

IMMIGRATION AND HATE: THE EFFECT OF INCREASING IMMIGRATION ON HATE
GROUP FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the thesis of
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Chair

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Abstract

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For the past several years, hate groups have been steadily increasing in the United States. Using theories of ethnic competition (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) and political opportunities (McAdam 1982), this paper examines factors that may cause variation in the number of hate groups per state in 2006. Primarily, this paper looks at the relationship between increasing undocumented populations, anti-immigration politicians, and economic hardships on hate group formation. Using a negative binomial regression analysis of state-level counts of hate groups, I find support for my argument that large undocumented populations and economic hardships are significantly associated with higher numbers of hate groups.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my friend, Edwin Magenge (September 21, 1980 – February 20, 2008). I was blessed to have had him in my life.

INTRODUCTION

Hate groups are a fairly under-researched form of social movement within sociology. These groups are important to examine, however, because they espouse hateful (i.e. racist, sexist, homophobic, etc.) rhetoric, and often resort to acts of violence against minority groups.

Currently, hate groups in the United States are on the rise, making it particularly important to further our knowledge of these groups, including why they form and what issues they unite around.

The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a U.S. based, non-profit, civil rights law firm, has collected information on hate groups since 1971, and publishes their findings in a quarterly magazine entitled the *Intelligence Report*. For the year 2000, the Southern Poverty Law Center's *Intelligence Report* listed 602 active hate groups in the United States. By 2006, SPLC listed 844 active hate groups in the U.S., meaning the number of hate groups increased by 40% over six years. Since 2004, there has been a 5% annual increase in the number of active hate groups listed by the SPLC. According to the SPLC (2006), one of the biggest reasons hate groups are on the rise in the United States is due to the increasing number of non-Anglo immigrants entering the country. Therefore, this paper will primarily focus on the issues of increasing immigration and anti-immigration politicians, along with other factors that may be key to understanding the dramatic increase in the number of hate groups within the United States.

Using data provided by the SPLC, this paper will explore several possible explanations for the number of active hate groups per state in 2006. First, I will examine whether ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) and defended neighborhood theory (Green et al. 1998), helps explain why Anglos may feel threatened by the increasing minority populations associated with increasing immigration. Also using ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992;

Blalock 1967), I will then discuss how economic hardships and/or the threat of economic instability may motivate Anglos to join hate groups. Next, I will examine McAdam's (1982) political opportunity theory to explain why anti-immigration rhetoric coming from hate groups and/or politicians may be associated with larger numbers of hate groups. Finally, I will briefly discuss regional differences in the number of hate groups within the U.S. After examining the literature, I will then present my hypotheses, discuss the data and methods utilized for this study, and present the results of my analyses.

ETHNIC COMPETITION THEORY

Theories of ethnic competition and defended neighborhoods provide support for the argument that the increasing minority populations which come along with immigration create concern for Anglo populations, especially those in areas that were historically Anglo.

Ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) proposes that racial violence/conflict occurs due to competition among racial groups for limited economic and/or political resources. The competition over resources may result from increasing immigration and migration, periods of economic contraction, increases in the amount of resources held by a minority group, and/or political challenges to Anglo dominance (Olzak 1992). In line with ethnic competition theory, Van Dyke and Soule (1999: 729-30) note that:

[Ethnic] groups come into contact with one another through immigration and migration and begin to vie for various resources in the shared environment. Competition for scarce resources activates ethnic boundaries which make group members more likely to behave in ways which will benefit their own ethnic group.

In other words, as minority populations increase, Anglo populations may feel that their political and economic security is threatened. This perceived threat to the Anglo population, in turn, can

lead to an increase in violence against minority populations in order to secure Anglo access to resources.

It is important to note here that ethnic competition theory includes “perceived threats” (Van Dyke and Soule 1999), which may often be more accurate in explaining increases in hate group membership and/or violence. For example, although there is no concrete evidence that immigrants are stealing jobs from American citizens or bringing diseases such as leprosy into the country, the threat of these things occurring may be enough to mobilize more people under hate group agendas.

The defended neighborhood theory proposed by Green et al. (1998) also has to do with Anglos feeling threatened by minority groups. Although this theory was used to describe an increase in hate crimes, it appears logical to link it to the rise in hate groups as well. The theory states that hate crimes are most frequent in locations where Anglos have historically been the majority, and especially in those areas that are seeing a rapid increase in minority populations (Green et al. 1998).

Ethnic competition and defended neighborhood theories help to explain why many Anglo citizens may feel threatened by increasing numbers of immigrants entering the country. First, increasing immigration is currently associated with increasing minority populations. Second, increasing immigration is also associated with Anglo fears of increasing economic competition. In other words, the increasing number of non-Anglo immigrants entering the U.S. may be creating tension between racial/ethnic groups, as white people may perceive the influx as a threat to their economic and/or political security. The perceived threats attached to immigration may, therefore, also lead to an increase in hate groups, as more Anglos may desire to preserve the status quo.

INCREASING IMMIGRATION

Currently, immigration has been a huge issue in the United States with the debate focused mainly on both authorized and undocumented Mexican immigrants entering the country. According to Hanson (2006), roughly 34% of all immigrants entering the United States since 1990 have come from Mexico and approximately 56% of Mexican immigrants are undocumented. According to ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967), this influx of non-Anglo immigrants into the United States may make Anglos feel that their economic and/or political security is being threatened, and therefore, may motivate more Anglos to join hate groups.

Historically, white supremacist groups have rallied around the issue of immigration since the birth of the Ku Klux Klan following the Civil War. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997) note that the perceived threats attached to immigrants by hate groups stem from white supremacists' primary racial concerns including: increased immigration, miscegenation, minority population growth, increasing rates of minority crime, and the loss of "white" jobs to minorities. Swain and Nieli (2003) concur that over the last decade, a new and strengthened white pride and consciousness has developed within the United States due to the increasing population of non-Anglo immigrants. The increasing immigrant presence threatens hate group members with the "prospect that white European Americans may soon become—or have already become—a minority population in many parts of the country" (Swain and Nieli 2003: 5). As these texts illustrate, the current debate over immigration is one that has important ramifications for members of hate groups due to the many alleged threats hate groups attach to non-Anglo immigrants.

Research has also linked increasing immigration to increasing violence against minority groups. In a study of urban racial violence against African Americans, Olzak (1990) found that

rates of violence towards African Americans between 1882 and 1914 were positively related to changes in immigration. Olzak (1990) noted that when immigration increased rapidly, violence committed against African Americans was roughly seventy times higher than when immigration was on the decline. Olzak's (1990) findings further support ethnic competition theory, as they suggest that Anglos respond negatively to large influxes of non-Anglo populations. While her study focused on the years 1882-1914, when African Americans were highly targeted in racial attacks, it is worth arguing that, currently, Hispanics are the targeted population for racial violence from those who oppose immigration.

