SOCIOPOLITICAL RADICALISM: THE MAKING OF MARTYRS
AN ASSESSMENT OF PAST AND CURRENT METHODS OF
RECRUITMENT AND SOCIALIZATION APPLIED BY RADICAL
ISLAMIC TERROR GROUPS

By

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Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my friends in London for providing me with valuable insights into the world of Islam and the millions of peaceful Muslims who struggle to represent their faith in a world at odds. These are the people who suffer the most for the actions of few. They are also the ones liable to ridicule by those who do not care to know. They are the key to our understanding and are critical to finding a solution.
Recruitment operations are among the most critical activities that any terror group must conduct in order to continue advancing its cause. This thesis is an assessment of current trends in recruitment operations conducted by radical Islamist terror groups, which are determined to establish a single, worldwide community of Muslims strictly governed by 7th Century Islamic law. Drawing extensively on open sources of data, this thesis highlights key cultural and historical factors that have given rise to the globalized brand of radical Islamic terrorism that faces the world community today.

Presented in a manner that can be applied across disciplines, this thesis provides terrorism researchers with a number of tools for better understanding terror group recruitment operations – beginning by selecting a working definition of terrorism that is relevant to the needs and interests of researchers, policymakers, and practitioners alike. This thesis provides a critical review of traditional theoretical approaches for analyzing causes of actors’ participation in terror activities. Placing an emphasis on the value of a multicausal theoretical approach, this thesis discusses the structures, strengths,
vulnerabilities, and behaviors of terror organizations as scale-free networks. Third, this thesis places contemporary radical Islam within cultural and historical contexts of Islam, martyrdom, jihad, and political violence, and establishes the ideological framework of modern-day Islamism. Data collected through ethnographic fieldwork in London, England highlights the conflict between mainstream and radical strains of Islam, fundamental aspects of Wahhabism, and the effects of the July 2005 London bombings on the British Muslim population. Finally, this thesis provides readers with a number of case studies of individuals within terror organizations ranging from suicide bombers to the ideologue who gave birth to modern radical Islamist interpretations of Salafi Islam.

In its concluding section, this thesis addresses current trends in recruitment operations; provides an assessment of likely future security threats; offers practitioners considerations for countering terror organizations; highlights critical areas of study for anthropologists and other researchers, policymakers, and practitioners; and emphasizes the problems that face mainstream Muslims and non-Muslims in a world targeted by an Islamist strain of terrorism that is fueled by the blood of its martyrs and victims.
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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my father, John Leo McNassar Jr.,
who was my ally, idol, and confidant.
**PREFACE**

*August 2003, 30 Miles South of Baghdad*

We got a call from the guards at the checkpoint, the boy had returned with his tribal elder, and was seeking medical assistance. Rob and I looked at each other and grinned. Chris was on patrol on MSR Tampa – a 450-mile stretch of highway, which runs from Syria to Kuwait and through Baghdad, so one of the guys called him on the SINGARS radio. Rob and I, wearing running shorts, t-shirts, and Chaco sandals, grabbed our weapons and aid bags and walked down the trail to the checkpoint. A local shaykh and several villagers greeted us, and the young boy was spread out on the ground. Smiling. The boy was 15, but his sun-weathered and sandy face made him look 35. I remember looking down at him, lying there and smiling at me as if we were old friends. His legs were destroyed.

It was early in the war and our beloved ‘camp’ Kalsu consisted of a few tents, a bombed-out, two-room Iraqi military communications building, a company of infantrymen and a few platoons of military police. We had no perimeter, no wires, no barriers, just emerald fields on three sides and a quiet rolling stream to the front.

Three weeks earlier, Chris had been patrolling a field about one hundred meters from our camp. At home, Chris is a FDNY paramedic and a veteran of the World Trade Center tragedy, but that day he was a soldier. As Chris came up on one side of the thirty-foot-long bridge leading into our camp, the boy came up on the other side. When they saw each other, Chris looked at the boy’s face, and the boy smiled at Chris as he lifted his AK-47.
Chris did not hesitate as the boy began to fire at him. In one smooth motion, Chris flipped the select-fire switch to ‘burst’ and raised his M-16 at the boy. He squeezed the trigger twice, and six rounds of armor piercing M855 5.56mm divided themselves equally into the boy’s two knees. The boy crumpled to the ground instantaneously, and Chris closed the distance between the two of them. Chris tossed the boy’s rifle away from the two them, and now, just as suddenly as he had shot the boy, Chris became a New York City paramedic again.

Three weeks later, Rob and I knelt down at the boy’s side and carefully began removing the bandages, weaving them in and out of the steel pins, screws, and rods that now held the boy’s withering legs to his body. Despite the lack of any pain medication, the boy did not show any sign of discomfort – I had admiringly noticed this in many of my Iraqi patients – he just continued to smile at us. As we finally exposed his wounds, Jon, our most devoted, selfless, and sole physician’s assistant, and Chris came in from their missions in nearby villages. I stepped back to make room for Jon and Rob to go to work.

Chris took a moment to observe the scene, took off his helmet, and then turned to the interpreter and instructed, “Ask him if he knows who shot him.” The interpreter asked the boy, and turned back, “He doesn’t know, but he remembers they call him ‘Doc.’” Chris looked at the boy and pointed at himself, “I shot you.” Then, once again, Chris knelt down at the boy’s side and gave the boy a shot of morphine.

I often think of Chris, Rob, and Jon treating that boy. The irony is not in the story, itself, it is in the characters. Rob, a former special operations Pararescue jumper, had been there before. He had been with me in Saudi Arabia in 1999 and 2000, and
before that, he had been in northern Iraq, smuggling Kurdish refugees into Turkey as Saddam’s death squads executed masses of Iraqi Kurds in reprisal for suspected coup attempts. Jon, at home a surgeon and family man, was a veteran officer having served as an enlisted man in Bosnia, Iraq, and, now, Afghanistan. Chris, like me, carries with him the experience of working in the devastatingly hopeless effort to save lives at Ground Zero, following the tragedies on September 11th.

Each person in the story, Chris, Rob, Jon, I, and the young boy, was brought together through a series of personal decisions and moral obligations. We had each chosen a side; we were all very good at what we did; and we all were there in the service of a cause greater than ourselves. After four years, I can still see the boy’s smile. The smile was genuine, and was not offered in contempt. It seemed more a smile of respect and mutual understanding, which I understood completely. Only those who have done war with one another may, truly, appreciate this smile, and the meanings it carries. I have never felt animosity toward my enemies in Iraq, not even when they attacked my fellows or me. I respected them for their commitment and service to their cause, just as I respected my own. I believe, completely, that this smile was one of pride in membership.

At fifteen, the boy had answered a calling to a cause greater than himself. He had taken up arms in a struggle – a jihad – against those he believed must be struggled against. He had faced the great American enemy, he had exerted himself, and, as Allah willed it, he had survived. Like the Prophet, he was a warrior.
This Thesis in Context

Erving Goffman (1961) described the social roles and behaviors of individuals, and the moral reasoning behind their behaviors as products in one’s “moral career.” Through complex enculturation and socialization processes, individuals are taught to accept certain ideologies, norms and beliefs as their own. This can be said of any members of any cultural group. In the military subculture, soldiers are acculturated in such a way that killing enemy soldiers in combat becomes morally justifiable; often this process has begun before an individual has entered the smaller military subculture.

I do not offer the previous story as an example of a terrorist act – it was not one; I offer it as an illustration. Just as all soldiers must learn to justify killing enemy soldiers, so did the young boy at Kalsu. As I discuss in the second chapter of this thesis, a primary distinction of terrorism is the intentional targeting of civilians. The questions of this thesis are how do terror groups justify the intentional killing of civilians and noncombatants, and what methods do they use to motivate others to do so, as well?

Terrorism is a complex form of behavior that is displayed by many different groups and group types, which are guided by unique ideologies, and practice various methods. Out of necessity, this project focuses on a particular form of terrorism – an international, radical Islamic movement known as al-Qaeda. This stated, it should be clear that I am not asserting that terrorism is unique to Islam. Though it claims to be, al-Qaeda does not represent Islam as a whole – it represents a small minority that holds a radicalized interpretation of Islam, which is not shared by the vast majority of the world’s
1.3 billion Muslims\(^1\). Further, it should not be inferred that being a Muslim makes one more likely to become a terrorist. This should go without saying, but I continue to be surprised by folks interested in the topic, who see otherwise.

I have the deepest respect for the Islamic faith. Since 1999, I have, periodically, worked and lived in various parts of the Middle East and have taken great pleasure in learning more about the landscape, people, art, music, food, language, religion, and customs. With few exceptions, every person I have met has extended warm invitations to learn more of the Arab and Muslim cultures, and I have done my best to make the most of it. In addition to my time in the Middle East, my fieldwork on this project has brought me closer to Muslims in London and a better understanding of the faith, language, and fundamental aspects of Islam. I am not a Muslim, though I am deeply disturbed to hear commonly rough or hostile generalizations of Islam, Muslims, or Muslim lands, and I hope this project will not offend any of them. If it does offend those with narrow or hostile views of peaceful Muslims or peaceful interpretations of Islam and the Qur’án, please feel free to read on and learn.

\(^1\) This 1.3 billion figure is based on 2004 estimates reported in the CIA World Factbook (March 2007). However, more recent figures suggest the world’s current population of Muslims is closer to 1.8 billion.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate

To those champions who avowed the truth day and night ... ... And wrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases...
The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates..., Platonic ideals..., nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.

Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been

by pen and gun

by word and bullet

by tongue and teeth

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate

[Al-Qaeda 2000:UK/BM3]

Setting the Scene

The screen is still dark as the shahada (martyrdom) music begins. As the camera focuses, only the man’s hands are visible. They hover over a small workshop table as he displays a number of simple, household items. Epoxy, ball bearings, needle and thread...

Employing everyday items, his hands quickly produce a plastique-like compound, which he molds into two six-inch-wide and fourteen-inch-long leaves. In less than a minute, he creates an impression in one leaf one centimeter deep. Into this yellow explosive mold, he pours hundreds of BB-sized ball bearings. He rolls the bearings
between his fingertips, working them into the corners of the explosive mat, delicately ensuring the maximum number of projectiles will be planted like deadly seeds. Taking the second leaf, he fashions the two into an explosive envelope stitched together without losing a single bearing. A pre-fabricated, white carrying belt, outfitted with leather straps is produced, and the plastique is slipped snugly into the belt’s pouch. As the man slips this vest on a young shaheed (martyr), he places two primers at the bottom edge of the vest, which will function as the detonating element with the pull of a pin. In only a few minutes, the hands have created a fully functional smart bomb using only items that can be purchased in a market. The demonstration is made complete as the video demonstrates the effectiveness of this simply made belt in various “combat scenarios” – a school bus, a commuter plane, a movie theater… Consistently, the belt has a killing radius of 30 meters.

This 26-minute instructional video, *Explosive Belt for Martyrdom Operations*, was made public on December 20th, 2004 in a jihadist chat room on the World Wide Web. The video’s star and director, calling himself the “Terrorist 007,” provides encouragement to his Muslim brothers engaged in an armed struggle and promotes insurgent activities in Fallujah, Rhamadi, and throughout Iraq.

**Facing the Problem**

Terrorism has taken a central position on today’s global political stage. With an increasing public fear of terrorist threats in the West, particularly within U.S. borders, a U.S. declared “global war on terror” (GWOT) – Operation Enduring Freedom – has

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reshaped foreign policy programmes around the world. Terrorism has become one of the most prominent transnational issues in a world defined by political, economic, social, and religious borders.

As international governments’ counter-terrorism efforts have grown in resources, scale and intensity, so have the organizations targeted by those efforts. The 2001 coalition offensives launched in Afghanistan, while effective in displacing the Taliban regime, were less effective in destabilizing Usama Bin Laden’s (UBL) al-Qaeda organization. Now, in Iraq, new al-Qaeda groups are effectively operating in an increasingly organized insurgency, with suspected support elements in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Kenya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, among other locations. Organizations and movements, formerly unrelated to al-Qaeda, are finding great structural, financial, technological, and strategic incentives in participating in the larger network, perhaps, too, fulfilling idealistic or moral causes.

Yesterday’s Freedom Fighters, Today’s Global Terrorists

Since the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989, radical Islamic organizations have seen an explosion in membership, resource opportunities, and scales of operation. Well-known media figures such as Usama bin Laden, Ayaman al-Zawahiri, and Musab al-Zarqawi\(^2\) once anonymously conducted small local operations out of places such as Jaji, Peshawar, and Kandahar. Today, less than two decades later, they each function as hyper-connected icons and master motivators in a globalized mujahideen (strugglers)

\(^2\) Coalition forces killed Musab al-Zarqawi on June 7, 2006 in Diyala Province, 30 miles northeast of Baghdad. Also killed in the bombing, which was the result of an unprecedented joint intelligence effort among Pakistan’s ISI, CIA, and MI6, was al-Zarqawi’s religious advisor, Sheikh Abu Abdul Rahman.
known as *al-Qaeda* (The Base) – a jihadist movement fueled on the blood of the
*shahadat* (martyrs); carried on by *mujahids* (warriors) seeking their own entry into
*Jannah* (paradise); and aimed at 1) ending U.S. aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination
of the Israeli state; 2) removing U.S. and non-Muslim military forces from Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other Muslim territories; 3) ending the oppression of Muslims by
Russia, China, and India; 4) ending repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and Afghanistan; and 5) the conservation
of the Muslim world’s energy resources and their sale at higher prices (Marlin 2001:18-21; Scheuer 2004:xviii).

These objectives have been clearly outlined by bin Laden in repeated statements,
but most notably in his 1998 *fatwa* (legal pronouncement) on behalf of al-Qaeda. Usama
bin Laden is not recognized by the *Ummah* (the world’s Muslim community) as a *mufti*
(Islamic legal scholar), and not authorized by the *Ummah* to make judgments on the
*Sharia* (laws of Islam). Despite this, his *fatāwa* (plural of *fatwa*) have been heard and
read around the globe many times over, thanks to the World Wide Web and network
news channels.

Bin Laden’s second *fatwa*, the "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
against the Jews and the Crusaders," was issued on February 23, 1998 in *al-Quds al-
Arabi*, an Iraqi-funded Arabic newspaper published in London. In this *fatwa*, Usama bin
Laden demanded that Americans be killed at any opportunity, and that all Muslim

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3 *Shahadat* is the plural for *shaheed* (or *shahid*), meaning ‘martyr.’ *Shahada* (or
*Shahadah*) means ‘testimony of faith,’ traditionally referring to the First Pillar of Islam –
‘There is no god but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet;’ though, *shahada* can also
refer to martyrdom, considered by many as the ultimate testimony of faith. For the
purposes of this thesis, I use ‘*shahada*’ when referring to martyrdom, and ‘*Shahadah*’
when referring to the practice of testifying to one’s faith.
brothers answer this call to *jihad* (to struggle), with urgency and faith. Just as Dr. Shaykh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam’s many *fatūwa* during the Soviet-Afghan War were so effective in attracting the attention of young Muslims eager to defend Islam, so hopes to be Usama bin Laden (Marlin 2001; Scheuer 2003, 2004; Thompson 2004; Bergen 2006; Wright 2006). This thesis is, in part, a practical assessment of that ambition.

*Carrying the Cause – Veterans to Mentors*

Recruitment operations are among the most carefully conducted operations by terrorist organizations, and in many ways, these procedures mirror the strict recruitment protocols of intelligence services such as the CIA, MI6 or the Mossad (Shirley 1998; Baer 2003; Thomas 2005). For example, a 180-page document recovered in a 2000 raid in Manchester, England, referred to as the *Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad* or the “al-Qaeda training manual*,” among other critical tasks, instructs an operative in carrying out recruitment operations. The al-Qaeda recruitment process follows a strict order of “finding, evaluating, approaching, recruiting, testing, training, treating, and terminating” a new agent (al-Qaeda 2000:UK/BM93-UK/BM97). The Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations (DO) trains its operations officers (often referred to as “case officers”) in how to select and manage agents. The DO’s “recruitment cycle” indicates a methodological approach very similar to al-Qaeda’s “recruitment process” – spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, handling and terminating (Shirley 1998; Kessler 2003; Moran 2005). Through highly selective methods, al-Qaeda seeks to incorporate only the

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4 A partial copy of the *Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad* is available on request.
5 The difference between “officers” and “agents” is often confused. “Officers” are trained intelligence personnel tasked with recruiting “agents,” which are foreign nationals recruited by covert officers.
most qualified and trustworthy individuals. Even when a recruit has undergone formal jihad training in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Philippines, Malaysia, or Indonesia, only 10-30% are invited to join the network (Sageman 2004:92). Due to the intensity of training and eventual operations, recruiters operate all around the globe, seeking out qualified individuals. In recent years, a number of recruitment cells have been revealed in London, England. These cells illustrate not only the methods being applied by recruiters, but also the criteria for qualities that recruiters are seeking in prospective candidates.

**Facing Our Fears**

This thesis takes the information presented in a number of open intelligence, cultural, academic, and media sources on radical Islam, al-Qaeda, and key actors in affiliated radical Islamic terror groups, and places them within the cultural contexts of Islam and historical contexts of *jihad, shahadat*, and subnational political violence. Analysis includes applying integrated theories from an interdisciplinary perspective. Chapter two discusses the long debate in defining terrorism, and provides an operational definition of ‘terrorism,’ as applied in this thesis. The primary theoretical perspectives in this thesis, discussed in chapter four, 1) outline a ‘new era’ of radical Islamic terrorism; 2) critique previous predicative models in profiling likely terrorist recruits; 3) provide a perspective for analyzing the al-Qaeda movement as a complex network; and 4) emphasize the role of anthropology in researching terrorism.

The theories and findings in this thesis are drawn from past and the most current bodies of work, reporting, and research on the topic of recruitment and socialization methods in violent political groups. Also included in this thesis is an assessment of data
collected during fieldwork, which highlights the effects of terror group activities on London’s Muslim population, the divisions between radical and fundamental Islam, and illustrates the eagerness of mainstream Muslims to find practical solutions to radical Islamic violence.

This thesis provides the reader with a better understanding of the push-factors that have contributed to terror group formations, recruitment operations, and cooperation within a larger movement. By contextualizing common terms, such as jihad and mujahideen, this thesis is designed to help anthropologists, policymakers, and other researchers develop more appropriate means of understanding and studying opaque terrorist networks or otherwise violent political action groups.

Due to the wide-ranging motivators, goals, and organizational structures that make up various terror groups, this thesis is decidedly narrow in focus. I focus on recruitment operations in radical Islamic terrorist networks. This, however, should not be taken as an indication that Islam is a root cause in terrorism, nor does this focus suggest that terrorism is unique to certain groups, regions, or peoples. Indeed, there have been many brands of terrorism based on interpretations of Islam, or stemmed from social and political clashes in the Middle East or Muslim territories, but those many brands have been the products of various ‘root causes.’ Likewise, terrorism has stemmed from other religious foundations, as well as social, political, economic, or conflict-based agendas, which have nothing to do with the Islamic faith. The purpose of this study is to focus on a particular brand of radical Islamic terrorism that is relevant to specific interests of today’s research and security environment. This particularly radicalized form of terrorism is, in part, rooted in recent trends of fundamental Islamist revivalism, organized
as a global network, and fueled by the blood of martyrs and victims in an attempt to eradicate all non-conforming religious, political, and social belief systems.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM WITH DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Defining ‘Terrorism’

Name Your Brand – Operationalizing Terrorism

Since September 11th, 2001, the media have invested much of their energy and ratings on headlines that depict a world climate of terror. Blurbs on al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden, Moqtada al-Sadr, and suicide bombings in Iraq have now become familiar topics of conversation for the masses – fear-inducing icons and vital political interests for old and new generations. For many, especially younger American audiences, September 11th represents the dawning of a new awareness. How many will recall Abu Nidal, the Shining Path, the Achille Lauro, the Rashneesh Cult, TWA Flight 847, or Aum Shinrikyo? Those who do remember acts of political violence prior to September 11th, as well as those with a newer awareness seem to recognize acts of terrorism when they occur, but any two people whom one may ask will likely provide different definitions of what ‘terrorism’ or an act of terror is.

For decades, and longer, social scientists and practitioners have been researching terrorism, trying to get at the ‘root’ of the problem. Like any other observer, these researchers often hold varying viewpoints, grounded in disciplines and theoretical frameworks with similar objectives, but alien languages. A common response to the question of defining terrorism, whether a researcher, policymaker, or casual observer, goes a lot like, “Well, it’s hard to say, but you just know it when you see it.” Indeed, this
may be the case, but this rule of thumb hardly serves to empirically qualify what terrorism is.

Since the beginning of the “Long War” in September 2001, there has been a reinvigorated interest in defining terrorism – particularly by policymakers and practitioners wishing to define the terms of the “global war on terror” and to classify opposing forces (OPFOR). There exists a very real need to determine who qualifies as the ‘enemy’ and what one must do to achieve such status, but the popular rule of thumb that ‘you know it when you see it’ is of little use in determining legal courses of action and rules of engagement (ROE). Recent forms of international terrorism, and a globalized counter-terrorism effort have become complicated by the difficulty of creating a common language for practitioners. The subjective nature of definitions by independent states, each with unique laws and vital interests, has contributed to an inability to clearly and universally define the problem – what is terrorism, and, given a definition of terrorism, will it suitably fit particular events?

**Government Definitions of Terrorism**

In an unclassified anti-terrorism publication by the U.S. Joint Staff issued to military personnel serving in the Middle East between 1996 and 2003, terrorism was explained as follows:

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6 The “Long War” was first coined in 2004 by U.S. Army General John Philip Abizaid, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, in reference to the war on terrorism.
An indiscriminate crime that comes in varying forms of threats and violence and is used primarily to attain political goals of one form or another. Terrorists generate fear through acts of violence, intimidation, and coercion. Acts of terrorism such as hijackings, bombings, etc., occur routinely in certain parts of the world making almost anyone a potential victim.

[The Joint Staff 1996, emphasis added]

According to the United States Department of Defense (DoD), terrorism can be defined as the “calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (http://www.hill.af.mil/sfs/FPC.html). In 2002, the U.S. State Department (DoS) considered terrorism as the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Bard 2003:372). 2003 postings by the DoS define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in futherance of political or social objectives” (Buchalter and Curtis, 2003:1).

The DoS’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism cites Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d) (22 USC 2656f(d)). The CIA also cites 22 USC 2656f (d), which differentiates between types of terrorism – the standard definition, under this code, is consistent with the U.S. State Department’s definition as 22 USC 2656f(d) applies to all U.S. intelligence organizations (https://www.cia.gov/terrorism/faqs.html). Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f (d) qualifies terrorism as follows:
(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country;
(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and
(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45316.pdf]

The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODC) has long been considering numerous legal definitions of terrorism, as has the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC). Currently, the UNODC supports Alex P. Schmid’s 1992 definition of terrorism as a “peacetime equivalent of a war crime.”

However, this definition is inadequate if the UN wishes to pursue intervening actions in struggling nations during wartime operations, such as in Iraq. This being the case, the UNODC has temporarily adopted what is being called the “Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism:”

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

[http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html]
Despite Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f (d), a review of U.S. government definitions of terrorism reflects a disjointed system that qualifies terrorism based on the code, but redefines terrorism based on the specific needs and/or mission of each agency. This dilemma is not unique to nation state governments – it is very much an issue that plagues the social sciences and other academic researchers’ efforts to address key research questions.

**Academic Considerations of ‘Terrorism’**

Criminologist, Jonathan R. White, refers to terrorism as a “complicated subject that crosses disciplines as freely as it does jurisdictional boundaries” (2002:xv). Similarly, the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s website states that “There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism and even when people agree on a definition of terrorism, they sometimes disagree about whether or not the definition fits a particular incident” (Buchalter and Curtis 2003:i). In 1988, Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman reported findings of 109 different definitions of terrorism, which ranked 22 descriptive elements ranging from violence to demands made on third parties (Schmid and Jongman, et al. 1988:5-6). Likewise, Walter Laqueur notes over one hundred definitions with only two consistent themes – violence and the threat of violence (1999:5-6).

Gianfranco Pasquino defines terrorism as “a series of acts intended to spread intimidation, panic, and destruction in a population,” pointing out that such acts can be carried out by individuals, groups opposing states, or groups acting on states’ behalf (1999:872). Rex A. Hudson’s 1999 report on terrorism and recruitment case studies
suggests that terrorism occurs when subnational groups find themselves unable to achieve unrealistic goals by conventional means. Pasquino adds to Hudson’s remarks in writing, “political terrorism will endure as the weapon of groups that have neither the capability, the possibility, nor the patience to utilize other instruments to pursue their goals and implement their strategies” (Pasquino 1999:873). In this case, “terrorists attempt to send an ideological or religious message by terrorizing the general public” (Hudson 1999:11). By selecting targets that are symbolic or representative of the opposing state or institution (the Pentagon, Mosque of Samarra, or London Underground, for example), terror groups may attempt to demonstrate that the government cannot protect its citizens. Unlike the UNODC “Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism,” which seems to exclude assassination as a potential form of terrorist act, Hudson emphasizes that terror groups can utilize assassinations in order to “teach the general public a lesson about espousing viewpoints or policies antithetical to their own” (1999:11) (Anwar Sadat, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, or Rafik Hariri, for example). Hudson generally classifies terrorist groups under five typologies: national-separatist, religious fundamentalist, new religious, social revolutionary/idealist, and right-wing extremist (1999:14-15); and defines terrorism as:

The calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.

[Hudson 1999:12]

Anthropologist, David Price, suggests that United Nations member states that support current anti-terrorist policies do so under an “explicit agreement that terrorism
shall remain undefined” (2002:3). Price, taking what might be considered a “barefoot anthropology” stance, points out that most of the world’s nation states find themselves in internal conflicts with one or more domestic groups contesting the states’ power holdings – conflicts that can result in exchanges of violence. As such is the case, “the idiom of power dictates that the violence of the state is legitimized as peace-keeping, while that of the dispossessed becomes terrorism” (Price 2002:4). Although Price is critical of current policies in defining terrorism and directing action against perceived threats, he offers no definition of his own.

In response to Price’s remarks, Jeffrey Sluka agrees to some extent, “Propagandistic use of the criminalizing label ‘terrorism’ manipulates public fears for political purposes – it removes the ‘political’ from political violence, excludes consideration of underlying political causes, and reduces it to mindless or ‘evil’ violence which cannot be explained, understood, or justified” (Sluka 2002:23). While there may be truth in this, or however broadly it might be applied, it is, at the same time, important to understand that some forms of violence are appropriately labeled as terrorism.

Sluka proposes two elements of violence that can be useful in developing an objective definition of terrorism. Based on trends over the past century, Carolyn Nordstrom points out that civilians, rather than combatants have become the primary targets and casualties of war and other forms of political violence (Sluka 2002). Sluka proposes two elements of violence that can be useful in developing an objective definition of terrorism. Sluka suggests that terrorism, including state terrorism, can be defined as the following: 1) the policy of using acts inspiring great fear as a method of
ruling or of conducting political opposition; and 2) The use of coercive means aimed at
civilian populations in an effort to achieve political, religious or other aims (2002:22).

Addressing the wide variations in how terrorism is qualified, British
anthropologist, Jack Goody, also observes that ‘terrorism’ is a label, which is applied to
groups or individuals who use illegal or illegitimate force against existing state
authorities; “They are essentially people that see themselves as without justice, without
rights, whether political or property” (2002:141). From this perspective, terrorism is a
highly subjective label applied by those in power to those with limited resources or
political prestige, who engage states in informal conflict, characterized by unconventional
acts of violence in order to disrupt the status quo. The labeling of one group (“terrorists”) by
another (state(s) in power), establishes a dynamic relationship, based in one group’s
attempt to “transform the use of illegitimate into legitimate force” (Goody 2002:142).
Examples of such transformation can be found in the American Revolution, the
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, or Robert Mugabe’s lasting political control
in Zimbabwe.

