

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, HEALTH AND THE CHAD/CAMEROON OIL
PIPELINE

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the thesis of Christa M. Herrygers find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

(Chair)

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STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, HEALTH AND THE CHAD/CAMEROON OIL
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Abstract

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Chair: Dr. John Bodley

While the Chad/Cameroon oil pipeline is being officially touted as beneficial development for the people in Cameroon, the Bagyeli have seen a myriad of negative consequences and few if any positive effects. The Bagyeli are foragers living in the rainforest of Cameroon near the terminus of the pipeline. For the Bagyeli, the pipeline has meant a loss of their habitat and a decline in the foodstuffs they rely on. Through the in-migration of people seeking employment and the increased impoverishment of the Bagyeli, there has been an increased risk of HIV infection as well as an increase in other diseases. As more areas in Chad and Cameroon, as well as other regions of the world, are being opened for oil exploration, the impacts this has on indigenous peoples' health must be understood and acted upon.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mother and father who provided me with my first map thus setting me off on my future path.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Objectives of this Thesis

This thesis illustrates how the Bagyeli have been affected by the recent Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline that runs through the rainforest where they live in Cameroon. In order to illustrate this, three issues are examined: first, the goals for the project as stated by the oil consortium; second, the possible risks associated with the pipeline; and third, the perspectives of the Bagyeli on how the pipeline has changed their lives.

There are many questions that are raised in this thesis. Who are the major power elites involved in the pipeline and what are their connections? Were environmental and social measures put into place by the project to mitigate risks? If so, were these measures successful? How do the Bagyeli perceive the effects of the pipeline? How do the corporations involved in the project perceive the pipeline? What was the United States government's role in the project? If this truly is a development project, whom is it development for?

My hypotheses are that structural violence is inherent in the growth process. No matter how many safeguards are implemented in a large-scale development project, the most vulnerable people are harmed. When the Commercial world intersects the Tribal world, the power elites can easily take advantage of those with little social power. In the case of the Bagyeli, they have little say in matters that affect their lives and no say in the management of the forest they depend on for survival. The pipeline, as a form of

structural violence, will increase poverty for all but a select few. This in turn will increase the risk of many diseases and degrade the forest that the Bagyeli rely on for survival.

Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework for the thesis. Bodley's Power and Scale theory and Farmer's concept of structural violence illustrates the problems inherent in the current global system and defines why large-scale corporate development exacerbates problems of poverty and health. Chapter 2 provides a background of the political, economic, and health statistics for Cameroon. Chapter 3 describes the Bagyeli, their relationship with village farmers, and their relationship with the rainforest. Chapter 4 describes the oil pipeline project and the risks involved. Chapter 5 looks at the players involved in the project and their interconnections. Chapter 6 gives an overview of how the Bagyeli view the pipeline and its effects. Chapter 6 also looks at how the corporations involved in the pipeline view the project.

Theoretical Framework

There are two main theoretical perspectives, which I have melded together to provide the framework for this thesis. The first is Dr. John Bodley's Power and Scale perspective. Power and Scale states that "...throughout world history particular individuals, driven by the natural human desire to accumulate social power, have promoted growth, or scale increases, that amplified many human problems by socializing the costs of development and disproportionately concentrating the benefits" (Bodley 2003:xv). This process is not inevitable but current development practices often elevate scale growth.

Power can be defined here as social power, which is “the ability of individuals to influence other people and events in order to maintain or improve their own and their children’s material opportunities, or life chances” (Bodley 2003:4). Social power is often gained through one’s imperium or personal power network. All human decision makers have imperia; this can range from household-based imperia found in every society to corporate groups such as governments and businesses. Power elites come into existence because they are able to create large, effective imperia and because there are few if any limits on power (Bodley 2003:4).

The other key component to the theory is scale. Scale “refers to the absolute size of populations, economic enterprises, markets, armies, cities, or anything that affects the well-being of people” (Bodley 2003:5). As a society grows in scale, power becomes concentrated for the few individuals at the top while the costs inherent in the elite-directed growth process are socialized. In other words, the benefits of growth are seen by only a few while the majority in the society assume the negative costs. Because the power elites at the top of the hierarchy have the most social power and reap the benefits of growth, they use their power to convince everyone that growth is good for us all. (Bodley 2003:5).

Using Power and Scale, all cultures can be broken down by their forms of imperia into three cultural worlds. These are the tribal, imperial, and commercial worlds. The household dominates the tribal world; political rulers dominate the imperial world and economic elites dominate the commercial world (Bodley 2003:6).

In the tribal world, societies were small and members lived in politically autonomous villages or in nomadic bands. Because of the size of the societies, resources

were abundant and everyone had direct access to the resources. No one could gain permanent control over the tribe because leadership was on a temporary basis and anyone could be a leader. Every household was able to participate in decision-making. These factors minimized competition, limited accumulation, and met everyone's basic needs for survival and comfort (Bodley 2003:7).

In the imperial world, societies became larger and those in the dominant political imperia controlled resources. Social classes also emerged, which led to disadvantaged groups of people. The political imperia consisted of rulers and priests who used religion, tribute, and the military to increase their social power. People no longer had direct access to resources but were only granted access to resources by those who controlled them. Wealth accumulation greatly increased but only among the power elites, which further reduced the nonelites' life chances (Bodley 2003:7-8).

In the commercial world, "material well-being depends on access to capital, markets, and employment, all of which are controlled by imperia organized by economic elites and the political rulers who support them" (Bodley 2003:8). The economic elites' power surpasses that of both local communities and national governments hence both are compliant with commercial interests. Economic rewards are concentrated within the elite structure but everyone shares the risks and negative consequences. Societies are larger than ever before and there are increasing numbers of people without any social power (Bodley 2003:8).

When tribal people are incorporated into either the imperial or commercial world, the result is one of impoverishment and disempowerment. Diseases of poverty, which were not present before, become rampant and are compounded by lack of healthcare and

the inability to acquire public assistance. If one were to create optimum scale societies, with optimum distributions of social power, this would alleviate current global problems (Bodley 2003:3;14-15).

The other main theoretical perspective that I am incorporating into my framework is Dr. Paul Farmer's notion of structural violence. Structural violence is often invisible and is the outcome of our current economic system; it is the result of socializing the costs of growth. Structural violence is that which keeps people in an unbreakable cycle of poverty and this negatively affects their health. This can include a myriad of offenses against human dignity: "extreme and relative poverty, social inequalities ranging from racism to gender inequality, and the more spectacular forms of violence that are uncontestedly human rights abuses" (Farmer 2003:8).

In other words, structural violence keeps people poor and has negative impacts on health. An anthropologist's duty is to research and uncover structural violence and then take action (Farmer 2003). Since, structural violence is often invisible one has to examine the current social system in order to bring it to light. To do this history, culture, politics, and economics on a local and global scale must be taken into account. Otherwise, when action is taken, the result will be like a band-aid covering a bullet wound instead of a solution.

Fieldwork and Methods

The fieldwork for this research was conducted in the Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf region of Cameroon over a three-month period in the summer of 2004. Originally I used Lolodorf as a base to travel to different Bagyeli base-camps. At the base-camps I

conducted informal interviews in French through an interpreter. If there were people at the base-camp who were unable to speak French, a member of the community would interpret into the local language. This was normally a young adult who had attended primary school. However, instances where this occurred were rare.

The main focus of these interviews was to determine how far away the base-camp was from the pipeline; if the community had been consulted before the pipeline was built; if the camp members suffered any losses because of the pipeline; if they received any compensation; and what the community felt would have been proper compensation. Also, I was trying to find a community that would allow me to live with them for a period of six-weeks.

During the interviews, many people stated that the base-camps around Bipindi were often closer to the pipeline. Taking this into account and also feeling that I had contacted many of the communities around Lolodorf, I traveled to Bipindi. Once at Bipindi, I made contact with a local NGO, Foyer Notre Dame de la Foret (FONDAF), whose workers have extensive contact with the local Bagyeli communities. I informed the workers about my research and asked if they could help locate a Bagyeli base-camp that would be willing to allow me to stay with them for six weeks. Within three days the workers took me to a base-camp in Kouambo where they introduced me to the community and described my research. I was informed that they would be happy to have me stay with them and to come back in two days.

After I arrived in Kouambo, I lived with the Bagyeli for six weeks. I used Kouambo as a base to interview not only the people I was staying with but also other Bagyeli communities in the area. When I visited a new community, I informed members

what my research was about and asked if it was okay to ask them questions. There was only one instance when a person refused to participate in interviews and that was at the base-camp of a traditional healer who felt that all white people wanted to steal the Bagyeli healing techniques. I reiterated my purpose, told him that he did not have to answer any questions and then left.

As word spread about my presence in the area, many Bagyeli from neighboring communities sought me out to tell their story of the pipeline. Sometimes they would talk to me in Kouambo and at other times they took me to their base-camp. All interviews were informal with me asking for the same data as in Lolodorf and also giving the interviewee opportunity to share what he or she felt was important. Interviews were sometimes one-on-one, but often they involved everyone at the base-camp. Although men answered most of my questions, the women at the camp would interject if they did not agree with an answer or wanted to make a point more strongly.

In addition to the interviews with the Bagyeli, I also interviewed health care workers to establish the state of the health infrastructure in the area. Also, many villagers sought me out to tell me their perspective on the pipeline.

Overall, I interviewed the Bagyeli at six base-camps and at the Catholic mission in Ngovayang. This consisted of a total of 46 informants, including both men (34) and women (12). However, as stated previously the women normally did not participate in the interviews unless they wanted to disagree with what had been said. The exception to this was the Bagyeli woman who worked for the FPP and who sought me out in Kouambo to tell me her views on the pipeline. One reason for the skewed bias towards men in the study is that often when I went to a base-camp the women would be out

gathering and only the men would be in the camp or the women would be preparing food. What the women did tell me about the pipeline, however, was identical to the information given by male informants. I also interviewed six local villagers and one Catholic priest who was European. The major limitation to this study is that often I would visit a base-camp and there would be no one there and the duration of my visit was too short to make return visits to some camps. Also, my language ability hindered me from conducting the research without an interpreter.

Outside of Cameroon the research consisted of a literature review. This included background reading on the Bagyeli, Cameroon, theory, and the corporate entities that make up the pipeline consortium. In addition, I made a detailed study of the Exxon and World Bank documents concerning the project.

CHAPTER TWO

CAMEROON

Background

Cameroon is located in central Africa, bordered by Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, The Republic of the Congo, and the Atlantic Ocean (see Figure 2.1). The total land area is 475,442 square kilometers and the population is estimated at 16.3 million (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:3). Life expectancy is 50 years and the average population density is 32 people per square kilometer (World Bank 2004).

Figure 2.1 Map of Cameroon



Source: About 2005

French and English are both official languages, but there are estimated to be around 200 local languages spoken. The two largest cities are Douala, considered to be the economic capital and Yaoundé, the official capital. The rate of urbanization is increasing; in 1976 28.5% of Cameroonians lived in urban areas, this increased to 37.8%

in 1987, 42% in 1991, 45.3% in 1997, and an estimated 50% in 2000. Yaoundé and Douala are both growing at rates of 5 to 6% a year and are estimated to both have populations over 1.5 million in 2000 (Esso 1999b:3.2). Transparency International, which is a European-based anti-corruption organization, has consistently ranked Cameroon as one of the world's most corrupt countries.

The political entity now known as Cameroon was originally a German protectorate, Kamerun, which was established in 1884. After World War I, Kamerun was divided between England and France. French-ruled Cameroon won its independence in 1960. In 1961, the southern section of British-ruled Cameroon voted to join the independent Cameroon Republic creating a federation of states. The northern section voted to join Nigeria. The first president of Cameroon was Ahmadou Ahidjo, a Muslim from northern Cameroon. During his regime, Ahidjo, tried to promote a strong national identity by incorporating different interests both regional and ethnic into his ruling party, Union Nationale Camerounaise (UNC). Ahidjo also led a referendum in 1972 to dissolve the Cameroon federation and create a unitary state the République du Cameroun (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:4).

Ahidjo reigned for twenty years and was re-elected for another five years in 1980. However, after serving two of those five years, Ahidjo passed the presidency to his prime minister, Paul Biya in November 1982. Supporters of Ahidjo attempted a coup, which failed in April of 1984. Biya's ruling style was different from Ahidjo's in that Biya played upon regional differences by placing people from his own region in governmental positions and marginalizing northerners and the minority Anglophones. He also banned all parties except his own ruling party (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:4-5). Biya's

rule has been marked by a consistent misuse of funds. He built a gigantic estate with a nine-hole golf course near his native village with state funds (Silverstein 2003c:A1).

It was not until the early 1990s that Biya gave into demands for legalizing multiparty elections and allowing private newspapers. The first multiparty election for the 180-seat National Assembly was held in March 1992. The ruling party, Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) won only 88 seats. The Anglophone Social Democratic Front (SDF) and Union Démocratique du Cameroun (UDC) both boycotted the elections. The northern party, Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le progrès (UNDP) won 68 seats. When the presidential elections were held in October of 1992, Biya was reelected with 39.9% of the votes. However, there were allegations of fraud and the SDF candidate, John Fru Ndi, who received 35.9% of the vote claimed to be the true winner (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:4-5).

Paul Biya was reelected as president on October 11, 2004. Most Cameroonians have little faith in their election process. There is an overwhelming belief that the outcome is already decided before the election. Only 8 million people were registered to vote in the presidential elections and not everyone registered bothered to vote. The next legislative election is slated for June 2007 and the next presidential election is not until October 2011. Most of the members of government are members of the RDPC who are rewarded with their positions by Biya for bringing in votes. However, the prime minister is an Anglophone, the only other Anglophone is the minister of commerce, and there has been an increase of northerners in the government. The number of women in the government has also increased, moving up from 3 to 6 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005:5-6;8).

Cameroon's human rights record may have improved in the last few years but it is still abysmal. There have been reports of Cameroon's security forces using excessive force and extra-judicial executions. Political opponents, human rights activists, and journalists are subjected to intimidation and arbitrary arrest. The judicial system is rife with corruption and bribery is common. Over half of the prisoners in jail have never had a trial. However, because of the stability of the country, Cameroon's relations with Western countries are good and there is little international pressure to improve its human rights record (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:8).

One recent example of Cameroon's poor stance on human rights occurred at the New-Bell maximum-security prison in Douala. In January of 2005, prisoners staged a riot to protest their harsh treatment from guards and the poor conditions in the prison. The riots ended with many wounded and five prisoners dead. The New-Bell prison was built to hold 800 inmates and the population is now at 3,000. There have been reports that 72 prisoners died in New-Bell in 2003. Overall, the prisons in Cameroon can hold 6,700 prisoners and it is estimated that there are over 20,000 people in these facilities today. The International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS) states that Cameroon has one of the highest prison occupancy rates in the world, second only to Barbados. President Biya announced his plans for building more prisons shortly after the incident (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005:15).

Economics

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Cameroon suffered a drastic economic decline, which led to a 55% drop in per capita GDP between 1986 and 1994. According to a

World Bank Poverty Report, Cameroon's economic collapse was the most painful that any country has been through (Horta 1999). Because of the economic collapse, foreign investors stayed away from Cameroon. In 1994, Cameroon devalued its currency and since then foreign direct investment has slowly begun to rise. However, this is mostly investment in the oil sector (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:37).

Since Cameroon is a former French colony, France is one of its main trading partners, largest bilateral donor, and largest foreign investor. France also has a defense agreement with Cameroon. There are around 161 subsidiaries of French companies operating in Cameroon. However, ties with the United States have been strengthening lately, as President Biya's recent visit to the White House would suggest. This is related to the growing interest in oil in the region (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:12).

Cameroon earned \$2.3 billion in 2003 from exports. Crude oil accounted for 40% of the export revenue. Timber was the second biggest export, accounting for 14.7% of the revenue. Cameroon's other exports are mostly agricultural commodities; with cocoa at 10.7%, cotton at 4.8%, coffee at 3.1%, bananas at 3.1%, and rubber at 1.5% of the revenues. The only industrial export is aluminum, which accounted for 4% of the revenues (see Table 2.1). The make-up of Cameroon's exports pose two problems for the possibility of economic growth. First is that agricultural commodities are vulnerable to fluctuations of the world market. Second is that oil production in the country is declining (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:21).

Cameroon was the Central African Franc Zone's third largest oil producer until 2001 when it lost the slot to Equatorial Guinea. In 2004 when Chad became an oil producer, Cameroon dropped to fifth. In 2003 oil production was at 94,000 b/d. Two-

thirds of the oil production is carried out by two companies, Total Exploration et Production Cameroun, and Pecten, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell. Most of Cameroon's oilfields have started to mature and the government estimates that if no new reserves are found, the country's reserves will be depleted by 2010. However exploration has begun in four different basins throughout the country, which appear promising. If new oil is found, the government is hoping to make use of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline for transport (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:17;30).

Table 2.1 Cameroon's Exports and Imports

Origins of gross domestic product 2003	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2003	% of total
Agriculture	27.9	Private consumption	67.8
Industry	30	Government consumption	8
Oil	6.3	Gross domestic investment	27.1
Services	42.8	Exports of goods & services	20.7
		Imports of goods & services	-23.7
Main exports fob 2003	% of total	Main imports fob 2003	% of total
Crude oil	39.8	Intermediate goods	47
Timber	14.7	Capital goods	30
Cocoa	10.7	Food & consumer goods	23
Cotton	4.8		
Destination of exports 2003	% of total	Origin of imports 2003	% of total
Spain	20.3	France	30.4
Italy	15	Nigeria	13.4
Netherlands	11.9	Belgium	5.3
France	10.6	Germany	4
US	8.4	Italy	3.9

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 2005:5

As revenue through oil declines, Cameroon is eager to make up the lost revenue through increased logging. Only the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon have larger forests than Cameroon. The logging industry employs over 55,000 people (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:28). The forests in Cameroon contain over 300 species that have commercial value. As of right now, only about 70 species are being

exploited and 5 species account for 70% of all logging. A law to improve forestry management was introduced in 1994 but illegal logging and corruption still threatens the sustainability of the timber industry (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:29). Since the law was introduced, logging increased 30% and new logging concessions were granted in some of the countries protected parks (Horta 1999).

Cameroon became the 86th member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) on July 10, 1963. Then Cameroon joined as the 92nd member of the International Development Association (IDA) in 1964, the 29th member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1967, the 100th member of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1974, and the 45th member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1988. Since joining the five sections of the World Bank, Cameroon has been funded for 45 loans, 39 credits, 25 investments, and 8 trust fund projects. The original principle totaled \$2,618,642,993 although to date only \$1,994,576,147 has been disbursed and \$331,475,468 has been cancelled. Cameroon has paid back \$927,463,422 and still owes \$979,491,193 (World Bank 2004).

Health

Cameroon does possess a large network of health facilities due to the boom period before the economic crash in the 1980s. Currently the Ministry of Public Health (MPH) estimates there are 1,031 government operated health facilities. These include 1 teaching hospital, 2 referral hospitals, 3 central hospitals, 8 provincial hospitals, 38 departmental hospitals, 132 district hospitals, and 847 health centers (Esso 1999b:3.6). In 2002, public

expenditure on health was only 1.1% of the GDP (see Table 2.2 for comparative figures). Out of the annual health budget, less than 1% is allocated for repairs. The low government spending on health has caused conditions of medical facilities to worsen especially in rural areas and the overall quality of medical services to decline (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:15).

Table 2.2 Comparative health indicators, 2002

(% unless otherwise indicated)

	Cameroon	Gabon	Ghana	Senegal
One-year-olds vaccinated against tuberculosis	77	89	81	70
Births attended by skilled personnel (1995-2002)	60	86	44	58
Physicians per 100,000 people (1990-2002)	7	n/a	9	10
Health expenditure per head (US\$ at PPP; 2001)	42	197	60	63
Infant mortality (per 1,000)	95	60	57	79
HIV/AIDS (% of people aged 15-49; 2003)	6.9	8.1	3.1	0.8

Source: Economist Intelligence Report 2004:15

There are an estimated 11,000 cases of Tuberculosis (TB) per year in Cameroon. Also, this estimate is likely to be low as there are a significant number of non-reported cases. The World Health Organization (WHO) puts the estimate at 341 cases per 100,000 people. Drug resistant TB is becoming a significant problem: 21% of the cases are resistant to one drug and 6.3% of the cases are resistant to two or more drugs (Esso 1999b:4.6).