As mentioned previously, the Southern Poverty Law Center (2006) also concurs that one of the main reasons hate groups are increasing in the United States is because of the growing number of non-Anglo immigrants entering the country. An article by Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center (2006: 49) states: "Hispanic immigration [may] have been the single most important factor [leading to the increase in hate groups] in recent years, fueling a national debate and giving hate groups an issue with real resonance." In other words, as more Americans begin to view increasing immigration as a threat to their political and/or economic security, hate group ideology regarding immigration may begin to appear more rational, and potentially motivate more Anglos to join hate groups.

In addition to the perceived economic and political threats stemming from immigration, interviews with hate group members conducted by Swain and Nieli (2003) provide anecdotal evidence that white supremacists perceive the increasing immigration of non-Anglos as a threat to their racial purity. Many white supremacists believe non-Anglos to be more violent, less intelligent, and less diligent than Anglos. For example, in an interview done by Swain and Nieli (2003) with Michael Levin, (a professor at City University of New York and author of race-

based books), Levin stated his belief that non-Anglos are genetically inferior to Anglos. Like Levin, many white supremacists would prefer immigration to be restricted to Europeans only, because the more non-Anglos the United States accepts, the “less intelligent” the population will become.

In sum, increasing immigration may be motivating more Anglos to join hate groups. As more non-Anglo immigrants enter the country, Anglos may begin to feel that their economic and political security is being threatened. Since white supremacist groups view non-Anglo immigrants as potential threats to the status quo, more Anglos may feel that they are ideologically aligned to hate groups, potentially encouraging them to join.

ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS

As mentioned previously, according to ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) much of the perceived threat of minority groups entering predominately Anglo areas stems from economic competition. When unemployment and poverty levels are high in an area, increasing job competition from minorities (or the threat of it) may be enough to mobilize Anglo citizens into hate groups.

The threat of economic competition may be especially real for lower-class Anglos who are more likely to compete with immigrants and other minority groups for certain blue collar jobs and in certain sectors of the economy. For example, Olzak (1990) found that ethnic conflict increases with rises in immigration and economic contraction because both factors put lower-class Anglos in competition with non-Anglos. Olzak (1992: 32) also states that, “Economists have argued that the influx of ethnic and racial populations [through immigration and migration] willing to work at low wages may initially drive wages down.” This initial decrease in wages

can ultimately confirm the fears of workers that immigrants are a threat to their economic survival, which can then lead to conflict and violence.

Van Dyke and Soule (2002) and McVeigh (1999) both found that when certain sectors of the economy are on the decline, extremist groups increase. In their study of patriot/militia groups in the United States, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) found a correlation between the loss of manufacturing jobs and farms in a state and the number of patriot/militia groups. States that had declining numbers of manufacturing jobs or farms were significantly more likely to have more patriot/militia groups than states that had not seen a decline. Similarly, in their analysis of the growth of the Klan in Indiana, McVeigh (1999) found that areas of the state that relied heavily on corn production were incredibly responsive to the Klan, especially farmers hurt by the agricultural depression of the 1920s. In times of country-wide economic depressions, however, research has found that rates of racial violence against minority groups do not increase, because extended periods of economic depression reduce the ability of group members to mobilize (Olzak 1990). Essentially, according to theories of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and the findings of Olzak (1990), without enough resources, no group can effectively mobilize behind any cause, no matter its level of perceived importance.

Hate group ideologies not only attract many lower-class Anglos, but have become increasingly attractive to middle-class Anglos who feel progressively more threatened by signs of a declining economy (Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Anglos who have resources, such as an education and/or employment, may join reactive movements in an effort to preserve the status quo. According to Van Dyke and Soule (2002: 499): “Those enjoying the most powerful positions in society [read: white males] may have sufficient economic and organizational resources and political leverage to mobilize, but may only be inspired to do so when faced with a

perceived threat to these resources.” Similarly, in her study of women in hate groups, Blee (1996) found that only about one third of the women she interviewed could be considered economically unstable and/or part of the lower class. Women in hate groups were either employed, attending college, or were married to a man with a stable income. In other words, it is not only middle class Anglo males that are being drawn into hate group movements, but middle class Anglo females as well.

Essentially, when Anglos perceive that their position at the top of the economic, political, and/or social ladder may be in jeopardy, they may be more willing to stand up against groups they perceive as threatening these statuses. Again, the threat (real or imagined) of economic insecurity among Anglos across various classes could create the potential grounds for mobilization into hate groups.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY THEORY

Along with ethnic competition theory, McAdam’s (1982) political opportunity theory will help to further explore the dramatic increase in hate groups in the U.S. Meyer (2004: 125) notes that “the essential insight [of the political opportunity model is] that the context in which a movement emerges influences its development and potential impact.” In terms of hate groups, therefore, the current use of anti-immigration rhetoric by some politicians may result in expanded opportunities for hate groups, especially within the political arena.

According to the political opportunity model of social movements proposed by McAdam (1982: 40), “movements develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek to change.” In other words, when people perceive that the political environment is favorable to their cause, they will

be more likely to mobilize. Conservative (or reactive) movements, such as hate groups, differ from other movements, however, because they are more concerned with expressing their grievances and getting the world back to the “way it used to be” (McVeigh 1999). In other words, the members of “reactive movements” (Van Dyke and Soule 2002) are not generally fighting for their basic rights and freedoms because they have already been afforded those things. Instead, these groups are responding to what they regard as a shrinking of their rights. In order to be successful, however, reactive movements must eventually pursue obtaining resources and gaining political opportunities, even if these things were not the movement’s initial motivation for organizing.

One way in which hate groups can gain political opportunities is through finding supporters of their ideologies within the U.S. government. When a U.S. politician uses similar anti-immigration rhetoric to that being espoused by hate groups, hate group members may view that politician as a potential ally to their cause. Also, by playing on the fears of average Americans (including politicians) through their anti-immigration rhetoric, hate groups are likely to increase their membership size, and therefore, their political power and access to resources.

ANTI-IMMIGRATION RHETORIC

Past studies have shown that anti-immigration rhetoric utilized by hate groups has been successful in increasing group membership by playing on the fears of mainstream Americans (McVeigh et al. 2004). From their study of the Klan in Indiana between 1915 and 1925, McVeigh et al. (2004: 663) found that:

Much of the Klan’s rhetoric concerning immigrants was an effort to exploit longstanding prejudices in Indiana. Thus the Klan’s anti-immigration bias tapped extant understandings of the social and economic realities in Indiana in an effort to mobilize members, generate solidarity within the organization, and to provide an element of the diagnostic frame the Klan used to explain Indiana’s economic conditions.