As White, Price, Sluka, and Goody illustrate, the subjectivity of defining threats is
not new, but as old and rehearsed as human conflict. The dynamic relationship between
the terrorized and their terrorizors requires periodic reconsideration. Often the victim
will become the villain, and what may one day be considered brutal and immoral may be
considered reasonable and just the next. Each chapter in history has been punctuated
with its own brand of terrorism. This is, perhaps, a lesson to those who would seek one,
static definition with one, certain solution.
Our Working Definition

Defining terrorism is one of the most daunting of tasks for any researcher in the field. Discussions of unconventional methods of conflict, just causes of war, and state/non-state applications of sociopolitical violence date back from Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz to present and future debates. However, difficulty in defining a problem does not mean that the problem does not exist. The discussion above is not intended to represent every possible consideration of what terrorism is or is not – such an endeavor would require far more pages than this thesis would allow. Rather, my intention is to illustrate the fact that terrorism is a controversially subjective term. As with any research topic, terrorism prompts many questions and can be approached from many angles. The purpose of this thesis is not to create a universally acceptable definition – after three years of actively working toward one, I am now less certain that a suitable solution to this question is even possible. This being said, I will settle on a measurable quality that allows us to put the study of radical Islamic terror group recruitment operations within historical and cultural contexts.

For the purposes of this discussion, terrorism is defined as it is under Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), as well as Rex A. Hudson’s definition included in his 1999 report, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes as Terrorist and Why?* (p. 12). These definitions have been selected because they do not present any inconsistencies when paired. The reader may find U.S. Code Section 2656f(d) useful in contextualizing my use of the terms *international terrorism, terrorism*, and *terrorist group*. Hudson’s definition is useful in assigning meaning to the terms *noncombatants* and *symbolic targets*. Additionally, Hudson’s definition is included for its emphasis on
the intended psychological impact of unexpected acts of terrorism, as well as the objectives sought in carrying out those acts.

**Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d)**

(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country;
(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and
(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.


**Rex A. Hudson’s Definition of ‘Terrorism’**

The calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.

[Hudson 1999:12]
CHAPTER THREE

MY ANTHROPOLOGY OF TERRORISM, PART I

Methods in Terror Group Research

Methods of Inquiry in Terrorism

Much of terrorism research is done under the cloak of secrecy. Often that is for legitimate national security reasons. However, research that is conducted in secret and not subject to rigorous peer review may be flawed and reach conclusions that are deleterious in their practical implications… The competition and collaboration that mark the scientific method are mostly absent in the government, leading officials to an unwarranted sense of confidence in their analyses. Seclusion of the intelligence-gathering process shelters it from criticism, which affects the validity and reliability of its conclusions.

[Sageman 2004:ix]

Terror groups are necessarily opaque in nature, which makes researching them no simple task. Researchers, at least those outside the intelligence community, are limited to open sources of data; however, regardless of open or closed sources, researching opaque institutions with limited available resources is an unfortunate reality, for academics and practitioners alike.

As one goes through the literature, the same references and citations seem to come up in an almost cookie cutter pattern. Perhaps this is due to the limited resources we do have, but, in any case, it also has a tendency to result in the same conclusions time after time. These conclusions hold some degree of validity; however, one senior intelligence official warns that there is a real tendency for analysts and academic researchers to fall victim to congruence and availability biases.
Michael Scheuer\(^7\) (2003, 2004), Robert Baer (2003, 2004), and Marc Sageman (2004), insist that reconsideration of trends in terrorism is necessary, and that most data available on terrorism that will be useful in this endeavor come from open sources, as they each have demonstrated in their unclassified texts. With Scheuer’s, Baer’s, and Sageman’s experienced observations in mind, this research has been conducted utilizing four overarching methodological approaches: archival data collection, consultations with subject matter experts, original fieldwork applying traditional ethnographic methods, and language training.

**Archival Data Collection**

Archival and open-source data collection has been a priority in this project for nearly three years. Employing a number of academic, professional, and media open-source databases has facilitated collection of particular materials. Journals such as Jane’s Information Group (JIG, or *Jane’s*), the *Economist, Foreign Affairs, International Security*, and a number of academic and professional counter-terrorism databases, among other sources, have proven to be invaluable resources for current and historical reports, assessments, and analysis. The CIA, FBI, U.S. State Department, and other U.S. government offices have numerous available open-source materials that are useful in determining active areas where direct, field-collected information may be available. In addition, foreign government offices have proven to be useful in aspect of archival collection.

\(^7\) Initially known as ‘Anonymous’ when he published *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes* (2003) and *Imperial Hubris* (2004), Scheuer was the senior CIA analyst for the Usama bin Laden Task Force and one of the most knowledgeable researchers on UBL, al-Qaeda, militant Islam, and the Middle East and South Asia.
Recent research has revealed a great wealth of information available on the World Wide Web. As terror groups have become more globalized in operational scope, and more selective and focused in recruitment strategies, many have taken to the Internet for constructing elaborate, web-based command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) operations. Additionally, recent research has revealed a vast web of interconnected sites that facilitate active recruitment operations on global, regional, and local levels. Information collected from these sites has helped to provide a basis of selection criteria that can be useful in identifying similar operations in London and abroad for this thesis, as well as future research.

This project’s electronic archival research has been enhanced by the use of passive and active cross-referencing methods, in which key terms, events, names, and locations are entered into several databases or search engines. As browsers locate new information, it is filtered for relevance, and forwarded automatically. As information is reviewed, I have been able to refine information requests to better suit the needs of this project.

A growing number of texts are available from current and former intelligence officials, who have proven to be invaluable for unique insights and suggestions for continued research (Baer 2003, 2004; Scheuer 2003, 2004; Sageman 2004). Several source texts are available, which provide firsthand observations from within terror networks or radical and militant Islamic movements (Qutb 1953, 1954, 1964; Khomeini 1981; Al-Qaeda 2000; Marlin 2001; Shoebat 2005; Al-Zawahiri 2006; Bergen 2006).

In addition, and for the particular interests of anthropologists, I recommend certain texts, written by Muslim academic and religious scholars, for contextualizing the

As will be discussed in the following chapter, three especially significant bodies of work have been reviewed and are cited throughout this thesis. These texts provide inventories of knowledge from three distinct periods in terrorism research, spanning from the 1980s to present, and highlighting the development of theories in terrorism research that are currently in use: Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman’s *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature* (1988); Rex A. Hudson’s *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes as Terrorist and Why?* (1999); and James J. F. Forest’s *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes* (2006).

**Fieldwork**

Fieldwork was conducted in London from May 2005 through July 2005. Fieldwork methods included onsite archival research, participant observation, snowball and event-based sampling methods, and informant development through informal interviews, casual private meetings, and community event-based and casual interactions. Essentially, fieldwork involved three routines. First, the collection and analysis of archival data available at local universities, mosques, cultural centers, and the bookstores along Edgware Road; second, frequent visits with numerous informants, including several key informants, ranging from mainstream Imams and community leaders to a radical-leaning Algerian, and a Pakistani educated in *madrasas* that promoted violence.
and martyrdom; and third, directly observing community events and individuals in and around locations with reported ties to Islamic terrorism.

The bulk of fieldwork for this thesis took place in Central London near or along Edgware Road, and at local area mosques. My original intent was to invest a significant amount of time at the Finsbury Park Mosque, as well, but for reasons discussed in chapter six, certain extraordinary circumstances prevented this.

**Participant Selection, Sampling and Informant Handling**

Due to the sensitive nature of my research, informants’ identities have been kept strictly confidential, and will not be shared with anyone. Field notes were initially taken in small notebooks after interactions, and then transcribed onto a single computer, which has remained in my possession and secured with password and biometric encryption. Under no circumstance have the identities or identifying features of informants been recorded, shared, or presented in this thesis. Informant meetings that were held in private were never mentioned to other informants. All informant names that are mentioned in this thesis are randomly coded pseudonyms.

Prior to traveling to London, the WSU Institutional Review Board pre-approved my submitted Human Subjects Review application and all methods applied in this project. Meetings with community members, to include informants, were informal and based entirely on the willingness of those community members to interact with myself. Due to the strict conditions of anonymity and informal nature of interactions with informants, no questionnaires or formal/semi-formal interviews were utilized in this project. Instead, informal and unstructured conversations and meetings with participants
were used in order to better-understand participants’ roles within the community and experiences with related research concerns.

Through unstructured interactions with informants and community events, the “snowballing” sampling method was utilized in order to determine individuals or events of interest. In this manner informants who possessed information or experiences relevant to this project were met and developed through introductions and information interactions. In other cases, spontaneous conversations or event-based interactions led to the development of informants.

It is important to note that the vast majority of community members in Edgware Road or greater Central London, Muslim or not, have no affiliation, whatsoever, with terror groups. To imply otherwise would be totally inappropriate. Research in Central London has not been a matter of “eliminating suspects.” Instead, fieldwork in London was designed as an attempt, through focused participant observation, to better understand community organization, factors in individuals’ decisions to attend particular venues, and individuals’ exposure to radical teachings or possible recruitment operations. In this way, this project may enable researchers and practitioners to appreciate what aspects of this community have made it such a prime location to be exploited by those terror group agents whom are tasked with recruitment missions. In other words, this project serves to identify types of community organizations, features, and members that are being targeted by recruiters, as well as trends in the transmission of radical Islamic ideologies.
Making Sense of the Data – Case Study Method

Compiling information provided by the use of the above-mentioned methods – archival research, participant observation, informal interviews, and snowball and event-based convenience sampling – has provided much of the required data needed in order to compare field data to existing case studies, such as those provided in Forest et al. (2006). Individuals in central London’s Muslim community, whether involved in terrorism or not, have witnessed terror group operations repeatedly in the last several years, most recently in July 2005, while my fieldwork was being conducted. By gathering firsthand accounts of events such as radical sermons at various mosques, informants’ and their associates’ decisions to attend certain groups, and revelations of neighbors joining jihadist movements, data collected in this and future projects may help other researchers in developing more-complete case studies originating in London.
CHAPTER FOUR

MY ANTHROPOLOGY OF TERRORISM, PART II

Traditions of Theory in Terror Group Research

In an earlier work, I warned against overrating the danger of terrorism, which was neither a new phenomenon nor as politically effective as we are often led to believe. I argued more often than not that the political effect of terrorism was in inverse ratio to the publicity it received... While I decried the idea that terrorism was steadily growing into a global threat, I also wrote that it could become one as the result of technological developments.

The ready availability of weapons of mass destruction has now come to pass, and much of what has been thought about terrorism, including some of our most basic assumptions, must be reconsidered. The character of terrorism is changing, any restraints that existed are disappearing, and, above all, the threat to human life has become infinitely greater than it was in the past.

[Walter Laqueur 1999:6]

New Beginnings

On September 9th, in his hotel room near the Newark International Airport, Ziad Samir Jarrah called his father, Samir, in Lebanon. He was cheerful and told his father he had received the money Samir had sent on the 4th. Ziad said that he had purchased a new suit and would soon return to Beirut to attend his cousin’s wedding scheduled for September 22nd. Ziad’s father told him that he had a special surprise upon his return – a new Mercedes. Samir had worried when Ziad had left Hamburg, Germany for Afghanistan in order to train for jihad, but after a stern intervention by his uncle, Ziad had agreed to leave that mistake in the past and return to Lebanon to start a family. Ziad told his father to kiss his mother and that he wanted his parents to be proud of him. Ziad and his father wished each other farewell.
On September 10th, Ziad wrote a four-page letter to his girlfriend (secretly his wife), Aysel Sengün, “I have done what I had to do... You should be very proud, because it is an honor and in the end you will see that everyone will be happy.” Ziad mails the envelope with a mistaken address. The letter would be returned to the U.S. by the German postal service and forwarded to the FBI one week later.

On September 11th, 2001, Jarrah and Ahmed al-Haznawi check out of their hotel and take a shuttle to the airport, while two others, Ahmed Alnami and Saeed Alghamdi, do the same. They are one member short. In Boston, two cells of five brothers board American Airlines Flights 11 and 175. In Washington DC, at Dulles, five more brothers board American Airlines Flight 77. Just before 8:00am, Ziad boards United Airlines Flight 93 and takes his first-class seat. At 8:42am, 41 minutes late, Flight 93 is cleared to take-off.

By 9:29am, Flight 93’s pilots are lying outside of the cockpit in a heap – one is dead and the other is dying. At 9:31 the first-class attendant can be heard begging and being killed. At 9:32, Ziad Jarrah announces he is flying the aircraft, which has a bomb on board and will be landing soon. At 9:59, passengers, hearing reports of the World Trade Center’s south tower collapsing, use a dining cart as a battering ram and rush the front of the aircraft.

At 10:06am on September 11th, 2001, Ziad Samir Jarrah, the 26 year-old wealthy son of a secular Bekaa Valley civil servant and a school teacher, educated by Catholics in Beirut, holding a master’s degree in aerospace engineering from the University of Applied Sciences in Hamburg, and married to a beautiful Turkish dental student, drives a

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8 A translated copy of Zarrah’s letter to Sengün is available on request.
Boeing 757 and its 40 passengers into a field in Pennsylvania and forever changes the conventional perception of a “terrorist.”

Exactly two years prior to this attack on U.S. soil, in *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?*, Rex A. Hudson reported that terrorists are generally thought to possess certain traits, including a feeling of alienation from society; a limited education – often dropouts; a religious or political devotion with a disregard for violence as a criminal act; a history of violence – perhaps upon initiation into a group; and a lower-class positioning (1999:50-51). Ziad Samir Jarrah defied these traits, and he was not unique among the cadre of September 11th participants.

Nineteen hijackers were represented on four separate flights on the morning of September 11th. Fifteen of those hijackers were citizens of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the other four were from middle to upper class neighborhoods in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Lebanon. Seven of the nineteen men were trained as pilots, and all of them were trained as elite operatives. Jarrah, as our chief, but representative example, was not known to be deeply politically or religiously minded, nor was he sexually “confused” as Ferracuti and Bruno have asserted (Ferracuti and Bruno 1981:209).

In reality, Jarrah had led a privileged life. He was known as an extremely sociable and well-liked neighbor and student in Germany and Florida. Raised by secular Muslims with doctors for children, Ziad was educated at a private Catholic school in Beirut, volunteered with handicapped children, was handsome and athletic, and as far as his loving and close family was concerned, Ziad gave no cause for alarm. Of course, Ziad was a terrorist and had been for some time. He is suspected to have been an early
member of the Hamburg Cell, recruited by Mohammed Atta (the Egyptian 9/11 operation leader who piloted American Flight 11 into the World Trade Center’s north tower). Ziad had traveled to Afghanistan late in 1999, with a core group of 9/11 operatives, and trained for two months at an al-Qaeda facility in guerilla tactics. It was here he was introduced to Usama bin Laden and was personally selected by bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad to train for the eventual air-attack – he was simply instructed by Khalid Sheikh Muhammad to return to Germany and enroll in flight school.

Just as it is significant that Jarrah fails to fit previous profiles of a terrorist, it is significant that he was selected, along with each September 11th hijacker, personally by Usama bin Laden. This event in Afghanistan, in 1999, is one among a key string of events that marks a radical shift in the trends of an Islamic brand of terrorism.

**Theory-Building in Terrorism Research**

The body of literature dedicated to the study of terrorism is staggering, particularly within the social sciences. Since terrorism has had its name, stemming from Edmund Burke’s references to revolutionary France’s government as “la Terreur,” it has occupied its own special place in scientific inquiry. The second half of the 20th century saw a great surge in terrorism research – a phenomena that reflected a parallel surge in the scale and intensity of terrorist operations, which will be discussed throughout this thesis. In reviewing this literature within current political, social, and cultural contexts – several prominent themes standout – forming the theoretical framework for this thesis.
Events-Based Divergence in Terrorism Literature

First, this thesis is based on the assertion that two bodies of work exist, whether provided by academics, practitioners, analysts, or journalists: Analysis prior to September 11, 2001 and analysis after September 11, 2001. After the tragedies in New York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania, questions were raised as to how such a massive attack, requiring years of preparation and concerted efforts, could have occurred without forewarning. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) reported a number of instances in which U.S. and foreign intelligence services had received information relevant to the plot directed by Usama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and carried out by cell leader Mohammad Atta, but failed to recognize all of the evidence. The same might be said of academic research in trends in terrorism.

Signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) is a term used by intelligence practitioners to explain the difficulties in filtering relevant information from massive amounts of constantly streaming data. For example, the CIA receives countless bits of information or data from a great number of sources – human intelligence sources (HUMINT), signal intelligence sources (SIGINT), and broad sweeping open sources – such as media broadcasts and publications, academic publications, Internet web sites, and public events. All of these raw data flood the desks of analysts through an integrated computer system, which is tailored for individual users’ assigned projects. However, the sheer volume of raw data (“noise”) creates “interference,” which can mask the relevant “signals.” Even when some signals come through clearly, they are often small, isolated pieces of information, which are difficult to place in any particular context.
SNR not only applies to intelligence practitioners, but academic researchers, as well. During the 1990s, some researchers, intelligence analysts, and practitioners began taking note of shifting patterns in terrorism; primarily, the emergence and rapid growth of well-supported, resource-rich terror networks with massive scales of operations and global ambitions (Alibek 1999; Hudson 1999; Chasdi 2002a, 2002b; Sageman 2004; Scheuer 2003, 2004; Preston 2007). Some of these researchers indicated that the rapid growth of particular types of terror organizations, as well as such organization’s rhetoric of mass-destruction and an increase in technological capabilities, provided for the prospect of a ‘new,’ deadlier form of terrorism – what Chasdi refers to as “higher order terrorism” (2002b:5). However, it required the 2001 attacks to plainly illustrate these growing trends and the momentum they had already gained. As this thesis will later discuss, these events can be traced back to radical interpretations of Islamist revivalist movements, such as Wahhabism or Salafism, and Qutbism.

In 1975, Brian Jenkins wrote that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” (1975:15). Prior to September 11th, many, if not most, researchers agreed with Jenkins’ assertion (Schmid and Longman, et al. 1982; Hudson 1999; Laqueur 1999; Scheuer 2003, 2004). This philosophy of cost versus benefit in political violence goes as far back as The History of the Peloponnesian War, in which Thucydides reported Athens’ downfall through poor politicking and unchecked brutality, which alienated potential allies. Sun Tzu wrote of reciprocal force – inflicting just enough force on one’s enemy to achieve victory, but to avoid destroying those people and places that one intends to win, and always to allow one’s enemy an egress route – essentially, providing an option of non-conflict. Clausewitz wrote of war as a “political instrument,” which
must be utilized to achieve three objectives: military power, the country, and the will of the enemy – unless the will of the enemy is “subdued…War may break out afresh” (1982[1832]:123). Thucydides, Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz wrote of strategy and asymmetric warfare as a means to achieve political and military objectives – territory, resources, and allies. In this sense, demonstrations of political violence or military force have traditionally been used in four manners – swaggering, defense, deterrence or compulsion (Art and Waltz 2004).

Strategies such as swaggering, defense, deterrence and compulsion can be understood as methods for reinforcing or imposing normative belief systems. Traditionally, terrorism researchers that have shared Jenkins’ assessment, which terrorist groups are better served by affecting low numbers of symbolic casualties that will result in attention getting, are those who assume terrorist behavior is normative; this assumption was supported by the majority of terrorist acts throughout the 20th century, which applied limited aims strategies, such as hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, and suicide bombings.

For nationalist or separatist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), employing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or otherwise high casualty yielding methods, would be counter-productive – resulting in an inverse ratio of desired political outcomes and negative publicity (Laqueur 1999:6). As Hudson comments, “if they exceeded certain constraints and employed WMD they would completely alienate themselves from the public and possibly provoke swift and harsh retaliation” (1999:1). Further, such belligerent attacks are likely to jeopardize ties with
existing support and funding bases, due to fears of retaliation and association with a group willing to inflict mass-casualties on civilians.

As comforting this belief was, it was misleading in the sense that it was based on the assumption that it could be applied to all forms of terror groups, as those groups would recognize WMDs as unattainable, disadvantageous, and unnecessary demonstrations of force. However, as the hijackers on September 11th demonstrated, even the lowest “low-tech” instruments – box cutters, in the hands of motivated individuals, could be transformed into multiple, highest “high-tech” smart bombs – guided aircraft.

The sudden and dramatic events of September 11th captured the attention of the world audience, symbolized the objectives and demands of al-Qaeda, and, more than any other terrorist act in recent history, struck a deep and lasting fear into the hearts of Americans. For researchers and practitioners, though, it also signified the moment that conventional wisdom gave way to the realities of adaptive, high-tech, higher-order terrorism. This message was again delivered, in letterform, in September and October of 2001, when four anthrax-contaminated letters were sent through the U.S. Postal Service to the New York Post, NBC’s Tom Brokaw, Senator Tom Daschle’s Washington D.C. office, and Senate Majority Leader and Judiciary Committee Chair, Patrick Leahy.

Unlike Aum Shinrikyo’s flawed anthrax and Sarin gas attacks in the 1990s, the anthrax strain used in the 2001 U.S. postal attacks, Ames, had been weaponized to 1-3 microns – even exceeding the perfected 3-5 micron achievements by the Soviet Union’s
processing. The 2001 anthrax attack resulted in more than ten thousand possible exposures, over thirty thousand vaccinations, more than a dozen illnesses, five deaths, and an estimated cost to the U.S. of $8 billion (Preston 2007:180). Not only did this attack indicate some terror groups’ possession of WMDs, but it also established their willingness to use them, setting a new, deadly precedent.

As Barkun points out in his pragmatic discussion on “doomsday” fears, some groups, particularly fundamentalist religious/political groups may promote “end-of-the-world visions,” or, more likely, aspire to destroy the sins of an old world order or apostate regime and create a “clean slate” (Barkun 2005:127-130). However, Barkun points out that the real value in ‘doomsday plots,’ (Chasdi’s “higher order terrorism”), is not the actual intent of terror groups to use weapons, but the threat to use those measures, as it is perceived by potential victims. Just as in the deterrence literature regarding states’ use of force, the threat of force, if credibility, cost-appreciation, intent and resolve are positively assessed, is an effective commodity in achieving political gains – this rule applies just as easily to terror groups (Art and Waltz 2004).

Since the early 1990s, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the availability of loosed weapons and weapon making knowledge (known as the “brain drain”) on world’s black market for WMDs, especially bioweapons (BW), has significantly increased the risk, likelihood, and even incidents of terror groups using the Biopreparat\(^9\) was the Soviet Union’s covert bioweapons (BW) research and development agency, organized under the Fifteenth Directorate. Unlike the U.S. BW program, which discontinued offensive BW development, under Nixon, with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the Soviet Union continued to develop increasingly deadly bioweapons until its collapse in 1991. Some researchers believe the program continues even today. As a result of poor site security and underpaid researchers, BW technology and knowledge (the “Brain Drain”) continues to flow out of the former Soviet Union. For more information, refer to Ken Alibek’s essential text, Biohazard (1991).
“higher order” weapons and weapons knowledge (Alibek 1999; Casagrande 1999; Hudson 1999; Tucker and Vogel 2000; CIA 2003; Preston 2007). Two years prior to September 11\textsuperscript{th}, Hudson singled out al-Qaeda as one of three religious fundamentalist groups\textsuperscript{10} that espouse rhetoric of mass-destruction. “These groups have a different attitude [from terror groups during the 1970s and 1980s] toward violence – one that is extranormative and seeks to maximize violence against the perceived enemy, essentially anyone who is not a fundamentalist Muslim or Aum Shinrikyo member” (Hudson 1999:1-2). Given the extreme nature or ambitions of radical Islamic terror groups, such as al-Qaeda and its close affiliates, what factors contribute to drawing in recruits that are willing to inflict maximum damage to noncombatants and civilians in the name of a cause?

\textit{Theories in Terrorist Recruitment}

Traditionally, popular theories in psychology suggest the most likely candidates for terror group recruitment are, primarily, those who lack educational opportunities, are in lower socioeconomic classes, have poor employment prospects, come from troubled family backgrounds, or are sexually frustrated (Ferracuti and Bruno 1981; Borum 2004). While combinations of these attributes are present in many available case studies, recent

\textsuperscript{10} Hudson’s 1999 study divides case studies into four categories of terror group types: 1) \textit{Ethnic separatist groups} – such as IRA, PIRA, Kurdistan Workers’ Part (PKK) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); 2) \textit{Social revolutionary groups} – such as Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N); 3) \textit{Religious fundamentalist groups} – such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Jihad Group; and 4) \textit{New religious groups} – such as Aum Shinrikyo. (Hudson 1999).
research indicates that such profiles only represent a minority in current successful recruitments, and are of little predictive utility (Sageman 2004:69-90).

Research in terrorism has, generally, been based in several different approaches within the social sciences. Martha Crenshaw’s organizational approach views terrorism and recruitment as a rational course of action that is decided upon by a group (Hudson 1999:17). “Acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to the group and its beliefs varies” (Crenshaw 1990:250). However, Crenshaw’s approach is not supported in several cases in which recruits are self-selected – John Walker Lindh, for example. These are individuals who initiate their own recruitment process, either by seeking out a larger group to participate in, or conducting acts of terrorism without the support or direction of a formal group or leader.

The political approach focuses on the environment in which a recruit is sensitized to subnational, national or international political pressures (Hudson 1999:15-16). As Hudson notes, Chalmers Johnson (1978) and Martha Crenshaw (1981) subdivide environmental preconditions “into permissive factors, which engender a terrorist strategy and make it attractive to political dissidents, and direct situational factors, which motivate terrorists” (1999:16). Such factors include geographic pressures of urbanization, transportation options to facilitate terror activities, communications media, weapons availability, and absence of security measures (Hudson 1999:16).

The physiological approach suggests that media coverage on terrorism serves as a form of cultural transmission. Potential recruits, seeing or hearing reports of terrorist methods, violence, demands, and goals “may be inspired to imitate” those acts (Hudson
David G. Hubbard (1983), and Kent Layne Oots and Thomas C. Wiegle (1985), suggest that, in viewing media account of terrorism, individuals are physiologically, rather than psychologically, stimulated to engage in terrorist behavior. According to this theory, through viewing acts of violence, recruits experience increased stress levels, which increase norepinephrine, acetylcholine, and endorphins. These increases have a narcotic, “contagion effect” on the terrorist, and potential recruits “need only to see that terrorism has worked for others in order to become aggressively aroused” (Hudson 1999:17-18). This explanation is interesting; however, the explanatory value of it seems questionable, seeing as the vast majority of news watchers do not rush out to bomb the neighborhood bus route after watching the five o’clock news. As a counter to the physiological approach, Hudson points out a psychological approach, which focuses on micro-level analysis of particular individuals’ recruitment and induction experiences, personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers can serve most valuably in determining causal factors (1999:19).

**Frustration-Aggression and Negative Identity Hypothesis**

Despite the fact that many psychologists have all but set aside the frustration-aggression hypothesis, it is probably one of the most frequently cited causes of terrorism and factors in terrorist recruitment by social scientists. Hudson points out Joseph Margolin’s suggestion that “much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal need objectives” (1977:273-4). Schmid and Jongman, noting John Dollard (et al. 1939), the originator of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, suggest frustration-aggression is often applied in the supposition that
“aggression is always a consequence of frustration. More specifically, the proposition is
that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of
frustration, and contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form
against subscribing to frustration-aggression too quickly, referring to Lee Sechrest
[Sechrest] (1971), “it is amazing how many people in political science, sociology, and
anthropology have taken on the frustration-aggression hypothesis for their own use
without realizing its still shaky status in psychology” (Stohl 1976:32).

Despite these warnings, Hudson observes the frequent and continued application
of frustration-aggression, and points to Franco Ferracuti’s (1992) alternative subcultural
theory, which takes into account terrorists and recruits “live in their own subculture, with
their own value systems” (1999:19). Offering subcultural theory as an alternative,
Hudson agrees with Paul Wilkinson’s perceived faults in frustration-aggression, who
suggests, “political terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of the
development of terroristic, or potentially terroristic, ideologies, beliefs, and life-styles”
(Wilkinson 1974:133).

