity.

In reality, it means that there is a lack of comprehension about integration itself.
The integration of society does not provide for loss of ethnic identity. On the contrary, integration supports the development and growth of ethnic identity (Naturalization Board of Republic of Latvia 2001:10).

In the postwar era, the state is not a state of a single nation anymore. The state still represents “its” nation, but the state is a diverse state. Since human rights scripts are omni-empowering in nature, then nations (of the state) have been able to express, maintain or strengthen their culture, ethnic identity and nationhood. As a consequence, as much as the rights of minorities are protected, minority ethnic groups are encouraged to integrate into the national culture of the state—i.e. the culture of the nation that the state is named after and represents. Integration is a social contract where the state guarantees the protection of linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic minorities, whereas “on the other side of this social contract, persons belonging to national minorities have a responsibility to integrate into the wider national society [of the state] through the acquisition of proper knowledge of the State [national] language” (OSCE 2000:4, emphasis added) or “…State history” (OSCE 2003:4). Importantly, social, cultural, economic and political integration of minorities has been set contingent, if not synonymous, with the knowledge of the national language of the titular ethnic group of the state. To gain access to the opportunities and resources of the state, immigrants and ethnic minorities have been required to demonstrate loyalty to the nation by learning its language (ECMI 1999; OSCE 2005). The more citizenship laws of young states have emphasized that membership in the state require a knowledge of the national culture (i.e. language and history) of the titular nation, the more have global pressures pushed states to create language-learning centers for minorities in order to facilitate the learning of the national language and thereby, the integration of minorities
(CSCE 1993). Learning the state’s *national* language has become the cornerstone of integration. This has reinforced, rather than has weakened, the nationhood of the titular group of the state. Importantly, the titular nation’s mission to strengthen the nation has not been discouraged. Instead, to counteract state-led nation-building, European and global pressures have aimed at empowering ethnic minorities within the state (to eliminate possible discrimination or marginalization). This is one of the reasons that various international organizations have expressed concerns when states have required that immigrants reside in the host state for longer periods in order to qualify for citizenship. Longer periods of residency leave uncertain the integration and the naturalization prospects of immigrants. In shorter periods of residency this uncertainly is decreased in time.

**Residency in the Country as a Precondition for Naturalization**

An immigrant is usually required to reside in a country for several years before qualifying for naturalization. The longer the immigrant resides in a nation-state, the more the immigrant is exposed to the culture of the titular nation. Thus, there is a higher likelihood of assimilation. Longer periods of residency also discourage unwanted immigrants from the state citizenship. Besides language, the length of residency (as a pre-condition for naturalization to citizenship) was also among the hot issues debated about citizenship regimes in post-Soviet republics. In the republics with prior statehood and nationhood, the nationalist arguments went to the extreme. Yet, in contrast to the language and history issues, the forceful impact of global pressures to conform was more direct, explicit and persistent. Different drafts of citizenship laws emerged. Drafts requiring that immigrants
reside in the country for shorter time periods (as a pre-condition for naturalization) were labeled as “national treason” (Kionka 1991a). Nationalists insisted that immigrants reside in the state for 10 or even 20 years in Estonia (Kionka 1991b) or minimum of 16 years in Latvia (Budryte 2005) before applying for citizenship.

The irony is in how the nationhood rhetoric was defended: to justify stringent citizenship and naturalization policies, authorities again referred to the world standards. Action scripts were borrowed from other state practices. In Estonia, legislators frequently cited Switzerland which not only required that immigrants possess the knowledge of the local dialect, national language and customs of Swiss, but also reside in Switzerland for 12 years; in Estonian draft citizenship law the residency requirement was set to only 10 years (Kionka 1991b). In quest to protect the interests of a “disappearing nation”, Estonian legislators also referred to the decolonized states of Malaysia and Fiji and cited legislation practices that these states applied to protect the political influence of the natives (Kionka 1991b). In the name of the nation, the new and young post-Soviet states borrowed scripts for action from the world society.

However, those exclusionary drafts were still not adopted. Those republics that came in contact with various international structures (such as the European Union), were required to comply with the accepted world standard: they were forced to decrease the uncertainty on the integration of immigrants and adopt measures that would facilitate (rather than marginalize) the incorporation of immigrants into the society. Slight deviations were tolerated, but excessive ones were rejected. The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities noted on the ‘16-year residency’ requirement of Latvia when he stated that “[a]s far as the requirement of a minimum period of residence in Latvia is concerned,
such period should not exceed 5 years. This is the period frequently adopted by states, and in this case there do not seem good reasons not to adopt it” (CSCE 1993, a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, April 6,). The young states obeyed: in adopted citizenship laws none of the new and young post-Soviet republics required that its immigrants reside in the country for 16 or even 20-years as a pre-condition for naturalization (see Figure 1).

![Figure-1: The Length of Residency Required from Immigrants as a Pre-condition for Naturalization to Citizenship in the First and Lastly Amended (by 2007) Citizenship Laws of 15 Post-Soviet Republics](image)

In the first versions of adopted citizenship laws immigrants were required to reside in the state for 3-10 years to qualify for naturalization. It should come as no surprise, that most of the republics followed the world model, and even more so in the most recent revisions of the citizenship law. By 2007, eleven out of fifteen post-Soviet young states specified that to qualify for naturalization to citizenship, immigrants reside in the country for 5-or-fewer
years. Republics with no prior statehood or nationhood (i.e. those in the periphery and most vulnerable to world society pressures) more complied with the world society model than the republics with nationhood and/or statehood.

The binding impact of world society pressures guides states’ policies on how immigrants are incorporated into the society. And yet, by doing so, European and world pressures do not restrict states from adopting nationhood-driven policies vis-à-vis immigrants. If the state emphasizes nationhood, then the world society forces insist on fewer obstacles to the integration of immigrants into the society. The domestic nation-building forces to exclude immigrants versus world-society forces to include immigrants are in a dialectic relationship. When states apply measures to delay the integration of minorities into the society, then world society forces push states to decrease the waiting period of integration (such as the length of residency in the host state); or states are forced to create more opportunities for immigrants to learn the national culture. The nation-building of the state is not rejected. Instead, rather than restrict the development of nationhood of the titular group, the pressures from the world empower minorities in a state. These pressures have indirectly facilitated to the nation-making and the strengthening of nationhood. The latter asserts that nation is still part of the postwar state model.

Where is Naturalization More Demanding?

Are immigrants required to fulfill more requirements to naturalize into citizenship in a young state where the titular ethnic group (a) has had both prior nationhood and statehood, (b) has had only nationhood but no internationally recognized statehood, or (c) has never
had statehood or nationhood? I discussed that language, history and the length of residency are some of the preconditions for acquiring citizenship of a state. Yet, besides these requirements, post-Soviet republics also required that immigrants demonstrate knowledge of the political system, the citizenship law of the state, and have a legal source of income. I constructed a simple cumulative index that indicates how stringent it is to obtain citizenship in various states that have different histories of prior nationhood and statehood. If a particular requirement was included into the citizenship law as a pre-condition for naturalization, then a code of 1 (otherwise 0) was assigned. Knowledge of language was coded as 0= not required, 1=only minimum communication knowledge required, 2= speaking, writing, reading and listening comprehension required. The cumulative index consisted of summing the codes of the following variables: knowledge of history, the political system and the state constitution, knowledge of the citizenship law, legal source of income and the knowledge of language. Additionally, some republics also specified a formal testing procedure for some of the pre-conditions. Formal examination entails extra demands on the immigrant. The index addresses that too: if a format testing procedure was specified for the particular pre-requisite, then a dummy-code of 1 was assigned (otherwise 0). The constructed index ranged from 0 to 9.

From the upper part of Table 3, the reader can easily see that already in the very first versions of citizenship laws, the naturalization procedure is more stringent in republics with prior nationhood and/or statehood than in the republics with neither prior nationhood nor statehood. The distinction is quite clear.
By 2007, only seventeen years later, this relationship has become sharper still. Not only the range of the index has increased from 8 to 9, but so has the stringency of the naturalization procedure among the republics with prior nationhood and/or statehood: In the most recent citizenship legislation, the stringency index ranged from 5 to 9 for the republics with prior nationhood and statehood, whereas the lowest index score is a characteristic of the republics that had neither prior nationhood nor statehood (index score range is from 0 to 2). Does this level of stringency mean that nationhood makes naturalization procedure more exclusive over time? Yes and no. Yes, since language and history are directly related to nationhood and are used by states to draw the boundary around the insiders versus outsiders of the state and the nation. No, since the index of stringency also contains components that are indicators of the world society penetration (such as pre-conditioning the naturalization on the knowledge of the political system and

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**Table-3: Number of Republics on the Stringency Index of Citizenship Laws of Fifteen Post-Soviet Republics, by Prior-to-Soviet-era Statehood and Nationhood Background of the Republic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Statehood and Nationhood</th>
<th>IN THE FIRST VERSION</th>
<th><strong>THE VERSION AS OF 2007</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index of Stringency (score in points)</td>
<td>Index of Stringency (score in points)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 5 7 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Prior Statehood or Nationhood</td>
<td>2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>2 2 2 0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Nationhood, but no Statehood</td>
<td>0 0 2 2 1 1 1 0</td>
<td>0 0 2 1 1 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Prior Statehood and Nationhood</td>
<td>1 0 0 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>0 0 0 2 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3 2 4 3 2 1</td>
<td>2 2 4 1 3 2 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the constitution of the state). However, it is important to note that the incorporation of world society scripts into citizenship policies has *not* replaced nationhood-related pre-requisites in these laws. Yet, the penetration of world society scripts into the citizenship legislation reflects the expansion and the diffusion, as well as the binding force of the world society culture on states of the postwar era. But this requires a separate examination and should be discussed in a new article.

**Conclusion**

Instead of developing a theoretical contrast between nationhood versus world society perspectives, I proposed a synthesis of these theories to examine the nation-state building processes of new states of the contemporary era. The synthesis provided a more comprehensive understanding of how new states negotiate their nationhood conceptions with the global pressures to adopt citizenship policies towards immigrants. Internal and external forces that shape nation-state building complement and mutually implicate one another; they do not stand in opposition to one another. Focusing only on either perspective (rather than both) limits our ability to observe and analyze the variable impact that the world pressures (to conform) and nationhood (to exclude) have in the early years of statehood.

While scholars have noticed decline in corporate identities in the postwar era (Frank and Meyer 2002), my findings suggest that corporate identities will continue to exist in the contemporary era. Since the nation remains part of the state model and is implicated in state agencies and policies, this generates continuing ethnic tension and
struggle between forces originated internally from nation-states or globally from the world society. Future research into resistance and struggle during the institutionalization of young states offers a promising opportunity to gain insight into the challenges confronting new states and to understand the interplay between the world society and nation-states more generally.

This research accepts Robertson’s challenge and has examined the “forms and ways” in which “glocalization” occurs (Robertson 1995). I argued that primordial nationhood is still a potent force in nation-state building. However, this rhetoric is reframed in the context of world society’s human rights scripts. Given the expansion and the diffusion of the human rights culture, new states no longer seek legitimacy for their nation-building agendas by referencing ethnic purity, homogeneity and primordialism. Instead, they mobilize human rights scripts of ethnic self-determination. These scripts empower both the dominant and minority ethnic groups of the society. Thus, even as ethnic minorities have used human rights norms to expand their opportunities and rights within the state, so have the titular ethnic groups used human rights culture to develop and strengthen their nationhood. Diversity, rather than homogeneity, is the hallmark of the contemporary state. Thus, the postwar nation is “tamed” rather than barbaric or intolerant (Ramirez 2006). The integration of immigrants and strengthening nationhood go hand in hand in the postwar era.

The institutionalization of nationhood and statehood in the young post-Soviet states provides evidence that the nation is still a contested component of nation-state building. As some states (such as the post-Soviet republics with no prior nationhood or statehood) follow the world society pressures and in scripted manner adopt inclusive policies towards
immigrants, others (such as the Baltic republics that had prior statehood and nationhood) struggle and try to negotiate these human rights scripts with their ethnic past. In the post-WWII era new states have struggled to institutionalize nationhood. Even those states have tried to do so where the titular ethnic group had no nationhood or statehood in the past (see Kurzman 1999).

And finally, my discussion extended to the sociological study of citizenship. Some scholars have argued that the expansion of human rights culture worldwide has changed the parameters of citizenship: immigrants increasingly use human rights values to exercise the same rights traditionally granted to only citizens of the state, thus a “post-national” citizenship is emerging (Soysal 1994). I argue that citizenship of the state remains an important component of sovereignty and has been used by young states to reinforce national boundaries. Additionally, in contrast to previous research, I did not find that the citizenship policies of post-Soviet republics were determined by pre-existing citizenship traditions (as argued otherwise by Weil 2001). Nor have citizenship policies of young states become more inclusive towards immigrants (Howard 2006). Instead, I demonstrated that all post-Soviet republics deviated from the all-inclusive Soviet citizenship tradition they inherited at the time of founding. Each new state adopted legislation that reinforced nationhood. Even those republics that had a pre-Soviet citizenship law made their post-Soviet citizenship legislation more exclusive and harder for immigrants to get incorporated into the newly independent state. For example, during the interwar period Latvia or Lithuania did not require immigrants to demonstrate proficiency of the titular ethnic language to apply for citizenship (Flournoy and Hundson 1929). In already the first post-Soviet citizenship laws Baltic republics (including Estonia) demanded that immigrants
demonstrate considerable proficiency of national language as a prerequisite for naturalization to citizenship. During the first 20 years of their existence, themes of nationhood have permeated citizenship policies of post-Soviet states making it more demanding for immigrants to qualify for and acquire citizenship.

Human rights scripts empowering national/ethnic cultures have been referenced by states to, first, strengthen nationhood of the titular group, and then to extend it to policy-making. This trend has been stronger among states in which nationhood and/or statehood existed prior to becoming a sovereign state in the postwar era. Post-Soviet states embraced nationhood; some have enacted citizenship laws that heighten the demands on immigrants seeking citizenship. As citizenship policies have emphasized nationhood, pressures from the world society have called on these states to create opportunities for immigrants to learn the national culture of the host nation to be able to naturalize into citizenship. This reinforces the nation, rather than weakens it. Thus, the world political culture indirectly reinforces nationhood and nation-state building. The modern state is not a “primordial” single-nation state. Yet the modern state is still a nation-state where the membership is granted to those that are loyal to the titular nation of the state (i.e. the nation after which the state is named).
References


MANUSCRIPT 2

ESTIMATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
IN POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS
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IN POST-SOVIE TOK REPUBLICS

Abstract

There is consensus among researchers that international migration data are undercounted in the fifteen post-Soviet republics. This paper examines various methods of international migration estimation in this region. The paper is methodological. I investigate the statistical management systems on migration and comparatively analyze various (alternative) methodological approaches to measuring migration.