Due to the rise of chloroquine resistant malaria in West Africa, there has been a seven-fold increase in deaths caused by malaria in the past five years. Malaria is the number one cause of disease mortality in Cameroon (Esso 1999b:4.10). Yellow Fever is also a problem in Cameroon. Outbreaks occur sporadically but the death tolls are significant. In December of 1990 an outbreak occurred in two towns, Mokolo and Mora. 182 cases were reported and 125 deaths. Estimates of deaths from the outbreak that were

not reported range from 500 to 1,000 (Esso 1999b:4.20). Cholera outbreaks also occur with major death tolls. The last happened in the summer of 2004 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:15).

Cameroon identified its first AIDS case in 1985. Since 1985 over 9,600 cases have been reported and the problem is escalating. According to official records, the HIV rate in Cameroon is 5.5%; however, due to lack of testing the actual rate is more likely double this figure. As elsewhere in the world, the pattern of HIV infections in Cameroon have altered from being mostly a male disease to having almost equal rates for males and females. Due to poor testing capabilities, most cases of HIV are discovered when a patient arrives at a hospital with AIDS. Also, many people never seek medical treatment and the cause of death remains officially unknown. Another concern is the very high Sexual Transmitted Infections (STI) rates, including syphilis (Handyside et al 1998:viii,xi).

Prostitution is very prevalent in Yaoundé and Douala. Prostitution is also not confined to the larger cities; on paydays many prostitutes travel to rural areas to meet clients. An increasing problem is the demand for child prostitutes because they are believed to be HIV and STI free. The HIV prevalence rates in Cameroon for high-risk groups are 17% among the military, 25 to 45% among commercial sex workers (CSW), 17% among truck drivers and 22.4% among TB patients (see Table 2.3). Again these figures may be low due to lack of testing (Handyside et al 1998:14,30).

Table 2.3 HIV Prevalence (%) among Tuberculosis Patients

Date	Prevalence Rate
1989	2.4
1990	4.1
1991	9.9
1992	
1993	
1994	22.4

Source: Handyside et al 1998:30


CHAPTER THREE

THE BAGYELI

Background


The Bagyeli live in the Atlantic Littoral Forest in the Ocean District of the South Province in Cameroon (see Figure 3.2). My research area consisted of the region along the Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf road. Although they are often referred to as the Bakola and sometimes Bakola/Bagyeli, throughout this paper I use the term Bagyeli, as this is how the people in the region term themselves. The Bagyeli, along with the Baka and the Medzan, are one of three groups of tropical forest foragers (“pygmies”) in Cameroon (see Figure 3.1), although the Medzan no longer forage as their main source of subsistence.

Figure 3.1 Geographical Locations of “Pygmy” Groups in Cameroon



Source: Esso 1999

Figure 3.2 Location of Bagyeli in Cameroon



Source: Esso 1999

The Bagyeli live in close contact with Bantu farmers. The different Bantu populations include the Bulu, Fang, Bassa, and Ngoumba (van Dijk et al 2003:19-20). In my research area, the main Bantu population was the Ngoumba. The Ngoumbas' main source of subsistence is swidden agriculture. They clear and burn an area of forest before the rainy season and then plant maize, cassava, cucumbers, cocoyams, and plantains. These crops are not only grown for subsistence but also for sale at local or district

markets. Once the soil has lost much of its nutrients, it is left fallow and the regrowth replenishes the soil. The average surface area utilized per farmer is ten hectares. Many villagers also cultivate cocoa as a cash crop. Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) are also important to the village population for supplemental food, medicines, and materials for construction. Recently large banana, pineapple, and oil palm plantations have been developed in the Ocean District but this is the work of city elites and not the local village population (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:5).

The villagers associate agriculture with proper work. The amount of land that one is able to grow crops on and money brought in from the sale of crops helps determine social status. People, especially the Bagyeli, who practice little or no agriculture, are considered lazy by the villagers (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:13).

Many of the Bagyeli do practice a small amount of agriculture (see Photo 3.1), however, the majority of the diet is provided by foods that they have foraged. Normally the Bagyeli keep one small field cultivated per year, which averages about 1,400 square meters. The fields are also not as maintained as the villagers' fields. Many Bagyeli say that they prefer to be able to stay long periods of time at their hunting camps rather than preparing fields for crops. A recent study, *The Social Dimension of Rainforest Management in Cameroon*, has found that the dependence or lack of dependence on agriculture for the Bagyeli was correlated with the village population they were associated with. In Ngoumba areas, the Bagyeli only grew 20-30% of the food crops that they consumed. In Bulu and Fang areas, the Bagyeli grew 63% of the food crops that they consumed. Food crops can always be easily obtained by trading with villagers in exchange for bushmeat (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:13).

Photo 3.1 Bagyeli Swidden Agriculture



Meat is a prized part of all meals. Out of the game captured, approximately 40% is sold or exchanged with villagers and the other 60% is eaten. Bagyeli men hunt game with traps and also using a spear and dogs. While the men set the traps, everyone including women and children check them for animals. Women also dig for rats (see Photo 3.2) when they go out to gather, using a smoking stick to help force the rat out of the nest (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:14-15). The Bagyeli have also been known to net-hunt and use crossbows but I did not witness either technique during my fieldwork.

Photo 3.2 Bush Rat



As with many other forager groups, honey is considered very valuable. The Bagyeli consider honey to be very nutritious. The honey gathered can be sold but most is consumed immediately (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:15). Indeed, one day when honey was brought back to base-camp, the children set upon the container in a second, resulting in one boy being stung by the bees still in the honey. Honey is often also given to guests as one of the best things one can offer.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Bagyeli have exploited the seeds of the *Strophanthus gratus* liana. Gathering the seeds involves climbing very tall trees. The seeds are sold through an exchange network of catholic nuns and some villagers to the pharmaceutical industry where they are used for ouabain, which has similar functions as digitoxin. The seeds are the Bagyeli's main source of income. The sale of the seeds

along with bushmeat and honey allows the Bagyeli to cover expenses such as school fees, medical care, alcohol and tobacco (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:15).

Historically, the Bagyeli were “true” nomadic tropical foragers. During the 1960s the Cameroonian government began a campaign to settle the Bagyeli along roadsides. Although the majority of the Bagyeli moved during this campaign, many disliked living in such close contact with the villagers and moved back to their base-camps in the forest. The roadside campaign had two effects. First, the time spent in temporary hunting camps has decreased. Second, moves between base-camps have decreased dramatically. However, the degree of mobility varies from family to family (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:26). Recently there has been a push by the Government and villagers towards roadside settlement again. The government claims they are encouraging settlement to be able to impose taxation and development. The Bagyeli feel the villagers want them to settle in their villages in order to exploit them for labor (Nelson et al 2001:16).

Relationship with Village Farmers

The relationship between the Bagyeli and the villagers differs from group to group and also between individuals. The Kwassio Bantu group includes the Ngoumba, Mabea, and Pfiébouri and there are myths telling of the long association between the Bagyeli and the Kwassio. Their common languages support the long association between the two groups. Bagyeli is in the same linguistic group, Maka-Njem, as Ngoumba. Despite some slight differences, the languages are mutually understandable (Ngima Mawoung 2001:211,215).

Historically the Kwassio lived in small roadside villages and supplied material goods such as iron and food crops in exchange for meat to the Bagyeli who lived in base-camps in the forest. With the arrival of Europeans, the Kwassio began to earn money through the sale of ivory. In order to obtain ivory, they traded iron with the Bagyeli in exchange for elephant tusks. To control whom a Bagyeli traded ivory with, the Kwassio would consider some Bagyeli to be their clan members or their “pygmies”. The more Bagyeli a Kwassio “possessed”, the more prosperous he could become. This was due not only to the amount of ivory he could obtain, but also the amount of influence he could wield amongst the other villagers (Ngima Mawoung 2001:231-214).

Upon independence, the relations between villagers and the Bagyeli began to change. This period opened up new avenues of status for the villagers through becoming part of the new government, even if at a local level. At the same time, a Catholic mission opened in Bipindi. The mission was specifically for the Bagyeli and helped with medical care, education, and tried to negate stereotypical attitude of others towards the Bagyeli. These changes led to the Bagyeli trading with other villagers besides their patron (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:24). Even with these changes, the notion of a villager possessing a Bagyeli is still prevalent today. Often during my research, a villager would approach me and ask if I wanted to speak to his “pygmy”.

While in some areas the relations between villagers and the Bagyeli are limited to the exchange of goods, there has been intermarriage between the Ngoumba and Bagyeli. It is possible for Ngoumba men to pay bridewealth and marry Bagyeli women. The opposite, however, is frowned upon and if a Bagyeli man marries a Ngoumba woman she will be shunned (Ngima Mawoung 2001:14). During my three-month research period, I

came upon only one instance of a Ngoumba man married to a Bagyeli woman and the man did not have use of his legs. However, many of my Bagyeli informants told intermarriage happened more often in the past and many gave this as they reason the moved to the roadside.

Today the Bagyeli are at the bottom of the village power structure. Many Bagyeli cannot afford identity cards and without them they cannot seek redress through the legal system (Nelson et al 2001:17; Schmidt-Soltau 2003:4). Also, those who have decided to settle by the roadside are allowed to live on land in the village that they do not have legal right to. This means the person who claims rights to that land agrees to let the Bagyeli stay there but can force them out at anytime.

The family I stayed with during my research had been staying on land in the village, which was claimed by the chief. Upon my arrival, after receiving approval from the Bagyeli for me to stay there, I visited the chief of the village to inform him of my research and residence with the Bagyeli. I also gave him a gift of two beers. Some days later, the chief visited me and said that my gift was not enough because other people had given him more and he demanded a case of whiskey because as he put it, I would not like to see the family I was staying with forced out of the village. I was ready to leave and find a new research area instead of causing conflict for the family with whom I was staying. After I consulted with the chief's brother, and the village and Bagyeli elders as to the best course of action, the chief apologized and I stayed on. Although, the chief ended up apologizing more than once and said he would have never forced the Bagyeli off the land, this account illustrates the tenuous position they are in.

Relationship with the Forest

The Bagyeli believe that God, “Nzambe”, gave them the forest in order to provide sustenance and medicine (Ngima Mawoung 2001:229). They identify themselves as the “people of the forest”. The forest is home to ancestor spirits. If the proper rituals are performed, the spirits can guide a hunter to his prey. The spirits can also be mischievous and cause people to lose their way in the forest. The Ngoumba also view the forest as the realm of spirits. Some believe the spirits cause hardships because they are upset over the degradation of the forest (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:11).

People in the area, both Bagyeli and Ngoumba, use many different varieties of NTFPs. One survey, *The Social Dimension of Rainforest Management in Cameroon*, showed that 280 different animals are killed for food and over 500 plants are utilized for over 1,100 functions. The Bagyeli and villager forest use pattern is complementary. The villagers collect NTFPs from secondary forest near the village where they live and trap animals near their agricultural fields. The Bagyeli collect NTFPs mostly from primary forest and often utilize forests far from their base-camp (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:14).

Most of the land in my research area is untitled. Access to the forest is based upon both the residential unit or base-camp and kinship networks. When resources become scarce in one area of the forest, the Bagyeli can move to where kin are located and utilize a different part of the forest (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:26).

Strangers can also be granted access to particular sections of the forest if they distribute gifts and share whatever they take out of the forest (Biesbrouck 1999b:9,20).

The kinship networks are based upon one's fathers and mother's patri-clan. While the settlement pattern is primarily patrilocal, there is a great deal of flexibility (Biesbrouck 1999b:22). For instance, the base-camp where I was located consisted of a father and mother, their unmarried children, and married sons, and also the father's sister who stayed in the base-camp with her husband, their unmarried children, and married sons. When a daughter moves to a different base-camp with her husband, she gains rights to exploit the forest at the new residential unit. She also will retain the rights to exploit the forest where her patri-clan has access (Biesbrouck 1999b:22).

If a woman becomes widowed she still maintains access to her deceased husband's area of the forest, unless she remarries in which case she will have access to her new husband's section. If a divorce occurs, she will lose the rights to her husband's section. Never, however, can the rights to the section of her father or her mother's brothers be taken away. Just as a woman will receive access to her husband's kin networks of forests, the husband will receive access to his wife's kin network during marriage (Biesbrouck 1999b:22-23).

The Bagyeli recognize the decline in the forest's productivity. These changes include species of animals and plants becoming rare. Logging is understood to be a main contributor to the depletion of the forest. Still most feel that the forest will never come to an end and cannot imagine life without it (Biesbrouck 1999b:18).

One law that has the potential to affect the Bagyeli's access to the forest is the 1994 Forest Law. The law "imposes a forestry regime by regulating access to and exploitation of movable forest resources, such as trees, wildlife and fish. Forests are defined by their physical appearance and include all land covered by vegetation with a

predominance of trees, shrubs and other plant species. The law makers declared the state the sole guardian and chief manager of all forests in the country, and thereby granted the state the exclusive right to exclude and allocate rights to economically exploit forest resources to the local population and corporate companies” (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:31). Although the law is enforced sporadically; it has made selling forest products forbidden, which has affected the Bagyeli’s selling of medicinal plants (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000:35).

CHAPTER FOUR


THE OIL PIPELINE PROJECT

Background

Oil was discovered in Chad in 1974. Because of armed conflict in the area, further development of the oil fields stopped in 1979 (Horta 2002). In 1998 an oil consortium, which at the time consisted of ExxonMobil, Elf and Shell, signed an agreement with Chad to exploit oil fields in the Doba region for a period of thirty years (Delescluse 2004:44). In 1994, it was discovered that there were approximately one billion barrels of oil in the area. However, there was a seemingly overwhelming problem of how to get the oil out of Chad, which is landlocked. The options of by road, railroad, and by pipeline were considered (Thurow & Warren 2003:A1).

By 2000, Elf and Shell had dropped out of the consortium and ChevronTexaco and Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), the Malaysian State oil company took their slots. ExxonMobil, through its subsidiary company Esso, has a 40% interest in the consortium and is the operator for the project. ChevronTexaco has 25% interest and PETRONAS has 35% (True 2003:74). The most cost effect means of transporting the oil was determined to be a pipeline, which would start at the Doba oil fields and traverse the whole of Cameroon to the Atlantic Ocean. The project cost around \$3.7 billion and consisted of approximately 300 wells in three oilfields and 1,070 kilometers of pipeline, which includes 11 kilometers of offshore pipeline (Delescluse 2004:44). (see Figure 4.1)

Figure 4.1 Map of Oil Pipeline



Source: Esso 1999

Before the project was put into effect, the consortium insisted on World Bank financial involvement. The World Bank approved, providing financial assistance, and although the total given was small compared to the overall costs of the project, ExxonMobil stated that the project would not continue without this support. There are two reasons for this. First is that the World Bank would provide political risk insurance because no government can afford to be on the Bank's bad side when it comes time to fund other projects. Second, having the World Bank's participation would open avenues for other sources of funding. Other funding sources that came to support the project included the European Investment Bank (144 million Euros), the U.S. Export-Import Bank (\$200 million), COFACE (\$200 million), and commercial banks such as Citi,

ABN-Amro, and Crédit Agricole Indosuez (Horta 2002; Horta et al 2002; Nguiffo 2002:3).

The World Bank put out a project information document that states why it felt the need to become involved in oil development.

The World Bank's priority in Chad and Cameroon is to help reduce poverty and build a basis for sustained growth. The proposed project provides a unique opportunity to improve the development prospects of Chad by generating substantial additional fiscal revenues and foreign exchange (currently estimated at about \$80 million per year and about \$1.5-2.5 billion over the 25-year production life of the project, depending upon world prices for oil and the volume of production from the fields). The Bank is considering providing funding for the project to help generate additional revenues to finance education, health and infrastructure expenditures and other growth and poverty alleviation activities, and provide a more sustainable fiscal and balance of payments outlook. As such, the project represents an important element in the Bank's country assistance strategy for Chad. The project will generate about \$500 million for Cameroon over the production life of the project which will help to finance public expenditures. World Bank Group involvement would: support the efforts of Chad and Cameroon to ensure that the project is designed and carried out in a manner that serves and protects their national interests; ensure greater public consultation, local participation, and attention to environmental and other socio-economic issues; and help to attract \$3 billion in private investment to the region that would generate about \$2.5-3 billion in additional revenues for Chad and Cameroon over the 25-year period of operations. [World Bank 1999:10]

The project information document goes on to state what benefits would occur through World Bank participation.

There are several benefits:

- i. The project must comply with the Bank's environmental, resettlement, natural habitat, indigenous peoples and other environmental and social safeguard policies. Environmental

assessment reports are available through the Public Information Center/InfoShop.

- ii. The World Bank is supporting the Chadian Government in designing a program to support the management of its petroleum and other fiscal revenues.
- iii. The World Bank is providing financial and technical assistance to the Governments of Chad and Cameroon to help protect their environment and other national interests.
- iv. The World Bank Group's involvement would provide political risk mitigation for the \$3 billion in foreign direct investment needed to generate the \$2.5-3 billion in petroleum revenues for Chad and Cameroon over the 28-year production period. [World Bank 1999:12]

Overall, the World Bank, through the IBRD, contributed \$93 million in loans.

This is split between Chad and Cameroon to help finance their respective parts in the project. \$40 million went to Chad and \$53 million went to Cameroon. Also the IFC and IDA made \$200 million available in loans for construction and capacity building. The IDA also gave two specific loans for capacity building, one to Chad for \$41.2 million and one to Cameroon for \$5.8 million (Norland 2003:52).

Construction for the project in Chad included development wells, water reinjection wells, a central treating facility, connecting pipelines, an electric power generation plant, a warehouse, a maintenance operations training center, an airfield, an office, housing facilities, separation and storage tanks, 170 kilometers of pipeline, one pumping station, and “other ancillary facilities and infrastructure”. In Cameroon, construction included over 880 kilometers of pipeline, two pumping stations, an offshore floating storage and offloading facility, and 11 kilometers of underwater pipeline (IBRD 2001:34; World Bank 2000:1-2).

The pipeline is 760 millimeters in diameter and is buried one meter below the ground (Esso 2003:2). The system easement needed for the installation of the pipeline

was 30 meters. Now that the pipeline is up and running a 15-meter easement will be maintained over the pipeline (see Photos 4.1-4.4). Almost all the equipment and material needed for the construction of the oil wells and pipeline had to be imported into Cameroon and Chad. Overall, 480,000 metric tons of construction freight was shipped to the two countries. This is equivalent to 6 Washington monuments or 50 Eiffel Towers. For the pipeline alone, 88,000 lengths of pipe were imported from Germany and France (Esso 2003:2-3). Pipeline construction was the responsibility of two companies, Willbros West Africa and Spie-Capag (Hart's 2000:1).

Photos 4.1-4.4 Oil Pipeline System Easement



The project was completed in July 2003. The oilfields are owned one hundred percent by the consortium, while the pipeline is owned and operated by the Tchad Oil Transportation Company (TOTCO) and the Cameroon Oil Transport Corporation

(COTCO). The consortium owns 80% of these two companies, but Chad has interests in both companies and Cameroon has interests in COTCO (Pipelines 2000; Walters 2002). The oil consortium will receive 55% of the overall returns, the government of Chad will receive 36%, and the government of Cameroon will receive 9% (Norland 2003:52). The source of Cameroon's revenue will come from a transit fee paid by COTCO. This fee gives Cameroon \$.41 for every barrel of oil that is transported through the pipeline and then sold (Esso 2004). Overall, it is estimated that the project only contributed 0.7% growth to Cameroon's GDP. This has been attributed to the amount of material that was imported for the project. Cameroon is expected to get approximately \$20 million per year in revenue for the 28-year expected life of the pipeline (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004:32).

The first shipment of oil happened in October 2003. By the end of 2004, 70 million barrels of oil had been shipped to markets around the world (see Table 4.1). In the fourth quarter of 2004 alone, 22 tankers shipped 18.7 million barrels of oil (Esso 2004).