Similar to frustration-aggression, Erik H. Erickson’s negative identity hypothesis
has been applied to suggest that potential terrorists take on negative social roles as a
result of failures in life goals. Hudson references Jeanne N. Knutson’s (1981) work on a
Croatian terrorist who was so disappointed in his inability to attain a university education
that he became a terrorist as an expression of his frustration – “Terrorists engage in
terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives”
**Narcissistic Rage Hypothesis**

Proponents of the *narcissistic rage* hypothesis take the view that terrorists and recruits are mentally ill, a condition that emerges during early development. As Hudson remarks, “basically, if primary narcissism in the form of the “grandiose self” is not neutralized by reality testing, the grandiose self produces individuals who are sociopathic, arrogant, and lacking in regard for others” (1999:20). “Similarly, if the psychological form of the “idealized parent ego” is not neutralized by reality testing, it can produce a condition of helpless defeatism, and narcissistic defeat can lead to reactions of rage and a wish to destroy the source of narcissistic injury” (Hudson 1999:20). Hudson relays John W. Crayton’s (1983) view that terrorism is an attempt by those suffering from narcissistic injury to maintain power or control through intimidation, and “‘meaningful high ideals’ of the political terrorist group ‘protect the group members from experiencing shame’” (Hudson 1999:20). Jerold Post’s concept of “splitting” addresses the needs of those with a damaged self-concepts, such as Adolph Hitler, to split into the “me” and the “not me.” Subsequently, this division in one’s self-concept promotes transference and requires one to find “an outside enemy to blame of their own inadequacies and weaknesses,” ultimately, drawing them toward terrorist groups, “which have an us-versus-them outlook” (Hudson 1999:20-21).

**Bridging the Theoretical Gap**

The traditional applications of frustration-aggression, negative identity, and narcissistic rage hypotheses in explanatory reasoning for terror group formation and recruitment have been problematic. Often, researchers have grounded themselves solely...
in one or another of these positions without considering cultural and subcultural contexts.

Hudson points out the work of Richard M. Pearlstein as one who has attempted to bridge the gap by utilizing negative identity and narcissistic rage in tandem in explaining terrorist recruitment and behavior. “[Pearlstine] observes that the political terrorist circumvents the psychopolitical liabilities of accepting himself or herself as a terrorist with negative identity through a process of rhetorical self-justification that is reinforced by the group’s groupthink” (Hudson 1999:21). Hudson rightly suggests that Pearlman’s hypothesis is “too speculative a construct to be used to analyze terrorist motivation independently of numerous other factors,” and highlights the relative absence of narcissistic behavior displayed by hijackers or suicide-bombers (Hudson 1999:21).

James J.F. Forest’s *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes* (2006) is the most comprehensive study on terrorism in the post-September 11th era. Forest and his contributing authors do not throw out older approaches or theories, but combine and expand them in a holistic manner:

> A single contributing factor – such as personal religious conviction, widespread poverty, or an oppressive government – is not likely to result in the formation of terrorist organizations. However, the current body of research on terrorism suggests that a combination of factors will, in most cases, result in some form of terrorism. This combination differs widely by region, and at a minimum involves motivations (political, social, and economic root causes), opportunities, contexts, processes (recruitment and training), personal disposition (psychological and religious orientation), and preparation (including family background, education, community history, and criminal record).

[Forest 2006(1):x]

Forest’s approach to researching terrorism represents the most current, pragmatic, and nuanced methods of inquiry we currently have at hand. From this multicausal theoretical approach, we are better equipped than any other generation of researchers and
practitioners, and ready to ask the questions of what draws individuals into terror groups, and how does recruitment occur? Forest’s text, which will be discussed later in this thesis, begins its examination of recruitment methods and operations at the most basic level – communication.

Regardless of the presence or absence of pre-existing psychological disorders, mentioned above, political or economic inequalities, social or interpersonal relationship crises, or unique qualifications, candidates for recruitment or terrorist activities must find an outlet or motivator for engaging in terrorism, as well as a justification. As Forest notes, Albert Bandura suggests that in order for a recruit to participate in a terror group that applies lethal methods, they must be able to morally justify killing through “moral disengagement,” through sanitizing their own language, displacing responsibility, and dehumanizing the enemy (Bandura 1990:161-191). Enabling a potential recruit to achieve this moral disengagement is a primary goal of a recruiter and terror group. This is achieved through early methods of communication – transmitting values through various methods:

Recruitment-related communication typically take place in oral, print and online formats, and largely deals in the realms of psychological, social, cultural, intellectual and emotional development. The predominant message of such communication is focused on developing an individual’s will to kill, particularly in the service of the terrorist organization.

[Forest 2006(1):2]

The contributing authors in Forest’s text emphasize that most frequent media for developing the “will to kill” are social institutions, such as schools (madrasas, colleges, and universities), religious institutions (mosques, churches, and temples), and prisons (Forest 2006[1]:2). Such institutions provide recruiters with access to captive audiences,
of sorts. Based on the terror group’s ideology, and the specific qualifications recruiters are seeking in candidates, certain institutions will be more heavily “worked” in an attempt to “spot and assess” or “find and evaluate” potential recruits (see the “recruitment cycle” discussion, p.5). In some cases, institutions, such as boarding schools, religious retreats or camps, and prisons, act as textbook examples of Erving Goffman’s (1961) “total institution.”

*Total institutions or total situations* are those in which every aspect of an “inmate’s” or recruit’s life is controlled in an effort to indoctrinate them, strip away any moral and behavioral attributes that are deviant from the group’s norms, resocialize them within the group’s own subcultural or cultural norms, beliefs, and customs, and, finally, produce an actor that represents the larger group’s ideology completely. In order to achieve these objectives, all aspects of life are conducted under a certain authority (handler); all activities are conducted in the company of others who are treated the same (students, candidates, trainees); all activities are tightly controlled and orchestrated (even seemingly random events, conversations, or tests); and all events lead to an overall objective of complete acculturation (Goffman 1961:6). Through a complex regiment of control, guidance, punishment and rewards, and peer group cooperation, recruits’ “moral careers” are managed closely until the desired objective has been met.

While Goffman’s total institution research was initially applied to such institutions as mental asylums, military boot camps, and seminaries, the concept can be appropriately applied to many situations in which terror groups communicate ideologies, utilize as recruiting grounds, or conduct initial training in. Additionally, Marc Sageman
(2004) suggests that networks, as the structural components of terror groups, can reinforce subcultural paradigms.

Sageman, a psychiatrist and political scientist, who formerly worked as a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Pakistan and Afghanistan with the “Afghan-Arabs” during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), approaches the study of radical Islamic terrorism, particularly global Salafi jihad (al-Qaeda), through network analysis. Sageman, like Forest (et al.), insists that understanding global terror groups, such as al-Qaeda, as complex structures consisting of linked nodes, hubs, and clusters, rather than isolated, local structures, will enable researchers to develop better methods of studying such groups, and will offer policymakers and practitioners insights useful in countering them. Sageman points to scale-free network theory as our strongest tool for understanding global Salafist terror groups.

**Scale-Free Network Theory**

Dr. Albert Laszlo Barabasi, a physicist at the University of Notre Dame, first coined the concept of a scale-free network in 1998 while attempting to “map out” the World Wide Web. Using a number of “cyber-robots,” Barabasi attempted to determine degrees of connectivity between web sites by tracing the patterns of hyperlinks between them.

Barabasi noticed a pattern dissimilar to previous network models. Rather than tree-like structures with roots, trunks, and branches (similar to kinship models), or hub-and-spoke network models (as with military chains of command and 20th century corporations), Barabasi found the Internet to be like a snowflake or a “web without a
spider,” with varying degrees of connectivity between web pages – connectivity defined by the hyperlinks, themselves (Barabasi 2003:222). In examining an uneven distribution of connectivity, Barabasi determined that only a very few web pages, or hubs, were dominating connective bandwidth (carrying capacity) and relationships, the large majority of web pages, acting as nodes, experienced poorer connections and less-frequent use.

Scale-free networks are rooted in certain factors. First, rapid growth confers preference on early entrants – the longer a node has been in place the greater the number of links it will accumulate. Scale-free networks obey a power law distribution in the number of connections between nodes on their network (Barabasi 2003:67). Few nodes demonstrate extremely high, preferential attachment (hubs), while most nodes (outliers) remain relatively poorly connected (Barabasi 2003:96).

Barabasi explains uneven distribution in that networks expand through the addition of new nodes to an existing network of nodes. New nodes attach themselves preferentially to nodes or hubs that are already well connected, based on its relative fitness and links within the larger network. For example, if an entrant node is joining a network, it will try to join as many other nodes as possible. Though, if given the choice only between one node with two connections, and another with four, the power law suggests that the junior node will attach itself to the more connected senior node. In this respect, the earlier in the network’s existence that a node attaches itself, the longer it has to collect links, increasing the power, prestige, and carrying capacity of that individual – this phenomenon is known as the first mover’s advantage.
A second principle of scale-free networks is that late or new-coming nodes will find themselves less connected appendixes of the system, but with specific tasks to perform. As time goes on and the entire network’s capacity is increased, however, these newer nodes will develop relative seniority and become more embedded within the dynamic web of links. Mid-range nodes will take on new responsibilities, serving as conduits for command and control (C2), and even adopting large divisions of responsibility within the network.

The third principle of a scale-free network suggests that in an environment with too much information, individuals will link to nodes that are easier to find – essentially, availability bias. This bias is referred to as preferential attachment, and is not only employed by new nodes to select connections within the network, but also by the network in order to diversify, specialize, or actively recruit. Knowing what assets or resources it wants and which candidates may possess such traits, networks can reinforce connectivity and recruitment through advertising nodes, making them easier to find for target acquisitions – such as those with special skills. This principle is sometimes referred to as “the rich get richer” rule.

Perhaps the most prominent in scale-free theory – in fact considered a “law” (Barabasi 2003:86) – is the idea that the greater the capacity of the hubs and nodes, the faster the network will grow. Every network begins as a small nucleus and expands with the addition of new nodes. As new nodes join the network, deciding which senior nodes have the greatest fitness and attaching themselves to them, the network grows exponentially. Scale-free network theory represents a significant departure from other models, which assume a fixed number of nodes are randomly connected to one another.
Barabasi’s theory maintains that there are no limitations with regard to the potential number of connections a hub or network can maintain. The final principle of growth promotes the idea that the scale of a network is only limited by bandwidth, which increases just as fast as the network recruits and grows – thus, scale-free. That being said, scale-free networks, like any other, have particular strengths and weaknesses.

A particular strength of scale-free networks is the indication that they are extremely tolerant of random failures or attacks, absorbing up to 80% random failures among nodes before they collapse. Due to the small number of essential nodes, random failures are much more likely to strike relatively small nodes. Even if major hubs are attacked and eliminated, fragmenting the network, other hubs can readily absorb the lost hubs’ carrying load and responsibilities. In this event, mid-range nodes may be promoted or become more tightly embedded within the network. Scale-free networks are, by nature, made up of small, organic units that are capable of self-sustaining in the event of an attack. Scale-free networks are not, however, without their own weaknesses. Supplementing their greatest strength – resistance to random attack – is the second element of what is known as the “80/20 Rule.”

Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to attacks on hubs that are intentional, concerted and simultaneous. Attacks that simultaneously eliminate as few as 5-20% of a network's critical hubs are capable of collapsing a network. However, if an orchestrated attack fails, networks can heal themselves rapidly. Further, an ineffective attack may result in fragmenting a network. In the event a network is fragmented, due to the organic, self-sufficient, and motivated nature of sub-elements of the network, one
may find the network becomes largely restructured – re-wired in a sense. While simultaneous attacks on key hubs may or may not serve as effective measures for countering a network, one method, Barabasi suggests, stands a far greater chance of success.

Scale-free networks are, apparently, extremely vulnerable to epidemics. Unlike random networks, which possess certain thresholds for epidemic tolerance, scale-free networks, as recent research indicates, may have as low as a zero tolerance threshold for viruses (ScaleFree.Net 2004). Since Barabasi’s first determination of the theory in 1998 and a subsequent Science publication in 1999, scale-free network theory has been applied to an astonishing array of technological, social, economic, and political institutions. Scale-free networks are found in airline routes, Hollywood cast assemblies, cocktail parties, sexual relationships, sexually transmitted diseases, cults, ancient bacteria, international conglomerates, and on the World Wide Web. Essentially, scale-free networks are everywhere, but not necessarily apparent.

Network Analysis in Terrorism: The Path to Scale-Free

This thesis considers the global Salafist movement or mujahideen, al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups, as a scale-free network; I do not hold this perspective, alone. One can find a number of Internet blogs and web pages on the matter, fueled by graduate students thinking up research interests; though at this point, they seem only to restate Barabasi’s theory with varying degrees of accuracy. But is anyone out there actually applying scale-free? Barabasi points out the post-September 11th research of Vladis Krebs, a management consultant who normally uses network theory to analyze corporate
communications (Barabasi 2003:222-223). Krebs is the designer of the software program *InFlow*, which can be applied to any number of organizations and operations in order to determine connectivity, power, scale, and what-if scenarios (InFlow 3.0 Network Mapping Software 2005). Krebs utilized InFlow in 2001 and 2002 to map out the connective links of the nineteen September 11th hijackers aboard the four planes that were involved in the attacks (Figure 1). In addition to the hijackers, Krebs was also able to include fifteen others who were not present during the hijackings, but had helped coordinate the attacks. What is most impressive is that Krebs managed to create the network map, which turned out to be quite accurate, utilizing only open source intelligence such as electronic news (television & Internet), newsprint (magazines, papers, and journals), and otherwise non-classified materials from a number of sources (Kessler 2003:185-191).

*Figure 1 (Social Network Analysis of the 9-11 Hijackers 2001/2002)*
Ultimately, Krebs was able to determine a great number of publicly disclosed contexts (in this case, entirely from the World Wide Web) shared by the thirty-four involved individuals, weighing the links based on the known closeness of the relationship (Barabasi 2003:223). The resulting network map, produced by Krebs’ own software, produced results, surprising even to him, with regard to varying degrees of connectivity. The map he created concurred with investigators’ conclusions that the operation leader of the attacks was Mohamed Atta – Atta possessed the highest degree of connectivity on the map, with connections to sixteen nodes. Next to Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi possessed the highest degree of connectivity with fourteen links to nodes. As one goes down the list of hijackers and conspirators, one observes numerous nodes with poor numbers of links (low connectivity) – the peripheral agents/operatives in the group (Barabasi 2003:223).

In support of scale-free’s 80/20 rule, Krebs’ map shows that, despite his central role, if Atta had been eliminated prior to the attacks, the mission would still have been successful – the rest of the hubs within the network were all capable of absorbing Atta’s responsibilities and operating independently. Barabasi (2003), Krebs (2003,2005), Sageman (2004), and Forest (2006) all suggest that the structure, strengths, and behavior of the larger al-Qaeda network, larger and with greater resources, resembles that of the September 11th sub-network or cluster.

Our Working Theoretical Position

In sum, this chapter has outlined the basis of three primary theoretical perspectives in my research. First, I have pointed out a shift in patterns of terrorism from the pre-September 11th era to the post-September 11th era. We have identified the
emergence of new trends in terrorism, which are characterized by increased technological weapons capabilities of certain types of terror groups. This increase in the technology that is available to terror groups to inflict greater amounts of damage is accompanied by the apparent willingness of some groups to actually apply these “higher-order” methods.

Second, this apparent shift in the objectives and methods of well-resourced, globally-operating, radical Islamic terror groups requires researchers to adopt more appropriate levels of analysis. Global terror networks, in a globalized world, connected by instantaneous communications media, easy-to-access mass-transportation modes, and diverse cultural sites, have no single “typical recruit” or method for attracting them. Based on the current literature and reports, as well as statements made by numerous informants during my fieldwork in London, I suggest that the study of recruitment and indoctrination must be based in a multicausal approach – a broader theoretical framework, which takes into account traditional predispositions, but also takes into consideration the over-arching ideologies of specific terror networks, those networks’ socialization methods, and specific candidates’ qualifications in light of group-specific operational requirements and cultural contexts. Traditional psychological, social, economic and political factors in terror group recruitment should be considered in light of a particular brand of radical Islamic ideology, which is grounded in a totalistic, messianic belief system, and is insulated and reinforced through a complex global network structure.

Third, international terror groups, such as al-Qaeda, can be described structurally and behaviorally as scale-free networks (Barabasi 2003). In the past, in analyzing terror groups’ structures, researchers have applied numerous network theories; scale-free
network theory, however, goes beyond the limited dimensions of previous models that predict limited growth and cooperation, and illustrates, through physics, how networks can continue to expand while maintaining their own security. By applying Albert Laszlo Barabasi’s concept of scale-free networks, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers can better-understand the manner in which terror groups take in new members, absorb, distribute and utilize resources, and manage command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I). In addition to helping researchers understand the structure and behavior of terror groups, scale-free network theory can be applied to reveal the vulnerabilities of terror groups in an effort to counter them (Barabasi 2003; Krebs 2003, 2005; Robb 2004).

The Role of Anthropology in Terrorism Research

As a final perspective, anthropological research into recruitment operations in terror groups has been limited. Each of the above theoretical perspectives is based in the assertion that anthropology, in its methods, has a unique contribution to offer the larger body of work. In taking an interdisciplinary approach to the topic, out of necessity, I hope to emphasize the value of reconsidering terror groups through an ethnographic lens. The wide variance in terror group ideologies, structures, goals, cultural norms and customs, and languages, in my assessment, prevents any real generalizing, predictive, grand-theories that can address every brand of terrorism in one stroke. Rather, each group must be considered uniquely within its own set of norms, customs, practices, rituals and circumstances. This mid-range analysis, sensitivity to one’s informants, and specific treatment in research is precisely what distinguishes anthropology within the
social sciences. Terrorism, while difficult to navigate ethically using traditionally anthropological methods, is one of the most current and critical courses of study within the social sciences. The current literature, by and large, lacks adequate input from the perspective of anthropologists willing and capable of providing ground level analysis.

Throughout the following chapters, we will explore the foundations of these theoretical perspectives, as well as utilize them in an effort to emphasize current trends in terror group recruitment operations within historical and cultural contexts specific to radical Islamic terrorism. As with many theses, the amount of data available regarding terrorism is broad in scope and vast in size. This being the case, I have selected a few representative samples of past and current literature to emphasize the basis for these theoretical perspectives, as well as to provide anthropologists with a brief synopsis of the cultural framework of radical Islamic terrorism.
Husayn’s Martyrdom at Karbala

In the 7th century CE, martyrdom was not new or a unique design of Islam. It had long been present wherever there was conflict, whether among pagans, Christians, Jews or Muslims. As early as Homer’s poems, *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*, martyrdom was glorified in literature. Achilles martyred Troilus in the Trojan Temple of Apollo and the prince, Hector, in front of all of Troy. Achilles, himself, accepted his own martyrdom in exchange for promised glory and eternity in the Elysian Fields. These deaths, set in the background of Troy’s burning, Odysseus’ ‘Night Operations,’ Ajax’s rape of Cassandra at the foot of Athena’s Palladium, and King Troilus’s slaying on the Altar of Zeus, speak not only to the glorification of their deaths, but the terror that consumed Troy at the hands of the Myrmidons and Achaeans throughout the Trojan War.

Just as the Romans consumed territory and conscripts, they consumed Homer and Thucydides’ testaments of brutality during the Trojan and Peloponnesian Wars. The fall of Carthage, which resulted in the deaths of over 450,000 civilians in one week with the use of hand weapons, roughly equaled the effects of the 1945 Valentine’s Day Dresden bombings (Sinclair 2003:3)! In the spring of 73 CE, after two and a half months of siege, the Roman Legion X completed construction of a rampart and entered the fortress at Masada; only to find 936 Jews had killed themselves rather than become slaves. In a gesture of their defiance, they had burnt every structure within the fortress walls, except for the food storage facilities, which were amply supplied. The Sicarii became known as
‘zealots’ and were referred to by the Roman historian, Flavius Josephus, as “brigands of a new type” (Laqueur 1999:11).

Like the Greeks, and Jews, Muslims have their own significant histories in martyrdom, none more significant than the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali in 680 CE – a unique moment in the history of faith and conflict. His death would signify the beginning of a ferocious new methodology in Shi’a and Muslim warfare, which would only become more refined throughout the ages.

The death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE without a son left the Ummah in a state of imbalance. The succession to his position of spiritual and political prominence sparked a conflict that has never known a moment’s peace since. Some argued that the Prophet’s succession should be based on kinship ties (Shi’as), while others believed that the leading families of Medina should rule the religious body (Sunnis).

The Prophet, Muhammad, asked his khalifa (deputy), loyal lieutenant, and father-in-law, Abu Bakr, to lead prayers in his stead while he was ill near the end of his life (Lewis 2003:20). This request led some to believe that the Prophet intended Abu Bakr to follow him in succession. However, others believed that Ali was the best Imam to follow Muhammad. Muhammad, having no son of his own, had adopted his heroic parallel cousin and married him to his favorite daughter, Fatima Zahra. Due to Ali’s record as a faithful servant to the Prophet and the deliberate fashion in which Muhammad had drawn Ali into his family, many believed Ali was Muhammad’s favored successor.

However, as Ali was with Muhammad’s family washing the corpse of the Prophet, Abu Bakr was elected as the first caliph at the destined Saqifah meeting. This event caused the fateful split creating the Shi’a and Sunni sects.
The five decades following Muhammad’s death saw three of the Prophet’s five successors assassinated. Muslim armies rose and marched against each other, and regional factionalism exploded in a wave of Arab expansion over most of the Middle East (Andriolo 2002:739-740). When the third caliph, Uthman, was assassinated in his home while reading the Qur’an in 656 CE, the Shi’as came to Ali and begged him to accept the position, which he did with some modesty. Despite the divide between the Shi’as and the Sunnis, Ali was well revered by both. Even still, the Sunnis consider Ali as the last truly exemplary successor of the Prophet.

In 680 CE, two decades after the death of Ali and the transition to Sunni Umayyad rule, Husayn ibn Ali, the second son of Ali and Fatima, raised the support of seventy-two companions to challenge the Umayyad caliphate. On their way through Karbala, a force of 3,000 fighters sent to intercept them surrounded Husayn and his entourage of seventy-two men.

The New Tactic: Martyrdom

The course of the Battle at Karbala has been meticulously recorded in Shi’a tradition in what is referred to as the Karbala narrative (Andriolo 2002:740, Loeffler 1988:41-42). Anthropologist, Karin Andriolo points out that the narrative cements three significant themes in the minds of future generations of Shi’as and Muslim martyrs.

The first theme is the suffering of Husayn. After being cut off from any water in the Iraqi desert and closed in on following a gruesome battle, Husayn begged for water for the infant son he cradled in his arms; instead, his son’s throat was pierced with an
arrow\textsuperscript{11}. After watching each of his companions slaughtered, Husayn faced his enemies and was pierced with 70 arrows before having his head cut off. Finally, a provincial governor, on its way to the Umayyad caliph abused Husayn’s head, where it was buried apart from its body (Andriolo 2002:740).

A second theme taken from this event and significant to the Shi’as is the \textit{intentionality} of Husayn’s slaying – not by his killers, but by his own will. Shi’as maintain that Husayn was fully aware of the suffering he would endure, but did not resist it once his companions and son fell. Instead, he freely chose his martyrdom, and intended it to rouse the conscience of the Ummah, Shi’a and Sunni alike (Ajami 1986, Loeffler 1988, Andriolo 2002). Husayn’s sacrifice was intended to unite the Islamic community, not divide it, as it has.

The final theme of Husayn’s death is found in the fact that he died in \textit{combat} (Andriolo 2002:740). Shi’a martyrs hold this tradition closely, as does every Muslim \textit{shaheed}. It is significant in Islam that the Prophet and his companions were warriors. Unlike the Prophet Jesus, Muhammad did not turn the other cheek in the face of an oppressor or infidel. Husayn, as the Prophet’s grandson, followed in this tradition. Despite the fact that thousands outnumbered Husayn’s 72-man entourage, they fought to their very end for a cause greater than human life or suffering. It was not until he was the last man standing that he ceased to resist, and this was in order to complete his martyrdom (Loeffler 1988:41-42).

\textsuperscript{11} Bernard Lewis writes that a single person survived the assault at Karbala – a sick child in a tent named Ali ibn Husayn (Lewis 2003:23). Shi’a traditions maintain that Husayn ibn Ali’s son died in his arms at the hands of Umayyad warriors.


**Husayn’s Legacy**

Every year, Shi’a Muslims observe Husayn’s martyrdom during *Muharram* – a month-long event that reenacts Husayn’s slaughter. Private and public rituals, which dramatically include processions of men whipping and cutting their own flesh, serve to remind Shi’as of the sacrifices made by their hero; though, *Muharram* and *Ashura* (the day of Husayn’s death) are not simply anniversaries. Effectively, these events encourage Shi’as to live life in a manner that promotes Islam as the message of the Prophet. Fouad Ajami reported the saying that one should live as if “Every day is Ashura, and every place is Karbala” (1986:141). Throughout history, though, some Shi’as have considered Husayn’s martyrdom more than a gesture, rather, a set of literal instructions to be mimicked. The school of thought that promotes martyrdom as a necessity pays close attention to its examples set by the Prophet’s companions, and is careful to re-qualify suicide when it is carried out in the defense of Islam.

During my fieldwork in London, one informant credited Muhammad as having instructed “it is better to spill one drop of blood in the defense of Islam than it is to spend 60 years in thoughtful prayer.” Whether or not this was really a message of the Prophet, it has a powerful effect on those seeking atonement for their sins and hoping for entrance into a paradise reserved for prophets and martyrs. During a mosque event in London, a *da’wa* leader told a group I was with that on Judgment Day, “the first three Muslims to see Allah will be scholars, martyrs, and charitable Muslims.” For Muslims eager to be among those first to be with Allah, martyrdom is often the most accessible option of the three.
Traditions in Shahadat

Since the seventh century, scenes of martyrdom in the tradition of Husayn have been ever-present. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Ayatollah Khomeini recruited boys as young as 12 years old to run into battle ahead of soldiers in order to detonate any unexploded landmines or draw machine gun fire; motivated by extreme interpretations of Husayn’s death, promises of financial support for their families, and atonement of their sins, these boys died by the thousands with the expectation of an awaiting paradise. In many cases, the boys were issued plastic keys, made in Taiwan, which they were told would grant them passage through the gates of the secret garden in Janna (paradise) (Taheri 1986:280; Andriolo 2002:738).

In a series of interviews in the Gaza Strip between 1996 and 1999, Nasra Hassan had the opportunity to meet with a number of men awaiting shahadat.

"I asked S. to describe his preparations for the suicide mission. "We were in a constant state of worship," he said. "We told each other that if the Israelis only knew how joyful we were they would whip us to death! Those were the happiest days of my life." 'What is the attraction of martyrdom?' I asked. 'The power of the spirit pulls us upward, while the power of material things pulls us downward,' he said. 'Someone bent on martyrdom becomes immune to the material pull. Our planner asked, 'What if the operation fails?' We told him, 'In any case, we get to meet the Prophet and his companions, inshallah.' We were floating, swimming, in the feeling that we were about to enter eternity.'"

[Hassan 2001:38]

It was impressed upon Hassan that martyrs are trained to focus on the immediacy of their deaths during an operation. It is imperative that a shaheed carry out his task without hesitation that might come from a fear of death or pain. As they explained to Hassan, each brother must imagine his own death from inside himself and focus on the presence of Allah (Hassan 2001:36). One brother told Hassan that “[Paradise] is very,
very near – right in front of our eyes. It lies beneath the thumb. On the other side of the detonator” (2001:40).

For modern-day terror organizations that conduct martyrdom operations, the group’s ability to prepare its members for death is an imperative function. Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad Group, and Abu Nidal are all examples of recent groups that have developed methods that follow this plan; but these groups have all borrowed from one early group that, in particular, refined the practice of martyrdom and, like the Greeks, serve as a milestone in the history of conflict.