To date only two scholarly articles have published that provide estimations of migration dynamics in this region. Migration data are difficult to obtain for post-soviet republics, and many republics do not even report migration statistics or report undercounted data. Due to the lack of reliable migration data on post-Soviet republics, researchers have suggested and relied upon the immigration-by-origin data to provide estimates for the migration dynamics in the region. I illustrate that this method has extensive validity and reliability problems when applied to post-Soviet republics due to the large variation that exists in how post-Soviet republics define the “migrant”.

I apply various alternative methods of estimating migration dynamics. I discuss immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries, examine how first post-Soviet population censuses captured migration in this region, compare census data to the immigration-by-origin data, and discuss nationwide household surveys on migration of post-Soviet republics. Throughout this discussion I illustrate and argue that population censuses and household surveys provide superior quality of data on migration than the
immigration-by-origin method. My discussion focuses on methodological guidelines that future researchers and scholars can advance on migration research in this region.
ESTIMATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

IN POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS

Many studies by scholars, applied researchers and international governmental and non-governmental organizations have made reference to dramatic international emigration in the former Soviet republics since the Soviet Union has collapsed. There is also an agreement that post-Soviet international emigration is undercounted. Yet, to date, only two scholarly articles have been published that provide estimations of migration dynamics in the region (Yeganyan et al., 2001; Korobkov and Zaianchkovskaia, 2004).

The implications of emigration undercounting and the lack of non-reliable migration data are quite severe. The bordering geographic position of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine to the European Union creates new economic and political security concerns for the EU member-states. Ukraine, for example, has become a transit country of illegal and undocumented migrants from the former Soviet Union and Asia that travel to Europe (Uehling, 2004). For some ethnic nationalities, such as Ukrainians, Moldovans, Georgians and Russians, women labor migrants outnumber male labor migrants (Cavounidis, 2003 cited in Cavounidis, 2006). The integration patterns into the host society also vary across post-Soviet migrants (see Drbohlav and Dzúrováof, 2007 for Ukrainians vs. Armenians). Additionally, the brain and labor-force drain makes it even harder to accomplish the regional integration of post-Soviet republics with East and West European countries (see Thaut, 2008 for Lithuania). Similar challenges come from Transcaucasian and Central Asia republics that, given the increase in the hate crimes and
racial hostility in Russia, increasingly search for better jobs not in Russia, but Europe or North America. The lack of proper migration policies to prevent emigration threatens not only the post-Soviet republics, but also receiving countries. Thus, reliable measurement of migration is important for policy-makers, economists and social scientists.

This paper incorporates an expansive scope of research to examine various methods of migration data estimation for fifteen former Soviet republics. The paper is methodological in nature and has three objectives. I examine the statistical management systems on migration, comparatively analyze various (alternative) methodological approaches to measuring migration, and discuss migration dynamics in post-Soviet republics since independence. Due to the lack of reliable migration data on post-Soviet republics, most research has suggested and relied upon the immigration-by-origin data to provide estimates for the migration dynamics in the region. I illustrate that even though this approach has been dominant among some researchers (Tishkov et al., 2005; Mansoor and Quillin, 2006), this method has extensive validity and reliability problems when applied to post-Soviet republics.

In the first part of the paper, I discuss the statistical systems and migration data collection mechanisms in fifteen former Soviet republics. I then pursue and apply various alternative methods of estimating migration dynamics. I discuss immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries, examine how first post-Soviet population censuses captured migration in this region, compare census data to the immigration-by-origin data, and discuss nationwide household surveys on migration of post-Soviet republics. Throughout this discussion I argue that population censuses and household surveys are methodologically a superior source of capturing international migration dynamics in
these republics than the immigration-by-origin method. My discussion focuses on methodological guidelines that future researchers and scholars can advance on migration research in this region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the statistical system of data collection was destroyed in many republics. Not only are statistical data limited on these developing countries, but migration data are even more difficult to obtain (due to availability and language issues). Some post-Soviet republics (such as Turkmenistan) do not even report migration or other demographic data. These data have been even more challenging to obtain for the migration dynamics in the 1990s when the financial difficulties, social unrest and civil wars undermined the maintenance of statistical data management. This makes scholars reluctant to use migration data for their analysis.

The paper draws on an extensive research and literature of estimating migration in these republics. I rely on statistical data published in annual statistical yearbooks of former Soviet republics and selected recipient countries to depict officially reported international emigration trends vis-à-vis estimated dynamics. In addition, I also incorporate reports and working papers presented at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), EUROSTAT conferences on migration and housing censuses where governmental statisticians and social scientists of the republics outlined and discussed the procedures in place for collecting migration data in their nation-states. I also rely on secondary data of grassroots research, such as in-depth qualitative interviews with migrants and their families, nationwide labor and migration household surveys that
various governmental and international agencies commissioned to advance the
development of migration statistics in post-Soviet republics. And finally, the paper relies
on legislative documents and governmental decrees issued to regulate migration
dynamics and statistical data collection on population in these republics.

Given the large interdisciplinary readership of this journal, the discussion of the paper is important for both scholars and policy makers that advance research on both migration and socio-economic processes in post-Soviet republics. No scholarly studies have been published where international migration is either a dependent or an independent variable. On numerous occasions scholars have emphasized that citizenship policies, ethnic wars, and the political and economic repression have caused depopulation of post-Soviet republics. And, yet, the statistical impact and the over-time significance of these forces have been left unexamined. Nor have there been studies where the impact of migration on social phenomena, such as gender dynamics, ethnic tension, etc, was analyzed. Thus, reliable measurement of migration is important for policy-makers, economists and social scientists.

**Statistical Management of Migration Statistics in Post-Soviet Republics**

Research has documented that international migration, emigration in particular, is highly undercounted in the former Soviet republics (Yeganyan *et al.*, 2001; Tishkov *et al.*, 2005; Mansoor and Quillin, 2006). The censuses conducted by the former Soviet republics during 1999-2002 revealed that regular estimations of the vital statistics misestimated the population decline by 4.3% in Estonia (Silver, 2003 cited in Arel, 2002) and by 5.3% in
Kazakhstan (Alekseenko, 2001 cited in Arel, 2002). Researchers have noted that the undercounting results from how migration dynamics are captured in statistical systems of these republics.

During Soviet rule, an individual, had to have a residence permit (*propiska*) from the police to live at a given address (Arel, 2002; Korobkov and Zaianchkovskaia, 2004). The *propiska* indicated the person’s permanent place of residence, and was stated in the passport of the citizen. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this system was declared unconstitutional and was abandoned (Arel, 2002, Korobkov and Zaianchkovskaia, 2004).

At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration was driven by three factors: massive departure of ethnic minorities to their homelands (i.e. the repatriation), emigration due to economic hardships, and emigration due to wars, conflict, political unrest or corruption. The undercounting of emigration mainly happened due to labor emigration. Many labor migrants from the former Soviet republics left for Russia and other more developed countries in search for better jobs. Due to the intended temporary nature of those departing and the desire to qualify for various social and property benefits from the homeland, these migrants never registered their leave with their home country. Thus, while they stayed in a host state, in their home country they were still registered as residents (since that was their permanent place of residence). Even when migration was registered, the system in place often failed to identify short-term and long-term international migration. Usually, no consistent data were collected on incoming citizens or transit foreigners.
The United Nations (1998a) defines the *long-term* migrant as a person who moves to the destination country for more than one year of residence, and that country becomes his/her usual place of residence for that period. *Short-term* migrants are persons who have moved to a new place of usual residence for more than three and less than 12 months.

Three main sources of error exist. (1) Many post-Soviet republics do not have a time-criterion to distinguish between short-term and long-term migration (i.e. a validity issue). Moreover, since the person can change his/her place of permanent residence several times, these data can count migration multiple times. (2) Statistical reliability issues also arise based on how migration data are collected, i.e. from the population register, from the border points, etc. (3). Many republics still rely on the offices of Internal Affairs to register the change of permanent residence of the person when the person moves out from the settlement unit (i.e. village, town, country, etc). The same offices of Internal Affairs were in charge of handling the “propiska” system during Soviet times (i.e. we the passport bureaus that would register the place of residence in the passport). Thus, the registration system is quite similar to the Soviet system. However, the time criterion of what constitutes “permanent place of residence” varies across the republics. This introduces a new source of measurement error for cross-national comparisons and derivations.

**Transcaucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**

As of 2008, in all three republics the migration statistics are obtained from the local offices of the Internal Affairs that register the change in the place of permanent residence
(similar to the Soviet “propiska” system). Short-term vs. long-term distinction of a migrant is not made. It is also not clear if reported annual data include refugees or not.

In Azerbaijan the registration of the place of residence in the passport has been replaced with identification cards (Chudinovskikh, 2006a). As per the 1996 law of Azerbaijan, “On registration according to the place of residence and sojourn” if the person leaves his/her place for more than 60 days, his/her registration is removed from the old address and is compiled according to the new address (article 10). Aliens are registered by place of residence if they have lived in the given address for more than 30 days (article 11).

In 2006 Armenia established a population register (Law on the Population Register of 2002, article 12.5), yet, migration is still compiled from local territorial passport bureaus that submit information to Internal Affairs offices (National Statistical Service of Armenia, 2008). If a citizen of Armenia leaves the country for more than six months, the person is required to notify to appropriate consulate bodies of Armenia, upon which, his/her record is deleted from the central population register while is still maintained in the register of the local territorial unit in Armenia (Law on the Population Register of 2002, articles 7 and 8).

In Georgia, due to war in the country in 1990s, migration was not documented. As per the law On Rules of Registration and Identity Verification of Citizens of Georgia and Aliens Residing in Georgia, the registration of persons by place of their usual residence is compiled by the Ministry of Interior. The person should notify the local body of Internal Affairs if s/he changes of the place of usual residence for more than three months (article 3, amended version of 2000). A foreigner is issued a residence permit if s/he plans on
staying in Georgia for more than three months (Ministry of Justice of Georgia, 2008).
After the Agency of Civil Registry was established in 2005-2006 (to document births, deaths, marriages, internally displaced people and refugees, issue identity cards, passports), Georgia has since been working on adopting a law on Population Register (UNDP Georgia, 2008).

Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
In these republics migration information is collected from the local Internal Affairs offices (similar to the old-Soviet “propiska” system). In Turkmenistan Statistical Agency was established only in 2007 (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2008), and no migration data were being collected prior to this date. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (Chudinovskikh, 2008) and Tajikistan (Kislitsyna, 2006; State Committee of Statistics of Tajikistan, 2008) the migrant is the person who has changed the place of permanent residence for more than six months. Short-term vs. long-term distinction of a migrant is not made.

Upon the change of the place of residence, the migrant submits two statistical questionnaire-cards that ask information on the place of birth, previous place of residence, demographic information, as well as purpose, destination and duration of travel (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2001; State Committee of Statistics and Centre of Economic Studies of Uzbekistan, 2005; Kislitsyna, 2006). Since 2000 Tajikistan has used household surveys to acquire on labor migration (Chudinovskikh, 2006a).
The republics do not collect consistent data on incoming citizens or the transit foreigners (Manke, 2006). Reported annual international migration data do not specify whether refugees and asylum seekers are included or not.

Turkmenistan is a special case in this group. The first President of Turkmenistan, President Niyazov, banned the National Academy of Sciences (RFE/RL, 2007). Even though a population census was conducted in 1995, the State Agency for Statistics was established only in 2007 (CIA, 2008). However, annual migration data have yet to be reported.

**Baltic Republics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania**

Latvia (in 1991), Lithuania (in 1992) and Estonia (in 2000) established population registers (Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of Latvia, 2009; Law of Lithuania on the Population Register, 1991; Herm, 2006). In the 1990s in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania migration data were collected from immigration and emigration coupons of citizenship offices (i.e. old Soviet passport bureaus) or local government bodies (Statistical Office of Estonia et. al., 1996; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 1995) that were submitted when the person declared a change in his/her permanent place of residence. Local administrative offices then submitted this information to population registers or to the responsible statistical office. Yet, as local state statisticians agree, population registers have not been a reliable source of migration information either (Ambrozaitiene, 2008; Herm, 2006).
In 2000 the Estonian government issued a law to create Population Register and to establish guidelines on migration statistics (Herm, 2006). However, the official creation of rules of migration registration had an adverse effect on data quality, and the migration estimates became even less reliable, which forced Estonian authorities to stop reporting population-register-based migration statistics since 2000 (Herm, 2006).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and by acquiring the member-state status of the European Union, the Baltic republics of the former USSR have tried to make their migration systems compatible with the both the guidelines of the United Nations (1998a) and the European Parliament EC No 862/2007 (European Parliament and the Council of Communities, 2007). However, even currently, Lithuania does not follow the UN definition of the short-term vs. the long-term migration, and simply states that the migrant is the person that has changed the place of usual residence for more than six months (Statistics Lithuania, 2007). Until 2000, Latvia and Estonia did not make that distinction either when reporting their international migration statistics (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSBL) 2000; Statistical Office of Estonia, 1997; 2001). In both Latvia and Estonia reported annual migration statistics relate to “long-term” or permanent migrants. Since 2005 all foreign and Estonian citizens who change their place of residence for 3 months or longer are obligated within 30 days to report the change of their place of residence (Herm, 2006). By 2003 Latvia complied with the United Nations (1998a) definition of long-term migration as a move of more than 12 months (CSBL, 2003). Since then its statistical yearbooks report only long-term migration of more than one year.
Slavic Republics and Moldova: Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova

Russia, Belarus and Ukraine have been primary destinations of migrants from the former Soviet region. As per the United Nation’s data of 2005 (2006a), Russia is the second country in the world hosting the largest number of international migrants with estimated 21.1 million migrants, and Ukraine is the forth in the world with estimated 6.8 million migrants. In contrast, Moldova is a country of emigration. According to the IMF (2003), remittances account for more than 20% of the GDP share in Moldova.

Measurement of migration largely varies among these four countries. Moldova is the only country that has since 1998 established a population register. In Belarus, Ukraine and even in Moldova the international migration data are still compiled in similar manner as in other republics-- through the tabulation of statistical forms on the arrival and departure obtained from the local offices of the Department of Internal Affairs (or the Department of Information Technologies for Moldova) when the person fills out address forms for place of residency (Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of the Republic of Belarus, 1997; 2002; 2007; Chudinovskikh, 2008; Department for Statistics and Sociology of the Republic of Moldova, 2003). In Belarus the permits for temporary stay are issued for at least 90 days of stay, and no longer than for one year if the person has moved for work, administrative and other activities (Resolution on Approval of Regulation on Stay of Foreign Citizens, point 23).