Table 4.1 Production Statistics for 2004
(net volume of shipments from marine terminal)

	1st Qtr 2004	2nd Qtr 2004	3rd Qtr 2004	4th Qtr 2004	Total 2004	Project To Date
Millions of Barrels	9.5	15.1	18.1	18.7	61.4	70.0
Export Tankers	10	16	20	22	68	77

Source: Esso 2004

In the summer of 2004, Cameroon held an inauguration ceremony in Kribi. The ceremony involved speeches, traditional dancing, and a ceremonial valve turning at the terminus of the pipeline. In attendance were five African heads of state (Esso 2004). As is common in Cameroon for official ceremonies, people from the nearby districts were

trucked in to help lend credence to the event. Almost everyone, both villager and Bagyeli, from Kouambo and neighboring villages went to the inauguration ceremony. Government officials especially wanted the Bagyeli to attend to provide the traditional dancing. The transport, while crowded and uncomfortable, is free and normally food is provided during the stay. Unfortunately, the ceremony coincided with my attack of malaria and I was not able to attend.

Possible Risks and Assessments

Because of the large scale environmental, social, and health problems that could be exacerbated by the pipeline project, the oil consortium completed a nineteen volume study that describes in detail the possible impacts of the project and steps the consortium would take to mitigate the risks. All nineteen volumes and many supporting documents are available on ExxonMobil's website. This section deals with the risks that were expected and what were the actual results.

Health and General Well-being

There are many health risks associated with the pipeline (see Table 4.2). Perhaps the most serious is the risk of rising HIV/AIDS rates, but there is also a risk of increasing malaria, TB, and other illnesses. These risks were laid out clearly in a World Bank credit document.

It is expected that there will be an increase in STDs/AIDS, mostly in the zones near project facilities and to a lesser extent in construction areas. There also will be an increase in trauma (i.e., accidents), especially during construction. Moreover, if population density increases due to the project, it could remain higher after the end of construction

than before the project started, which would also impact on health issues in the area. Under the Environmental Management Plan...and the petroleum environmental capacity building operations for Chad and Cameroon...various steps are planned to mitigate these impacts. Other effects may develop, not so much as a direct impact of the project, but rather as a consequence of increased revenues; these include: increased tobacco use with subsequent respiratory problems and alcoholism. Respiratory problems might also increase during the construction period, but there is very little documented evidence of causal links between dust due to construction and respiratory diseases. Proper quantification of such health risks is a very difficult task. While additional health costs may be associated with the implementation of the project, as indicated above, specific activities addressing health risks will be carried out by the Private Sponsors and by Chad and Cameroon and should produce net health benefits. Use of oil revenues in key social sectors, particularly in the health sector, should also lead to important, yet unquantifiable, health benefits. [World Bank 2000:74-75]

They also state in their project information document,

In Cameroon, spontaneous in-migration to the Atlantic coastal area is expected to be limited by the low number of jobs available and the relatively unattractive environment in terms of disease and low agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, the resident population, including the vulnerable Bakola people, will be affected by the arrival of construction workers and their camp followers and by the loss of forest resources. Elsewhere in Cameroon, significant social impacts are not expected as a result of pipeline construction or operation. Public health will be a concern both in the construction worker community and in the project affected communities. The potential spread of HIV/AIDS is of particular concern, as well as the spread of insect- and water-borne diseases such as malaria, onchocerciasis, and schistosomiasis. Tuberculosis, hepatitis, and diarrhea are also common problems in the forest zones. As medical services are virtually unavailable, except in the vicinity of Yaoundé, the project sponsors will implement a program of health outreach to local communities, in addition to taking responsibility for the health and safety of workers. [World Bank 1999:23-24]

Esso also voices its concern over the possible increase of HIV/AIDS in its project documents. “Therefore, if low-risk groups, e.g., rural population, come in contact with high-risk groups, e.g., commercial sex workers and their male clients, the opportunity to generate an epidemic is substantial. For example, the altered contact and mixing of different subgroups that can occur between truckers, their contacts and then their spouses and/or girlfriends can amplify the basic case reproduction rate” (Esso 1999b:5.7).

In order to avoid the risk of increased HIV/AIDS, Esso developed a multi-pronged program. The first step was the education of all project workers in the prevention of HIV. The second step was to distribute free condoms to all of its workers. The third step was to screen employees for STIs. Also, Esso posted educational billboards and had a touring educational van, which toured the oilfield villages in Chad (Esso 2001). While it is honorable that Esso and the World Bank were aware of the risks and developed some kind of program, their efforts are not enough. HIV is a disease of poverty and education alone will not lower the risk. Also, any program that aims at decreasing HIV needs to include treatment and an increase in testing capability.

A journalist, writing for the Washington Post, documented the prostitution problem in Kome, Chad.

In Kome, however, the main beneficiaries so far have been commercial sex workers and the village chief, who opened a popular bar for Americans called the Phoenix Club. American oil workers donated a generator to the club so they could play music, watch videos and make ice to keep their beer cold.

Samantha NgoMaben popped on her hoop earrings, slithered into her purple faux leather pants and showed off her new tank top with its sticky Playgirls logo. “They’re all from my American oil boyfriend,” cooed NgoMaben, a prostitute, as she pushed her head through the lace curtain

covering the door to her tiny room. She pointed across the road to the oil fields. "I have so many American boyfriends," she said. "I tell the white Americans from Texas, 'Keep coming. At least you will make us girls rich.'"

With her 4-year-old daughter clutching her hand, Celica Bessong, an immigrant from the Central African Republic, admitted that she didn't have any stylish clothing. Yet. She pulled out three photographs of herself posing on a sofa in her underwear. She would use the photos to entice her American customers. "We need the money," she said with a shrug.

"The truth is a lot of people didn't get the jobs they hoped for," said Miskine Magadi, the village chief, who also opened a maze of one-room attached huts behind the bar that the commercial sex workers rent. "People here are suffering. They don't even have food to eat."

In a nearby village, Taraseem Pelagie, 35, said her 14-year-old daughter got pregnant because "she wanted to make some quick money" with a man they thought worked for the oil company. He had lied to her.

Another woman, Ashta Salieh, said her husband had been given a job at the oil plant but recently died of AIDS. He was making enough money to take a second wife, who was infected. Now Salieh worries she might have contracted HIV, too.

Esso Chad has posted a billboard on an unpaved road that snakes into town. It shows a man kneeling in front of his wife and offers advice on how to achieve an AIDS-free petroleum zone: "Be faithful to your wife. Avoid AIDS." [Wax 2004:A16]

A related problem is that the people who migrated into Chad and Cameroon for work on the pipeline as construction workers, truck drivers, or as prostitutes will eventually return home when their jobs have ended. This could lead to the spread of HIV in other regions of Chad and Cameroon and other African countries as well (Silverstein 2003d:A1). Also, there could be an increase of HIV among young girls in both Chad and Cameroon because of the increase in child prostitution. Some men seek out young girls

as a form of protection against HIV. Often the families of the young girls, who have no other means, see this as the only possibility to survive (Nguiffo 2002:11).

In my research area around the Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf road, there seemed to be few active programs for the prevention or treatment of HIV. While there had been some educational programs, testing and treatment is almost non-existent. There is a Committee for SIDA in Kouambo that serves the surrounding area. This is a provincial committee installed by the minister of public health. When speaking to the minister of the program, who was working on and off during my stay because he was sick with malaria, he stated that the program started in January of 2004 and he received funding for six months. He was unsure if the program would receive funds to continue longer. The program has five field teachers that travel throughout the area to educate people about HIV. The minister was adamant that “since the construction of the pipeline the level of HIV in the area increased”. He stated that “most of the cases are hidden because some people cannot afford to go where they could get tested and also others were afraid of testing positive and being stigmatized and abandoned”.

He also said that malaria was a big problem in the area (which he knew first hand) and stated that COTCO was supposed to supply the village with mosquito nets but never did. He did know of areas that had received nets. He said, “The other two biggest health problems that the village had were TB and STIs”. Indeed, one person in the village died of TB while I was there and others in her family were ill. He ended our conversation by stating, “everyone was optimistic that the project would change their lives for the better but they got nothing. The people in charge of the project and COTCO did nothing to help the health of the population”.

Another major health problem in Cameroon is cholera. There was a major outbreak in Douala while I was there. There have also been cholera outbreaks in my research area. While Esso describes cholera as being traced to poor water and poor sanitation, the initiative attached to the pipeline project is one that aims to educate people at the neighborhood and household level (Esso 2004). As with AIDS, cholera is a disease of poverty. If poor water quality is the cause, education will not solve the problem, clean water will.

Quality of water is a major problem throughout the length of the pipeline. Out of one hundred villages that the pipeline travels by, only 10% have a drinking water system (Yimga and Hilbert 2002:15). Esso knows that potable water is a problem for many villages and that poor water is causing cholera outbreaks but in a sample public consultation question and answer summary this is what was said about village water sources, *“We have a water problem in this village. The only well in the village is dry. What are you going to do for water for your camps? We will use trucks to supply our small temporary camps with water. At major installations, we will drill our own wells and will not use the water in the village. Our well is in a glade and dead leaves keep falling into it. The water is not potable. What are you going to do? We prefer not to get involved with the village water supply. We foresee drilling wells in some of our installations that will be left for the villages after our departure”* (Esso 1999d:9).

One last health problem is the prevalence of Hepatitis C Virus (HCV). Amongst the forest population in southern Cameroon, the prevalence rate is 13%. This compares to a prevalence rate of less than 1.5% in Europe and the United States. Because the transmission for HIV and HCV is the same (blood contact, sexual relations), it is feared

that the forest population are at a risk for rapid spread of HIV if it was introduced into rural populations (Kowo et al 1995:485-496). It is estimated that before the pipeline, the Bagyeli had an HIV rate of below 1.6% (Esso 1999b:5.11).

Table 4.2 Health Statistics for Pipeline Workers in 2004

	Number of Diagnoses				
	1Q2004	2Q2004	3Q2004	4Q2004	Cumulative Total 2004
Chad					
STDs	21	21	31	39	112
SSS* Events (excluding Malaria and STDs)	7	9	17	9	42
Hospitalization	1	0	0	0	1
Medevacs	2	1	0	0	3
Cameroon					
STDs	69	33	31	29	162
SSS* Events (excluding Malaria and STDs)	0	0	0	0	0
Hospitalization	0	0	0	0	0
Medevacs	1	0	0	0	1
*SSS: Early warning system used to identify changes in disease rates. Some examples of disease covered by SSS include gastrointestinal, dermal and respiratory diseases.					

Source: Esso 2004

Environment

One potential environmental impact of the project is the loss of wildlife. Esso lays out four main reasons that wildlife could be impacted both temporarily and permanently. The first is through the loss of habitat due to the land needed for the pipeline. Second is the fragmentation of habitat due to the pipeline easement. Third is increased hunting and poaching through increased access and also through the rise in

population due to the pipeline workers. Fourth is wildlife being scared off due to the noise of the machinery (Esso 1999d:25). Poaching is an increasing problem due to the popularity of bushmeat. In large cities such as Yaoundé and Douala, some types of bushmeat are considered exotic and a delicacy, which many higher-class restaurants cater to. At the same time, there is large demand for bushmeat as street-food both in the larger cities and in the more rural areas (Esso 1999c:B.1). There was little the consortium could do to offset the loss of land in the project area although they did create two national parks, which will be discussed in more detail in a latter section. In order to control the loss of wildlife due to increased hunting and poaching, the consortium prohibited hunting and trading of bushmeat by their workers. They also provisioned food for the project workers (World Bank 1999:24).

Another problem, which has both social and environmental implications, is the maintenance of the system easement. When the pipeline was built, the system easement was 30 meters. Now that the pipeline is up and running, a 15 meter system easement has to be maintained over the pipeline in order to prevent damage to the line. Within the 15 meters, trees and bushes are not allowed to grow. Also, no structures are allowed to be built within the easement. In addition, trees that are outside the 15-meter easement may be trimmed or cut down if they obstruct the aerial view of the pipeline. Esso claims that cultivation of crops is allowed in the easement as long as digging does not exceed 60 centimeters in depth. They also state that the usage of herbicides to control vegetation is not planned (IBRD 2001:48-49; Esso 1999c:2.3). However, during a conversation with a worker whose job it was to maintain the system easement in my research area, he claimed that herbicides were being used and crops as well as other plants were subjected to the

herbicide or cut down. Monitoring the system easement requires aerial patrol by helicopter at least once a month. Also, workers walk the line to further monitor activities and to clear the easement (IBRD 2001:49).

Of major concern is the possibility of oil spills. The consortium’s Environmental Management Plan (EMP) requires that all spills that occur in a wetland area or in a body of water must be reported no matter the size of the spill. Also, spills on land must be reported if they are greater than 150 liters in volume. There are three reportable levels of environmental non-compliance situations. Level I is “early warning”, where there is no significant impact to an identified sensitive resource but there is a situation that is not consistent with the EMP. Level II is “expeditious action required”, where the non-compliance situation could give rise to a serious impact to an identified sensitive resource. Level III is “serious”, where there is an impact to an identified sensitive resource. In the fourth quarter of 2004, field monitors recorded eight Level I environmental non-compliance situations and one minor spill (see Table 4.3). In total, there were six reportable oil spills in 2004 (Esso 2004). There is no data in regards to the size of the spill or location on land or in water.

Table 4.3 Total Reportable Situations by Country for 2004

	Level I	Level II	Level III	Total Non-Compliance Situations	Compliance Initiatives	Reportable Spills
Chad	14	3	0	17	0	5
Cameroon	10	4	0	14	0	1
Total	24	7	0	31	0	6

Source: Esso 2004

Related to the worry of oil spills is the offshore loading facility located near Kribi. Most of the inhabitants of Kribi and along the Atlantic coast rely on fishing and tourism for survival. Of concern is the fact that the loading facility where oil is stored before

being loaded onto tankers is a single-hulled vessel (Horta 2000b). Esso had the following to say about their decision to use a single-hulled vessel,

Both a double hull and a single hull FSO (Floating Storage and Offloading) were evaluated for use during early project planning and design stages. International regulations now in force will cause the industry to phase out the use of single hull tankers and convert to double hull tankers by the year 2015. However, these international regulations, as amended, specifically exclude FSOs that are moored on a fixed location, as will be the case for this project. The reason for the exclusion is that moored FSOs are at significantly less risk from high energy collision and grounding than conventional trading tankers. In addition, favorable site conditions and other project safeguards will also help to minimize the potential for other vessels to collide with the FSO. These features include: dedicated guard vessel, sites surveillance, designated exclusion zone, navigation aids, weathervaning, mooring configuration, marine operating procedures, oil storage management, selective ballast tank locations, and fenders. [Esso 1999d:5.6-5.7]

The main difference for oil companies when deciding between a single hull and double hull vessel is cost. If regulations do not require a double hulled vessel when moored, then a single hulled vessel is the most cost effective option even if the risks of spills are higher.

The opening of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline has led to an increase in oil exploration throughout Central and West Africa. In Chad, EnCana Corporation holds a 50% interest in oil exploration that covers over 108 million gross acres. The area covers a vast majority of the country and includes the seven sedimentary basins of Lake Chad, Bongor, Logone-Birni, West Doba, Doseo, Salamat, and Erdis. The corporation stated that the pipeline has made exploration in these areas feasible (Petzet 2004:43). Cameroon is also planning on allowing exploration in areas that were not economically

feasible until the construction of the pipeline (Ford 2003:25). The President of the Central African Republic (CAR) has stated that by 2005, oil from his country will be traveling through the pipeline. There is also speculation of exploration in Niger (Djiraibe et al 2002:7; Petzet 2003:46).

Monitoring the environmental situation along the pipeline is the responsibility of three groups: the Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractors, COTCO and TOTCO, and the governments of Chad and Cameroon. The EPC contractors were responsible for environmental monitoring during the construction of the pipeline. Their duties were reviewed and assessed by COTCO and TOTCO. During the operational phase, most of the environmental monitoring activities are the responsibility of COTCO and TOTCO. However, COTCO has only budgeted \$500,000 per year for its monitoring duties. The governments of Chad and Cameroon are supposed to monitor and assess COTCO and TOTCO's environmental performance. While this arrangement places ultimate responsibility for environmental management on the governments, the EMP states that the government of Cameroon will need financial and technical support before it will be able to efficiently monitor or counteract any environmental impacts of the pipeline project (Horta 2000a).

In order to boost Cameroon's capacity for environmental management, the IDA approved a loan of 4.3 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR), equivalent to \$5.77 million. The loan aims at strengthening the institutional, regulatory and legal framework of Cameroon; strengthening coordinating capacities for environmental management; strengthening public intervention capacity for environmental management, which includes improving health centers, acquiring equipment and medical supplies, and

creating an oil spill response plan; and improving project management, monitoring and evaluation. The goals of the loan are expected to be met by June 30, 2005 almost two years after the first oil flowed through the pipeline and five years after construction began (IDA 2000:14-15).

The main goal of the loan was to create the Cameroon Petroleum Environmental Capacity Enhancement Project (CAPECE). The World Bank expects the implementation of CAPECE to establish national environmental standards and norms in the petroleum sector, ensure that the pipeline project meets environmental standards and norms, develop Cameroon's capacity to monitor and mitigate environmental impacts of large-scale projects, and ensure that environmental information is distributed to all "relevant" stakeholders (World Bank 2000:1). The World Bank states that the benefits for Cameroon include,

- environmental risks will be identified at an early stage, enabling mitigating action to be triggered within an appropriate timeframe,
- the net environmental impacts of the petroleum sector development will be positive; in particular, the tourism potential of the Kribi area will be maintained,
- the environmental offsite enhancements and the IPP (Indigenous Peoples Plan) will be implemented, and will improve governance performance of Cameroon in environmental management,
- the potential for social conflicts in the pipeline area will be minimized,
- environmental management capacity in Cameroon will be enhanced in the petroleum sector in a transparent and visible way; this in turn will help strengthen overall environmental management systems in the country and attract more foreign investment, and
- public opinion will become more aware of the environmental safeguards built into the project; this will demonstrate the benefit of conducting environmental assessment of large infrastructure projects, thereby creating a constituency for more sustainable

development in Cameroon in the future. [World Bank 2000:8]

The Bagyeli and the Indigenous Peoples Plan

“Keeping Pygmies in their current pristine state means they will keep dying of tuberculosis at the age of 30,” (Andre Madec, ExxonMobil’s development executive for the pipeline. Quoted in Silverstein 2003b)

“Change is inevitable even in the absence of the pipeline. The Project will accelerate change in the Project area, but through the IPP, negative impacts can be minimized and beneficial impacts maximized. In the long-term, the IPP can be implemented in a manner which will improve the existing conditions of the Pygmies in the Project area” (Esso 1999:5.10).

The Indigenous Peoples Plan (IPP) was created in addition to the EMP to help mitigate the specific impacts the pipeline construction would have on the Bagyeli. In creation of the IPP, 40 Bagyeli settlements less than 3000 meters from the pipeline were consulted. The IPP states that the village of Kouambo was consulted twice, once in 1997 and once in 1998. Below are some highlights of the IPP,

This IPP covers Bakola Pygmies and Bantu villagers in the rural Project area between Kribi and Lolodorf. However, the primary emphasis of the Plan is to address health, education, and agricultural needs issues specific to an estimated 1,000 Bakola Pygmies living in the area. This is because:

- Of their sensitivity to the ecological environment and dependence on forest resources.