In other words, Klan members during this period of time expressed their belief that immigrants would take jobs from and lower the wages of Anglo men, which played on the fears of the Anglo public. By doing this, their membership increased because the Anglo population felt threatened by the increasing immigrant population. These same arguments are used today to justify stricter border and immigration laws by white supremacist groups, conservative politicians, and many average Americans.

Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997) provide further evidence that white supremacist groups play on the fears of average Americans with their anti-immigration rhetoric. For example, the authors quote an article from *The Truth at Last* (a white patriot newspaper), which threatens that immigrants are stealing so many jobs from Americans that “many young White families have no future!” (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997: 115). Anti-immigrant propaganda such as this could very likely make average citizens feel that their economic security is seriously threatened by immigrants, and make those citizens want to organize to stop it.

Interviews with hate group members and leaders provide anecdotal evidence that white supremacists utilize anti-immigration rhetoric, especially in reference to non-Anglo immigrants. For example, in an interview done by Swain and Nieli (2003: 100) with Jared Taylor, (the founder and editor of the white rights magazine, *American Resistance*), Taylor stated:

Up until 1965, we had an immigration policy that was designed, I think, to keep the country white. I see absolutely nothing wrong with that. In fact, I think that’s a healthy, normal, and natural position for a country to take. I think Japan should stay Japanese. I think Mexico should stay Mexican. Some think somehow that it’s virtuous of the United States, after having been founded and built by Europeans, according to European institutions, to reinvent itself or transform itself into a non-Anglo country with a Third World population. I think that’s a kind of cultural and racial national suicide.

Like Taylor, many white supremacists dismiss the fact that Native Americans (and Hispanics) inhabited North America long before Europeans, in order to justify their belief that the United States is, and should continue to be, an “Anglo” nation.

The potential consequences of the overload of anti-immigration rhetoric on the masses are described in a Southern Poverty Law Center article by Mock (2007: 32):

There’s no doubt that the tone of the raging national debate over immigration is growing uglier by the day. Once limited to hard-core white supremacists and a handful of border-state extremists, vicious public denunciations of undocumented brown-skinned immigrants are increasingly common among supposedly mainstream anti-immigration activists, radio hosts, and politicians...According to hate crime statistics published annually by the FBI, anti-Latino hate crimes rose by almost 23% between 2003 and 2005.

In other words, anti-immigration rhetoric used by hate and nativist groups has the potential to convince average citizens that their status is threatened by immigrants, and may make some lash out violently against Hispanics, a population that for many Americans has come to represent undocumented immigration.

As the scholarly literature, interviews, and anti-Hispanic hate crime statistics suggest, anti-immigration rhetoric used by white supremacist groups is framed to correspond with and/or heighten the fears and biases existing among the general population. It is logical to assume, therefore, that as white supremacist groups successfully embellish the fears average Anglo Americans may have regarding immigration, more people will be prone to join hate groups and/or more hate groups will be formed throughout the nation. It is also cogent to assume that once hate group members and average white citizens begin hearing similar anti-immigration rhetoric coming from politicians, hate group rhetoric will appear to be even further validated. As mentioned previously, an increase in membership size may then be associated with greater political power and access to a greater number of resources (McAdam 1982) for hate groups in the U.S.

Anti-immigration rhetoric coming from politicians may support and strengthen hate group agendas. According to the political opportunity theory (McAdam 1982), once hate group members witness anti-immigration politicians, they may be more likely to believe that they have political allies, and begin to demand recognition from them. When ideological gaps are bridged between hate group members and politicians, political leverage may be gained. At the same time, by utilizing anti-immigration rhetoric similar to hate groups, politicians legitimate that rhetoric, which may persuade average Americans with related nativist sentiments to either support or join hate groups throughout the country.

Politicians that take the opinions of extreme nativist groups into consideration may also be furthering hate group agendas. For example, the Southern Poverty Law Center has been discovering ties between nativist groups, such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), and hate groups, and is now listing groups like FAIR as hate groups in their *Intelligence Report*. According to the SPLC Report (2007: 4), racist anti-immigration groups, such as FAIR, are extremely dangerous because "...the mainstream media frequently rel[ies] on [them] for information and commentary...FAIR has also been taken seriously by Congress, which has called upon its officials to testify on immigration more than 30 times since 2000." With American journalists and politicians listening to groups such as FAIR, it is no wonder that the current immigration debate has become so heated and violent.

Whether it is because of hate group rhetoric reaching mainstream America, media coverage of immigration, or personal ideologies regarding immigration, many current U.S. politicians support anti-immigration laws, opening up the political arena for hate groups to air their grievances on the issue. For example, a *Washington Post* article by Stewart (2005)

discusses Virginian republican gubernatorial candidate, Jerry W. Kilgore's, views on undocumented immigrants:

Kilgore's strong opposition to illegal immigration is long-standing. As state attorney general, he endorsed denying in-state tuition to undocumented immigrants and restricting their access to Virginia driver's licenses. He also supported a law that will require local and state governments to check the legal status of anyone older than 19 who applies for public benefits.

Although the majority of politicians quoted in the media comment negatively on undocumented immigrants only, their discourse affects authorized non-Anglo immigrants as well. As mentioned previously, the Hispanic population in the United States, both authorized and undocumented, has come to represent undocumented immigration in the minds of many citizens. Therefore, anti-immigration rhetoric coming from politicians supports anti-immigration rhetoric coming from hate groups, and at the same time, expands the political opportunities of these groups (McAdam 1982).

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS OF HATE GROUPS

The Southern United States is notorious for its long history of fostering hate groups, and was the home of the very first hate group in the country, the Ku Klux Klan (Ridgeway 1995). For this reason, it will be important to address whether or not simply being a Southern state has an impact on the number of hate groups within a state. That being said, however, in more recent decades, hate groups have spread well beyond the South, especially through the increased use of the Internet (Burriss et al. 2000; Perry 2000; Simi and Futrell 2006), making it important to analyze each region of the United States for this project.

THE CURRENT STUDY

In order to better understand hate groups in the U.S., researchers must try to uncover the factors which make the number of these groups increase. The reviewed literature gives some possible explanations for the increasing number of hate groups, but little research has been done on the connection between anti-immigration politicians or estimated undocumented populations and hate groups. Utilizing ethnic competition (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) and political opportunity (McAdam 1982) theories, this study will add to the existing literature on hate groups by providing an analysis of anti-immigration politicians and undocumented populations and their effect on hate group formation. Below are the hypotheses I will be testing in this analysis.