The Old Man of the Mountains & Hashshīshīn Devotion

In order for a subversive or clandestine group to be successful in conducting harassment and terror operations, it must first be capable of maintaining its own membership. Operations in subversion and/or violence are inherently risky and often daunting. Group leaders must develop and execute strategies for recruiting, training, and utilizing human resources in the most effective manner possible. Most often, these groups are considerably more restricted in membership, resources, and legitimacy than those elements that they oppose, and must find methods to operate effectively in the face of superior opposition. Often this requirement can be translated to mean the operative must be willing to die for the group’s cause. Perhaps no group in history mastered this principle as effectively as the group Marco Polo called the “Assassins.”

In Iran and Persia, from the 11th to the 13th century, two clusters of mountain fortresses at Alamut made up the Nizari state. One of very few places in which the Shi’as
maintained power, the Nizari state featured an elite group of men who conducted operations intended to destabilize the Sunni Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad.

The Assassin, or Hashshīshīn, sect leader was Hassan Ibn al-Sabbah, an Ismaili Shi’a poet and scientist known by his followers as “Aloadin” (Lewis 2003:6). In 1090 CE, Hassan discovered the remote Alamut castle in the Elburz Mountains while it was under the control of a Turkish Seljuk subject. Hassan overthrew the master by covertly recruiting his own castle staff to stand against him. Hassan eventually sneaked into the castle and took control of Alamut, and by the time the master realized what was happening, Hassan’s alliance was too strong to resist. Hassan permitted the Turk to leave the castle and paid him 3,000 gold dinars for the real estate (Lewis 2003:43).

In his fortified valley, Hassan began training young men who would be ordered to assassinate prominent Sunnis whose deaths were expected to cause disruptions, a climate of fear, and shifting alliances. Hassan recognized the advantages of surgical, high-intensity low-conflict operations, just as he was able to commit to and enforce an unchanging system of goals and methods that would last for more than two hundred years (Andriolo 2002:737).

Boys would be recruited by Hassan through preaching of Shi’a Islam, the perversion of the Sunni Caliphate, and the themes of Husayn ibn Ali’s martyrdom at Karbala – lessons he had learned, himself, from Amira Zarrab in Rayy (near present day Tehran) (Lewis 2003:38). While boys were being recruited from the countryside, they were brought to the fortress at Alamut where they retreated into elite compounds in small groups of two or three. These small groups would become a loyal cell, insulated from the outside world and socialized in utter seclusion with senior Fedayeen (Goffman’s total
situation). Cells were meticulously trained in weaponry, tactics, language, disguise, enemy cultural traits, and whatever knowledge and skills would allow them to later pass undetected deep into enemy strongholds. A typical mission for the *fida’is* (assassin) would require him to come so close to a highly placed and well-protected target that he could dispatch him with a dagger. The *fida’is* infiltrating the target’s innermost circle and attaining a confidential position was not uncommon (Andriolo 2002:736-737). Particularly hard-to-reach targets might have found themselves so unfortunate as to have an entire cell of assassins inching their way toward him by using multiple covers.

As impressive as the scope of an individual assassin’s training may have been, the most impressive quality of an assassin was his perpetual readiness, even eagerness to die. During his reign, Hassan was known to impress other warlords by ordering his men to stab themselves or to leap to their deaths from the castle walls on his orders (Andriolo 2002, Lewis 2003; Sinclair 2003). “They always obeyed. Their instant sacrifice scared all opponents” (Sinclair 2003:27).

According to Marco Polo’s account of the “Old Man of the Mountains,” and the Shaykh’s secret garden, Hassan had created an unprecedented ethereal training experience for his elite *Fedayeen*. The secret garden was modeled after the *Jannah* of the Prophet Muhammad, complete with gilded palaces, houri, dancers, musicians, and singers. According to Polo, Hassan had planted every fruit imaginable in this garden, through which flowed streams of wine, milk, and honey (Lewis 2003:7).

Only assassins who had completed their initiation rites could enter the garden. Hassan would tell them tales of the Prophet’s military feats and the glorified martyrs before them, and would guarantee them atonement. The senior *da’is* (higher-ranked
Nizaris) would drug the *fida’is*, whom would wake up in the garden where he would spend a number of hours, or even days, in an intoxicated state, enjoying feasts catered by virgins and every other delight of paradise before he would be abruptly drugged again and wakeup in the real world. Like Ayatollah Khomeini’s youth martyrs and Nasra Hassan’s young *shahadat* in Palestine, Nizari *Fedayeen* were taught that entering into *Jannah* would be just as painless and quick. From time to time, the men might have been rewarded for feats or advanced training by being transported back into this false paradise, but each *fida’is* who experienced it was most eager for the real journey. Having overcome any fears of death, Hassan’s assassins were not distracted at all with hopes of survival; rather, they took pride in dying defiantly with their victims (Andriolo 2002:737, Lewis 1968:127), and were, therefore, practically capable of eliminating any target. And they did.

During the two centuries of Nizari Assassins, the *Fedayeen* succeeded in murdering two caliphs and several vizirs, sultans, emirs, administrators, judges, and clerics (Andriolo 2002:737). As Hassan grew in power, his Hashshishīn sect expanded deeper into Iran and Syria, and the Hashshīshīn, in their devotion to destroying the Sunni caliphate in Baghdad, allied themselves with the Christian Knights Templar. So impressed by the Assassins were the Knights Templars that they adopted the Assassin ranking system of hierarchy, which remains present today in the Freemasons and numerous terror organizations (Sinclair 2003:28-31).

The Assassins met with a rather abrupt end when, in 1169 AD, the Shi’a caliphate in Egypt fell to the Zengids closely followed by Saladin. At this point, the Assassins in Syria even offered to convert to Christianity. The Assassins’ written history was
completely destroyed in 1256 AD when the Mongols sacked the surrendered fortresses at Alamut, after immolating the 700,000 residents of Baghdad (Sinclair 2003:31).

**Nizari Tradition**

The story of the Nizari is relevant to this thesis in two ways. The first significant point is the obvious formalization of martyrdom as a primary method of warfare. Previous incidents of martyrdom were largely the result of death in battle, such as with Hector, Husayn’s companions, or Christian crusaders; death by religious persecution like the late pagans in Rome, Saint Stephen, or the Jews in Blois; or by closely following accusations of heresy, as with Jesus and Priscillian. In each instance, martyrdom achieved its victims’ glory and recognition for their sacrifices, but those sacrifices were rarely executed deliberately. In other words, most martyrs in history became martyrs at the choosing of their executioners. Nizari martyrs, on the other hand, actually sought out their own death—taking on a mission with suicide as a primary objective. This mindset did not expire with the Nizari, as illustrated by Ayatollah Khomeini’s youth martyrs, Nasra Hassan’s *shahadat* in Gaza, and Ziad Jarrah and his fellow 9/11 hijackers.

Despite the fact that the Mongols destroyed the records of the Nizari, the traditions of the Nizari were so profound that they were noticed and recorded by every other group they encountered. These histories last to this day, and offer continued guidance to groups wishing to honor Islam in the same ways.

The second significant point of the Nizari also stems from the fact that they were so extraordinary in their methods. The Nizari operatives referred to themselves as the *Fedayeen* (a label later adopted by Hezbollah fighters in Palestine), though, to others,
they were known as “Assassins.” Attacks that targeted specific, individual targets had been conducted prior to 11th century Iran – Alexander the Great’s debated poisoning, the killing of Julius Caesar on the Ides of March, or Uthman in his home, for example; however, the terms ‘assassin’ or ‘assassination’ found their contemporary meanings in the Nizari state and its clandestine methods.

**The Islamic Revival and Wahhabism**

Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), born in al-‘Uyayna, Najd (KSA today), was educated by his father and brother, who were both Islamic scholars. At an early age, al-Wahhab was considered by many in al-‘Uyanya to have had skewed visions of Sunni Islam. As one scholar referred to al-Wahhab, “God Almighty expanded his breast for him, enabling him to understand those contradictory matters that lead men astray from His path,” nonetheless, al-Wahhab’s father “detected signs of extreme doctrinal deviance in him at quite an early age” (Algar 2002:6).

Trained in law, theology, and Sufism at Mecca and Medina, Al-Wahhab adopted a Hanbali perspective – the strictest form of Sunni law (Esposito 2005:118). As al-Wahhab traveled and studied, he became critical of Islam in Arabia. To al-Wahhab, any deviation from literal interpretations of the Qur’an or hadith, was a grave offense, and he saw a Muslim world around him that was full of *al-shirkiyat* (shirk or sins) and *al-bida* (innovation) inspite of the principles of Islam delivered by the Prophet (Algar 2002:11). Idolatry through the veneration of saints and their tombs, he believed, was the worst form of *shirk*; and the fact that these practices had become the norms in the heart of Islam,
Mecca and Medina, made the decline in Islamic fundamentals even worse (Esposito 2005:118).

Al-Wahhab declared that the nation of Islam had turned to *Jahiliyya* (the state of ignorance before the time of the Prophet), needed to return to Islam as it had been at the time of the Prophet, and that idolaters deserved death for their sins. Al-Wahhab met with a local tribal leader, Shaykh Muhammad ibn Saud, at the oasis of Dariyah. The two pledged oaths to one another, Saud’s military would do jihad against all non-belivers (non-Wahhabis) and rule the Muslim world, and al-Wahhab would be his religious leader (Aslan 2006:243); the revivalist movement known as Wahhabism or Salafism (referring to the Prophet and his companions) had begun. Wahhabism represented a significant revolution in *jihad*, as widespread jihadist movements had previously been directed at *dar al-barb* (non-believers). This *jihad*, however, was directed inward, at *dar al-Islam* (Muslims).

Despite Wahhabi claims of adherence to Salafism, the Qur’an and the hadith strictly prohibited Muslims from waging war with other Muslims. Al-Wahhab and Saud justified the mass killing of other Muslims through the fatawa of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1236-1328). During the Mongol conquests of Muslim lands, Taymiyya legitamized the killing of Mongol reverts by reasoning that, “since the Mongols continued to follow the Yasa legal code of Genghis Khan instead of the Sharia, they were not real Muslims, but apostates who should be punished with death according to the Sharia” (Sageman 2004:8-9). This would mark an important precedent, which, in the 21st century, legitimized Muslim on Muslim violence, as well as just cause for mass killings of civilians.
As Wahhabists swept across the Arabian Penninsula, they purified Islam through *ijtihad* – “weeding out” all beliefs and practices of Islam inconsistant with Salafism; Wahhabi missionary-warriors, who became known as *Ikhwan*, or Brotherhood – eventually adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Algar 2002:77). On their path to the Two Holy Cities, Wahhabis killed any Muslims who would not recognize Wahhabism as the true interpretation of Islam. Upon entering Mecca and Medina, the Wahhabis destroyed the tombs of the Prophet and his Companions, all existing shrines, and books (other than the Qur’an); banned flowers, music, tobacco, and coffee; and forced men to grow beards and women to be veiled and secluded (Algar 2002:77-80; Aslan 2006:243-244; Sageman 2004:8-9). On Ashura, in 1802, the Brotherhood raided Karbala and massacred two thousand Shi’as who were mourning Husyan ibn Ali. During the raid, as they had with the Prophet’s and Companions’ tombs, they destroyed the tombs of Ali, Husayn, Fatima, and Husayn’s Imams (Aslan 2006:244). This act would revitalize the hatred of Shi’a Muslims toward Sunnis. It also represented the lasting establishment of the House of Saud and Wahhabism in the Arabian Penninsula.

*The Revolutionary Age of Terrorism*

Terrorism entered the modern consciousness during the 18th century. During the Scientific Revolution of the 1600s, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and the like inspired new considerations regarding almost every matter. Critical thinking began to take on an applied responsibility, which primed America and Europe to raise new discussions on social issues. Prior to the Enlightenment, commoners were considered to be the property of the state, and the state belonged to the noble class of landowners;
however, with the Age of Enlightenment, citizenship and states were the subjects of new reason. Commoners came to believe that the role of a state was to advocate and protect its citizens. As White remarks, “if science could question the ability of the church to define the natural order, the social philosophers of enlightenment reasoned, then social science could question the economic and political order of society” (2002:66).

By the 1770s, American colonists perceived that Great Britain was moving toward a policy of the protection of citizens’ rights and property, though this movement was limited to the east of the Atlantic. In 1775, Americans left intellectual debate at the door and took their demands for democracy to the battlefields, where they would finally achieve their objectives in 1783. The Revolutionary War was fought with both conventional and guerilla methods; but all in all, it was considered a “conservative” revolution, which resulted in a democratic British system without a king. Power was transferred from London to Philadelphia, and that was that (White 2002:66-67). In part, the American Revolutions may have been more easily swallowed in Europe due to the fact that power, though now in American, still was maintained by the upper class. This would not be the same in France.

The French Revolution (1789-1795) was somewhat more deadly and drastic than the American Revolution had been. In France, the feudal establishment of the Ancien Régime, backed by the Catholic Church, was toppled by a disorganized middle-class that was caught in its own ideological struggle. The result of the insurrection was a chaotically impotent National Convention and a terrified European upper-class.

During this time, the British political philosopher Edmond Burke referred to the French revolutionary climate as the “Reign of Terror.” For the first time, the word
‘terrorism’ appeared as a way of describing the actions of government, dubbed ‘la Terreur,’ which included the slaughter of French nobles, their families, and sympathizers (White 2002:67). European nobles were absolutely horrified by the political climate in Paris, to the point of deploying military forces to quell the terrorists. However confused the politics of the Republic were, the Reign of Terror effectively – even easily – threw back the Austrian, Prussian, Spanish, and British armies in 1793.

Meanwhile, la Terreur continued its domestic policy of weeding out counterrevolutionary elements through methods of terror recommended to the National Convention by Robespierre: “The mainspring of popular government in time of war is both virtue and terror: virtue without which terrorism is fateful: terror without which virtue is helpless. Terror is nothing but prompt, severe and inflexible justice: it is thus an emancipation of virtue” (Sinclair 2003:76-77). Between June of 1793 and July of 1794 (the Reign of Terror), it is estimated that la Terreur’s acts of terrorism (methods of “protecting” France from its internal enemies) claimed as many as 17,000 lives of 400,000 detained (Sinclair 2003:77).

France’s First Republic was short lived, though, and in 1804 the First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, declared himself to be the first Emperor. According to White, the French Revolution was the “first revolution in the modern sense of the word” (2002:67). In other words, the French Revolution differed in the sense that it was a social revolution, rather than merely a political revolution. However, the Enlightenment may have been served a bit too much a bit too fast for Paris’s middle-class. New social experiments were many and innovative, but the threshold for such a radical shift was just too low.
Nevertheless, Europe was hungry for democracy and the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century saw an ambitious movement swelling.

Most European democrats of the early 1800s felt that constitutional democracies were evolutionary processes, which given enough time, would establish themselves. Radical democrats, however, believed that social equality was just as important as individual freedoms. A middle class democracy would also require the reorganization of class structure and the redistribution of wealth. Radical democrats became known as socialists, maintaining that all institutions should be democratic – including the ownership and control of industrial production; and that wealth should belong to every person. This concept of socialism became especially popular among groups of displaced workers (White 2002:68).

During the 1840s, the German economic philosopher Karl Marx suggested that the key to democracy was the control of economic power, and capitalist economic systems were fueled by the exploitation of the lower classes (Marx 1956). Some socialists, tiring of the slow shift towards democracy, took Marx’s writings to recommend a violent revolution, and went underground. By 1846, small groups of radical democrats were conducting covertly subversive operations directed at challenging authority through political bombings and assassinations. These activities were popularly referred to as acts of terrorism, which updated the definition to include acts of subversion and harassment directed at government policies.

Despite the lack of democracy in Paris, the French did enjoy a freedom of the press through which they observed social reform acts in Britain and had the sense that
Europe was moving ahead without them. 1846 saw child labor abuses, poor harvests and national financial crises, which was followed up in 1847 by a deep economic depression.

In February of 1848, Prime Minister Guizot resigned and as a large crowd gathered outside the ministry building to investigate, a nervous police presence attached bayonets before accidentally firing into the crowd and killing 52 civilians. Soon the entire city was full of smoke and barricades and workers and middle-class merchants staged a revolution. Taking advantage of the moment, the radical democrats joined in and a new democratic republic was announced.

However, the democrats, once again, were unable to coordinate themselves in the effort. As Paris lit up, so did revolutions throughout Europe, called the ‘Spring of Nations,’ but each rising was put back down by military force. France established its Second Republic, but would return to an empire again in 1852 under Napoleon III.

Radical democrats finally took control of the revolutionary efforts throughout Europe. Terrorism, in its most modern form, found its widest application in history as groups, unable to face armies and police forces in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, began to plant bombs, set factories on fire, and assassinate counterrevolutionary government officials. At this point, the term ‘terrorism’ was widely applied across Europe in order to explain radical socialist acts of violence and disruption (White 2002:68).

**Anarchy as Terrorism**

As some radical democrats elected to apply more and more radical acts of violence in the pursuit of political control, others chose to distance themselves from terrorism and pursue change peacefully – these socialists became known as *anarchists*. 
Championing the anarchist way was Pierre Joseph Proudhon, who believed democracy would come with the elimination of property and government (White 2002:69, Sinclair 2003:131). Proudhon subscribed to the idea that governments could effectively be replaced by extended familial communes and property could be managed through common interests. Proudhon, like Marx, essentially indicated that states legalized their own thefts from the proletariat. However, Proudhon, unlike Marx, felt that governments were entirely undesirable. Marx and others believed that as unpleasant as governments were, they were a necessary evil that would protect citizen rights if even to the slightest degree.

Despite Proudhon’s belief that peace and patience were the ways to achieve ideal communes and logical evolution would eventually prevail, some of his anarchists wished to speed up the process by destroying society through extreme acts of violence. These operators became known as ‘anarchist terrorists’ and significantly altered the Western definition of the term *anarchist*, which had been in use since the Greeks (White 2002:69).

**The Russian Brand of Terrorism**

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote of a European class war that was united beyond states’ lines. However, the 1848 revolutionary wave was made up of subnationalist movements that were uncoordinated and effectively burnt out. Unable to realize socialist objectives in open revolution, movements began to operate deeper underground, forming secret societies with secret alliances. Across Europe and into Russia, anarchists felt that revolution, to be successful, would have to cross transnational boundaries, and that one big revolution would be the last revolution (Sinclair 2003:130).
These same anarchists also felt that this delivery unto freedom required the active and violent destruction of all governments. Nowhere was this sentiment stronger than in Russia.

The Russian aristocrat Mikhail Bakhunin was among the most notorious of the anarchists referred to as ‘terrorists’ operating against the Czar. Bakhunin, mentored by Proudhon, and very publicly opposed to Marx’s tendencies toward authoritarianism, remarked that Proudhon “adored Satan and proclaimed Anarchy. Quite possibly Marx could construct a still more rational system of liberty, but he lacks the instinct of liberty – he remains from head to toe an authoritarian” (Sinclair 2003:131).

After escaping exile in Siberia in 1861, Bakhunin fled to London where he met Sergey Nechayev. In 1869 they compiled eight pamphlets, including the *Revolutionary Catechism*, which was the first document to define the ideology and psychology of the political terrorist (Sinclair 2003:132, White 2002:72). The principles laid out by the two, but primarily by Nechayev, remain into the 21st century a descriptive model of effective terrorist methods.

1. The revolutionary is a doomed man. He has no personal interests, no affairs, sentiments, attachments, property, not even a name of his own. Everything in him absorbed by one exclusive interest, one thought, one passion – the revolution…

15. The whole ignoble social system must be divided into several categories. In the first category are those who are condemned to death without delay. The Alliance should draw up a list of persons thus condemned in order of their relative harmfulness to the success of the cause…

22. The Alliance has no aim other than the complete liberation and happiness of the masses, of the people who live by manual labour. But, convinced that this liberation and the achievement of this happiness is possible only through an all-destroying popular
revolution, the Alliance will by all means and all its power further the development and extension of those evils and those calamities which must at last exhaust the patience of the people and drive them to a general uprising…

26. To consolidate this work into one invincible, all destroying force is the sole object of our organization; this is our conspiracy, our task.

[Nechayev 1896 in Sinclair 2003:132-133]

Nechayev formed a secret society named ‘The Retribution of the People,’ which inspired ‘Nardonaya Volya’ – functionally known as ‘The People’s Will.’ The Retribution of the People was based on the hierarchy of the Illuminati, which consisted of five-member cells that answered to a secret committee. The committee, in turn, reported solely to Nechayev. This system though, was based on authoritarian principles, which was counter-intuitive for anarchists. This led to a violent play in the highest-ranks when Nechayev was accused of wrong-doing, and subsequently killed his accuser in a park. The murder and flopped attempt at hiding the body resulted in Russian secret police cracking down on Nechayev using spies, who jeopardized the network’s roster.

Nechayev, after a short evasion in Switzerland, was imprisoned and tortured for the remainder of his life. Bakhunin wrote of Nechayev’s suffering – “…The individual has ceased to count, and his place has been taken by the legion, invisible, unknown, ubiquitous, always at work, daily dying, and daily being resurrected. They are being arrested by the dozens, but hundreds come forward to replace them…” (Sinclair 2003:133). Nechayev’s imprisonment and Bakhunin’s writings inspired The People’s Will in numerous assassination and bombing operations, culminating the 1881
assassination of the Moscow police Chief and Czar Alexander II. However, these two successful operations also meant the end of The People’s Will.

Russian anarchism had been so successful in creating a climate of fear, that many came to feel that it threatened to destroy world order. Out of this fear came a radical and violent counter-anarchist movement of nationalism. Whereas anarchists felt they were fighting for ideals, nationalists felt they were fighting patriotically for their countries—and patriotism tended to gain broader support networks (White 2002:70). Not only did citizens want to see their own rights protected, nationalist movements wanted to succeed alongside like-minded allies.

**February Revolutionists: The Birth of 20th Century Terrorism**

In 1905, Czar Nicholas found himself at the helm of a nation coming out of a devastating military defeat by Japan, consumed with economic failures, and trapped in bureaucratic muck (White 2002:73). Unemployed workers began to demonstrate in St. Petersburg and were promptly joined by a group of naval enlisted men. The Russian military stomped out the uprising for the time being, but it was clear that one more national crisis would send the country into chaos. That event would surface in 1914 as Russia entered into the World War.

“My flaming body will be a torch to light my people on their path to freedom.”

These were the words of Gavrilo Princip after he shot and killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife with the help of two other Bosnian students, effectively kicking off World War I (Sinclair 2003:136-137). Russians were worn down from their economic crisis and looking for a way out from under the Czar; so in February of 1917,
once again, workers took to the streets. This time they were joined by the Russian Army and were able to create their new government.

The February revolutionary government, the Mensheviks, however, found themselves in a precarious position. It was their idea to beef up the Russian economy, in part, by committing Russia’s continued efforts in the war and capitalizing on allied support. This did not fly well, though, considering the widespread disapproval of Russia’s continued participation in the war. Germany was quick to pick up on this, and so was Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

Lenin and the German High Command arranged his return to Russia, where Lenin took control of the Bolsheviks and staged an effective revolution in October of 1917. Lenin and his top lieutenant, Leon Trotsky, took control of Russia, withdrew it from the war, and set the stage for a new brand of state-sponsored terrorism.

Lenin and Trotsky developed a domestic policy of terrorism designed to wrest control from bourgeois governments and control internal enemies (White 2002:73). Once their government was established, terrorism became a constant control that could insulate the Russian government from civil war and continued discontent. Terrorism also became the chief foreign policy of the state in an effort to keep Western powers from jeopardizing the weak government. Rampant fear of communist terrorism soon spread across Europe and the Atlantic and established a mood of violence and paranoia that would plague the world powers through the Cold War. Not only did the October Revolution of 1917 write the first sentence in a book of warring super-states, but it would also inspire a student of Marxism and Leninism, Sayyid Qutb, to revive a slumbering movement in Islam.
June 2005, London

Informant 3: Jack, you must be careful in this Mosque.

Author: What do you mean?

I3:  The Mosque is a Saudi mosque.

A: I didn’t realize this was Saudi mosque. Why should I be careful?

I3:  They don’t say it is [a Saudi mosque], but Saudis pay for many mosques. I am Muslim, and I pray, so I come here; but I know Islam, myself. I am a Muslim and I study. I read the Qur’an. I do not believe in saying when I am right and others are wrong, but… you must be careful. When you become a Muslim, insha’allah [if Allah wills it], you will be careful who you listen to. You must be careful in who you listen to at the Mosque – I can tell you who is [bad], I know everyone.

A:  I’ll keep that in mind.

I3:  Do you know who Sayyid Qutb is?

A:  I know of him, but not very well. Do you agree with him?

I3:  Have you read his book?

A:  No. Which one?

I3:  His book. When you come to my house, insha’allah, my wife will make us food and I will show you my computer, insha’allah. It will be fun… I will give you some good books for becoming a Muslim, insha’allah.

Sayyid Qutb

The separation from their lord is the greatest and most agonizing punishment and depravation. It is a miserable end of a man whose very humanity is derived from only one source, namely his contact with Allah, his benevolent Lord. When man is torn away from this source of nobleness he losses all his qualities as a human being and sinks to a level which makes him deserve to be thrown in Hell, “They shall roast in Hell.” On top of that, there is something much worse and much more agonising, namely, rebuke. “And a voice will say to them, ‘This is (the reality) which you denied!’”

[Qutb 1954:93]
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was the most influential person in modern radical Islam. Peter Bergen refers to Qutb as the “ideological godfather of al Qaeda” (2006:207). Sayyid Qutb, a poet, ideologue, and critic, was born in Egypt to a middle class family and received a Western education in Cairo. As a child, Qutb had memorized the Qur’an by the age of ten and lived conservatively, though was not radical. Politically, Qutb held loyal nationalist views, and after university, he took a position in the Egyptian Ministry of Education, which sent him to the U.S. in 1948 in order to study the American education system.

During his time in the U.S., Qutb studied in New York, Colorado and Washington D.C. Particularly in Greeley, Colorado, Qutb made several observations of American culture, which were morally reprehensible – the street side beating of a black man by a mob of white locals; the aggressive curses and shouts of college students at a football game; a sea of liquor stores around towns, and scenes of young, unmarried women and men dancing to “Bali Hai” and “Baby It’s Cold Outside” (Wright 2006:22). As he later remarked of a particular college social, “the room convulsed with the feverish music of the gramophone. Dancing naked legs filled the hall, arms draped around waists, chests met chests, lips met lips, and the atmosphere was full of love” (Wright 2006:22; BBC documentary: The Power of Nightmares).

While in Washington D.C., Qutb met with Muslim revert and British official, James Heyworth-Dunne, who related the hindrances of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Wright 2006:16). Heyworth-Dunne suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood was “the only barrier to the establishment of ‘Western Civilization’ in the Middle East” (Algar
Heyworth-Dunne offered Qutb $10,000 and translation services for his newest book, but Qutb, believing that Heyworth-Dunne was trying to recruit him for the CIA, refused the offer, later recalling, “I decided to enter the Brotherhood even before I left the house” (Wright 2006:16). Qutb was a changed man. Although he admired America’s “achievements in production and social organization,” his observations of American idolatry, racism, materialism, liberal displays of sexuality, and disregard for the principles of faith were too extraordinary to ignore (Algar 2000:2). Immediately upon his return to Egypt in 1951, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood, since its creation in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, had been, through political means, attempting to reestablish an egalitarian global Sunni Caliphate, beginning in Egypt. The Brotherhood, like Qutb upon his return from the U.S., saw Egypt’s monarchy as an apostate regime, out of touch with the fundamental principles of Islam and the Prophet’s hadith. Qutb, well-versed in Western literature and motivated by his experiences in the U.S., fearing the same course in Islam, and encouraged by the political (though ideologically different) successes of the French and Russian revolutions, began writing anti-nationalism literature for the Brotherhood.

Before the July 1952 coup d’état, the Brotherhood believed that Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s Free Officers would reestablish a pure Egyptian society; however, it was soon clear this would not be the case. Nasser, fearing the Brotherhood would incite an uprising, imprisoned Qutb and several Brothers in January 1954 (Algar 2000:6).