- Of their limited ability to enter into and participate in many aspects of mainstream Cameroonian life due to pre-existing socioeconomic prejudice based on their way-of-life and physical appearance.
- They experience higher rates of disease, which when coupled with poor access to health facilities, places them at higher risk than neighboring Bantu villagers.
- They have limited access to schooling; hence little formal schooling, and little motivation to seek it.
- Their agricultural production is poor, in part due to having little limited training in methods to promote even average yields and long-absences from settlements to hunt. [Esso 1999:1.1-1.2]

Several short-term impacts on Bakola Pygmies that are potentially associated with the Project were identified:

- Short-term impacts include the potential for disturbing wildlife for a 30- to 60- day period resulting in temporary reduction of hunting catches.
- The presence of numerous construction workers for periods of weeks or months will noticeably increase the local population, with the following potential effects:
 - Increase in hunting pressures.
 - Impacts on Bakola supply of starchy food if prices rose due to construction workers buying cassava.
 - Exposure to disease vectors from outside workers

Potential long-term effects on Bakola Pygmies that are potentially associated with the Project include:

- Potential for Bakola Pygmy settlements to move because of the Project.
- If permanent employment occurred, the influx of workers could unbalance long-term wild species survival, including some species that are officially protected. At present, animal resources in the area do not renew sufficiently fast to cope with the nutritional needs of the larger population centers in the area.
- Temporary modifications in the trade and exchange system between Bakola Pygmies and Bantu villagers. [Esso 1999:2.1-2.2]

In regards to compensation, the IPP states,

The Bakola and Bantu villagers will receive compensation for lost land or crops at the same standard rates as all other Cameroonian citizens...In addition, special compensation

provisions are suggested to meet the special needs and concerns of the Bakola Pygmies... With regard to compensation, the team explained that:

- Compensation would be paid for damages done to improvements and other replaceable items, including crops/fields and important medicinal and fruit trees, and
- That compensation could be received either as cash and/or in-kind. During this consultation the Bakola Pygmies expressed a preference for in-kind compensation instead of cash. Since there are no banks in the area, money can be stolen, and local leaders indicated that money tends to be spent on non-essential items such as alcoholic beverages. To the extent practical, Bakola Pygmies will be paid in-kind such as with building material (corrugated iron sheets for the roofs), machetes, and lamps. In addition to this IPP, benefits the Bakola Pygmies can obtain through the compensation process, are:
 1. Individual compensation: but this was limited due to the fact that the pipeline routing avoided Pygmy settlements.
 2. Regional compensation: It provides for Pygmies, as well as Bantus, hence it is not a Pygmy specific compensation [Esso 1999:2.4]

The compensation guidelines for the Bagyeli make a point of stating that compensation was paid to the owners of the crops and not the owners of the land. This is an important distinction to make because the Bagyeli do not have legal claim to the land they cultivate. However, the guidelines go on to state that during the compensation process, the village chief and bush-cutters always accompanied the compensation team from the village (Esso 1999c:C.2). The presence of villagers, who have more power in the village structure than the Bagyeli, puts the Bagyeli at a disadvantage. It has been reported that through this process, the villagers claimed fields that were actually cultivated by the Bagyeli. Because of the uneven power structure, the Bagyeli have no recourse when this occurs (Nelson 2002).

The IPP also states that most Bagyeli preferred in-kind compensation to monetary compensation. Most of the in-kind compensation was in the form of corrugated iron sheets to use as roofing if the compensation was enough to cover a roof. Also given were machetes, kerosene lamps, and kitchen utensils (Esso 1999c:C.2). What this amounted to were people in a base-camp who believed they would get material to build a roof and they did not. Instead, in most base-camps, they received enough iron for one roof. This has led to an increase in jealousy and a subsequent increase in accusations of witchcraft. As for the regional compensation, once again because of the uneven power structure in the villages, the Bagyeli had little say over what compensation to choose.

The following is a sampling of what the IPP claims the Bagyeli said they needed during consultation interviews,

The interviews conducted in each Bakola settlement are very consistent. Problems, common to many settlements, that were raised during the interviews include: A strong desire to improve agriculture. They need: tools, seeds and regular technical assistance to improve agricultural production. As it becomes more and more difficult to survive from a hunting-gathering economy all settlements wish to increase their agricultural fields. Many asked for chain saws to clear the forest. Improvement of agriculture would not only lead to better nutrition, but many insist on its importance as a source of revenue. Lack of appropriate medical care because of the distance to health centers, and especially because of the price of treatments. For example, the cost of the first two months of treatment for tuberculosis is 40,000 FCFA (later the amount of drugs is decreased, but the treatment has to be conducted over one year). The treatment of a hernia (which, in case of strangulation, is a medical emergency, and the cause of death for many people), is 40,000 FCFA for Pygmies (and more for villagers). [Esso 1999:3.11-3.12]

This section is important because throughout the interviews I conducted, many Bagyeli did express the need for seeds and better basic tools to grow crops. However, not

one informant expressed the desire to increase agricultural yields. Perhaps this is a desire of some Bagyeli, but overall I found this not to be the case. Also, increasing agricultural production does not increase nutrition.

The price of medical treatments, the distance to clinics and the clinics' quality are very important. Here is further clarification on what the IPP states should be done for medical care:

As the IPP plans to consider global health for Bakola and Bantu villagers in the Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf area, it is important to support existing health centers instead of creating village pharmacies, except between Bandevouri and Kribi (35 km), where no medical facility exists. Each center should have at least a petrol refrigerator and appropriate small equipment for sterilization, deliveries, and small surgery, and a microscope for biological investigations on blood and stools. An electric generator would be very useful, and each center's principal nurse (in Kribi, Bandevouri, Grand-Zambi, Bipindi, and Bidjouka at least) should receive a motorcycle. A system to deliver medical care to Pygmies at lower prices should be studied. Very expensive drugs (for tuberculosis and AIDS) should be provided free for everybody. Some funding should be devoted to epidemiological surveys (AIDS in particular, because medical authorities have no precise idea of the prevalence of the disease among the population). Importance of the involvement of local services in epidemiological studies of national institutes has been emphasized. It is also very important that local health professionals receive regular training. [Esso 1999:3.13-3.14]

The project did nothing to improve these conditions in my research area. The staff at the hospital in Bipindi had not been paid for 18 months. The doctor left and the nurse remained, doing what he could for no pay. There was little in the way of medical supplies and almost no medicine. Patients have to pay for everything from needles to gauze (see Photos 4.5-4.9).

Photos 4.5-4.8 Hospital at Bipindi



When I arrived at the base-camp in Kouambo, the head of the household (John) had an infection from a cut on his leg. He could not move and was in great pain. I got him to show me the wound and it was clear that the infection was spreading. There was no way for him to walk the four kilometers into Bipindi even if he could afford the medical costs so I arranged for the nurse to come out to the base-camp. The nurse treated him with what supplies he had but I had to take a trip to Lolodorf to get antibiotics and tetanus medication. By the end of my fieldwork, John was able to go out on daylong hunting excursions. There is a Catholic run mission near Lolodorf where the Bagyeli can be treated for free, but that is 45 kilometers away. To make this trip, one would either have to have enough money to pay for transportation or walk.

The IPP has a specific plan for TB.

The Chad Export Project has recently initiated a tuberculosis control program for the benefit of both the Bakola Pygmies and Bantu villagers in the Lolodorf-Kribi area. This program could be expanded. The control program is centered in Ngovayang, Bipindi, and Lolodorf. At each location, a medical team including a physician, a nurse, and two lab technicians, will spend three days performing TB screening tests. About 10 percent of the local Bakola Pygmy population (or ~250 persons) and four percent of the villager population (or ~400 persons) will be screened by skin test. Bacterial diagnosis will follow for those who test positive. Following the screening effort, a health trainer will visit each of the screening locations. The trainer will educate the community regarding the signs and symptoms of TB and measures to reduce exposure for the families of TB-infected patients. He/she will also dispense the medication to the patients and train the patients in the proper administration of the TB treatment. (Esso 1999:5.5)

Not a single one of my informants had heard of this program. Also, as I stated previously, one villager in Kouambo died of TB while I was conducting my fieldwork and others were ill.

One means of offsetting the loss of biodiversity for the Bagyeli was to create two national parks including Campo-Ma'an. There have been more problems associated with the park than benefits, however. Concessions for logging have already been granted inside the park's boundaries (Horta 2001). The budget given for the creation and maintenance of the parks was only \$3.5 million (World Bank 2000:3). The Foundation for Development and Environment in Cameroon (FEDEC) was created to oversee the implementation of the IPP and the newly created parks. It is widely acknowledged that FEDEC is less than effective (Yimga and Hilbert 2002:14). There has also been controversy over the Bagyeli right to exploit resources from the park.

Compensation

The total compensation for individual land use that was paid out by the project is around \$13 million; this includes cash and in-kind payments. In the fourth quarter of 2004, \$148 thousand in compensation was paid in Chad and \$18 thousand in compensation was paid in Cameroon. Community and regional compensation in Cameroon totaled \$2.8 million and benefited 266 villages (Esso 2004). Resources eligible for compensation included food and cash crops; fruit, medicinal trees, and plants; forest resources that can be traced back to individual proprietors; houses and other constructions; and sacred sites such as graves, sacred trees, and other sacred items (Esso 1999c:C.1).

Esso stated that, “the overall goal of this Plan is to ensure fair and adequate compensation to affected individual and communities. The overall guiding principles of the Plan are: Affected people’s standard of living will not be less than their current conditions when compensation is complete. Both holders of legal title to land and land users are compensated. Is provided in a timely manner that assures the land is available for use when needed for Project construction and operations. Compensation is perceived as fair by local population” (Esso 1999c:1.4).

The problems with compensation specific to the Bagyeli were discussed earlier but there were also problems in the overall compensation plan. People could choose between cash compensation and in-kind compensation. If they opted for in-kind compensation, they were shown a catalog full of items they could choose from such as bicycles, sewing machines, and plows. One could choose the item(s) wanted as long as they were not worth more than the amount of compensation. However, many people

have complained about the quality of the items given, with many of them falling apart after a couple of months (Thurow & Warren 2003:A1).

Regional compensation was also fraught with problems. As stated earlier most Bagyeli were not involved in deciding community compensation. Also, community compensation had to be chosen from a list of options and a village could only choose options that coincided with the amount of compensation they had (Yimga and Hilbert 2002:14). In Kouambo, the community compensation was a football (soccer) field. The villagers told me that they were informed this would be a facility with seating where regional matches could be held and would bring income into the community. In the end, all that happened was a field was cleared of trees. The villagers were upset because they could have cleared a field themselves and there were other items that the village really needed (see Photo 4.9).

Photo 4.9 Football Field



CHAPTER FIVE

THE PLAYERS INVOLVED

“Life in the world of oil is such that morals will never have a place in it (Loic le Floch-Prigent, ex CEO of Elf-Aquitaine. Quoted in Nguiffo and Breitkopf 2001:1).

“The biggest thing this company can bring to some of these countries is the opportunity to see capitalism and the free market work. Am I comfortable with everything the government of Chad does? No. Am I comfortable with the concept that we’re now going to give the Chadian people an opportunity to improve their lot through economic development? Extremely comfortable” (Lee R. Raymond, President and CEO of ExxonMobil. Quoted in Bianco et al 2001:58).

The Corporations

Corporations are directed by a small group of people with very powerful networks. The corporations themselves are not actors and the decision makers are often hidden. This chapter analyzes the few elites that control the corporations in the consortium of oil companies.

ExxonMobil

ExxonMobil is based in Irving, Texas and is ranked number two, just behind Wal-Mart, in the Fortune 500. ExxonMobil earned \$213.2 billion in revenues in 2003 up 16.8% from 2002. If ranked by profits, ExxonMobil is number one earning \$21.5 billion up 87.7% since 2002 (Fortune 2004:B-1). Interestingly, the fastest growing industry

ranked by revenues is the pipeline industry and the most profitable industry ranked by return on revenues is mining, crude oil production (Fortune 2004:F-25-F-26). (see Table 5.1 for 2000 figures)

Table 5.1 Oil Income for 2000

Company	Sales (Billions)	Net Income (Billions)	Return on Capital Employed
ExxonMobil	\$232.7	\$17.7	21%
Royal Dutch/Shell	\$191.5	\$12.7	22%
BP Amoco	\$148.1	\$11.9	14%

Source: Bianco et al 2001:58

ExxonMobil began life as part of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust. In the 1920’s it was operating as Standard Oil of New Jersey. The S.O. is where the name Esso derives; it expanded into South America then later into the Middle East. The company became Exxon in 1972 and Esso became a subsidiary but is the name most often used in foreign operations. The merger with Mobil happened in 1999 (Draffan 2002). Exxon paid \$83 billion for Mobil, and was the largest oil merger in history (Bianco et al 2001:58).

ExxonMobil has a set of guiding principles that shape the way it conducts business or at least how it presents itself to the outside world. An abbreviated summary follows,

Exxon Mobil Corporation is committed to being the world's premier petroleum and petrochemical company. To that end, we must continuously achieve superior financial and operating results while adhering to the highest standards of business conduct. These unwavering expectations provide the foundation for our commitments to those with whom we interact:
 We are committed to enhancing the long-term value of the investment dollars entrusted to us by our shareholders. By running the business profitably and responsibly we expect

our shareholders to be rewarded with superior returns. This commitment drives the management of our company... We pledge to be a good corporate citizen in all the places we operate worldwide. We will maintain the highest ethical standards, obey all applicable laws and regulations, and respect local and national cultures. Above all other objectives, we are dedicated to running safe and environmentally responsible operations. To be successful, ExxonMobil must be at the leading edge of competition in every aspect of our business. This requires that the Corporation's substantial resources - financial, operational, technological, and human - be employed wisely and evaluated regularly. While we maintain flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, the nature of our business requires a focused, long-term approach. We will consistently strive to improve efficiency and productivity through learning, sharing and implementing best practices. We will be disciplined and selective in evaluating the range of capital investment opportunities available to us. We will seek to develop proprietary technologies that provide a competitive edge. [ExxonMobil 2001]

In order to keep an oil business profitable, the amount of oil extracted for sale has to be replaced by new discoveries. For ExxonMobil this means just to break even, it has to find a new 1.6 billion barrels of oil a year. Then if the company wants to make a profit, it has to find a cost effective way of exploiting the oil reserves. ExxonMobil has made great strides in lowering its costs per barrel, in the 1980's they spent \$4 for every barrel sold but in 2000 they spent \$0.65 per barrel (Bianco et al 2001:58). Interestingly, while the costs of extracting oil are declining, the amount of oil spent per barrel of oil extracted is rising. In the 1940's for every barrel of oil used in the extraction process, 100 barrels were extracted. Today, for every barrel of oil used, only 10 barrels are extracted (Manning 2004:42).

Exxon is linked to one of the most well-known oil disasters in history, although it does not rank in the top 25 worst oil spills. The Exxon Valdez spilled 257,000 barrels of

oil into Prince William Sound. The tanker has been renamed the Sea River Mediterranean and it now hauls oil across the Atlantic.

It is not just money and profits that makes a corporation powerful, it is personal networks. These networks span other corporations, academic institutes, and governments. They link people to other people who also have extensive power networks. Since 1993, Lee R. Raymond has been the CEO and Chairman of ExxonMobil. He earns \$27.78 million a year and \$15.9 million in exercised stocks (Yahoo 2005). He is a director of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., the United Negro College Fund; and the American Petroleum Institute. He is a trustee and vice chairman of the American Enterprise Institute. He is a trustee of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. Also, he is a member of the Business Council, the Business Roundtable, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the National Academy of Engineering, the National Petroleum Council, the President's Export Council, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the Singapore-U.S. Business Council, the Trilateral Commission, and the University of Wisconsin Foundation (ExxonMobil 2004).

Also important are the board of directors personal networks. The board of ExxonMobil consists of Lee R. Raymond, Michael J. Boskin, James R. Houghton, William R. Howell, Reatha Clark King, Philip E. Lippincott, Henry A. McKinnell, Jr., Marilyn Carlson Nelson, Walter V. Shipley, and Rex W. Tillerson. Together, they have network ties to the following institutions: Advisory Committee on the National Income and Product Accounts; American Academy of Arts and Sciences; American Electric Power Company Inc; American Enterprise Institute; American Museum of Natural History; American Petroleum Institute; Boy Scouts of America; Business Council (4);

Business Roundtable; Campbell Soup Company; Carlson Companies; Chase Manhattan Corporation; Circle Ten Council; City University of New York; Clark Atlanta University; Commerce Department; Congressional Advisory Commission on the Consumer Price Index; Congressional Black Caucus Foundation; Corning Incorporated; Council of Economic Advisors; Council on Foreign Relations; Department 56 Inc; Deutsche Bank AG; Engineering Foundation Advisory Council for the University of Texas at Austin; First Health Group Corporation; Fox Chase Cancer Center; General Mills Inc; Goodwill Industries of Greater New York & Northern New Jersey Inc; Halliburton Co.; Harvard Corporation; International Business Council of the World Economic Forum; International Trachoma Initiative; J.C. Penny Company Inc; John Wiley & Sons Inc; MetLife Inc.; Mayo Clinic Foundation; Metropolitan Museum of Art; Minnesota Mutual Companies Inc; M.I.T. Corporation; Moody's Corporation; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Standards; National Women's Business Council; New York Academy of Medicine; New York City Police Foundation; New York City Public Library; Oracle Corporation; Panel of Advisors to the Congressional Budget Office; Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company; Pfizer Inc (2); Pierpont Morgan Library; Scott Paper Company; Society of Petroleum Engineers; Stanford University (2); Travel Industry Association of America; University of Chicago; University of Minnesota; U.S.-Russian Business Council; Verizon Communications; Visteon Inc; Vodafone Group PLC; Wallace Foundation; Wells Fargo & Company; Williams Companies Inc; World Travel and Tourism Council; Wyeth (ExxonMobil 2004).

Out of the institutions listed, 26 are other corporations. Out of those 26, 13 are in the Fortune 500 and 4 are in the Fortune 1000 (Fortune 2004).

ChevronTexaco

In the oil industry ChevronTexaco is second only to ExxonMobil. The corporation is based in San Ramon, California and is ranked number six in the fortune 500. ChevronTexaco earned \$112.9 billion in revenues in 2003 up 22.7% from 2002. If ranked by profits, ChevronTexaco is number thirteen, earning 7.2 billion, however this is up 538.7% from 2002 (Fortune 2004:B-1).

Chevron began life in 1879 as the Pacific Coast Oil Company. Texaco started in 1901 as the Texas Fuel Company. They merged to form ChevronTexaco in 2001. As of December 31, 2003, ChevronTexaco had over 12 billion barrels of proved oil reserves. The company has a refining capacity of 2.2 million barrels of crude oil per day. Also, ChevronTexaco runs 24,000 retail sites in 84 countries (ChevronTexaco 2005b).

The corporate code of conduct is as follows,

At the heart of The ChevronTexaco Way is our vision ...to be the global energy company most admired for its people, partnership and performance. Our Vision Means: Providing energy products and services that are vital to society's quality of life; Being known as people with superior capabilities and commitment, both as individuals and as an organization; Thinking and behaving globally, and valuing the positive influence this has on our company; Being the partner of choice because we best exemplify collaboration; Delivering world-class performance; Earning the admiration of all our stakeholders—investors, customers, host governments, local communities and our employees—not only for the goals we achieve but how we achieve them... Our Company's foundation is built on our Values, which distinguish us and guide our actions. We conduct our business in a socially responsible and ethical manner. We respect the law, support universal human rights, protect the environment, and benefit the communities where we work. Integrity. We are honest with others and ourselves. We meet the highest ethical standards in all business dealings. We do what we say we will do. Trust. We trust, respect and support each other,

and we strive to earn the trust of our colleagues and partners. Diversity. We learn from and respect the cultures in which we work. We value and demonstrate respect for the uniqueness of individuals and the varied perspectives and talents they provide. We have an inclusive work environment and actively embrace a diversity of people, ideas, talents and experiences. Partnership. We have an unwavering commitment to being a good partner, focused on building productive, collaborative, trusting and beneficial relationships with governments, other companies, our customers, our communities and each other. High Performance. We are committed to excellence in everything we do, and we strive to continually improve. We are passionate about achieving results that exceed expectations- our own and those of others. Responsibility. We take responsibility—as individuals and as teams—for our work and our actions, and we are recognized for doing so. We welcome scrutiny, and we hold ourselves accountable. Growth. We embrace change and encourage innovation. We seek out and pursue smart, challenging opportunities that contribute to personal and business growth. [ChevronTexaco 2005a]

Chevron has been linked to human rights abuses associated with oil in Nigeria. In 1998, there were around one hundred unarmed people protesting at one of Chevron's production platforms. Chevron enlisted the help of the Nigerian military and police to break up the protest. The end result was two protesters dead and eleven arrested (Ndumbe 2002:85-86).

Once again, what makes ChevronTexaco so powerful is personal networks. David J. O'Reilly has been CEO and chairman of ChevronTexaco since 2000. He earns \$7.82 million a year (Yahoo 2005). He is also chairman of the Board of the American Petroleum Institute. The board of directors consists of David J. O'Reilly, Peter J. Robertson, Samuel H. Armacost, Robert J. Eaton, Sam Ginn, Carla A. Hills, Franklyn G. Jenifer, former senator J. Bennett Johnston, former senator Sam Nunn, Charles R. Shoemate, Frank A. Shrontz, Thomas A. Vanderslice, Carl Ware, and John A. Young.