In Ukraine and Moldova, permanent residence status is recorded if the person has moved into a new place of residence for at least six months (Chudinovskikh, 2008). Belarus and Russia do not have any time-criterion for defining permanent residency (Chudinovskikh, 2008).
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova border the European Union. To make the migration and asylum related legislation and policies of these three republics compatible with the European Union policies on migration, in 2001, Sweden, UNHCR and IOM initiated the Söderköping process (IOM Ukraine, 2008). Seven EU member-states – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania--joined the project. The project created a joint network where migration data and policies are shared—to facilitate the integration of regional migration dynamics and policies.

One of the primary destinations of labor migrants from the former Soviet republics is Russia (Arel, 2002; Iunusov, 2003; Korobkov and Zaianchkovskaia, 2004; Tishkov et al., 2005; Mansoor and Quillin, 2006, Gevorkyan et. al. 2006). Citizens of the former Soviet republics, with the exception of Baltic republics and Georgia and Turkmenistan, can enter Russia without a visa.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia’s definition of a ‘migrant’ has changed several times (Andrienko and Guriev, 2005; Chudinovskikh, 2006a). Due to these changes many migrants have been left out of the count which, as Chudinovskikh (2006a) demonstrates, has resulted in artificial spikes and downfalls in migration trends in this country. Currently, according to the Russian legislation, foreign citizens who enter Russia without a visa can stay as temporary visitors for no longer than 90 days (Federal Migration Service, 2008a). However, labor force surveys of the republics reveal that undocumented migrants find ways to remain in Russia for longer periods. Given the 90-day restriction on stay, many undocumented migrants who fail to obtain work permit, exit Russia every 87-89 days and re-enter in two days, thus renewing their visiting status again (Khajimukhammedov, 2008).
Upon arrival of the migrant, the receiving party in Russia is responsible within three days of the arrival to obtain migration registration for the visitor from the local federal migration service (Federal Migration Service (FMS), 2008a). The receiving party can be individuals (citizens of Russia or legally residing foreigners) or legal entities. The migration registration is free of charge.

To obtain a work permit, the visitor should apply to the local federal migration service during the temporary stay period. The fee is 1000 Russian Rubles (FMS, 2008b). The work-permit is issued within the established quota within 10 days from the date of the application. If the work-permit is valid for more than 90 days, the migrant has to find an employment within 90 days, otherwise the work-permit is revoked (FMS, 2008b). In 2008, the work permit quota was 3.4 million, whereas in 2009 the work-permit quota was set to around four million (RBC Daily, 2008), but would probably get reduced due to the global economic depression. From the four million work permits 1.3 million were set for construction jobs; 200,000 for jobs in machine-industry and metallurgy; over 54,000 jobs are set in administrative, financial and economic managerial positions (RBC Daily, 2008).

There are great differences in how long-term and temporary migration is defined, and how international migration data are collected in post-Soviet republics. While some republics rely on population registers to capture migration, most post-Soviet republics still collect migration data imitating the old Soviet “propiska” system. Similarly, some republics do not state any time criterion to define a migrant; others rely on the three or

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7 One US dollar= 35 Russian rubles as of March 13, 2009 per Central Bank rate of Russia. Hence, 1,000 Russian rubles= USD 29.
six-month threshold, whereas Latvia defines long-term migration as a migration with
duration of longer than one year. Moreover, due to the lack of universal definition of the
short-term migration, frequently traveling undocumented labor migrants get counted on
numerous occasions, thus artificially inflating the migration measure. And finally, it is
often not unclear whether the annual international migration reports include also refugees
or asylum seekers. This makes comparison of migration data cross-nationally very
difficult, if possible at all

Alternative Methods of Measurement of International Migration

A: Immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries

While the research community agrees that post-Soviet migration data are not reliable, few
have tried to provide solutions to the matter. A notable research that focused on
population dynamics in two post-Soviet republics—Armenia and Georgia—was
conducted by Yeganyan et al. (2001). While the primary focus of the article was the re-
estimation of life expectancy, the research team estimated the population age structure,
infant and elderly mortality to eventually derive the actual annual population size for the
1990s. The method relied on birth and mortality data. Unfortunately, the extension of this
estimation approach to other republics may not be fruitful. Yeganyan et al. (2001)
acknowledge that mortality data (primarily old age mortality) is under-reported in many
post-Soviet republics. Other scholars have also documented various aspects of low
reliability of natural growth data of post-Soviet republics (Jones and Grupp, 1983;
Anderson and Silver, 1986; Velkoff and Miller, 1995; Aleshina and Redmond, 2005).
Given the limitations in demographic statistics in developing countries, international governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, or the World Bank, have relied on immigration-by-origin statistics of host countries to estimate international migration of the sending country. This method has been successful in several western countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom (see Kelly and Walker, 1982 cited in Simmons, 1987), or West-European countries, North America and Australia (United Nations/EUROSTAT, 2006).

In 2002 the United Nation’s Population Division released a report that was based on the immigration-by-origin data of total of 45 Western and post-Soviet countries. This report estimated annual migration trends in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for 1980-1998. While the effort was important, the report failed to specify what receiving countries were used to estimate emigration for each sending country. Nor did the report provide clarification on what categories of migrants (e.g. repeat migrants, refugees) are captured in the estimates. The estimates were also biased and did not include emigration from predominantly Muslim post-Soviet republics to East Asian or Middle Eastern countries (such as United Arabic Emirates or Turkey that have been favorite destinations of migrants from Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan). Among all studies, the estimations by the United Nations depict by far the largest volume of emigration trend in these republics. Figure-1 depicts the migration trends defined by this UN report.

By far the most comprehensive and complex analysis of migration dynamics in the Eastern and Southern Europe and the former Soviet region was done by the team of researchers from the World Bank (Mansoor and Quillin, 2006). These researchers conduct regression analysis to examine the determinants of migration, the impact of
remittances on the development of countries in this region, and finally discuss the
migration policies of international organizations in this region. Research relies on survey
data collected from returned migrants in six countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, and Tajikistan) and immigration-by-
origin data of receiving countries (administrative data of population estimates and
population censuses). Yet, this report suffers the same validity problems with the
definition of migrants across countries, as discussed above. The authors themselves cast
doubt about statistical model results by indicating the low quality of the data (Mansoor
and Quillin, 2006, p. 11). Thus, the errors in the measurement make even the most
complex and analytical research seem unreliable.

As the earlier discussion illustrates, cross-national variations over definition of a
“migrant” and various sources used for capturing migration create large difficulties for
cross-national derivations or comparisons. Hence, often trends depicted by researchers
using this method have been contradicted by others. Some have argued that immigration
flows within the CIS region have declined since 1989 (Korobkov and Zaianchkovskaia,
2004; Tishkov et al., 2005). However, Chudinovskikh (2006a:7) reasserts that decline of
migration inflow into Russia could have also (artificially) resulted from changes in the
rules of migration data collection that Russia had introduced since 1996 (see also
Denissenko, 2003; Mkrtchyan, 2003; Chudinovskikh, 2004—all cited in Chudinovskikh,
2006b). Thus, while studies by the United Nations (2002), Korobkov and
Zaianchkovskaia (2004), Tishkov et al. (2005) are important and valuable, their scientific
contribution is limited due to low reliability and validity of the data used for the
migration estimation.
It is often also practically impossible to capture immigration-by-origin data of every country in the world to estimate annual international migration dynamics. Thus, this technique is useful mostly for regional migration dynamics.

Finally, the format in which migration estimates are obtained and reported determines the extent to which these data can be used by scholars and policy-makers. To examine the impact of various socio-economic and political forces on migration over time, or to analyze the impact of migration as an independent variable, researchers need (preferably) annual migration data. Thus, it is important to report separately both immigration and emigration data to allow other scholars to rely on the data in future research. Past research has usually focused on total migration stock (i.e. gross migration) for some time periods, such as total net-migration for 1989-2003; annual migration statistics are not reported (see for example, Mansoor and Quillin, 2006). Nair (1985) fairly notices that structural changes of the country may result in no variation of the net-migration. And hence, reporting only net-migration or the gross totals for certain time periods limits the analytical utility of the data. Reporting the gross migration also restricts the possibility for a researcher who may want to examine the immediate and delayed impact of a certain policy on migration dynamics in the country.

**Practical exercise using immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries:**

Reflecting on the studies discussed in this section, I have relied on the immigration-by-origin data of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the USA to depict annual international emigration data vis-à-vis
the official migration trends for each of the 15 Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. Figure-1 describes these migration dynamics. The reader should still be aware that these estimations suffer from validity issues due to the variation in definition and recording of migrants across the republics (as discussed earlier). Moreover, these are only estimations based on select 10 receiving countries and do not capture the whole magnitude of total annual international emigration. Annual international immigration-by-origin data were incomplete for Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Thus, these countries were excluded from the calculation.

Since Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan (and Ukraine) were the primary destinations of post-Soviet migrants, immigration-by-origin data of these republics are reported separately. I have also included immigration by origin data of the USA (includes only permanent migration). The select-NIS category captures Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. In this group all migration data are captured based on the reports of the offices of Internal Affairs (similar to the “propiska” system) or population registers (for Latvia and Lithuania for later years). More details on the data collection systems were provided earlier.

I have combined the migration data of Baltic republics with other republics into the same category since the immigration trends of Baltic States were minimal, even regionally among the Baltic States, and practically not visible if reported separately in the charts.

Immigration-by-origin data of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, USA and select NIS countries are stacked one above the other to reflect the magnitude of emigration in post-Soviet republics vis-à-vis the official statistics of the sending republic.
Official and the UN estimates refer to the total annual international emigration. For comparison purposes official and the UN trends are not stacked in the figure, but reveal the actual trends reported by each party accordingly. Estimated international emigration is reported as percent of the annual size of the population of the sending republic.

Only 10 countries (USA and 9 post-Soviet republics) were used for this exercise, and already for almost every republic there is a time period when the migration is undercounted. The emigration trends are higher in the 1990s than in the 2000s. This is primarily determined by the high wave of repatriation of many ethnic minorities, such as Jews, Russians, Germans, to their homelands. Russia by far is the primary destination of migrants from the post-Soviet republics (but not for Baltic States in recent years). By the end of 1990s this emigration started to decline, which, as Chudinovskikh (2006a) and Denissenko (2003) claim, should be attributed to the changes in rules of migration registration that Russia introduced in 1996 and in 2000. However, with the exception of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, emigration to Russia started to decline before 1996. Thus, change in the rules of registration of migrants provides only partial explanation to the lower emigration volumes into Russia. Russia’s official immigration data also confirm that immigration started to decline as early as in 1994 rather than 1996 when the first change in registration rules was introduced.

The decline of emigration to Russia is especially interesting for Central Asian republics. Past research has argued that emigration from the Central Asian republics—i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has been contained within the former USSR territory, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan (Mansoor and
Quillin, 2006, Korobkov and Zaianchkovskaia, 2004; Tishkov et al., 2005). Yet, since 2000, the official data report higher emigration trends than has been received by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In fact, Belarus has received very little of the annual emigration volume of these republics. Even though Ukraine is not included in the calculations, we should not expect emigration to Ukraine to be higher than emigration to Belarus or Russia. So what accounts for this decline of emigration into Russia? Has the pattern of repeat migration with Russia or Belarus or Ukraine changed that is not captured by the registration rules or are citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan searching for new destinations other than the former Soviet territory?

After Russia, Kazakhstan is the next popular destination of migrants from the Central Asia. Since 2000 this emigration has especially increased for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Among the 10 countries used for the estimation, Belarus and Russia were the main destinations of migrants from Baltic republics in the 1990s (largely due to the repatriation of Russians, Belarusians and other Slavic nationalities). United States has received only a fraction of emigration from these states. Yet, the emigration of Lithuanian migrants into the USA has somewhat increased since 1999.
Figure 1: Officially Reported Total Annual International Emigration vs. Emigration estimated by Select Immigration-By-Origin Data of Receiving Countries, 1990-2005 (Percent of the Total Annual Population of the Sending Republic)

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Belarus

Moldova

Ukraine

Russia
Figure-1 (cont.): Officially Reported Total Annual International Emigration vs. Immigration—
Origin Data of Receiving Countries, 1990 -2005 (Percent of the Total Annual Population of the
Sending Republic)

*Estonia stopped reporting annual migration data since 2000. Georgia does not report emigration, reports
only net-migration. Turkmenistan does not report any migration data.
Emigration into the USA has been relatively higher among the Armenian migrants. However, over years, more migrants have been departing for permanent residence into the USA from European republics of the former USSR- i.e. Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia.

Unfortunately, as discussed, estimates using immigration-by-origin data are limited in use given the validity issues surrounding the definition of what constitutes a migrant. A positive step in this direction has been taken by Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the framework of the Söderköping process (IOM Ukraine, 2008). This program is designed to make migration-related legislation compatible and comparable with seven European Union member-states that share a border and receive migrants from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. These seven EU states are Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Countries of the project also exchange migration data to facilitate the estimation of migration dynamics and integration of migrants. Currently, integration of legislation is still in progress, and the data reported publicly do not allow full comparisons.

To increase the use of immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries, regional integration and coordination of migration legislation, such as among the Central Asian Republics or among the Transcaucasian republics with Russia is crucial. The role of international organizations is especially important in facilitating this process.

Due to practical difficulties involved in using immigration-by-origin data, the role of population censuses in obtaining migration data increases in this region.
B. Population censuses of post-Soviet republics

In developing countries the main medium to collect information about international migration remains the population census. Population censuses are usually good at measuring migration stock for a given time period. With detailed questions, such as ‘the arrival date’ and ‘the country of origin,’ it may be possible to even reconstruct annual migration dynamics between census periods.

**Immigration:** The 2000 round of population censuses of post-Soviet republics emphasized immigration rather than emigration. Conventional direct methods for estimating international migration also primarily cover immigration rather than emigration. These measures include the ‘place of birth’ (known as the lifetime migration estimator), ‘place of previous residence’ (e.g. last residence or residence at fixed point in time in the past), ‘duration of the residence,’ ‘date of arrival’ information, etc. (Skeldon, 1987).

In its recommendations, the United Nations identifies two key measures that capture the gross migration stock (rather than annual migration dynamics). These measures are the ‘citizenship of the person’ and the ‘place of birth’ (United Nations, 1997, p. 92). Almost all post-Soviet republics that conducted a population census after the collapse of the USSR had incorporated into their census questionnaires the measures on ‘the place of birth’ and ‘the citizenship’ (see table-1). But these measures do not provide information about the inter-census migration dynamics. Moreover, the important task is to distinguish Soviet migration from post-Soviet migration. Thus, we need the ‘arrival date’ or ‘duration of stay’ information for the migrant. Yet, the republics that...
were the main destination for immigrants—Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan—as well as Baltic republics, never acquired information on the ‘arrival date’ of the person (see table 1, column 3). Hence, it is impossible to separate Soviet from post-Soviet migration for these republics.