The literature connects hate groups with anti-immigration sentiments since the birth of the initial hate group in the U.S., the KKK (Ridgeway 1995). The literature also suggests that political opportunities encourage social movement formation (McAdam 1982). Linking these two pieces together, my first hypothesis will test whether or not having anti-immigration politicians is significantly related to the number of hate groups within a state.

H1: States that have one or more anti-immigration politician(s) in 2005 will have more hate groups than states that did not have anti-immigration politicians.

My next hypotheses both have to do with increasing minority populations. According to ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) and the defended neighborhood theory (Green et al. 1998), looking at the percent change in the non-Anglo population and the percent of undocumented people in a state will be important because it will shed light on whether or not areas that are experiencing an increase in minority populations are also seeing more hate groups. First, I will examine whether or not the change in the percent of a state's population that is non-Anglo between 2000 and 2005 is associated with the number of hate groups. Then, I will look at

whether or not a state's estimated undocumented population is significantly related to the number of hate groups.

H2a: States with a larger percent change in their non-Anglo population will have a larger number of hate groups than states that have had a smaller percent change in their non-Anglo population.

H2b: States with larger percentages of undocumented persons will have a larger number of hate groups.

Since ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) further suggests that job competition may be related to an increase in hate groups, I will next examine whether or not a state's unemployment and poverty rates are significantly related to the number of hate groups in the state. The literature also suggests (McVeigh 1999; Van Dyke and Soule 2002) that the decline in farms and manufacturing jobs contributes to the increase in hate/extremist groups. Therefore, I will examine whether or not a state's change in number of farms between 2000 and 2005, or its change in number of manufacturing jobs between 2004 and 2005 is significantly related to that state's number of hate groups.

H3: States experiencing economic hardships, (higher unemployment rates, higher poverty rates, large decreases in their manufacturing jobs, and/or large decreases in their number of farms), will have a higher number of hate groups than states not experiencing economic hardships.

Finally, because ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967) suggests that a combination of competition over jobs and increasing minority populations may contribute to an increase in hate groups, I will examine whether or not the interaction between *percent*

undocumented and change in manufacturing jobs, or between percent unemployed and change in manufacturing jobs is associated with the number of hate groups in a state.

H4: In states that have a higher number of undocumented people, an increase in manufacturing jobs will still be equated with an increase in the number of hate groups.

H5: In states that have higher unemployment rates, an increase in manufacturing jobs will still be equated with an increase in the number of hate groups.

Although the main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether or not anti-immigration politicians and/or increasing amounts of undocumented people have an effect on hate group formation, all of these hypotheses will provide useful information about hate groups, and why these groups have been on the rise in recent years. The next section of this paper will provide information on the data and methods of analysis used to test my hypotheses.

DATA AND METHODS

To test my research hypotheses, I examined the variation in the number of Anglo hate groups in each state, making a total of fifty cases. I chose to use the state as my level of analysis because I wanted to look at the influence of anti-immigration politicians, which would be difficult to do at the county or city level.

To measure my dependent variable, I used the list of active hate groups in 2006 published in the Southern Poverty Law Center's *Intelligence Report* of spring 2007. SPLC's Intelligence Project (2007: 52) gathered the information on active hate groups "from hate group publications, citizen reports, law enforcement agencies, field sources and news reports." The SPLC (2007) considered hate groups to be "active" if they did any of the following: held marches, rallies, or meetings, gave speeches, published literature, distributed leaflets, and/or performed criminal

acts. Groups that appeared to only exist on the Internet were not included in the list. The categories of hate groups in the *Intelligence Report* include: the Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazis, White Nationalists, Racist Skinheads, Christian Identity, Neo-Confederates, Black Separatists*, and a General Hate section. The “General Hate” section is divided into subcategories including anti-gay, anti-immigrant, Holocaust denial, racist music, radical traditionalist Catholic, and finally, an “other” category.

The SPLC (2007) reported 756 active hate groups in 2006. Of these, 165 were Ku Klux Klan; 191 were Neo-Nazi; 110 were White Nationalist; 78 were Racist Skinhead; 37 were Christian Identity; 102 were Neo-Confederate, and 73 were general hate organizations. Within the “general hate” category, 6 were anti-gay; 12 were anti-immigrant; 5 were Holocaust denial; 14 were racist music; 13 were radical traditionalist Catholic, and 23 were “other”. Table 1 (below) shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in this analysis.

*Black Separatist groups were not included in this analysis because they differ greatly from white hate groups in ideology and reasons for formation.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analysis

VARIABLE	MEAN	S.D.
Dependent Variable		
Number of Hate Groups	15.04	13.8062
Independent Variables		
Anti-Immigration Politicians	0.1	0.3030
Percent Republican	53.078	8.5251
Percent Change Non-Anglo	854.8002	2090.061
Percent Undocumented	5.1953	10.0822
Percent Unemployed	4.884	1.0586
Percent in Poverty	12.698	3.2786
Manufacturing Jobs	-13.098	16.8719
Farms	-1.36	1.9976
Interaction Variables		
Percent Undocumented * Manuf. Jobs	-173.4462	544.7808
Percent Unemployed * Manuf. Jobs	-69.3672	94.6384
Control Variables		
Northeast	0.18	0.3881
Midwest	0.24	0.4314
West	0.26	0.4431

Notes: N = 50; Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000, 2004, 2005); SPLC (2007); *Washington Post* (2005); *New York Times* (2005).

According to McVeigh (2004: 913), “The SPLC’s lists of U.S. racist organizations are by far the most comprehensive available. Its outstanding reputation is well established, and the SPLC has been an excellent source of information for social scientists who study racist organizations.” That being said, however, there are some limitations to this data. Due to the secretive nature of most hate groups, the SPLC is unable to report on membership size or dates of group initiation, and may fail to document *all* existing hate groups in a given year. Finally, as McVeigh (2004) points out, SPLC’s decision to label certain groups as hate groups can vary from year to year. McVeigh (2004:913) notes: “For example, in the year 2000 the SPLC made a decision to add numerous chapters of a neo-Confederate organization called the League of the South to its list of hate groups. In previous years the SPLC was familiar with the organization but did not include it in its lists.” Although it is important to note its imperfections, the SPLC data will still help in determining what factors are contributing to the increase in hate groups in the U.S.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The following analysis includes seven independent, two interaction, and four control variables. Using McAdam’s (1982) political opportunity theory, my first independent variable, *Anti-Immigration Politicians*, is a measure of whether or not a state had at least one politician making anti-immigration comments in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* during 2005. To clarify the *Anti-Immigration Politicians* variable, I will discuss the content coding process I used to create it. First, I collected the names of each state’s two Senators and Governor during 2005 from the 109th Congress Picture Directory and the National Governors Association. Next, using the Audit Bureau Circulation’s list of the top 100 newspapers based on circulation, I selected the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. Although the *New York Times* was

ranked third and the *Washington Post* was ranked fifth in the U.S. according to circulation, they were the two highest ranking papers available in the Lexis Nexis database, which was ultimately why I chose them.