Together, they have network ties to the following institutions: Affymetrix Inc; Air Force; American International Group Inc; Bestfoods; Boeing; Boise Cascade Corp; Callaway Golf Company; Chrysler Corporation; Cigna Corp; CIPHERGEN Biosystems Inc; Coca-Cola Bottling Co Consolidated; Coca-Cola Co (2); DaimlerChrysler AG; Dallas Citizens Council; Dell Inc; Del Monte Foods Company; Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc; General Electric Co; Georgia Power Co; Georgia Tech; GlaxoSmithKline PLC; Hewlett-Packard Co (2); Hills & Co. International Consultants; Howard University; International Paper Co (2); Internet Security Systems Inc; Johnston & Associates; Lucent Technologies Inc (2); Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co; Monitoring Committee for the Louisiana Desegregation Settlement Agreement; Nexant Inc; Novell Inc; Nuclear Threat Initiative; Pacific Telesis Group; Scientific-Atlanta Inc; SmithKline Beecham PLC; SRI International; Texas Science and Technology Council, Time Warner Inc; U.S. Economic Cooperation Council; Vodafone AirTouch PLC; Weiss, Peck & Greer LLC (ChevronTexaco 2005b). Out of the companies listed, 11 are in the Fortune 500 and 4 are in the Fortune 1000 (Fortune 2004).

PETRONAS

PETRONAS, Malaysia's national petroleum company, was established in 1974 and is headquartered in Kuala Lumpur. As the national petroleum company, the Malaysian government fully owns PETRONAS. The company has business interests in 35 countries, owns 93 subsidiaries, has 19 partially owned companies, and 55 associated companies. In 2004, PETRONAS had revenues of \$25.6 billion up from 21.4 billion the

year before. Their net income was 6.2 billion, which was up from 3.9 billion in 2003 (PETRONAS 2005).

Their mission statement is as follows,

“We are a business entity”

PETRONAS and its Group of Companies are on-going enterprises organised and run in a rational, economic and commercial manner with the purpose of enhancing its shareholders' value or wealth. This means that it must conduct itself in a professional, ethical and business-like manner where sound business principles such as clear business objectives, growth and profitability, and being customer-focused are the way of life in the corporation. To achieve this, PETRONAS must be committed to enhancing the capability of its employees, as a corporation is only as good as the people who work for it. **“Petroleum is our core business”**

PETRONAS focuses its energy and allocates its resources to petroleum business, which is its core business. This includes the integrated chain of activities covering exploration, development and production of oil, gas and condensates; refining, trading and supply; marketing; distribution; petrochemicals and other manufactured petroleum products and derivatives. PETRONAS may also undertake other non-petroleum businesses that reinforce its strategy and performance of its core business. To ensure continued future supply of petroleum for Malaysia as well as continued skill building in its core business, PETRONAS would selectively seek opportunities overseas to explore and secure new reserves and develop and add value to these resources.

“Our primary responsibility is to develop and add value to this national resource”

Petroleum resources are the national resource of a nation, be it Malaysia or any other country in the world. PETRONAS' mission is to develop and add value to these resources wherever it operates, converting these resources into higher-value products that would satisfy the needs of customers and bring benefits to the people.

“Our objective is to contribute to the well-being of the people and the nation”

PETRONAS' goal is to contribute to the well-being of the people and nation where it operates. To fulfil this role, all of its business activities must be viable and

profitable. PETRONAS' contributions - designed to assist in enhancing the quality of life of the people and help in the development of the nation - include the provision of quality petroleum and related products and services at a fair price; promoting and creating business and job opportunities in the petroleum industry; enlarging the country's industrial base; and ensuring safe and clean environment.
[PETRONAS 2005]

Recently PETRONAS was responsible for spilling one million tons of crude oil into the Bargui River, located in Brazil (Horta 2000b). PETRONAS also has been connected to human rights abuses in Sudan. The allegations relate to two oilfields operated by the oil consortium, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, which PETRONAS is a part of (Atkinson 2000:22).


Because it is a Malaysian Corporation and not required to disclose as much information as American corporations, it was more difficult to establish links between its board of directors and other entities. However, I did find a few. The chairman and CEO of PETRONAS is Tan Sri Dato Sri Mohd Hassan Marican. He was appointed CEO in 1995. He is a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants and the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants. He is also a member of the Commonwealth Business Council, the International Investment Council for the Republic of South Africa, and the World Economic Forum (WEF) Council of 100 leaders, as well as being the current Energy Community Chairman for WEF. He is a board member of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, the Central Bank of Malaysia, the International Centre for Leadership in Finance (ICLIF), and Putrajaya Holdings (ICLIF 2003).

The rest of the board of directors includes: Tan Sri Dato' Zaki Tun Azmi who has connections to the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, and the Malay Chamber of Commerce; Dato' Izzuddin Dali, Dato' Seri Khalid Ramli; Raja Dato'

Zahara Raja Zainal Abidin; Datuk Ishak Imam Abas who has connections to the Kuala Lumpur City Center Group; Dato’ Sahmsul Azhar Abbas who is connected to the London Club, the Malaysian Maritime Academy, and the Maritime Institute of Malaysia; Datuk Anuar Ahmad; and Mohammed Azhar Osman Khairuddin who is connected to the Kuala Lumpur City Center Group and the Universiti Teknologi Petronas.

As scale increases, so do the buildings of the powerful elite. It is interesting to note that in 1998, PETRONAS built the world’s tallest building. Called the PETRONAS Towers, the building is located in Kuala Lumpur. The building is 88 stories and is 452 meters tall. Recently however, Taipei 101 has surpassed the towers as the world’s tallest building. Located in Taiwan the building is 101 stories and is 509 meters high. The PETRONAS Towers are still the world’s largest twin towers (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Increasing Scale of the World’s Tallest Towers



Source: Skyscraper Museum 2004

The Governments

Many governments have a stake in the oil pipeline, for instance Chad and Cameroon (see Chapter Two for details on Cameroon); however, in terms of scale, powerful corporate and Western government interests override the governments of Chad and Cameroon. What is of note is the United States' interests in developing a thriving oil industry in Africa and how this relates to approval for the construction of the pipeline.

United States Government Interests

Both the Clinton and Bush administrations supported the oil pipeline project. The project was approved by the Clinton administration in 1998. The assistant secretary for African affairs at the State Department at the time was Susan Rice. She stated that the Clinton administration supported the pipeline project because of the World Bank's plan to ensure the project improved human rights and reduced poverty (Houston Chronicle 2003:9) The United States in particular was instrumental in passing World Bank approval for the project (Marquis 2000:A3).

The United States consumes 17 million barrels of oil a day. With such high consumption, the U.S. is constantly looking for new sources of oil, especially outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) price controls. OPEC consists of Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. The desire for African oil is illustrated by the fact that 80% of American investment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is related to the energy sector (Yohannes 2003:2). Africa already produces around 16% of the oil the

U.S. imports. It is estimated within the next decade this will increase to over 25% (Vesely 2002:30).

American interests in Africa are also spurred by the desire for developing opportunities for U.S. business. The African market has over 500 million potential consumers. In 1993, U.S. businesses exported around \$4.8 billion goods and services to SSA (Moose 1995:148-149).

In January of 2002, two think-tanks, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS) and the Council on Foreign Relations held meetings to illustrate the links between increased reliance on African oil and the efforts to fight terrorism. One speaker at the meetings was Walter Kansteiner the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Kansteiner was formerly a part of Scowcroft Group, which is an international business-consulting firm. Brent Scowcroft who is a former National Security Advisor to both President Ford and Bush, Sr. heads Scowcroft Group. At the meeting, Kansteiner stated, “For too long, official Washington has been gripped by the perception that the United States has no vital interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the political and security conditions of the Persian Gulf deteriorate, the availability and appeal of reliable, alternative sources of oil for the American market grows. African oil is emerging as a clear direction U.S. policy could take to provide a secure source of energy” (quoted in Yohannes 2003:4).

Another speaker was Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski who works at the Africa desk in the Pentagon. She stressed the importance of promoting U.S. trade and protecting American interest in West and Central Africa because of the new oil being discovered. Kwiatkowski then recommended the creation of “well-trained, small, professional, and

apolitical militaries” made up of indigenous African populations to protect American investors and energy companies in SSA (Yohannes 2003:4).

Yet another speaker was Robert Murphy, an economist from the State Department. Murphy stressed the importance of new non-OPEC sources of oil. He stated, “Africa has provided us with an excellent array of diverse oil exporters. Political discord or dispute in African oil states is unlikely to take on a regional or ideological tone that would result in a joint embargo by suppliers at once. Much of West Africa’s oil is offshore, thereby insulated from domestic political or social turmoil, and can be delivered via open sea-lanes devoid of canals or narrow straits” (quoted in Yohannes 2003:4-5). In other words, African nations are incapable of joining together to curtail exploitation by the oil companies.

At a congressional hearing on the proposed pipeline project, Donald Norland a former U.S. ambassador to Chad, spoke of the importance of increasing African and particularly Chadian oil resources. He stated, “ Finally, the Chad oil project takes on new importance in the light of the latest explosion of Middle East violence, specifically its relevance to U.S. energy policy which urges diverse sources of energy in the interest of U.S. national security. Indeed, it has reliably been reported that, for the first time, the two concepts – ‘Africa’ and ‘U.S. national security’ – have been used in the same sentence in Pentagon documents” (quoted in Yohannes 2003:9).

Another player interested in pushing U.S. interest in African oil is the Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG). AOPIG published a report given to Congress and the Bush administration that laid out the reasons African oil is so vital. The report stated that,

First, in the post-September 2001 environment, the United States must diversify the sources of its energy needs, and the best way to do it is to bring West Africa into the international spotlight, and to make it a top priority in U.S. foreign policy. With its 40 billion barrels of high grade proven oil reserves, which are likely to rise with new discoveries, West Africa would provide the United States the needed flexibility in its foreign policy in matters of energy, thereby nullifying any potential blackmail by other oil producing states in the Middle East. Apart from moderating the global price structure with reasonably priced West African oil, U.S. “dependence on hostile and unstable suppliers in other parts of the globe would diminish” as a result of U.S. control over West Africa.

Second, between two-thirds and three-fourths of foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals in sub-Saharan Africa in the next decade is going to be in the energy sector as oil companies are already gearing up to invest \$10 billion annually in the sector. As a result of the combined massive U.S. investment in West African energy sector and the growing demand for oil, U.S. oil imports from the region will rise from the current level of 15.3 percent to 25 percent of the total U.S. oil imports by 2015. By 2020, the U.S. will be consuming 770 million barrels of West African oil annually.

Third, in order to accelerate the discovery, production and supply of West African oil, the United States must facilitate the deployment of large-scale capital to the region to put in place a modern and reliable infrastructure, similar to the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline and the West African Gas pipeline. The development of cross border infrastructural projects can enormously facilitate the integration of pipelines, transmission and transportation networks, crucial to the speedy exploitation of the region’s natural resources.

Fourth, using the ideas embedded in the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, the United States should transform the region into the core of the U.S.-Africa free trade area. After all, greater West Africa, with the Gulf of Guinea oil basin as its epicenter, is home to 250 million potential consumers. The region is also fabulously endowed with critically important minerals, such as chromium, uranium, diamonds, gold, bauxite, copper, phosphate, titanium and cobalt. The United States can use its trade relations with the region as a leverage to induce privatization of real estate, and neoliberal market reforms

in such critical sectors as energy, banking, and transportation. The United States could sweeten the pot by extending debt relief to particular states under a stringent regime of conditionality. Finally, the stability of oil production and the security of oil supply requires American forward military presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Hence, a unified sub-command must be established for the Gulf of Guinea as part of the U.S.-European Command as an interim measure until a separate unified military command is created for the region. The proposed site for such a command is Sao Tome and Principe, which itself is sitting on four billion barrels of oil. [Yohannes 2003:10-11]

The ties between the Bush administration and the oil industry are widely known. Condoleeza Rice was formerly on Chevron's board of directors. Rice even had an oil tanker named after her by Chevron (Yohannes 2003:16).

The Sources of Funding

The World Bank

“The continent that is developing most slowly, Africa, is not suffering from globalization, its suffering from a lack of globalization...The choices are either to let Chad go on being very poor or to give it the chance to transform itself into a somewhat poor country” (Robert Calderifi, chief of African external affairs for the World Bank. Quoted in Walsh 2000:C1)

“This project involves important risks. For many years, we have been working intensively with the governments, private companies and communities involved to make certain that those risks will not interfere with the project's major purpose – which is to begin to lift Chad out of dreadful poverty. We have been very open about the issues involved and discussed them with nongovernmental organizations, researchers and journalists. The project now reflects some of the best know-how and safeguards available. Elaborate steps are being taken to protect the environment and people living along the pipeline route and to ensure that most of the oil revenues will be used for basic services such as health, education and rural roads. The project is a good example of governments and international institutions working with the international private sector and community groups to bring the benefits of a major investment quickly--rather than just eventually-- to everyone's door. It is a solid expression of the 'new' World Bank. The project still presents many challenges. But we believe they are worth taking on – to give one of the poorest countries in the world a unique chance to transform its people's future” (Calderisi 2000:B8).

“What I find demoralizing is that there is no organization on earth that is doing more for the poor than we do. Globalization is not something the World Bank can turn back. It’s not something the International Monetary Fund can stop. We can only help people and countries adjust to it, to try to close the gaps” (James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank. Quoted in Sanger 2000:A.1)

The World Bank’s fundamental philosophy is that growth is good for the poor. However, no matter how many safeguards are implemented, if development is based upon the philosophy of growth or increasing scale, the most vulnerable population, the poor, will be harmed. The World Bank was established in 1945. Since this time, its main concern has been the development of infrastructure. The development of infrastructure was seen as the main tool for long-term growth and stability (Leautier and Lemer 2003:1-2).

The World Bank consists of five institutions, which each deal with different areas of development. The first institution is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The IBRD provides loans to and development assistance to countries that are considered middle-income or poorer but creditworthy. These countries per annual income ranges from around \$1,500 to \$5,000. Voting power is determined by how much money the country has put into the IBRD (see Appendix II). The second institution is the International Development Association (IDA) (see Appendix III). The IDA was established in 1960 and is specifically centered on poverty reduction and lends money through credit to the poorest nations. Together loans from the IBRD and the IDA are normally given to enhance health and educational structures, rural development, and basic infrastructure. The loans normally require a country to privatize certain sectors and to create a favorable climate for private investment. The third institution is the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (see Appendix IV). The IFC was established in

1956 to finance capital investment. The for-profit institution gives financial assistance to both corporations and governments. The fourth institution is the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (see Appendix V), established in 1988. MIGA helps provide insurance to foreign investors against losses incurred through non-commercial risks. The final institution is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), created in 1966. The ICSID helps to settle disputes between foreign investors and host countries (Ince 2001:55-57).

The President of the World Bank is James Wolfensohn. Wolfensohn has served two terms as president, although he has announced that when his term is up on May 31st, 2005, he will not seek to serve another term. Wolfensohn was born in Australia but is now a United States citizen. Before joining the World Bank, he was President and CEO of James D. Wolfensohn Inc., which is an investment firm advising major corporations. He also has ties to Salomon Brothers, Schroeder's Ltd., J. Henry Schroeder's Banking Corporation, and Darling & Co. In addition to his corporate banking ties, he is active with Carnegie Hall, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, the International Federation of Multiple Sclerosis Societies, the Business Council for Sustainable Development, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Population Council, Rockefeller University, Princeton, the Brookings Institutions, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Century Association, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society. Queen Elizabeth II knighted him in 1995 (World Bank 2005).

The five nations that have the most voting rights in the World Bank are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. These five countries can

appoint an executive director to act on their behalf. The executive directors for the five nations are Robert B. Holland III, Yoshio Okubo, Eckhard Deutscher, Pierre Duquense, and Tom Scholar. Perhaps not surprisingly, the U.S. executive director Robert Holland III, has ties to the oil industry. Holland has connections with Triton Energy, where he served as CEO. He also has connections to Texas Limited. Other voting nations within the World Bank form a voting block and elect a person to act on their behalf. The block, which consists of Albania, Portugal, Greece, San Marino, Italy, Malta, and Timor-Leste, is the only one that voted against the pipeline.

Charles McPherson, a senior advisor in the World Bank's oil and gas department, had the following to say about why the World Bank became involved in the oil pipeline project. "Oil companies will say they behave responsibly in their own operations and will undertake certain activities outside the centre to be good corporate citizens, such as funding a school or hospital but they will quite fairly say this isn't our main business. It has to come out of our profit flow so it has to be recovered somehow. So why should we be involved when we aren't the most effective players in this...That's why they've come to us and said: 'We're not development agencies, you are you go and put in place the minimum governance required to ensure the development impact of our operations will be positive'" (Gavin 2003:1).

The European Investment Bank

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is headquartered in Luxembourg. The bank was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1956. The shareholders of the bank are the member nations of the European Union (EU). The Board of Governors is comprised of

the Finance Ministers of each nation. The mission of the bank is the development of capital markets in the EU. Outside of the EU the bank helps to finance projects that will enhance the investment opportunities of the countries within the EU (EIB 2005).

The Chairman and President of the European Investment Bank is Philippe Maystadt from Belgium. Maystadt is also a professor at the Catholic University of Louvain. He has also held many positions within the Belgian government including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Foreign Trade; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Affairs; Minister for the Budget, Scientific Policy and Planning; Minister for the Civil Service and Scientific Planning; Chairman of the Social Christian Party; and as a member of Parliament. Maystadt also was Chairman of the Interim Committee of IMF from 1993-1998.

The U.S. Export-Import Bank

The Export-Import Bank is the official export credit agency of the U.S. The Bank's mission is to help finance the export of American goods and services. In order to achieve this goal, the Bank provides pre-export financing, export credit insurance, and buyer financing. The Bank was created over 70 years ago and since then has helped to finance the export of goods and services totaling over \$400 billion (Ex-Im 2005).

Since 2002, the President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank has been Philip Merrill. Before becoming president, he was chairman of Capital-Gazette Communications, Inc., a publishing company. Other positions he has held include Assistant Secretary-General of NATO, member of the Department of Defense Policy Board, counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and special assistant to the

Deputy Secretary of State. In total, Merrill has served in six administrations. He also has connections to the Aspen Institute, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Johns Hopkins University, Cornell University, the Corcoran Gallery of Art, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Maryland, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chief Executives Organization, the Center for Security Policy, and the World Presidents' Organization. Merrill has also served on Bush's Gulf War Air Power Survey and Reagan's Commission on Cost Control in the Federal Government. In addition to all of this, he has established the Capital Gazette Foundation and the Merrill Family Foundation (Ex-Im 2005; Right Web 2005).

The rest of the Board of Directors includes April H. Foley, Max Cleland (former senator, he served in Sam Nunn's vacated seat – see ChevronTexaco board), Linda Conlin, and J. Joseph Grandmaison. Their personal networks include: American University; Boston University; Corporation for Policy Review Institute for Dispute Resolution; Don Breazeale and Associates; Episcopal Church; Harvard; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States; New England Region Commission; PepsiCo Inc; Pfizer Inc; Reader's Digest Association Inc; United Way, U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Department of State; U.S. Information Agency; U.S. Trade and Development Agency; U.S Tourism Administration; U.S. Veterans Administration; Wilson Sporting Goods Inc (Ex-Im 2005).

In addition to the overall board of directors, the Bank has a specific Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee. The members represent different areas of doing business such as commerce, trade finance, small business, and banking. The members are

Ambassador Howard Jeter from Goodworks International; Patrick Baumann from the Harris Corporation; Patricia Desvergers from Global Trading International; Bruce Fields from Standard Americas Inc; Willene Johnson formerly from the Federal Reserve System; Franklin Kennedy from Equator Management Services; Edward Kostenski from Nationwide Equipment; Timothy McCoy from Corporate Council on Africa; Barry Worthington from United States Energy Association; and Gerald Zadikoff from G.M. Selby & Associates Inc (Ex-Im 2005).

Coface

Based in France, Coface, or Compagnie Française d' Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur, was founded in 1946 and is a subsidiary of Natexis Banques Populaires and the Banque Populaire Group. The Bank is the French equivalent to the U.S. Export-Import Bank. Coface “facilitates global trade by offering companies solutions to manage, finance and protect their customer portfolio and enabling them to outsource all or part of their receivables management, as well as the related risks” (Coface n.d.).

François David has been Chairman of Coface since 1994. He has held numerous positions in the French government including Director of the Cabinet of the French Minister of Foreign Trade and Director of external economic relations within the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget. David has also been the International Managing Director of the Aerospatiale Company and is on the board of Rexel, Vinci, and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company.