If information is available by the ‘place of previous residence’ and the ‘arrival data,’ then census data can also be used to derive immigration-by-origin information, i.e. emigration data of the sending country. Unfortunately, post-Soviet censuses provided very limited information to estimate emigration data. The interpolation of immigration stock by country of origin is impossible for the republics that experience high immigration flows—i.e. Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan—that never acquired information on the ‘place of previous residence’ (see table-1). In Baltic States this calculation is also limited since Lithuania and Latvia acquired the information only for the year prior to the census, whereas Estonia acquired the information only for the place of residence in 1989. Limited data, if any, are reported for the remaining republics.

**Emigration:** To capture temporary emigration, researchers refer to the ‘duration of absence’ or the ‘place of current residence’ of the household members. Indirect measures, such as the ‘residence of children’ and the ‘residence of siblings,’ are also applied (see Zaba, 1987 for the review). None of the former Soviet republics used either

---

8 For the remaining republics limited census data are available, and often, not sufficient detail is provided in publicly available data (i.e. census publications, reports, and online census statistics) to allow further derivations. For example, Tajikistan or Ukraine combines internal and international migration data during reporting. Georgia, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan provide limited migration data that are insufficient for derivations. Azerbaijan does not report migration data in its census publications.

9 Several limitations apply to these techniques, such as validity issues based on how the ‘migrant’ is defined and what group of people it can erroneously capture. Indirect measures can also erroneously exclude from the estimation the emigration of native-born children of the foreign-born population, and include foreign-born children of the native-born population (Zaba 1987).
the method of ‘residence of children’ or ‘residence siblings’ for emigration estimation. To capture temporary emigration, only half of the republics incorporated measures on the ‘duration of the absence,’ ‘the place of current temporary residence’ and ‘the purpose of the absence’ (see Table-1). The situation is especially problematic among the Central Asian republics where, despite heavy regional migration dynamics, only Turkmenistan included measures on the temporary emigration.

**De-jure Enumeration:** To make the census data less distorted and more compatible internationally, the United Nations states that “[c]ountries are recommended to use the place of usual residence [de jure] as the basis of household membership” (United Nations, 1998b: 44). Post-Soviet censuses used a *de jure*, rather than de-facto (i.e. currently present) enumeration of the population. Some have noted that the de jure enumeration registers only permanent migrants and the massive scale of temporary labor migration is not captured (Skeldon, 1987 on the Asia Pacific region). If the country collects information about the emigration, then the de-jure enumeration is not problematic (since emigration is estimated directly by the census questions). However, if emigration information is not collected by the population census, then information about the emigration stock can be obtained by comparing census de-facto data to de-jure population. Only half of the post-Soviet republics acquired information on temporary emigration. Thus, for the other republics capturing the *de facto* population may reveal more information about the migration (both temporary and permanent).

**Format of the Data:** Additional problems occur based on how census data are reported. Each republic has a varying degree of detail in its publicly available census data. The format of data presentation is even more subjective, depending on which
variables are used for bivariate or multivariate tables. Thus, even if the republic captures migration data by the census, these data may still be limited in use due to the format they are made available to the public.

Given the low reliability of annual migration data, population censuses can be a superior source of migration data. As said earlier, post-Soviet censuses more emphasized immigration rather than emigration in their censuses. In figure-2 and figure-3 I contrast census reported gross immigration data vis-à-vis the cumulative annually reported immigration-by-origin data for a given time period. The figures are based on the example of Moldova (as a migration sending country) and Belarus (as one of the primary migration receiving countries in the post-Soviet region). These two republics provide enough detail of census migration data needed for comparisons. Both countries captured information on previous place of permanent residence and duration of stay. The data are reported as grouped in time periods: immigration into the country 6-9 years prior to the census year, 5-3 years prior to the census, and less than 2 years prior to the census year. However, since Moldova and Belarus had their censuses at different years (Belarus in 1999, and Moldova in 2004), the time intervals reference different time periods of post-Soviet years.

Annual immigration-by-origin data capture both the temporary and the long-term migrants. These data are registered by the statistical management systems that post-Soviet republics have in place currently. I discussed the problems with these systems earlier in the paper. In contrast to annual immigration-by-origin data, it is possible for censuses to capture only those immigrants that have stayed in the country long-term (since temporary immigrants eventually leave after a short time). To address the issue
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<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Place of Previous Residence</th>
<th>Year/Period of arrival</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Duration Absent</th>
<th>Place of Temporary Residence</th>
<th>Purpose of Absence</th>
<th>Duration Present</th>
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<td>no</td>
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</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Place of the previous residence during the 1989 census

** Place of the previous residence 1 year prior to the census

^^ No Census has been conducted since the disintegration of the USSR

of short-term migrants that arrive closely prior to the census, for data presented in figure-2 and figure-3 I have excluded the latest time period that captures the census year. Thus, all data focus on immigration 1-9 years prior to the census year. We should expect that census reported gross immigration be less than (or not exceed) the cumulative annually reported immigration data for the given time period. This is because the annual immigration data also capture temporary and short-term migrants, whereas census data do not. Yet, figure-2 (for Belarus) and figure-3 (for Moldova) reveal the measurement error of annual immigration-by-origin statistics.

Figure-2 (A-D): Belarus’ Gross Annually Reported Immigration vs. Census Reported Immigration by Sending Post-Soviet Republics, by Time Period (in Persons)
Figure-2 (A-D), cont.: Belarus' Gross Annually Reported Immigration vs. Census Reported Immigration by Sending Post-Soviet Republics, by Time Period (in Persons)

B: Central Asian Republics

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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8,734</td>
<td>7,184</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<td>1,056</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>1,036</td>
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<td>824</td>
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<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
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<td>1,036</td>
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C: Baltic Republics and Moldova

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<td>Moldova</td>
<td>22,857</td>
<td>22,857</td>
<td>17,803</td>
<td>17,803</td>
<td>6,499</td>
<td>6,499</td>
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<td>28,924</td>
<td>22,351</td>
<td>22,351</td>
<td>11,239</td>
<td>11,239</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,478</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>1,081</td>
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D: Slavic Republics

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<td>Russia</td>
<td>228,480</td>
<td>228,480</td>
<td>26,401</td>
<td>26,401</td>
<td>14,541</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>19,072</td>
<td>228,016</td>
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<td>11,981</td>
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Legend:
- 1990-1993 annual
- 1990-1993 census
- 1994-1996 annual
- 1994-1996 census
- 1997-1998 annual
- 1997-1998 census
For Belarus, for immigration during 1994-1996, the census reports higher estimates than the cumulative annual estimates reported for immigration-by-origin from Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The census estimates refer to long-term migrants that have arrived in Belarus during 1994-1996 (thus were in the country prior to census for 3-5 years). Usually, the questions that require retrospective accounts from the respondent suffer higher measurement error. Thus, asking the respondent about the approximate time of arrival 6-9 years or 3-5 years prior to the census has lower reliability than asking a question about the arrival 1-2 years prior to the census. However, even for the most recent period prior to the census year –i.e. 1997 -1998 (Belarus held its census in 1999), the inconsistency of annual statistical data management is still evident. The census reports a higher number of migrants that have arrived in Belarus during 1997-1998 than the annual migration registration sources cumulatively report for the same time period. This is evident for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, Estonia, and marginally so for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.

A similar error is noticeable for Moldova too. The error is evident for Kazakhstan and marginally so for Ukraine for immigration during 1999-2002 (figure-3).

Census migration data can reveal a wide range of information. Migration by the place of previous residence can provide insights not only into the immigration pattern of the receiving country, but also about the emigration patterns of the sending republic. Or if information is collected on emigration (both long-term and temporary), insights can be gained into the emigration pattern too. Unfortunately, very few post-Soviet republics
collected information on the (temporary) emigration. Most of the republics do not even report emigration statistics in their census publications and releases.

Figure-3: Moldova’s Gross Annually Reported Immigration vs. Census Reported Immigration by Top Sending Post-Soviet Republics, by Time Period (in Persons)

The next post-Soviet censuses are scheduled during 2009-2011. The CIS Inter-State Statistical Committee has drafted a census model-questionnaire, which may be adopted by the republics and adjusted to the needs of a republic (United Nations, 2006b). Yet, in the draft version of the questionnaire of Belarus there are fewer measures on migration than there were in the recent census. In Baltic republics the population censuses follow the census guidelines established by the European Union. Here population censuses are expected to be conducted in 2011. Some European Union countries implement not a traditional population and housing census, but collect their information from population registers—i.e. relying on a register-based census. Latvia was the only post-Soviet republics that in 2000 used a population register to collect information on about 30% of census measures (United Nations, 2007; Vegis and Usackis, 2007). In the second post-Soviet
census of Latvia about 70% of the information will be collected from population and administrative registers—to eventually transition to a fully register-based census (Vegis and Usackis, 2007). In the second post-Soviet census Latvia will rely on population registers to collect information on the ‘place of birth’ and ‘citizenship’ of the person, while the census questionnaire will include questions on the ‘place of previous residence’ and ‘arrival date’ (Vegis and Usackis, 2007).

Population censuses can be a useful source of data on migration. If information is collected on the date of the arrival/departure and the place of previous/current residence, then it will be possible to derive estimates for annual or temporary immigration and emigration using population census data. Moreover, census data can reveal information about the migration patterns of long-term migrants both for sending and receiving countries. Population censuses provide useful information for long-term migrants and some information for only recent temporary migrants. Thus, the temporary migration in the inter-census period is largely left uncovered. Yet, the value of population censuses can be even more increased if information is collected about patterns of temporary migration. While this information can be collected by population censuses (for only recent years), more detail on temporary migration can be captured through annual nationwide household labor surveys. Thus, census data can be supplemented by annual nationwide surveys on labor force dynamics—to gain insights into the patterns of temporary migration.
C. Household surveys

To compensate for the errors in statistical systems on migration, some post-soviet republics have relied on labor-force household surveys to acquire information about the temporary and long-term migrants. Labor-force surveys provide multi-dimensional information. The researcher can acquire a wide range of data on both emigration as well as immigration—e.g. the approximate number of migrants and trends of migration, favorite destinations, duration of stay, demographic characteristics of migrants, information about the life of migrants and their families—frequency of remittances and the average amount sent, what these remittances are being used for, types of jobs migrants do, living conditions of migrants, migration networks that often channel temporary and undocumented migration. Information can also be obtained about immigrants—i.e. the type of jobs fulfilled by immigrants, labor-force needs, etc. If labor-force household surveys are conducted regularly on a longitudinal basis with periodical renewal of a fraction of sample, regular information can be acquired on migration dynamics of the country. These surveys can even be combined with the population censuses to verify the quality of the data or even interpolate the migration dynamics for earlier years.

While labor-force surveys have been conducted by many post-Soviet republics, few governments have actually commissioned labor-force surveys to estimate undocumented migration. In this group, Lithuania’s example is notable. As statisticians of Baltic governments agree, in Baltic republics population registers have not been a reliable source of migration information (Ambrozaitiene, 2008; Herm, 2006). The incorporation of additional sources of data—such as Social Insurance Funds, taxpayer databases, etc, still
have proven to be insufficient to capture emigration (Ambrozaitiene, 2008). Thus, to supplement migration data of the population register, since 2000 Lithuania has started implementing labor surveys to capture undeclared long-term migration (Statistics Lithuania, 2009). As survey data convey, more than 50% of annual migration is undeclared in Lithuania (Figure-4). The survey also provides detailed information on the education, reason of departure, age and other characteristics of undeclared migrants (not shown). The 2008 survey was planned to focus on return migration and immigration (Ambrozaitiene, 2008).

**Figure-4: Lithuania’s Annual Declared and Undeclared Emigration Stacked**

Source: Statistics Lithuania (2009), Statistics Lithuania (various), Ambrozaitiene (2008)

In some republics the surveys are initiated by the governmental agencies, whereas in others various international organizations, such as the OSCE, IOM, and UN, conduct the surveys. Due to various sampling methodologies and research design, the surveys capture different aspects of migration. Yet, almost all surveys try to provide some estimate of migration dynamics, favorite destinations of migrants, demographic characteristics of the migrant, etc. Unfortunately, in most republics these surveys carry only episodic character
and have not been conducted on a longitudinal basis to allow examination of trends. Yet, Lithuania illustrates that household surveys too can be used to supplement and even replace traditional means of registration of annual emigration.

Conclusion

There is limited analytical research on migration dynamics in the post-Soviet republics. The primary reason for this gap is the lack of reliable migration statistics in this region. Migration is usually undercounted in post-Soviet republics due to undocumented (temporary) labor migration. Some researchers have attempted to estimate migration using immigration-by-origin data of receiving countries. However, variations in definitions of a ‘migrant’ among post-Soviet republics limit the possibilities of application of immigration-by-origin estimation methods.

Population censuses provide a valuable alternative to estimating migration dynamics. If information is collected on the “previous place of residence,” “citizenship,” and “duration of stay,” then a higher degree of detail can be obtained on long-term migration. Based on the example of Moldova and Belarus it was illustrated that population censuses actually have captured more migrants than the annual migration registration systems in place. Even more important is that these migrants are long-term migrants (that have stayed in the country for more than 12 months), and thus were captured by the censuses when duration of stay was documented. If temporary migrants are also added, then the migration
trends become even higher. Thus, migration trends estimated by the immigration-by-origin method are low in reliability. Population censuses are a superior source for the data.

Population census migration data can be complemented by even more flexible and less expensive approaches—annual or quarterly nationwide household surveys. Household surveys are multidimensional and can provide the highest degree of detail on migration in the country. Many post-Soviet republics are improving their statistical management systems by trying to establish population registers, such as Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. Armenia and Moldova have already established population registers. Yet, the experience of Lithuania illustrates that population register data can still undercount emigration. Even the combination of alternative sources of population information, such as Social Insurance Fund or taxpayer databases, cannot supplement for more reliable migration statistics. In fact, more than 50% of annual emigrants had left Lithuania undocumented. Thus, international organizations should work with authorities of these republics to develop research methodology that can be carried out by post-Soviet republics longitudinally and also be comparable across republics to allow cross-national analyses and estimations of migration.

Creation of ‘migration centers’ as regional statistical organizations can also contribute to comparative research. These centers can be created for the whole CIS region, only within Central Asia, or in the Transcaucasian region, or even in cooperation with the EU countries. These centers should be supported by the governments of the republics to demonstrate the will and desire to actually collect, analyze and guide migration dynamics in their countries. ‘Migration centers’ can serve as a data depository: for example, any household survey on migration, or annual migration statistics of the republics should be
deposited in the center’s database. Using these data, policy-makers across the republics can communicate, exchange practices and policy-experiences, and adopt regulations and guidelines to achieve desired migration outcomes. Finally, establishment of such centres will also facilitate the work of scholars who usually have difficulties in obtaining statistical data on post-Soviet republics.
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CIVILIZING NATION-STATES:
SCRIPTED VS. COERCIVE MECHANISMS OF DIFFUSION OF WORLD POLITICAL CULTURE INTO POST-SOVIE T BALTIC STATES

coauthored with Gregory Hooks
CIVILIZING NATION-STATES:

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Abstract

The economists and political scientists have emphasized upon the materialist origins of diffusion of policies and practices. These scholars have argued that it is the economic competition and or the change in the external material incentives that results in the diffusion of the policy or practice. In contrast, the social learning theory and the neo-institutionalists argue that the diffusion is a result of change in ideas. In this paper, we jointly examine these theoretical arguments to explain the conditions of diffusion of state practices and policies that determined the citizenship regimes adopted by Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union when the USSR collapsed in 1991.