Next, I combined each politician's name with the word "immigration" in a Nexis Lexis search for articles from the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* in 2005. I then content coded all articles retrieved by this search on the basis of what the politician in the article was being quoted as saying or doing rather than the article content as a whole. Finally, I labeled each article as being one of the following: "positive/pro-immigration," "negative/anti-immigration," or "neutral".

I coded articles as positive/pro-immigration if they included quotes or actions from a politician that defended immigrants, claimed immigrants were good for the U.S. economy, supported aid for immigrants, advocated amnesty for illegal immigrants, etc. For example, an article in the *Washington Post* entitled, "The Right Immigration Reform" (30 July, 2005), discussed a bipartisan immigration reform proposal by Senators John McCain (R-Ariz) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), which would offer immigrants residing in the U.S. illegally a chance to become citizens. As the author of this article, Sanchez (30 July, 2005), writes:

The bill, introduced in May, is the only one that acknowledges the roots that many illegal immigrants have already put down in this country. The legislative proposal would encourage illegal immigrants to join a guest-worker program for up to six years by giving them the opportunity to obtain legal residence and start on the path to citizenship. Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.), one of the initial co-sponsors of the McCain-Kennedy bill on the House side, said that allowing for such permanent legalization must be part of the equation.

On the other hand, I coded an article as negative/anti-immigration if it included quotes or actions from a politician that related immigrants to criminals, expressed immigrants were depressing the U.S. economy, proposed increasing border security (especially by advocating civilian border patrols such as the Minutemen), refused to consider giving amnesty to illegal

immigrants, etc. For example, an article in the *New York Times* entitled, “Governors Say They Will Raze Border Town Used by Smugglers” (28 August, 2005), it was noted that:

The governors of New Mexico and its southern neighbor, the Mexican state Chihuahua, agreed Friday to bulldoze or board up buildings in a semi-abandoned town just inside Mexico that is a haven for would-be immigrants and smugglers. Gov. Bill Richardson [of New Mexico] and Gov. Jose Reyes Baeza of Chihuahua also said they hoped to establish a police presence to end lawlessness in the border town, Las Chepas, which has been used as a staging ground for migrants and drug and human smugglers.

This article also went on to discuss that Bill Richardson had just recently declared a state of emergency in the border areas of New Mexico because of the immigration “problem.” As this article demonstrates, it was fairly easy to determine whether or not a politician saw immigrants as a threat or problem to be dealt with.

Finally, I coded an article as neutral if a politician’s comments or actions were not overtly pro- or anti-immigration, or were more fact based. For example, all that was mentioned in a *New York Times* article by Bumiller and Lipton (19 October, 2005) about Senator Coburn was: “Senator Tom Coburn, Republican of Oklahoma, asked Mr. Chertoff how the administration could enforce the requirement that temporary workers leave after six years.” In this instance, Senator Coburn was part of the discussion of immigration reform, but his views on the issue were not made clear by this statement. Therefore, the article was coded as neutral.

In the *New York Times*, eleven politicians made pro-immigration statements in at least one article, fourteen politicians made anti-immigration statements in at least one article, and thirty eight politicians made neutral statements regarding immigration in at least one article. In the *Washington Post*, thirteen politicians made pro-immigration statements in at least one article, fifteen politicians made anti-immigration statements in at least one article, and thirty five politicians made neutral statements regarding immigration in at least one article. Combining both newspapers, therefore, there were a total of twenty three pro-immigration politicians,

twenty nine anti-immigration politicians, and seventy three “neutral” politicians. Overall, seventeen states had at least one politician that made an anti-immigration statement in at least one of the newspapers, and five states had at least one politician that made an anti-immigration statement in both newspapers in 2005.

Using ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967), my next two variables are measures of increasing immigration. The first variable, *Percent Change Non-Anglo*, is the percent change in the non-Anglo population of each state between 2000 and 2005. The data for this variable came from the U.S. Census (2005), and I created it by first subtracting the total white population from the total state population in both 2000 and 2005 to get the total non-Anglo population for each year per state. Then, I subtracted the non-Anglo population in 2000 from the 2005 non-Anglo population and divided that number by the non-Anglo population in 2000. Finally, I multiplied that number by 100 to create a percentage. The next independent variable, *Percent Undocumented*, is the estimated percent of the population per state that was undocumented in 2000. I collected the data for this variable from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2000), and then I created it by dividing the number of undocumented people per state by the total population plus the number of undocumented subjects. Then, I multiplied that number by 100 to create a percentage.

Also using ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967), the next four variables are measures of economic hardships. The first variable, *Percent Unemployed*, is the percent of a state’s population that was unemployed in 2005. The next independent variable, *Poverty*, is the percent of each state’s population that was at or below the poverty line in 2004. The data for both of these variables came from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004, 2005). The next variable, *Manufacturing Jobs*, measures the change in the number of manufacturing jobs between 2004

and 2005. I also collected this data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004, 2005), and then I created the variable by subtracting the number of manufacturing employees in 2004 from the number of manufacturing employees in 2005. Finally, the variable, *Farms*, measures the change in the number of farms between 2000 and 2005. I collected the data for this variable from the U.S. Census Bureau (2006), and then I created it by subtracting the number of farms in 2000 from the number of farms in 2005.

My first control variable, *Percent Republican*, is the percent of a state's population that voted Republican in the 2004 presidential election. I collected the data for this variable from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004). The final three control variables, *Northeast*, *Midwest*, and *West*, measure whether a state is in the Northeast, Midwest, or Western region of the United States, and are based on the U.S. Census region definitions (2008).

The two interaction variables included in the analysis examine how the relationship among certain variables may impact the number of hate groups in a state. The first interaction variable is *percent undocumented * manufacturing jobs*. The second interaction variable is *percent unemployed * manufacturing jobs*.

Table 2 (below) describes how each variable was measured and names its source. I also ran collinearity diagnostics to confirm that none my variables were highly correlated with each other, and it appeared that there should be no issues of multicollinearity in the analysis.