Other board members include: CEO Jérôme Cazes, François Casassa, Christian Blanc, Philippe Blavier, Jacques Blondeau, René Clavaud, Jean Criton, Edouard

Esparbès, Steve Gentili, Yvan de La Porte du Theil, Patrick Maheut, Jean-Pierre Morin,
Eric Pernon, Alain Régnier, Olivier Schatz, and Jean-Louis Warnet (Coface n.d.)

CHAPTER SIX


PERSPECTIVES ON THE PIPELINE

The Bagyeli

This portion of chapter six mainly discusses the Bagyeli's perspective of the pipeline project. Interspersed throughout this section will also be other villager's perspectives because, while I mostly was interested in the effects of the pipeline on the Bagyeli, the pipeline affected everyone in the area. While I was not able to verify every perception as fact, the perceptions are the lived Bagyeli experience. Also, in the EMP Esso states that one of its goals in regards to the project and specifically regarding compensation is that it is "perceived as fair by local populations" (Esso 1999c:1.4).

During the interviews, I had a standard set of questions that I asked. These included: Were you informed about the pipeline before construction began? What losses have you experienced because of the pipeline? Did you receive any compensation for your losses? How has the pipeline affected daily life? Has the pipeline affected hunting? Have illnesses increased because of the pipeline project? If so, which illnesses? Were there any benefits from the project? Were you or someone you know employed by the project? What benefits would you have wanted from the project? Has logging increased because of the pipeline? While, these questions formed the basis of the interviews, I allowed the informants to take the interview in the direction they wanted and to tell me about what they felt to be the most important issues.

Figure 6.1 Location of Bagyeli Base-Camps and Hunting Areas



Source: Esso 1999

My first stop in my fieldwork was the Catholic mission in Ngovayang (see Figure 6.1). While there, I interviewed the priest in charge and some of the Bagyeli who were there for medical care or for food. During my interview, the priest stated, “the biggest problem for the Bagyeli is nutrition this has become increasingly worse due to logging and the pipeline”. He also informed me that “some people have made money from the pipeline project but it was spent quickly and now no one could ever tell there was a ‘development’ project here”. Finally he told me, “there was a lot of prostitution during the project, which harmed families”.

My interview with the Bagyeli at Ngovayang consisted of ten people, both men and women, who were eating in the small outdoor cooking area at the mission. When I asked if they were informed about the pipeline before it was built, the response was positive. They said they had been informed. They informed me that “medicinal trees were cut down and we received no compensation, and there are now few of these vital trees”. They also told me that “many bars were constructed in the areas where the pipeline workers were camped, which brought a lot of prostitution. Some wells were constructed but we can no longer use them since they are polluted, because no one maintains them and we were not taught how to maintain them ourselves”.

As far as hunting is concerned, the Bagyeli at the mission told me “during construction, all the animals left because of the noise. Now the animals are starting to come back but hunting still is not as good as it once was”. I asked if the pipeline affected health and was told “those who were employed as workers on the pipeline had problems from the heat and dust. Also, heavy machines used in the construction crossed through streams that were used for drinking water and now they are polluted”. I then asked if

there were any benefits from the pipeline and was told there was “nothing, absolutely nothing”. One person did say that he was employed by the project, but this was for only three months. He said, “I was able to buy a bed and build a latrine, with my income”.

The Bagyeli at the mission stated that what they would have liked from the project is “construction of houses, a good source of water, improved roads (The Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf road is unpaved and was made worse by the construction equipment. When it rains it is nearly impassible.), electricity, or more medical centers, but we got nothing”. They also stated, “before the pipeline was built, we were told we would get houses but we only knew of a few people who actually got a house and then the house did not have windows or doors”. I asked if they could do anything on the land where the pipeline is located. They said, “No, the land is wasted and empty”. Now that the project is over, they said that “no one connected to the project has come back to see how we are living. No one cares if we are dying or suffering now that the project is over”. Before I left, one person told me “many people ask us questions and then do nothing and I hope you will not be one of those”. This was not the last time I was told this. I have taken it up as a challenge.

From Ngovayang, I traveled to Lolodorf, which I used as a base to travel to other Bagyeli base-camps. In Ngoyang, I went to talk to a headmaster of a school where many Bagyeli children study. At the school there are 111 students; 65 are Bagyeli, some come from up to 10 kilometers away. The headmaster teaches general science, geography, biology, agriculture, English, mathematics, health, and French. COTCO and a NGO helped to build the school. The school was supposed to be two stories and contain an apartment for the headmaster, but only one story got built and the rest of the funds were

embezzled. The government runs the school and both the government and COTCO give supplies but these are never enough to run the school. One organization had to sell chickens to help pay for the Bagyeli children's school fees. COTCO built a nursery school and promised funding for 25 years. Then the responsibility for the school was transferred to FEDEC and now there is no funding available. The health center in the area was closed for one year and the medicine was sold. The center was reopened in December of 2003 but FEDEC has not yet sent the drugs they promised. COTCO never checks to see how the money is being spent.

I then traveled to Nkouamboer. There I was informed that the people at the base-camp were given notice before the project. The Bagyeli told me, "we had some medicinal plants destroyed by the pipeline and now we have to go farther to collect the plants". They also told me that they received no compensation for their losses. They stated, "We wanted to live where the pipeline is, but COTCO told us that we had to move. Because of the move we were told that we would get houses. Only one house was built and we had to do that ourselves, we only received some iron for doors and roofs. We were told that someone would come back to check on our houses and give us money and food after the project, but no one has come. Now we are living closer to the road than we were before the pipeline and this has made life difficult. The animals went far away during the project and now we have fewer animals to hunt. Before the project we were able to find animals everyday, now we have to go far and do not get meat everyday". I asked what they would have wanted to see come out of the pipeline project. They told me "we did not expect any benefits, but then were promised things that we never received".

From Lolodorf I traveled to Bipindi. At Bipindi I had an interview with a worker at FONDAF. FONDAF helps Bagyeli children receive an education. Children from the surrounding area stay at the organization. FONDAF was closed in 1996 due to lack of funds but it reopened in 1998. The organization charges 5,000 francs (around \$9) a year for a child to stay there. However, if a family cannot afford the fee, family members can work for the foundation to earn the money. The worker stated “the strategies employed by the pipeline project to help the Bagyeli were not right. COTGO gave books to the Bagyeli to help with schooling but did not care whether the children were able to go to school or not”. He also said “the project increased logging in the area and negatively affected hunting. Before the project, parents used to bring a lot of meat for their children but now hardly any is brought”.

From FONDAF, I went to talk to a family living right next to the pipeline. The father of the household was a villager who did not have the use of his legs. His wife was a Bagyeli. He makes things out of cane and sells them to help support his family. His wife does some gardening and gathers and his sons hunt. The villager said, “the pipeline destroyed none of my crops but the larger animals have all left. There has been a lot of logging in the area. Sometimes trees are planted to replace the ones cut down but they often die and no one replaces them again”. He said, “The project should have helped with land rights because my family can be kicked out of the building we are staying in at any time”. He ended the interview by saying that “people are suffering and the greatest project in the world passes by here”.

Next I visited Loundabele, which is about 50 meters from the pipeline. The Bagyeli in Loundabele were informed about the pipeline before construction started.

They told me “we lost important farmland and medicinal trees. We were compensated with iron, which was used to build a roof on one house. There was some iron left over that we wanted to use for another house but those that donated the iron took it back. Hunting has become more difficult and we eat more cassava leaves now and less meat”. They stated that “many people gave many promises but the promises have not been fulfilled. The most important thing that we need is a good water source”.

After Loundabele, I visited Namayo. Namayo is home to a traditional healer. The traditional healer was willing to answer questions about the pipeline project but if he felt a question would give away secrets, he would not answer. I returned to the camp a second time to see if I could learn more about the medicinal plants lost because of the pipeline and to learn more about the Bagyeli beliefs in spirits, but on that occasion he refused to answer my questions at all, stating that “all white people want to steal the secrets of the Bagyeli and then we would have nothing”.

The Bagyeli here were informed about the project. “We lost many different types of medicinal plants and now we have to go farther to get them”. The traditional healer said he “has been unable to find some plants, so I am unable to treat some illnesses. We were compensated with food and iron. The noise of the heavy machinery made the animals leave. There is a large amount of logging in the area and we can hear the sound of chain saws often. The logging has led to an even greater loss of the plants we need. We would have wanted houses, a source of clean water, and latrines from the project”.

Finally, I arrived at the base-camp in Kouambo, which was going to be my home for the next six weeks. Kouambo consists of Ngoumba villagers and one Bagyeli base-camp, although there are other base-camps a short walk away. The village is spread out

along the Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf road. The villagers live in mud-brick homes that have corrugated iron roofs. There are a few buildings, such as the village chief's that are brick. The Bagyeli, live in the middle of the village, directly across from the school. The base-camp is only 30 paces away from the road and consists of six houses. Their homes are also mud-brick but only one, the eldest man's, has an iron roof. The other houses have roofs made of the leaves of the raffia palm.

The forest surrounding the village consists of varying stages of secondary forest. The secondary forest consists of a mixture of fields and fallow lands (Biesbrouck 1999b:17). The secondary forest is utilized both by the villagers and the Bagyeli for growing crops and minor hunting and gathering. Beyond the fields used for cultivating crops is primary forest. For extended hunting trips, the Bagyeli will utilize their hunting camps or *nyaa*, which are in primary forest. Houses in the hunting camps are constructed with the leaves of Marantaceae or of makung and can be constructed in half a day (Biesbrouck 1999a:193). The hunting camp for the Bagyeli living in Kouambo is about a one-day walk away from the village. The amount of time that the Bagyeli spend in the forest versus the village varies from case to case. Many of the Bagyeli in Kouambo stated that they spent on average three to four months in the forest per year. However, One of the sons in the base-camp is employed as a teacher by FONDAF. Although he does participate in extended hunting trips the amount of time he spends in the forest is greatly reduced compared to the others.

The Bagyeli informed me that their language, which they term Bagyeli, has minor differences from that of the Ngoumba and the Bakola. Guthrie (1967-1970), classifies the Bakola as A 80 which in the Maka-Njem group. The Ngoumba also belong to this

group. The social organization of the Bagyeli is very fluid. The organization of a base-camp is based on kinship but is not a permanent arrangement. Individuals can easily move to a different base-camp where they also have kin. Indeed, some of the people I was told lived in the base-camp in Kouambo, I never met because they were living with other kin at the time. While I was there, the base-camp in Kouambo consisted of people all descended from one woman who had recently died. There was her eldest son, his wife, their son and his wife and two children, another of their sons and his wife and one child, five unmarried younger sons and daughters, and the eldest son's unmarried brother. In addition, there was the sister of the eldest son, her husband, and two of her sons with their wives and children.

Talking to the Bagyeli where I was staying, I was informed “the pipeline affected hunting a lot and now there are very few animals around”. This was illustrated when many of the people at the camp left for an extended hunting trip to get meat for a death celebration for their grandmother who had recently died. They were unable to find many animals and nothing that they killed was larger than a bush rat. They stated that they “received a lot of promises from COTCO but only actually got iron for one roof. A lot of medicinal plants were destroyed. The main things we would have wanted from the project are houses, potable water, and a palm plantation”. They told me that “living by the road was good because we have access to education, but life was better living in the bush, because there was not as much jealousy or illnesses”.

I was visited by the brother of the village chief. He told me “deforestation affects the Bagyeli most because they are the people of the forest. Therefore they should have a say in logging and in the pipeline project but they do not. We (the villagers) were

informed about the pipeline project and at the meeting we were told that the project was for the people of Chad not for Cameroon. Also at the meeting we were told about regional compensation and were told that the Kribi-Bipindi-Lolodorf road would be tarred”. He also informed me “the people of Kouambo need health services, a good source of water, electricity and a good road”. I asked him if a better road would be a good thing or if it would allow more logging in the area. He said that “it might increase logging but that people will then be able to access markets more easily and more people could come for traditional healing which would help the Bagyeli”.

Another day a Bagyeli woman who works with the Forest Peoples Project (FPP) came to see me. She told me “the pipeline project caused the loss of many important medicinal plants including some that were very useful and could treat a variety of illnesses”. She said “COTCO supplied seeds, books, and a limited amount of medicines. We were informed that we would receive material for houses but in reality only a few people got iron. This has created jealousy because only one family in a location would get the iron whereas the people thought that there would be houses for everyone”.

I was walking along the road one day and a man from the village stopped me because he had heard what I was doing and he wanted to share information with me. I asked him how the project has changed things. He said that “people were poor before the project and people are poor now”. He was given monetary compensation for lost crops but he said “it was not enough money to carry out any projects because I had to share the money with my family”. He informed me “the level of AIDS has increased because workers are going back to their villages infected. Malaria has also increased because of

the project”. He also talked about the village compensation, saying, “The funds for the football field were misused. COTCO told the village that because of this, they could choose something else for compensation but so far nothing has happened. The village asked for electricity but COTCO said it was too expensive. What the village needs most is good water”.

A Bagyeli man, who works for FPP, came to see me in Kouambo and then took me to his village, Bongwana. He said “I recommended a special group to take care of the Bagyeli during construction. When project people came to talk to the Bagyeli, they just agreed with everything without understanding really what these people were telling them. People should work directly through the Bagyeli and not through the Bantu. Many organizations that say they are working for the Bagyeli are actually working in their own interests. Many medicinal plants have been lost. There has been an increase in logging, especially illegal logging. Sometimes the logging takes place right behind a Bagyeli camp but they cannot say anything because they do not own the land”. I asked him what he felt the biggest problem was for the Bagyeli. He said that “people consider the Bagyeli as a different race but everyone should be integrated into society the same and NGOs are not doing what they are supposed to. COTCO was trying to provide books for the Bagyeli but this is not enough. They should have put a Bagyeli in charge of giving books so one would learn how to help the Bagyeli in the future. The Bagyeli should be educated on development projects, how to do them and to sustain them. Hunting is not as profitable as it was in the past. The Bagyeli need to be shown how development will help them in the future. They need to be educated through seminars. I would like to see programs put in place to raise domestic animals (see Photo 6.1). Also a health center is

one of the biggest needs. The Bagyeli have problems with worms, malaria, hernias and infected cuts. They need to be educated about AIDS”.

Photo 6.1 Domestic Pig Program



I traveled to Grand Zambi because I heard there was a health center there but when I arrived it was closed because the nurse had gone to Kribi. Instead I talked to a school headmaster who was the brother of the nurse. He stated that “a Bagyeli child came to the hospital because of tetanus, but there was no medicine to treat tetanus and the child died. AIDS and TB have both increased because of the pipeline. COTCO gave a list of proposed compensation that people had to choose from, they did not ask what the people really wanted. COTCO told each village how much compensation it could have and people had to choose from the list something equal to that amount, they could not choose something worth more”. He said, “The biggest health problems for the Bagyeli

were TB, rashes, and AIDS. People need a good road and should have been compensated better. One man had crops destroyed and the project staff took his name but has not given him anything. Local people wanted repairs for the school and the water reserve”. He also stated “the project failed because the people in charge never come to see how things are going. This was the opposite of development. People are suffering more, heavy trucks broke bridges and they have not been repaired, and peoples’ health is suffering. There is no medicine for TB or AIDS outside of the capital. People do not want to know if they have AIDS because they are stigmatized and cannot get treatment anyway”.

I stopped in Log Ndiga to conduct interviews and only one man was in the camp. He told me “I did not know about the project until it started. The hunting forest was harmed and now I have to go farther to hunt. I was compensated with a house and a cart”. He said, “The children need to be educated because if they were educated, they would be able to have jobs and know their rights. We also need modern wells because children are dying because of bad water. Cholera is a problem and there was an outbreak in this area”. He also said “they need English courses, which would help people to find jobs. Many projects are done by English and American companies. There needs to be a program to help raise domestic animals such as pigs, because hunting is not as beneficial as it was in the past. Now there is a very high level of logging and this is ruining hunting and destroying mango and other important trees”.

After this interview, I continued on to a traditional healer’s home. The traditional healer told me that “I treat migraines, snake bites, worms, menstrual disorders, and I am very good at treating cases of witchcraft. I have a spirit that tells me what the sickness is

and how to treat it. Many medicinal plants were destroyed but my spirit helps to guide me to plants farther away”. He said “I have had more patients since the pipeline was built”. This is due to an increase in witchcraft, which he said, “is due to jealousy because some people got compensation or had jobs and others got nothing. Projects that would be useful include building houses, a palm plantation, and wells”.

To summarize, almost every one of my informants mentioned the decline in hunting, lack of good medical care, loss of medicinal plants, and lack of compensation as the major problems either worsened or at best not improved by the pipeline project. Also, houses, palm plantations, wells, medical care, and good roads were the most frequently mentioned items that the communities need. In general the Bagyeli and the villagers had the same concerns and critiques of the pipeline project, however, the villagers focused more on crop loss and the Bagyeli more on the loss of medicinal plants.

Overall, my findings were similar to other existing studies on the Bagyeli and the pipeline, which were written by and for NGOs working in the area (see Biesbrouck and Dkamela 1998; Djiraibe et al 2002; Horta et al 2002; Kenrick n.d; and Nelson et al. 2001). Perhaps not surprisingly the reports written for COTCO and Esso are more positive in regards to the situation with the Bagyeli then what I found (See Cogels and Koppert 2003; Esso 1999; Exxon 1998; Koppert et al. 1997; and Koppert et al 1998).

The Corporations

The oil consortium and the World Bank have touted the pipeline as a development project. In order to facilitate the promotion of their views of the pipeline project, both

ExxonMobil and the World Bank are clients of Weber Shandwick Public Affairs, a large public relations firm (Horta 2000a).

Tom Walters, Vice President of ExxonMobil had the following to say about the pipeline project at the Congressional Sub-Committee for Africa hearing on the Chad-Cameroon oil development project.

I am aware of no other project in Africa or perhaps the world that has conducted public consultation to the level of the Chad Project – we are proud of what was accomplished and the input received from local citizens and knowledgeable others, has been invaluable. Some have called the Chad Project a new model; I see it as applying ExxonMobil's basic business model which includes our high standards for safety, health, and environmental management along with the high standards of business conduct and ethics to the unique issues Chad presents. For example, in Chad, we had the opportunity of applying this model on a clean slate. There was no prior history of development to deal with.

We have approached the Chad-Cameroon Project with a focus on detailed and rigorous planning, uncompromising ethical business practices and adherence to all laws while respecting local culture and customs. In the absence of local engineering and construction codes, we have applied U.S. standards to the Chad Project's design and implementation.

As we invest to meet the world's energy needs, we are mindful of our responsibilities as a corporate citizen.

We are committed to developing relationships that are mutually beneficial to the citizens of those countries where we operate as well as to our shareholders, employees and contractors.

Our goal is not to assume the role of government, but to support government in its efforts to see that resource development improves the quality of life for its citizens. We expose leading-edge western business practices to countries like Chad and Cameroon, supporting democratic and capitalistic reforms as well as providing example-setting ethical behaviors.

As we conduct our business, we do so in a manner that recognizes the balanced environmental and economic needs of the community and the country. We achieve this

by investing wisely and paying careful attention to environmental protection and mitigation as well as safe work practices. To do this, we need to have the input of local citizens and others knowledgeable on local matters through our comprehensive consultation processes.

The key to our success is our company's philosophy of managing our business for the long-term and applying the highest standards consistently to every aspect of our business. [Walters 2002]

In October of 2003, ExxonMobil took out a full-page ad in the New York Times describing the benefits of the pipeline. The ad was entitled *Voilà* and it stated,

A new chapter in world energy markets opened in early October when the first cargo of crude oil from the African country of Chad was loaded onto a tanker off the coast of Cameroon.

The story behind that first cargo is worth the telling.

Oil was discovered 27 years ago in Chad, a landlocked country that is one of the world's poorest.

The Chad oil fields are about 650 miles from the ocean, and major upgrading of railways, roads and bridges was required to get the oil project materials on location. The pipeline route travels through environmentally and socially sensitive areas, including the rainforest in southern Cameroon and communities of Bakola pygmies near the coast. The route also lies in the area of the world with the highest exposure to malaria, and one of the highest rates of meningitis.

Chad was nearly the poorest country in Africa, and Cameroon was only moderately better off. Moreover, Chad suffered for many years from civil strife and armed rebellion, a condition that subsided only in the late 1990s.

The obstacles to oil development were so formidable that some of the early project participants dropped out, and were replaced by ChevronTexaco and Petronas in 2000.