We argue that the debates on whether the diffusion of the policy originated due to coercion or change in ideas have polarized the theoretical domain by posing a measurement rather than a theoretical debate. The emphasis on either materialist (coercive) or ideational (scripted) mechanisms of diffusion is insufficient in understanding the diffusion process of policies among nation-states. We suggest a synthesis of materialist and ideational arguments on diffusion to suggest a model where these competing mechanisms of diffusion intercept rather than occur in isolation or in opposition.
CIVILIZING NATION-STATES:
SCRIPTED VS. COERCIVE MECHANISMS OF DIFFUSION OF WORLD POLITICAL CULTURE INTO POST-SOVIET BALTIC STATES

Due to decolonization (in Africa, the Carribean and Asia) and the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 100 new nation-states have joined the world system since 1945 (McNeely 1995). Despite this rapid expansion in the number and sharp variation in the history and cultural traditions, there has been great homogeneity in the policies and practices of nation-states. Research has documented homogeneity in state practices in the adoption and expansion of mass education (Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal, 1992), national curricula in schools (Benavot et al. 1991), the universalization of women’s suffrage (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan, 1997), liberalization of state policies on same-sex relations (Frank and McEneaney, 1999), environmental protection (Frank, Hironaka and Schofer 2000), and much more.

Our research centers on the mechanisms through which states are “civilized” resulting in the high degree of homogeneity in policies and practices. Economists and political scientists have emphasized materialist mechanisms of diffusion. In the international relations literature, scholars have focused on coercive mechanism, for example the change in some material incentives, such as force (Owen 2002) or financial sanctions (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) has resulted in the change of the policy of the adopter. Research has also highlighted the impact of economic competition on the diffusion of policies and practices among the adopters (Meissner 2002, or see Saggi 2002 for a review.).
Research reflecting the cultural turn has been prominent in recent years. This research has placed emphasis on the role of ideas as the driving force for diffusion. Often diffusion occurs when the practice is borrowed after analyzing the choices of those other social entities that had faced the issue, i.e. diffusion through learning (Elkins and Simmons 2005, Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005b). World society theorists argue that in the post-World War II era global culture constructs the identities and shapes the policies and agendas of social entities (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). The subscription to world norms and values grants legitimacy status to nation-states (Meyer et al. 1997). The World Society theory focuses on the diffusion of ideas as globally theorized models that transcend in scripted manner (Strang and Meyer 1993). In various aspects of social life the World Society theory has documented the rapid expansion of the world culture as rule-like recipes of action for various social entities (Meyer et al 1997).

To date, there have been surprisingly few studies where scholars have examined several theoretical perspectives jointly to make inferences on causes or mechanisms of diffusion (but see Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008). In separate publications, opposing explanations of diffusion mechanisms have been offered for the same phenomenon. Some have even suggested that empirically these mechanisms will likely interact and it is often unclear to which direction the average policy convergence may occur (Holzinger and Knill 2005).

In an attempt to address this gap in research and theorizing, we examine competing theoretical explanations of diffusion and present a comparative historical examination of citizenship policies and the integration of ethnic minorities in post-Soviet republics. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the three Baltic republics -- Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania -- regained their independence. After the USSR annexed the Baltic republics in 1940, Soviet authorities applied assimilation policies that changed the demographic profile of these republics. The proportion of titular ethnic population decreased drastically and proportion of Russians and other minorities increased (Parming 1980, Anderson and Silver 1989). Ethnic Lithuanian, Estonians and Latvians feared that their “nation” would disappear if these demographic trends were not reversed.

Our goal is to not retell the story of citizenship regimes in Baltic republics that has been studied by many scholars (Brubaker 1992, Budryte 2005, Barrington 1995, Pabriks 1999). Instead, we examine citizenship regimes of Baltic republics to contribute to theoretical debates over diffusion. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Baltic republics sought to restore their “lost” nationhood. Even as they faced domestic pressures to build a nation (i.e. an ethno-culturally coherent entity), these post-Soviet republics were also under great pressure to secure legitimacy in world society. Rhetorical commitments to human rights culture and democracy notwithstanding, the newly created Baltic republics adopted very exclusive citizenship policies – policies that marginalized ethnic minorities from the polity. Over the ensuing decade, each Baltic republic revised its citizenship regime to facilitate the integration of ethnic minorities into the polity. Through comparative historical analysis we examine the transformation of citizenship regimes as an instance diffusion, i.e., “socially mediated spread of some practice within a population” (Strang and Meyer 1993:487). We examine governmental documents, laws, media releases, as well as the correspondence of officials of Baltic republics with various international organizations to determine the causes and mechanisms of diffusion of western human rights standards.
into citizenship policies of these young states. In so doing, our research addresses the following questions:

- Was the diffusion of human rights values into the nation-building and citizenship policies of Baltic republics scripted (as predicted by the World Society theory) or was it coercive (as predicted by materialist accounts)?
- What can explain this mechanism of diffusion?

**Materialist vs. Cultural Explanations of Diffusion**

Diffusion is the “socially mediated spread of some practice within a population” (Strang and Meyer 1993:487). Diffusion has occurred when “an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 1983:13 cited in Strang and Meyer 1983: 487-488).

The literature on diffusion is based on the assumption that there is similarity in the policies and practices of social entities across time and space, or what Elkins and Simmons (2005) refer to as diffusion “clustering.” Thus, the theory of diffusion assumes some homogeneity in the policies of the states.

This research is informed by the belief that theoretical debates over diffusion have too often been posed at the measurement level. The measurement dispute has driven accounts to emphasize either materialist (coercive) or ideational (scripted) mechanisms of diffusion, making it difficult to discern the influence of both material and cultural factors on specific policy outcomes.
Scholars have identified four mechanisms of origins of diffusion -- economic competition, coercion, learning and world society (Dobbin et al. 2007). Two of these (economic competition and coercion) are associated with materialist perspectives; learning and world society place primacy on cultural explanations.

**Materialist explanations of diffusion:** Economic competition anticipates that diffusion occurs when social entities, such as countries, compete for material economic resources—e.g. direct foreign investment (Saggi 2002), trade and financial needs (Meissner 2002), etc. The likelihood of the diffusion of the practice is higher if the policy change will result in short-term (rather than long-term) benefits (see Dobbin et al. 2007 for a review).

In political sociology and international relations much has been written about coercive mechanism of diffusion of policies. Coercive diffusion assumes that the change in materialist incentives, such as force (Owen 2002) or financial sanctions (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003), lead to diffusion. Coercive diffusion is vertical -- from a powerful social entity to a less powerful adopter. The mechanism of adoption of a practice usually implies a rational cost-benefit analysis on behalf of both the adopter and the imposer of the policy. In this framework, nation-states and international governmental organizations promote diffusion of their policies and practices in the belief that an absence of diffusion of their policies would have higher political or economic costs or result in global or regional instability.

The reliance on coercive mechanisms to promote diffusion has been criticized as ineffective for addressing severe governmental failures. Coercive mechanisms, such as use of foreign aid or some incentive, often focus on technocratic and managerial aspects of
policy adoption. But these mechanisms do not provide a strategic intervention to promote a democratic transition or protect citizenry from a failed or kleptocratic state (see, for example, Santiso 2003). Often it is difficult to monitor the recipient countries’ progress. In many cases the coercive approach does not result in policy change either.

**Cultural explanation of diffusion:** A large body of research has explained how the change in ideas contributes to diffusion of policies and practices. When no coercion or competition exists among social entities to foster diffusion, and when the practice is borrowed after analyzing the choices of those other social entities that had faced the issue, then an “uncoordinated interdependence” exists that leads to diffusion through learning (Elkins and Simmons 2005). Where the emphasis is on learning, it is assumed that options are consciously explored and evaluated. A change in beliefs – i.e., arriving at a conclusion that available alternatives are superior to current practices -- results in diffusion (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005b). This approach has been criticized for the tendency to assume that if diffusion has occurred, then learning has occurred too (see Dobbin et al. 2007 for review). But too little attention has been paid to whether the innovation actually had a positive impact on the adopter before it diffused to other adopters (Dobbin et al. 2007).

Often learning does not occur, but adopters still borrow practices from others, or rather mimic the practices of other social entities. In the organizational literature network ties have been important predictors for diffusion of a policy in times of uncertainty. Scholars have noted that organizations mimic others in the field during circumstances of environmental uncertainly (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989). Gleditsch and Ward (2006) demonstrate that the likelihood of transitioning to democracy from an autocracy dramatically increases when the proportion of democratic
neighboring states increases and when there is less conflict in the region. There is regional similarity and convergence in state regimes, and transitions to autocratic/democratic regimes are shaped by regional dynamics (and possible linkages to other social entities in the region).

Shifting focus from the regional to the global scale, world society theory calls attention to the rapid unstructured and scripted diffusion of world culture in the post-WWII era. This diffusion cannot be fully explained by rational choice, relational or realist explanations (Strang and Meyer 1993). In this theoretical framework, it is believed that as the innovation spreads, some “threshold” is reached, after which the adoption of a practice grants legitimacy to the actors, rather than progress in the performance (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983). But why would social entities mimic others in the field? The neo-institutionalist scholars argue that in the post-World War II era global culture constructs the identities and shapes the policies and agendas of social entities (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). Thus, the subscription to world norms and values (i.e. joining human rights treaties, etc) grants a legitimacy status to nation-states. The neo-institutionalists focus on the diffusion of ideas as globally theorized models that transcend in scripted manner (Strang and Meyer 1993).

Neo-institutionalist scholars have also argued (as have the students of realism in international relations) that the state’s subscription to world culture (e.g. human rights treaties) does not necessarily translate into a policy practice. Most deviant states are often most likely to sign on the human rights treaties to obtain the legitimate state status worldwide --as a “window dressing” (Haften-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). However, linkages to global civil society (i.e. the international non-governmental organizations INGOs) have
statistically significant impact on exerting pressures on state’s policy practices, thus translating the treaty into a practice (Hafter-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). This, has been labeled as “paradox of empty promises” when pressures emanating from the world society (international governmental and non-governmental organizations) lead to the diffusion of the state policy (Hafter-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).

**Temporal Scale and Explanations of Diffusion**

We argue that the debates on whether the diffusion of the policy originated due to coercion or change in ideas have polarized the theoretical domain by posing a measurement rather than a theoretical debate. These opposing perspectives have focused on specific stages of diffusion (and found empirical support) but have discounted or ignored other aspects. One consequence has been theoretical presentations that talk past or ignore alternatives. In terms of measurement, studies have displayed very different empirical emphases, e.g., diffusion of ideas globally and locally versus actual [materialist] implementation of the policy at specific times and places. There are obvious limitations to examining only one step in the process of diffusion: coercive arguments have focused on the final stage diffusion—i.e. whether the policy has been adopted and implemented, thus, neglecting the origins of the ideas, practices and policies that are diffused. Conversely, the world society literature has not focused on the specifics of implementation – the focus has been on homogeneity across polities and conformity to global culture. In their overview of the diffusion literature, Dobbin et al. (2007) have emphasized that the theoretical literature on diffusion has been polarized into opposing explanations, and few studies have
attempted to provide more comprehensive examinations of diffusion. This paper addresses that theoretical concern.

Giddens (1984) placed great emphasis on temporality and stressing the imperative of carefully considering the temporal context – and consequences for sociological investigation. For individual social actors, time is experienced on a day-to-day basis (reversible time) and across a life span (irreversible). Although individual social actors play an important role, diffusion takes place on the time-scale of institutions. Institutions grow, change and disappear on temporal scale that is distinct from individual experiences of time. Without reifying the distinction, we believe that accounts placing emphasis on the cultural – world society theory in specific – provide insights into diffusion over the time span of institutions. Conversely, we believe that materialist accounts help us understand the goals and actions of social actors who play a prominent role in specific episodes of diffusion. And, as Giddens (1984) insists, a complete investigation requires a consideration of both.

Since the post-WWII era there has been great homogenization of state policies and practices (Meyer et al. 1997). However, the diffusion of world culture to specific states has not always occurred in a steady, gradual or scripted fashion. Instead, change has come in fits and starts. If the focus is on a narrow slice of time and a specific place, one can identify episodes of resistance to world culture and others in which diffusion occurs rapidly. In understanding these specific episodes, materialist calculations of actors and material resources available to actors play a prominent role. Thus, our synthesis of materialist and cultural explanations of diffusion integrates both sets of mechanisms and temporal scales – and in so doing, offers a more nuanced account of diffusion than is
possible when they are studied in isolation or in opposition to one another. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of global and local trends in diffusion.

Figure-1: Global and Local Trends in Diffusion of the World of Culture (variation of local diffusion patterns is in circles)

When the focus is at the global level, the diffusion of world culture appears to be steady and smooth. However, if we zoom in on one case, diffusion appears episodic – often described as punctuated equilibrium as opposed to continuous. Moreover, if we examine several specific cases over a relatively short period of time we find considerable variation in diffusion. The challenge is to develop theoretical accounts and empirical investigations that incorporate multiple temporal scales and causal mechanisms. Our historical
examination of Baltic republics takes on this challenge to provide a more complete account of how and why their citizenship policies violated and then conformed to world culture.

In the contemporary era the coercive imposition of a policy (by force or some other material stimulus) is usually framed and carried out within the values and norms of the world political culture. Since World War II, a globally unified political culture (rooted in Weberian notions of rationality) has reinforced the authority of the state as a “goal attaining project,” carrying a responsibility to manage its populations according to the norms of world culture (Thomas and Meyer 1984: 439, Boli and Meyer 1978, Meyer et al. 1997; see also Frank and McEneaney 1999; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997). The identities, policies and agendas of social entities are embedded in and derived from world political culture (Meyer et al. 1997). Thus, to legitimate their actions, both adopters and imposers rely on the culture of human rights and progress that envelopes social entities. Even coercion is typically justified on basis of human rights agendas and defended as a last resort when scripted (and uncontested) diffusion has failed.