Table 2: Measurement and Data Sources of Variables

Variable	Measurement	Data Source
<i>Hate Groups, 2006</i>	Count Variable	Southern Poverty Law Center's <i>Intelligence Report</i> 2007.
<i>Anti-Immigration Politicians, 2005</i>	Dichotomous Variable: Coded 0 if State politicians made anti-immigration comments in one or fewer newspapers. Coded 1 if State politicians made anti-immigration comments in both the <i>New York Times</i> and the <i>Washington Post</i> .	Content coded all articles from a Lexis Nexis search of each State's Senators' names and each State's Governors' names along with the word "immigration" in 2005, in the <i>New York Times</i> and the <i>Washington Post</i> .
<i>Percent Republican, 2004</i>	Continuous Variable	U.S. Census Bureau Table entitled: <u>Popular Vote Cast for President by Political Party--States: 2000 and 2004</u>
<i>Percent Change Non-Anglo, 2000-2005</i>	Continuous variable. Created by first subtracting the total Anglo population from the total State population in both 2000 and 2005 to get the total non-Anglo population for each year per State. Then, subtracting the non-Anglo population in 2000 from the 2005 non-Anglo population and dividing that number by the non-Anglo population in 2000, and then multiplying that number by 100 to create a percentage.	U.S. Census Bureau Tables entitled: <u>Resident Population by Race, Hispanic or Latino Origin, and State: 2005</u> , and <u>Table A-5 States Population by Race and Hispanic Origin</u> .
<i>Percent Undocumented, 2000*</i>	Continuous Variable: Created by dividing the number of undocumented people per state by the total population plus the number of undocumented subjects. Then, multiplying that number by 100 to create a percentage.	U.S. Department of Homeland Security: <u>Table 1. Estimated Undocumented Resident Population, by State of Residence: 1990 and 2000</u>

<i>Percent Unemployed, 2005</i>	Continuous Variable	U.S. Census Bureau Table entitled: <u>Total Unemployed and Insured Unemployed by State: 1980 to 2005</u> . (Table 611)
<i>Poverty, 2004*</i>	Continuous Variable	U.S. Bureau of the Census Table entitled: <u>Individuals and Families Below Poverty Level--Number and Rate by State: 2000 and 2004</u> .
<i>Manufacturing Jobs, 2004-2005*</i>	Continuous Variable: Created by subtracting the number of manufacturing employees in 2004 from the number of manufacturing employees in 2005.	U.S. Bureau of the Census Tables entitled: <u>Manufacturing Establishments--Establishments, Employees, and Payroll by State: 2004</u> . (Table 971), and <u>Manufactures Summary by State: 2005</u> . (Table 973)
<i>Farms, 2000-2005</i>	Continuous Variable: Created by subtracting the number of farms in 2000 from the number of farms in 2005.	U.S. Bureau of the Census Table entitled: <u>Farms—Number and Acreage by State: 2000 and 2006</u> . (Table 803)
<i>Northeast</i>	Dichotomous Variable: Coded 0 if State is not in the NE, and 1 if State is in the NE. (Excluded/Comparison variable is <i>South</i> .)	U.S. Census Bureau: <u>Attachment C: Census Regions, Census Divisions, and Their Constituent States</u>
<i>Midwest</i>	Dichotomous Variable: Coded 0 if State is not in the MW, and 1 if State is in the MW. (Excluded/Comparison variable is <i>South</i> .)	U.S. Census Bureau: <u>Attachment C: Census Regions, Census Divisions, and Their Constituent States</u>
<i>West</i>	Dichotomous Variable: Coded 0 if State is not in the West, and 1 if State is in the West. (Excluded/Comparison variable is <i>South</i> .)	U.S. Census Bureau: <u>Attachment C: Census Regions, Census Divisions, and Their Constituent States</u>

*Data was either not available for 2005, or was not available for both 2000 and 2005 (for change over time variables).

ANALYSIS

The dependent variable in the analysis, *the number of hate groups per state*, is a count variable.

The number of hate groups per state is relatively small, with fifty percent of states having eleven or fewer hate groups, and roughly eight percent of states having no known hate groups. The mean of the variable is 14.823, and the variable ranges from 0 to 55 groups.

Given that the dependent variable is a non-negative count variable, I used negative binomial regression to estimate the models rather than ordinary least squares regression.

Negative binomial regression corrects for overdispersion, unlike the Poisson model which assumes that the variance is equal to the mean and that counts are independent (Greene 1995).

Overdispersion can result from unobserved heterogeneity, or the absence of an independent variable(s) that would significantly affect the dependent variable, and /or contagion, whereby events are not truly independent of one another. An assumption of independence with hate group counts would be somewhat unrealistic because the presence of one hate group in a state is likely to be dependent on, or to encourage, the presence of other hate groups in that state (McVeigh 2004; Van Dyke and Soule 2002).

RESULTS

Results for the analysis are presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3: The Effect of Anti-Immigration Politicians and Selected Independent Variables on the Number of Hate Groups in U.S. States, Using Negative Binomial Regression.

VARIABLE	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4 (Full Model)
Anti-Immigration Politicians	0.7661* (0.4302)	_____	_____	-0.0774 (0.3173)
Percent Republican	-0.0434** (0.0210)	_____	_____	0.0013 (0.0159)
Percent Change Non-Anglo	_____	0.0000 (0.0000)	_____	_____
Percent Undocumented	_____	0.0438*** (0.0128)	_____	0.0227* (0.0128)
Percent Unemployed	_____	_____	0.2346* (0.1218)	0.2310** (0.1057)
Percent in Poverty	_____	_____	-0.0482 (0.0482)	_____
Manufacturing Jobs	_____	_____	-0.0334*** (0.0066)	-0.0241** (0.0084)
Change in Farms	_____	_____	-0.0329 (0.0534)	_____
Northeast	-1.2643** (0.4665)	-0.9258 ** (0 .3328)	-0.9033** (0 .3474)	-0.6974* (0.3451)
Midwest	-0.7645** (0.3580)	-0.5926 * (0 .3012)	-0.9781*** (0 .3189)	-0.6928** (0.2594)
West	-1.1949*** (0.3433)	-1.1597*** (0 .3156)	-0.8456*** (0 .2702)	-0.8709*** (0.2589)
Constant	5.5051*** (1.2348)	2.8487*** (0.2079)	2.0137*** (0.6290)	1.2986 (1.1395)
Dispersion Parameter	0.7003 (0.1634)	0.5465 (0.1391)	0.3321 (0.1001)	0.3056 (0.0961)
Chi-Squared df	16.54 5	25.67 5	42.37 7	44.39 8

Notes: *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

One-Tailed Test

N = 50

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000, 2004, 2005); SPLC (2007); *Washington Post* (2005); *New York Times* (2005).