But the oil offered hope for a better future and a remarkable coalition of people and organizations eventually collaborated to make the Chad/Cameroon oil project a unique example of energy development.

ExxonMobil and the early project partners invited the World Bank to help fund a minority ownership in the pipeline – which represents about 40 percent of the project's cost – for the governments of Chad and

Cameroon. The World Bank then assisted Chad in designing an unprecedented plan to ensure that oil revenues would contribute to poverty alleviation and an improved education system.

An extensive public consultation process in hundreds of villages, begun seven years prior to the start of construction, led to many project changes. The pipeline was routed to avoid villages and cultural sites and to protect biodiversity. People who, due to construction, faced losses of crops and plants used for medicinal purposes were provided compensation.

The project partners helped build schools, health clinics and community water wells. They also put in place extensive public health education programs focused on malaria and HIV/AIDS prevention. These efforts included distribution of 80,000 insecticide-treated bed nets.

Local employment soared as 35,000 workers were employed during the project's construction. More than \$650 million was pumped into the local economies through 2,200 Chadian and Cameroonian companies.

And so with the first oil loaded, an extraordinary project begins to supply energy to the world as well as a better life and a cargo of hope to the people of Chad and Cameroon. [ExxonMobil 2003:A29]

Esso's annual report for 2004 also stated that the project had brought improvements to peoples' lives.

After months of field research and four thousand interviews in the villages of southern Chad, a research team determined that the Chad/Cameroon Development Project has significantly improved living conditions for people living in the oilfield and pipeline areas.

- The finding was based on a village-by-village socioeconomic index score similar to the United Nations Human Development Index. Project-area villages scored in a range that was about twice as high on the socioeconomic index as the study's control villages, which are located outside the Project area.
- People in the Project area tended to have better housing. Metal roofs and cemented walls were observed five times more often in Project area villages compared to the control villages.

- People living in the Project area had better access to improved diets as indicated by their ability to more often obtain meat and fish.
- Nearly all of the households in the Project area (90%) reported using mosquito nets for malaria prevention, a result of the Project-funded Roll Back Malaria campaign. By comparison, 10% of control village households reported using mosquito nets. [Esso 2004]

The report starts out by saying that conditions are improved in both the project and pipeline areas, but it documents no improvements in the pipeline area. I have not been to Chad and cannot comment on improvements brought by the project in the oilfield area, but in Cameroon such improvements were negligible.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Structural violence is inherent in the growth process. No matter how many safeguards are implemented in a large-scale development project, the most vulnerable people are harmed. When the Commercial world intersects the Tribal world, the power elites can easily take advantage of those with little social power. In the case of the Bagyeli, they have little say in matters that affect their lives and no say in the pipeline project.

The country of Cameroon has been rated as one of the most corrupt countries for many years running by Transparency International. Cameroon's public expenditure on health is only 1.1% of GDP. TB, malaria, cholera, and HIV are all significant problems in Cameroon. What hospitals exist are run down and there is little medicine available to rural people.

The Bagyeli are tropical forest foragers and rely on forest products for survival, although agricultural is growing in importance. They identify themselves as "the people of the forest". Access to the forest is based upon the residential unit and kinship networks. Many Bagyeli have been resettled in roadside villages, which has affected their health and has placed them on the lowest social rung. They do not have legal claim to the land they occupy and lack of national identity cards makes seeking redress through the legal system impossible. As the forest becomes more degraded through logging and the pipeline project, the Bagyeli way of life is threatened. The Bagyeli recognize the decline in the forest's productivity. These changes include species of animals and plants becoming rare. Logging is understood to be a main contributor to the depletion of the

forest. Still most feel that the forest will never come to an end and cannot imagine life without it.

Oil was discovered in Chad in 1974. The oil pipeline project is run by a consortium of oil companies, which includes ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and PETRONAS. The project cost \$3.7 billion and runs 1,070 kilometers, starting in Chad and through Cameroon to the Atlantic Ocean. The World Bank came on board the project as political risk insurance, providing loans and credits to the two governments and the consortium. Now that the pipeline is up and running, a 15-meter system easement has to be maintained over the pipeline. The first shipment of oil happened in October 2003. By the end of 2004, 70 million barrels of oil had been shipped to markets around the world.

There are many risks associated with the pipeline including an increase of HIV and STIs, malaria, and cholera. In order to mitigate the increased risk of HIV, Esso developed a multi-pronged program, which included education for its workers on the prevention of HIV, distribution of free condoms, and STI screening for its workers. The program did not include treatment or testing of HIV.

Possible environmental risks include the loss of wildlife through destruction of habitat and increased poaching; the possibility of oil spills and leaks; and increased oil exploration. Esso implemented an Indigenous Peoples Plan to offset the risks associated with the Bagyeli. The IPP states that compensation should be given to the owners of crops and not the owners of the land, but in reality many villagers claimed crops that were cultivated by the Bagyeli. Also compensation was given to the Bagyeli in the form of goods such as iron for roofs. This amounted to one person in a base-camp receiving

iron for a roof and others who received nothing, which has led to an increase in jealousy. Regional compensation was also fraught with problems.

The players involved in the pipeline are ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, PETRONAS, the United States government, the World Bank, The European Investment Bank, The U.S. Export-Import Bank, and Coface. These institutions are comprised of individuals with powerful personal networks. Through these networks, people are able to manipulate the system in their favor and make decisions that promote growth in revenues, profits, and fossil fuel consumption.

Throughout my interviews with the Bagyeli, almost every one of my informants mentioned the decline in hunting, lack of good medical care, loss of medicinal plants, and lack of compensation as the major problems either worsened or at best not improved by the pipeline project. Also, houses, palm plantations, wells, medical care, and good roads were the most frequently mentioned items that the communities need. The Bagyeli perspective is that there was an increase in disease. There was also an increase in jealousy, which led to more accusations of witchcraft. This can also be used to show that there is an increase in illnesses because witchcraft is often an explanation for unexplained illness. In general the Bagyeli and the villagers had the same concerns and critiques of the pipeline project, however, the villagers focused more on crop loss and the Bagyeli more on the loss of medicinal plants.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the oil consortium and the World Bank have a different perspective on the pipeline. They state that the project is “development done right” and that the pipeline is a model that can be used for other large-scale projects. Through

advertisements and press releases, the corporations are able to present their position to the world whereas the Bagyeli perspective is mostly silent.

The implication of this study is simple. The Bagyeli need to have control over what happens to the forest they depend upon for survival. Creating ways of increasing the Bagyeli's social power (and decreasing elite social power) is not so simple. NGOs in the area are already working to increase the Bagyeli's standing in local communities. The FPP even took some Bagyeli to the World Bank's headquarters to protest the pipeline. One thing that I believe NGOs in the area should do is to go to the communities. Right now many NGOs hold meetings in a central location such as Bipindi and the local leaders come to the meetings and then are supposed to disseminate the information they receive to their communities. Also, NGOs need to join together to work for the Bagyeli's interests. One NGO with its office in Bipindi cannot do as much as twenty NGOs with offices spread throughout Cameroon, Europe, and the United States. Finally, NGOs need to be sure they are not imposing their ideals and wants on the Bagyeli but are working for the Bagyeli.

The case of the Bagyeli and the oil pipeline illustrates the dangers of large-scale corporate development and the increases in scale that has put power in the hands of a few elites, while taking power completely away from others. Unless something is done to modify the current social system, indigenous peoples and the poorest of the poor will continue to be exploited, will continue to bear the brunt of illnesses, and will continue in their cycle of poverty while the power elites will continue to gain more power and wealth. If one were to create optimum scale societies, with optimum distributions of social power, this would alleviate current global problems.

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APPENDIX I

ACRONYMS

AIDS – Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

AOPIG – Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group

CAPECE – Cameroon Petroleum Environmental Capacity Enhancement Project

CAR – Central African Republic

CEO – Chief Executive Officer

COTCO – Cameroon Oil Transport Corporation

CSW – Commercial Sex Workers

EIB – European Investment Bank

EMP – Environmental Management Plan

EPC – Engineering Procurement and Construction

EU – European Union

FEDEC – Foundation for Development and Environment in Cameroon

FPP – Forest Peoples Project

FONDAF – Foyer Notre Dame de la Foret

FSO – Floating Storage and Offloading

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HCV – Hepatitis C Virus

HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IASPS – Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies

IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICLIF – International Centre for Leadership in Finance

ICPS – International Centre for Prison Studies

ICSID – International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

IDA – International Development Association

IFC – International Finance Corporation

IPP – Indigenous Peoples Plan

MIGA – Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

MPH – Ministry of Public Health

NTFPs – Non-timber forest products

RDPC – Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais

SDF – Social Democratic Front

SDR – Special Drawing Rights

SSA – sub-Saharan Africa

STI – Sexual Transmitted Infections

TB – Tuberculosis

TOTCO – Tchad Oil Transportation Company

UDC – Union Démocratique du Cameroun

UNC – Union Nationale Camerounaise

UNDP – Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le progrès

WEF – World Economic Forum

WHO – World Health Organization

APPENDIX II

IBRD EXECUTIVE VOTING STATUS

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT VOTING POWER OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS		
	NO. OF VOTES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
DIRECTORS APPOINTED BY:		
1. UNITED STATES (BROOKINS)	265,219	16.39
2. JAPAN (OKUBO)	127,250	7.87
3. GERMANY (DEUTSCHER)	72,649	4.49
4. FRANCE (DUQUESNE)	69,647	4.30
5. UNITED KINGDOM (SCHOLAR)	69,647	4.30
ELECTED DIRECTORS:		
6. ALZETTA (BELGIUM)	77,669	4.80
AUSTRIA	11,313	
BELARUS	3,573	
BELGIUM	29,233	
CZECH REPUBLIC	6,558	
HUNGARY	8,300	
KAZAKHSTAN	3,235	
LUXEMBOURG	1,902	
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	3,466	
SLOVENIA	1,511	
TURKEY	8,578	
7. MARTI (SPAIN)	72,786	4.50
COSTA RICA	483	
EL SALVADOR	391	
GUATEMALA	2,251	
HONDURAS	891	
MEXICO	19,054	
NICARAGUA	858	
SPAIN	28,247	
VENEZUELA, REP. BOLIVARIANA DE	20,611	
8. MELKERT (NETHERLANDS)	72,208	4.46
ARMENIA	1,389	
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	799	
BULGARIA	5,465	
CROATIA	2,543	
CYPRUS	1,711	
GEORGIA	1,834	
ISRAEL	5,000	
MACEDONIA, FYR OF	677	
MOLDOVA	1,618	
NETHERLANDS	35,753	
ROMANIA	4,261	
UKRAINE	11,158	
9. MASSE (CANADA)	62,217	3.85
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	770	
BAHAMAS, THE	1,321	
BARBADOS	1,198	

BELIZE	836	
CANADA	45,045	
DOMINICA	754	
GRENADA	781	
GUYANA	1,308	
IRELAND	5,521	
JAMAICA	2,828	
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	525	
ST. LUCIA	802	
ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES	528	
10. CANUTO (BRAZIL)	58,124	3.59
BRAZIL	33,537	
COLOMBIA	6,602	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	2,342	
ECUADOR	3,021	
HAITI	1,317	
PANAMA	635	
PHILIPPINES	7,094	
SURINAME	662	
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	2,914	
11. BOSSONE (ITALY)	56,705	3.50
ALBANIA	1,080	
GREECE	1,934	
ITALY	45,045	
MALTA	1,324	
PORTUGAL	5,710	
SAN MARINO	845	
TIMOR-LESTE	767	
12. AUSTIN (NEW ZEALAND)	55,800	3.45
AUSTRALIA	24,714	
CAMBODIA	464	
KIRIBATI	715	
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	16,067	
MARSHALL ISLANDS	719	
MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF	729	
MONGOLIA	716	
NEW ZEALAND	7,486	
PALAU	266	
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	1,544	
SAMOA	781	
SOLOMON ISLANDS	763	
VANUATU	836	
13. SINAMENYE (BURUNDI)	55,190	3.41
ANGOLA	2,926	
BOTSWANA	865	
BURUNDI	966	
ERITREA	843	
ETHIOPIA	1,228	
GAMBIA, THE	793	
KENYA	2,711	
LESOTHO	913	
LIBERIA	713	
MALAWI	1,344	
MOZAMBIQUE	1,180	
NAMIBIA	1,773	

NIGERIA	12,905	
SEYCHELLES	513	
SIERRA LEONE	968	
SOUTH AFRICA	13,712	
SUDAN	1,100	
SWAZILAND	690	
TANZANIA	1,545	
UGANDA	867	
ZAMBIA	3,060	
ZIMBABWE	3,575	
14. VASUDEV (INDIA)	54,945	3.40
BANGLADESH	5,104	
BHUTAN	729	
INDIA	45,045	
SRI LANKA	4,067	
15. INGOLFSSON (ICELAND)	54,039	3.34
DENMARK	13,701	
ESTONIA	1,173	
FINLAND	8,810	
ICELAND	1,508	
LATVIA	1,634	
LITHUANIA	1,757	
NORWAY	10,232	
SWEDEN	15,224	
16. DIB (ALGERIA)	51,544	3.19
AFGHANISTAN	550	
ALGERIA	9,502	
GHANA	1,775	
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF	23,936	
MOROCCO	5,223	
PAKISTAN	9,589	
TUNISIA	969	
17. VEGLIO (SWITZERLAND)	49,192	3.04
AZERBAIJAN	1,896	
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	1,357	
POLAND	11,158	
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	3,096	
SWITZERLAND	26,856	
TAJKISTAN	1,310	
TURKMENISTAN	776	
UZBEKISTAN	2,743	
18. ALJAZZAF (KUWAIT)	47,042	2.91
BAHRAIN	1,353	
EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF	7,358	
IRAQ	3,058	
JORDAN	1,638	
KUWAIT	13,530	
LEBANON	590	
LIBYA	8,090	
MALDIVES	719	
OMAN	1,811	
QATAR	1,346	
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	2,452	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	2,635	
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF	2,462	

19. ZHU (CHINA)	45,049	2.78
CHINA	45,049	
20. ALYAHYA (SAUDI ARABIA)	45,045	2.78
SAUDI ARABIA	45,045	
21. KVASOV (RUSSIAN FED.)	45,045	2.78
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	45,045	
22. HERWIDAYATMO (INDONESIA)	41,096	2.54
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	2,623	
FIJI	1,237	
INDONESIA	15,231	
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP.	428	
MALAYSIA	8,494	
MYANMAR	2,734	
NEPAL	1,218	
SINGAPORE	570	
THAILAND	6,599	
TONGA	744	
VIETNAM	1,218	
23. QUIJANDRIA SALMON (PERU)	37,499	2.32
ARGENTINA	18,161	
BOLIVIA	2,035	
CHILE	7,181	
PARAGUAY	1,479	
PERU	5,581	
URUGUAY	3,062	
24. GOMES (GUINEA-BISSAU)	32,252	1.99
BENIN	1,118	
BURKINA FASO	1,118	
CAMEROON	1,777	
CAPE VERDE	758	
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1,112	
CHAD	1,112	
COMOROS	532	
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF	2,893	
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF	1,177	
COTE D'IVOIRE	2,766	
DJIBOUTI	809	
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	965	
GABON	1,237	
GUINEA	1,542	
GUINEA-BISSAU	790	
MADAGASCAR	1,672	
MALI	1,412	
MAURITANIA	1,150	
MAURITIUS	1,492	
NIGER	1,102	
RWANDA	1,296	
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	745	
SENEGAL	2,322	
TOGO	1,355	

Source: World Bank 2004

APPENDIX III

IDA EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS VOTING STATUS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION VOTING POWER OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS		
	NO. OF VOTES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
DIRECTORS APPOINTED BY:		
1. UNITED STATES (BROOKINS)	2,019,309	14.15
2. JAPAN (OKUBO)	1,541,960	10.81
3. GERMANY (DEUTSCHER)	989,929	6.94
4. UNITED KINGDOM (SCHOLAR)	715,264	5.01
5. FRANCE (DUQUESNE)	611,024	4.28
ELECTED DIRECTORS:		
6. INGOLFSSON (ICELAND)	698,470	4.89
DENMARK	147,261	
FINLAND	87,630	
ICELAND	33,217	
LATVIA	3,659	
NORWAY	147,135	
SWEDEN	279,568	
7. ALZETTA (BELGIUM)	642,918	4.51
AUSTRIA	97,065	
BELGIUM	164,653	
CZECH REPUBLIC	66,501	
HUNGARY	107,092	
KAZAKHSTAN	806	
LUXEMBOURG	36,266	
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	42,400	
SLOVENIA	31,522	
TURKEY	96,613	
8. MASSE (CANADA)	623,359	4.37
BARBADOS	29,714	
BELIZE	4,553	
CANADA	417,713	
DOMINICA	16,749	
GRENADA	20,627	
GUYANA	23,460	
IRELAND	43,937	
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	7,888	
ST. LUCIA	27,231	
ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES	31,487	
9. SINAMENYE (BURUNDI)	609,238	4.27
ANGOLA	48,362	
BOTSWANA	32,495	
BURUNDI	25,706	
ERITREA	25,295	
ETHIOPIA	26,044	
GAMBIA, THE	19,444	
KENYA	46,951	
LESOTHO	31,414	

LIBERIA	22,467	
MALAWI	38,112	
MOZAMBIQUE	14,817	
NIGERIA	15,257	
SIERRA LEONE	16,967	
SOUTH AFRICA	39,761	
SUDAN	22,484	
SWAZILAND	15,373	
TANZANIA	46,951	
UGANDA	46,951	
ZAMBIA	56,730	
ZIMBABWE	17,657	
10. VASUDEV (INDIA)	598,568	4.19
BANGLADESH	80,183	
BHUTAN	19,583	
INDIA	440,607	
SRI LANKA	58,195	
11. VEGLIO (SWITZERLAND)	534,032	3.74
AZERBAIJAN	3,803	
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	2,700	
POLAND	322,515	
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	29,374	
SWITZERLAND	154,326	
TAJIKISTAN	20,568	
UZBEKISTAN	746	
12. MELKERT (NETHERLANDS)	522,439	3.66
ARMENIA	5,317	
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	21,849	
CROATIA	40,374	
CYPRUS	37,001	
GEORGIA	37,493	
ISRAEL	47,294	
MACEDONIA, FYR OF	18,707	
MOLDOVA	612	
NETHERLANDS	312,030	
UKRAINE	1,762	
13. BOSSONE (ITALY)	504,788	3.54
ALBANIA	33,042	
GREECE	35,502	
ITALY	398,415	
PORTUGAL	37,271	
TIMOR-LESTE	558	
14. ALYAHYA (SAUDI ARABIA)	502,122	3.52
SAUDI ARABIA	502,122	
15. GOMES (GUINEA-BISSAU)	449,724	3.15
BENIN	13,166	
BURKINA FASO	23,766	
CAMEROON	25,284	
CAPE VERDE	4,916	
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	13,620	
CHAD	13,590	
COMOROS	13,141	
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF	14,764	
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF	10,985	
COTE D'IVOIRE	40,456	

DJIBOUTI	532	
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	6,167	
GABON	2,093	
GUINEA	30,687	
GUINEA-BISSAU	6,790	
MADAGASCAR	40,456	
MALI	24,808	
MAURITANIA	18,275	
MAURITIUS	39,133	
NIGER	19,302	
RWANDA	20,312	
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	6,414	
SENEGAL	37,824	
TOGO	23,243	
16. CANUTO (BRAZIL)	439,683	3.08
BRAZIL	249,653	
COLOMBIA	70,226	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	27,780	
ECUADOR	35,989	
HAITI	24,871	
PANAMA	10,185	
PHILIPPINES	16,583	
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4,396	
17. AUSTIN (NEW ZEALAND)	428,234	3.00
AUSTRALIA	183,741	
CAMBODIA	12,922	
KIRIBATI	11,777	
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	80,978	
MARSHALL ISLANDS	4,902	
MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF	18,424	
MONGOLIA	24,389	
NEW ZEALAND	41,449	
PALAU	504	
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	16,368	
SAMOA	18,441	
SOLOMON ISLANDS	518	
VANUATU	13,821	
18. HERWIDAYATMO (INDONESIA)	389,830	2.73
FIJI	9,423	
INDONESIA	126,774	
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP.	19,567	
MALAYSIA	51,529	
MYANMAR	48,827	
NEPAL	34,400	
SINGAPORE	5,099	
THAILAND	58,195	
TONGA	16,813	
VIETNAM	19,203	
19. ALJAZZAF (KUWAIT)	306,304	2.15
EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF	67,384	
IRAQ	9,407	
JORDAN	24,865	
KUWAIT	78,681	
LEBANON	8,562	
LIBYA	7,771	