Qutb and his Brothers were released briefly, but again returned to prison following what was likely a staged assassination attempt on Nasser. Qutb, ill his entire
life, was unable to attend his own court date in July 1955 when he was sentenced to fifteen years. Despite his fragile state, Nasser had Qutb and his fellows tortured repeatedly throughout their imprisonment\textsuperscript{12}.

Before Qutb’s martyrdom in May of 1966, he smuggled a series of letters to friends and family outside of the prison. The letters would be turned into his manifesto, *Milestones* (1964). He wrote of the hardships and torture endured by the Brothers in prison, the decline of Islam, and the need for a determined, violent Salafist movement. Echoing al-Wahhab, Qutb declared Islam was now in a state of *Jahiliyya*.

Mankind today is on the brink of a great precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head – this being just a symptom and not the real disease – but because humanity is devoid of those values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for its real progress…

The period of the Western system has come to an end primarily because it is deprived of those life-giving values which enable it to be the leader of mankind…

Islam cannot fulfill its role except by taking concrete form in a society, rather, in a nation; for man does not listen, especially in this age, to an abstract theory which is not seen materialized in a living society. From this point of view, we can say that the Muslim community has been extinct for a few centuries, for this Muslim community does not denote the name of a land in which Islam resides, nor is it a people whose forefathers lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time… How is it possible to start the task of reviving Islam?…

It is necessary that there should be a vanguard which sets out with this determination and then keeps walking on the path, marching through the

\textsuperscript{12} The tortures endured by the Muslim Brothers in prison were so heinous that inmates were considered martyrs even before their own deaths. Nasser’s jailers perfected the art of interrogation and torture, to the point that the *Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad* (the “al-Qaeda Training Manual” has a chapter dedicated to the instruction of conducting interrogations by applying the methods used against the Brothers (Al-Qaeda 1998:UK/BM161-UK/BM180).
vast ocean of Jahiliyyah which has encompassed the entire world… I have written “Milestones” for this vanguard, which I consider to be a waiting reality about to be materialized.

[Qutb 1964:7-12]

**Qutb’s Lasting Influence, al-Qaeda’s Birth, and the Push for London**

“Sayyid Qutb’s impact in radical Islam cannot be understated” (Aslan 2000; Mamdani 2004; Sageman 2004; Philips 2006). Sayyid Qutb, as a student of Western political thought and Islamic law, and the ideologue of modern Islamism, managed to do in prison, while abused beyond imagination, what no other modern Islamist thinker had been able to do. Just as Muslims believe that the Qur’an and the hadith, delivered by Muhammad and his Companions, are the perfected message of Allah, Sunni Islamists believe that Sayyid Qutb’s declaration of Jahiliyyah is true and urgent. Qutb was a master radical thinker. *In the Shade of the Qur’an* (1954) is a methodical review of every verse contained in the Qur’an, and each modern translation he offered continues to inspire jihadists seeking to purify Islam. Not only does Qutb declare shirk on all non-Muslims, but also on every Muslim that does not accept a most extreme interpretation of Salafism.

Sunni jihadists revere Sayyid Qutb’s martyrdom just as Husayn’s martyrdom is honored by Shi’as. Qutb’s martyrdom demonstrated each theme of Husayn’s Karbala narrative. Qutb suffered at the hands of his jailors, enduring years of torture, even in ill health. Qutb’s martyrdom was intentional. Even in the last days of his life, Qutb refused to plea with Nasser or accept Nasser’s offers of release (Aslan 2000). Finally, Qutb’s
death was in combat; through his writings, celebrity, and anti-nationalist rhetoric, Qutb resisted Nasser and *Jahiliyyah* through his final moments. Qutb’s martyrdom represented the ideologue’s willingness to do *jihad* not only with the pen, but also by the sword, and his call for a vanguard would soon be answered.

Also imprisoned with Qutb and the Muslim Brothers, was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid’s brother. After their release from prison by Anwar Sadat, Muhammad published Qutb’s writings and taught Qutbism to followers attracted by Qutb’s revival. Al-Zawahiri, educated and imprisoned with Qutb, went on to lead the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group.

In 1971, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted King Abdul Aziz University as a state-run school. Traditionally, Saudi and Arab students had traveled to the West to gain educations that would benefit the Arab economy. King Abdul Aziz University was opened to provide upper class students with a top-notch education. As the University grew, the KSA extended invitations to many exiled Brotherhood scholars to join the faculty. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Shaykh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam were among them. Their knowledge of Qutbism influenced many students, but none more so that Usama bin Laden (Scheuer 2003; Bergen 2006). Qutb’s vanguard would finally be realized with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as a King Abdul Aziz University class reunion, of sorts, was held in Peshawar.

Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, the U.S., Egypt, and Israel entered the 1979 Israel-
Egypt Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union saw this agreement as a Cold War threat, which
garnered the U.S. more power in the Middle East than the Soviets could tolerate. In an
attempt to offset this power play, the Soviets formed an alliance with Afghanistan’s
Marxist Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to rout the mujahideen that
threatened the PDPA’s regime.

While the PDPA had faced its own insurgency, the invasion of the Soviets
represented a profoundly more offensive gesture to Islamists and moderate Muslims
alike. Muslims from around the world came to the aid of the mujahideen, with the help
of the U.S., Europe, Saudi, Egypt, Pakistan, and Iran. The need for mujahids in
Afghanistan represented a key opportunity for Middle East states such as Egypt and
Lybia to rid their prisons of Islamists who threatened their regimes. In exile, many of
these fighters traveled through Peshawar, through the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services
Office, or Services Bureau) run by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, Usama bin Laden, and
Ayman al-Zawahiri, and into Afghanistan to become known as the “Afghan-Arabs.”

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the Maktab al-Khidamat was torn.
Azzam felt the struggle had been victorious and their objectives had been met. Bin
Laden and Zawahiri, however, felt this was the moment to seize. After a bomb under a
pulpit failed to kill him, Azzam and his two sons were assassinated in front of his mosque
in November 1989. Now, armed with thousands of experienced warriors, an operational
base in Afghanistan, and a world wide support network (courtesy of U.S., British, and
European diplomatic, military, and intelligence efforts during the war) al-Qaeda, “the
Base,” or vanguard of Qutb’s global Salafi movement had formally arrived.
As for where to go after Afghanistan, many of the *mujahids* were unable to return to the states from which they came, due to exile. Thousands of Islamists, hardened by combat experience, and motivated to keep the Islamist momentum alive, had to find a new home. For many, such as Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, Omar Bakri Muhammad, and Abu Qatada al-Filistini, that home would be London.
CHAPTER SIX
FIELDWORK: EVERYONE’S HEADED TO LONDON

Bookshops, Tea Parties, Fundamentals, Histories, and Bombs

Site Selection

A prime example of a major recruitment operation, based on Qutb’s revivalism, is the Finsbury Park Mosque case. In February of 2003, Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, the imam of the Finsbury Park mosque, was removed by British authorities and held until February 7, 2006 when he was convicted of eleven counts of inciting violence and hatred, solicitation of murder, and possession of a copy of the Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad. Since the 1990s, Abu Hamza had been preaching intolerance and recruiting individuals to travel to Afghanistan to train for mujahideen and shahadat (martyrdom), including his own son. In the years that Abu Hamza was the Finsbury Park imam, the mosque and surrounding neighborhood became ‘honey pots’ for jihadists seeking a more extreme brand of Islam.

Between 2000 and 2003, those who attended Finsbury Park mosque represented the Who’s Who of radical Islamic terrorism; included in this group was Richard Reid (the “shoe bomber”), Zacharias Moussaoui, and Kamal Rabat Bouralha – the man who trained Chechen terrorists to wire a school in Beslan, Russia with explosives, killing 344 children and teachers on September 1, 2004. British intelligence services believe that Abu Hamza and Finsbury Park mosque leaders recruited numerous fighters to travel to Chechnya in 2001. With Abu Hamza’s dismissal in 2003, followed by a temporary shutdown of
Finsbury Park Mosque, dozens of mosque attendees who subscribed to violent jihad had to find new community venues in central London.

The vast majority of those who attend Finsbury Park Mosque were and are, for the most part, unaffiliated with terror organizations, but a small segment appears to have been deeply involved with at least one major network. In recent years, several researchers have emphasized that London has served to attract all walks of political and religious extremists, as well as those cast out of their own societies (Baer 2002; Forest 2005; Bergen 2006; Phillips 2006). Some come to London out of convenience, some for university education, some seek the shelter of liberal human rights laws, and others seek to exploit the resources enabled by those laws.

According to Britain’s 2001 census, at just over 1.5 million, Muslims represent the second highest religious group in the sixty million plus population (2.8%) (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=954). The vast majority of these Muslims are peaceful, law-abiding, mainstream individuals. However, 2004 and 2005 reports by researchers and British officials suggest that as many as sixteen thousand British Muslims either support or are directly-engaged in terrorist activities. Of those sixteen thousand, around three thousand are suspected of having passed through al-Qaeda training camps – several hundred thought to be “primed” to attack targets within the U.K. (Phillips 2006:viii [Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 2004; Winnet and Leppard 2005]).
Planning For London

At the time this research was designed and initiated, London had been relatively quiet. Abu Hamza had been detained and was awaiting trial, the last IRA bombing had been in February 1996, and Londoners were busy watching the war in Iraq on the BBC. Few peoples’ minds were on subversive, radical, Islamic, global terror movements, subtly moving along in England. It was the fall of 2004 and spring of 2005 when this fieldwork was planned.

Initially based on Robert Baer’s (2004) brief mention of radical literature distribution in Central London, stories of displaced mujahideen, and demonizing photos of the Shaykh known as “The Hook” published in The Economist, I wondered about the true state of London’s radical Islamic community. The purpose of the field study started out, simply, as going to London and having a look around. As mentioned in chapter three, I planned on three routines, which I pretty much stuck to – local archival research, participant observation at locations identified in the background study, and keeping up with local and community events. These were certainly achieved.

Edgware Road

Edgware Road is home to thousands of Arabs and Muslims. Situated in central London, and edging off of Hyde Park, Edgware Road has a distinctly Arab atmosphere. Lined with textile shops, hotels, restaurants, travel agencies and outdoor markets, Edgware Road is a relatively wealthy area in London. As I walked to the top of the road, I stopped by a number of halal butcher shops, shewerma stands, and rug stores. After
gorging myself thoroughly, and arranging to meet a textile shop owner later that week, I began to backtrack in order to find every bookshop in the main road.

Given the mass immigration of political exiles, former mujahideen, and radical Islamist preachers during the 1980s and 1990s, which I discussed in the previous chapter, I had carefully pre-selected points of interest to collect data in London. In addition to these sites, I was particularly interested in exploring Edgware’s bookshops, due to Robert Baer’s observations. Baer suggests that, while outwardly these shops do not promote radicalism, their backrooms and dusty shelves offer what may be the West’s largest collection of radical Islamist literature, which incites violence and hatred toward non-believers. Baer also suggests that these shops may provide a useful data mine for researchers and practitioners; noting that in 1994, the CIA did not have any Arabic speakers stationed in London; thus, no one was following up on the distribution of radical literature (Baer 2002:xv-xvi). This claim was intriguing to me, so I had made it a point to check for myself as soon as possible. I soon found out that Baer was right about one thing... the books were all in Arabic, and I had almost no idea what they meant.

However, I did eventually befriend two owners of two different shops, in particular, whom were patient enough to stand my questions and dumb shuffling of papers. Over the course of my fieldwork, I revisited the shops on several occasion and was able to view a few texts of interest. I was surprised to find that many texts were rather easy to come across; additionally, quite a few appeared to have gone through very informal publication processes – that is, many texts were loose-leaf, bound with string, and contained in plain jackets with no indexes or publication information. I asked about
a few on my first occasion with them, and was told that they were not published widely, rather, written and/or distributed locally by Islamic scholars and interest groups.

One text, of particularly obvious interest, depicted Ariel Sharon on the front cover, scowling down at the earth, which was clutched in a hand and set in front of an American eagle and flag, which were both engulfed in flames. I purchased the text, along with a few others, and spoke to the shop owner about *da’wa, Jahiliyyah*, and these books. He explained one and gave me an Arabic childrens’ book to practice reading the other. When asked about why he carried these books, he said he sold “…all kinds of books. Science, religion, Islam… It’s important to know what people think about Islam; this is how you become a Muslim. You think. You decide it’s the right choice for you” He also cautioned me about Finsbury Park Mosque:

I31: They are very [gestures as misguided or deviated] there. You know Abu Hamza?

Author: I know of him.

I31: Hamza is not there any more.

A: [Affirmative]

I31: He is not there, but the Mosque is still his. That mosque has been ruined and should be closed… I don’t know why they think it should be open any more.

A: Interesting, I was thinking about going there. Do you know anyone who does?

I31: You do not want to go there. That is not Islam. Go to another mosque.

A: Which one? I was looking at the [X] mosque, but I’d like to go to all of them to see what they’re like.

I31: Don’t go to Finsbury. You can go to [X], that’s a good mosque; you can learn Arabic there. See if Islam is for you. Don’t wait. Go today.
**Finsbury Park Mosque**

Despite this warning, as well as the misgivings of most people with whom I spoke about Finsbury Park Mosque, I had come to London, in part, because of the Mosque’s reputation. While discussing Finsbury a few days earlier with a British anthropologist, I had been told that Finsbury Park Mosque would not be inviting. Part of this was, apparently, due to a heavy police presence near the Mosque. After Abu Hamza al-Masri’s initial arrest and dismissal in January 2003, he had held *khutbahs* (sermons) in the street in front of the Mosque. Hundreds of Muslims would attend and kneel in the street during his speeches. Abu Hamza’s followers were so devoted that many continued to visit the street in front of the Mosque even after his final arrest in May 2004. Muslims at another local mosque referred to demonstrations at the Finsbury Park Mosque, during which Abu Hamza’s loyalists would wear mock suicide bomb belts and angrily protest his arrest and detention. In order to reclaim the Mosque’s lost prestige; the board of trustees renamed it the ‘North Central London Mosque’ in February of 2005, and replaced the Mosque’s Imams. However, in every instance that I discussed the Mosque with others, it was still popularly referred to as ‘Finsbury Park Mosque.’

My fieldwork coincidently began as Abu Hamza was heading to trial for possession of the *Encyclopedia of Jihad*, aiding terrorism, incitement of hatred, and weapons arsenal possession charges. His court date had been set for July 5th and in the month leading up to the date, I was hesitant to impose myself as a disruption. Figuring I had plenty of time to check in on Finsbury, I decided to spend more time visiting other local mosques and venues, which had already provided me with numerous insights. Once
I had spent a little more time at other mosques, and, perhaps, found some people who attended Finsbury to go along with, I would visit again. Finsbury would have to wait.

**Da’wa Tea Party and Concealment**

At one mosque, I noticed a wide variance in mosque-goers backgrounds. Many were born and raised in London; however, about half of those I spoke with were recent immigrants or temporary visitors to London. This particular mosque has a reputation for fundamental preaching and a strong da’wa program, which includes Arabic language training, courses in the fundamentals of Islam (Sunnah, Hadith, and Sharia lessons) and weekly Islamic Circle meetings (weekly khutbahs or sermons on Islam’s the Sharia in everyday life). Due to these programmes, and the imam staff, the mosque has gained an international reputation as the place in the West to go to learn Sunnah and Sharia. I immediately began attending every mosque function.

During my first Islamic Circle, the leader of the discussion spoke on the necessity of intensity in living Islam and one’s practice of the faith. Islam, he said, must be a part of every thing in life, and one is responsible only to one’s self and God. If one is to stumble or do shirk, there was no need to tell anyone. Instead, conceal or “cover up” one’s indiscretion so that only God may judge you, “If you’re going to cause problems and present obstacles for yourself, why tell? No one needs to know but you and God.”

Following this first Circle, I was introduced to a Somali man in his mid-twenties (I3). He and I spoke for quite some time after the meeting, and, as one who went to the

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13 *Sunnah* refers to the ways of the Prophet – Islamic customs or laws based on the deeds and words directly from the Prophet. *Hadith* are deeds and words of the Prophet according to his Companions and witnesses. In terms of contextualizing any dilemma or *Sharia* question, Muslims refer, first, to the Qur’an, then *Sunnah*, and, finally, *Hadith*. 

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mosque once or more a day, he was very familiar with many of the mosque goers. While we were sharing a cup of tea between prayers, several men came over to our table and greeted us before sitting down. As I was away purchasing each of them some tea and cake, I3 introduced me as being from ‘Washington,’ which interested one Algerian man (I21), in particular. As I sat down again:

Informant 21: You are from Washington D.C.?
Author: No, I’m from Washington State – in the northwest U.S.
I21: Is that near Virginia? What do you think of this war right now?
A: No, it’s on the Pacific. It’s tough to say. It’s a complex issue14… [interrupted]
I21: Are you a Christian?
A: Yes, I’m Catholic.
I21: How can you still be a Christian? Christians will never go to Heaven… 'Our father,' 'My father,' the ‘Holy Trinity…’ are all mistakes that are misinterpreted in the Gospels by Christians. Yes, Jesus was a prophet, but Muhammad is the last prophet, and Islam is the only true religion. Non-believers, no matter who they are or how they live, will not go to God without converting to Islam.
A: I understand… [Interrupted]
I21: Christians who kill Muslims can never be forgiven. This is why George Bush is leading America to Shaytaan (Satan). All I can say to you is that I hope you come to Islam before it’s too late for you… Americans kill Muslim women and children in our land and believe in God? [Shakes his head in disagreement]

My Escort

I3 and I went for a walk in a nearby park. It became a regular routine – I3 and I would meet away from the mosque, and walk for an hour through a large park before

14 While conducting fieldwork, I elected not to share my military or combat experience with informants, unless specifically asked.
going to mosque. He was devout in nearly every way, from his dress and his family life, to his interest in my beard and status as a non-believer. Nearly every other comment involved me becoming a Muslim; though, this became common when spending hours on end in any mosque as a non-Muslim. At times, it became nearly impossible to separate myself from I3. Insulating my informants from one another, in order to protect their anonymity, was a challenge; especially with I3 adopting me as his revert\(^\text{15}\) project. I was also concerned that spending too much time with any one person would alienate others, though this didn’t seem to become an issue.

I3 was unemployed, though his wife had a decent-paying job and was able to support their family. In his free time, which was any time he wasn’t at mosque or caring for his children, he enjoyed working on computers, and would occasionally brag about being able to hack any computer or network, to include Microsoft’s network. As I mentioned in the last chapter (p. 76), on one occasion I went to his home for lunch and a book exchange. While there, he wanted to show me his computer, and demonstrated his abilities by hacking into Yahoo. Prior to showing me his hacking abilities, he would often speak of them, but then quickly add that he no longer did that, since he was now older and hacking was immoral.

I3 had immigrated with his family in early 1990s, following the Battle for Mogadishu in October 1993\(^\text{16}\). At the time of his immigration, one of I3’s close affiliates

\(^{15}\) Non-Muslims who do Shahada and become Muslims are referred to as ‘reverts,’ not converts, as all people are truly intended to be Muslim; Shahada, in other words, in more of a return to Islam than a new acceptance.

\(^{16}\) The Battle for Mogadishu took place on 3 and 4 October 1993, as Task Force Ranger, a group of approximately 160 Rangers, Delta Force operators, Navy SEALs, and Pararescue PJs, captured several high-ranking militia members, loyal to Muhammad Farah Aidid. The al-Qaeda-trained militia quickly surrounded the Task Force and an 18-
held a senior position in Muhammad Farah Aidid’s militia. I3 and I would talk
frequently about Islamism, which he would speak of cryptically. He seemed sympathetic
to Islamist thinking, yet disapproved of Muslim on Muslim violence. He spoke of
Muslims answering al-Zarqawi’s call to jihad in Iraq:

I3: [al-Zarqawi] is able to recruit so many because the Americans are invading Muslim
land just as the Russians did. [Greater] Jihad\(^\text{17}\) is more important in every Muslim’s day-
to-day life. This is where we strive to be good and follow the Prophet’s example.
[Lesser] Jihad\(^\text{18}\) in Iraq is much easier than everyday jihad. If a Muslim believes that
Islam is being attacked, he must do jihad.

A: Then why don’t more Muslims go to Iraq for jihad?
I3: Bin Laden kills Muslims. That is not the way of Islam – a Brother must never kill a
Brother or Sister.

A: Then why isn’t there a mujahideen to defend Muslims from al-Qaeda?
I3: In order to do this, there needs to be a Caliphate and flag, but the West will never
allow this. Islam would be too powerful as a nation for Blair and Bush.

I3 and I were having a meal at the mosque when his younger brother showed up.
I3 had told me about his brother, whom he supported financially, and loved very much,
“but is young.” I3’s brother, I6, had come to the mosque with his friend for prayer and
lunch, and I3 told him he should come more often. I6 laughed and rolled his eyes. I6
told I3 that he went to mosque “the normal amount.” “You should go more,” his brother

\(^{17}\) Al-jihad al-akbar (greater jihad) is the ‘struggle’ Muslims face in daily life, living in
adherence to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and Hadith. It is considered the most noble from of
jihad.

\(^{18}\) Al-jihad al-ashgar (lesser jihad) is the ‘struggle’ some Muslims take on in warfare or
combat in the defense of Islam. It is considered less noble, and often avoidable in Islam.
advised. I6 insisted that he goes to mosque enough, but that I3 just doesn’t know this because I6’s on the other side of town. I asked I6 where he went to mosque. “Finsbury,” he replied. We talked a bit on other subjects before I asked I6 if he was going to Finsbury anytime soon, and he mentioned he wasn’t planning on it, but he might still go. I3 suggested we all go to his house for dinner the following week, and his wife would cook. I6 eagerly accepted and so did I, as I was already making plans to ask I6 to take me to Finsbury with him.

**Fundamentals and Saudi in London**

By the time July had come around I had become a regular at the mosque. People recognized me, if only by sight, and I felt sufficiently free to loiter about and strike up conversations. I had met with imams, *da’wa* staff, and had been one of a few regular participants at Islamic Circle, so I was well known to the staff, which was a bit surprised that I had not reverted to Islam yet.

Normally, during Islamic Circle and prayer, men and women were separated. A dividing wall was propped up and on one side were the men, and the women on the other. We were seated on the floor and in chairs in a semi-circle around the Imam or visiting Shaykh or speaker. A video camera was placed in front of the speaker and the signal was run to a television set for the women, twenty feet away, behind the small wall. As one *da’wa* leader previously advised,

> The greatest thief, the worst kind of thievery, is one who steals from prayer - one who thinks of anything other than prayer and God during prayer is stealing from God. It is a most serious sin, one that is most important to avoid. This is also why we have a separation of men and women during prayer times – In order to avoid those obvious distractions that can occur by thoughts and sights of the opposite sex... When a man
looks at a woman, or a woman looks at a man any number of thoughts and emotions can occur, so it is just better that they are not together during prayer. There are three main reasons for men and women, then, to pray separately and avoid being alone together. First, we believe women and men should be separated in order to avoid these distractions during prayer. Second, and most importantly, this separation is compulsory, by The Prophet.

Even during meals, the sexes were separated; the only time this did not occur was during fundamentals training. Classes were held in the Mosque’s library two days a week for eight hours each day. After wudu\(^{19}\), we would take our seats along the sides of the room – the women across from the men. For the most part, those present were new Muslims, or Muslims who had traveled to the mosque for the course – students present at the course were mostly from London, but some came from places such as Germany, Turkey, France, Somalia, Uganda and Canada. In all, there were about one hundred students including several married couples. During the course, the teacher spoke on Sunnah questions that a Muslim may encounter in the modern world, placing an absolute emphasis on literal interpretations. The “Rights” (as in responsibilities and obligations) of men, women, husbands, wives, the dying, the elderly, the Scholar, the Muslim, Allah, and the Ummah were all topics of focus.

The da’wa leader of the course, representing the mosque, identified Sunnah as the defining aspect of true Islam, and 73 sects that oppose God’s will and the Prophet’s examples. In the modern era, democracy threatens Islam, as it “runs on the self-interests of individuals… Like a killer whale in a pool, it deprives creatures of something natural and inherent.” Muslims must pass along Islam as the Prophet did – sharing it with all as

\(^{19}\) *Wudu* is the ritual washing of the face, hands, and feet before prayer.
if they were neighbors. One can never expose the faults of another Muslim, nor should a Muslim read the Qur’an from cover to cover – instead, read it by verse and chapter over a period of time. Additionally, just as Allah has His rights and Muslims have theirs, so do non-Muslims. Non-Muslims have the natural rights to security, and the ability to practice their faith. In addition, they have the right to access Islam and the right not to be compelled into Islam. However, if non-Muslims attempt to erect churches or synagogues in Saudi Arabia, curtail Muslim beliefs, or otherwise interfere with Muslim rights, all natural rights are revoked.

A young woman raised her hand and was called on. She took objection to a point made by I26, who insisted that the “Rights of Husbands” included a husband’s natural right to make his wife work for an income. She asserted that she had been taught in school that the “Rights of Wives” held that women do not have to work unless they choose to, but, in any case, a husband does not have the natural right to force his wife to work – only force her not to work. At this, I26 stated, “You are wrong Sister. If your husband wishes you to work, by God, you will work.” Again she objected that the Rights were inconsistent, or that her husband had no natural right in the matter. I26 suddenly became very impatient, “Sister, I have told you – you are wrong! You must believe me!” Once more she stood up, and reminded I26 that the “Rights of the Muslim” promote critical thought in Sharia, which should permit this debate. I26 became visibly upset, and raised his voice, “Sister, this is shirk! You are wrong because Muhammad says you are wrong. This is final. I fear for your soul, because it is so clear you are on the path of Shaytaan. You must change your ways or you will go to Jahannam (Hell). I am very sorry for you” [to the rest of the group] “I cannot help this Sister.” Later in the day, a
male student asked I26 if we were learning Wahhabism, to which I26 replied, “Wahhabis, Wahhabism is different today.”

My Fellow Historian

I28 was a high-position member in a local mosque. I met him early in my fieldwork as I was exploring several locations. He was from East Africa and had been well educated in Saudi Arabia at a prestigious Wahhabi university, which had turned out several influential Sharia scholars. Because of his education, he was selected at a young age to work in London, and held a high level of responsibility in his position. Our meetings, usually in his office, were thoroughly enjoyable experiences. One of his roles in the community was to speak with young Muslims who were considering jihad. I28 was immediately interested in talking about radical Islam in London, and was, in fact, the one who started the conversation. I rarely had to ask probing questions, as he seemed sensitive to my interests even though our conversations were very informal. I28 indicated that “only a few” individuals had come to see him in the past, whom he had counseled against doing jihad, and he felt that he had been successful.

The few people whom he had spoken with were all males and in their early 20s. I asked him about their backgrounds, but he did not seem to know or wish to give such details. “They were all different,” he said. They had come from different mosques in the area, not his own, he inferred.

Throughout my fieldwork, I met with I28 on six occasions, as he was very busy; though, when we did meet, it was usually for several hours. We spoke, for the most part, about our personal lives and history. During one session, he asked me questions about
U.S. history for three hours, and I was a bit surprised that I could fill them. I had gone from Columbus to WWII and he was eager to hear more in our next visit, but I warned him that I had given him just about everything I knew. In exchange, I28 filled me in on Islam, Africa, and the bride he would arrange for me.

After a few visits with I28, he offered me two books that were written for Muslims who are contemplating jihad. I had actually requested copies before he had offered them, and he seemed to be hesitant, but handed them over. We talked more history and he told me more about arranged marriages and reversion. I declined once more and headed home to read the texts as he rushed off to a meeting, but we would see each other Friday, as planned.

London is Burning

On July 5, 2005, after months of anticipation, Abu Hamza al-Masri’s trial begins. On July 6th, the eight most powerful political heads in the world arrive at Gleneagles, Perthshire, Scotland for the G8 Summit. That evening, London wins the bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games. London celebrates into the night, as four shaheeds, who know tonight is their last night on earth, prepare for Jannah. 52 people who don’t know tonight is their last night on earth, sleep fitfully.