The results of Model 1 indicate that anti-immigration politicians are positively related to the number of hate groups in a state, which supports hypothesis 1. The coefficient for this variable is statistically significant in Model 1, and the presence of an anti-immigration politician is associated with 115.1% more hate groups. In Model 4, however, anti-immigration politicians are no longer significantly related to hate groups. The percent Republican in a state is also significantly related to the number of hate groups in Model 1, but in the opposite direction to which I thought. The results for this variable indicate that a one percent increase in the percent Republican is associated with 4.2% fewer hate groups. In Model 4, however, with the addition of other variables, the percent Republican is no longer statistically significant. The significant effect of both anti-immigration politicians and percent Republican disappeared with the addition of either the manufacturing jobs variable or the percent undocumented variable*, indicating spurious relationships.

In Model 2, the results show that the coefficient for the percent change of the non-Anglo population is in the expected positive direction, but is not significantly related to the number of hate groups. The percent of undocumented persons in a state, as hypothesized, is however positively related to the number of hate groups. The coefficient for this variable is statistically significant in Model 1, and a one percent increase in percent undocumented is associated with a 4.5% increase in hate groups. In Model 4, the percent of undocumented persons in a state remains statistically significant, and in the expected positive direction.

As hypothesized, Model 3 shows that the percent unemployed in a state is positively related to the number of hate groups. The coefficient for this variable is statistically significant, and a one percent increase in percent unemployed is associated with a 26.4% increase in hate

*To determine this, I ran models adding each of the independent variables one at a time to see which one(s) eliminated the significance of anti-immigration politicians and percent Republican.

groups. In Model 4, the percent unemployed remains significant and in the expected positive direction. The percent in poverty in a state, as shown in Model 3, however, is not significantly related to the number of hate groups.

Model 3 also shows that the change in the number of manufacturing jobs is statistically significant and in the expected negative direction. A one unit increase in the number of manufacturing jobs is associated with 3.3% fewer hate groups. This finding supports the hypothesis that states that gained, or have lost fewer, manufacturing jobs have less hate groups than states that have seen large losses in the manufacturing sector of their economy. This finding remains significant in Model 4 as well. However, the change in the number of farms in a state, as shown in Model 3, was not significantly related to the number of hate groups, although the coefficient was in the expected negative direction. The results for the change in the number of farms may differ from the findings of Van Dyke and Soule (2002) and McVeigh (1999) because this analysis looks at different years than those two studies.

Finally, the results of Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 all indicate that the Northeastern, Midwestern, and Western regions of the United States have significantly fewer hate groups than Southern states. Compared to the South, a state located in the Northeast is associated with 50.2% fewer hate groups, a state in the Midwest is associated with 50% fewer hate groups, and a state in the West is associated with 58.1% fewer hate groups.

The results for the effects of the interaction variables on the number of hate groups are presented in Table 4 below.

Table 4: The Effect of Interaction Variables on the Number of Hate Groups in U.S. States, Using Negative Binomial Regression.

VARIABLE	MODEL 1	MODEL 2
Percent Undocumented × Manuf. Jobs	0.0007** (0.0004)	_____
Percent Unemployed × Manuf. Jobs	_____	0.0168* (0.0086)
Percent Undocumented	0.0434** (0.0164)	0.0101 (0.0133)
Percent Unemployed	0.2244** (0.0981)	0.3899*** (0.1306)
Manufacturing Jobs	-0.0356*** (0.0101)	-0.1193** (0.0499)
Northeast	-0.6374** (0.2615)	-0.6836** (0.2627)
Midwest	-0.6520** (0.2341)	-0.5081* (0.2493)
West	-0.6686** (0.2610)	-0.7157** (0.2560)
Constant	1.1744** (0.5250)	0.4653 (0.7052)
Dispersion Parameter	0.2688 (0.0876)	0.2721 (0.0884)
Chi-Squared df	48.45 7	47.92 7

Notes: *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
One-Tailed Test
N = 50

As hypothesized, Table 4 shows that in states with higher undocumented populations, an increase in the number of manufacturing jobs is associated with having more hate groups. The

coefficient for the interaction between *percent undocumented* and *manufacturing jobs* is statistically significant, and a one unit increase in *percent undocumented*manufacturing jobs* is associated with a 0.1% increase in hate groups. In other words, even in states that have gained, or lost fewer, manufacturing jobs, a large undocumented population is associated with more hate groups.

Similarly, Table 4 shows that in states that had higher unemployment rates, an increase in manufacturing jobs is also associated with having more hate groups, as was hypothesized. The coefficient for *percent unemployed*manufacturing jobs* is statistically significant, and a one unit increase in *percent unemployed*manufacturing jobs* is associated with a 1.7% increase in hate groups. Again, even in states that have gained, or lost fewer, manufacturing jobs, higher levels of unemployment are associated with more hate groups.

Table 5 (below) helps to further clarify the interaction variable, *percent undocumented* manufacturing jobs*, by showing the predicted number of hate groups at varying levels of *percent undocumented* and *manufacturing jobs*.

Table 5: Predicted Number of Hate Groups at Varying Levels of the Percent of the Population that is Undocumented and Change in Manufacturing Jobs in U.S. States.

		<i>Manufacturing Jobs</i>	
		High Loss of Jobs	Lower Loss or Gained Jobs
<i>Percent Undocumented</i>	Low	16.3485	7.8547
	Average	25.2355	8.5100
	High	45.6380	20.2706

Note: A “Low” percent undocumented means between 0-1% of the population is undocumented; “Average” means between 1.1-15.27% of the population is undocumented; and “High” means that above 15.28% of the population is undocumented. For manufacturing jobs, a “High Loss of Jobs” is less than -13.098, and a “Lower Loss or Gained Jobs” is greater than -13.098.

As Table 5 shows, in states that gained, or lost fewer, manufacturing jobs, the higher the undocumented population, the larger the number of predicted hate groups. The table also illustrates that the predicted number of hate groups is the largest in states that have had a high loss of manufacturing jobs and have the highest undocumented populations (45.6). In line with ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967), this interaction may exist because Anglo workers might perceive increasing undocumented populations as a potential threat to their economic security, even if they are currently employed. Anglos working blue collar jobs may feel especially threatened by increasing undocumented populations, as the newcomers may be willing to do the same work for smaller wages (Olzak 1992). As the numbers indicate, the perceived threat of increasing undocumented populations taking jobs from Anglos is only enhanced by a decline in the number of manufacturing jobs available.

Table 6 (below) breaks down the second interaction variable, *percent unemployed* manufacturing jobs*, by showing the predicted number of hate groups across varying levels of *percent unemployed* and *manufacturing jobs*.

Table 6: Predicted Number of Hate Groups at Varying Levels of the Percent Unemployed and the Change in Manufacturing Jobs in U.S. States.