Thus, we argue that in the contemporary era, diffusion of policies consists of constructivist, learning, and coercive components (rather than any of these alone) that intersect to foster diffusion of agendas, practices or policies on social entities, such as nation-states. In this comparative historical study, we identify both coercive, learned and scripted mechanisms of diffusion reinforcing one another. Thus, to understand the processes of diffusion one has to examine these processes jointly. Specifically, we claim that coercive diffusion is also rooted in world culture, the powerful social entities that impose diffusion on weaker adopters derive legitimacy from world culture, and this coercion contributes to the globally unified political culture. As such, finding evidence of
coerced diffusion is not inconsistent with the view that human rights culture is spreading; in some instances, coercion is the means by which this global culture is spread.

The literature on coercive diffusion has been somewhat under-theorized. This perspective has emphasized the presence (or not) of the material incentive in spreading the practice; this literature has devoted less energy in explaining the conditions of diffusion. Haas (1992) offers an approach that highlights the role of soft coercion when explaining diffusion. Specifically, Hass draws attention to the ideas of (hegemonic) powers and the manner in which they diffuse via epistemic communities, including transnational organizations and trans-governmental channels. Neo-institutionalist scholars have devoted sustained attention to the process of diffusion and to the conditions under which diffusion occurs (Strang and Meyer 1993). Neo-institutionalist scholars emphasize the importance of epistemic communities and the manner in which learning contributes to diffusion. We apply and build on this research.

**Cultural Linkages:** When the entities involved in the communication perceive that they belong to the same social category (i.e. a linkage is assumed), diffusion is rapid (Strang and Meyer 1993). In uncertain situations social entities, such as organizations, mimic one another, especially if a network tie is present (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989). Cultural linkages of assumed similarity often override direct interaction among social entities (Strang and Meyer 1993).

The diffusion can be structured and require direct contact or can take an unstructured form (Strang and Meyer 1993). Structured conditions of diffusion occur when international governmental organizations monitor the practices of their member-states and pressure them to adopt appropriate practices (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Unstructured
diffusion occurs when nation-states embrace the cultural identity of the nation-state and adopt economic and population development goals (Strang and Meyer 1993). When the institutionalized conceptions of progress become rule-like recipes of action, then social entities often adopt these models (if only symbolically) to show their joint cultural linkage (Strang and Meyer 1993).

We add that while cultural linkages facilitate possibilities for uncontested or scripted rather than coercive mechanisms of diffusion, coercion can be applied in a manner that impacts cultural linkage as well. For example, US efforts to foster democratic identity -- including material incentives -- for Iran are attempts to establish cultural linkage of Iran with Western democratic nation-states. Further research should examine in which instances is the coercion on the cultural linkage level more likely and why.

**Theorization of the Adopter, Form and the Outcome of Diffusion:** Once social entities or potential adopters situate themselves within cultural linkages, they self-consciously theorize about the concepts and relationships. “[T]heorization may be regarded as turning diffusion into rational choice” (Strang and Meyer 1993: 500). Theorization identifies relational linkages of adopters, innovative practices and their importance, conditions necessary for diffusion, and definitions of diffusion outcomes in terms of efficiency, justice or progress (Strang and Meyer 1993: 497-500). Theorization enables and expands diffusion. The more abstractly are these properties theorized, more social entities can identify commonalities with these theorized models, and hence, the more rapid is the diffusion within cultural linkages, and thus, the less structured is the diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993).
We believe that coercion is likely to occur when local theorization has failed to result in desired outcome of the policy. This means that scripted (unstructured) diffusion has not occurred. Building on Strang and Meyer (1993), we differentiate two ways in which world culture is theorized locally at the level of adopters and imposers. While globally theorized models facilitate unstructured (i.e. scripted) diffusion of world scripts into policy practices of social entities, two variations of theorization are possible at the local level. (1) The more abstractly the global world culture is theorized, the less structured is the diffusion (Strang and Meyer (1993), and hence, the less theorization occurs locally. This means that scripted diffusion to the local level occurs. (2) When diffusion fails to occur at the adopter level, more intense theorization occurs (through cultural linkages or coercive efforts are undertaken to promote diffusion), resulting in more structured form of diffusion. In this process, the identity of both the adopter and participating (imposing) parties is constructed vis-à-vis relational and cultural linkages; both the form and the outcome of diffusion are theorized. Since world culture constructs the identities and agendas of social entities (including adopters or imposers), the local theorization is constrained by world culture, thus, bounded theorization occurs at the level of entities involved in the diffusion.

Coercive diffusion is a special case of structured diffusion. Coercive diffusion occurs when scripted/unstructured diffusion has failed to occur, i.e. the social entity has failed to conform to the accepted social norms of global culture. Thus, in cases of coerced diffusion, more theorization is needed to legitimate the imposed policy. In cases of coercive diffusion, we anticipate that theorization will heavily rely on extensive linkages to
the world dominant culture (especially references to human rights and progress) to justify and legitimate their policies.

The Unique Role and Importance of the Baltic Republics

Our analysis focuses on citizenship laws in the Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As the Soviet Union began to weaken in the late 1980s, independence movements emerged in the republics, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 1991, the world recognized the independent statehood of Baltic republics. At the time of their founding, the Baltic republics changed the old-Soviet citizenship law and adopted new citizenship laws.

In the wake of the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940, Soviet demographic and assimilation policies transformed population dynamics. During Soviet era, the proportion of ethnic Latvians declined from 75% in 1934 (Parming 1980) to 52% in 1989 (Anderson and Silver 1989). Had demographic trends continued unchanged, ethnic minorities threatened to outnumber ethnic Latvians in Latvia. In similar fashion, the ethnic Estonian population declined by 31%; when the Soviet Union collapse, ethnic Estonians comprised only 62% of the republic’s population (Parming 1980, Anderson and Silver 1989). In Lithuania, however, the proportion of the national ethnic group did not decline during the Soviet era.

To counteract Soviet assimilation policies, the Baltic republics began calling for independent statehood in the late 1980s (a few years prior to the USSR’s dissolution).
Grievances focused on the decline of the national ethnic population and the russification of the national language, customs, etc. Citizenship regimes became a hotly debated issue in the public, and were seen as possible mechanisms to reverse the assimilation of the national ethnic group and stop the immigration of other ethnic groups into the republics (RFE/RL 1989). Upon re-gaining independent statehood, Estonia and Latvia adopted citizenship laws that marginalized and excluded certain ethnic minorities and immigrants from the polity. The international community criticized these provisions on the grounds that they violated human rights principles of world culture, violated minority rights and did not provide for integration of minorities and immigrants into the society.

In the late 1980s, the Soviet authorities sent adjudicated special units (such as the Black Berets, or the OMON) to monitor and halt the independence movements in the Baltic republics (Bungs 1989a). Thus, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia faced a difficult challenge: Baltic republics needed to achieve international recognition as independent and legitimate states. However, at home these states were expected to restore the “lost” nationhood. In this context, these republics were the first among all 15 former Soviet republics to “theorize” and self-consciously balance nation-state identity in global community of states and nation-building demands on the domestic front. Because they were the first to claim separation and independent statehood from the Soviet Union (and theorize citizenship in this context), other post-Soviet republics borrowed from the Baltic republics. In fact, several republics, including Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, sent groups of activists to Baltic republics to borrow and replicate their models, rhetoric and action programs (see Crow 1990 for Tajikistan, or Bohr et al. 1989 for Turkmenistan). Leaders of the Ukraine referred to the Baltic republics “…as models during the large public
meetings…” (Nahaylo 1989:19). Thus, from a theoretical standpoint the choice of post-Soviet Baltic republics was intentional and based on their importance for political developments across post-Soviet republics.

Due to the variation among the Baltic republics, our historical comparison will shed light on scripted, learned and coercive mechanisms of diffusion. In Lithuania where Soviet demographic policies had not decreased the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians (i.e. the titular ethnic group), citizenship laws did not exclude certain ethnic minorities from the new polity. Thus, every person permanently residing in Lithuania was granted citizenship in the newly independent Lithuanian state.

In contrast, in Latvia and Estonia, where the proportion of the titular ethnic group had declined during Soviet years, the post-Soviet citizenship laws were targeted against ethnic minorities (primarily Russians and other Slavs). These citizenship laws created hardships (such as extended periods of residency in the country (up to 16 years), demanded extensive language fluency and knowledge of national history as pre-requisites for granting citizenship to ethnic minorities. These citizenship laws were designed to exclude ethnic minorities and create a homogenous ethnic nation. In their citizenship policies, Latvia and Estonia denied citizenship status to all ethnic minorities who had migrated during Soviet times and had lived in the republic for over 40 years.

Citizenship policies of Latvia and Estonia became a very controversial issue both at home and abroad. International organizations and domestic NGO’s pressured Estonia and Latvia to adjust their citizenship policies to global human rights standards. On the domestic front, nationalist public sentiments pressured authorities to exclude ethnic minorities from the new state in order to build an ethnically homogenous nation. Due to
the controversy surrounding citizenship regime, Latvia tried to delay the adoption of its citizenship law to ensure its bid for membership to the Council of Europe. We anticipate finding that coercive diffusion was more prevalent in Latvia and Estonia, while scripted diffusion played a larger role in Lithuania.

While many nation-states, international governmental and non-governmental organizations expressed concerns over the citizenship regimes of the Baltic republics, the European Union and its various supporting structures, such as the Council of Europe, Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, previously CSCE), and the European Commission, played a crucial role. At times, the European Union imposed specific demands and offered material incentives to encourage these republics to conform to human rights values and principles of democracy. To highlight the intersection between scripted and coerced diffusion, we focus on the relations between the Baltic republics and the European Union. We also discuss the role and impact that other social entities, especially global actors, have had to influence the adoption of citizenship regimes in the Baltic republics.

Methods

Our theoretical argument relies on the theory proposed by Strang and Meyer (1993). They define diffusion as the “socially mediated spread of some practice within a population” (Strang and Meyer 1993:487). Diffusion has occurred when “an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 1983:13 cited in Strang and Meyer 1983: 487-488). Strang and Meyer (1993) explain that this definition includes “both communication and influence processes.”
Cultural linkages are the ties that social entities perceive they have with other social entities of the same type or category (Strang and Meyer 1983). These linkages are established when nation-states commit to human rights treaties or conventions, or claim a European (or western) identity, join international governmental organizations, such as the United Nations. Theorization is the self-conscious rationalization (i.e. explanation) about the outcome and form of the diffusion, and relationships that social entities have (or will have) due to diffusion, including the construction of identities of social entities.

This paper is based on comparative historical analysis of various documents, historical accounts, news reports, official governmental communication of the European Union and other governmental and non-governmental organizations with the Baltic republics. The official communication between the EU and the Baltic states is available from the electronic library and archives of the EU agencies and the OSCE. We have also incorporated the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) series “Report on the USSR.” This collection includes Communist media, underground publications, and RFE/RL broadcasts. In 1995, the Soros Foundation became custodian for this collection and has tried to build an archive that is readily accessible for scholarly research.

Diffusion of Nation-State Models into the Baltic Republics

Theorization of Adopters and Cultural linkages

In 1991 world states recognized the full sovereignty and independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The same year these republics became members of the United Nations.
World Society theory argues that new and peripheral states are more vulnerable to the pressures of the world society ideology (Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978, 1980), thus, they will be more likely to embrace the dominant culture to legitimate their actions. In the late 1980's, when independence movements erupted in the Baltic republics, Soviet authorities sent special military units to halt the independence movements (Bungs 1989a). Despite these pressures, human rights scripts of the world culture still diffused and were adopted by the national independence movements of the republics. These movements called for the creation of new, independent and democratic states. The leaders of these national movements eventually replaced Soviet authorities and became the new national authorities of the republics when the USSR collapsed. For example, the National Assembly (Sajudis) of the Lithuanian independence (reconstructive) movement stated that

Sajudis stands for social justice, humaneness and democracy; for cultural autonomy for Lithuania’s national minorities in a Lithuanian state; for its traditional neutral status in a demilitarized zone in Europe; [and] for universally accepted human and civil freedoms, from which flow the general right of Lithuania’s citizens independently to choose and foster their own forms of state existence” (Girnius 1989a: 23, emphasis added).

World culture envelops states. Despite efforts to oppose the diffusion of the world culture – sometimes violent and coercive opposition -- world culture remains a powerful source for the construction of the nation-state identity, and is used by states to justify their actions and linkages.

The Baltic republics sought cultural linkages with the Western world. These republics made a bid for NATO membership, initiated in 1991 at the NATO Rome
Baltic republics also sought to confirm their cultural ties to the Western world by stressing their European regional identity. To legitimate its cultural ties to Europe, Estonia highlighted an enduring relationship with Finland, emphasizing the joint historical and cultural past of both countries. To consolidate their European identity, the Baltic republics applied for the membership to the Council of Europe, with an intention for a future application to the European Union.


Within one year of independence, Estonia and Latvia ratified all six UN treaties available at the time. Lithuania ratified three treaties within one year and, by 1998, Lithuania had ratified all six major treaties.\(^{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) None of the three post-Soviet Baltic republics has ratified the CMW treaty.
### Table-1: Ratification Year of Principal International Human Rights Treaties by Baltic Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
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<tr>
<td>CMW</td>
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These treaties create imagined communities of nation-states that the particular adopter identifies with. These treaties consolidate the linkages of the adopter to the larger population of the same category. Additionally, these treaties provide very abstract and vague theorization about the nature of the world. Thus, the subscription to these abstract theorized models (of human rights) fosters diffusion of practices of social entities. These abstract theorized models guide the policies of nation-states, and they also guide international governmental and non-governmental organizations that justify organizational goals and agendas in accordance with the principles at the heart of these UN treaties.

**Scripted Theorization in Lithuania**

As stated above, Soviet demographic policies had less impact in Lithuania. At the time of independence, Livs remained the dominant ethnic group in Lithuania, whereas in Latvia and Estonia, the proportion of national ethnic group had declined dramatically during the Soviet era. Thus, Lithuania’s theorized model of the nation-state did not exclude ethnic minorities; citizenship regimes were not theorized as mechanisms of building a homogenous nation-state. In fact, Lithuania did not even adopt an integration policy towards its minorities until 2004, when eventually the Government adopted a Programme
of Integration of National Minorities into Society for the years 2005 – 2010 (Council of Europe/ERICarts 2009). The Lithuanian citizenship model conformed to the world model. In contrast to other Baltic republics, Lithuania granted citizenship to every person that was a permanent resident in the republic when Lithuania gained independence (even as Lithuania was the last of the Baltic republics to ratify UN human rights treaties (see table-1). Lithuania offers an example of scripted diffusion of the world nation-state model.

**Scripted, Learned and Coerced Theorization in Estonia and Latvia**

The theorized global models of identity and action are incomplete and dynamic with constant interpretation, redefinition, re-theorization, reinforcement and differentiated expansion. Various social entities, embedded (or distant) from the world political culture, collide with or adopt the meaning and scripts of the world culture. This is a world political culture in making.

Despite the theoretically distinct arguments that coercive (materialist) vs. ideational (scripted) models of diffusion provide about the outcome and mechanism of diffusion, adoption of policies by states is never a pure process. Rather, scripted diffusion, learning and coercion are present when the nation-state adopts a policy and tries to legitimate it in the world community.