I’m getting a late start. I was supposed to be at Edgware Road at 9am, and it’s 8:45 already. I’m in the living room throwing my stuff into a bag and writing down last night’s field notes. BBC is on in the background. I head downstairs, but I’ve left my camera and head back up. As I open the door, I hear a siren race down the road, then
another. More are coming, still. I grab my camera off of the table and glance past the television at the window to see more lights.

**The Bombings**

Within the first 50 seconds of 8:50am, three suicide bombers detonated bombs on the London Underground Tube lines at Aldgate, Edgware Road, and King’s Cross stations. 57 minutes later, the #30 bus exploded at Tavistock Square near University College London. In 57 minutes, four suicide bombers claimed the lives of 52 Londoners and wounded another 700. The bombings brought London’s transit and telecommunications infrastructure to a crippling standstill for more than twelve hours. This attack represented the first time a suicide bombing had ever been conducted on British soil.

In the aftermath of the July 7\textsuperscript{th} terror attacks, I was able to observe the effects of the attacks not only on the city as a whole, but more particularly, on local Muslim communities and institutions that I had been studying for a year, participating with and observing for several weeks leading up to the attack.

**Thursday, July 7, 2005**

Unfortunately, the bombings were not unfamiliar to me. I remembered the scenes from Ground Zero in New York and had a good idea of what the British emergency services were looking at for the next several weeks. I remembered the August 29, 2003 assassination of Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim in Najaf and the holy hell that started that week. I knew this would not play well for the Muslims I had been working with,
regardless of who had conducted the attack. Sara, my flatmate, was on the #30, at least, she had been. She got off at Euston Station when buses transporting Underground evacuees brought it to a stop. As she got off, it pulled ahead and she chased it, but it was gone. The bus rounded Euston and turned right, toward UCL. Then it exploded.

As I watched the news unfold I knew I needed to go somewhere, but we didn’t know what had blown up yet. The news channels were chaos, and at 9:50am, there were seven reported detonations at ten locations. I kept waiting until I was sure Edgware Road was on the confirmed list. Finally, I headed out onto the street again. The buses were down, the Tubes were out, the phones were hopeless, and even the taxis were nowhere to be seen. So I walked, as usual. Normally, the walk through Regent’s Park was beautiful and peaceful, but this time, the park represented an information black hole. It took 30 minutes to get back to the other side, and another 15 to get to Edgware. But it was too late. The Hilton was an overstaffed emergency room. The Tube station was surrounded by firefighters in protective gear; I simply stood by and watched my street, my weak ethnography, turn to tragedy. It was, I suppose, what I had begun to suspect it would become.

I turned back to head to the mosque. I knew it would be important to be there today, but I still did not go. Instead, I went home to watch the tragedy unfold like everyone else – on T.V. In some way I was humiliated. It was the first time something like this had happened when I could not be a part of fixing it. It was also my community of Muslims who would pay the price for another’s misdeed. I realized how attached to my participants I had become.
Friday, July 8, 2005

I walked into I28’s office. I did not knock – I just walked in and closed the door. He looked at me, then looked at his desk, and then looked at the wall. He just stared for several moments without saying a word. I sat down across from him and stared at the wall, too.

After five minutes or so, we finally greeted one another. He spoke very slowly and shook his head.

I28: They were Muslims.

A: I know.

I28: They killed Muslims… They attacked a Muslim neighborhood.

A: Is your wife all right?

I28: [looking out the window] She’s fine. Thank you… These Muslims were British. They already know from the CCTV… This is not Islam, Jack.

After 30 minutes, I left I28’s office and began to walk around the mosque. The mosque was very quiet, with only two or three people on the prayer floor. I went to the mosque’s bookstore and looked around a bit, before going down to the Islamic Circle leader’s office. He was there, and greeted me quietly. He gave me a very expensive copy of the Qur’an that he had shipped from Saudi after a previous discussion. It was heavy and incredibly beautiful. We spoke briefly and then I went back upstairs. There was a man from my fundamentals course standing outside, so I went to him. I had not had the opportunity to speak with him much before, and he seemed in reasonably good
spirits considering the current state of affairs. We spoke about terror attacks, and he echoed I28’s remarks.

He was in his mid-thirties and from Pakistan. He had been in London for fifteen years. As we were talking, he noticed the beautiful Qur’an in my right hand\textsuperscript{20} and mentioned that he had memorized it when he was young. He had attended \textit{madrasas} like everyone else in his area, and had been taught to recite the Qur’an in Arabic, but didn’t know how to speak Arabic. This is a common occurrence in Pakistan’s \textit{madrasa} system, which has received much criticism in the past several years. Pervez Musharraf is currently reforming this system, which remains to be a major factor in radical ideology building in Pakistan. Students in \textit{madrasas}, unable to understand the meaning behind their own Arabic recitations, have often received radical interpretations of Qur’anic messages. Reciting the Qur’an, while hearing these interpretations, reinforces students’ beliefs in the validity of their instruction.

\textit{Preparing to Leave the Field}

Fieldwork had initially been scheduled to last into August. However, in the first week of July, I received a phone call from my father, who was asking me to come home to the U.S. I knew this was not good, as he had always encouraged me on my adventures. I spoke with him again around July 9\textsuperscript{th} and it was clear that he was terminally ill, and I immediately scheduled a return flight.

\textsuperscript{20} In Islam it is customary to use one’s right hand for all clean things. One eats, shakes hands, holds prayer beads, and handles the Qur’an, and so on with the right hand. Using the left hand for such activities is offensive and inappropriate.
This was a difficult time to leave the field, as the July 7th bombing had significantly altered the course of my fieldwork. Research had been useful prior to the bombing, particularly in developing a better understanding of the fundamentals of Islam, Muslim cultural contexts outside of the Middle East, and contemporary Wahhabism. By the London bombings, I had developed strong rapports with several informants and had established myself as somewhat of a regular at several local community venues. Some research questions had been on a paced schedule, so I, unfortunately, had to make the best of what information I had at the time I left.

In the final few days of fieldwork, I wrapped up a number of loose ends and made one final push for any information I might benefit from that could not be collected from the U.S. I returned to Edgware Road on July 9th, in order to drop by each bookstore one more time. Once again, I managed to find several texts with radical themes, as well as a few general knowledge texts that have aided in my own contextualization of the material in this thesis and other projects. Although I was not able to visit Finsbury Park Mosque with I6, I did make another trip there on July 9th.

The days following the London Bombings were particularly difficult for London’s Muslim population. Due to modern technology, London’s transit security monitors and CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) devices were able to capture images of the July 7th suicide bombers, which were processed within hours of the attacks. In addition, a number of Islamic groups had claimed responsibility for the attacks in short order. The positive identification of the bombers as Muslims resulted in a rash of hate crimes, such as beatings, mosque vandalisms, incitements of violence, hate mail, and death and bomb threats. This misdirected backlash resulted in a crisis of racism and fear in London. In
order to protect Muslim citizens, British authorities posted significant numbers of police officers at each mosque in London.

When I arrived at Finsbury Park Mosque, I was met with a scene that seemed more from Neshoba County in 1964 than London in 2005. The Mosque had a group of about a dozen police officers standing between it and a large crowd of non-Muslim British citizens yelling and gesturing to Muslims as they climbed the front steps for prayer. As before, this would not have been an appropriate time for me to enter the mosque, so I left that primary research objective in the field until I could return.

Subsequent research has indicated that the February 2005 board of trustees name change of the mosque to ‘North London Central Mosque,’ and well as a new staff of imams, has had a seemingly positive effect on the mosque’s reputation, with attendance tripled since Abu-Hamza’s dismissal. However, the mosque does have continued ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, through at least one board member (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13501930/).

In addition to Edgware Road and Finsbury Park Mosque, I visited a number of local sites that I had frequented during fieldwork. I also made it a point to check in with each informant before leaving. At my primary field site, I had one more opportunity to attend an Islamic Circle on July 10th.

**When You Least Expect It**

I found my fieldwork to be immensely gratifying. It had been an aggressive project with ambitious objectives, which turned out far different from what I had expected. I did not end up uncovering any recruitment operations or terrorist networks
that I know of. I did have a few run-ins with radical-minded individuals, but no one who
fit the ‘terrorist’ label, as outlined in chapter two. My field methods had paid off in terms
of sampling – I had managed to develop a large number of informants and a few key
informants. Better yet, my informants had wide-ranging and experienced backgrounds,
which enabled me to interact with individuals with distinctly different views of Islam,
Muslims, and non-believers.

Participant observation had been effectively applied, in that I had gained valuable
insights for this thesis and future research from an, otherwise, unavailable perspective;
and I had managed to gain and keep the trust that was necessary to effectively
communicate with my informants. I had effectively immersed myself in certain
community venues in such a way that community members had accepted me, and I was
able to approach almost any person of interest. I had also been able to utilize this access
by involving myself even deeper in the community, through participating with senior
imams, Sharia scholars, and da’wa leaders, in Islamic Circles, fundamentals courses, and
informed critical discussions on Islam, jihad, and Muslim-related foreign policies.

The July 7th London bombings had added an unexpected and tragic dynamic to
the research, but I still had managed to miss any radical khutbah that may have occurred
in public venues in London – events that I had been certain were occurring, just as I
continue to be certain that London and England have become ‘hot spots’ for recruitment
operations. Like Daniel Strieff asked of Abu Hamza’s followers, “Where have they
gone”(http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13501930/)?
Radicalism After All

Three days after the bombing, on July 10th, I met I3 one last time at one of our meeting points. We walked toward the mosque as he made his last ditch efforts to have me do Shahadah with I26. If I stayed, tomorrow I could go with him in the van. He and a few of his hacker buddies were going to drive around London in the van with laptops and hack personal networks for fun. “No thanks,” I said.

As we came to the mosque, we crossed through the police line and walked across the plaza. As we stepped inside, there was a massive crowd on the prayer floor. Since I had been there, I had seen 200 people, at most, on the prayer floor at any one time, and that was for a visiting Shaykh from Saudi Arabia. Before us was 250-300 Muslim men sitting on the floor and listening to an impromptu khutbah, put on by an outside stranger. As we removed our shoes and stepped into the prayer room, I could see a Mosque imam who appeared very upset over whatever was going on.

I3 and I stood off to the side of the room as a man knelt in front of the massive audience. “Brothers, our Heroes are Martyrs. Tony Blair and George Bush cannot ignore our Brothers, our Heroes. This is the moment to struggle for Allah…We must not neglect what God has instructed us we must take on. The West has corrupted Islam… the Jews and Christians build on Muslim land what they will never leave… …as our mothers and children die at their hands…” Was this really happening? Here?

We had come for an Islamic Circle and this was happening in this mosque? How did this happen? Who let it happen? I looked through the crowd and looked at each face as I listened to the speaker. Only a few of the faces were familiar; almost all of them were new to me. This was not a typical weekend-sized crowd. The entire audience was
male and looked to be between 20 and 40 years old. The faces in the crowd were not upset; they were either still or nodding in agreement. I thought I must have been misunderstanding the *khutbah*… ‘Bush, Blair, Jews, Christians, Murder, Shayytan...’ The whole recipe was there. This was actually a radical, a *really* radical *khutbah*! I was absolutely amazed to hear it and still cannot imagine how the imams allowed it, or if they had not, why the police were not rushing the doors. This was not a subtle call; this was urgent and direct. He called for struggle against US and British policies, and police and military forces. The speaker even suggested taking the struggle to America, just as the July 7th bombers had finally brought the fight to London. This is exactly what I came to London looking for, so why am I so shocked to hear it? This may be a fundamental mosque, but there is a big difference between fundamental and radical.

I3 became very uncomfortable, and wanted to leave, (or, perhaps, not to be spotted with me) so I walked with him to the shoe shelves, where I continued to listen. The talk ended up going for an hour, and when it ended, all of the men simply filed out of the mosque. Where had they come from, and where were they going? I had spent every waking moment at this mosque lately, so how did I not see that coming?

The Shaykh was waiting downstairs, so we headed down to Islamic Circle. We did *wudu* and went in and took our places on the floor. The Shaykh waited patiently and then sat for a moment in silence. “What just happened up there; in this Mosque is a deep, deep shame. I am ashamed of myself. I am ashamed of Muslims today. *We* are to blame for the attacks of Thursday. We, as Muslims, have not done everything we can do to stop this. That was not jihad – that was *terrorism*. On Thursday, British Muslims killed British Muslims. They killed Muslims in a Muslim neighborhood. The reason we have
police outside is good. People are afraid because terrorists are Muslims. If we cannot show each other Islam, how can we show others?”

The Shaykh went on with the Circle, and spoke of the group of 250-300 men who just held a radical sermon in his mosque. He spoke of a need for all Muslims to exert themselves against terrorists and fear, to do jihad. As he spoke of the 250-300 strangers who were just in his mosque preaching radicalism, we sat and listened to him, all 23 of us.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CURRENT METHODS OF RECRUITMENT
Jihadi Case Studies, Recruiting Grounds, and Islamist Da’wa

The London Bombers

Mohammad Sidique Kahn’s martyrdom video was aired on the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera network on September 1, 2005. The fifteen-minute video was accompanied by a second video in which Ayman al-Zawahiri praised the London bombings and credited the martyrs with maintaining the momentum of attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., Madrid, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine; an additional martyrdom video by Shehzad Tanweer, which aired on Al-Jazeera on September 19, 2005, also featured Ayman al-Zawahiri, claiming that Khan and Tanweer had traveled to meet members of Qaeda al-Jihad in Afghanistan, seeking out opportunities for martyrdom operations.21

21 Electronic versions of each video can be found online using ‘Khan + martyr + video’ or ‘Tanweer + martyr + video’ or similar search terms. Specific Web addresses are of limited value, as copies of the videos are frequently taken down once they are discovered or widely viewed. At the time of this writing, a partial copy of Khan’s video, as well as an accompanying blog can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQU740rlCzY&mode=related&search=; Tanweer’s video can be found on the popular ‘YouTube’ website at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjsnG20DDPg&mode=related&search=; both videos were posted as recently as February 3, 2007. The host of these videos, known as ‘saqib7863’ hosts five other videos related to radical Islam, including one of a jihadist training camp. Saqib7863 has several ‘subscribers’ whom favor his videos. A brief browsing session of saqib7863’s YouTube network and the videos hosted by its members illustrates how ‘honey pot’ sites draw in new browsers, and glorify martyrdom and radical ideologies.
Mohammad Sidique Kahn, Cell Leader – Edgware Road Suicide Bomber.

On July 7, 2005, 30-year-old Mohammad Sidique “Sid” Kahn was a husband, father, and the leader of the group known since that day as ‘the London bombers.’ Born in Leeds in West Yorkshire, England in October 1974, Khan was raised by moderate Pakistani immigrant parents. Khan was described as a quiet, studious, and respectful child by his peers, who never got into trouble, despite being bullied in his early school years. Between 1996 and 2001, Kahn studied business at Leeds Metropolitan University, where he met a British Muslim woman of Indian origin, whom he married in October 2001 despite family disapproval (House of Commons 2006:13). Upon graduating from university, Khan took a position as an assistant teacher at a Leeds primary school working with special needs students. Kahn quickly developed a strong rapport with students, parents, and fellow teachers, and was viewed as an ideal role model who was known to speak out against the September 11th attacks to his students (BBC 2006).

Until 2001, peers did not describe Kahn as particularly religious; however, in 2001, shortly after taking his position at Hillside Primary School, Kahn became known for regularly praying at work and attending various local mosques on Fridays. He also became very active at several community venues in Beeston, such as mosques, youth clubs, gymnasiums, and a local bookshop. Between 2001 and 2004, Kahn gained a reputation for being a passionate speaker on Islam and a natural leader who attracted impressionable young Muslims. At a gym referred to by some locals as “the al-Qaeda gym,” Kahn frequently gave talks on topics ranging from healthy living to avoiding criminal activity (House of Commons 2006:16). The Beeston Islamic bookshop that Kahn frequented (which was shut down following the London bombings) was reportedly
“used [by local Muslim youth] to watch extremist DVDs and videos, access extremist websites, and for extremist lectures” (House of Commons 2006:16).

Shehzad Tanweer – Aldgate Suicide Bomber

As early as 2001, Kahn came into contact with a childhood acquaintance named Shehzad Tanweer, who was attending several of the same Leeds Muslim community venues. Tanweer, born in December 1982, grew up in the Beeston area of Leeds. While Beeston is known as a lower socioeconomic neighborhood, Tanweer’s family enjoyed greater than average wealth, as Tanweer’s father was a successful businessman. Growing up, Tanweer enjoyed many privileges afforded by his father’s work. Tanweer preferred to dress in designer clothing, drove a Mercedes, and excelled in sports and martial arts. At 16, Tanweer began to practice Islam with greater interest. (BBC 2005a; House of Commons 2006:15) Like Kahn, Tanweer attended Leeds Metropolitan University where he studied sports science from 2001 until 2003. After leaving university early in 2003, Pakistani records indicate that Tanweer passed through Pakistan’s border (BBC 2005a), though little is known of the circumstances surrounding this occurrence.

Kahn and Tanweer quickly became friends, and were often seen together at local gyms, mosques, youth clubs, and the Beeston Islamic bookshop (BBC 2006c; BBC 2006d; House of Commons 2006). By the time Kahn and Tanweer attended a Beeston area youth club camping trip in April 2003, Kahn’s reputation and access to local Muslim youth had been firmly established. The camping trip, which was one of many outdoor youth club activities Kahn participated in, is thought to have been used by recruiters for

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22 According to the House of Commons report, 10,000 of Beeston’s 16,300 residents experience living conditions represented amongst the lowest 3% of Britain’s national population (2006:13).
identifying individuals for recruitment operations – “camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing, and other outward bound type activities are of particular interest because they appear common factors for 7 July bombers and other cells disrupted previously and since” (House of Commons 2006:17).

The Recruit Becomes the Recruiter

Three months after attending the camping trip, in July of 2003, Kahn traveled to a remote area along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border for a period of two weeks, where he is suspected of having made initial al-Qaeda contacts, received limited training, and had been encourage to begin recruiting Muslim youth for martyrdom operations (House of Commons 2006:20; Intelligence and Security Committee 2006:12). According to British authorities, by late 2003, Khan and Tanweer had become persons of interest in other investigations of suspected radical Islamic activities within Britain; however, they were low-priority leads and were not followed up on (Intelligence and Security Committee 2006:14).

Hasib Mir Hussain – #30 Bus Suicide Bomber

Through Tanweer, Kahn met a young student named Hasib Mir Hussain. Like Kahn and Tanweer, Hussain, born in 1986, was the son of Pakistani immigrant parents. While growing up, Hussain struggled as a student and enjoyed sports. Hussain stood out from his peers due to his large build, and was reported to start fights in secondary school (BBC 2005a). In 2001, Hussain frequented Beeston area gyms with his friend Shehzad Tanweer. After being introduced to Kahn, Hussain began attending youth clubs and the
Beeston Islamic bookshop. In 2002, Hussain went on a *hajj* to Mecca with his family, and returned with a fervent religious mindset, adopting traditional dress, growing a beard, and praying regularly.

Before dropping out of school in 2003, Hussain had been noticed carrying his religious education notebook on which he had written ‘al-Qaeda No Limits’ and openly supported al-Qaeda, referring to the 9/11 hijackers as martyrs (BBC 2006b; House of Commons 2006:15). In 2003, Hussain traveled to Pakistan to visit family and returned to Leeds with a new interest in physical fitness and weight loss (BBC 2005a; House of Commons 2006:15).

**Germaine “Jamal” Lindsay – King’s Cross Suicide Bomber**

Germaine Lindsay was born in Jamaica in September 1985. Unlike the three bombers who were British-born Muslims from intact Pakistani families, Lindsay had immigrated to England with his Jamaican mother. Throughout his life, Lindsay experienced a turbulent family environment. His father had remained in Jamaica, and his stepfathers were either abusive or abandoned his mother. Despite these difficulties, Lindsay was a successful student and athlete, as well as a gifted artist and musician (House of Commons 2006:17).

In 2000, Lindsay’s mother reverted to Islam, and he soon followed, taking the name ‘Jamal.’ Shortly after becoming a Muslim, Lindsay began attending al-Madina Masjid Mosque in Leeds, which was frequented by Mohammad Sidique Kahn and Shehzad Tanweer. At the mosque, Lindsay came into contact with Shaykh Abdallah al-Faisal, a Saudi-trained Wahhabi imam at Brixton Mosque; Abdallah al-Faisal was known
for his radical khutbahs, and close ties to Abu Hamza at Finsbury Park Mosque. Al-Faisal, also Jamaican-born, gave a number of extremist khutbahs at al-Madina Masjid Mosque, which had an especially strong impact on Lindsay (House of Commons 2006:18). Shortly after reverting to Islam in 2000, Lindsay was disciplined at school for distributing leaflets in support of al-Qaeda; at mosque, however, he was highly regarded for his ability to quickly learn Arabic, his ability to recite long passages from the Qur’an, and the serious manner in which he approached his faith (House of Commons 2006:18).

Lindsay, who had always been close to his mother, was taken off guard in 2002 when she left for the U.S. in order to live with another man (BBC 2006a). Left alone in their Huddersfield home, Lindsay soon dropped out of school, became reliant on state benefits, and took on a number of odd jobs (BBC 2005a; BBC 2006a; House of Commons 2006:18). Shortly after, Lindsay encountered a young woman online, whom he met at a ‘Stop the War’ rally, and married the same year. Lindsay appears to have met Kahn and Tanweer in the later part of 2004 (BBC 2006a; Intelligence and Security Committee 2006; House of Commons 2006).

The Recruits Become a Cell

By the fall of 2004, Kahn, Tanweer, Hussain, and Lindsay had formed a close-knit group that was centered on Leeds area mosques, youth clubs, gyms, and the Beeston Islamic bookshop. Members of the group were often seen together, and each member became increasingly devout in their religious practices.

By November 2004, Kahn had become complacent at work and was let go due to an unexplained extended absence. Just prior to November 19, 2004, Kahn and Tanweer
told their families that they were going to Pakistan in search of suitable *madrasas* to continue their studies of Islam (BBC 2005a; House of Commons 2006). Tanweer’s parents provided him with money for travel and living expenses, trusting that Kahn would be a reliable travel companion. Evidence suggests that Khan believed that once inside Pakistan, he would be sent to Afghanistan in order to fight (House of Commons 2006:20).

After arriving in Pakistan, Kahn left Tanweer at an uncle’s home, and traveled on his own to parts unknown. One week later, he returned and told Tanweer’s family that the two would be going to a *madrasa* near Lahore (House of Commons 2006:20). However, statements made by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the al-Qaeda video accompanying Tanweer’s martyrdom video suggest that the two traveled to Afghanistan where they were greeted by handlers with whom Kahn had made prior arrangements, possibly as early as his July 2003 trip. Currently, there are no available records of Khan and Tanweer’s movements between late November 2004 and February 2005. It is during this period, though, that the two are believed to have attended al-Qaeda sponsored training, as well as having planned their upcoming London attack – to include finalizing Kahn’s selection of participants (Hussain and Lindsay). The martyrdom videos, aired in September 2005 on *al-Jazeera*, appear to have been filmed sometime during this three-month period. The early filming of these videos indicates not only the advanced planning involved in the London bombings (which were low in cost and technical

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23 The martyrdom videos of Mohammad Sidique Kahn and Shehzad Tanweer both contain logos and trademarks consistent with *as-Sahab*, a production company that is responsible for publicizing numerous al-Qaeda messages. Each video demonstrates the same characteristics of accompanying tapes, which feature Ayman al-Zawahiri and Azzam al-Amriki (“Azzam the American”) – the Californian son of a goat farmer, formerly named Adam Gadahn, praising the 7 July attacks.
complexity), but also suggests a certain commitment on the parts of Kahn and Tanweer. Had they wished to withdraw their bids as *shaheeds*, handlers could easily have used the tapes, as documented involvement with al-Qaeda, as compelling tools. Kahn and Tanweer returned to Britain on February 8, 2005. Tanweer was noted to have lost a considerable amount of weight and stated that he “had not been well and had not found a suitable school” (House of Commons 2006:20).

Leading up to July 7th, each of the four bombers began to prepare for the attacks. Each used personal or family funds, lines of credit, bad checks, and tradable commodities to fund the operation. Authorities believe that the entire operation, including Kahn and Tanweer’s travels in Southwest Asia, bomb-making materials, an apartment referred to as “the bomb factory,” and local transportation costs, was funded by the bombers without the aid of al-Qaeda or external sources of income. Costs for the operation did not exceed 8,000 GBP (approximately $16,000) (House of Commons 2006:23).

**The Impending Attacks**

Between February 2005 and July 7, 2005, only 19-year-old Germaine Lindsay exhibited irregular behavior as he shaved his beard, donned Western clothing, began flirting with women, and became easily irritated. Lindsay splurged on toys for his young child, and spent most of his time at home on his computer. Just prior to 7 July, Lindsay’s wife discovered he was having an affair and kicked him out of their house with a bag of clothing (House of Commons 2006:24-25).

Hasib Mir Hussain and Shehzad Tanweer, both living with their parents, each left for their mission late on 6 July after spending seemingly normal days with their families.
18-year-old Hasib slept-in and ate cereal before “just visiting friends” in London (BBC 2006b). His mother packed him some sandwiches to take along on his journey. 22-year-old Shehzad played cricket in a nearby park until 11 p.m. He told his mother he was going to Manchester to visit an Islamic school, so she packed him a bag full of clothing.

30-year-old Khan, the eldest group member, cell recruiter, operation organizer, and soon-to-be Edgware Tube station bomber, met with Tanweer and Hussain that night for the drive to Luton station. Lindsay met his three brothers at 6:49 a.m., and the four strapped on backpacks before entering the station to catch the 7:40 a.m. train to London’s King’s Cross station. At 8:30 a.m., the four were seen euphorically hugging at King’s Cross Tube station – observers assume that they were headed on a camping trip, due to their heavy looking backpacks, casual clothing, and relaxed demeanor (House of Commons 2006:4).

Exactly twenty minutes after their embrace, at 8:50 a.m., Mohammad Sidique Kahn detonated his pack under Edgware Road, killing seven and wounding 163 commuters; Shehzad Tanweer detonated his pack near Aldgate station, killing eight and wounding 171; and Germaine Lindsay detonated his pack between King’s Cross and Russell Square, killing 27 and wounding 340 (House of Commons 2006:5). 57 minutes later, aboard the #30 bus at Tavistock Square, Hasib Mir Husayn joined his brothers in martyrdom, taking 13 civilians with him and wounding over 110 more.
I am going to keep this short and to the point, because it's all been said before by far more eloquent people than me. But our words have no impact upon you, therefore I'm going to talk to you in a language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood.

I'm sure by now the media has painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on it to suit the government and to scare the masses into conforming to their power and wealth-obsessed agendas. I, and thousands like me, are forsaking everything for what we believe.

Our driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam, obedience to the one true God, Allah, and follow in the footsteps of the final Prophet and messenger Muhammad… This is how our ethical stances are dictated.

Your democratically elected governments perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world and your support of them makes you responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

Until we feel security, you'll be our targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you, too, will taste the reality of this situation.

Jihad is an obligation on every single one of us, man or woman, and by staying at home you’re turning your backs on jihad, which is a major sin… If you have any doubts or reservations about this… I strongly suggest that you research the… check the Islamic history – the books are very widely available. Go to the classical scholars, see what sort of lives they led, and then go to your so-called knowledgeable people and ask them why they are hiding this knowledge from us…

Muslims around the world, I strongly advise you to sacrifice this life for the hereafter, save yourselves from the fiery atonement, come back to your religion and bring back your honor. You’re not safe, not in the East or the West, and you’ll never have peace until Allah’s Sharia reigns supreme over these lands…

I myself, I make du’a to Allah… to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s heroes like our beloved Shaykh Usama bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all of the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the… of this cause.

With this, I leave you to make up your own minds, and I ask you to make du’a to Allah Almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers, and enter us into the garden of Paradise.