		<i>Manufacturing Jobs</i>	
		Lost Jobs	Gained Jobs
<i>Percent Unemployed</i>	Below Average	9.8882	X
	Average	18.0151	5.3835
	Above Average	24.6461	9.6881

Note: “Average” values fell between one standard deviation above and below the mean. “Below Average” values were less than one standard deviation below the mean, and “Above Average” values were greater than one standard deviation above the mean.

Similar to Table 5, Table 6 shows that the predicted number of hate groups increases as unemployment rates increase, even if there has been a gain in manufacturing jobs. Table 6 also demonstrates that states that have lost manufacturing jobs and have an above average percent unemployed are predicted to have the greatest number of hate groups (24.6). Also in line with ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967), this interaction may exist because high unemployment rates might make Anglos feel that their economic security is at risk, even if they are currently employed. In other words, high unemployment rates mean more competition for fewer jobs, making Anglos (and especially Anglos in blue collar professions) want to preserve the status quo. Therefore, a large decline in the number of manufacturing jobs coupled with high unemployment rates, enhances the threat (real or perceived) of economic insecurity for Anglos.

DISCUSSION

The results of this research contained both expected and unexpected findings. The analyses confirmed several of my hypotheses, including: 1) larger percentages of undocumented persons are associated with more hate groups; 2) higher unemployment rates are associated with more hate groups; 3) large losses of manufacturing jobs are associated with more hate groups; and 4) states in the Southern United States have more hate groups. The analyses also confirmed my hypotheses regarding the two interaction variables, *percent undocumented* manufacturing jobs* and *percent unemployed* manufacturing jobs*. In states that had either a high percentage of undocumented or unemployed people, a gain in manufacturing jobs was still associated with a higher number of hate groups.

To further clarify the effect of the main independent variables on the number of hate groups in a state, I will examine three states as examples: California, South Carolina, and

Oregon. California, the state with the greatest number of hate groups (55) in 2006, had all of the characteristics found to be significant in previous models. California had anti-immigration politicians, an above average percent unemployed and percent of undocumented people, and they lost manufacturing jobs. South Carolina also had a large number of hate groups (43) in 2006, but did not possess all of the characteristics found to be significant in my models. The high number of hate groups in South Carolina is most likely associated with its above average unemployment rate, loss of manufacturing jobs, and because it is a Southern state. Finally, Oregon had a relatively small number of hate groups (9) in 2006, and possessed only one of the characteristics found to be significantly associated with hate groups in my models; an above average unemployment rate. Other than the high unemployment rate, Oregon had seen a gain in manufacturing jobs, had a below average percentage of undocumented people, and did not have anti-immigration politicians, all characteristics the previous analyses would associate with a small number of hate groups. Overall, these examples demonstrate the strong association between a loss of manufacturing jobs, the percent of unemployed persons, and the percent of undocumented persons with higher numbers of hate groups in a state.

All of the significant findings in these analyses (aside from the regional differences) provide further support for ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967). Essentially, states that have large numbers of undocumented people, who the literature suggests are largely Hispanic (Hanson 2006; Potok of SPLC 2006), and are facing economic hardships (such as high unemployment rates and/or loss of manufacturing jobs) have the most hate groups. Under the current circumstances, it appears that Anglos perceive that their job opportunities are shrinking at the same time the population is growing—and specifically a sector of the population that has been stereotyped as willing to work for lower wages than most U.S. citizens. In other words, it

appears that it is this real or perceived threat of economic insecurity Anglos are facing that has resulted in the growth of hate groups.

Unexpectedly, one of my main hypotheses was not confirmed by the analyses. Although *anti-immigration politicians* was significant in Model 1 of Table 4, the addition of other variables made it non-significant, which implies a spurious relationship. In previous models not shown here, it appeared that adding either the variable *manufacturing jobs* or *percent undocumented* had this effect on both *anti-immigration politicians* and *percent Republican*. For example, it was not that having anti-immigration politicians led to more hate groups in a state, but that the states that had anti-immigration politicians lost more manufacturing jobs, which led to more hate groups. Similarly, it was not that states that had higher percentages of Republicans had fewer hate groups, but that those states gained, or lost fewer, manufacturing jobs, which was equated with a lower number of hate groups. The same situation occurred with *percent undocumented*, as it was not anti-immigration politicians or percent Republican that led to more hate groups, but having higher percentages of undocumented people. It appears, therefore, that my analyses did not support McAdam's (1982) political opportunity theory. Perhaps the long history of white supremacists' mistrust of the government restrains these groups from forming extremely close ties with politicians, even if some politicians share in hate group ideology.

CONCLUSION

This study provides important information about the effects of the increasing number of undocumented immigrants, economic hardships, and regional differences on the formation of hate groups in the United States. According to my findings, hate groups are most likely to form in states that are experiencing economic hardships (i.e. high unemployment rates and loss of

manufacturing jobs), and/or have large undocumented populations. Southern states are also more likely than states in any other region of the U.S. to have greater numbers of hate groups. These findings support ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967), and contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, the results demonstrate that a positive relationship does exist between the increasing immigration of undocumented persons and hate group formation in the U.S. Second, the results indicate that the condition of state economies, and especially the manufacturing sector of those economies, is deeply entwined with hate group formation.

These findings also provide important policy implications. Most importantly, the results indicate a need to decrease unemployment rates in the U.S. As unemployment rates rise, and huge sectors of the economy (like manufacturing) are being moved overseas (Hagenbaugh 2002), many U.S. citizens are facing economic instability. The threat of economic instability, as demonstrated by my findings, is then associated with the additional problem of increasing numbers of hate groups. Once the economy is improved, it is likely that the issue of increasing immigration (both authorized and unauthorized) in the U.S. will not seem as threatening to the majority of Anglo citizens. When there are plenty of decent jobs in the country, Anglo citizens will not have to fear that their livelihoods may be threatened by immigrants entering the country to work.

While my results confirm that hate groups are associated with economic hardships, future research should attempt to examine if there are other sectors of the economy that are associated with more hate groups. Future research should also continue to examine the effect of increasing immigration on hate group formation, utilizing more current data on both documented and undocumented populations as it becomes available. A future study could also analyze the effect

of immigration on hate group formation at the county level, when/if county level data on both documented and undocumented immigrants is made available. Studies examining media coverage of immigration within the U.S. may also shed more light on whether many Anglos are responding negatively to immigration primarily because of perceived economic competition or due to racial differences.

This study has identified several important reasons why hate groups have been increasing in the United States, and continued research has the potential of expanding our knowledge on this topic. Understanding hate group formation in the United States is crucial for influencing policy and finding solutions to curb the growth of these groups, the violence committed by these groups, and the racist ideologies they spread.

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