MALDIVES	30,186	
OMAN	27,003	
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	10,351	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	1,367	
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF	40,727	
20. MARTI (SPAIN)	305,544	2.14
COSTA RICA	12,480	
EL SALVADOR	6,244	
GUATEMALA	33,667	
HONDURAS	27,109	
MEXICO	102,666	
NICARAGUA	29,845	
SPAIN	93,533	
21. DIB (ALGERIA)	275,381	1.93
AFGHANISTAN	13,557	
ALGERIA	27,720	
GHANA	23,831	
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF	15,455	
MOROCCO	64,794	
PAKISTAN	127,231	
TUNISIA	2,793	
22. ZHU (CHINA)	273,252	1.91
CHINA	273,252	
23. QUIJANDRIA (PERU)	248,510	1.74
ARGENTINA	134,439	
BOLIVIA	40,959	
CHILE	31,782	
PARAGUAY	16,958	
PERU	24,372	
24. KVASOV (RUSSIAN FED.)	39,573	.28
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	39,573	

Source: World Bank 2004

APPENDIX IV

IFC EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS VOTING STATUS

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION VOTING POWER OF DIRECTORS		
	NO. OF VOTES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
DIRECTORS APPOINTED BY:		
1. UNITED STATES (BROOKINS)	569,629	23.67
2. JAPAN (OKUBO)	141,424	5.88
3. GERMANY (DEUTSCHER)	129,158	5.37
4. FRANCE (DUQUESNE)	121,265	5.04
5. UNITED KINGDOM (SCHOLAR)	121,265	5.04
ELECTED DIRECTORS:		
6. ALZETTA (BELGIUM)	125,221	5.20
AUSTRIA	19,991	
BELARUS	5,412	
BELGIUM	50,860	
CZECH REPUBLIC	9,163	
HUNGARY	11,182	
KAZAKHSTAN	4,887	
LUXEMBOURG	2,389	
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	4,707	
SLOVENIA	1,835	
TURKEY	14,795	
7. BOSSONE (ITALY)	99,893	4.15
ALBANIA	1,552	
GREECE	7,148	
ITALY	81,592	
PORTUGAL	8,574	
TIMOR-LESTE	1,027	
8. VASUDEV (INDIA)	99,234	4.12
BANGLADESH	9,287	
BHUTAN	970	
INDIA	81,592	
SRI LANKA	7,385	
9. MARTI (SPAIN)	97,478	4.05
COSTA RICA	1,202	
EL SALVADOR	279	
GUATEMALA	1,334	
HONDURAS	745	
MEXICO	27,839	
NICARAGUA	965	
SPAIN	37,276	
VENEZUELA, REP. BOLIVARIANA DE	27,838	
10. MASSE (CANADA)	92,944	3.86
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	263	
BAHAMAS, THE	585	
BARBADOS	611	
BELIZE	351	
CANADA	81,592	
DOMINICA	292	

GRENADA	324	
GUYANA	1,642	
IRELAND	1,540	
JAMAICA	4,532	
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	888	
ST. LUCIA	324	
11. MELKERT (NETHERLANDS)	87,113	3.62
ARMENIA	1,242	
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	870	
BULGARIA	5,117	
CROATIA	3,132	
CYPRUS	2,389	
GEORGIA	1,111	
ISRAEL	2,385	
MACEDONIA, FYR OF	786	
MOLDOVA	1,034	
NETHERLANDS	56,381	
ROMANIA	2,911	
UKRAINE	9,755	
12. INGOLFSSON (ICELAND)	86,693	3.60
DENMARK	18,804	
ESTONIA	1,684	
FINLAND	15,947	
ICELAND	292	
LATVIA	2,400	
LITHUANIA	2,591	
NORWAY	17,849	
SWEDEN	27,126	
13. KVASOV (RUSSIAN FED.)	81,592	3.39
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	81,592	
14. CANUTO (BRAZIL)	75,980	3.16
BRAZIL	39,729	
COLOMBIA	12,856	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1,437	
ECUADOR	2,411	
HAITI	1,072	
PANAMA	1,257	
PHILIPPINES	12,856	
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4,362	
15. AUSTIN (NEW ZEALAND)	73,309	3.05
AUSTRALIA	47,579	
CAMBODIA	589	
KIRIBATI	262	
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	16,196	
MARSHALL ISLANDS	913	
MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF	994	
MONGOLIA	394	
NEW ZEALAND	3,833	
PALAU	275	
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	1,397	
SAMOA	285	
SOLOMON ISLANDS	287	
VANUATU	305	
16. QUIJANDRIA SALMON (PERU)	64,144	2.67
ARGENTINA	38,379	

BOLIVIA	2,152	
CHILE	11,960	
PARAGUAY	686	
PERU	7,148	
URUGUAY	3,819	
17. VEGLIO (SWITZERLAND)	62,601	2.60
AZERBAIJAN	2,617	
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	1,970	
POLAND	7,486	
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	2,053	
SWITZERLAND	41,830	
TAJKISTAN	1,462	
TURKMENISTAN	1,060	
UZBEKISTAN	4,123	
18. HERWIDAYATMO (INDONESIA)	59,912	2.49
FIJI	537	
INDONESIA	28,789	
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP.	528	
MALAYSIA	15,472	
MYANMAR	916	
NEPAL	1,072	
SINGAPORE	427	
THAILAND	11,191	
TONGA	284	
VIETNAM	696	
19. SINAMENYE (BURUNDI)	58,873	2.45
ANGOLA	1,731	
BOTSWANA	363	
BURUNDI	350	
ERITREA	1,185	
ETHIOPIA	377	
GAMBIA, THE	344	
KENYA	4,291	
LESOTHO	321	
LIBERIA	333	
MALAWI	2,072	
MOZAMBIQUE	572	
NAMIBIA	654	
NIGERIA	21,893	
SEYCHELLES	277	
SIERRA LEONE	473	
SOUTH AFRICA	16,198	
SUDAN	361	
SWAZILAND	934	
TANZANIA	1,253	
UGANDA	985	
ZAMBIA	1,536	
ZIMBABWE	2,370	
20. DIB (ALGERIA)	45,980	1.91
AFGHANISTAN	361	
ALGERIA	5,871	
GHANA	5,321	
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF	1,694	
MOROCCO	9,287	
PAKISTAN	19,630	

TUNISIA	3,816	
21. ALJAZZAF (KUWAIT)	34,476	1.43
BAHRAIN	1,996	
EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF	12,610	
IRAQ	397	
JORDAN	1,191	
KUWAIT	10,197	
LEBANON	385	
LIBYA	305	
MALDIVES	266	
OMAN	1,437	
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	444	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	4,283	
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF	965	
22. ALYAHYA (SAUDI ARABIA)	30,312	1.26
SAUDI ARABIA	30,312	
23. ZHU (CHINA)	24,750	1.03
CHINA	24,750	
24. GOMES (GUINEA-BISSAU)	22,947	.95
BENIN	369	
BURKINA FASO	1,086	
CAMEROON	1,135	
CAPE VERDE	265	
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	369	
CHAD	1,614	
COMOROS	264	
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF	2,409	
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF	381	
COTE D'IVOIRE	3,794	
DJIBOUTI	271	
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	293	
GABON	1,518	
GUINEA	589	
GUINEA-BISSAU	268	
MADAGASCAR	682	
MALI	701	
MAURITANIA	464	
MAURITIUS	1,915	
NIGER	397	
RWANDA	556	
SENEGAL	2,549	
TOGO	1,058	

Source: World Bank 2004

APPENDIX V

MIGA DIRECTORS VOTING STATUS

MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY VOTING POWER OF DIRECTORS		
	NO. OF VOTES	PERCENT OF TOTAL
DIRECTORS ELECTED BY 6 LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS:		
1. UNITED STATES (BROOKINS)	32,169	15.01
2. JAPAN (OKUBO)	9,259	4.32
3. GERMANY (DEUTSCHER)	9,216	4.30
4. UNITED KINGDOM (SCHOLAR)	8,845	4.13
5. FRANCE (DUQUESNE)	8,483	3.96
6. CHINA (ZHU)	5,810	2.71
DIRECTORS ELECTED BY OTHER SHAREHOLDERS:		
7. SINAMENYE (BURUNDI)	11,828	5.52
ANGOLA	467	
BOTSWANA	368	
BURUNDI	354	
ERITREA	330	
ETHIOPIA	403	
GAMBIA, THE	330	
KENYA	583	
LESOTHO	368	
MALAWI	357	
MOZAMBIQUE	451	
NAMIBIA	387	
NIGERIA	1,767	
SEYCHELLES	330	
SIERRA LEONE	412	
SOUTH AFRICA	1,942	
SUDAN	486	
SWAZILAND	338	
TANZANIA	528	
UGANDA	513	
ZAMBIA	598	
ZIMBABWE	516	
8. ALZETTA (BELGIUM)	11,711	5.46
AUSTRIA	1,646	
BELARUS	513	
BELGIUM	3,857	
CZECH REPUBLIC	1,064	
HUNGARY	1,274	
KAZAKHSTAN	648	
LUXEMBOURG	484	
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	671	
SLOVENIA	460	
TURKEY	1,094	
9. MELKERT (NETHERLANDS)	11,633	5.43
ARMENIA	360	

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	360	
BULGARIA	923	
CROATIA	610	
CYPRUS	463	
GEORGIA	391	
ISRAEL	1,115	
MACEDONIA, FYR OF	368	
MOLDOVA	376	
NETHERLANDS	4,102	
ROMANIA	1,258	
UKRAINE	1,307	
10. MASSE (CANADA)	10,210	4.77
BAHAMAS, THE	456	
BARBADOS	400	
BELIZE	368	
CANADA	5,505	
DOMINICA	330	
GRENADA	330	
GUYANA	364	
IRELAND	930	
JAMAICA	461	
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	330	
ST. LUCIA	368	
ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES	368	
11. INGOLFSSON (ICELAND)	8,206	3.83
DENMARK	1,545	
ESTONIA	395	
FINLAND	1,337	
ICELAND	370	
LATVIA	451	
LITHUANIA	467	
NORWAY	1,512	
SWEDEN	2,129	
12. GOMES (GUINEA-BISSAU)	8,145	3.80
BENIN	388	
BURKINA FASO	341	
CAMEROON	387	
CAPE VERDE	330	
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	340	
CHAD	340	
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF	876	
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF	395	
COTE D'IVOIRE	590	
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	330	
GABON	449	
GUINEA	371	
MADAGASCAR	456	
MALI	423	
MAURITANIA	391	
MAURITIUS	433	
RWANDA	412	
SENEGAL	536	
TOGO	357	
13. BOSSONE (ITALY)	8,100	3.78
ALBANIA	382	

GREECE	773	
ITALY	5,250	
MALTA	412	
PORTUGAL	953	
TIMOR-LESTE	330	
14. ALJAZZAF (KUWAIT)	7,864	3.67
BAHRAIN	416	
EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF	1,089	
JORDAN	451	
KUWAIT	1,919	
LEBANON	530	
LIBYA	829	
OMAN	446	
QATAR	521	
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	576	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	652	
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF	435	
15. CANUTO (BRAZIL)	7,594	3.54
BRAZIL	2,886	
COLOMBIA	1,050	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	427	
ECUADOR	601	
HAITI	355	
PANAMA	511	
PHILIPPINES	764	
SURINAME	362	
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	638	
16. DIB (ALGERIA)	7,364	3.44
AFGHANISTAN	398	
ALGERIA	1,424	
GHANA	712	
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF	1,939	
MOROCCO	893	
PAKISTAN	1,443	
TUNISIA	555	
17. AUSTIN (NEW ZEALAND)	6,848	3.20
AUSTRALIA	3,299	
CAMBODIA	444	
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	1,071	
MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF	330	
MONGOLIA	338	
PALAU	330	
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	376	
SAMOA	330	
VANUATU	330	
18. HERWIDAYATMO (INDONESIA)	6,764	3.16
FIJI	351	
INDONESIA	2,129	
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP.	340	
MALAYSIA	1,300	
NEPAL	402	
SINGAPORE	552	
THAILAND	1,022	
VIETNAM	668	
19. VEGLIO (SWITZERLAND)	6,561	3.06

AZERBAIJAN	395	
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	357	
POLAND	1,044	
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	687	
SWITZERLAND	2,923	
TAJKISTAN	354	
TURKMENISTAN	346	
UZBEKISTAN	455	
20. MARTI (SPAIN)	6,478	3.02
COSTA RICA	486	
EL SALVADOR	402	
GUATEMALA	420	
HONDURAS	458	
NICARAGUA	460	
SPAIN	2,545	
VENEZUELA, REP. BOLIVARIANA DE	1,707	
21. ALYAHYA (SAUDI ARABIA)	5,808	2.71
SAUDI ARABIA	5,808	
22. KVASOV (RUSSIAN FED.)	5,808	2.71
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	5,808	
23. VASUDEV (INDIA)	4,965	2.32
BANGLADESH	879	
INDIA	3,328	
SRI LANKA	758	
24. QUIJANDRIA SALMON (PERU)	4,639	2.16
ARGENTINA	1,534	
BOLIVIA	500	
CHILE	765	
PARAGUAY	421	
PERU	937	
URUGUAY	482	

Source: World Bank 2004

APPENDIX VI

EXXONMOBIL SUBSIDIARIES

	% Owned Directly or Indirectly by ExxonMobil	State or Country of Organization
Aera Energy LLC	48.2	California
Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company	50	Saudi Arabia
Ampolex (CEPU) Pte Ltd	100	Singapore
Ancon Insurance Company, Inc.	100	Vermont
BEB Erdgas und Erdoel GmbH	50	Germany
Cameroon Oil Transportation Company S.A.	49.46	Cameroon
Caspian Pipeline Consortium	7.5	Russia/Kazakhstan
Castle Peak Power Company Limited	60	Hong Kong
Chalmette Refining, LLC	50	Delaware
CMD Partnership, L.P.	100	Delaware
Delhi Petroleum Pty. Ltd.	100	Australia
Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd	100	Australia
Esso Austria GmbH	100	Austria
Esso Brasileira de Petroleo Limitada	100	Brazil
Esso Capital B.V.	100	Netherlands
Esso Chile Petrolera Limitada	100	Chile
ESSO Deutschland GmbH	100	Germany
Esso Espanola, S. L.	100	Spain

Esso Exploration and Production Angola (Block 33) Limited	100	Bahamas
Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc.	100	Delaware
Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria (Deepwater) Limited	100	Nigeria
Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited	100	Nigeria
Esso Exploration and Production Norway AS	100	Norway
Esso Exploration and Production UK Limited	100	England
Esso Exploration Angola (Block 15) Limited	100	Bahamas
Esso Exploration Angola (Block 17) Limited	100	Bahamas
Esso Holding Company Singapore Limited	100	Bahamas
Esso Ireland Limited	100	Ireland
Esso Italiana S.r.l.	100	Italy
Esso Malaysia Berhad	65	Malaysia
Esso Natuna Ltd.	100	Bahamas
Esso Nederland B.V.	100	Netherlands
Esso Norge AS	100	Norway
Esso Petrolera Argentina Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada	100	Argentina
Esso Petroleum Company, Limited	100	England
Esso Pipeline Investments Limited	100	Bahamas
Esso Schweiz GmbH	100	Switzerland
Esso Societe Anonyme Française	81.548	France

Esso Standard Oil Company (Puerto Rico)	100	Puerto Rico
Esso (Thailand) Public Company Limited	87.5	Thailand
Esso Trading Company of Abu Dhabi	100	Delaware
Exxon Azerbaijan Limited	100	Bahamas
Exxon Capital Corporation	100	New Jersey
Exxon Chemical Arabia Inc.	100	Delaware
Exxon Chemical Asset Management Partnership	87.75	Delaware
Exxon Luxembourg Holdings LLC	100	Delaware
Exxon Mobile Bay Limited Partnership	88.69	Delaware
Exxon Neftegas Limited	100	Bahamas
Exxon Overseas Corporation	100	Delaware
Exxon Overseas Investment Corporation	100	Delaware
Exxon Yemen Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Alaska Production Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.	100	Singapore
ExxonMobil Aviation International Limited	100	England
ExxonMobil Canada Ltd.	100	Canada
ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH	100	Germany
ExxonMobil Chemical Films Europe, Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Chemical France S.A.R.L.	99.77	France
ExxonMobil Chemical Holland B.V.	100	Netherlands
ExxonMobil Chemical Holland LLC	100	Delaware

ExxonMobil Chemical Limited	100	England
ExxonMobil Chemical Olefins Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Chemical Operations Private Limited	100	Singapore
ExxonMobil Chemical Polymeres SNC	99.77	France
ExxonMobil de Colombia S.A.	99.03	Colombia
ExxonMobil Egypt (S.A.E.)	100	Egypt
ExxonMobil Energy Limited	100	Hong Kong
ExxonMobil Exploration and Production Malaysia Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Far East Holdings Ltd.	100	Bahamas
ExxonMobil Finance B.V.	100	Netherlands
ExxonMobil Gas Marketing Europe Limited	100	England
ExxonMobil Global Services Company	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Holding Company Holland LLC	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Hong Kong Limited	100	Hong Kong
ExxonMobil International Holdings Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil International Services, SARL	100	Luxembourg
ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Inc.	100	Bahamas
ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Ventures Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Luxembourg UK, SARL	100	Luxembourg
ExxonMobil Malaysia Sdn Bhd	100	Malaysia
ExxonMobil Marine Limited	100	England
ExxonMobil Mediterranea S.R.L.	100	Italy

ExxonMobil Oil Corporation	100	New York
ExxonMobil Oil Indonesia Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Petroleum & Chemical	100	Belgium
ExxonMobil Pipeline Company	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Qatargas Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Rasgas Inc.	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Sales and Supply Corporation	100	Delaware
ExxonMobil Yugen Kaisha	100	Japan
Fina Antwerp Olefins N.V.	35	Belgium
Imperial Oil Limited	69.6	Canada
Infineum USA L.P.	50	Delaware
Kyokuto Sekiyu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha	50	Japan
Mineraloelraffinerie Oberrhein GmbH & Co. KG	25	Germany
Mobil Argentina S.A.	100	Argentina
Mobil Australia Resources Company Pty Limited	100	Australia
Mobil California Exploration & Producing Asset Company	100	Delaware
Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company	100	Delaware
Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd.	100	Bahamas
Mobil Corporation	100	Delaware
Mobil Equatorial Guinea Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Erdgas-Erdoel GmbH	99.999	Germany
Mobil Exploration and Development Argentina Inc.	100	Delaware

Mobil Exploration & Producing Australia Pty Ltd	100	Australia
Mobil Exploration and Producing North America Inc.	100	Nevada
Mobil Exploration Indonesia Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Exploration Norway Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Fairfax Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil International Finance Corporation	100	Delaware
Mobil North Sea Limited	100	Delaware
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd	100	Australia
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Oil Française	99.986	France
Mobil Oil New Zealand Limited	100	New Zealand
Mobil Oil Nigeria Public Limited Company	60	Nigeria
Mobil Pase Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited	100	Nigeria
Mobil Producing Texas & New Mexico Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Refining Australia Pty Ltd	100	Australia
Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company Inc.	100	Delaware
Mobil Yanbu Refining Company Inc.	100	Delaware
Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha	43.77	Japan
Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V.	50	Netherlands
oy Esso ab	100	Finland

Paxon Polymer Company, L.P. II	92.84	Delaware
Qatar Liquefied Gas Company Limited	10	Qatar
Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited	26.5	Qatar
Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited (II)	29.999	Qatar
Saudi Aramco Mobil Refinery Company Ltd.	50	Saudi Arabia
Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Co.	50	Saudi Arabia
Schubert Beteiligungs-GmbH	72.999	Germany
SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc.	100	Delaware
SeaRiver Maritime, Inc.	100	Delaware
Societa per Azioni Raffineria Padana Olii Minerali-SARPOM	74.21	Italy
Standard Marine Tonsberg AS	100	Norway
Superior Oil (U.K.) Limited	100	England
Tengizchevroil	25	Kazakhstan
TonenGeneral Sekiyu K.K.	50.021	Japan
Tonen Kagaku K.K.	50.021	Japan

Source: Draffan 2002