[Mohammad Sidique Kahn 2005]
John Walker Lindh’s Path to Jihad

Named after the Beatle John Lennon, John Walker Lindh was born in 1981 in Washington D.C. to an Irish Catholic father and a Buddhist mother. Frank Lindh worked for the U.S. Department of Justice while attending law school. In 1991, the Lindh family moved to wealthy Marin County, California, where Lindh was home schooled before attending a private alternative school where he was described as a good student with interests in hip hop music, the Internet, and basketball. At the age of twelve, Lindh watched the Spike Lee film Malcolm X, and soon gave up surfing hip hop and rap sites on the Internet for sites about Islam (CNN 2001; BBC 2002; U.S. DoJ 2002).

In 1997, Lindh reverted to Islam. In 1998, his parents decided to separate, and John Walker Lindh asked his parents for money to travel to Yemen in order to study a “pure” dialect of Arabic (BBC 2002). After one year in Yemen, Lindh returned home to California, and began attending a mosque in Mill Valley, taking on the aliases ‘Suleyman al-Faris’ and ‘Suleyman al-Lindh.’ A female Muslim at the same mosque suggested that Lindh became involved with radical-leaning Muslims, adding, "It's my observation that new Muslims are influenced by the people around them. Whoever they lean on for their Islamic advice and for their Islamic questions, they will be influenced by these people," (CNN 2001). Dissatisfied with life in the U.S., Lindh returned to Yemen in early 2000 to study Islam.

Abdul Hamid – Lindh’s Indoctrination

Lindh’s father recalled that following al-Qaeda’s October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, Lindh wrote in an email that the attack on the Cole was justified, as the
presence of the ship in a Yemen port was an act of war against Islam. Lindh’s father feared that Lindh was becoming “brainwashed” (BBC 2002).

In February 2001, Lindh was encouraged to attend a madrasa in Bannau, Pakistan, along the Northwest Frontier. At the madrasa, Lindh was recruited into the Kashmiri militant group, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM or HuM)\(^{24}\), which he joined on May 1, 2001. During his initial 24-day paramilitary training, Lindh was trained in propaganda speaking, shoulder-fired weapons, and “special missions” training (U.S. DoJ 2002). During his training, Lindh began reading texts about the Taliban and its struggle against the Northern Alliance and decided to join the Taliban, later stating that he joined in order “to help the Islamic government… because the Taliban are the only government that actually provides Islamic law” (BBC 2002). Declining a HUM assignment in Kashmir, Lindh was directed to Kabul in May 2001.

Lindh’s HUM handlers instructed Lindh to identify himself as an Irishman, and referred him to Dar al-Anan Headquarters for the Afghan Mujahideen. During his initial screening, which included numerous interviews and preliminary tests, recruiters determined that Lindh possessed no specialized skills beyond his limited HUM training, and was unable to speak Urdu, Pashto, or Dari. As a result, Lindh was informed that he would be sent to al-Qaeda’s al-Farooq camp for Arab fighters for an additional seven weeks of paramilitary training. Lindh accepted the assignment, and was sent to one of Usama bin Laden’s quest houses in Kandahar (U.S. DoJ 2002; Thompson 2004).

\(^{24}\) Harakat ul-Mujahideen is responsible for numerous kidnappings and murders of Western travelers and Indian nationals, as well as the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814, and at least one assassination attempt on Pervez Musharraf.
Lindh arrived at *al-Farooq* around June 1, 2001 with nearly one hundred other trainees, which were divided into groups of 15 to 20 individuals, and immediately began a seven-week course of training. Training was divided into several blocks of instruction, including various shoulder-fired weapons and pistols (three weeks); orienteering, navigation, and hand to hand combat (one week); battlefield tactics and terrorist attack methods (one week); and explosives, including rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) such as Molotov cocktail bombs (one week) (CNN 2001; U.S. DoJ 2002). Included in Lindh’s *al-Farooq* class were seven other Americans training for al-Qaeda operations (Thompson 2004:122).

During Lindh’s training, he took on the alias ‘Abdul Hamid.’ During June and July 2001, Usama bin Laden visited *al-Farooq* on as many as five occasions, during which he gave lectures on “the local situation, political issues, old Afghan/Soviet battles, etc.” (U.S DoJ 2002). On one occasion, as he had done with Ziad Jarrah, Usama bin Laden personally met with Lindh and thanked him for his efforts in the cause. According to some reports, an instructor informed Lindh that bin Laden was organizing twenty attacks in the U.S. and invited Lindh to participate. Five of the twenty attacks would take place in September 2001 (four of the 9/11 hijackings, plus one that was never achieved), with an additional fifteen to be staged following the initial attacks (Thompson 2004:122).

Nearing completion of his training, Lindh was offered several options: he could remain at *al-Farooq* for advanced training in artillery, explosives, poisons, intelligence, and terror tactics (U.S. DoJ 2002); he could travel to the frontlines within Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance; or he could travel abroad to do *jihad* against *al-Adou al-
Lindh, eager to get into the fight and hesitant to directly participate in attacks on the U.S., chose to be assigned to the frontlines with thirty of his new compatriots. In July, with less than two months until the planned September 11th attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., Lindh was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and ammunition, and deployed with the mujahideen to Takhar.

**The “Green Diaper” Recruit**

Hatred develops like a drug addiction. First, you throw a stone. Then you throw a Molotov cocktail. Then you toss a bomb on top of a bank. I know… Hatred of Jews was my education, what I was taught each day by teachers and parents and the entire community. I knew nothing else, so I believed it was a righteous thing to grow up and kill Jews.

[Shoebat 2005:13]

Born in Bethlehem in 1960, Walid Shoebat was the grandson of the Beit Sahour Mukhtar (chieftain), who was a close associate of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and martyred Palestinian revolutionary leader Abdul Qader al-Husseini (Shoebat 2005:42). Shoebat, whose father was a Muslim teacher and mother was an American-born Christian, was raised in a deeply anti-Semitic household. As a young boy, Shoebat witnessed the Six-Day War (1967), the Jordanian Black September (1970), and the Yom Kippur War (1973) and recalls numerous occasions in his formal education when he and other Palestinian youths were taught about Nazism and Zionists.

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25 *Al-Adou al-Qareeb* means ‘the near enemy’ as opposed to *al-Adou al-Baeed*, ‘the distant enemy.’ In Lindh’s case, *al-Adou al-Qareeb* was in reference to the Northern Alliance and any other invading or disruptive opposing forces within Afghanistan. *Al-Adou al-Baeed* referred to American and Israeli targets, as well as any other strategic targets outside of Southwest Asia selected by al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden, or affiliated terror groups.
Shoebat’s first lesson in the Qur’an, took place during an early school fieldtrip to the Jerusalem Zoo. According to Shoebat, the teacher (Shoebat’s uncle) tossed a cigarette butt into a gorilla’s cage, which immediately began smoking the cigarette. When students asked how the gorilla picked up the habit, the teacher replied that the “monkey was a descendant of the Jew, ‘sons of the detestable apes’” (2005:33). On another occasion, an Islamic studies teacher instructed his class that raping Jewish women was permissible according to verses in the Qur’an (Suwar 4.20; 33.50\textsuperscript{26}), as they should be considered as captive slaves, subject to their masters’ demands (2004:32).

Shoebat became active in a high school youth organization that constructed fliers and organized demonstrations. At a riot, he and another boy used sticks with nails in them in an attempt to beat an Israeli soldier to death. The soldier escaped with severe head wounds, but Shoebat was arrested and thrown in prison. While in his cell, 15 year-old Shoebat listened to the sounds of Israeli soldiers torturing another inmate by breaking his legs with clubs (Shoebat 2005:28). After his release, 16 year-old Shoebat and others attempted to kill a Jewish truck driver and his wife for accidentally running over a Palestinian girl who was crossing the street. Despite the fact that the driver was trying to call for help for the young girl, Shoebat and others broke out the driver’s window and pelted him with stones (2005:16).

By the time Shoebat was approached by his own PLO-backed Fatah recruiter, he was primed for the ‘pitch.’ A well-known bomb maker from Jerusalem simply had to meet with Shoebat, provide him with a device disguised as a loaf of bread, and tell him what building to detonate it in – the Bethlehem branch of the Bank of Leumi:

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\textsuperscript{26} Suwar is the plural for Surah (or Surat), which refers to the 114 individual chapters contained within the Qur’an.
I went to the bus station and took the bus to Bethlehem, fully ready to give my life if I had to. My hand was ready to pitch the bomb forward when I saw some Palestinian children walking near the bank. Instead, I threw the bomb on the bank’s rooftop… I was only sixteen years old. I wondered if anyone were killed… I didn’t enjoy what I had done, but I felt compelled to do it because it was my duty. I felt I had to be a martyr, to kill Jews in order to go to heaven and meet the 72 virgins.

[Shoebat 2005:15-16]

Impressed with Shoebat’s devotion to the cause, the PLO recruited him in 1978 to travel to the U.S. in order to raise funds for the organization and recruit college students to fight in Lebanon. At Loop College (now Harold Washington College), Shoebat met Shaykh Jamal Sa’id.27 According to Shoebat, Sa’id ran a boot camp for Shoebat and others to train for jihad. Training in a basement, Shoebat and the other recruits were frequently woken up by Sa’id late at night “for vigorous training, martial arts, and chanting [slogans of] hate and indoctrination” (2005:30).

Shoebat suggests that college campuses were major recruiting grounds for Islamist groups at the time. Shoebat and others attended classes for cover, but spent the majority of their time organizing activism events, raising funds, or recruiting candidates for jihad. In many cases, the operatives started relationships with American women in order to obtain green cards, which would allow them to continue their operations without

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27 Jordanian-born Shaykh Jamal Sa’id is currently the imam at Chicago’s Bridgeview Mosque, which has been involved in several investigations. *According to Shoebat, Sa’id was connected to “Mustafa Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor” (2005:29). Mustafa Azzam’s son, Shaykh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, was Usama bin Laden’s mentor and partner in *Maktab al-Khidamat* during the Soviet-Afghan War. Shoebat may have been confused in this matter. Shoebat has come under much criticism for his writings and extensive public speaking, which many claim are “anti-Muslim.” After reading the Bible in 1993, Shoebat converted to Christianity. Some claim that he is now just as radical a Christian as he was a Muslim.
interruption. Shoebat asserts that the types of operations he participated in during his time as a PLO recruiter still occur today:

Tougher screening of people entering the country will solve part of the problem. But it is not difficult for extremists already here to explain Islam in a completely untruthful fashion to the unquestioning moderates and win them over by the droves. It’s a kind of mental indoctrination button that can turn moderates into extremist robots, ready to carry out instructions… At campus events, they will speak of peace in English and talk about infiltration in Arabic.

[Shoebat 2005:30]

Recruitment Grounds

It may not be difficult to imagine how some young men and women, raised in a society of risk and violence, can be recruited as easily as Shoebat. However, Lindh, Khan, Tanweer, Hussain, and Lindsay were not exposed to the same day-to-day violence as young Palestinian mujahids – quite the contrary. From Riverside, California to London, England and Sydney, Australia, cases very different from those in the West Bank, Kashmir, Kabul or Peshawar are presenting themselves with an increasing frequency. Ambitious Islamist groups seeking to engage al-Adou al-Baeed do not necessarily need to recruit individuals with histories of violence, acculturated to hate, and willing to go abroad to do jihad. The real challenge for recruiters is in impressing upon candidates their obligations to do jihad, and selecting or creating a suitable social environment in which to make their appeal, wherever that may be.

James J.F. Forest points out that recruitment activities can occur “virtually anywhere that people gather – either physically or online” (2006[1]:5). NYPD intelligence analyst, Madeline Gruen, suggests that internationally coordinated watch lists, biometric screening measures, and better systems to detect fraudulent documents have resulted in recruiters utilizing adaptive methods gaining access to potential
candidates (Gruen 2006:11-12). *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (HT or HuT), *al-Muhajiroun*, and *al-Muntada al-Islami* are just a few of the many currently operating organizations that promote radicalism, dedicating substantial resources to recruiting individuals around the world – particularly in the U.S. and Britain – to carry out terrorist operations. HT is, perhaps, the most well-organized and far-reaching group of its kind.

**The Terror Recruit Casting Agency – Hizb ut-Tahrir**

Founded in 1953 by the appeals court judge and grandson of a prominent Ottoman era Islamic scholar, Shaykh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (Party of Liberation), now headquartered in Britain, focuses on re-establishing the Caliphate and ensuring all Muslims live in Muslim states governed by *Sharia* (Phillips 2006:7; Forest et al. 2006). Rather than directly applying violence, HT members contribute to the cause through non-violent political and social methods; however, HT has a profound ability to produce radicalized offspring who are willing to use violence to achieve Islamist objectives. Answering Sayyid Qutb’s call for a vanguard to lead the world from *Jahiliyyah*, HT leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood use literature posted on the Internet to cultivate “a fifth column that may be called upon to fight the United States from within” (Gruen 2006:13).

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28 *Hizb ut-Tahrir*’s website can be viewed in English at [http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/](http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/). The website includes the history and mission statements of the organization, as well as a hosted discussion forum. Discussion topics include U.S. military body armor specifications, Islamist struggles in Europe, and reminders that “Peace with Israel is Haram.”
“The Dark Cloud on the Horizon” – The Internet as a Gateway to Terror

The turning point, perhaps, was when I moved in with my grandparents here in Santa Ana, the county seat of Orange, California. My grandmother, a computer whiz, is hooked up to America Online and I have been scooting the information superhighway since January. But when I moved in, with the intent of finding a job (easier said then done), I began to visit religious folders on AOL and the Usenet newsgroups, where I found discussions on Islam to be the most intriguing. You see, I discovered that the beliefs and practices of this religion fit my personal theology and intellect as well as basic human logic.

[Azzam al-Amriki, October 2004 (Weimann 2006:57)]

In 1995, at 17 years old, Adam Gadahn, AKA “Azzam al-Amriki,” who was raised on a goat farm in Riverside, California, enjoyed watching television, and listening to music, began surfing the Internet in search of Islam (Weimann 2006:57). Like John Walker Lindh, Gadahn was guided to sites and discussion groups that promoted Islamist principles, Sayyid Qutb’s urgent call for a vanguard to defend the Muslim world from Jahiliyyah, and the legitimacy of violence in that pursuit. Twelve years later, Adam Yahiye Gadahn (Azzam al-Amriki) is ranked as the FBI’s second most wanted terrorist, second only to Usama bin Laden, and three positions ahead of Ayman al-Zawahiri (http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/fugitives.htm). Gadahn is wanted for treason and providing aid, comfort, and services to al-Qaeda, and has been repeatedly seen on al-Qaeda videos, including the video accompanying Shehzad Tanweer’s 2005 martyrdom video.

Marc Sageman points out previous methods applied by Iran, al-Qaeda, and groups in Algeria and Bosnia by which audio and videocassettes were utilized to “spread the myth and promise of jihad to alienated young Muslims in search of a mission” (2004:160). Numerous tapes feature the calm and articulate Usama bin Laden or well
known Salafist scholars who glamorize military training in Afghanistan and advocate jihad as a requirement for becoming a good Muslim. In many cases, copies of these cassettes continue to be found in the apartments of martyrs or mujahideen investigated by law-enforcement officials (Sageman 2004:160).

With today’s electronic communications gateways, terror group recruiters have adopted more sophisticated, farther-reaching methods to distribute these messages. Between 1997 and 2004, the number of websites owned and managed by terror groups increased by 571 percent (Kumler 2004). Online communities, seen as egalitarian, anonymous, and full of information and opportunity, can provide socially, politically, or religiously isolated individuals with an opportunity to find others with similar views. These individuals, seeking others to connect with through commonalities, are likely to spend greater amounts of time in the virtual world at the expense of interacting with their immediate social environments (Sageman 2004:161). Sageman suggests that disconnecting from one’s immediate social world and investing greater amounts of time in the virtual world promotes a global outlook: “The virtual community is no longer tied to any nation, a condition that corresponds to the mythical [Ummah] of Salafism, which specifically rejects nationalism and fosters the global Salafi jihad priority of fighting against the ‘far enemy’ rather than the ‘near enemy’” (2004:161).
Terrorists in Your Home – The Online Recruitment Process

The Internet has become the new Afghanistan for terrorist training, recruitment, and fundraising… Terrorist groups are exploiting the accessibility, vast audience, and anonymity of the Internet to raise money and recruit new members. Al-Qaeda doesn’t operate like a terrorist organization anymore… They don’t live together, they don’t train together, sometimes they don’t even meet… They don’t need human interaction as long as they can communicate.

[Gabriel Weimann (Kumler 2004)]

Just as recruiters at mosques monitor the attendance rates of Muslims in order to target the most impressionable and devout candidates, website administrators, moderators, and browsers are able to monitor the participation and interests of website visitors. According to Gruen, radical Islamic terror groups focus the greatest amount of recruitment efforts on males between the ages of 16 and 22, which represent the largest demographic population on the Internet in the West (10.5 million in the U.S. alone), who spend, on an average, 32 hours per month on the Web (2006:13). Recruiting individuals on the Internet presents certain security risks; however, it carries certain benefits as well.

Potential candidates found online differ from previous generations and demographic groups of mujahideen. For instance, online candidates must have access to a computer and know how to use it. Individuals in the poorest corners of the developing world generally do not enjoy the same access to the Internet and computers that individuals in higher socioeconomic classes and regions do. Individuals with greater access to personal computers are also more likely to possess higher levels of education (Sageman 2004:162). Additionally, the most common language on the Internet is English, requiring the most productive terror group members to be proficient in the
language (Sageman 2004:163). With these considerations in mind, HT recruiters utilize
the Internet as an early screening method for identifying the most desirable candidates.

In order to successfully develop a candidate, the recruiter must overcome a
particularly difficult challenge – in cases within the U.S., for example, the recruiter must
convince the candidate to set aside the benefits of “separation of the church and state,
equality of the sexes, and the rewards associated with life in a meritocracy” (Gruen
2006:13). The recruit must discard these privileges, and accept the charge of establishing
a Caliphate and overthrowing secular apostate governments and replacing them with
Islamic governments that will impose strict interpretations of Sharia.

Targeting websites that host music downloads, video gaming, and chat rooms, HT
recruiters apply a number of methods to identify potential recruits. By building attractive
‘honey pot sites,’ which host popular culture topics such as gaming or music downloads,
or by posting comments in existing online forums and chat rooms (‘trolling’ in user
terms), HT recruiters attempt to engage, identify, and isolate individuals whom they
consider susceptible to radicalism – ideally, those who feel “disaffected or marginalized”
(Gruen 2006:13-18). Once individuals have been selected for development, recruiters
must cautiously draw them in without coming off as too extreme, which might result in
unwanted attention or repelling the candidate. Through a gradual process, recruiters
utilize the Internet’s 24/7-access to the candidate in order to create a virtual version of
Goffman’s ‘total situation.’ As a recruit spends more time online visiting HT-run sites or
sites with HT recruiters trolling, they are increasingly exposed to radical literature and
friendly chat through personal messages (PMs), instant messages (IMs), or emails – all
the while disconnecting from their immediate environment.
HT and other recruitment groups utilize the same marketing techniques that are used by commercial enterprises, which “capture” information about site visitors in order to market directly to those who seem most interested in site content (Weimann 2006:60; Zanini and Edwards 2001). Based on comments made in forums, users’ profiles, histories, ‘friends’ networks, or chat room activity, recruiters are able to determine well-known persons or sources of information that are respected by the recruit. Using this information, recruiters provide or create testimonials from those well-known figures that will have a compelling effect on the recruit; testimonials from other members on the board are used, as well, to manipulate the recruit into believing they have been marginalized by Western systems (Gruen 2006:14-15).

Islamist ideology is conveyed through simplifying Islam for the interested candidate. Sageman suggests that broad access to the Internet has a tendency to reduce the complexity of discourse to the lowest common denominator of the group. As most targeted users are new Muslims or non-Muslims, they are not prepared to challenge the validity of assertions made by HT authority figures. Simplistic Islamist lessons provided by recruiters are based in the original cultural contexts of the Qur’an and hadith, and discount fourteen centuries of critical thought by Islamic scholars (Sageman 2004:162). If recruits are effectively engaged, seem receptive to Islamist principles, and their participation continues, they will eventually be “overwhelmed with literature that threatens grave consequences for not following the extremist’s objectives. Finally, the target is bombarded with material that forces him to question his beliefs and persuades him that the radical’s way of life is better for him and his loved ones” (Gruen 2006:14).
If the recruit demonstrates acceptance of these materials, the recruiter will direct them to other HT-affiliated websites\textsuperscript{29} that provide increasingly radical texts and guidance, and refer them to an authority figure who will act as a mentor and handler for the remainder of the recruitment process. Materials, such as HT-produced literature, extremist videos, manuals, and hyperlinks to websites addressing certain tasks, will be provided online. In many cases, these will include hyperlinks to websites celebrating martyrs, glorifying jihad, and sites dedicated to developing desirable skills. For example, al-Qaeda’s online publication, \textit{al-Battar} (“The Sword), serves as an online training camp for members in the global Salafist movement. The ninth edition of \textit{al-Battar} was dedicated to training jihadists in conducting kidnapping operations – including skill development in selecting targets, surveillance, negotiating, directions for conducting proper beheadings, and instructions for posting videos of those beheadings on the Internet (Kumler 2004; Weimann 2006).

Not all recruitment cases on the Internet result in formal group indoctrinations. A developed candidate might only be encouraged to do jihad and given support through exposure to ‘how to’ or ‘do it yourself’ (DIY) resources. Instructional videos and websites available on the Internet go far beyond kidnapping procedures, to include sites with detailed directions in assassinations, explosives, making and delivering poisons by mail, firearms, and creating electronic viruses. However, many of these lessons are provided solely as virtual guides for ‘lone wolf’ types of operations. If a recruit is to become truly indoctrinated into a terror group, his recruitment process will only have begun in Internet chat rooms.

\textsuperscript{29} Examples of websites that promote HT ideals include, but are not limited to \url{www.hizbuttahrir.org}, \url{www.risalah.org}, \url{www.hizb.org.uk}, and \url{http://www.khilafat.org}.
*Hip-Hop Recruiters – Popular Culture as a Gateway for Recruitment*

In addition to Internet recruiting grounds, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and similar recruitment organizations utilize other popular culture venues for appealing to the masses that frequent them. Sayyid Qutb’s ideology stemmed, in part, from his exposure to and extreme distaste for American cultural norms. Among the most abhorrent scenes witnessed by Qutb was the Greeley, Colorado college dance hall gathering, during which male and female students danced, embraced, and kissed to popular tunes of the day. Qutb was not the only Muslim opposed to these profane displays; many contemporary, mainstream Muslims avoid music due to traditional beliefs. During my fieldwork, several Muslim Londoners spoke out against the Live 8 benefit concerts of July 2, 2005, which were conducted in each of the G8 countries in order to raise political awareness of global human rights and poverty crises. Usama bin Laden was known to require his television speakers to be muted in order to avoid being exposed to incidental bits of music (Bergen 2006).

Despite a deep-seated aversion to such elements of popular Western culture, HT recruiters recognize that music represents one of their greatest points of access to impressionable youths. “In the United States, the type of music young people listen to is often their medium for self-expression; the lyrics put their feelings into words and validate their developing worldviews” (Gruen 2006:16). Utilizing Internet websites, university campuses, or music venues, HT supports or produces bands whose instrumental melodies are similar to those of popular hip-hop or rap bands. Lyrics are written and performed simply so they can be easily memorized and repeated, subtly driving Islamist appeals into the minds of listeners (Gruen 2006:17). Much like young
madrasa students are taught to recite verses of the Qur’an with radical understandings, music fans humming ‘Soul Salah Crew,’ ‘Soldiers of Allah’ (SOA), or ‘MC Hamza’ (Abu Hamza al-Masri’s son) tunes may gradually begin to identify with Islamist worldviews:

**SOA, Sleeping Giant:**

_Governments who claim__  
_They implementing Islam_  
_Like who??!_  
_Like Taliban, Iran and Sudan._  
_All 52_  
_So-called Muslim nations_  
_Oppressing the masses_  
_In the name of Islam_  
_They are digging our graves_  
_While we are asleep_  
_Over a billion_  
_But ooh so weak_  
_We need to rise up_  
_And get back on our feet_

[Soldiers of Allah (http://www.afghanhits.com)]

**Rock ‘n’ Roll University**

Higher learning institutions have played traditional roles as prime locations to recruit candidates that may serve valuable roles in radical movements. For instance, the Germany-based Hamburg Cell was established in order to find and recruit well-educated university students who would be capable of speaking fluent English, operate for extended periods in liberal Western societies without raising suspicion, and learning to fly and navigate sophisticated commercial aircraft with precision into high value targets. As Forest points out, institutions such as Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Bandung Institute of Technology in Malaysia, Abu Bakar University in Pakistan, and, of course, King
Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia have provided recruiters with some of their most successful recruits (2006:5).

In recent years, HT has met with great success in bringing radicalism to masses of American and British university students. Gruen reports chat room sessions and videos posted on HT band websites that depict groups playing at University of California campuses, and asserts that every HT-sponsored band based in the U.S. has played at some college or another (Gruen 2006:18-19). These concerts, normally arranged by student groups, draw in large numbers of students who are able to purchase CDs and stickers with website information. If students go to bands’ fan websites, such as those for SOA, they will be directed to free MP3 downloads and a number of hyperlink options. In order to guide the websites’ visitors, HT music ‘honey pot’ sites will provide only a few links – one for lyrics, one for other bands, and one to discussion forums with HT recruiters reading for qualifying posts, for example (Gruen 2006:18-20). Once visitors begin participating in the forums, they will be gradually drawn into discussions that question their social, political, and religious worldviews, and provide persuasive Islamist arguments.

Ideally, HT recruiters, posing as Islamic scholars or knowledgeable and like-minded college students, will be able to convince fan site visitors that Islam is under attack from al-Adou al-Baedd, and that the visitors should return to school to raise student organizations dedicated to HT objectives. These groups will, in turn, invite HT bands to perform on-campus concerts and distribute information about HT websites, Islamism, and Shayytan al-Akbar (“The Great Satan”).
“Getting the Geeks Out of the Basement” – Face to Face Recruiting

As I wrote in the introductory chapter, contemporary terror groups are becoming increasingly selective with regard to candidates. Lindh, Tanweer, Hussain, Lindsay, and Shoebat are examples of recruits with limited qualifications who were able to effectively carry out directed operations; these individuals are joined by the majority of low-level members in terror groups who are tasked with basic missions. As Mohammad Sidique Khan echoed in his final video, the blood of martyrs gives life to the message of radical Islam. However useful some limited-skill actors can be, the most beneficial terrorists are those that can advance the Islamist movement by compelling others to do jihad. As Gabriel Weimann points out, “the future of terrorism relies more on future recruitment than any other factor” (2006:65).

The long-term influences of Islamist icons such as Sayyid Qutb, Usama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri will likely never be fully measurable. However, individuals such as Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, Shaykh Abdallah al-Faisal, Mohammad Haydar Zamar, and Shaykh Omar Abdel-Rahman have had significant and immediate effects on the individuals they came into direct contact with. Such individuals include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing organizer, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef; the 9/11 cell leader, Mohammad Atta; and the July 7th cell leader, Mohammad Sidique Kahn. Each of these individuals, with the exception of Sayyid Qutb, received formal jihad and recruitment methods training in Pakistan or Afghanistan. However, in today’s security

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30 Currently in custody, Mohammad Haydar Zamar was responsible for recruiting Mohammad Atta, the 9/11-operation leader, into al-Qaeda. Born in Syria, Zamar was a German citizen and local jihadist celebrity in Hamburg, Germany, where the 9/11 attacks were planned. Zamar fought in Bosnia and trained in Afghanistan, and is suspected of serving as a link between al-Qaeda support staff and the Hamburg Cell in preparation for the September 11th attacks.
environment, traveling abroad for training can raise unwanted attention for aspiring terror recruits and recruiters in training. Nonetheless, candidates who are selected for formal indoctrination must find some venue other than the Internet to continue on their paths to jihad:

[The recruit] still needs to undergo an intense period of face-to-face interaction to check for his commitment and devotion to the cause and generate bonds that will prevent him from betraying the cause… In the artificial setting of the camps, a semblance of equality and fraternity can easily be approximated for the duration of the training. The trainees live in a communal setting, where their normal life responsibilities are suspended and mutual care is encouraged. The camps re-create the ideas of the mythical \(\text{Ummah}\) and give concrete life to the virtual community hinted at on the Internet.