The demographic policies of the Soviet Union changed the population structure of Latvia and Estonia, threatening to soon make the titular ethnic group a minority in “its” own state. Russian (not Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian languages), was the official language in the republics. In the Soviet era, every education textbook was translated into Russian and was subject to review and approval by Soviet authorities.
In the 1980s, Soviet President Gorbachev implemented reforms that allowed freedom of speech (glasnost). These reforms sparked nationalist movements across the Soviet Union. Independence movements in the Baltic States claimed that the Soviet Union had illegally annexed them (“colonized”). The anti-Soviet sentiments in the republics were directed towards the restoration of the right of self-determination and local control of demographic policies, including control over language and education policies. For example, Estonia’s 1988 Declaration of Sovereignty stated:

For more than 5,000 years, the Estonian nation tilled the soil and developed its culture on the shores of the Baltic Sea. In 1940, the nationally homogenous sovereign Estonian Republic became part of the Soviet Union, having been provided guarantees of sovereignty and national well-being. The internal policies [under Stalin and during] the period of stagnation ignored these guarantees and principles. As a result, an unfavorable demographic situation has evolved for the indigenous Estonian population (Bungs, 1989b: 13).

The newly independent nation-state was envisioned as ethnically homogenous, and its citizenship regime was defined to be a mechanism to achieve this goal. The Latvian citizenship law stated in its preamble that one of the goals of the citizenship law is to “liquidate the consequence of the Soviet occupation and annexation of Latvia and to renew the lawful rights of the Republic of Latvia’s body of citizens” (cited in Helsinki Human Rights Watch 1992:3). In Baltic Republics, the post-Soviet state did not see itself as a new state; it was a continuation of the pre-Soviet (i.e. pre-1940) state. On this basis, the Baltic States restored a pre-Soviet citizenship law to define the rights of individuals living there. While Lithuania modified its pre-Soviet citizenship law to grant citizenship to every
citizen permanently residing in Lithuania at the time of independence from the USSR, Latvia and Estonia did not. The incorporation of Baltic Republics into the USSR was declared an annexation of statehood. In undoing this annexation, hundreds of thousands of persons who had lived in Latvia and Estonia for the 50 years of Soviet rule were declared illegal and stateless.

Drafts of citizenship laws required that immigrants (including those who moved to Latvia in the Soviet era – including 50-year residents) reside in the post-Soviet Latvia for 16 years (with no starting date specified) and demonstrate proficiency in the Latvian language to qualify for citizenship status (Helsinki Human Rights Watch 1992). Estonia took a similar approach and went so far as to require a 2-year residency to be eligible to vote in local elections (Girnius 1989b).

The Helsinki Human Rights Watch (1992), Commission on Security and Cooperation of Europe (CSCE 1993, 1994), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1994) and other international organizations stated that the proposed citizenship laws by Latvia and Estonia were designed to exclude persons based on ethnicity, nationality and political affiliation; deviated from Western standards of naturalization of children and elders into citizenship, and violated other human rights of the person, such as the right to ownership. The Baltic republics were urged to modify their citizenship laws to meet the Western standards of democracy. The international governmental and non-governmental organizations reinforced these demands for policy changes by referencing the world political culture of human rights.

Shortly after independence (circa 1991), CSCE (currently, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) began playing an active role in all post-
Soviet republics. CSCE monitored the transition to democratic statehood, integration of minorities into the nation-state, resolution of conflict and stability of the region. CSCE played a key role in evaluating the progress made by Baltic republics (and other post-Soviet republics) towards fulfilling the membership criteria for the Council of Europe, and later for the accession criteria for the European Union -- pre-conditions for the Baltic republics to gain membership in the EU.

After evaluating the proposed citizenship laws, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) insisted on changes in the laws. The suggested changes were motivated, empowered, and legitimated by the world scripts of human rights.

Taking into account Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is recommended that Estonia proceed to reduce the number of stateless persons permanently residing on its territory. …Children born in Estonia who would otherwise become stateless should be granted Estonian citizenship, taking into account … International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and …the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Letter of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, April 6, 1993 in CSCE 1993).

International non-governmental organizations also made reference to the world cultural scripts (i.e. covenants and international UN treaties). For example, the Executive Director of Helsinki Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the Chairman of the Latvia’s Supreme Council in 1991. This letter stressed Latvia’s commitments to international human rights treaties and stated that:
Many of the draft law’s provisions on naturalization [to citizenship] violate the spirit of the CSCE documents, the Universal declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. By joining the CSCE, Latvia committed itself to uphold the human rights standards set out in these agreements; Latvia’s citizenship and naturalization regulations should therefore conform to these standards (Helsinki Watch 1992:9, letter of November 4, 1991).

Demands and pressures (although not coercive) emanating from the international governmental and non-governmental organization reiterated both the cultural linkages, as well as the theorization of the outcomes that Baltic republics had declared earlier. These pressures set limits on how globally theorized models would be adopted locally, thereby guiding theorization of citizenship in the Baltic republics. Through this cyclical process of pressure and reaction, the cultural linkages (of both nation-states and international organizations) can be reinforced, and identities of the adopters theorized.

But the Baltic republics refused to adjust their policies. In fact, their response to criticism from international organization revealed that the application of initial citizenship policies was partially based on ‘diffusion through learning’. Baltic republics cited similar policies applied by other social entities of the same type (i.e. nation-states) and international organizations in situations that Baltic States theorized as similar. For example, in response to criticisms, Mr. Pantelejevs, the Chairman of the Human Rights and Nationality Committee of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Council (i.e. the national parliament), drafted a letter addressed to the Executive Director of the Helsinki Watch:

You are most certainly aware that there exist precedents in the world that immediately after the elimination of occupation or colonization, a retroactive
qualification period was used to determine citizenship rights [for example, Austria after World War II, and the current UN Secretariat-General plan for Western Sahara] (Helsinki Watch 1992: 13, letter of December 23, 1991).

Estonia also referred to the decolonized states -- Malaysia and Fiji -- and cited legislation enacted by these states that was designed to protect the political influence of the natives and save the “disappearing nation” (Kionka 1991).

However, in the post-WWII era, the political culture of the world had changed. The homogenous conceptions of the nation were defied by the world human rights scripts (Frank and Meyer 2002). It was the individual, not the primordial nation that was the central element of the society (Frank and Meyer 2002). Because local theorization failed to comply with the world society’s models of nation-state building, new approaches were theorized and suggested by international governmental and non-governmental organizations. In each instance, the means of implementation and the outcome of suggested practices were framed within the larger umbrella of the world dominant political culture from which nation-states or international organization derive their identities, agendas and the policies.

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) made several recommendations, such as these addressed to Latvia:

I do understand that the Latvian Government feels the need, especially in the light of the demographic changes brought about in Latvia during the years of the Soviet period, to take measures to strengthen the Latvian identity. However, there are other instruments than the citizenship law to promote and strengthen the Latvian identity, especially in the cultural, education and linguistic fields (Letter of the
CSCE Higher Commissioner on National Minorities addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, April 6, 1993 in CSCE 1993).

I have also gained the impression that, within the community of CSCE states, the solution of the citizenship issues is seen as being closely connected with democratic principles (CSCE 1994, January 31).

New models of (local and global) policies are theorized by epistemic communities. Even international governmental organizations seek legitimacy by this form of theorization when promoting diffusion of world abstract models locally. For example, the OSCE relied on the advice and suggestions of communities of experts, scholars, heads of international organizations involved in analyzing (i.e. theorizing) the form, outcome and mechanisms of diffusion of world scripts. In its recommendations on how to improve the protection of children rights in citizenship laws, the OSCE consulted various international experts to ensure that the recommendations were in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The list of experts that the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities cited to Baltic governments included professors of law and child research from various universities in the United States, Norway, Finland, Germany; chairmen and members of the UN committees and working groups on human rights and minorities, and think-tank members (OSCE 1997a, letter of the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, May 23).

Still, theorization does not always result in the local implementation of the preferred policy. The international relations literature has argued that international governmental organizations are often inefficient in promoting their policies because no
preconditions are imposed on member-states. For example, the United Nations has failed to force compliance with its international human rights treaties. The enforcement mechanisms are ineffective in making states adjust policies after the state has become a member of the United Nations. In contrast, among international governmental organizations, the European Union (EU) is considered as one of the most successful in changing the policies of its member-states (Knaus and Cox 2005). Membership in the EU is based upon meeting a set of pre-conditions. Only after the nation-state’s policies conform to the EU standards is the state permitted to join the European Union. Thus, ‘soft’ coercion promotes the diffusion of policies and practices (Dobbin et al. 2007).

The three Baltic republics have vigorously pursued full participation in European institutions, with the eventual goal of gaining membership in the European Union. Just two years after independence (1993), Estonia and Lithuania joined the Council of Europe. But the Council of Europe (COE) postponed Latvia’s membership because it failed to adopt a citizenship policy to conform to COE expectations. Only after Latvia complied with the COE demands was Latvia granted membership to the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1994).

The implementation of (citizenship) policies is continuously monitored by the world society (NGOs and IGOs), leading to interventions and adjustments when social entities, such as states, deviate from the world dominant theorized scripts after the force of the incentive has been granted or the pressure lifted. In 1995 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania formally applied for membership in the European Union. The EU offers potential members technical and financial assistance to develop market economies and institutional ties (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). In 1993, the European Council decided on a 3-criteria
framework as a pre-condition for the EU membership (known as Copenhagen criteria). The first, political, criterion stated that the for membership to the EU the candidate country must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Commission 2009). Thus, the protection of human rights became one of the fundamental pre-conditions for accession. Since 1995, the European Community also introduced a provision by which aid can be suspended if the democratization of the country was in question (Santiso 2003).

Where ‘coercive’ mechanisms of diffusion are employed, diffusion is often more structured and theorization is quite evident. As this form of diffusion is imposed from “above,” it has to be theorized as legitimate both locally (for the adopter) and globally (for the imposer). This was clearly evident in the communication between Baltic republics and the EU organizations. The EU bodies framed the imposed policies on citizenship as “future oriented, defined by progress.” In the post-WWII era, the globally unified political culture (rooted in Weberian notions of rationality) has organized the state as a “goal attaining project in an integrated cultural frame” that leads to the expansion of the state and its institutions (Thomas and Meyer 1984: 439). This commitment to a rationalized state identity, pursued under the banner of progress and growth, promotes a model in which the nation-state establishes various ministries and agencies to adopt policies on population control (Barrett and Frank 1999), individualized citizenship (Berkovitch 1999), and more. And this imposed theorization conformed to this cultural script. Here is an example from the EU communication with Latvia:
The Latvian electorate has, by popular vote on 3 October, spoken out in favour of implementation of the amendments to the citizenship laws adopted by the Saeima (Latvian Parliament) ….

The European Union welcomes this *farsighted decision* which constitutes an important step towards further integration of all inhabitants of Latvia. … The result of the referendum is a vote in favour of a *future-oriented* approach promoting stability and is consistent with the principles and aims of the European Union. The European Union welcomes the fact that the decision of the Latvian electorate takes into account the political priorities [of human rights] enumerated in the Accession partnership. It is therefore of marked relevance to Latvia’s relationship with the European Union (European Commission 1998, emphasis added).

Not only the imposed diffusion was framed in terms of progress as part of the identity of the contemporary nation-state, but the cultural linkages to human rights scripts were also reinforced. The identities of social entities are legitimate and meaningful for as long as they are constructed (or imposed) vis-à-vis the world cultural scripts (e.g. human rights covenants or treaties) that penetrate across all social levels and guide the policies of social entities.

Even material goals, such as economic or geopolitical security, are framed and justified within the values of the world culture. When imposing policies, social entities re-iterate their cultural linkages with the world culture and society for legitimacy purposes. They conceive an identity of “community of value” aligned with the global culture of human rights:
OSCE participating States have subscribed to the norms and values common to us all, as laid down in the Helsinki Final Act and later elaborated in, among other things, the Copenhagen Document. Norms and principles are fundamental to the concept of the OSCE human dimension: without them the OSCE would no longer be a community of values. If we would no longer be a community of values, we would be unable to develop the concept of comprehensive security (Speech of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE 1997b:3, emphasis added).

Thus, not only adopters, but also imposers legitimate their identities and agendas by emphasizing conformity to world society scripts.

**Local Theorization**

Imposed diffusion will often not have lasting effects if the adopters themselves do not perceive benefits outweighing the costs of the policy diffusion. Scholars have noted that it is not the transnational or societal pressures that result in the success of the EU imposing conditions on potential member states. Rather, it is the perception of costs and benefits by political leaders and citizens that have determined the success of the EU conditionality on the adoption of the policy acceptable to Western standards (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003).

In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Baltic republics envisioned a homogenous nation-state. Citizenship regimes were seen as mechanisms to achieve that goal by excluding ethnic minorities and immigrants from the newly independent state. Nevertheless, under pressure from the world society (i.e. various governmental and non-governmental organizations) these Baltic republics changed their citizenship laws to make
their national practices aligned with the world cultural scripts. But how were these changes justified or legitimated by the diffusion adopters?

The imposed theorization from the European Union stressed upon the human rights culture and the “progress-oriented” identity of the modern nation-state. When revising citizenship laws, the Baltic republics also re-framed their theorization. The revised laws were defined to be part of a rational and future-oriented project. In turn, the more exclusive citizenship law that was enacted shortly after independence was defined to be an ineffective and an “ad hoc approach to integration” (National program “Integration of Society in Latvia, Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia 2001: 4). As part of a larger and progress-oriented reform, this citizenship law would be “replaced by a goal-oriented national political strategy” (stated in the National program “Integration of Society in Latvia, Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia 2001: 4). A similar development was in evidence in Estonia as well:

The changed internal and external situation requires that Estonia’s policy on non-Estonians take a new step forward. This step must be based on our current national and social interests, the goal of ensuing rapid modernisation of society in the context of accession to the European Union… The emphasis of Estonia’s national policy on non-Estonians should be [on the] orientation to the future. Policy on non-Estonians must be based not so much on the problems of the past as on ensuring a stable future and development potential for Estonia, the need to modernise, and the values of a united Europe (Estonia’s National Integration Policy, Government of Republic of Estonia 1998 cited in European Center for Minorities. 1999:39, emphasis added).
As part of this theorization, national integration policies reframed the diffusion outcome from a “threat to homogenous nation” to an opportunity.

Integration means the engagement of persons in all levels of society. Integration is not a change in ethnic identity, but the removal of barriers, which hinder many non-Estonians from participating fully in Estonian society (Government of Republic of Estonia 1998 cited in European Center for Minorities. 1999:40, emphasis added).