[Sageman 2004:163]

**Training for Tots – Terrorist Summer Camps**

*Hizb ut-Tahrir* agrees with Sageman, and provides select online candidates with the opportunity to develop skills that will benefit the Islamist cause in more substantial ways than becoming a ‘lone wolf.’ An-Nasr Productions (ANP), a HT-affiliated hip-hop band, posted on its website an advertisement for a youth organization known as the Muslim Youth Network (MYN). According to Gruen, HT sponsors a number of community centers, youth clubs, retreats, and summer camps around the world (2006:20). For many individuals considering becoming a Muslim, surrounding local communities may lack, or may appear to lack, adequate venues for learning about Islam. HT attempts to exploit these absences of mainstream Muslim community venues by providing parents with an opportunity to send their non-Muslim or curious Muslim children to community centers or youth camps. Likewise, older candidates who learn of such camps through
Internet sites, peer groups, or discreet recruiters are often eager to spend time away from home with others who share similar interests.

Once at these camps, recruits are individually assessed by HT recruiters for reliability, intelligence, talents, and acceptance of Islamist ideals; based on recruiters’ impressions of the candidates, they may be selected for training. Several HT camps provide recruits with music lessons or courses on building websites (Gruen 2006:20). Normally, recruits will have little or no idea what *Hizb ut-Tahrir* is until they are officially recruited. Once indoctrinated and imbued with seemingly harmless skill sets, recruits are encouraged to start their own bands, organize clubs, or create ‘honey-pot’ websites that will advance HT’s goals. In the end, the recruits become recruiters – just as Ramzi Yousef, Mohammad Atta, Mohammad Sidique Kahn had before them.

**Captive Audiences – Prisons as Recruitment Centers**

The imprisonment of Muslim Brotherhood members during the 1960s and 1970s had a profound effect on the Salafist movement. Sayyid Qutb’s Egyptian prison experience inspired his most influential piece of work, *Milestones*, which continues to serve as a spiritual manual for so many Islamists. Just as the ideologue’s individual experience represents a turning point, so do the experiences of Qutb’s fellow Brotherhood inmates. In their early captivity, they developed a bond that would carry their organized movement across continents and through the following decades – the prison tortures, executions, and releases of Muslim Brotherhood members during the mid 20th century gave global momentum to what had been a localized movement.
J. Michael Waller (2006) suggests that today’s Western prison experience provides inmates with the same opportunities for organizing and spreading radicalism. American prison reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s provided inmates with greater access to religious texts and spiritual counseling. Since 1973, several prison system officials and researchers have reported that these reforms have come at the expense of granting radicalism access to over two million individuals primed for adopting extreme belief systems (U.S. Congress 1973, 2003; Waller 2006).

According to journalist Siraj Islam Mufti, of the two million inmates in U.S. prisons in 2001, approximately 350,000 were Muslims, and as many as 40,000 more can be expected to enter prison every year (Mufti 2001:1). Although Waller questions Mufti’s figures, he suggests that they accurately reflect growing trends. Waller asserts that Muslim prison recruits represent between 15 and 20 percent of total prison populations. (2006:35). “These inmates mostly came into prison as non-Muslims. Once inside the prison a majority turns to Islam for the fulfillment of spiritual needs… finding new meaning to their lives, along with self-respect for themselves they never could have envisioned before in the streets” (Mufti 2001). Waller suggests that an inmate considering converting to any religion in prison is faced with two possibilities: first, they may adopt a mainstream interpretation of a religion in the aspirations of becoming a better father, son, spouse, or citizen; or second, they may take the “easier” radical path, which “reaffirms the prisoner’s sense of victimhood, encouraging attitudes that civil society is the enemy and must be taken down” (2006:30).

In the same manner that ‘trolling’ HT Internet recruiters evaluate and approach online surfers, Islamist chaplains or inmates within the system attempt to convince
reverting Muslims that they are marginalized victims and that Salafism is the only true interpretation of Islam. Within the information vacuum defined by prison walls, inmate recruits are encouraged to participate in Islamist Muslim groups, attend prayer, and read literature by scholars that insist that inmates’ misdeeds are actually the product of a corrupt society.

In 2003, reports to the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security indicated that Islamist chaplains, many of whom were backed by Saudi-sponsored Wahhabi organizations, have become deeply imbedded in the U.S. prison system (U.S. Congress 2003; Waller 2006:35). The well-respected mainstream Sufi Shaykh, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, suggests that many U.S. prisons’ moderate Muslim resources have been filtered out of prison libraries and replaced by Saudi Wahhabi publications and Islamist literature in an attempt to win over reverts with few research options (Waller 2001, 2006). Between quieted mainstream Muslim inmates, discretely subversive chaplains, and libraries filled with Islamist texts, new Muslim inmates can find themselves in as overwhelming, radical, total situation – created, quite literally, in Goffman’s original theoretical environment – an institution.

Married Networks – Terrorism Through Kinship

While seeking refuge in Malaysia from Indonesia’s Suharto regime in 1993, Abu Bakar Bashir (or Ba’asyir) and Abdullah Sungkar created Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) with the aims of establishing Indonesia as an Islamic state and spreading Salafism throughout Southeast Asia (Abuza 2006; Jones 2006). Fourteen years after its birth, JI acts as the most connected terror organization in the region, with close ties to al-Qaeda, GAM,
Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Laskar Mujahideen and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MER-C) (Abuza 2005:1).

*Jemaah Islamiyah* (“Islamic Group”) takes a distinctive methodological approach in recruitment operations. Like other groups, such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, JI conducts recruitment activities across the region, selecting candidates from madrasas and mosques. However, for formal recruitment and indoctrination, JI utilizes kinship ties in order to strengthen its operations. Sibling relationships, in-law relationships, father-son teams, and arranged marriages serve to protect JI and affiliated groups from security concerns that tend to plague other terror groups with lesser social networks (Abuza 2006; Ismail 2006). Through rigid enforcement of kinship requirements, JI effectively reduces motivations for individuals to morally or ideologically disengage from the organization. Betraying the network would also require a member to betray his family and faith. Additionally, kinship ties reduce JI’s vulnerabilities to traditional counter-terrorism methods, such as infiltration by intelligence practitioners (Ismail 2006:6).

There are between 25,000 and 35,000 madrasas in Southeast Asia, with as many as 14,000 in Indonesia alone (Abuza 2006:69). During a 2002 raid of a JI safehouse, Indonesian police recovered a list of 141 madrasas that JI had been targeting for recruitment operations. Placed in such schools, JI recruiters observe students as they learn to recite the Qur’an or are given lessons on jihadism. Commonly, the schoolhouse walls feature posters that glorify jihad and espouse the necessity of ridding the world of *Jahiliyyah*. If students appear especially receptive to extremist materials, they are likely to be selected for recruitment.
Siblings or cousins who attend the same school and are receptive to Salafi ideals are developed together. Like the Nizari Fedayeen, the recruits are isolated from the larger group and treated to lessons that emphasize their duties to Islam and the importance of tasks that they may one day be honored to perform. This practice accustoms the recruits to providing one another with mutual ideological support, and ensures deeper engagement within JI and Islamist causes (Ismail 2006:5).

Once candidates are determined to be ready for indoctrination by their recruiter, they may be fielded together in order to attend training and carry out cooperative missions. For example, JI brothers Riduan “Hambali” Isamuddin and Rusman “Gun Gun” Gunawan, while working independently from one another, were capable of performing each other’s tasks when necessary. Until he was forced into hiding in 2002, Hambali directed JI operations and acted as JI’s liaison to al-Qaeda. When Hambali was forced into hiding in Cambodia following the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, his younger brother, Rusman, was able to manage JI operations funds and takeover email communications with al-Qaeda until his arrest in September 2003 (Ismail 2006:7).

Arranged marriages and their accompanying in-law relationships have, perhaps, served as the most valuable tools in expanding JI’s networking capabilities. The emergence of JI followed the 1962 collapse of the Darul Islam group. During the 1980s and 1990s, the would-be JI central staff was organized in Malaysia through a series of marriages. Indonesian separatists and Malaysian extremists used marriages, arranged by spiritual leaders, to forge the JI movement and lasting alliances that would define its core membership (Abuza 2006:67). As JI is an opaque organization, exact numbers are difficult to assess; however, Malaysian and Indonesian intelligence agencies believe that
JI’s central staff consists of well over 100 families throughout the Southeast Asia (Abuza 2006:66).

Since JI’s creation, arranged marriages between key clusters, hubs, and nodes in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Brunei, JI has served to strengthen membership ties in what would otherwise be a fragmented organization. Marriages between high-status individuals, such as senior al-Qaeda member Omar al-Faruq (killed in Iraq in September 25, 2006) and Mir Augustina (the daughter of revered Darul Islam militia leader Haris Fadillah), are key elements of JI’s kinship network, which analysts attribute to JI’s resilience to heavy casualties and prosecutions (Ismail 2006; Abuza 2006; Jones 2006).
CHAPTER EIGHT

RECRUITMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

Past Theories, Current Assessments, and Future Understanding

For the Islamist terrorist leaders of the early twenty-first century, conversions of non-Muslims to Islamism are vital to their political strategy. Europeans, Asians, and Americans from non-Muslim backgrounds do not fit the terrorist profile that many are accustomed to seeing. They know their societies far better than immigrant terrorists, and they blend in seamlessly. They also have valuable passports. Some analysts view the conversions as a new generation of political and social protest against the West and in support of the “third world,” with Islamism being adopted as a political and cultural statement more than a religion.

[Waller 2006:31]

Sociopolitical Motivation Appeals in Islamic Radicalism

The Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad’s second chapter, “Necessary Qualifications and Characteristics for the Organization’s Member” recommends that recruiters look for fourteen qualities or skills in prospective recruits (Al-Qaeda 2000: UK/BM15-UK/BM20). These requirements range from being capable of maintaining secrets to being physically and mentally healthy. The first three requirements on the list require members of the group to be 1) a Muslim, 2) accepting of the group’s ideology, and 3) willing to become a martyr in the pursuit of the group’s objectives.

This thesis focuses specifically on recruitment activities within terror groups whose objectives and worldviews are based in a radical Islamist ideological framework. This brand of Islamism is rooted in Sayyid Qutb’s interpretations of Islam, which were motivated by 7th Century Islam, cultural traditions of militant jihad and martyrdom,
revolutionary achievements, and 20th Century political oppression and social injustice. Qutb’s call for a vanguard to deliver the world from its returned state of *Jahiliyyah* was carried out of Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood, spread in universities from Chicago to Jeddah, and granted Western political and social legitimacy with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, this vanguard is often referred to as al-Qaeda, though al-Qaeda is only a small element of a larger network, which includes groups based in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Kashmir, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, U.K., and the U.S.

Participants in this movement accept certain principles. The first principle is that the Qutb’s interpretation of Salafi Islam, based on the Qur’an and Sunnah in their original cultural and historical contexts, is the only true interpretation of Islam. Any Muslim practicing any form of Islam other than Salafism is considered to be a non-believer. Second in the pursuit of establishing a global Salafi community, all non-believers must revert to this ‘true’ form of Islam. Third, the global community must be led by a Salafi caliphate, and governed strictly by Sharia as it stood during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Fourth, any non-believer or state unwilling to adopt this belief system and standing in the way of the realization of these objectives can and must be justly killed or eliminated. Finally, it is imperative that all Muslims recognize these principles as the will of God, and each Muslim has the absolute duty to do jihad against *Jahiliyyah* until Islam is returned to its rightful place as mankind’s one true religion.

It should be understood that most Muslims do not share these beliefs, nor do all Salafi or Wahhabi Muslims hold them as extremely as those promoting Qutb’s revival. Many, if not most, Muslims believe that Islam is the one true religion. The distinction
between Islam and radical Islam, of whatever sect, lies in the manner by which Islam is to be spread – through da’wa and tolerance, or by force and hatred. In order to sustain their movement, radical Islamic groups must convince new members that their causes are just and their methods are warranted. Waller, as quoted above, suggests that many recruits view participation in the radical Islamist terror movement as a political and social statement of protest (Waller 2006:31). Former deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, Paul Pillar, agrees and suggests that “the words and actions of some terrorists provide the most obvious clues” as to why individuals become motivated to participate in acts of terror (Pillar 2006:31). Numerous cases presented in this thesis support these assertions.

In his martyrdom video, Mohammad Sidique Kahn cited perceptions of failing Western policies, military atrocities, and social deviance as motivations for his cell’s actions (p. 108; 118); Shehzad Tanweer echoed these statements in his own video (p. 108). John Walker Lindh claimed to have supported the Taliban due to his perception that it was the only government in the world that observed noble Islamic laws (BBC 2002). Unknown numbers of HT recruits have been lured into Internet sites promoting Islamism as the solution to sociopolitical conditions that have “marginalized” them. The mysterious speaker at the radical khutbah I witnessed in a London mosque just days after the London bombings also claimed that British and U.S. policies were leading non-believers to “Jahannam.”
Lessons From the Recruits

As I discussed in chapter four, many popular theories suggest that the most likely candidates for terror group recruitment are those who lack educational opportunities, are in lower socioeconomic classes, have poor employment prospects, come from troubled family backgrounds, or are sexually frustrated (Ferracuti and Bruno 1981: Borum 2004). Other theories such as frustration-aggression hypothesis (Margolin 1977), negative identity hypothesis (Knutson 1981), and narcissistic rage (Crayton 1983), continue to be applied despite heavy criticism (Sechrest 1971; Stohl 1976; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Hudson 1999; Sageman 2004; Levitt 2006). I have presented the backgrounds of a number of individuals in this thesis who have been or continue to be involved in radical Islamic groups, including Sayyid Qutb, Ziad Jarrah, Mohammad Sidique Kahn, Shehzad Tanweer, Hasib Mir Hussain, Germaine Lindsay, John Walker Lindh, and Walid Shoebat, and Azzam al-Amriki (Adam Gadahn).

From considering these cases, as well as information collected regarding the selectiveness of recruiters and various screening methods, it is apparent that traditional prescriptive theories are not adequate for reliably profiling individuals based on background characteristic or personality traits. Indeed, some of these cases may have displayed some of the characteristics discussed by Ferracuti and Bruno (1981), such as poor employment prospects, educational opportunities, or troubled family backgrounds – Germaine Lindsay, for instance. However, the majority of cases we have considered demonstrate a near or total absence of ‘typical’ recruitment candidate characteristics – Qutb, Jarrah, Kahn, Tanweer, and Lindh, for example.
The *Jemaah Islamiyah* kinship recruitment system, Khomeini’s recruited youth brigades during the Iran-Iraq War, or the awaiting Palestinian *shahadat* studied by Nasra Hassan shed light on the processes through which individuals who are raised in societies plagued by risk and violence and inundated with tales of glory through jihad and martyrdom may be acculturated to the effect of accepting terrorist roles—the “green-diaper” baby theory (Sageman 2004:112). Hamas applies complex early recruitment strategies, which include its well-known social welfare system that provides indefinite monthly stipends up to $1000 for the families of *shahadat* (Levitt 2006). In October 2004, the Hamas children’s website *al-Fateh*, designed in a cartoon theme, posted a picture of the decapitated head of a female suicide bomber. The “*shaheeda*” was displayed with the caption, “The perpetrator of the suicide bombing attack, Zaynab Abu Salem. Her head was severed from her pure body and her headscarf remained to decorate [her face]. Your place is in heaven in the upper skies, oh, Zaynab, sister [raised to the status of heroic] men” (Waller 2006:64). Walid Shoebat recalled an instance in a crowded theatre when an audience was watching the film *21 Minutes in Munich* (1976), “The moment we saw the Palestinians throw grenades into the helicopter, killing the Israeli athletes, hundreds of viewers yelled, “*Allahu Akbar!*” (2005:17).

The frustration-aggression hypothesis may be tempting in the case of Shoebat, but it still neglects the point that most Palestinians do not throw bombs onto bank rooftops. Those insistent on applying aggression explanations of terrorism may be better served by Craig A. Anderson’s *general aggression* model, which illustrates a more dynamic system of processing frustrations, “aggression is not a drive that must be vented” (Anderson 2007:148). Rather than being trapped within a narrow set of choices based on frustration
intake and aggressive output, the general aggression hypothesis suggests the relationship is based on proximate variables and “distal risk factors that influence the individual’s personal preparedness to aggress” (Anderson 2007:40).

Despite studies such as those on Hamas’ financial incentives for martyrdom operations (Levitt 2006) or the former Soviet-Afghan War mujahid who went from working in an American fast-food restaurant to an al-Qaeda executive office (Sageman 2004), many recruitment cases do not support the argument that economic needs will necessarily play a part in qualifying potential recruits. As we have seen, John Walker Lindh actually paid his own way (with the unwitting help of his parents) into radical Islam, and the London bombers funded their own martyrdom at the cost of 8,000 GBP (House of Commons 2006). Mohammad Sidique Kahn had a university education and was employed in a rewarding position. On a number of occasions, Khan had even been featured in the local media for his exceptional reputation and effectiveness in working with troubled and disabled children (BBC 2005a, 2006c; House of Commons 2006). Shehzad Tanweer had been especially privileged and was accustomed to wearing designer clothing and driving a Mercedes.

A key point of this thesis is the apparent trend that many recruitment operations are taking place far from the “front lines” of Southeast Asia and West Bank. Instead, recruits are being reached by radicalism at their Hamburg university campuses, Beeston bookshops, and home computer screens. John Walker Lindh, the London bombers, and Azzam al-Amriki provide useful illustrations of the point that Islamist terror group recruits can be found anywhere. 20 years old at the time of his famed capture in November 2001, Lindh hailed from one of the wealthiest counties in California, and from
a family described by a neighbor as a “Birkenstock family… very earnest, very nice, very intellectual” (BBC 2002). Whereas individuals such as Shoebat or JI family members may be considered by some to be more ‘predictable’ targets for recruitment, individuals far removed from the woes of Qutb or bin Laden must be engaged through other appeals.

**Recent Acts and Future Threats – Scale-Free Terrorism**

Radical Islamist terror groups pose very real threats in our world today – not only to non-believers in Western states, but perhaps more immediately to Muslims who do not subscribe to Qutb’s interpretation of Salafi Islam. *Jemaah Islamiyah*’s October 12, 2002 nightclub and consulate bombings in Bali, which killed 202 civilians, and the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) November 9, 2005 Amman, Jordan hotel bombings, which killed 60 and wounded 115, many of whom were attending a wedding, are only two among a recent series of attacks that target Muslims who do not adhere to Qutbist ideology.

Thomas Preston’s *Lambs to Lions: Nuclear and Biological Weapons Proliferation and Their Impact Upon Interstate Security Relationships* (2007) provides several real world scenarios that illustrate the potential levels of destruction that terror groups and rogue states are capable of inflicting with loosed biological weapons. The question of whether or not terror groups would ever consider the use of bioweapons has now been replaced with the question, *when* will such weapons be deployed? Credible reports of groups seeking out higher order weapons (Alibek 1999; Casagrande 1999; CIA 2003; Preston 2007), paired with incidents such as the Rashneesh Cult’s 1984 attack in Oregon, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin gas subway attacks in Tokyo, and the 2001 anthrax letter
mailings, paint a startling picture of groups apparently willing to apply such destructive methods.

As demonstrated on September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005, al-Qaeda has managed to find inexpensive methods of inflicting massive levels of damage. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, total al-Qaeda expenses for the September 11th operation were between $400,000 and $500,000 (2004:169). The London bombings, funded by the suicide bombers, themselves, cost only 8,000 GBP (House of Commons 2006:23). As Ayman al-Zawahiri warned on October 13, 2002, al-Qaeda recognizes the strategic value of network disruptions, suggesting that al-Qaeda “would target the nodes of your economy… If a boat that did not cost $1,000 managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude [referring to the U.S.S. Cole], imagine the extent of the danger that threatens the West's commercial lifeline which is petroleum” (Abuza 2004:5).

Just as Barabasi, Forest, Krebs, Sageman, and I consider cooperative groups within the global, radical, Islamist mujahideen part of a scale-free network, so does the mujahideen see Western and global economic and infrastructure systems. The September 11th attacks were designed to strike at highly symbolic targets, but also to cripple three major U.S. networks – the airline system, the World Trade Center financial hub, and key DoD and executive branch personnel and headquarters. Likewise, the July 7th attacks were directed at key Underground locations during morning rush hour traffic in a city where most commuters use mass transit systems. It will likely never be certain whether Mohammad Sidique Kahn and his cell selected their targets for infrastructure values, probabilities of high victim density, or both. Whatever their objectives were, the attacks
had disabling effects on not only the Underground and bus lines, but also emergency services, telecommunications, and, most importantly, thousands of lives.

**Scale-Free Counterterrorism**

Understanding the current radical Islamist movement through a scale-free perspective provides two particularly useful lessons. First, as terror groups recognize critical hubs as targets for disrupting networks, some attacks will increase in complexity. This is not to insist that they will necessarily become more sophisticated with regard to technology – though this is a likely probability; rather, planning and execution will place greater demands on the individuals who carry out the operations. While the London bombings and other suicide attacks have required relatively low skill levels on the parts of operatives, the September 11th attacks required certain operatives to possess piloting skills capable of putting commercial aircraft on pre-selected targets.31 Future attacks will likely encourage recruiters to seek individuals whom possess specialized skills, or display higher aptitudes for skill learning.

A second lesson from the scale-free perspective is more useful for counterterrorism practitioners wishing to disable terror groups. Terror networks are protected by their inherent structure, which demonstrate extremely high thresholds for

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31 Mohammad Atta (World Trade Center, North Tower), Marwan al-Shehhi (World Trade Center, South Tower), Ziad Samir Jarrah (target unknown, thought to be Capitol Hill or White House), Hani Hanjour (Pentagon) were all selected for their abilities to pilot aircraft, or assessed abilities to successfully complete flight training sufficient for the operation. Hanjour was the replacement for the originally planned fourth pilot, Ramzi Binalshibh, whom was unable to obtain a U.S. visa. Zacharias Moussaoui, is suspected having been another replacement for Binalshibh, however he was unable to satisfy flight school requirements and, reportedly, determined by al-Qaeda to have been excluded from the operation for unstable behavior.
random attacks (even attacks on up to 80% of the total network). However, simultaneous attacks on 5-15% of the network’s key hubs can fragment the network, resulting in a catastrophic failure by eliminating access to key C3I\textsuperscript{32} resources. However, this form of attack, if conducted improperly, will only result in fragmenting the cluster or network, and potentially losing track of previously known elements of the network – effectively creating several new groups or structures that must again be identified and tracked down. As another option, practitioners may wish to apply a virus approach, in which existing network members (nodes) are recruited as agents, who can be utilized to establish links with other nodes and internally disrupt the network through information sharing, spreading counter-ideologies, or subversion, draining cluster resources and “preparing the way for cascading internal failures” (Barabasi 2003:223).

**Primary Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research**

As acts of terror initiated by radical Islamist groups have become increasingly deadly, so have they become increasingly publicized. Throughout the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, many attacks occurred in more ‘predictable’ parts of the world, and most audiences viewed terrorism from a distance. However, today’s operations are reaching out to every corner of the globe, striking closer to the interests of formerly unaffected viewers. While these dramatic scenes of destruction are viewed with horror by most, others find cause for celebration and even motivation for adopting the causes behind the acts of violence.

The absence of universal background characteristics and personality traits in individual cases of recruitment suggests that traditional theories have limited value in

\textsuperscript{32} C3I: Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.
determining the likelihood of particular individuals becoming terrorists. These examples illustrate the fact that candidates for terror group recruitment come from a wide variety of economic, social, cultural, political and religious backgrounds. Simply stated, the main point of this thesis is that potential candidates for radical Islamic terror group recruitment can come from any background, any home, and any part of the world. Currently, there appear to be no universal traits or background characteristics that will aid in definitively profiling individuals for recruitment activities.

Rather than trying to counter terrorism through predicting who might become a terrorist, researchers and practitioners may be better served by focusing on the characteristic behaviors of individuals during and after their recruitments, and the social environments in which those recruitments occur. These environments may be real or virtual, near or far. In considering just a few case studies and several organization’s methods, such as those of al-Qaeda, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), we have seen a number of gateways through which recruiters access their candidates – mosques, madrasas, universities, prisons, youth clubs, gymnasiums, bookshops, the Internet, and kinship. These examples of recruitment activities and grounds illustrate only a few methods that are currently in use by radical Islamic terror groups, and should not be assumed to represent every possible recruitment ground. As Forest suggests, individuals may be recruited “anywhere that people gather – either physically or online” (2006[1]:124).

Zachary Abuza (2006) and Marc Sageman (2004) suggest that the key to an individual’s success or failure in entering a terror network is based in his ability to
establish a link to an existing network node or hub. Wherever recruitment takes place, this link is established in the form of social affiliations such as friendship (London bombers), kinship (JI), discipleship (JI), or worship (all) (Sageman 2004:107). A recruit that is unable to establish a link will be unable to penetrate the insulated security framework that is created by the extended network structure, effectively becoming a lone wolf that is left with thousands of Islamist websites to guide them on their journey to jihad.

Researchers and practitioners wishing to better understand terror group recruitment are faced with difficult challenges that arise from focusing on opaque subjects. In the case of radical Islamist activities, successfully meeting these challenges requires researchers to develop a thorough knowledge of the cultural and historical contexts of radical Islam, as well as the places where it is currently being promoted. The most critical pieces of information that currently make terrorist activities so dangerously effective and secretive cannot be collected at a distance; rather, this information must come from those people and places directly involved in the activities we wish to understand. This is where anthropologists can serve mostvaluably. Many researchers, from numerous disciplines, are equipped with language skills, and familiarity with Islamic texts and traditions; however, they often lack firsthand exposure to radicalized elements of the faith. Through ethnographic work, which cooperatively engages those with the most intimate knowledge of Islam and its current practices, anthropologists may be able to locate and study active recruitment appeals, participants, and locations.
One Final Thought

To most outsiders, Islam seems straightforward or simply defined as a religious faith. However, the *Ummah* consists of Muslims who hold a wide range of interpretations. A particularly valuable lesson that was impressed upon me during my fieldwork was the difficulty that can arise in attempting to differentiate between moderate, strict fundamentalist, and radical Islamist interpretations of Islam. This difficulty is not limited to visiting anthropologists doing participant observation; it is one that is faced by the many Muslims who strive to honorably become ideal Muslims. This difficulty also emphasizes the need for anthropologists to go to ground with applied studies, which draw on the expert advice of informed and critically minded Islamic scholars and practicing Muslims. These are the individuals who are most sensitive to cultural and environmental norms, as well as cases in which individuals or groups violate those norms and stand out as more likely participants in terror group activities – they are our key informants.

Common and reasonable concerns for researchers seeking direct knowledge from informants and research subjects are the ethics involved in conducting such work. Anthropologists, before any other interest, must be concerned for the welfare of their informants and the people they study. Some may see doing ethnographic fieldwork in terrorism as a risk-prone endeavor, which unnecessarily jeopardizes informants; if done improperly, this may become the case. However, it is essential that we understand that peaceful Muslims around the world are perhaps faced with the greatest threats from radical Islam. They are its most immediate targets. They are targeted for recruitment;
they are targeted for attacks based on their varying viewpoints; and they are targeted by intolerant non-Muslims who unjustly perceive their beliefs to be the same as those who target them. Islam is not at war with the West – *radical* Islam is. As anthropologists, our chief ethical concern should be the question, what can we do to help protect the most vulnerable targets of radical Islam?

Through cautious and deliberate ethnographic work, which encourages greater exchange between researchers, practitioners, and informed participants, anthropologists may be able to access the most sorely needed information regarding current recruitment operations. This research will benefit all those affected by terrorism – the men, women, and children targeted for recruitment, potential innocent victims of terror attacks, the practitioners attempting to counter terrorism, and Muslims such as the Shaykh in London who asked, “If we cannot show each other Islam, how can we show others?”
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