The opposition to integration is typically related to a fear of losing ethnic identity. ... The integration of society does not provide for loss of ethnic identity. On the contrary, integration supports the development and growth of ethnic identity (Naturalization Board of Republic of Latvia 2001:10).

The similarity in framing the issue provides evidence of both structured and scripted diffusion of world cultural scripts. When the diffusion is structured (especially when imposed), the form of the diffusion is highly theorized to ensure the desired outcome. The highly structured nature of this diffusion allows for less variation in how the diffusion occurs (or is imposed), even at the local level. Since identities and actions of states (or those social entities that impose or delegate agendas) are constructed and legitimated by world culture of human rights and rationality, the locally theorized models are still highly scripted with these globally penetrating and vertically transcending patterns of legitimacy. Thus, a bounded theorization, even under-theorization, occurs as is evident in this statement from Estonia’s national integration policy:

The goals of the state in forming a policy on non-Estonians [is] to change attitudes in addressing issues related to non-Estonians. The attitude ‘non-Estonians as a
problem’ *must be replaced* by the attitude “non-Estonians as participants in rebuilding Estonia (Government of Republic of Estonia 1998 cited in European Center for Minorities. 1999:41, emphasis added).

The attitude “must be replaced.” While usually it is the events that lead to the change in attitudes, in theorization that occurs in urgency (and is under-theorized) it is the attitudes that should first change. Under-theorized explanations for diffused practices are labeled as “unorthodox.”

Re-independent Estonia has been successful above all due to its bold steps and unorthodox solutions. The time is ripe to take such steps in policy related to non-Estonians as well (Government of Republic of Estonia 1998 cited in European Center for Minorities. 1999:42).

The reframing in Latvia was even more remarkable. Instead of committing itself to restoring a homogenous nation state, the prior existence of an ethnically pure Latvian nation was called into question: “Latvia has never been an ethnically homogenous nation” (stated in the National program “Integration of Society in Latvia, Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia 2001: 5).

In some cases, new approaches are announced, but theorization displays little concern for why previous policies were no longer viable. Instead, theorization is focused on how (rather than why) the new practice will be put in place (this pattern is likely where the practice is coerced and the diffusion of the practice is imposed and theorized from above).

The European Union condemned exclusive citizenship regimes that Baltic republics adopted. Thus, the EU proposed an alternative theorization of how to achieve the new
“future-oriented-goal” to integrate, rather than exclude, immigrants and minorities. World nation-states have achieved cultural uniformity through a peaceful approach—education (Tilly1994). Thus, in Estonia, the ethnic nation would no longer be nurtured through citizenship regimes. Instead, it was theorized that “the development of the Estonian educational system [is] the central integration agent” (Government of Republic of Estonia 1998 cited in European Center for Minorities. 1999:41). In Latvia, the national integration policy was even more detailed in outlining how integration of minorities could be accomplished through the election system, migration management and work with migrants/expatriates/repatriates, NGO sector, philanthropy, entrepreneurship, education, and among those, also though citizenship (Naturalization Board of The Republic of Latvia 2001).

The impact of the local theorization on the globally theorized scripts is limited since the local theorization is more concrete (not abstract that others could relate to) and hence has a restricted scope of diffusion and application (Strang and Meyer 1993). Nevertheless, local theorization remains important: through the ‘learned’ diffusion these local models resonate beyond national borders and are analyzed by other social entities (of the same type) that are still enveloped with global scripts. Thus, the local theorization typically flows horizontally, although vertically imposed ‘borrowed’ practices are also possible.

While local theorization affects only how locally the policy is adopted, the local theorization conforms to global abstract models. The deviation of the locally theorized models from the global relations scripts will eventually converge on world models from
diffusion based on learning, or as adopters face difficulties in justifying or explaining their policy choices to the civil society domestically and globally.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we argued that in the contemporary era, diffusion mechanisms of policies consist of scripted, learned, and coercive components (rather than any of these alone). These mechanisms of diffusion intersect at various stages to foster diffusion of agendas, practices or policies on social entities, such as nation-states. We relied and built on the diffusion model proposed by Strang and Meyer (1993). Through a comparative historical examination of the Baltic republics, we illustrated that even the coercive mechanisms of diffusion (imposed by international governmental organization or other social entities) are framed and legitimated within world society culture. Cultural linkages help to construct identities for both the imposers and the adopters of the diffusion of the world culture. These linkages are used to legitimate various mechanisms of diffusion, including those that are coerced or imposed to the adopters.

Meyer and Strang (1993) identify two forms of diffusion: unstructured (i.e. scripted) and structured. We argued that the coercive diffusion is likely to occur when the scripted diffusion has failed to occur, and hence, coercive diffusion is a form of structured diffusion. As our discussion illustrated, when diffusion is imposed on the adopters, heavy theorization occurs that allocate the identity of the adopter and the outcome of the diffusion within the world cultural goals—progress and rationality. In the post-World War II era, the globally unified culture has constructed the state-from in terms of progress, as a “goal
attaining project” (Thomas and Meyer 1984: 439). And hence, as was evident from the
rhetoric of communication between the Baltic republics and the European Union agencies,
when the policy is imposed (i.e. coerced) on states, the diffusion outcome is theorized in
terms of “progress” as “future-oriented” innovation, thus, bounded theorization occurs
within the scripts of the world culture that globally penetrates and transcends patterns of
legitimacy.

Our discussion contributes to the theoretical debates on diffusion both in sociology
and also in international relations. New and young states are especially prone to the
pressures to conform to world norms and values emanating from the world society (nation-
states, international and local organizations). However, enveloped by world culture, both
the imposers and adopters are constrained by world cultural scripts that shape how the
adopter, outcome and the form of diffusion is framed and implemented by the social
tentities involved in the diffusion.
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CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

All three manuscripts of this dissertation research address various challenges that states face when starting a new nation-state in the contemporary era.

Manuscript 1: “Has the Nation Disappeared?” examined the challenges of nation-building, empirically focusing on all fifteen post-Soviet republics. This manuscript was located within the literature on citizenship, nationalism and the sociological accounts of neo-institutional thinking (primarily World Society theory). The paper engaged several competing theoretical perspectives. Primordial accounts of nation-building envision an ethnically homogenous state. This model of the nation-state has been dominant throughout the 20th century (Giddens 1987). However, neo-institutionalists have noted that World War II and its aftermath shifted the emphasis from the primordial nation to the individual, and the legitimacy of corporate collective identities, such as the primordial dominance of a nation, was “defeated” (Frank and Meyer 2002). This manuscript examined the manner in which new and young states (of the former Soviet Union) built a nation when primordial conceptions of national identity and nationalism were condemned by world society. The paper investigated how nationhood and the world society pressures have shaped citizenship regimes of these republics in the nation-building process.

I proposed a synthesis of competing theoretical accounts proposed by nationhood versus world society impacts on the institutionalization and transformation of citizenship in post-Soviet republics. My findings indicated that nationhood is still contested in the contemporary era. However, given the expansion and the diffusion of the human rights culture, these new states did not seek legitimacy for their nation-building agendas by
referencing ethnic purity, homogeneity and primordialism. Instead, they mobilized human rights scripts of ethnic self-determination. World society and (internal) nationhood forces dialectically reinforced each other. As ethnic minorities used human rights norms to expand their opportunities and rights within the state, so the titular ethnic groups used human rights culture to develop and strengthen their nationhood. Diversity, rather than homogeneity, is the hallmark of the contemporary state. Thus, the postwar nation is “tamed” rather than barbaric or intolerant (Ramirez 2006). Primordial membership to the nation has been redefined to “loyalty to the nation of the state,” where loyalty is defined by increased demands on immigrants to learn the language and history of the state in order to qualify for naturalization to citizenship.

Some scholars argue that the expansion of human rights culture worldwide has changed the parameters of citizenship (Soysal 1994). I argued that citizenship of the state remains an important component of sovereignty and has been used by young states to reinforce national boundaries. Additionally, I did not find that the citizenship policies of post-Soviet republics were determined by pre-existing citizenship traditions (as argued otherwise by Weil 2001). Nor have citizenship policies of young states become more inclusive towards immigrants (Howard 2006).

Future research into resistance and struggle during the institutionalization of young states offers a promising opportunity to gain insight into the challenges confronting new states and to understand the interplay between the world society and nation-states more generally. Future research can and should expand states under consideration, e.g., post-colonial states in other regions and other times. By varying the historical context and
geographic setting, an expansion of this study can identify a wide array of challenges confronting nation-building and state-building projects in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Manuscript 2: “Estimation of International Migration in Post-Soviet Republics,” examined the challenges that young and new states, or states with rapidly transitioning economies and political systems, face when trying to estimate international (temporary and long-term) migration. The empirical discussion focused on post-Soviet republics. However, the issues addressed in the manuscript can easily be extended to other developing states with rapid politico-economic transitions. And, even though the manuscript did not focus directly on citizenship policies of states, it indirectly contributed to our understanding of both citizenship regimes and nation-building. Countries modify their citizenship policies to attract or limit immigration/emigration. This has impact on ethnic dynamics and nation-building processes of both the sending and receiving states. Thus, this manuscript too, is located within the literature that examines nation-building in the contemporary era.

This manuscript was methodological in nature. I investigated the statistical management systems on migration and comparatively analyzed methodological approaches to measuring migration. Scholars have argued in favor of using immigration-by-origin of receiving countries to estimate international migration of states with unreliable statistical data on migration. I adopted this method to the new states in the post-soviet region. In this manuscript I illustrated that this method has extensive validity and reliability problems when applied to post-Soviet republics. Large variation exists in how post-Soviet republics define the “migrant.” This complicates comparisons of migration data cross-nationally. Throughout my discussion I argued that population censuses and (annual or quarterly)
household surveys provide superior quality of data on migration than the immigration-by-origin method, when applied to post-Soviet republics.

The research gap on migration dynamics in the post-Soviet region is, in large part, due to the lack of detailed information on how migration is counted. To address limitations in migration studies on post-Soviet republics, future research should carefully document and disclose sources used to calculate migration data. Additionally, extra care should be used when discussing how ‘migrants’ have been defined in the statistical terminology of sources used, and how these definitions relate to ‘temporary migrants,’ ‘refugees and forced migrants,’ and ‘repeat migrants.’ Also, when reporting migration estimates, research should specify whether the counts incorporate temporary migrants and refugees.

To facilitate quantitative research on post-Soviet migration, scholars should pay attention to the format in which estimated migration data are reported. Preferably, migration data should be reported not as net-migration (Nair 1985), or gross migration or migration stock, but as annual measures of both immigration and emigration. If possible, annual immigration and emigration data should be reported in the appendix of any reports or article that offers estimates of migration.

Given the low reliability of migration data of post-Soviet republics, the role of population censuses becomes especially important. It is essential that future population censuses collect detailed information on immigration (specifically, the ‘arrival date’). This would make it possible to calculate annual migration dynamics since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, detailed information should be captured on the temporarily absent and the temporarily present migrants. On a positive note, there is mounting
evidence that international organizations are pushing post-Soviet states to incorporate these measures into upcoming population censuses.

Beyond population censuses, alternative sources of migration dynamics should be developed. Censuses are very expensive. And thus, well-designed household surveys, commissioned by the government, can be a useful source on migration dynamics of the country. International organizations and local authorities should work together to develop research methodology that can be carried out by individual states while still providing comparable data across post-Soviet republics to allow cross-national analysis and estimations of migration.

Russia has been the primary recipient of migration flows of the former Soviet region. Thus, the post-Soviet migration research has primarily focused on Russia. However, scholars, researchers and international organizations should (1) shift their focus from the receiving country to sending countries, and (2) analyze dynamics in sending courtiers that lead to migration. Examination and the improvement of migration-related policies of sending countries should be a priority in this task.

The post-Soviet region is a highly multicultural region, thus, migration impacts various ethnic groups selectively. International organizations and policy makers should sanction post-Soviet republics to design proper measures for assessing migration by ethnicity, gender and age of migrants. Once these steps are taken, researchers can analyze how various policies impact certain ethnic groups in this multicultural region, and anticipate the impact of policies adopted before they are implemented. International organizations should encourage, or rather demand, careful analyses of policies impacting migration (pre and post-policy adoption). These analyses should be quantitative and
analytical. Currently, migration policies seem to be fashioned on the basis of ad hoc and reactionary reasoning. More careful data gathering and policy evaluation would make possible the adoption and implementation of policies that are geared toward achieving specific goals in the future.

Manuscript 3: “Civilizing Nation-States,” was co-authored by Gregory Hooks. This manuscript also addressed the challenges that young and new states face in the contemporary era. This manuscript did not examine the content of policies on citizenship and nation-state building, but examined the mechanisms by which various policies and practices diffuse globally and are adopted locally.

The literature on diffusion has been polarized between materialist and culturalist explanations of diffusion. Economists and political scientists have argued that change in material incentives (such as physical force or financial aid) results in the diffusion of policies and practices. In contrast, social learning theory and neo-institutionalism argue that diffusion is the result of changes in ideas. In this paper, we draw on both of these theoretical traditions to explain diffusion of state practices and policies. Specifically, this paper examined the transformation of citizenship regimes adopted by Baltic republics in the 15 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. We elaborated a synthesis of materialist and ideational arguments on diffusion to suggest that in the contemporary era, diffusion mechanisms of policies consist of scripted, learned, and coercive components (rather than any of these alone). These mechanisms of diffusion intersect at various stages to influence the diffusion of agendas, practices or policies on social entities, such as nation-states. Building on the diffusion model proposed by Strang and Meyer (1993), we illustrated that even coercive mechanisms of diffusion (imposed by international
governmental organization or other social entities) are framed and legitimated within world society culture. Cultural linkages help to construct identities for both the imposers and the adopters of the diffusion of the world culture. These linkages are used to legitimate various mechanisms of diffusion, including those imposed on adopters. Enveloped by the world culture, both the imposers and adopters are constrained by world cultural scripts that shape how the adopter, the outcome and the form of diffusion is framed and implemented by the social entities involved in the diffusion. In the post-World War II era, the globally unified culture has constructed the state-from in terms of progress, as a “goal attaining project” (Thomas and Meyer 1984: 439). When diffusion is imposed on the adopters, heavy theorization occurs locally. This theorization rationalizes and legitimizes the identity of the adopter and the outcome of the diffusion within the world cultural goals—progress and rationality. Thus, bounded theorization occurs within the scripts of the world culture that globally penetrate and transcend local patterns of legitimacy.

Diffusion mechanisms of various policies and practices among adopters are under-studied. Too frequently, materialist and culturalist scholars talk past one another. More comparative studies with joined examination of competing theoretical explanations are needed to provide insights into diffusion mechanism in various areas of nation-state building. Future studies can also examine why certain practices and policies diffuse in more scripted manner, while others are coerced or never diffuse. And finally, future studies on diffusion can also examine how mechanisms of diffusion have changed over the 20th century and try to elaborate some of the forces that have determined that change.
References


